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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@\Final Other ##  ( ( ` `  #\  PCsP# dd_P  <  i   SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  uB< * ` ` ( ( *(  _Pdd #[ P['CdP# I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)-#[ P['CdP# ( ( , , )  uB " C Nos. 95!124 and 95!227 ) !   J -#o P['Cn&P# ddh %y# uB  ddh < #[ P['CdP#.95!124 & 95!227"CONCUR/DISSENT  uBn  DENVER AREA ED. TEL. CONSORTIUM v. FCC%z# uB  ddh < #[ P['CdP#.95!124 & 95!227"CONCUR/DISSENT  uBn  DENVER AREA ED. TEL. CONSORTIUM v. FCC`A؃ C  DENVER AREA EDUCATIONAL TELE  8 COMMUNICATIONS CONSORTIUM,  J !INC., et al., PETITIONERS  J -, 95!124,v.ă e FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION  J@ *etal. -  J Q ALLIANCE FOR COMMUNITY MEDIA, et al., (BPETITIONERS  J -, 95!227,v.ă e FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION  JP *etal. ?  hhx  ( on writs of certiorari to the united states court  of appeals for the district of columbia circuit & hxf #[ P['CdP# d [June 28, 1996] -,   #o P['Cn&P#  J &Footnotes#[ P['CdP# ff X01Í Í01Í Í , , #o P['Cn&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: See Midwest Video II, 440 U.S., at 701; see also Brief for Federal Respondents 23. But see 47 U.S.C. 541(c) ( Any cable system shall not be subject to regulation as a common carrier or utility by reason of providing any cable service). That the leased access provisions may be described in commoncarrier terms does not demonstrate that access programmers have obtained a First Amendment right to transmit programming over leased access channels. Labeling leased access a common carrier scheme has no real First Amendment consequences. It simply does not follow from common carrier status that cable operators may not, with Congress' blessing, decline to carry indecent speech on their leased access channels. Common carriers are private entities and may, consistent with the First Amendment, exercise editorial discretion in the absence of a specific statutory  J prohibition. Concurring in Sable, Justice Scalia explained: I note that while we hold the Constitution prevents Congress from banning indecent speech in this fashion, we do not hold that the Constitution requires public utilities to carry it. 492 U.S., at 133. See also"    J Information Providers' Coalition for Defense of First  J Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 877 (CA9 1991) ( [A] carrier is free under the Constitution to terminate  J service to dialaporn operators altogether); Carlin  J` Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Telephone and  J8 Telegraph Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1297 (CA9 1987) (same),  J cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988); Carlin Communica J tion, Inc. v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1357 (CA11 1986) (same).  J  Nothing about common carrier status per se constitutionalizes the asserted interests of the petitioners in  JH these cases, and Justice Kennedy provides no authority for his assertion that common carrier regulations should be reviewed under the same standard as contentbased  J restrictions on speech in a public forum. Ante, at 19. Whether viewed as the creation of a common carrier scheme or simply as a regulatory restriction on cable operators' editorial discretion, the net effect is the same: operators' speech rights are restricted to make room for access programmers. Consequently, the fact that the leased access provisions impose a form of common carrier obligation on cable operators does not alter my view that Congress' leased access scheme burdens the constitutionally protected speech rights of cable operators in order to expand the speaking opportunities of access programmers, but does not independently burden the First Amendment rights of programmers or viewers.  ;H2 d d-C؃  2  Petitioners argue that public access channels are public fora in which they have First Amendment rights to speak and that 10(c) is invalid because it imposes contentbased burdens on those rights. Brief for Petitioners New York Citizens Committee for Responsible Media et al., in No. 95!227, pp. 8!23; Brief for Petitioners Alliance for Community Media et al., in No. 95!227, pp. 32!35. Though I agree that contentbased prohibi"  Ԯtions in a public forum must be narrowly drawn to  J effectuate a compelling state interest, Perry Ed. Assn.  J v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983), I do not agree with petitioners' antecedent assertion that public access channels are public fora.  We have said that government may designate public property for use by the public as a place for expressive activity and that, so designated, that property becomes  J a public forum. Id., at 45. Petitioners argue that [a] local government does exactly that by requiring as a condition of franchise approval that the cable operator set aside a public access channel for the free use of the general public on a firstcome, firstserved, nondiscrimi J natory basis.   uB` ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf <  FTN    XFrXFr ff In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. __, __ (1995) (slip op., at 8!9), we found the university's student activity fund, a nontangible channel of communication, to be a limited public forum, but generally we have been quite reluctant to find even limited public fora in such channels of communication.  