WPCR 2BBcR Z3#|["m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<;o;rfolWSGrfffZAeAe8.888888888888f>fffff]````J>J>J>J>rffffrrrrxffoffxffofff]]]]o````ffffffrrJ>J>J>J>lox;x;x;x;x;rrrrffWWWoSoSoSoSxGxGxGrrrrrrxfoZoZoZox;rWoSxGxfxfofrNe.}S1SSS```==`9}}`9(PPS88SSrr(P9ee\\w.e77\\\wwweeeCe.wR)EreewwwwIeenR\\\wwwxio\eEfRfIfRxe|W87y\r\rxWlRx\\]\ceIfIs`Wx\rriIe77\``rigewiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiIIIIIIIeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee777777777777\\\\\\\````````````rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrxfx8xs8s\"X^FJa3SS}FSFFFFofSS}3o}SOJO}otaxSSSFSS*SSSSSSSSSSOo}}}}fOfOfOfO}}}}}}}oooo}}}}fOfOfOfOOOOOO}}ooottttaaaxxxOota}NF}JokkTKSS3aaAA}}3aSF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS2K#~c"c c"X^HJS<aa}FSFFFF}oaa}<a]XX}kaaSFSS*SSSSSSSSSS]o]o]o]o]o]o]o]o]XXXXX}}}}kkkX}kNF}J}}}\\VV<xx}SS}}<xVF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXgn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^3=Iff%==\o3=3offffffffff33oooQzKpzzz~~z=o=o\%ifQpQ=bp=:f=p\ifQQAp_\\U=o=o=3============f=iiiiiQQQQQK=K=K=K=p\\\\pppp~\ip\\~\\ziiiiQQQQpQQQQbbbbbbppK=K=K=K=pfz=z=z=z=z=pppp\\QQQzQzQzQzQ~A~A~Apppppp~\zUzUzUpz=pQzQ~A~\~\p\pNo3w\=QNNfffMDf=f=3GG\==\\pp%G=ooee3o<cC"X^?S}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}SS}a}SFS}S}ooS}FSF}oaS}}}oc7cS?SS*SSSSSSSSSSF}}}}}oooooaFaFaFaF}}}}}}}}}}}}}oooooooo}}}}}}aFaFaFaF}FFFFF}}oooaaaaSSS}oooFoaS}}}NX?}S}}}}}}KS}K}KF}}}SS}}S}KF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^#22KI-72222222222777(BAAAFAHYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>1&s)o=3no P['C&P &p%e8.|e P['CP&r8SF> P['CPdq:SHvX pTCdo'l80lX pTCnDS?3s\  PCPlDS??皝4  p(AC&yu![2*d[ P['CP uu![2*P[e xzCX&r!Y1)LY P['CP x)o=3no P['C&P z)o=3PRoe xzC&X&\UC%D4C P['CJP&YF66 P['CP&[G' ԦGG P['C^P'"m^ #-AAa_'':G ' AAAAAAAAAA GGG4VTTT[TN[a/A[Nn_[N[TJN_TrRRG'G'G:AA4C:'?G%#E%hG:CA46-G?[??8'G'G' ''u''''''''''C%TATATATATAu]T4T:T:T:T:/%/%/%/%_G[:[:[:[:_G_G_G_GR?TA[C[:[:R?[:NCTATATAT4T4T4T4[CT:T:T:T:[?[?[?[?[?[?aGaG/%/%/%/%A[EN%N%N%N%N%_G_G_G_G[:[:uaT4T4T4J6J6J6J6N-N-N-_G_G_G_G_G_Gr[R?G8G8G8[CN%_GT4J6N-R?R?[C[:_GNG G:#422AAA'#aaA'VVAa'--Au::uGGu-u'GG@@S G&&@@@SZSSGssFFz/G `S:0P]sssFFzZSSSS3`ZZZFFM:@e@@SSSTJN@F0G:G3G:TFV='&T@P@hGT=K:T@Z@A@EF3G3QCY=T@]PZPJ3F&&@CCPJHFSJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ3333333FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF&&&&&&&&&&&&@@@@@@@CCCCCCCCCCCCPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPTGT'TQZ'Q@24MsxGHo}IHJOpin InitInitial Opinion codesdpЊ #  ( (    П I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@BQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote - Circv C   (  Cd  ( ( ( FTNFormats for each footnote,  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); United States v. Nixon,  uB 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). But in this case there is no suggestion that the Federal Judiciary is being asked to perform any function that might in some way be described as executive. Respondent is merely asking the courts to exercise their core Article III jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies. Whatever the outcome of this case, there is no possibility that the decision will curtail the scope of the official powers of the Executive Branch. The litigation of questions that relate entirely to the unofficial conduct of the individual who happens to be the President poses no perceptible risk of misallocation of either judicial power or executive power.  Rather than arguing that the decision of the case will produce either an aggrandizement of judicial power or a narrowing of executive power, petitioner contends that"as a byproduct of an otherwise traditional exercise of judicial power"burdens will be placed on the President that will hamper the performance of his official duties. We have recognized that [e]ven when a branch does not arrogate power to itself ... the separationofpowers doctrine requires that a branch not imh #"  Ԯpair another in the performance of its constitutional  J duties. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. ___, ___  J (1996) (slip op., at 8); see also Nixon v. Administrator of  J General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). As a factual matter, petitioner contends that this particular case"as well as the potential additional litigation that an affirmance of the Court of Appeals judgment might spawn"may impose an unacceptable burden on the President's time and energy, and thereby impair the effective performance of his office.  Petitioner's predictive judgment finds little support in either history or the relatively narrow compass of the issues raised in this particular case. As we have already noted, in the more than 200year history of the Republic, only three sitting Presidents have been sub J jected to suits for their private actions.$K  uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < In Fitzgerald, we were able to discount the lack of historical support for the proposition that officialcapacity actions against the President posed a serious threat to the office on the ground that a right to sue federal officials for damages as a result of constitutional  uB violations had only recently been recognized. See Fitzgerald, 457  uB U.S., at 753, n. 33; Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The situation with respect to suits against the President for actions taken in his private capacity is quite different because such suits may be grounded on legal theories that have always been applicable to any potential defendant. Moreover, because the President has contact with far fewer people in his private life than in his official capacity, the class of potential plaintiffs is considerably smaller and the risk of litigation less intense. See supra, at  J 9!10. If the past is any indicator, it seems unlikely that a deluge of such litigation will ever engulf the Presidency. As for the case at hand, if properly managed by the District Court, it appears to us highly unlikely to occupy any substantial amount of petitioner's time.  