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On September 27, 1990, three days after respondents filed their co"m^ #-AAa_'':G ' AAAAAAAAAA GGG4VTTT[TN[a/A[Nn_[N[TJN_TrRRG'G'G:AA4C:'?G%#E%hG:CA46-G?[??8'G'G' ''u''''''''''C%TATATATATAu]T4T:T:T:T:/%/%/%/%_G[:[:[:[:_G_G_G_GR?TA[C[:[:R?[:NCTATATAT4T4T4T4[CT:T:T:T:[?[?[?[?[?[?aGaG/%/%/%/%A[EN%N%N%N%N%_G_G_G_G[:[:uaT4T4T4J6J6J6J6N-N-N-_G_G_G_G_G_Gr[R?G8G8G8[CN%_GT4J6N-R?R?[C[:_GNG G:#422AAA'#aaA'VVAa'--Au::uGGu-u'GG@@S G&&@@@SZSSGssFFz/G `S:0P]sssFFzZSSSS3`ZZZFFM:@e@@SSSTJN@F0G:G3G:TFV='&T@P@hGT=K:T@Z@A@EF3G3QCY=T@]PZPJ3F&&@CCPJHFSJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ3333333FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF&&&&&&&&&&&&@@@@@@@CCCCCCCCCCCCPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPTGT'TQZ'Q@Opin InitInitial Opinion codesdpЊ #  ( (    П I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@2w]GToTHHVXBQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote - Circv C   (  Cd  ( ( ( FTNFormats for each footnote,  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: desire not to be counseled. Because Madsen bears many similarities to this case and because many of the parties'  J arguments depend on the application of Madsen here, we review our determination in that case.  A Florida state court had issued a permanent injunction enjoining specified organizations and individuals from blocking or interfering with clinic access and from physically abusing people entering or leaving the clinic. Six months after the injunction issued, the court found that protesters still impeded access by demonstrating on the street and in the driveways, and that sidewalk counselors approached entering vehicles in an effort to hand literature to the occupants. In the face of this evidence, the court issued a broader injunction that enjoined the defendant protesters from  k `physically abusing, grabbing, intimidating, harassing, touching, pushing, shoving, crowding or assaulting'   anyone entering or leaving the clinic; from   `congregating, picketing, patrolling, demonstrating or entering that portion of public rightofway or private property within [36] feet of the property line of the Clinic'   ; from ap "  Ԯproaching anyone   `seeking the services of the Clinic'   who is within 300 feet of the clinic, unless the person  u  `indicates a desire to communicate'  ; and from making any noise or displaying any image which could be heard or seen inside the clinic. 512 U.S., at 759!760.  After determining that the injunction was not a prior  J restraint and was content neutral, id., at 762!764, we held that the proper test for evaluating contentneutral injunctions under the First Amendment was whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant  JH government interest, id., at 765. The Florida Supreme Court had concluded that the injunction was based on a number of governmental interests: protecting a woman's freedom to seek pregnancyrelated services, ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting the medical privacy of patients whose psychological and physical wellbeing were threatened as they  J were held captive by medical circumstance. Id., at 767!768. We held that the combination of these interests was quite sufficient to justify an appropriately tailored injunction to protect unimpeded access to the  Jh clinic by way of public streets and sidewalks. Id., at 768.  We held that some of the injunction's provisions burdened more speech than necessary to serve these interests, and that others did not. We upheld the 36foot buffer zone as applied to the street, sidewalks, and driveways as a way of ensuring access to the clinic. We explained that the trial court had few other options to protect access to the clinic: allowing protesters to remain on the sidewalks and in the clinic driveway was not a valid option because of their past conduct, and allowing them to stand in the street was obviously impractical. In addition, we stated that some deference must be given to the state court's familiarity with the` "   facts and the background of the dispute between the  J parties even under our heightened review. Id., at  J 769!770 (citing Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor  J Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 294 (1941))  We struck down the 300foot noapproach zone around the clinic, however, stating that it was difficultBQ 8C   JS  , , (  to justify a prohibition on all uninvited approaches ... regardless of how peaceful the contact may be .... Absent evidence that the protesters' speech is  J independently proscribable (i.e., `fighting words' or threats), or is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm, see  Jc Milk Wagon Drivers, 312 U.S., at 292!293, this provision cannot stand. `As a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.'  Js Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. [312, 322 (1988)] (internal quotation marks omitted). The `consent' requirement alone invalidates this provision; it burdens more speech than is necessary to prevent intimidation and to ensure access to the clinic. 512 U.S., at 774.  