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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) 1. a. i.(1)(a)(i) 1) a) 1. a. i.(1)(a)(i) 1) a) 1. a. i.(1)(a)(i) 1) a)Ҳ2|+  .NOutlineBOutline with Bullets* I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)-*+x-*+x-*+xҲOutlineNOutline with numbersܸ-} I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) 1. 1.(1) 1.(1) 1. 1) 1. 1. 1.(1) 1.(1) 1. 1) 1. 1. 1.(1) 1.(1) 1. 1) 1.ҲBQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote *~ d   (  dd  ( ( ( Opin InitInitial Opinion codes pЊ #  ( (    П I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)2+K ! 5$L&CirculationCirculationn Format Ł J   .#e P['C |P#2nd DRAFT #  P['A>P# y !)  dd^_ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESА2 ^_dd #T P[:+AdP# <<  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)DaggersDagger Footnote Option /|fT#[ P['CP#X01Í Í14,39Í Í #o P['C#{&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:P#)  dd^_  R SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESА*(  ^_dd #T P[:+AdP# <<  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)Final OpFinal Opinion Formatr   #  ( (   X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:P#x X )  dd^_ SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESА*(  ^_dd #T P[:+AdP# <<  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)262H+Hz-/c35 EllipsisParagraph EllipsisD;X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:P# Justice Stevens#e P['C|P# 14Circulated: _______________________________ 14Recirculated: _____________________________ "m^AE[¾0NNuANAAAAh_ܾ夤NNu0huN}JEJϏuhl[}}}pNNNANN'NNNNNNNNNNJ麨huuuu_J_J_J_Juuuu}uu}uhhhhuuuu}}}}}}_J_J_J_JJJJJJuu¨hhhllll[[[嶤}pppJhl[}}uNAuEhccNFÂNN0[[<<uu0[NэA'MM捍]@s:`捍fsѨ`sfszNMϏzsffzfMMfffffffMMMMMMMMMMMMNN2E7c9Z?ctB"m^!+==\Z%%7C%==========CCC1QOOOVOIV\-=VIhZVIVOEIZOlMMC%C%C7==1?7%;C#!A#bC7?=13+C;V;;5%C%C%%%n%%%%%%%%%%?#O=O=O=O=O=nXO1O7O7O7O7-#-#-#-#ZCV7V7V7V7ZCZCZCZCM;O=V?V7V7M;V7I?O=O=O=O1O1O1O1V?O7O7O7O7V;V;V;V;V;V;\C\C-#-#-#-#=VAI#I#I#I#I#ZCZCZCZCV7V7n\O1O1O1E3E3E3E3I+I+I+ZCZCZCZCZCZClVM;C5C5C5V?I#ZCO1E3I+M;M;V?V7ZCNCC7!1//===%!\\=%QQ=\%++=n77nCCn+n%'CCCC,CC"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hRF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS&)o=3no P['C&P&4NA> P['CP&u![2*d[ P['CPu![2*[e xzCX&r!Y1)LY P['CP)o=3no P['C&P)o=3Roe xzC&XYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR2hLc FgJC"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXP#)  dd^_  R SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATESА uB  -(  ^_dd #T P[:+AdP# <<  I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)-#[ P['CdP# ( ( , , ) C  (9 C No. 91!6824 ) !   J 4 #o P['Cn&P# ddd < Ӌ%iCK ddd < #[ P['CdP#  uBn "ZAFIRO v. UNITED STATES%jCK ddd < #[ P['CdP#  uBn "ZAFIRO v. UNITED STATES`B؃ C GLORIA ZAFIRO, JOSE MARTINEZ, SALVADOR  J  GARCIA and ALFONSO SOTO, PETITIONERS  J %^v. UNITED STATES   on writ of certiorari to the united states court T of appeals for the seventh circuit $F#[ P['CdP# d [January 25, 1993] -,   #o P['Cn&P#  J gFootnotes#[ P['CdP# dd X01Í Í01Í Í , , #o P['Cn&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: ԍ   XgEpXFrCf. Kinkade, 140 Ariz., at 93, 680 P. 2d, at 803 (distinguishing competing from mutually antagonistic defenses). And in any event, the jury in this case obviously did not believe Soto and Zafiro, as it convicted both of them. Accordingly, there is no basis, in law or fact, for concluding that the testimony of Soto and Zafiro prejudiced their codefendants.  There is even less merit to the suggestion that Soto or Zafiro was prejudiced by the denial of their severance motions. Neither Garcia nor Martinez testified at all, of course, and the District Court explicitly cautioned the jury(l"   that the arguments made by their attorneys were not to  J be considered as evidence. Ante, at 7. Moreover, the assertion by his counsel that Garcia did not know the contents of the box is not inconsistent with Soto's ignorance or innocence; nor is the similar assertion by counsel for Martinez inconsistent with Zafiro's possible innocence. In my opinion, the District Court correctly determined that the defenses presented in this case were not mutually antagonistic. See App. 88!89.  I would save for another day evaluation of the prejudice that may arise when the evidence or testimony offered by one defendant is truly irreconcilable with the innocence of a codefendant. Because the facts here do not present the issue squarely, I hesitate in this case to develop a rule that would govern the very different situation faced  J in cases like People v. Braune, 363 Ill. 551, 557, 2 N.E. 2d 839, 842 (1936), in which mutually exclusive defenses transform a trial into more of a contest between the defendants than between the people and the defendants. Under such circumstances, joinder may well be highly prejudicial, particularly when the prosecutor's own caseinchief is marginal and the decisive evidence of guilt is left to be provided by a codefendant.  