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Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (raising children). M.L.B.'s case, involving the State's author J ity to sever permanently a parentchild bond,J uBV ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Although the termination proceeding in this case was initiated by private parties as a prelude to an adoption petition, rather than by a state agency, the challenged state action remains essentially the same: M.L.B. resists the imposition of an official decree extinguishing, as no power other than the State can, her parentchild relationships. demands the close consideration the Court has long required when a family association so undeniably important is at stake. We approach M.L.B.'s petition mindful of the gravity of the sanction imposed on her and in light of two prior  J& decisions most immediately in point: Lassiter v. Depart J ment of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18  J (1981), and Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).  J  Lassiter concerned the appointment of counsel for indigent persons seeking to defend against the State's termination of their parental status. The Court held that appointed counsel was not routinely required to6 "   assure a fair adjudication; instead, a casebycase determination of the need for counsel would suffice, an assessment to be made in the first instance by the trial court, subject ... to appellate review. 452 U.S., at 32.  For probationrevocation hearings where loss of condi J8 tional liberty is at issue, the Lassiter Court observed, our precedent is not doctrinaire; due process is provided, we have held, when the decision whether counsel should be appointed is made on a casebycase basis. See  J Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973). In criminal prosecutions that do not lead to the defendant's incarceration, however, our precedent recognizes no right  J to appointed counsel. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S., at  J 373!374. Parental termination cases, the Lassiter Court concluded, are most appropriately ranked with probationrevocation hearings: While the Court declined to recognize an automatic right to appointed counsel, it said that an appointment would be due when warranted by  J0 the character and difficulty of the case. See Lassiter,  J 452 U.S., at 31!32.  uBp ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The Court noted, among other considerations, that petitions to terminate parental rights may charge criminal activity and that [p]arents so accused may need legal counsel to guide them in  uB understanding the problems such petitions may create. Lassiter, 452 U.S., at 27, n.3.  Significant to the disposition of M.L.B.'s case, the  J Lassiter Court considered it plain ... that a parent's desire for and right to `the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children' is an important interest, one that  ) `undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.' !   J Id., at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). The object of the proceeding is not simply to infringe upon [the parent's] interest, the Court recognized, but to end it; thus, a decision against the parent  JP  work[s] a unique kind of deprivation. Lassiter, 452P # "   U.S., at 27. For that reason, [a] parent's interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision ... is ... a  J commanding one. Ibid.; see also id., at 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ( A termination of parental rights is both total and irrevocable. Unlike other custody proceedings, it leaves the parent with no right to visit or communicate with the child .... (footnote omitted)).  J  Santosky held that a clear and convincing proof standard is constitutionally required in parental termi J nation proceedings. 455 U.S., at 769!770.B  uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Earlier, in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431!432 (1979), the Court concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment requiresa clear and convincing standard of proof in civil commitmentproceedings.B In so ruling, the Court again emphasized that a termination  JH decree is  final and irrevocable. Id., at 759 (emphasis in original). Few forms of state action, the Court said,  J  are both so severe and so irreversible. Ibid.  l uB< ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < In Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987), the Court declined  uB to extend Santosky to paternity proceedings. The Court distinguished the State's imposition of the legal obligations attending a biological relationship between parent and child from the State's  uB termination of a fully existing parentchild relationship. See Rivera,  uB 483 U.S., at 579!582. In drawing this distinction, the Court found it enlightening that state legislatures had similarly separated the two proceedings: Most jurisdictions applied a preponderance of the evidence standard in paternity cases, while 38 jurisdictions, at the  uB time Santosky was decided, required a higher standard of proof in  uBb proceedings to terminate parental rights. See Rivera, 483 U.S., at  uB 578!579 (citing Santosky, 455 U.S., at 749!750). As in  J Lassiter, the Court characterized the parent's interest as commanding, indeed, far more precious than any property right. 