J #vBQ d  ( , ,  We now apply Madsen to the challenged provisions of the injunction and ask whether they burden more speech than necessary to serve a significant governmental  J interest.o uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Petitioners argue that the injunction is an unlawful prior re uB straint and that the standard we set out in Madsen is therefore  uBm inapplicable. Because we rejected this argument in Madsen and  uB$ because petitioners make no effort to distinguish Madsen on this  uB ground, we reject it again. As in Madsen, alternative channels of communication were left open to the protesters, and the injunction was issued not because of the content of [the protesters'] expression,  uB ... but because of their prior unlawful conduct. Madsen, 512 U.S., at 764, n.2."  Ԍ8 ;H2 dЃ d8B؃  <2  Petitioners first argue that there are no significant governmental interests that support the injunction. The argument goes as follows: of the seven causes of action in respondents' complaint, the only one left standing after the District Court's most recent opinion is respondents' trespass claim; a trespass cause of action can support an injunction banning trespass, but nothing else; thus, the injunction's provisions banning demonstrating within 15 feet of people, cars, and entrances are overbroad.  First, this argument is factually incorrect. The trespass claim is not the only one left standing at this point. In its opinion issuing the preliminary injunction, the District Court held that the conduct that satisfied the elements of a 1985(3) claim under federal law also satisfied the elements of a 40!c claim under state law.  J After our decision in Bray, the District Court dismissed respondents' 1985(3) claim. Petitioners argue that in doing so, the District Court necessarily and implicitly dismissed the 40!c claim as well, since the two claims were based on the same conduct. But our opinion in  J& Bray did not attempt to construe any statute other than 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). And the fact that certain conduct does not state a claim under 1985(3) does not necessarily mean that the same conduct does not state a claim under a state law that uses the same or similar language as 1985(3), since state courts may of course choose to construe their own law more broadly (or more narrowly) than its federal counterpart. In any event, the language of the two statutes is noticeably different.  J See n.4, supra. Thus, the dismissal of the 1985(3)  J claim in light of Bray did not also act as a dismissal of respondents' 40!c claim. This is confirmed by the  JF District Court's comment in its postBray opinion that the preliminary injunction is grounded not only on the"   1985(3) claim, but two statelaw claims as well. 828 F.Supp.,at 1026, n.4.  Although petitioners contend that the 40!c cause of action is no longer valid simply because the 1985(3) claim is no longer valid, an argument we reject, they do not contend that the District Court erred in concluding as an independent matter that respondents were likely to succeed on their 40!c and trespass claims. See Brief for Petitioners 32. The injunction's terms are clearly crafted to remedy these violations.  An injunction tailored to respondents' claims for relief may nonetheless violate the First Amendment. In making their First Amendment challenge, petitioners focus solely on the interests asserted by respondents in their complaint. But in assessing a First Amendment challenge, a court looks not only at the private claims asserted in the complaint, but also inquires into the governmental interests that are protected by the injunction, which may include an interest in public safety and  J order. Madsen, 512 U.S., at 767!768; Milk Wagon  J Drivers, 312 U.S., at 294!295. Both the injunction in  J Madsen and the injunction here are supported by this  J governmental interest. In Madsen, it was permissible to move protesters off the sidewalk and to the other side of the street in part because other options would block the free flow of traffic on the streets and sidewalks. 512 U.S., at 767!768. Here, the District Court cited public safety as one of the interests justifying the injunction"certainly a reasonable conclusion, if only because of the dangerous situation created by the interaction between cars and protesters and because of the fights that threatened to (and sometimes did) develop. Even though the governmental interest in public safety is clearly a valid interest here, as it was  J in Madsen, plaintiffs in neither case pleaded a claim for threat to public safety. Indeed, this would be a strange concept, since a plaintiff customarily alleges`"   violations of private rights, while public safety expresses a public right enforced by the government through its criminal laws and otherwise. Thus, the fact that threat to public safety is not listed anywhere in respondents' complaint as a claim does not preclude a court from relying on the significant governmental interest in public safety in assessing petitioners' First  J Amendment argument.  