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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) 1. a. i.(1)(a)(i) 1) a) 1. a. i.(1)(a)(i) 1) a) 1. a. i.(1)(a)(i) 1) a)ҲOutlineBOutline with Bullets* I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)-*+x-*+x-*+xҲ24 >/ 0 .a1 2OutlineNOutline with numbers ܸ-} I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) 1. 1.(1) 1.(1) 1. 1) 1. 1. 1.(1) 1.(1) 1. 1) 1. 1. 1.(1) 1.(1) 1. 1) 1.ҲBQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote *~ d   (  dd  ( ( ( Opin InitInitial Opinion codes pЊ #  ( (    П I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)DaggersDagger Footnote Option /|fT#[ P['CP#X01Í Í14,39Í Í #o P['C#{&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:Final OtherFinal form, Not an OPINION u  #  ( (   # P['A>P#)  dd^_  R SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESА*(  ^_dd #T P[:+AdP# <<  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)Final OpFinal Opinion Formatr   #  ( (   X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:P#x X )  dd^_ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESА*(  ^_dd #T P[:+AdP# <<  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)5 EllipsisParagraph EllipsisD;X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXHYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>1&9)o=3no P['C&P ?xxxx `KX&:%e8.|e P['CP&;8SF> P['CPd<:SH$vX pTCd='l80$lX pTC&>4NA> P['CP&?u![2*d[ P['CP @u![2*@[e xzCXA)o=3@Roe xzC&X&r!Y1)LY P['CP B)o=3no P['C&P &DUC%D4C P['CJP&F66 P['CPB-C6C0C6OBR9%$P<K<bCO9G6O<T<=<AB0C0L?T9OKTKE0B$$<??KEDBN Opin Init #  ( (     П I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a) Final Other  ##  ( ( ( (  # P['A>P#')  dd^_  R SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESА uB  8(  ^_dd #T P[:+AdP# <<  I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)*#[ P['CdP# ( ( , , 4 C  39 C No. 91!8674 4 !   J ) #o P['Cn&P# ddd < Ӌ%ib uB  ddd < #[ P['CdP#"191!8674"DISSENT  uBn -SMITH v. UNITED STATES%jb uB  ddd < #[ P['CdP#"191!8674"DISSENT  uBn -SMITH v. UNITED STATES`Q؃ C JOHN ANGUS SMITH, PETITIONER v. 2UNITED STATES    on writ of certiorari to the united states court ' of appeals for the eleventh circuit 1#[ P['CdP# d [June 1, 1993] *,   #o P['Cn&P#  J Footnotes#[ P['CdP# dd X01Í Ío01Í Í, , #o P['Cn&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: op., at 7); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979);  J Minor v. Mechanics Bank of Alexandria, 1 Pet. 46, 64 (1828). To use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use  """## it for its intended purpose. When someone asks Do you use a cane? he is not inquiring whether you have your grandfather's silverhandled walkingstick on display in  J the hall; he wants to know whether you walk with a cane. Similarly, to speak of using a firearm is to speak of  J8 using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a weapon. To be sure, one can use a firearm in a number of ways,  J ante, at 7, including as an article of exchange, just as one can use a cane as a hall decoration"but that is not the  J ordinary meaning of using the one or the other. uB ԍThe Court asserts that the significant flaw in this argument is that  uB  to say that the ordinary meaning of `uses a firearm' includes using a firearm as a weapon is quite different from saying that the ordinary  uB% meaning also excludes any other use. Ante, at 6 (emphases in original). The two are indeed different"but it is precisely the latter that I assert  uB to be true: The ordinary meaning of uses a firearm does not include using it as an article of commerce. I think it perfectly obvious, for example, that the objective falsity requirement for a perjury conviction would not be satisfied if a witness answered no to a prosecutor's inquiry whether he had ever used a firearm, even though he had once sold his grandfather's Enfield rifle to a collector. The Court does not appear to grasp the distinction between  JH how a word can be used and how it ordinarily is used. It would, indeed, be both reasonable and normal to say that petitioner `used' his MAC!10 in his drug trafficking  J offense by trading it for cocaine. Ibid. It would also be reasonable and normal to say that he used it to scratch his head. When one wishes to describe the action of employing the instrument of a firearm for such unusual purposes, use is assuredly a verb one could select. But  J that says nothing about whether the ordinary meaning of the phrase uses a firearm embraces such extraordinary  J employments. It is unquestionably not reasonable and normal, I think, to say simply do not use firearms when one means to prohibit selling or scratching with them.  