SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES -------- No. A-69 -------- PAUL DELO, SUPERINTENDENT, POTOSI CORREC- TIONAL CENTER v. WALTER J. BLAIR __ ON APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY OF EXECU- TION July 21, 1993 PER CURIAM. Applying the prevailing legal standard, it is "particularly egregious" to enter a stay on second or subsequent habeas peti- tions unless "there are substantial grounds upon which relief might be grant- ed." Herrera v. Collins, ___ U. S. ___, _______ _______ ___ (1993) (slip op., at 8) (internal quotations omitted) (O'CONNOR, J., con- curring, joined by KENNEDY, J.). No sub- stantial grounds were presented in the present case. The District Court stated that the "facts in Herrera mirror those _______ in the present case." Blair v. Delo, _____ ____ No. 93-0674-CV-5 (W.D. Mo. July 19, 1993). This assessment was not even questioned by the Court of Appeals, and is obviously correct. There is therefore no conceivable need for the Court of Ap- peals to engage in "more detailed study" over the next five weeks to resolve this claim. See Blair v. Delo, No. 93-2824 _____ ____ (CA8 July 20, 1993). It is an abuse of discretion for a fed- eral court to interfere with the orderly process of a state's criminal justice system in a case raising claims that are A-69 - APPLICATION 2 DELO v. BLAIR ____ for all relevant purposes indistinguish- able from those we recently rejected in Herrera. Accordingly, the Court of _______ Appeals' stay must be vacated. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, dissenting. The Court errs twice in granting the State's application to vacate the Court of Appeals' stay of execution. First, A-69 - APPLICATION DELO v. BLAIR 3 ____ it errs by affording insufficient defer- ence to the Court of Appeals' decision. Second, it errs by letting stand the Dis- trict Court's decision, which was itself erroneous. I "The standard under which we consider motions to vacate stays of execution is deferential, and properly so. Only when the lower courts have clearly abused their discretion in granting a stay should we take the extraordinary step of overturning such a decision." Dugger v. ______ Johnson, 485 U. S. 945, 947 (1988) _______ (O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C.J., dissenting). Accord Barefoot v. Estelle, ________ _______ 463 U. S. 880, 896 (1983); Wainwright v. __________ Spenkelink, 442 U. S. 901, 905 (1979) __________ (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). In this case, the Court of Appeals granted a tem- porary stay of execution to allow it time properly to consider Blair's appeal. In my view, its decision to do so does not constitute an abuse of discretion. The State likens this case to Delo v. ____ Stokes, 495 U. S. 320 (1990), in which ______ this Court vacated a stay of execution because the prisoner's habeas petition "clearly constitute[d] an abuse of the writ." Id., at 321. Although the habeas ___ petition currently before the Court of Appeals is Blair's third, the abuse of the writ doctrine cannot serve as the basis for vacating this stay. Blair's principal contention in his federal habe- as petition is that he is actually inno- cent, and this Court has recognized an exception to the abuse of the writ doc- trine where a habeas petitioner can show that he probably is innocent. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. ___, ___ _________ ____ (1991) (slip op. 25-26). II The Court's second error is that it lets stand the District Court's decision deny- ing Blair's claim without an evidentiary hearing. In Herrera v. Collins, 506 _______ _______ U. S. ___, ___ (1993), this Court assumed "that in a capital case a truly persua- sive demonstration of `actual innocence' made A-69 - APPLICATION 4 DELO v. BLAIR ____ after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 26). ___ The Court provided little guidance about what sort of showing would be "truly per- suasive." Yet despite the uncertain con- tours of this constitutional right, fed- eral courts have an obligation to treat actual-innocence claims just as they would any other constitutional claim brought pursuant to 28 U. S. C. S2254. The rules governing federal habeas, not addressed by the Herrera majority, pro- _______ vide that "[a] district court may sum- marily dismiss a habeas petition only if `it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.' 28 U. S. C. S2254 Rule 4." 506 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17) (dissent- ing opinion). "If . . . the petition raises factual questions and the State has failed to provide a full and fair hearing, the district court is required ________ to hold an evidentiary hearing." Id., at ___ ___ (slip op., at 13) (emphasis added), citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, ________ ____ 313 (1963). In this case, Blair has submitted seven affidavits tending to show that he is innocent of the crime for which he has been sentenced to death. The State does not dispute that no state court remains open to hear Blair's claim. Because Blair's affidavits raise factual ques- tions that cannot be dismissed summarily, the District Court erred in denying petitioner's claim without an evidentiary hearing. JUSTICE SOUTER would deny the applica- tion to vacate the stay.