455 U.S., at 758!759.  JX  Although both Lassiter and Santosky yielded divided opinions, the Court was unanimously of the view that the interest of parents in their relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty interests protected by the Four "  Ԯ J teenth Amendment. 455 U.S., at 774 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It was also the Court's unanimous view that [f]ew consequences of judicial action are so grave  J as the severance of natural family ties. Id., at 787.  9H1 d d-V؃  J  2  Guided by this Court's precedent on an indigent's access to judicial processes in criminal and civil cases, and on proceedings to terminate parental status, we turn to the classification question this case presents: Does the Fourteenth Amendment require Mississippi to accord M.L.B. access to an appeal"available but for her inability to advance required costs"before she is forever branded unfit for affiliation with her children? Respondents urge us to classify M.L.B.'s case with the generality of civil cases, in which indigent persons have  J> no constitutional right to proceed in forma pauperis.  J See supra, at 9!11. M.L.B., on the other hand, maintains that the accusatory state action she is trying  J to fend offp  uB. ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < See supra, at 12, n.8.p is barely distinguishable from criminal condemnation in view of the magnitude and permanence  Jv of the loss she faces. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50, 55 (1967) (resisting feeble enticement of the `civil' labelofconvenience, and holding that Fifth Amendment's safeguard against selfincrimination applies in juvenile  J proceedings). See also Santosky, 455 U.S., at 756, 760 (recognizing stigmatic effect of parental status termination decree: [I]t entails a judicial determination that [a parent is] unfit to raise [her] own children.). For the purpose at hand, M.L.B. asks us to treat her parental termination appeal as we have treated petty offense appeals; she urges us to adhere to the reasoning in  J Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), see supra, at 6!7, and rule that Mississippi may not withhold the transcript M.L.B. needs to gain review of the ordernG "    J ending her parental status. Guided by Lassiter and  J Santosky, and other decisions acknowledging the primacy  J of the parentchild relationship, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois,  J 405 U.S., at 651; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S., at 399,  J` we agree that the Mayer decision points to the disposition proper in this case.  We observe first that the Court's decisions concerning  J access to judicial processes, commencing with Griffin and  J running through Mayer, reflect both equal protection and  J due process concerns. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S., at  Jp 608!609. As we said in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S.  JH 660, 665 (1983), in the Court's Griffin!line cases, [d]ue process and equal protection principles converge. The equal protection concern relates to the legitimacy of fencing out wouldbe appellants based solely on their  J inability to pay core costs. See Griffin, 351 U.S., at 23  J (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment) (cited supra, at 5!6). The due process concern homes in on the essential fairness of the stateordered proceedings anterior to  J adverse state action. See Ross, 417 U.S., at 609. A  J  precise rationale has not been composed, id., at 608, because cases of this order cannot be resolved by resort  J to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, Bearden, 461 U.S., at 666. Nevertheless, [m]ost decisions in this area, we have recognized, res[t] on an equal protection  J framework, id., at 665, as M.L.B.'s plea heavily does,  J for, as we earlier observed, see supra, at 5, due process does not independently require that the State provide a  J right to appeal. We place this case within the framework established by our past decisions in this area. In line with those decisions, we inspect the character and intensity of the individual interest at stake, on the one hand, and the State's justification for its exaction, on  J the other. See Bearden, 461 U.S., at 666!667.  J  We now focus on Mayer and the considerations linking  J that decision to M.L.B.'s case. Mayer, described supra,  J` at 6!7, applied Griffin to a petty offender, fined a total` "   of $500, who sought to appeal from the trial court's  J judgment. See Mayer, 404 U.S., at 190. An impecu J nious medical student, id., at 197, the defendant in  J Mayer could not pay for a transcript. We held that the State must afford him a record complete enough to allow fair appellate consideration of his claims. The defendant  J in Mayer faced no term of confinement, but the conviction, we observed, could affect his professional prospects and, possibly, even bar him from the practice of medi J cine. Ibid. The State's pocketbook interest in advance payment for a transcript, we concluded, was unimpressive when measured against the stakes for the defend J ant. Ibid.  