The normal usage is reflected, for example, in the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which provide form "   enhanced sentences when firearms are discharged, brandished, displayed, or possessed, or otherwise used.  J See, e. a ! g., United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual  T! 2B3.1(b)(2) (Nov. 1992). As to the latter  J` term, the Guidelines say:  {! `Otherwise used' with reference to a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) means that the conduct did not amount to the discharge of a firearm but was more than brandishing, displaying, or possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon. USSG  ! 1B1.1, comment., n. 1(g) (definitions). Otherwise used in this  Jp provision obviously means otherwise used as a weapon. p uB ԍ X  The Court says that it is not persuaded that [its] construction of the  uB phrase `uses ... a firearm' will produce anomalous applications. Ante, at 9. But as proof it points only to the fact that  ! 924(c)(1) fortuitously  uB contains other language"the requirement that the use be during and  uB in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime"that  uBk happens to prevent untoward results. Ibid. That language does not, in fact, prevent all untoward results: Though it excludes an enhanced penalty for the burglar who scratches his head with the barrel of a gun, it requires one for the burglar who happens to use a gun handle, rather than a rock, to break the window affording him entrance"hardly a distinction that ought to make a sentencing difference if the gun has no other connection to the crime. But in any event, an excuse that turns upon the language of  p! 924(c)(1) is good only for that particular statute.  uB# The Court cannot avoid anomalous applications when it applies its anomalous meaning of use a firearm in other contexts"for example, the Guidelines provision just described in text.  uBH  In a vain attempt to show the contrary, it asserts that the phrase otherwise used in the Guidelines means used for any other purpose at  uB all (the Court's preferred meaning of use a firearm), so long as it is more  uBm  culpable than brandishing. See ante, at 8. But whence does it derive that convenient limitation? It appears nowhere in the text"as well it should not, since the whole purpose of the Guidelines is to take out of the hands of individual judges determinations as to what is more culpable and less culpable. The definition of otherwise used in the Guidelines merely says that it means more than brandishing and less than firing. The Court is confident that scratching one's head with a firearm is not  uBn  more than brandishing it. See ante, at 9. I certainly agree"but only  uB% because the more use referred to is more use as a weapon. Reading the  uB Guidelines as they are written (rather than importing the Court's deus"##  uB ex machina of a culpability scale), and interpreting use a firearm in the  uBG strange fashion the Court does, produces, see ante, at 8, a full sevenpoint upward sentence adjustment for firing a gun at a storekeeper during a robbery; a mere fivepoint adjustment for pointing the gun at the storekeeper (which falls within the Guidelines' definition of brandished,  uB# see USSG  c ! 1B1.1, comment., n. 1(c)); but an intermediate six!point adjustment for using the gun to pry open the cash register or prop open the door. Quite obviously ridiculous. When the Guidelines speak of otherwise us[ing] a firearm, they mean, in accordance with normal usage, otherwise using it as a weapon"for example, placing the gun barrel in the mouth of the storekeeper to intimidate him. pm "  Ԍ  Given our rule that ordinary meaning governs, and given the ordinary meaning of uses a firearm, it seems to me inconsequential that the words `as a weapon'  J appear nowhere in the statute, ante, at 5; they are reasonably implicit. Petitioner is not, I think, seeking to  J8 introduce an additional requirement into the text, ante, at 6, but is simply construing the text according to its normal import.8  The Court seeks to avoid this conclusion by referring to the next subsection of the statute,  ! 924(d), which does not employ the phrase uses a firearm, but provides for the confiscation of firearms that are used in referenced offenses which include the crimes of transferring, selling, or transporting firearms in interstate commerce. The  J Court concludes from this that whenever the term appears in this statute, use of a firearm must include nonweapon  J use. See ante, at 10!12. I do not agree. We are dealing here not with a technical word or an artfully defined  J0 legal term, compare Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. ___, ___  J (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2!4), but with common words that are, as I have suggested, inordinately sensitive to context. Just as adding the direct object a  J firearm to the verb