Of greater significance, petitioner errs by presuming that interactions between the Judicial Branch and theh $"   Executive, even quite burdensome interactions, necessarily rise to the level of constitutionally forbidden impairment of the Executive's ability to perform its constitutionally mandated functions. [O]ur ... system imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence the absence of which `would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.' !   J ԚMistretta, 488 U.S., at 381 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S., at 121). As Madison explained, separation of powers does not mean that the branches ought to have no  JH partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each  J other.G%%  uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325!326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (empha uB? sis in original). See Mistretta, 488 U.S., at 381; Nixon v. Adminis uB trator of General Services, 433 U.S., at 442, n. 5.G The fact that a federal court's exercise of its traditional Article III jurisdiction may significantly burden the time and attention of the Chief Executive is not sufficient to establish a violation of the Constitution. Two longsettled propositions, first announced by Chief Justice Marshall, support that conclusion.  First, we have long held that when the President takes official action, the Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted within the law. Perhaps the most dramatic example of such a case is our holding that President Truman exceeded his constitutional authority when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation's steel mills in order to avert a  J national catastrophe. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.  J Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Despite the serious impact of that decision on the ability of the Executive Branch to accomplish its assigned mission, and the substantial time that the President must necessarily have devoted to the matter as a result of judicial involvement, we exercised our Article III jurisdiction to%"   decide whether his official conduct conformed to the law. Our holding was an application of the principle estab J lished in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), that [i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the  J` judicial department to say what the law is. Id., at 177.  Second, it is also settled that the President is subject to judicial process in appropriate circumstances. Although Thomas Jefferson apparently thought otherwise, Chief Justice Marshall, when presiding in the treason  Jp trial of Aaron Burr, ruled thata subpoena duces tecum  JH could be directed to the President. United States v.  J Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (No.14,692d) (CC Va. 1807).&  uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < After the decision was rendered, Jefferson expressed his distress in a letter to a prosecutor at the trial, noting that [t]he Constitution enjoins [the President's] constant agency in the concerns of 6. millions of people. 10 Works of Thomas Jefferson 404, n. (P. Ford ed. 1905). He asked, [i]s the law paramount to this, which calls on  uB him on behalf of a single one? Ibid.; see also Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 751!752, n.31 (quoting Jefferson's comments at length). For Chief Justice Marshall, the answer"quite plainly"was yes. We unequivocally and emphatically endorsed Marshall's position when we held that President Nixon was obligated to comply with a subpoena commanding him to produce certain tape recordings of his conversations with  JX his aides. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). As we explained, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of highlevel communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from  J judicial process under all circumstances. Id., at 706.'JJH uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < Of course, it does not follow that a court may  ! `proceed against  uBg the president as against an ordinary individual,' 5!  United States v.  uB Nixon, 418 U.S., at 715 (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 192 (No.14,692d) (CC Va. 1807)). Special caution is appropriate if the materials or testimony sought by the court relate to a President's official activities, with respect to which [t]he interest inC&"## preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed and entitled to great respect. 418 U.S., at 712. We have made clear that in a criminal case the powerful interest in the fair administration of criminal justice requires that the evidence be given under appropriate circumstances lest the very integrity of the judicial system be  uB# eroded. Id., at 709, 711!712.'"  Ԍ Sitting Presidents have responded to court orders to provide testimony and other information with sufficient frequency that such interactions between the Judicial and Executive Branches can scarcely be thought a novelty. President Monroe responded to written interrogatories, see Rotunda, Presidents and ExPresidents as Witnesses: A Brief Historical Footnote, 1975 U. Ill. L.F. 1, 5!6, President Nixon"as noted above"produced  J tapes in response to a subpoena duces tecum, see United  J States v. Nixon, President Ford complied with an order  Jp to give a deposition in a criminal trial, United States v.  