uB Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 804 (1985) (Combined Federal Campaign not a limited public forum);  uBa Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 47!48 (1983) (school mail facilities not a limited public forum). In any event, we certainly have never held that public access channels are a fully designated public forum that entitles programmers to freedom from contentbased distinctions. Brief for Petitioners Alliance for Community Media et al., in No. 95!227, p. 33. I disagree.  J  Cable systems are not public property.  $  uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < See G. Shapiro, P. Kurland, & J. Mercurio, CableSpeech: The Case for First Amendment Protection 119 (1983) ( Because cable systems are operated by private rather than governmental entities, cable television cannot be characterized as a public forum and, therefore, rights derived from the public forum doctrine cannot beasserted by those who wish to express themselves on cable systems). Cable systems are privately owned and privately managed, and petitioners point to no case in which we have held that government may designate private property as a public0% "   forum. The public forum doctrine is a rule governing  J claims of a right of access to public property, Perry Ed.  J Assn., supra, at 44, and has never been thought to extend beyond property generally understood to belong  J` to the government. See International Soc. for Krishna  J8 Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 681 (1992) (evidence of expressive activity at rail stations, bus stations, wharves, and Ellis Island was irrelevant to  J public fora analysis, because sites such as bus and rail  J terminals traditionally have had private ownership  Jp (emphasis in original)). See also id., at 678 (public  JH forum is government or public property); Perry Ed.  J Assn., supra, at 45 (designated public forum consists of public property).  J  Petitioners point to dictum in Cornelius v. NAACP  J Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985), that a public forum may consist of private property dedicated to public use, but that statement has no applicability here. That statement properly refers to the common practice of formally dedicating land for streets and parks when subdividing real estate for developments. See 1A C. Antieau & J. Antieau, Antieau's Local Government Law 9.05 (1991); 11A E. McQuillin, Law of Municipal Corporations 33.03 (3d ed. 1991). Such dedications may or may not transfer title, but they at least create enforceable public easements in the dedi J cated land. 1A Antieau, supra, 9.15; 11A McQuillin,  J supra, 33.68. To the extent that those easements create a property interest in the underlying land, it is that governmentowned property interest that may be designated as a public forum.  It may be true, as petitioners argue, that title is not dispositive of the public forum analysis, but the nature of the regulatory restrictions placed on cable operators by local franchising authorities are not consistent with the kinds of governmental property interests we have said may be formally dedicated as public fora. Our` "   public forum cases have involved property in which the government has held at least some formal easement or other property interest permitting the government to treat the property as its own in designating the property  J` as a public forum. See, e. g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.  J8 496, 515 (1939) (streets and parks); Police Dept. of  J Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (sidewalks  J adjoining public school); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.  J v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (theater under  J longterm lease to city); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460!462 (1980) (sidewalks in front of private residence);  JH Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267!268 (1981) (university facilities that had been opened for student activities). That is simply not true in these cases. Pursuant to federal and state law, franchising authorities require cable operators to create public access channels, but nothing in the record suggests that local franchising authorities take any formal easement or other property interest in those channels that would permit the government to designate that property as a  J public forum.   uBH ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Petitioners' argument that a property right called the right to exclude has been transferred to the government is not persuasive. Though it is generally true that, excepting 10(c), cable operators are forbidden to exercise editorial discretion over public access channels, that prohibition is not absolute. Section 531(e) provides that the prohibition on the exercise of editorial discretion is subject to 544(d)(1), which permits operators and franchising authorities to ban obscene or other constitutionally unprotected speech. Some states, however, have not permitted exercise of that authority. See,  uB e. g., Minn. Stat. 238.11 (1994) (prohibiting any censorship of leased or public access programming); N. Y. Pub. Serv. Law 229 (McKinney Supp. 1996) (same). At any rate, the Court has never recognized a public forum based on a property interest taken by regulatory restriction.  