(Bench Opinion)

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 95–1873

GUY E. ADAMS, et al., PETITIONERS v. CHARLIE FRANK ROBERTSON and LIBERTY NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of alabama

[March 3, 1997]

Per Curiam.

We granted a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama to decide whether the Alabama courts' approval of the class action and the settlement agreement in this case, without affording all class members the right to exclude themselves from the class or the agreement, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Alabama Supreme Court did not address this federal issue, and it is now apparent that petitioners have failed to establish that they properly presented the issue to that court. We therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.

In 1992, respondent Charlie Frank Robertson filed a class action suit in an Alabama trial court, alleging that Liberty National Life Insurance Company had fraudulently encouraged its customers to exchange existing health insurance policies for new policies that, according to Robertson, provided less coverage for cancer treatment. The trial court appointed Robertson as class representative and certified the class pursuant to provisions of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure that do not give class members the right to exclude themselves from a class. See 676 So. 2d 1265, 1268, 1270 (Ala. 1995); App. 90. The trial court then approved a settlement agreement that precluded class members from individually suing Liberty National for fraud based on its insurance policy exchange program. See 676 So. 2d, at 1270–71; App. 158–159.

Petitioners, who had objected to the settlement in the trial court, appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion addressing only state law issues, see 676 So. 2d, at 1270–1274, and petitioners sought a writ of certiorari. We granted certiorari on the question whether the certification and settlement of this class action suit (which petitioners characterize as primarily involving claims for monetary relief) violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the class members were not afforded the right to opt out of the class or the settlement.

With "very rare exceptions," Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 533 (1992), we have adhered to the rule in reviewing state court judgments under 28 U. S. C. §1257 that we will not consider a petitioner's federal claim unless it was either addressed by, or properly presented to, the state court that rendered the decision we have been asked to review. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U. S. 82, 87 (1985); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 217–219 (1983); McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 309 U. S. 430, 434 (1940). As petitioners concede here, the Alabama Supreme Court did not expressly address the question on which we granted certiorari. See Reply Brief for Petitioners 2–3, n. 1.

Nor have petitioners met their burden of showing that the issue was properly presented to that court. When the highest state court is silent on a federal question before us, we assume that the issue was not properly presented, Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U. S. 537, 550 (1987), and the aggrieved party bears the burden of defeating this assumption, ibid., by demonstrating that the state court had "a fair opportunity to address the federal question that is sought to be presented here," Webb v. Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 501 (1981). We have described in different ways how a petitioner may satisfy this requirement. See Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 583–585 (1969). In some cases, we have focused on the need for petitioners either to establish that the claim was raised "`at the time and in the manner required by the state law,'" Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U. S. 71, 77–78 (1988) (quoting Webb, supra, at 501)), see, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 181, n. 3 (1983); Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 549–554 (1962), or to persuade us that the state procedural requirements could not serve as an independent and adequate state law ground for the state court's judgment, see, e.g., Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U. S. 255, 262–265 (1982). In other cases, we have described a petitioner's burden as involving the need to demonstrate that it presented the particular claim at issue here with "fair precision and in due time," New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 67 (1928); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 85, n. 9 (1980). See generally, 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4022, pp. 322–339 (1996).

But however we phrase our requirements, petitioners here have failed to satisfy them. Petitioners have done nothing to demonstrate that they complied with the applicable state rules for raising their federal due process claim before the Alabama Supreme Court, or to explain why the failure to comply with those rules would not be an adequate and independent ground for the state court to disregard that claim.

Neither have petitioners satisfied us that they presented their federal claim with "fair precision and in due time." They argue that they raised their federal due process claim in their initial brief before the Alabama Supreme Court, and point to two pages of that brief discussing Brown v. Ticor, 982 F. 2d 386 (CA9 1992), cert. dism'd as improvidently granted, 511 U. S. 117 (1994). Although Ticor is relevant to the federal claim they present here, see id., at 392, they mentioned the case below in the context of an entirely different argument that the right to a jury trial under §11 of the Alabama Constitution gives a plaintiff the right to opt out of a class action settlement agreement. The discussion of "a federal case, in the midst of an unrelated argument, is insufficient to inform a state court that it has been presented with a claim." Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, supra, at 550, n. 9.

