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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) 1. a. i.(1)(a)(i) 1) a) 1. a. i.(1)(a)(i) 1) a) 1. a. i.(1)(a)(i) 1) a)ҲOutlineBOutline with Bullets* I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)-*+x-*+x-*+xҲOutlineNOutline with numbers ܸ-} I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) 1. 1.(1) 1.(1) 1. 1) 1. 1. 1.(1) 1.(1) 1. 1) 1. 1. 1.(1) 1.(1) 1. 1) 1.ҲBQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote *~ d   (  dd  ( ( ( 2^1 .' A( 5_*,Opin InitInitial Opinion codes pЊ #  ( (    П I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)DaggersDagger Footnote Option /|fT#[ P['CP#X01Í Í14,39Í Í #o P['C#{&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:P#)  dd^_  R SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESА*(  ^_dd #T P[:+AdP# <<  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)Final OpFinal Opinion Formatr   #  ( (   X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:P#x X )  dd^_ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESА*(  ^_dd #T P[:+AdP# <<  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)2RC21H3 6<5 EllipsisParagraph EllipsisD;X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"X^HJS<aa}FSFFFF}oaa}<a]XX}kaaSFSS*SSSSSSSSSS]o]o]o]o]o]o]o]o]XXXXX}}}}kkkX}kNF}J}}}\\VV<xx}SS}}<xVF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS2QcC cF cJJ cM"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQX P['CPd&:SHvX pTCd''l80lX pTC&(4NA> P['CP&)u![2*d[ P['CP *u![2*3[e xzCX&r!Y1)LY P['CP+)o=3no P['C&P ,)o=33Roe xzC&X&2UC%D4C P['CJP&F66 P['CP"m^#22KI-72222222222777(BAAAFAHYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>1 Opin InitЊ #  ( (     П I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a) Final Other  ##  ( ( ( (  # P['A>P#')  dd^_  R SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESА uB  -(  ^_dd #T P[:+AdP# <<  I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)-#[ P['CdP# ( ( , , 4 C  3c C No. 92!602 4 !   J "Z #o P['Cn&P# ddd < %hǢ uB  ddd < #[ P['CdP#K192!602"DISSENT  uBn  (ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER v. HICKS%iǢ uB  ddd < #[ P['CdP#K192!602"DISSENT  uBn  (ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER v. HICKS`Q؃ C ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER, et al., PETITIONERS  J 1v. MELVIN HICKS    on writ of certiorari to the united states court ( of appeals for the eighth circuit 1#[ P['CdP# d [June 25, 1993] -,   #o P['Cn&P#  J gFootnotes#[ P['CdP# dd X01Í Í01Í Í , , #o P['Cn&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: of a personnel decision. See ante, at 10!11. Most companies, of course, keep personnel records, and such records generally are admissible under  uB Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e. ! g., Martin v.  uBc Funtime, Inc., 963 F.2d 110, 115!116 (CA6 1992); EEOC v. Alton  uB Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 925!926 (CA11 1990). Even those employers who do not keep records of their decisions will have other means of discovering the likely reasons for a personnel action by, for example, interviewing coworkers, examining employment records, and identifying standard personnel policies. The majority's scheme rewards employers who decide, in this atypical situation, to invent rather than to investigate.d "##Ԍ uB  This concern drives the majority to point to the hypothetical case, ante, at 10!11, of the employer with a disproportionately high percentage of minority workers who would nonetheless lose a Title VII racial discrimination case by giving an untrue reason for a challenged personnel action. What the majority does not tell us, however, is why such an employer  uB# must rely solely on an antagonistic former employee, ante, at 11, rather than on its own personnel records, among other things, to establish the credible, nondiscriminatory reason it almost certainly must have had, given the facts assumed. The majority claims it would be a mockery of justice to allow recovery against an employer who presents compelling evidence of nondiscrimination simply because the jury believes a reason  uBm given in a personnel record is probably not the `true' one. Ante, at 11, n.5. But prior to drawing such a conclusion, the jury would consider all of the compelling evidence as at least circumstantial evidence for the truth of the nondiscriminatory explanation, because the employer would be able to argue that it would not lie to avoid a discrimination charge when its general behavior had been so demonstrably meritorious. If the jury still found that the plaintiff had carried his burden to show untruth, the untruth must have been a real whopper, or else the compelling evidence must not have been very compelling. In either event, justice need not worry too much about mockery.N and the trier of fact concludes that the plainh "  Ԯtiff has proven his prima facie case, the court must enter  J judgment for the plaintiff. Ante, at 7, n.3. The majority's scheme therefore leads to the perverse result that employers who fail to discover nondiscriminatory reasons for their own decisions to hire and fire employees  J8 not only will benefit from lying,l 8i uB ԍ &  XgEpXFrAs the majority readily admits, its scheme places any employer who  uBZ lies in a better position than the employer who says nothing. Ante, at  uB 18!19. Under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, an employer caught in a lie will lose on the merits, subjecting himself to liability not only for damages, but also for the prevailing plaintiff's attorney's fees, including, presumably, fees for the extra time spent to show pretext. See 42 U.S.C.  w ! 2000e!5(k) (1988 ed., Supp. III) (providing for an award of a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party in a Title VII action). Under the majority's scheme, the employer who is caught in a lie, but succeeds in injecting into the trial an unarticulated reason for its actions, will win its case and walk away rewarded for its falsehoods.l but must lie, to defend successfully against a disparatetreatment action. By offering false evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason, suchp "   an employer can rebut the presumption raised by the plaintiff's prima facie case, and then hope that the factfinder will conclude that the employer may have acted for a reason unknown rather than for a discriminatory reason. I know of no other scheme for structuring a legal action that, on its own terms, requires a party to lie in order to prevail.  