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For purposes of removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.   (b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.> In a case not originally removable, a defendant who receives a pleading or other paper indicating the postcommencement satisfaction of federal jurisdictional requirements"for example, by reason of the dismissal of a nondiverse party"may remove the case to federal court within 30 days of receiving such information. 1446(b). No case, however, may be removed from state to federal court based on diversity of citizenship more than 1 year after commencement of  J the action. Ibid.o ; uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < In full, 28 U.S.C. 1446(b) provides:   The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not"## required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.   If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable, except that a case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement of the action. "  Ԍ Once a defendant has filed a notice of removal in the federal district court, a plaintiff objecting to removal on the basis of any defect in removal procedure may, within 30 days, file a motion asking the district court to remand the case to state court. 1447(c). This 30!day limit does not apply, however, to jurisdictional defects: If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case  J shall be remanded. Ibid.; uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) provides:   A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.... The State court may thereupon proceed with such case.  9H1 d dy,III؃  2  We note, initially, two givens in this case as we have accepted it for review. First, the District Court, in its decision denying Lewis' timely motion to remand, incorrectly treated Whayne Supply, the nondiverse defendant, as effectively dropped from the case prior to removal. See App. 55. Second, the Sixth Circuit correctly determined that the complete diversity requirement was not satisfied at the time of removal. App. to  J Pet. for Cert. 8a9a.Bn ; uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Caterpillar's petition for certiorari raised the question whether the subrogation claim asserted by Liberty Mutual, and thus theU"## citizenship of Whayne Supply, should be disregarded for purposes of determining diversity of citizenship, in view of the settlement agreed upon between Lewis and Whayne Supply. See Pet. for Cert. i, 18!23. Our order granting review did not encompass that question, see 517 U.S. ___ (1996), and we express no opinion on it.B We accordingly home in on this#"   question: Does the District Court's initial misjudgment still burden and run with the case, or is it overcome by the eventual dismissal of the nondiverse defendant?  Petitioner Caterpillar relies heavily on our decisions in  J` American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6  J8 (1951), and Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699 (1972), urging that these decisions long ago settled the proposition that remand to the state court is unnecessary even if jurisdiction did not exist at the time of removal, so long as the district court had subject matter jurisdiction at the time of judgment. Brief for  JH Petitioner 8!9. Caterpillar is right that Finn and  J Grubbs are key cases in point and tend in Caterpillar's favor. Each suggests that the existence of subjectmatter jurisdiction at time of judgment may shield a judgment against later jurisdictional attack. But neither decision resolves dispositively a controversy of the kind we face, for neither involved a plaintiff who moved promptly, but unsuccessfully, to remand a case improperly removed from state court to federal court, and then challenged on appeal a judgment entered by the federal court.  J  In Finn, two defendants removed a case to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. 341 U. S., at 7!8. Eventually, final judgment was entered for the  J plaintiff against one of the removing defendants. Id., at 8. The losing defendant urged on appeal, and before this Court, that the judgment could not stand because the requisite diversity jurisdiction, it turned out, existed neither at the time of removal nor at the time of judgment. Agreeing with the defendant, we held thatP#"   the absence of federal jurisdiction at the time of judgment required the Court of Appeals to vacate the  J District Court's judgment. Id., at 17!18.; uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The Court left open in Finn the question whether, on remand to the District Court, a new judgment [could] be entered on the old verdict without a new trial if the nondiverse defendant were  uB= dismissed from the case. 341 U.S., at 18, n.18. In the litigation's second round, the District Court allowed the plaintiff to dismiss all  uB claims against the nondiverse defendant. See Finn v. American Fire  uBb & Casualty Co., 207 F.2d 113, 114 (CA5 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 912 (1954). Thereafter, the District Court granted a new trial, on the assumption that the original judgment could not stand for  uB lack of jurisdiction. See ibid. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside the judgment entered after the second  uB trial and ordered the original judgment reinstated. Id., at 117.  J  Finn's holding does not speak to the situation here, where the requirement of complete diversity was satisfied at the time of judgment. But Caterpillar points  J to wellknown dicta in Finn more helpful to its cause. There are cases, the Court observed, which uphold judgments in the district courts even though there was  J no right to removal. Id., at 16. n$ ; uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The Court cited Baggs v. Martin, 179 U.S. 206 (1900), and three  uBK lower federal court cases. Finn, 341 U.S., at 16, n.14. In those cases, the  Jp Finn Court explained, the federal trial court would have had original jurisdiction of the controversy had it been brought in the federal court in the posture it had at the time of the actual trial of the cause or of the entry of  J the judgment. Ibid.  J  The discussion in Finn concentrated on cases in which  J courts held removing defendants estopped from challenging final judgments on the basis of removal errors. See  J0 id., at 17. The Finn Court did not address the situation of a plaintiff such as Lewis, who chose a state court as the forum for his lawsuit, timely objected to removal before the District Court, and then challenged the removal on appeal from an adverse judgment. "  Ԍ J  In Grubbs, a civil action filed in state court was removed to federal court on the petition of the United States, which had been named as a party defendant in a crossaction filed by the original defendant. 