The burden of overcoming any individual defendant's presumption of innocence, by proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, rests solely on the shoulders of the prosecutor. Joinder is problematic in cases involving mutually antagonistic defenses because it may operate to reduce the burden on the prosecutor, in two general ways. First, joinder may introduce what is in effect a second prosecutor into a case, by turning each codefendant into  J( the other's most forceful adversary.(N uB ԍ   XgEpXFr Defendants who accuse each other bring the effect of a second prosecutor into the case with respect to their codefendant. In order to zealously represent his client, each codefendant's counsel must do everything possible to convict the other defendant. The existence of this"## extra prosecutor is particularly troublesome because the defense counsel are not always held to the limitations and standards imposed on the  uB government prosecutor. United States v. Tootick, 952 F.2d 1078, 1082  uB (CA9 1991). See also United States v. Romanello, 726 F.2d 173, 179  uBl (CA5 1984). ķ Second, joinder may(#"   invite a jury confronted with two defendants, at least one of whom is almost certainly guilty, to convict the defendant who appears the more guilty of the two regardless of whether the prosecutor has proven guilt beyond a  J` reasonable doubt as to that particular defendant.`#N uB[ ԍSee State v. Vinal, 198 Conn. 644, 652, 504 A.2d 1364, 1368 (1986) (in joint trial with mutually antagonistic defenses, where one defendant is found not guilty, it becomes likely under these circumstances that the conviction of the losing defendant is more a result of his codefendant's success in defending himself than it is a product of the state's satisfaction of its constitutional duty to prove the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt). Though the Court is surely correct that this second risk may be minimized by careful instructions insisting on separate consideration of the evidence as to each codefen J dant, ante, at 6!7, the danger will remain relevant to the  J prejudice inquiry in some cases.$ N uB ԍ   XgEpXFrTootick, 952 F. 2d, at 1082. See also People v. Braune, 363 Ill. 551, 556, 2 N.E. 2d 839, 842 (1936) ( [N]o judge, however learned and skillful, could have prevented risk of prejudice in particularly aggravated case).  Given these concerns, I cannot share the Court's enthusiastic and unqualified preference for the joint trial of  J defendants indicted together. See ante, at 3. The Court correctly notes that a similar preference was announced  J a few years ago in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987), and that the Court had sustained the permis J sibility of joint trials on at least two prior occasions.% N uBX ԍ   XgEpXFrIn neither Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954), nor United  uB States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat. 480 (1827), however, did the Court express a preference for joint trials. There will, however, almost certainly be multidefendant cases in which a series of separate trials would be not0%"   only more reliable, but also more efficient and manageable than some of the mammoth conspiracy cases which the Government often elects to prosecute. And in all cases, the Court should be mindful of the serious risks of prejudice and overreaching that are characteristic of joint trials, particularly when a conspiracy count is included in the indictment. Justice Jackson's eloquent description of  J these concerns in his separate opinion in Krulewitch v.  J United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949), explains why there is much more at stake here than administrative  Jp convenience. See also United States v. Romanello, 726 F.2d 173 (CA5 1984).  I agree with the Court that a brightline rule, mandating severance whenever codefendants have conflicting  J defenses is unwarranted. See ante, at 4. For the reasons discussed above, however, I think district courts must retain their traditional discretion to consider severance whenever mutually antagonistic defenses are presented. Accordingly, I would refrain from announcing a preference for joint trials, or any general rule that might be construed as a limit on that discretion.  Because I believe the District Court correctly decided the severance motions in this case, I concur in the Court's judgment of affirmance.