uBP ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Justice Scalia in dissent contends that the District Court's reliance on public safety was not permissible because only the government may seek an injunction based on that factor. But the District Court's reliance on this factor was not to use it as an element which supported respondents' claim for an injunction. Rather, the court used this factor as a basis for rejecting petitioners' challenge to the injunction on First Amendment grounds.   Given the factual similarity between this case and  J Madsen, we conclude that the governmental interests  Jp underlying the injunction in Madsen"ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting a woman's freedom to seek pregnancyrelated  J services,o  uB9 ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < We need not decide whether the governmental interest in protecting the medical privacy and wellbeing of patients held `captive' by  uB medical circumstance"at issue in Madsen"is implicated here.  uB^ That interest was relevant in Madsen because patients while inside  uB the clinic heard the chanting and shouting of the protesters and  uB suffered increased health risks as a result. See id., at 772. Here, although the District Court found that the loud voices of sidewalk counselors could be heard inside the clinic, petitioners do not challenge the injunction's ban on excessive noise. ibid."also underlie the injunction here, and in combination are certainly significant enough to justify an appropriately tailored injunction to secure unimpeded physical access to the clinics. 8 ;H2 dЃ d8C؃  l2  We strike down the floating buffer zones around people entering and leaving the clinics because theyv "   burden more speech than is necessary to serve the relevant governmental interests. The floating buffer zones prevent defendants"except for two sidewalk counselors, while they are tolerated by the targeted individual"from communicating a message from a normal conversational distance or handing leaflets to people entering or leaving the clinics who are walking on the public sidewalks. This is a broad prohibition, both because of the type of speech that is restricted and the nature of the location. Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment, and speech in public areas is at its most protected on public sidewalks, a prototypical example of a traditional public  J forum. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322  J (1988); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983). On the other hand, we have before us a record that shows physically abusive conduct, harassment of the police that hampered law enforcement, and the tendency of even peaceful conversations to devolve into aggressive and sometimes violent conduct. In some situations, a record of abusive conduct makes a prohibition on classic speech in limited parts of a public sidewalk permissible.  Jh See, e.g., Part II!D infra; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 769!770. We need not decide whether the governmental interests involved would ever justify some sort of zone of separation between individuals entering the clinics and protesters, measured by the distance between the two. We hold here that because this broad prohibition on speech floats, it cannot be sustained on this record.  Since the buffer zone floats, protesters on the public sidewalks who wish (i) to communicate their message to an incoming or outgoing patient or clinic employee and (ii) to remain as close as possible (while maintaining an acceptable conversational distance) to this individual, must move as the individual moves, maintaining 15 feet of separation. But this would be difficult to accomplish`"   at, for instance, the GYN Womenservices clinic in Buffalo, one of the respondent clinics. The sidewalk outside the clinic is 17feet wide. This means that protesters who wish to walk alongside an individual entering or leaving the clinic are pushed into the street, unless the individual walks a straight line on the outer edges of the sidewalk. Protesters could presumably walk 15 feet behind the individual, or 15 feet in front of the individual while walking backwards. But they are then faced with the problem of watching out for other individuals entering or leaving the clinic who are heading the opposite way from the individual they have targeted. With clinic escorts leaving the clinic to pick up incoming patients and entering the clinic to drop them off, it would be quite difficult for a protester who wishes to engage in peaceful expressive activities to  J know how to remain in compliance with the injunction. J  uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < We suspect that these floating buffer zones would also be quite difficult for a District Court to enforce. Contempt proceedings would likely focus on whether protesters who thought they were keeping pace with the targeted individual from a distance of 15 feet actually strayed to within 14 or 13 feet of the individual for a certain period of time. This lack of certainty leads to a substantial risk that much more speech will be burdened than the injunction by its terms prohibits. That is, attempts to stand 15 feet from someone entering or leaving a clinic and to communicate a message"certainly protected on the face of the injunction"will be hazardous if one wishes to  Jh remain in compliance with the injunction. h uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Significantly, the District Judge himself expressed this same concern at the September 27 TRO hearing, stating his understanding that a moving buffer zone would be quite infeasible. Nevertheless, the terms of the TRO and the injunction provide exactly that, and the District Court never authoritatively put a limiting construction on the injunction.  