WPCxP 2ABcR Z23|o "m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS2J#}c!cc"X^HJS<aa}FSFFFF}oaa}<a]XX}kaaSFSS*SSSSSSSSSS]o]o]o]o]o]o]o]o]XXXXX}}}}kkkX}kNF}J}}}\\VV<xx}SS}}<xVF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^018``(AASe.8..``````````..eeeS}xJlxoxxxoAeAeS(fl]o`Afr>;o;rfolWSGrfffZAeAe8.888888888888f>fffff]````J>J>J>J>rffffrrrrxffoffxffofff]]]]o````ffffffrrJ>J>J>J>lox;x;x;x;x;rrrrffWWWoSoSoSoSxGxGxGrrrrrrxfoZoZoZox;rWoSxGxfxfofrNe.}S1SSS```==`9}}`9(PPS88SSrr(P9ee\\w.e77\\\wwweeeCe.wR)EreewwwwIeenR\\\wwwxio\eEfRfIfRxe|W87y\r\rxWlRx\\]\ceIfIs`Wx\rriIe77\``rigewiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiIIIIIIIeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee777777777777\\\\\\\````````````rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrxfx8xs8s\"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^!$/CCdb((gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkklWdPZH\I\I\IlWoY2(mWgRklWaMlWs\SCYG\IhSr\lWw_s\_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXgn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS2EG{4 c; c>`A"X^?S}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}SS}a}SFS}S}ooS}FSF}oaS}}}oc7cS?SS*SSSSSSSSSSF}}}}}oooooaFaFaFaF}}}}}}}}}}}}}oooooooo}}}}}}aFaFaFaF}FFFFF}}oooaaaaSSS}oooFoaS}}}NX?}S}}}}}}KS}K}KF}}}SS}}S}KF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%jjjrjbrz P['CPd/:SHvX pTCd-'l80lX pTCmDS?3s\  PCPnDS??皝4  p(AC&ou![2*d[ P['CP &]I(!̤PI P['ChPpu![2*d[ P['CP qu![2*P[e xzCX&r!Y1)LY P['CP r)o=3no P['C&P s)o=3PRoe xzC&Xd*w=50wX pTC&2RMwGH HTQJ LBQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote - Circv C   (  Cd  ( ( ( Footnotes*rsFormats for ASTERISK footnotes'#[ P['CdP# ddf < X01Í Í1*'(Í Í #o P['Cn&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: programming control systems, ante, at 34, it does not contend (nor does the record suggest) that any local board or access center has the authority to exclude indecent programming, or to do anything that would cast doubt on the status of public access channels as public forums. Cf. Agosta 88 (New York state law forbids editorial control over public access programs by either the cable operator or the municipality); Comments of Hillsborough County Board of County Commissioners, FCC Record, at 2 (explaining county's inability to exclude indecent programming). Indeed, [m]ost access centers surveyed do not prescreen at all, except, as in [two named localities], a high speed runthrough for technical quality. P. Aufderheide, Public Access Cable Programming, Controversial Speech, and Free Expression (1992), reprinted in App. 61, 68. As the plurality acknowledges, the record indicates no response to indecent programming by local access centers (whether they prescreen or not) other than requiring indemnification by programmers, certification of compliance with local standards, time segregation, [and] adult content"    J advisories, ante, at 33. Those are measures that, if challenged, would likely survive strict scrutiny as narrowly tailored to safeguard children. If those measures, in the words of the plurality, normally avoid, minimize, or eliminate any childrelated problems concerning `patently offensive' programming on public  J access channels, ante, at 34, one is left to wonder why the cable operator veto over leased access programming authorized in 10(a) is constitutional even under the plurality's First Amendment analysis. Although I concur in its judgment that 10(c) is invalid, I cannot agree with the plurality's reasoning.  In regard to 10(a), the plurality's analysis there undermines its claims of faithfulness to our First Amendment jurisprudence and close attention to context.  First, the plurality places some weight on there being nothing to stop `adults who feel the need' from finding [indecent] programming elsewhere, say, on tape or in theaters, or on competitive services like direct broadcast  J television, ante, at 15. The availability of alternative channels of communication may be relevant when we are assessing contentneutral time, place, and manner  J restrictions, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 802 (1989), but the fact that speech can occur elsewhere cannot justify a contentbased restriction,  J Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S., at 556; Schneider v.  J State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).  Second, the plurality suggests the permissive nature of 10(a) at least does not create the same risk of  Jx exclusion as a total ban on indecency. Ante, at 15. This states the obvious, but the possibility the Government could have imposed more draconian limitations on speech never has justified a lesser abridgment. Indeed, such an argument almost always is available; few of our First Amendment cases involve outright bans on speech.  J See, e. g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130!137 (1992) (broad discretion of county`"   administrator to award parade permits and to adjust permit fee according to content of speech violates First  J Amendment); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (informal threats to recommend criminal prosecutions and other pressure tactics by state morality commission against book publishers violate the First Amendment).  