JH Fromme, 405 F.Supp. 578 (ED Cal. 1975), and President Clinton has twice given videotaped testimony in  J criminal proceedings, see United States v. McDougal,  J 934 F.Supp. 296 (ED Ark. 1996); United States v.  J ԚBranscum, No., LRP!CR!96!49 (ED Ark., June 7, 1996). Moreover, sitting Presidents have also voluntarily complied with judicial requests for testimony. President Grant gave a lengthy deposition in a criminal case under such circumstances, R. Rotunda & J. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law 7.1 (2d ed. 1992), and President Carter similarly gave videotaped testimony for  J use at a criminal trial, ibid.  In sum, [i]t is settled law that the separationofpowers doctrine does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction  J over the President of the United States. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 753!754. If the Judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President's official conduct, and if it may direct appropriate process to the President himself, it mustx'"   follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of his unofficial conduct. The burden on the President's time and energy that is a mere byproduct of such review surely cannot be considered as onerous as the direct burden imposed by judicial review and the  J8 occasional invalidation of his official actions.(8 uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < There is, no doubt, some truth to Learned Hand's comment that a lawsuit should be dread[ed] ... beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death. 3 Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Lectures on Legal Topics 105 (1926). We recognize that a President, like any other official or private citizen, may become distracted or preoccupied by pending litigation. Presidents and other officials face a variety of demands on their time, however, some private, some political, and some as a result of official duty. While such distractions may be vexing to those subjected to them, they do not ordinarily implicate constitutional separation of powers concerns. We therefore hold that the doctrine of separation of powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office.  The reasons for rejecting such a categorical rule apply as well to a rule that would require a stay in all but the most exceptional cases. Brief for Petitioner i. Indeed, if the Framers of the Constitution had thought it necessary to protect the President from the burdens of private litigation, we think it far more likely that they would have adopted a categorical rule than a rule that required the President to litigate the question whether a specific case belonged in the exceptional case subcategory. In all events, the question whether a specific case should receive exceptional treatment is more appropriately the subject of the exercise of judicial discretion than an interpretation of the Constitution. Accordingly, we turn to the question whether the District Court's decision to stay the trial until after petitioner leaves office was an abuse of discretion.  9H1 dm ("  Ԍd\7VII؃  2  The Court of Appeals described the District Court's discretionary decision to stay the trial as the functional equivalent of a grant of temporary immunity. 72 F. 3d, at 1361, n. 9. Concluding that petitioner was not constitutionally entitled to such an immunity, the court  JB held that it was error to grant the stay. Ibid. Although we ultimately conclude that the stay should not have been granted, we think the issue is more difficult than the opinion of the Court of Appeals suggests.  Strictly speaking the stay was not the functional equivalent of the constitutional immunity that petitioner claimed, because the District Court ordered discovery to proceed. Moreover, a stay of either the trial or discovery might be justified by considerations that do not require the recognition of any constitutional immunity. The District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket.  Jb See, e.g., Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). As we have explained, [e]specially in cases of extraordinary public moment, [a plaintiff] may be required to submit to delay not immoderate in extent and not oppressive in its consequences if the public  J welfare or convenience will thereby be promoted. Id., at 256. Although we have rejected the argument that the potential burdens on the President violate separation of powers principles, those burdens are appropriate matters for the District Court to evaluate in its management of the case. The high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief Executive, though not justifying a rule of categorical immunity, is a matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including  J2 the timing and scope of discovery.)np 2 uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < Although these claims are in fact analytically distinct, the District Court does not appear to have drawn that distinction. Q("## Rather than basing its decision on particular factual findings that might have buttressed an exercise of discretion, the District Court instead suggested that a discretionary stay was supported by the  uB legal conclusion that such a stay was required by Fitzgerald. See 869 F.Supp., at 699. We therefore reject petitioner's argument that we lack jurisdiction over respondent's crossappeal from the District Court's alternative holding that its decision was also permitted,  uB inter alia, under the equity powers of the Court. Ibid. The Court of Appeals correctly found that pendant appellate jurisdiction over this issue was proper. See 72 F. 3d, at 1357, n. 4. The District Court's legal ruling that the President was protected by a temporary immunity from trial"but not discovery"was inextricably inter uB$ twined, Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995), with its suggestion that a discretionary stay having the same effect might be proper; indeed, review of the [latter] decision [is]  uBI necessary to ensure meaningful review of the [former], ibid.