Similarly here, the stakes for petitioner M.L.B." forced dissolution of her parental rights"are large,  J   u ! `more substantial than mere loss of money.' !  Santosky,  J 455 U.S., at 756 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)). In contrast to loss of custody, which does not sever the parentchild bond, parental status termination is irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve] of the  J mostfundamental family relationship. Santosky, 455U.S., at 753. And the risk of error, Missis J sippi's experience shows, is considerable. See supra, at4, n.3.  J@  Consistent with Santosky, Mississippi has, by statute, adopted a clear and convincing proof standard for parental status termination cases. Miss. Code Ann. 93!15!109 (Supp. 1996). Nevertheless, the Chancellor's termination order in this case simply recites statutory language; it describes no evidence, and otherwise details no reasons for finding M.L.B. clear[ly] and convinc J( ing[ly] unfit to be a parent. See supra, at 2!3. Only a transcript can reveal to judicial minds other than the Chancellor's the sufficiency, or insufficiency, of the evidence to support his stern judgment.  J  The countervailing government interest, as in Mayer, is financial. Mississippi urges, as the justification for its` "   appeal cost prepayment requirement, the State's legitimate interest in offsetting the costs of its court system. Brief for Respondent 4, 8, n.1, 27!30. But in the tightly circumscribed category of parental status termi J` nation cases, cf. supra, at 14, n.11, appeals are few, and not likely to impose an undue burden on the State. See Brief for Petitioner 20, 25 (observing that only 16 reported appeals in Mississippi from 1980 until 1996 referred to the State's termination statute, and only 12 of those decisions addressed the merits of the grant or denial of parental rights); cf. Brief for Respondents 28 (of 63,765 civil actions filed in Mississippi Chancery Courts in 1995, 194 involved termination of parental rights; of cases decided on appeal in Mississippi in 1995 (including Court of Appeals and Supreme Court cases), 492 were first appeals of criminal convictions, 67 involved domestic relations, 16 involved child custody). Mississippi's experience with criminal appeals is noteworthy in this regard. In 1995, the Mississippi Court of Appeals disposed of 298 first appeals from criminal convictions, Sup. Ct. of Miss. Ann. Rep. 42 (1995); of those appeals, only seven were appeals from misdemeanor  J convictions, ibid., notwithstanding our holding in Mayer  Jh requiring in forma pauperis transcript access in petty  J@ offense prosecutions.  @ uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Many States provide for in forma pauperis appeals, including  uB_ transcripts, in civil cases generally. See, e.g., Alaska Rule App. Proc. 209(a)(3) (1996); Conn. Rule App. Proc. 4017 (1996); D.C. Code Ann. 15!712 (1995); Idaho Code 31!3220(5) (1996); Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 735, 5/5!105.5(b) (Supp. 1996); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 453.190 (Baldwin 1991); La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., Art. 5185 (Supp. 1996); Me. Rule Civ. Proc. 91(f) (1996); Minn. Stat. 563.01, subd. 7 (1994); Mo. Rev. Stat. 512.150 (1994); Neb. Rev. Stat. 25!2306 (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. 12.015.2 (1995); N.M. Stat. Ann. 39!3!12 (1991); N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law 1102(b) (McKinney 1976); Ore. Rev. Stat. 21.605(3)(a) (1991); Pa. Rule Jud. Admin. 5000.2(h) (1996); Tex. Rule App. Proc. 53(j)(1) (1996); Vt. Rule App. Proc. 10(b)(4) "## (1996); Wash. Rule App. Proc. 15.4(d) (1996); W.Va. Code  uBG Ԛ59!2!1(a) (Supp. 1996); State ex rel. Girouard v. Circuit Court for  uB Jackson County, 155 Wis.2d 148, 454 N.W.2d 792 (1990).  uB  Several States deal discretely with in forma pauperis appeals,  uBl including transcripts, in parental status termination cases. See, e.g.,  uB# In re Appeal in Pima County v. Howard, 112 Ariz. 170, 540 P.2d 642 (1975); Cal. Family Code Ann. 7895(c) (West 1994); Colo. Rev.  uB Stat. 19!3!609 (Supp. 1996); Nix v. Department of Human Re uBH Ԛsources, 236 Ga. 794, 225 S.E.2d 306 (1976); In re Chambers, 261 Iowa 31, 152 N.W.2d 818 (1967); Kan. Stat. Ann. 38!1593 (1986);  uB In re Karren, 280 Minn. 377, 159 N.W. 2d 402 (1968); Mich. Rule  uBm P. Ct. 5.974(H)(3) (1996); In re Dotson, 72 N.J. 112, 367 A.2d 1160  uB$ (1976); State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6, 399 N.E.2d  uB 66 (1980); Ex parte Cauthen, 291 S.C. 465, 354 S.E.2d 381 (1987). @  "  Ԍ In States providing criminal appeals, as we earlier recounted, an indigent's access to appeal, through a transcript of relevant trial proceedings, is secure under  J our precedent. See supra, at 5!7. That equal access right holds for petty offenses as well as for felonies. But counsel at state expense, we have held, is a constitutional requirement, even in the first instance, only when the defendant faces time in confinement. See  J supra, at 8. When deprivation of parental status is at stake, however, counsel is sometimes part of the process  Jp that is due. See Lassiter, 452 U.S., at 31!32. It would be anomalous to recognize a right to a transcript needed to appeal a misdemeanor conviction"though trial counsel may be flatly denied"but hold, at the same time, that a transcript need not be prepared for M.L.B."though were her defense sufficiently complex,  J Statepaid counsel, as Lassiter instructs, would be designated for her.  