Similarly, assertion of government control over private property cannot justify designation of that property as a "   public forum. We have expressly stated that neither government ownership nor government control will  J guarantee public access to property. See Cornelius,  J supra, at 803; Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh  J` Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981). Government control over its own property or private property in which it has taken a cognizable property interest, like  J the theater in Southeastern Promotions, is consistent with designation of a public forum. But we have never even hinted that regulatory control, and particularly direct regulatory control over a private entity's First Amendment speech rights, could justify creation of a public forum. Properly construed, our cases have limited the government's ability to declare a public forum to property the government owns outright, or in which the government holds a significant property interest consistent with the communicative purpose of the forum to be designated.  Nor am I convinced that a formal transfer of a property interest in public access channels would suffice to permit a local franchising authority to designate those channels as a public forum. In no other public forum that we have recognized does a private entity, owner or not, have the obligation not only to permit another to speak, but to actually help produce and then transmit the message on that person's behalf. Cable operators regularly retain some level of managerial and operational control over their public access channels, subject only to the requirements of federal, state, and local law and the franchise agreement. In more traditional public fora, the government shoulders the burden of administering and enforcing the openness of the expressive forum, but it is frequently a private citizen, the operator, who shoulders that burden for public access channels. For instance, it is often the operator who must accept and schedule an access programmer's request for "    J time on a channel.  uBh ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < See D. Brenner, M. Price & M. Meyerson, Cable Television and Other Nonbroadcast Video 6.04[7] (1996) (hereinafter Brenner). Some States and local governments have formed nonprofit organizations to perform some of these functions. See D. C. Code Ann. 43!1829(a) (1990 and Supp. 1996) (establishing Public Access Corporation for the purpose of facilitating and governing nondiscriminatory use of public access channels). And, in many places, the operator is actually obligated to provide production facilities and production assistance to persons seeking to produce  J access programming. q uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < See, e. g., 47 U.S.C. 541(a)(4)(B) (authorizing franchise authorities to require adequate assurance that the cable operator will provide adequate public, educational, and governmental access channel capacity, facilities, or financial support); Conn. Gen. Stat. 16!331c (1995) (requiring cable operators to contribute money or resources to cable advisory councils that monitor compliance with  uB; public access standards); id., 16!333(c) (requiring the department of public utility control to adopt regulations establishing minimum standards for the equipment supplied ... for the community access programming); D. C. Code Ann. 43!1829.1(c) (1990) ( For public access channel users, the franchisee shall provide use of the production facilities and production assistance at an amount set forth in the request for proposal); Minn. Stat. 238.084.3(b) (1994) (requiring cable operators to make readily available for public use at least the minimal equipment necessary for the production of programming and playback of prerecorded programs). That these activities are  uBa  partly financed with public funds, ante, at 32, does not diminish the fact that these activities are also partly financed with the operator's money. See Brenner 6.04[7], at 6!48 ( Frequently, access centers receive money and equipment from the cable opera uB= tor); id., 6.04[3][c], at 6!41 (discussing cable operator financing of public access channels and questioning its constitutionality as forced subsidization of speech). Moreover, unlike a park picketer, an access programmer cannot transmit its own message. Instead, it is the operator who must transmit, or speak, the access programmer's message. That the speech may be considered the operator's is driven home by 47 U.S.C. 559, which authorizes a fine of up to $10,000 and two years' imprisonment for any person who "   transmits over any cable system any matter which is obscene. See also 558 (making operators immune for all public access programming, except that which is  J obscene).J uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Petitioners argue that 10(d) of the 1992 Act, 47 U.S.C. 558, which lifts cable operators' immunity for obscene speech, forces or encourages operators to ban indecent speech. Because Congress could directly impose an outright ban on obscene programming, see  uB Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989), petitioners' encouragement argument is meritless.  Thus, even were I inclined to view public access channels as public property, which I am not, the numerous additional obligations imposed on the cable operator in managing and operating the public access channels convince me that these channels share few, if any, of the basic characteristics of a public forum. As I have already indicated, public access requirements, in my view, are a regulatory restriction on the exercise of cable operators' editorial discretion, not a transfer of a sufficient property interest in the channels to support a designation of that property as a public forum. Public access channels are not public fora, and, therefore, petitioners' attempt to redistribute cable speech rights in their favor must fail. For this reason, and the other reasons articulated earlier, I would sustain both 10(a) and 10(c).  