į2 )"  Ԍ Nevertheless, we are persuaded that it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to defer the trial until after the President leaves office. Such a lengthy and categorical stay takes no account whatever of the respondent's interest in bringing the case to trial. The complaint was filed within the statutory limitations period"albeit near the end of that period"and delaying trial would increase the danger of prejudice resulting from the loss of evidence, including the inability of witnesses to recall specific facts, or the possible death of a party.   The decision to postpone the trial was, furthermore, premature. The proponent of a stay bears the burden  J of establishing its need. Id., at 255. In this case, at the stage at which the District Court made its ruling, there was no way to assess whether a stay of trial after the completion of discovery would be warranted. Other than the fact that a trial may consume some of the President's time and attention, there is nothing in the record to enable a judge to assess the potential harm that may ensue from scheduling the trial promptly after discovery is concluded. We think the District Court )"   may have given undue weight to the concern that a trial might generate unrelated civil actions that could conceivably hamper the President in conducting the duties of his office. If and when that should occur, the court's discretion would permit it to manage those actions in such fashion (including deferral of trial) that interference with the President's duties would not occur. But no such impingement upon the President's conduct of his office was shown here.  9H1 d d66VIII؃  2  We add a final comment on two matters that are discussed at length in the briefs: the risk that our decision will generate a large volume of politically motivated harassing and frivolous litigation, and the danger that national security concerns might prevent the President from explaining a legitimate need for a continuance.  We are not persuaded that either of these risks is serious. Most frivolous and vexatious litigation is terminated at the pleading stage or on summary judgment, with little if any personal involvement by the defendant. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12, 56. Moreover, the availability of sanctions provides a significant deterrent to litigation directed at the President in his unofficial  J capacity for purposes of political gain or harassment.* uB> ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < See, e.g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11; 28 U.S.C. 1927; Chambers  uB v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (noting that if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power in imposing appropriate sanctions). Those sanctions may be set at a level sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11(c)(2). As Rule 11 indicates, sanctions may be appropriate where a claim is presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, including any claim based on allegations and other factual contentions [lacking] evidentiary support or unlikely to prove wellgroundedd)"## after reasonable investigation. Rules 11(b)(1), (3). G*"   History indicates that the likelihood that a significant number of such cases will be filed is remote. Although scheduling problems may arise, there is no reason to assume that the District Courts will be either unable to accommodate the President's needs or unfaithful to the tradition"especially in matters involving national security"of giving the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities.+GZI uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 710!711; see also Fitzger uBj ald, 457 U.S., at 753 ( Courts traditionally have recognized the President's constitutional responsibilities and status as factors  uB counseling judicial deference and restraint). FTN    XFrXFr ff ۶ Several Presidents, including petitioner, have given testimony without jeopardizing the Nation's security. See supra, at 23. In short, we have confidence in the ability of our federal judges to deal with both of these concerns.  If Congress deems it appropriate to afford the President stronger protection, it may respond with appropriate legislation. As petitioner notes in his brief, Congress has enacted more than one statute providing for the deferral of civil litigation to accommodate important public interests. Brief for Petitioner 34!36.  FTN  B XFrXFr ff See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 362 (litigation against debtor stayed upon filing of bankruptcy petition); Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. App. 501!525 (provisions governing, inter alia, tolling or stay of civil claims by or against military personnel during course of active duty). If the Constitution embodied the rule that the President advocates, Congress, of course, could not repeal it. But our holding today raises no barrier to a statutory response to these concerns.  The Federal District Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. Like every other citizen who properly invokes that jurisdiction, respondent has a right to an orderly disposition of her claims. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. ` BIt is so ordered.ă