WPC? 2aBcR ZR3|o"m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<c"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"X^?Sf}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}FFoSaSFSu}So}o}oS}}FF}F}}}}SaF}}}}ox2xS?SS*SSSSSSSSSS}FooooooooooSFSFSFSF}}}}}}}}}}o}}}}}}ooooooo}oooo}}}}}}}}SFSFSFSFa}FFFFF}}}}}}SSSaaaaFFF}}}}}}}ooo}F}SaF}}}}}NX?q}So}}}}}EN}K}K-oo}SS}}SoKF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"X^?S}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}SS}a}SFS}S}ooS}FSF}oaS}}}oc7cS?SS*SSSSSSSSSSF}}}}}oooooaFaFaFaF}}}}}}}}}}}}}oooooooo}}}}}}aFaFaFaF}FFFFF}}oooaaaaSSS}oooFoaS}}}NX?}S}}}}}}KS}K}KF}}}SS}}S}KF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS2"cpcc6c"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^3=Iff%==\o3=3offffffffff33oooQzKpzzz~~z=o=o\%ifQpQ=bp=:f=p\ifQQAp_\\U=o=o=3============f=iiiiiQQQQQK=K=K=K=p\\\\pppp~\ip\\~\\ziiiiQQQQpQQQQbbbbbbppK=K=K=K=pfz=z=z=z=z=pppp\\QQQzQzQzQzQ~A~A~Apppppp~\zUzUzUpz=pQzQ~A~\~\p\pNo3w\=QNNfffMDf=f=3GG\==\\pp%G=ooee3o<>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXHYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>1Opin InitInitial Opinion codesdpЊ #  ( (    П I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@BQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote - Circv C   (  Cd  ( ( ( 271o+,H-/ 0FTNFormats for each footnote,  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:Ti1 c3^ 7 c~;Final OtherFinal form, Not an OPINION (96)Vu #  ` `  #\  PCsP#   dd_P  <   SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES * ` ` ( ( *(  _Pdd #[ P['CdP# I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)"m^!$/CCdb((gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkklWdPZH\I\I\IlWoY2(mWgRklWaMlWs\SCYG\IhSr\lWw_s\_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR2????dOpin InitЊ #  ( (    П I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@VFinal Other ##  ( ( ` `  #\  PCsP#   dd_P  <   SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  uBn * ` ` ( ( *(  _Pdd #[ P['CdP# I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)-#[ P['CdP# ( ( , , ) (9 %C No. 94!1988 ) !   J [ #o P['Cn&P# ddh %mb uB  ddh < #[ P['CdP#&94!1988"DISSENT  uBn  CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA v. HARRISON%nb uB  ddh < #[ P['CdP#&94!1988"DISSENT  uBn  CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA v. HARRISON`B؃ C CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA, INC., PETI J  ԚTIONER v. TOWN OF HARRISON,  J '8MAINE, et al.   hhx  on writ of certiorari to the supreme judicial &court of maine & hxf #[ P['CdP# d [May 19, 1997] -,   #o P['Cn&P#  J &Footnotes#[ P['CdP# ff X01Í Í01Í Í , , #o P['Cn&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: domestic nonprofit corporations. WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117, 120 (1968). The Court's analysis contradicts both the  uB holding of this case and its reading of Board of Education"which is obviously the correct one.   J  It is true that the opinion in Board of Education addressed only the Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and J"   not the Commerce Clause. A commerceclause argument was unquestionably raised by the plaintiff in error, however, in both brief, see Brief for Plaintiff in Error, D.T. 1906, No.103, pp.30!38, and oral argument, see 203 U.S., at 555 (argument of counsel), and the Court could not have reached the disposition it did without rejecting it. [T]he Court implicitly rejected [the]  J argumen[t] ... by refusing to address [it]. Clemons v.  J Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 747!748, n.3 (1990). The Commerce Clause objection went undiscussed, I think, because it was (as it is here) utterly contrived: the State's legislated distinction between charity bestowed within her borders and for her people and charity bestowed elsewhere or for others did not implicate commerce at all, except to the indirect and permissible extent that innumerable state laws do.  Finally, even if Maine's property tax exemption for local charities constituted facial discrimination against outofstate commerce, and even if its policy justification (unrelated to economic protectionism) were insufficient  J to survive our virtually per se rule of invalidity, cf.  J Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), there would remain the question whether we should not recognize an additional exception to the negative Commerce Clause,  J@ as we have in Tracy. As that case explains, just as a public health justification unrelated to economic protectionism may justify an overt discrimination against goods moving in interstate commerce, so may health and safety considerations be weighed in the process of deciding the threshold question whether the conditions entailing application of the dormant Commerce Clause are present. ___ U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 28). Today's opinion goes to great length to reject the Town's contention that Maine's property tax exemption does not fall squarely within either the market participant or subsidy exceptions to the negative Commerce Clause, but never stops to ask whether those exceptions are the` "   only ones that may apply. As we explicitly acknowledge  J in Tracy"which effectively creates what might be called a public utilities exception to the negative Commerce Clause"the subsidy and market participant exceptions do not exhaust the realm of state actions that we should abstain from scrutinizing under the Commerce Clause. In my view, the provision by a State of free public schooling, public assistance, and other forms of social welfare to only (or principally) its own residents"whether it be accomplished directly or by providing tax exemptions, cash or other property to private organizations that perform the work for the State"implicates none of the concerns underlying our negativecommerceclause jurisprudence. That is, I think, selfevidently true, despite the Court's effort to label the recipients of the State's philanthropy as cus J tomers, or clientele, see, e.g., ante, at 10. Because 652(1)(A) clearly serves these purposes and has nothing to do with economic protectionism, I believe that it is beyond scrutiny under the negative Commerce Clause.  3 Stars (***   3 Stars As I have discussed, there are various routes by which the Court could validate the statute at issue here: on the ground that it does not constitute facial discrimination against interstate commerce and readily survives  J the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test; on the ground that it does constitute facial discrimination but is supported by such traditional and important state interests that it survives scrutiny under the virtually  J. per se rule of invalidity; or on the ground that there is a domestic charity exception (just as there is a public utility exception) to the negative Commerce Clause. Whichever route is selected, it seems to me that the  J quid pro quo exemption at issue here is such a reasonable exercise of the State's taxing power that it is not prohibited by the Commerce Clause in the absence of>"    J congressional action. We held as much in Board of  J Education, and should not overrule that decision.  The State of Maine may have special need for a charitableexemption limitation of the sort at issue here: its lands and lakes are attractive to various charities of more densely populated Eastern States, which would (if the limitation did not exist) compel the taxpayers of Maine to subsidize their generosity. But the principle involved in our disapproval of Maine's exemption limitation has broad application elsewhere. A State will be unable, for example, to exempt private schools that serve its citizens from State and local real estate taxes unless it exempts as well private schools attended predominantly or entirely by students from outofstate. A State that provides a tax exemption for real property used exclusively for the purpose of feeding the poor must provide an exemption for the facilities of an organization devoted exclusively to feeding the poor in another country. These results may well be in accord with the parable of the Good Samaritan, but they have nothing to do with the Commerce Clause.  I respectfully dissent.