uBd  Justice Breyer in dissent places great stress on the Districtd "## Court's statement at this September 27 hearing, and concludes that the District Court never understood the TRO, or even the injunction,  uB to contain floating buffer zones. We believe Justice Breyer misreads the record.  First, despite the District Court's statements at the September 27 hearing, the court held petitioner and one other defendant in contempt for violating paragraph 1(a) of the TRO, because they came within 15 feet of an individual attempting to enter the clinic even though they were more than 15 feet from any doorway or driveway  uB entrance to the clinic. See ProChoice Network of Western N. Y. v.  uB Project Rescue Western N. Y., No. 90!CV!1004A (WDNY) Sept 28, 1992), pp. 7!8, 20!21 (doctor parked several hundred feet from clinic and then attempted to walk on sidewalk toward clinic; contemnors followed doctor the length of the sidewalk, yelling at him from a distance of only a few feet, up until the point where doctor was 10 to 20 feet from clinic driveway entrance; court held that this conduct violates the TRO's proscription against demonstrating within fifteen feet of any person seeking access to a clinic). Thus, we conclude that the District Court read the TRO the way an ordinary person would"to create a floating buffer zone.  Second, the District Court's opinion accompanying the issuance of the preliminary injunction shows that the court interpreted the injunction to contain floating buffer zones. The court described  uB paragraph (b) of the injunction as setting dual `clear zones' of  uB fifteen feet around entrances and fifteen feet around people and  uBo vehicles seeking access. 799 F.Supp., at 1434 (emphasis added). And the injunction by its terms bans demonstrating within 15 feet  uB of clinic entrances or within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle seeking access to [the clinic] (emphasis added).  Finally, we note that no judge of the en banc Court of Appeals expressed doubt that the injunction included floating buffer zones, cf. 67 F. 3d, at 389, n. 4 (discussing how far from a clinic a float uBp ing buffer zone may reach, not, as Justice Breyer suggests, whether the injunction creates floating buffer zones at all), and that none of the parties before us has suggested that the injunction does not provide for such zones. SincehL "   there may well be other ways to both effect such separation and yet provide certainty (so that speech protected by the injunction's terms is not burdened), we conclude that the floating buffer zones burden more speech than necessary to serve the relevant governmen`L "  Ԯtal interests. Because we strike down the floating buffer zones, we do not address the constitutionality of the cease and desist provision that allows sidewalk counselors within those buffer zones.  We likewise strike down the floating buffer zones around vehicles. Nothing in the record or the District Court's opinion contradicts the commonsense notion that a more limited injunction"which keeps protesters away from driveways and parking lot entrances (as the fixed buffer zones do) and off the streets, for instance"would be sufficient to ensure that drivers are not confused about how to enter the clinic and are able to gain access to its driveways and parking lots safely and easily. In contrast, the 15foot floating buffer zones would restrict the speech of those who simply line the sidewalk or curb in an effort to chant, shout, or hold signs peacefully. We therefore conclude that the floating buffer zones around vehicles burden more speech than necessary to serve the relevant governmental interests. 8 ;H2 dЃ d8D؃  D2  We uphold the fixed buffer zones around the doorways, driveways, and driveway entrances. These buffer zones are necessary to ensure that people and vehicles trying to enter or exit the clinic property or clinic parking lots  J can do so. As in Madsen, the record shows that protesters purposefully or effectively blocked or hindered people from entering and exiting the clinic doorways, from driving up to and away from clinic entrances, and from driving in and out of clinic parking lots. Based on this conduct"both before and after the TRO issued"the District Court was entitled to conclude that the only way to ensure access was to move back the demonstrations away from the driveways and parking lot entrances. Similarly, sidewalk counselors"both before and after the TRO"followed and crowded people right up to the doorways of the clinics (and sometimes "   beyond) and then tended to stay in the doorways, shouting at the individuals who had managed to get inside. In addition, as the District Court found, defendants' harassment of the local police made it far from certain that the police would be able to quickly and effectively counteract protesters who blocked doorways or threatened the safety of entering patients and employees. Based on this conduct, the District Court was entitled to conclude that protesters who were allowed close to the entrances would continue right up to the entrance, and that the only way to ensure access was  JH tomove all protesters away from the doorways.  