Third, based on its own factual speculations, the plurality discounts the risks created by the law that operators will not run indecent programming on access channels. The plurality takes a glance at the programming that cable operators allow on their own (nonaccess) channels, and, espying some indecent programming there, supposes some cable operators may be willing to allow similar programs on leased access  J channels. Ante, at 15. This sort of surmise, giving the government the benefit of the doubt when it restricts speech, is an unusual approach to the First Amendment, to put it mildly. Worse, it ignores evidence of industry structure that should cast doubt on the plurality's sanguine view of the probable fate of programming considered indecent under 10(a). The plurality fails to note that, aside from the indecency provisions of 10 tacked on in a Senate floor amendment, the 1992 Act strengthened the regulation of leased access channels because it was feared cable operators would exercise their substantial market power to exclude disfavored programmers. The congressional findings in the statute and the conclusions of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation after more than two years of hearings on the cable market, see S. Rep. No. 102!92, pp. 3!4 (1991), are instructive. Leased access channels had been underused since their inception in  J 1984, the Senate Committee determined. Id., at 30. Though it recognized the adverse economics of leased access for programmers may have been one reason for the underutilization, the Committee found the obstinacy` "   of cable operators and their control over prices, terms,  J and conditions also were to blame. Id., at 31. BQ C  , , ( N N  The cable operator is almost certain to have interests that clash with that of the programmer seeking to use leased access channels. If their interests were similar, the operator would have been more than willing to carry the programmer on regular cable channels. The operator thus has already decided for any number of reasons not to carry the programmer. For example, the operator may believe that the programmer might compete with programming that the [operator] owns or controls. To permit the operator to establish the  J; leased access rate thus makes little sense. Ibid.jBQ ; d   ( , , Perhaps some operators will choose to show the indecent programming they now may banish if they can command a better price than other access programmers are willing to pay. In the main, however, leased access programs are the ones the cable operator, for competitive reasons or otherwise, has no interest in showing. And because the cable operator may put to his own commercial use any leased access capacity not taken by unaffiliated programmers, 47 U.S.C. 532(b)(4), operators have little incentive to allow indecent programming if they have excess capacity on leased access channels.  There is even less reason to think cable operators will choose to show indecent programs on public access channels. The operator is not paid, or paid much, for transmitting programs on these channels; public access programs may compete with the operator's own programs; the operator will wish to avoid unwanted controversy; and, here as with leased access channels, the operator may reclaim unused PEG capacity for its own paid use, 47 U.S.C. 531(d)(1).  In the 1992 Act, Congress recognized cable operators might want to exclude unaffiliated or otherwise dis/!"  Ԯfavored programmers from their channels, but it granted operators discretion to do so in regard to but a single category of speech. The obvious consequence invited by the discretion is exclusion. I am not sure why the plurality would suppose otherwise, or contend the practical consequences of 10(a) would be no worse for programmers than those flowing from the sort of time J segregation requirement approved in Pacifica. See ante, at 16. Despite its claim of making a more contextual  J assessment of this case, ante, at 18, the plurality  Jp ignores a key difference of this case from Pacifica. There, the broadcaster wanted to air the speech in question; here, the cable operator does not. So the safe harbor of latenight programming permitted by the FCC  J in Pacifica would likely promote speech, whereas suppression will follow from 10(a).  9H1 d d,VI؃  2  In agreement with the plurality's analysis of 10(b) of the Act, insofar as it applies strict scrutiny, I join Part III of its opinion. Its position there, however, cannot be reconciled with upholding 10(a). In the plurality's view, 10(b), which standing alone would guarantee an indecent programmer some access to a cable audience, violates the First Amendment, but 10(a), which authorizes exclusion of indecent programming from access channels altogether, does not. There is little to commend this logic or result. I dissent fromthe judgment of the Court insofar as it upholds theconstitutionality of 10(a).