WPCM 2BBcR Z3#|o "m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^018``(AASe.8..``````````..eeeS}xJlxoxxxoAeAeS(fl]o`Afr>;o;rfolWSGrfffZAeAe8.888888888888f>fffff]````J>J>J>J>rffffrrrrxffoffxffofff]]]]o````ffffffrrJ>J>J>J>lox;x;x;x;x;rrrrffWWWoSoSoSoSxGxGxGrrrrrrxfoZoZoZox;rWoSxGxfxfofrNe.}S1SSS```==`9}}`9(PPS88SSrr(P9ee\\w.e77\\\wwweeeCe.wR)EreewwwwIeenR\\\wwwxio\eEfRfIfRxe|W87y\r\rxWlRx\\]\ceIfIs`Wx\rriIe77\``rigewiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiIIIIIIIeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee777777777777\\\\\\\````````````rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrxfx8xs8s\2&~"cc)#"X^HJS<aa}FSFFFF}oaa}<a]XX}kaaSFSS*SSSSSSSSSS]o]o]o]o]o]o]o]o]XXXXX}}}}kkkX}kNF}J}}}\\VV<xx}SS}}<xVF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"X^?Sf}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}FFoSaSFSu}So}o}oS}}FF}F}}}}SaF}}}}ox2xS?SS*SSSSSSSSSS}FooooooooooSFSFSFSF}}}}}}}}}}o}}}}}}ooooooo}oooo}}}}}}}}SFSFSFSFa}FFFFF}}}}}}SSSaaaaFFF}}}}}}}ooo}F}SaF}}}}}NX?q}So}}}}}EN}K}K-oo}SS}}SoKF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR27 c& c!* c-0"m^3=Iff%==\o3=3offffffffff33oooQzKpzzz~~z=o=o\%ifQpQ=bp=:f=p\ifQQAp_\\U=o=o=3============f=iiiiiQQQQQK=K=K=K=p\\\\pppp~\ip\\~\\ziiiiQQQQpQQQQbbbbbbppK=K=K=K=pfz=z=z=z=z=pppp\\QQQzQzQzQzQ~A~A~Apppppp~\zUzUzUpz=pQzQ~A~\~\p\pNo3w\=QNNfffMDf=f=3GG\==\\pp%G=ooee3o<>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXgn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS2uD c7 c ;`>C"m^!+==\Z%%7C%==========CCC1QOOOVOIV\-=VIhZVIVOEIZOlMMC%C%C7==1?7%;C#!A#bC7?=13+C;V;;5%C%C%%%n%%%%%%%%%%?#O=O=O=O=O=nXO1O7O7O7O7-#-#-#-#ZCV7V7V7V7ZCZCZCZCM;O=V?V7V7M;V7I?O=O=O=O1O1O1O1V?O7O7O7O7V;V;V;V;V;V;\C\C-#-#-#-#=VAI#I#I#I#I#ZCZCZCZCV7V7n\O1O1O1E3E3E3E3I+I+I+ZCZCZCZCZCZClVM;C5C5C5V?I#ZCO1E3I+M;M;V?V7ZCNCC7!1//===%!\\=%QQ=\%++=n77nCCn+n%CC<HYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>1&`)o=3no P['C&P &V%e8.|e P['CP&,8SF> P['CPd-:SHvX pTCd\'l80lX pTC]DS?3s\  PCP^DS??皝4  p(AC&mu![2*d[ P['CP Eu![2*P[e xzCXa)o=3PRoe xzC&X&r!Y1)LY P['CP b)o=3no P['C&P &lUC%D4C P['CJP&F66 P['CPuy<u F̀Xð-GPSQVފiryvBQ d  ( , ,  Notwithstanding that the subjective motivation for the officer's decision to stop respondent related to drug interdiction, the legality of the stop depended entirely on the fact that respondent was speeding. Of course, [a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to  J_ believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Whren v.  J7 United States, 517 U.S. ___ (1996) (slip op., at 3). As noted above, however, by the time Robinette was asked for consent to search his automobile, the lawful traffic stop had come to an end; Robinette had been given his warning, and the speeding violation provided no further justification for detention. The continued detention was  JG therefore only justifiable, if at all, on some other grounds.YJG uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) ( [A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer  uB than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop); United  uB States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) ( stop and inquiry must be `reasonably related in scope to the justification for  uBB their initiation' !  (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)).YG"  Ԍ At no time prior to the search of respondent's vehicle did any articulable facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion of some separate illegal activity that would  J justify further detention. See United States v. Sharpe,  J` 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985); United States v.  J8 ԚBrignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881!882 (1975); Terry v.  J Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). As an objective matter, it inexorably follows that when the officer had completed his task of either arresting or reprimanding the driver of the speeding car, his continued detention of that person constituted an illegal seizure. This holding by the Ohio Supreme Court is entirely consistent with  J federal law.   uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Since this Court reviews judgments, not opinions, Chevron U.  uB? S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984), the Ohio Supreme Court's holding that Robinette's continued seizure was illegal on these grounds provides a sufficient basis for affirming its judgment.  The proper disposition follows as an application of  J wellsettled law. We held in Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), that a consent obtained during an illegal detention is ordinarily ineffective to justify an otherwise  JX invalid search.2 K X# uBS ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice White explained that statements given during a period of illegal detention are inadmissible even though voluntarily given if they are the product of the illegal detention and not the result of an independent act of  uB/ free will. 460 U.S., at 501. The defendant in Royer had been  uB  illegally detained when he consented to the search. Id., at 507. As a result, the plurality agreed that the consent was tainted by  uBT the illegality and was ineffective to justify the search. Id., at 507!508. Concurring in the result, Justice Brennan agreed with this much of the plurality's decision, diverging on other grounds.  