use narrows the meaning of that verb (it can no longer mean partake of), so also adding the modifier in the offense of transferring, selling, or transporting firearms to the phrase use a firearmm "    J expands the meaning of that phrase (it then includes, as it previously would not, nonweapon use). But neither the narrowing nor the expansion should logically be thought  J to apply to all appearances of the affected word or phrase. Just as every appearance of the word use in the statute need not be given the narrow meaning that word acquires in the phrase use a firearm, so also every appearance of the phrase use a firearm need not be given the expansive connotation that phrase acquires in the broader context use a firearm in crimes such as unlawful sale of firearms. When, for example, the statute provides that its prohibition on certain transactions in firearms shall not apply to the loan or rental of a firearm to any person for temporary use for lawful sporting purposes, 18 U.S.C.  ! 922(a)(5)(B), (b)(3)(B), I have no doubt that the  J  use referred to is only use as a sporting weapon, and not the use of pawning the firearm to pay for a ski trip. Likewise when, in  ! 924(c)(1), the phrase uses ... a firearm is not employed in a context that necessarily envisions the unusual use of a firearm as a commodity, the normally understood meaning of the phrase should prevail.  Another consideration leads to the same conclusion:   ! 924(c)(1) provides increased penalties not only for one who uses a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, but also for one who carries a firearm in those circumstances. The interpretation I would give the language produces an eminently reasonable dichotomy between using a firearm (as a weapon) and carrying a firearm (which in the context uses or carries a firearm means carrying it in such manner as to be ready for use as a weapon). The Court's interpretation, by contrast, produces a strange dichotomy between using a firearm for any purpose whatever,"    J including barter, and carrying a firearm. o uBh ԍThe Court responds to this argument by abandoning all pretense of  uB giving the phrase uses a firearm even a permissible meaning, much less its ordinary one. There is no problem, the Court says, because it is not  uB contending that uses a firearm means uses for any purpose, only that  uBD it means uses as a weapon or for trade. See ante, at 12!13. Unfortunately, that is not one of the options that our mothertongue makes available. Uses a firearm can be given a broad meaning ( uses for any purpose) or its more ordinary narrow meaning ( uses as a weapon); but it can not possibly mean uses as a weapon or for trade.   Finally, although the present prosecution was brought under the portion of  ! 924(c)(1) pertaining to use of a firearm during and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime, I think it significant that that portion is affiliated with the preexisting provision pertaining to use of a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence, rather than with the firearmtrafficking offenses defined in  G! 922 and referenced in  ! 924(d). The word use in the crime of violence context has the unmistakable import of use as a weapon, and that import carries over, in my view, to the subsequently added phrase or drug trafficking crime. Surely the word use means the same thing as to both, and surely the 1986 addition of drug trafficking crime would have been a peculiar way  J to expand its meaning (beyond use as a weapon) for crimes of violence.  Even if the reader does not consider the issue to be as clear as I do, he must at least acknowledge, I think, that it is eminently debatable"and that is enough, under the rule of lenity, to require finding for the petitioner here. At the very least, it may be said that the issue is subject to some doubt. Under these circumstances, we adhere to  the familiar rule that, `where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.' "   J Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, J 284!285 (1978), quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S."    J 336, 348 (1971). uBh ԍ X  XgEpXFrThe Court contends that giving the language its ordinary meaning would frustrate the purpose of the statute, since a gun can be converted  uB instantaneously from currency to cannon, ante, at 17. Stretching language in order to write a more effective statute than Congress devised is not an exercise we should indulge in. But in any case, the ready ability to use a gun that is at hand as a weapon is perhaps one of the reasons the statute  uB sanctions not only using a firearm, but carrying one. Here, however, the  uBi Government chose not to indict under that provision. See ante, at 4.  For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.