Equally unavailing is petitioners' reliance on three other pages of their Alabama Supreme Court brief. Although that portion begins with a heading asserting that "[m]inimum due process requires that Class Members be given the right to opt out or exclude themselves from the class," see Brief for Appellants in No. 1931603 et al. (Sup. Ct. Ala.), p. 23, the discussion under that heading addresses only whether members of the class who were not Alabama residents had been afforded due process under Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797 (1985). We therefore think that a court may fairly have read this section as arguing, as had the petitioner in Shutts, id., at 802, that the state court lacked personal jurisdiction over out-of-state class members, not the different and broader question of whether, if a state court has jurisdiction over the plaintiffs, due process requires that all class members have the right to opt out of the class and settlement agreement.

Nor are petitioners helped by the fact that respondents addressed the federal due process issue raised here in their briefs as appellees in the Alabama State Court. Petitioners failed to address respondents' federal due process arguments in their reply brief in the state Supreme Court and, instead, described "[t]he pivotal issue in this case" as the right to a jury trial under the Alabama Constitution. Reply Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1931603 et al. (Sup. Ct. Ala.), pp. 1–5. In these circumstances, it would have been perfectly reasonable for a state court to conclude that the broader federal claim was not before it.

Petitioners having thus failed to carry their burden of showing that the claim they raise here was properly presented to the Alabama Supreme Court, we will not reach the question presented. We need not decide in this case whether our requirement that a federal claim be addressed or properly presented in state court is jurisdictional or prudential, see Yee, 503 U. S., at 533; Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 468 U. S., at 79; Gates, 462 U. S., at 217–219, because even treating the rule as purely prudential, the circumstances here justify no exception.

The rule serves an important interest of comity. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., supra, at 79. As we have explained, "it would be unseemly in our dual system of government" to disturb the finality of state judgments on a federal ground that the state court did not have occasion to consider. Webb, 451 U. S., at 500 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the rule affords state courts "an opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the actions of state officials, and, equally important, proposed changes" that could obviate any challenges to state action in federal court. Gates, supra, at 221–222. Here, the Alabama Supreme Court has an undeniable interest in having the opportunity to determine in the first instance whether its existing rules governing class action settlements satisfy the requirements of due process, and whether to exercise its power to amend those rules to avoid potential constitutional challenges, see Ala. Const., §6.11; 1971 Ala. Acts No. 1311.

Our traditional standard also reflects "practical considerations" relating to this Court's capacity to decide issues. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., supra, at 79. Requiring parties to raise issues below not only avoids unnecessary adjudication in this Court by allowing state courts to resolve issues on state law grounds, but also assists us in our deliberations by promoting the creation of an adequate factual and legal record. See Webb, supra, at 500. Here, even if the state court's construction of its class action rules would not obviate the due process challenge, it would undoubtedly aid our understanding of those rules as a predicate to our assessment of their constitutional adequacy. And not incidentally, the parties would enjoy the opportunity to test and refine their positions before reaching this Court.

The only unusual consideration weighing in favor of reaching the question presented is that respondents failed to raise a timely objection to our granting the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the question presented in that petition had not been properly raised or addressed. This Court's Rule 15.2 "admonishe[s counsel] that they have an obligation to the Court to point out in the brief in opposition, and not later, any perceived misstatement" "of fact or law in the petition that bears on what issues properly would be before the Court if certiorari were granted." Without minimizing this obligation, however, we find no interest here in penalizing the failure of counsel to comply with Rule 15.2 that overrides the interest of comity or the value to this Court of a fully developed factual and legal record upon which to base decisions.

Accordingly, we dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

It is so ordered.