uBy See id., at 509. Justice Brennan's agreement on that narrow  uB0 principle represents the holding of the Court. See Marks v. United  uB States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).2 See also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 433!434 (1991) (noting that if consent was given during the course of an unlawful seizure, the results ofn "   the search must be suppressed as tainted fruit);  J Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218!219 (1979);  J Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601!602 (1975). Cf.  J Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Because Robinette's consent to the search was the product of an unlawful detention, the consent was tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to justify the  J search. Royer, 460 U.S., at 507!508 (plurality opinion). I would therefore affirm the judgment below.   9H1 d d,II؃  J  2  A point correctly raised by Justice Ginsburg merits emphasis. The Court's opinion today does not address either the wisdom of the rule announced in the second syllabus preceding the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion, or the validity of that rule as a matter of Ohio law. Nevertheless the risk that the narrowness of the Court's holding may not be fully understood prompts these additional words.  There is no rule of federal law that precludes Ohio from requiring its police officers to give its citizens warnings that will help them to understand whether a valid traffic stop has come to an end, and will help judges to decide whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances at issue  J in any given case.  uB> ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Indeed, we indicated in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991), that the fact a defendant had been explicitly advised that he could refuse to give consent was relevant to the question whether he was seized at the time consent was sought. And, in other cases we have stressed the importance of similar advice as a circumstance supporting the conclusion that a consent to search was voluntary.  uB See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); United  uB? States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558!559 (1980). Cf. Washing uB ton v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9 (1982) (consent to search was voluntary where defendant consented, in writing, ... after being advised that his consent must be voluntary and that he had an absoluted "## right to refuse consent). Nor, as I have previously obG "  Ԯserved, is there anything in the Federal Constitution that prohibits a State from giving lawmaking power to  J its courts. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 479, and n.3 (1981) (dissenting opinion). Thus, as far as we are concerned, whether Ohio acts through one branch of its government or another, it has the same power to enforce a warning rule as other  J States that may adopt such rules by executive action. p G uB ԍAs we are informed by a brief amicus curiae filed by Americans For Effective Law Enforcement, Inc.: Such a warning may be good police  uBu practice, and indeed amicus knows that many law enforcement agencies among our constituents have routinely incorporated a warning into their Fourth Amendment consent forms that they use in the field, but it is  uB precisely that"a practice and not a constitutional imperative. An officer who includes such a warning in his request for consent undoubtedly presents a stronger case for a finding of voluntariness in a suppression hearing, and we would not suggest that such agencies and officers do otherwise. We know, too, that instructors in many police training programs of leading universities and management institutes routinely recommend such warnings as a sound practice, likely to bolster the voluntariness of a consent to search. [We ourselves] conduct[] law enforcement training programs at the national level and many of our own speakers have made this very point. Brief for Americans For  uB Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 7. FTN   XgEpXFr  ddf <   Moreover, while I recognize that warning rules provide benefits to the law enforcement profession and the courts, as well as to the public, I agree that it is not our function to pass judgment on the wisdom of such  J rules. Accordingly, while I have concluded that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio should be affirmed, and thus dissent from this Court's disposition of the case, I am in full accord with its conclusion that the Federal Constitution neither mandates nor prohibits the warnings prescribed by the Ohio Court. Whether such a practice should be followed in Ohio is a matter for Ohio lawmakers to decide.