405 U.S., at 700!701; see 28 U.S.C. 1444 (authorizing removal of actions brought against the United States, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2410, with respect to property on which the United States has or claims a lien). No party objected to the removal before trial or judgment.  J See Grubbs, 405 U.S., at 701. The Court of Appeals nonetheless held, on its own motion, that the interpleader of the United States was spurious, and that removal had therefore been improper under 28 U.S.C.  J 1444. See Grubbs, 405 U.S., at 702. On this basis, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court's judgment should be vacated and the case remanded to  J state court. See ibid.  JX  This Court reversed. Id., at 700. We explained: BQ 0C  , , (  Longstanding decisions of this Court make clear ... that where after removal a case is tried on the merits without objection and the federal court enters judgment, the issue in subsequent proceedings on appeal is not whether the case was properly removed, but whether the federal district court would have had original jurisdiction of the case had it been  J[ filed in that court. Id., at 702. kvBQ 3d  ( , , We concluded that, whether or not the case was properly removed, the District Court did have jurisdic JG tion of the parties at the time it entered judgment. Id., at 700. Under such circumstances, we held, the  J validity of the removal procedure followed may not be  J raised for the first time on appeal. Ibid. (emphasis  J added). Grubbs instructs that an erroneous removal need not cause the destruction of a final judgment, if the requirements of federal subjectmatter jurisdiction  J/ are met at the time the judgment is entered. Grubbs,/ "   however, dealt with a case removed without objection. The decision is not dispositive of the question whether a plaintiff, who timely objects to removal, may later successfully challenge an adverse judgment on the ground that the removal did not comply with statutory prescriptions.  Beyond question, as Lewis acknowledges, there was in this case complete diversity, and therefore federal subjectmatter jurisdiction, at the time of trial and judgment. See Brief for Respondent 18!19 (diversity became complete when Liberty Mutual settled its subrogation claim with Whayne Supply and the latter was formally dismissed from the case). The case had by then become, essentially, a twoparty lawsuit: Lewis, a citizen of Kentucky, was the sole plaintiff; Caterpillar, incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in Illinois, was the sole defendant Lewis confronted. Caterpillar maintains that this change cured  J0 the threshold statutory misstep, i.e., the removal of a case when diversity was incomplete. Brief for Petitioner 7, 13.  Caterpillar moves too quickly over the terrain we must  J cover. The jurisdictional defect was cured, i.e., complete diversity was established before the trial commenced. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit erred in resting its decision on the absence of subjectmatter jurisdiction. But a statutory flaw"Caterpillar's failure to meet the 1441(a) requirement that the case be fit for federal adjudication at the time the removal petition is filed"remained in the unerasable history of the case.  And Lewis, by timely moving for remand, did all that was required to preserve his objection to removal. An order denying a motion to remand, standing alone, is [o]bviously ... not final and [immediately] appealable  J as of right. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 578 (1954). Nor is a plaintiff required to seek permission to take an interlocutory appeal pursuant` "    J to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b)^ ; uBh ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Section 1292(b) provides for interlocutory appeals from otherwise not immediately appealable orders, if conditions specified in the section are met, the district court so certifies, and the court of appeals exercises its discretion to take up the request for review.^ in order to avoid waiving  J whatever ultimate appeal right he may have.0 l; uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < On brief, Caterpillar argued that Lewis effectively waived his objection to removal by failing to seek an immediate appeal of the district court's refusal to remand. Brief for Petitioner 13. We reject this waiver argument, though we recognize that it has at uB tracted some support in Court of Appeals opinions. See, e.g., Able  uB v. Upjohn Co., 829 F.2d 1330, 1333!1334 (CA4 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 963 (1988).0 Indeed, if a party had to invoke 1292(b) in order to preserve an objection to an interlocutory ruling, litigants would be obliged to seek 1292(b) certifications constantly. Routine resort to 1292(b) requests would hardly comport with Congress' design to reserve interlocutory review for  I! `exceptional' !  cases while generally retaining for the federal courts a firm final judgment rule.  J Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978)  Jp (quoting Fisons, Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241, 1248 (CA7), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972)).  Having preserved his objection to an improper removal, Lewis urges that an all's well that ends well approach is inappropriate here. He maintains that ultimate satisfaction of the subjectmatter jurisdiction requirement ought not swallow up antecedent statutory violations. The course Caterpillar advocates, Lewis observes, would disfavor diligent plaintiffs who timely, but unsuccessfully, move to check improper removals in district court. Further, that course would allow improperly removing defendants to profit from their disregard of Congress' instructions, and their ability to lead district judges into error.  Concretely, in this very case, Lewis emphasizes, adherence to the rules Congress prescribed for removal m "   would have kept the case in state court. Only by removing prematurely was Caterpillar able to get to federal court inside the 1year limitation set in  J Ԛ1446(b).7 ; uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Congress amended 1446(b) in 1988 to include the 1year limitation in order to reduc[e] the opportunity for removal after substantial progress has been made in state court. H.R. Rep. No. 100!889, p.72 (1988).7 Had Caterpillar waited until the case was  J` ripe for removal, i.e., until Whayne Supply was dismissed as a defendant, the 1year limitation would have  J barred the way, K l; uBT ԍOn appeal, Lewis raised only the absence of diversity. He did not refer to the 1year limitation prior to his brief on the merits in this Court. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 17, 30!31. Under this Court's Rule 15.2, a nonjurisdictional argument not raised in a respondent's brief in opposition to a petition for a writ of certiorari may be deemed waived. Under the facts of this case, however, addressing the implications of 1446(b)'s 1year limitation is  ! `predicate to an intelligent resolution' of  uBU the question presented. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. ___, ___ (1996) (slip  uB  op., at 4) (quoting Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 258!259, n.5 (1980)). We therefore regard the issue as one fairly included within the question presented. This Court's Rule 14.1. The parties addressed the issue in their briefs and at oral argument, and we exercise our discretion  uB to decide it. FTN  \  XgEpXFr  ddf < XFrXFr and plaintiff's choice of forum would  J have been preserved.&% ; uBw ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Lewis preferred state court to federal court based on differences  uB. he perceived in, inter alia, the state and federal jury systems and rules of evidence. See Brief for Respondent 22!23.&  These arguments are hardly meritless, but they run up against an overriding consideration. Once a diversity case has been tried in federal court, with rules of  JH decision supplied by state law under the regime of Erie  J R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming.  J  Our decision in NewmanGreen, Inc. v. Alfonzo J ԚLarrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989), is instructive in this  J regard. NewmanGreen did not involve removal, but it did involve the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction andX "   a party defendant whose presence, like Whayne Supply's  J in this case, blocked complete diversity. NewmanGreen proceeded to summary judgment with the jurisdictional flaw"the absence of complete diversity"undetected.  J` See id., at 828!829. The Court of Appeals noticed the flaw, invited the parties to address it, and, en banc, returned the case to the District Court to determine whether it would be prudent to drop [the jurisdiction  J spoiler] from the litigation. Id., at 830. We held that the Court of Appeals itself had authority to dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party, although we recognized that, ordinarily, district courts are better positioned to  J make such judgments. Id., at 837!838. [R]equiring dismissal after years of litigation, the Court stressed in  J NewmanGreen, would impose unnecessary and wasteful burdens on the parties, judges, and other litigants  J waiting for judicial attention. Id., at 836. The same may be said of the remand to state court Lewis seeks  J0 here. Cf. Knop v. McMahan, 872 F.2d 1132, 1139, n.16 (CA3 1989) ( To permit a case in which there is complete diversity throughout trial to proceed to judgment and then cancel the effect of that judgment and relegate the parties to a new trial in a state court because of a brief lack of complete diversity at the beginning of the case would be a waste of judicial resources.).  Our view is in harmony with a main theme of the removal scheme Congress devised. Congress ordered a procedure calling for expeditious superintendence by district courts. The lawmakers specified a short time, 30 days, for motions to remand for defects in removal procedure, 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), and district court orders remanding cases to state courts generally are not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, 1447(d). Congress did not similarly exclude appellate review of refusals to remand. But an evident concern that may explain the lack of symmetry relates to the federal courts' subject`"  ԫmatter jurisdiction. Despite a federal trial court's threshold denial of a motion to remand, if, at the end of  J the day and case, a jurisdictional defect remains uncured, the judgment must be vacated. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(h)(3) ( Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the  J action.); Finn, 341 U.S., at 18. In this case, however, no jurisdictional defect lingered through judgment in the District Court. To wipe out the adjudication postjudgment, and return to state court a case now satisfying all federal jurisdictional requirements, would impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court system, a cost incompatible with the fair and unprotracted administration of justice.  Lewis ultimately argues that, if the final judgment against him is allowed to stand, all of the various procedural requirements for removal will become unenforceable; therefore, defendants will have an enormous incentive to attempt wrongful removals. Brief for Respondent 9. In particular, Lewis suggests that defendants will remove prematurely in the hope that some subsequent developments, such as the eventual dismissal of nondiverse defendants, will permit th[e] case  J@ to be kept in federal court. Id., at 21. We do not anticipate the dire consequences Lewis forecasts.  The procedural requirements for removal remain enforceable by the federal trial court judges to whom those requirements are directly addressed. Lewis' prediction that rejection of his petition will encourag[e]  JP state court defendants to remove cases improperly, id., at 19, rests on an assumption we do not indulge"that district courts generally will not comprehend, or will balk at applying, the rules on removal Congress has prescribed. The prediction furthermore assumes defendants' readiness to gamble that any jurisdictional defect, for example, the absence of complete diversity, will first`"   escape detection, then disappear prior to judgment. The welladvised defendant, we are satisfied, will foresee the likely outcome of an unwarranted removal"a swift, and nonreviewable remand order, see 28 U.S.C. 1447(c), (d), attended by the displeasure of a district court whose authority has been improperly invoked. The odds against any gain from a wrongful removal, in sum, render improbable Lewis' projection of increased resort to the maneuver. 3 Stars (*** ͥ3 Stars For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.  J ` 3It is so ordered.ă