Finally, the Court's opinion destroys a framework carefully crafted in precedents as old as 20 years, which the Court attempts to deflect, but not to confront. The majority first contends that the opinions creating and  JH refining the McDonnell Douglas framework consist primarily of dicta, whose bearing on the issue we consider today  J presumably can be ignored. See ante, at 12. But this readiness to disclaim the Court's considered pronounce J ments devalues them. Cases, such as McDonnell Douglas, that set forth an order of proof necessarily go beyond the minimum necessary to settle the narrow dispute presented, but evidentiary frameworks set up in this manner are not for that reason subject to summary dismissal in later cases as products of mere dicta. Courts and litigants rely on this Court to structure lawsuits based on federal statutes in an orderly and sensible manner, and we should not casually abandon the structures adopted.  Because the Court thus naturally declines to rely entirely on dismissing our prior directives as dicta, it turns to the task of interpreting our prior cases in this  J area, in particular Burdine. While acknowledging that statements from these earlier cases may be read, and in one instance must be read, to limit the final enquiry in a disparatetreatment case to the question of pretext, the Court declares my reading of those cases to be utter[ly]  J implausib[le], ante, at 10, imputing views to earlier  J Courts that would be beneath contempt, ante, at 15, n.7. The unlikely reading is, however, shared by the Solicitor General and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which is charged with implementing and` "   enforcing Title VII and related statutes, see Brief for  J United States et al. as Amici Curiae 1!2, not to mention the Court of Appeals in this case and, even by the Court's count, more than half of the Courts of Appeals to have  J` discussed the question (some, albeit, in dicta). See ante, at 9!10. The company should not be cause for surprise.  J For reasons explained above, McDonnell Douglas and  J Burdine provide a clear answer to the question before us, and it would behoove the majority to explain its decision to depart from those cases.  The Court's final attempt to neutralize the force of our  JH precedents comes in its claim that Aikens settled the  J question presented today. This attempt to rest on Aikens  J runs into the immediate difficulty, however, that Aikens  J repeats what we said earlier in Burdine: the plaintiff may succeed in meeting his ultimate burden of persuasion  s ! `either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explana J tion is unworthy of credence.' V!  Aikens, 460 U.S., at 716  J (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S., at 256). Although the Aikens Court quoted this statement approvingly, the majority here projects its view that the latter part of the statement  Jh is problematic, ante, at 17, arguing that the next sen J@ tence in Aikens takes care of the problem. The next sentence, however, only creates more problems for the  J majority, as it directs the District Court to decide which  J party's explanation of the employer's motivation it believes. 460 U.S., at 716 (emphasis supplied). By requiring the factfinder to choose between the employer's explanation and the plaintiff's claim of discrimination  J( (shown either directly or indirectly), Aikens flatly bars the Court's conclusion here that the factfinder can choose a third explanation, never offered by the employer, in ruling  J against the plaintiff. Because Aikens will not bear the reading the majority seeks to place upon it, there is no "   hope of projecting into the past the abandonment of precedent that occurs today.  I cannot join the majority in turning our back on these  J earlier decisions. Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains  J free to alter what we have done. Patterson v. McLean  J Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172!173 (1989). It is not as though Congress is unaware of our decisions concerning Title VII, and recent experience indicates that Congress is ready to act if we adopt interpretations of this statutory scheme it finds to be mistaken. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071. Congress has taken no action to  J indicate that we were mistaken in McDonnell Douglas and  J Burdine. 5* * *  The enhancement of a Title VII plaintiff's burden wrought by the Court's opinion is exemplified in this case. Melvin Hicks was denied any opportunity, much less a full and fair one, to demonstrate that the supposedly nondiscriminatory explanation for his demotion and termination, the personal animosity of his immediate supervisor, was unworthy of credence. In fact, the District Court did not find that personal animosity (which it failed to recognize might be racially motivated) was the true reason for the actions St. Mary's took; it adduced this reason simply as a possibility in explaining that Hicks had failed to prove that the crusade [to terminate him] was racially rather than personally motivated. 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (ED Mo. 1991). It is hardly surprising that Hicks failed to prove anything about this supposed personal crusade, since St. Mary's never articulated such an explanation for Hicks's discharge, and since the person who allegedly conducted this crusade denied at trial any personal difficulties between himself and Hicks. App. 46. While the majority may well be troubled about the unfair` "   treatment of Hicks in this instance and thus remands for review of whether the District Court's factual conclusions  J were clearly erroneous, see ante, at 21!22, the majority provides Hicks with no opportunity to produce evidence showing that the District Court's hypothesized explanation, first articulated six months after trial, is unworthy of credence. Whether Melvin Hicks wins or loses on remand, many plaintiffs in a like position will surely lose under the scheme adopted by the Court today, unless they possess both prescience and resources beyond what this Court has previously required Title VII litigants to employ.  Because I see no reason why Title VII interpretation should be driven by concern for employers who are too ashamed to be honest in court, at the expense of victims of discrimination who do not happen to have direct evidence of discriminatory intent, I respectfully dissent.