J0  In aligning M.L.B.'s case and Mayer"parental status termination decrees and criminal convictions that carry no jail time"for appeal access purposes, we do not  J question the general rule, stated in Ortwein, that fee requirements ordinarily are examined only for rational "  Ԯ J ity. See supra, at 11. The State's need for revenue to offset costs, in the mine run of cases, satisfies the  J rationality requirement, see Ortwein, 410 U.S., at 660; States are not forced by the Constitution to adjust all tolls to account for disparity in material circumstances.  J8 Griffin, 351 U.S., at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment).  But our cases solidly establish two exceptions to that general rule. The basic right to participate in political processes as voters and candidates cannot be limited to  Jp those who can pay for a license.p uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The pathmarking voting and ballot access decisions are Harper  uB v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664, 666 (1966) (invalidating, as a denial of equal protection, an annual $1.50 poll tax  uB imposed by Virginia on all residents over 21); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 135, 145, 149 (1972) (invalidating Texas scheme under which candidates for local office had to pay fees as high as $8,900  uB" to get on the ballot); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 710, 718 (1974) (invalidating California statute requiring payment of a ballotaccess fee fixed at a percentage of the salary for the office sought).    uB  Notably, the Court in Harper recognized that a State may exact fees from citizens for many different kinds of licenses. 383 U.S., at 668. For example, the State can demand from all an equal fee  uB# for a driver's license. Ibid. But voting cannot hinge on ability to pay, the Court explained, for it is a  ! `fundamental political right  uB ... preservative of all rights.' !  Id., at 667 (quoting Yick Wo v.  uBH Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)). Bullock rejected as justifications for excluding impecunious persons, the State's concern about unwieldy ballots and its interest in financing elections. 405 U.S.,  uBm at 144!149. Lubin reaffirmed that a State may not require from an indigent candidate fees he cannot pay. 415 U.S., at 718. Nor may access to judicial processes in cases criminal or quasi criminal in  J nature, Mayer, 404 U.S., at 196 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), turn on ability to pay. In accord with the substance and sense of our decisions in  J Lassiter and Santosky, see supra, at 12!15, we place decrees forever terminating parental rights in the "   category of cases in which the State may not bolt the  J door to equal justice, Griffin, 351 U.S., at 24 (Frank J furter, J., concurring in judgment); see supra, at 5.  9H1 d d,VI؃  2  In numerous cases, respondents point out, the Court has held that government need not provide funds so that people can exercise even fundamental rights. Brief  J~ for Respondents 12; see, e.g., Lyng v. Automobile  JV Workers, 485 U.S. 360, 363, n.2, 370!374 (1988) (rejecting equal protection attack on amendment to Food Stamp Act providing that no household could become eligible for benefits while a household member was on  J strike); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 543!544, 550!551 (1983) (rejecting nonprofit organization's claims of free speech and equal protection rights to receive tax deductible contributions  J to support its lobbying activity); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321!326 (1980) (Medicaid funding need not be provided for women seeking medically necessary abortions). A decision for M.L.B., respondents contend, would dishonor our cases recognizing that the Constitution generally confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.  J DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).  Complainants in the cases on which respondents rely sought state aid to subsidize their privately initiated action or to alleviate the consequences of differences in economic circumstances that existed apart from state action. M.L.B.'s complaint is of a different order. She is endeavoring to defend against the State's destruction of her family bonds, and to resist the brand associated with a parental unfitness adjudication. Like a defendant resisting criminal conviction, she seeks to be spared"   from the State's devastatingly adverse action. That is  J the very reason we have paired her case with Mayer, not  J with Ortwein or Kras, discussed supra, at 9!11.  