9H1 d dy,III؃  2  Most sexually oriented programming appears on premium or payperview channels that are naturally blocked from nonpaying customers by market forces, see First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd 998, 1001, n. 20 (1993), and it is only governmental intervention in the first instance that requires access channels, on which indecent programming may appear, to be made part of the basic cable package. Section 10(b) does nothing more6"   than adjust the nature of governmentimposed leased access requirements in order to emulate the market forces that keep indecent programming primarily on premium channels (without permitting the operator to charge subscribers for that programming).  Unlike 10(a) and (c), 10(b) clearly implicates petitioners' free speech rights. Though 10(b) by no means bans indecent speech, it clearly places contentbased restrictions on the transmission of private speech by requiring cable operators to block and segregate indecent programming that the operator has agreed to carry. Consequently, 10(b) must be subjected to strict scrutiny and can be upheld only if it furthers a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means  J available. See Sable, 492 U.S., at 126. The parties agree that Congress has a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological wellbeing of minors and that its interest extends to shielding minors from the influence of [indecent speech] that is  J not obscene by adult standards. Ibid. See Ginsberg v.  J New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (persons who have th[e] primary responsibility for children's wellbeing are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility). Because 10(b) is narrowly tailored to achieve that wellestablished compelling interest, I would uphold it. I therefore dissent from the Court's decision to the contrary.  Our precedents establish that government may support parental authority to direct the moral upbringing of their children by imposing a blocking requirement as a  JP default position. For example, in Ginsberg, in which we upheld a State's ability to prohibit the sale of indecent literature to minors, we pointed out that the State had simply imposed its own default choice by noting that the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for  J` their children. 390 U.S., at 639. Likewise, in Sable`"   we set aside a complete ban on indecent dialaporn messages in part because the FCC had previously imposed certain default rules intended to prevent access by minors, and there was no evidence that those rules  J` were ineffective. 492 U.S., at 128!130. ` uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < After Sable, Congress quickly amended the statute and the FCC again promulgated those safe harbor rules. Those rules were later  uB6 upheld against a First Amendment challenge. See Dial Information  uB Servs. Corp. of N. Y. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (CA2 1991),  uB cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1072 (1992); Information Providers' Coalition  uB[ for Defense of First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866 (CA9 1991). In promulgating regulations pursuant to 10(b), the FCC was well aware that the default rules established for dialaporn had been upheld and asserted that similar rules were necessary for leased access channels. See First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd 998, 1000 (1993) ( The blocking scheme upheld in these cases is, in all rele uB vant respects, identical to that required by section 10(b)); ibid. ( [J]ust as it did in section 223 relating to `dialaporn' telephone services"Congress has now determined that mandatory, not voluntary, blocking is essential).  The Court strikes down 10(b) by pointing to alternatives, such as reverseblocking and lockboxes, that it says are less restrictive than segregation and blocking. Though these methods attempt to place in parents' hands the ability to permit their children to watch as little, or as much, indecent programming as the parents think proper, they do not effectively support parents' authority to direct the moral upbringing of their children. See First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd, at  J 1000!1001. I  uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < In the context of dialaporn, courts upholding the FCC's mandatory blocking scheme have expressly found that voluntary blocking  uB_ schemes are not effective. See Dial Information Servs., supra, at  uB 1542; Information Providers' Coalition, supra, at 873874. The FCC recognized that leasedaccess programming comes from a wide variety of independent sources, with no single editor controlling [its] selection  JX and presentation. Id., at 1000. Thus, indecent programming on leased access channels is especially likely0%"   to be shown randomly or intermittently between non J indecent programs. Ibid. Rather than being able to simply block out certain channels at certain times, a subscriber armed with only a lockbox must carefully monitor all leasedaccess programming and constantly reprogram the lockbox to keep out undesired programming. Thus, even assuming that cable subscribers generally have the technical proficiency to properly operate a lockbox, by no means a given, this distinguishing characteristic of leased access channels makes lockboxes and reverseblocking largely ineffective.  