H  uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The fact that the injunction allows two sidewalk counselors into the fixed buffer zones"subject to the cease and desist provision" does not detract from this conclusion. It is clear from the District Court's opinion that its decision to allow two sidewalk counselors inside the buffer zones was an effort to bend over backwards to accommodate defendants' speech rights. See 799 F.Supp., at 1434. Because the District Court was entitled to conclude on this record that the only feasible way to shield individuals within the fixed buffer zone from unprotected conduct"especially with law enforcement efforts hampered by defendants' harassment of the police"would have been to keep the entire area clear of defendant protesters, the District Court's extra effort to enhance defendants' speech rights by allowing an exception to the fixed buffer zone should not redound to the detriment of respondents. Although one might quibble about whether 15 feet is too great or too small a distance if the goal is to ensure access, we defer to the District Court's reasonable assessment of the number of feet necessary to keep the  J entrances clear. See Madsen, 512 U.S., at 769!770 ( [S]ome deference must be given to the state court's familiarity with the facts and the background of the dispute between the parties even under our heightened review).  Petitioners claim that unchallenged provisions of the injunction are sufficient to ensure this access, pointing "   to the bans on trespassing, excessive noise, and blocking, impeding or obstructing access to the clinics. They claim that in light of these provisions, the only effect of a ban on demonstrating within the fixed buffer zone is a ban on peaceful, nonobstructive demonstrations on public sidewalks or rights of way. Brief for Petitioners 47. This argument, however, ignores the record in this case. Based on defendants' past conduct, the District Court was entitled to conclude that some of the defendants who were allowed within 5 to 10 feet of clinic entrances would not merely engage in stationary, nonobstructive demonstrations but would continue to do what they had done before: aggressively follow and crowd individuals right up to the clinic door and then refuse to move, or purposefully mill around parking lot entrances in an effort to impede or block the progress of cars. And because defendants' harassment of police hampered the ability of the police to respond quickly to a problem, a prophylactic measure was even more appro J priate. Cf. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206!207 (1992) (upholding 100foot nocampaign zone around polling places: Intimidation and interference laws fall short of serving a State's compelling interests because they `deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts' to impede elections. Moreover, because law enforcement officers generally are barred [under state law] from the vicinity of the polls to avoid any appearance of coercion in the electoral process, many acts of interference would go undetected. These undetected or less than blatant acts may nonetheless drive the voter away before remedial action can be taken (citations omitted)). The ban on blocking, impeding, and obstructing access was therefore insufficient by itself to solve the problem, and the fixed buffer zone was a necessary restriction on defendants' demonstrations.  J  Petitioners also argue that under Madsen, the fixed buffer zones are invalid because the District Court could` "   not impose a speechrestrictive injunction (or TRO) without first trying a nonspeechrestrictive injunction,  J as the trial court did in Madsen. But in Madsen we simply stated that the failure of an initial injunction to accomplish its purpose may be taken into consideration in determining the constitutionality of a later injunction. 512 U.S., at 770. The fact that the District Court's TRO included a speechrestrictive provision certainly does not mean that the subsequent injunction is automatically invalid. Since we can uphold the injunction  Jp under the Madsen standard without this consideration being present, petitioners' argument fails.  