J  Respondents also suggest that Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), is instructive because it rejects the notion that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race  J than of another, id., at 242. This must be all the more true, respondents urge, with respect to an allegedly disparate impact on a class [here, the poor] that, unlike race, is not suspect. Brief for Respondent 31.  J  Washington v. Davis, however, does not have the sweeping effect respondents attribute to it. That case involved a verbal skill test administered to prospective Government employees. [A] far greater proportion of blacks"four times as many"failed the test than did whites. 426 U.S., at 237. But the successful test takers included members of both races, as did the unsuccessful examinees. Disproportionate impact, standing alone, the Court held, was insufficient to prove unconstitutional racial discrimination. Were it otherwise, a host of laws would be called into question, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more  J affluent white. Id., at 248.  To comprehend the difference between the case at  JP hand and cases controlled by Washington v. Davis,#%P uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < See Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256  uBo (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development  uB& Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).# one need look no further than this Court's opinion in  J Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). Williams held"   unconstitutional an Illinois law under which an indigent offender could be continued in confinement beyond the maximum prison term specified by statute if his indigency   prevented him from satisfying the monetary portion of the sentence. The Court described that law as  u ! `nondiscriminatory on its face,' N!  and recalled that the  J law found incompatible with the Constitution in Griffin had been so characterized. 399 U.S., at 242 (quoting  J Griffin, 351 U.S., at 17, n.11); see Griffin, 351 U.S., at 17, n.11 ( [A] law nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation.). But the  JH Williams Court went on to explain that the Illinois  J statute in operative effect exposes only indigents to the risk of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum.  J Williams, 399 U.S., at 242 (emphasis added). Sanctions  J of the Williams genre, like the Mississippi prescription  J here at issue, are not merely disproportionate in impact. Rather, they are wholly contingent on one's ability to pay, and thus visi[t] different consequences on two  J categories of persons, ibid.; they apply to all indigents and do not reach anyone outside that class.  J  In sum, under respondents' reading of Washington v.  J Davis, our overruling of the Griffin line of cases would be two decades overdue. It suffices to point out that this Court has not so conceived the meaning and effect of our 1976 disproportionate impact precedent. See  J Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S., at 664!665 (adhering in  J 1983 to Griffin's principle of `equal justice' v! ).*o uB0 ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Six of the seven Justices in the majority in Washington v. Davis,  uB 426 U.S. 229 (1976), had two Terms before Davis read our deci uB sions in Griffin and related cases to hold that [t]he State cannot adopt procedures which leave an indigent defendant `entirely cut off from any appeal at all,' by virtue of his indigency, or extend to such indigent defendants merely a `meaningless ritual' while others in  uBz better economic circumstances have a `meaningful appeal.' !  Ross v.  uB1 Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974) (opinion of the Court by  uB ԚRehnquist, J.) (citations omitted).*"  Ԍ Respondents and the dissenters urge that we will open  J floodgates if we do not rigidly restrict Griffin to cases  J typed criminal. See post, at 14!17 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Brief for Respondents 27!28. But we have repeatedly noticed what sets parental status termination decrees apart from mine run civil actions, even from other domestic relations matters such as divorce,  J paternity, and child custody. See supra, at 12!15, and n.11. To recapitulate, termination decrees wor[k] a  J unique kind of deprivation. Lassiter, 452 U.S., at 27. In contrast to matters modifiable at the parties' will or based on changed circumstances, termination adjudications involve the awesome authority of the State to destroy permanently all legal recognition of the parental  J relationship. Rivera, 483 U.S., at 580. Our Lassiter  J and Santosky decisions, recognizing that parental termination decrees are among the most severe forms of  JX state action, Santosky, 455 U.S., at 759, have not  J0 served as precedent in other areas. See supra, at 14, n.11. We are therefore satisfied that the label civil should not entice us to leave undisturbed the Mississippi  J courts' disposition of this case. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S., at 50. '* * *  For the reasons stated, we hold that Mississippi may not withhold from M.L.B. a `record of sufficient completeness' to permit proper [appellate] consideration  J of [her] claims. Mayer, 404 U.S., at 198. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.  J( ` 3It is so ordered.