Finally, petitioners make several arguments that may  J be quickly refuted. They argue that, unlike Madsen, there is no extraordinary record of pervasive lawlessness, Brief for Petitioners 45, and that the buffer zones are therefore unnecessary. As explained above, our review of the record convinces us that defendants' conduct was indeed extraordinary, and that based on this conduct the District Court was entitled to conclude that keeping defendants away from the entrances was necessary to ensure access. Petitioners also argue that the term demonstrating is vague. When the injunction  Jh is read as a whole, see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972), we believe that people of ordinary intelligence (and certainly defendants, whose demonstrations led to this litigation in the first place) have been given a reasonable opportunity to know what  J is prohibited, id., at 108.  Petitioners also contend that the cease and desist provision which limits the exception for sidewalk counselors in connection with the fixed buffer zone is contrary to the First Amendment. We doubt that the District Court's reason for including that provision" to protect the right of the people approaching and entering the facilities to be left alone"accurately reflects our  J` First Amendment jurisprudence in this area. Madsen` "   sustained an injunction designed to secure physical access to the clinic, but not on the basis of any generalized right to be left alone on a public street or side J walk. As we said in Madsen, quoting from Boos v.  J` Barry, 485 U.S. 322,  U `[a]s a general matter, we have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.'   512 U.S., at 774. But as earlier noted, the entire exception for sidewalk counselors was an effort to enhance petitioners' speech  JH rights, see n.11, supra, and the cease and desist  J limitation must be assessed in that light.u %  uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Although petitioners argue that our disapproval of the 300!foot  uB? no approach zone in Madsen requires disapproval of the cease and  uB desist provision, Madsen is easily distinguishable on this point, since the noapproach zone was eight times broader than the buffer  uBd zone deemed necessary to ensure access to the clinic in Madsen.  uB  Justice Scalia in dissent suggests that our failure to endorse the District Court's reason for including the cease and desist provision requires us to reverse the District Court's decision setting the injunction's terms. This suggestion is inconsistent with our prece uB dents. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 76 (1990) ( [A]lthough we affirm the Seventh Circuit's judgment ... ,  uBe we do not adopt the Seventh Circuit's reasoning); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215, n. 6 (1982) ( Respondent may, of course, defend the judgment below on any ground which the law and the record permit, provided the asserted ground would not expand the relief  uBA which has been granted); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) ( [W]e do not disturb the settled rule that, in reviewing the decision of a lower court, it must be affirmed if the result is correct `although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a  uB wrong reason' $!  (quoting Helvering  v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245  uB (1937)); Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 536!537 (1931) ( [T]he entire record is before this court with power to review the action of the court of appeals and direct such disposition of the case as that court might have done upon the writ of error sued out for the  uB review of the [district] court); Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117, 120 (1827) (Marshall, C.J.) ( If the judgment [of the lower court]g "## should be correct, although the reasoning, by which the mind of the Judge was conducted to it, should be deemed unsound, that judgment would certainly be affirmed in [this] Court).u   "  Ԍ J  Petitioners and some of their amici attack the cease and desist provision accompanying the exception for sidewalk counselors as content based, because it allows  J a clinic patient to terminate a protester's right to speak based on, among other reasons, the patient's disagree J8 ment with the message being conveyed. But in Madsen we held that the injunction in that case was not content based, even though it was directed only at abortion protesters, because it was only abortion protesters who had done the acts which were being enjoined. Here, the District Court found that [m]any of the `sidewalk counselors' and other defendants ha[d] been arrested on more than one occasion for harassment, yet persist in harassing and intimidating patients, patient escorts and medical staff. 799 F.Supp., at 1425. These counselors remain free to espouse their message outside the 15foot  buffer zone, and the condition on their freedom to espouse it within the buffer zone is the result of their own  J0 previous harassment and intimidation of patients. J0 uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr ddf < The defendants, including the two petitioners, stipulated before the District Court that [i]f [the District Court] concludes that some or all of the relief requested by plaintiffs should be granted on a preliminary injunctive basis, defendants will consent to the entry of such an injunction against each and every one of them. App. to Pet. for Cert. A136.   5* * *  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  J ` BIt is so ordered.ă