Petitioners argue that 10(b)'s segregation and blocking scheme is not sufficiently narrowly tailored because it requires the viewer's written consent, 47 CFR 76.701(b) (1995); it permits the cable operator 30 days to respond to the written request for access, 76.701(c); and it is impermissibly underinclusive because it reaches only leased access programming.  J0  Relying on Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), petitioners argue that forcing customers to submit a written request for access will chill dissemina J tion of speech. In Lamont, we struck down a statute barring the mail delivery of  ! `communist political propaganda' d !  to persons who had not requested the Post  J@ Office in writing to deliver such propaganda. Id., at 307. The law required the Post Office to keep an official list of persons desiring to receive communist  J political propaganda, id., at 303, which, of course, was intended to chill demand for such materials. Here, however, petitioners' allegations of an official list of those who wish to watch the `patently offensive' chan J( nel, as the majority puts it, ante, at 24, are pure hyperbole. The FCC regulation implementing 10(b)'s written request requirement, 47 CFR 76.701(b) (1995), says nothing about the creation of a list, much less an official government list. It requires only that the cable operator receive written consent. Other statutory provisions`"   make clear that the cable operator may not share that, or any other, information with any other person, including the Government. Section 551 mandates that all personally identifiable information regarding a subscriber be kept strictly confidential and further requires cable operators to destroy any information that is no longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected. 47 U.S.C. 551. None of the circumstances that figured  J prominently in Lamont exists here.  Though petitioners cannot reasonably fear the specter of an officially published list of leasedaccess indecency viewers, it is true that the fact that a subscriber is unblocked is ascertainable, if only by the cable operator. I find no legally significant stigma in that fact. If a segregation and blocking scheme is generally permissible, then a subscriber's access request must take some form, whether written or oral, and I see nothing nefarious in Congress' choice of a written, rather than an oral,  J0 consent.J0 uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Because, under the circumstances of these cases, I see no constitutionally significant difference between a written and an oral request to see blocked programming, I also see no relevant distinction between 10(b) and the blocking requirement enacted in the  uBt 1996 Act, on which the majority places so much reliance. See ante, at 2627. Any request for access to blocked programming"by whatever method"ultimately will make the  J subscriber's identity knowable.S uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Indeed, persons who request access to blocked programming pursuant to 47 CFR 76.701(c) (1995) are no more identifiable than persons who subscribe to sexually oriented premium channels, because those persons must specially request that premium service.S But this is hardly thekind of chilling effect that implicates the First Amendment.  Though making an oral request for access, perhaps by telephone, is slightly less bothersome than making a written request, it is also true that a written request is  J less subject to fraud by a determined child. Ante, at"   29. Consequently, despite the fact that an oral request is slightly less restrictive in absolute terms, it is also less effective in supporting parents' interest in denying enterprising, but parentally unauthorized, minors access to blocked programming.  The segregation and blocking requirement was not intended to be a replacement for lockboxes, Vchips, reverseblocking, or other subscriberinitiated measures. Rather, Congress enacted in 10(b) a default setting under which a subscriber receives no blocked programming without a written request. Thus, subscribers who do not want the blocked programming are protected, and subscribers who do want it may request access. Once a subscriber requests access to blocked programming, however, the subscriber remains free to use other methods, such as lockboxes, to regulate the kind of pro J gramming shown on those channels in that home.%  uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The lockbox provision, originally passed in 1984, was unaffected by the 1992 Act and remains fully available to every subscriber. 47 U.S.C. 544(d)(2). Thus, petitioners are wrong to portray 10(b) as a highly ineffective method of screening individual programs, see Brief for Petitioners in No. 95!124, p. 43, and the majority is similarly wrong to suggest that a person cannot watch a single program ... without letting the `patently offensive' channel in its entirety invade his  Jh household for days, perhaps weeks, at a time, ante, at  J@ 24; see ante, at 26. Given the limited scope of 10(b) as a default setting, I see nothing constitutionally infirm about Congress' decision to permit the cable operator 30 days to unblock or reblock the segregated channel.  Petitioners also claim that 10(b) and its implementing regulations are impermissibly underinclusive because they apply only to leased access programming. In  J( R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), we rejected the view that a contentbased restriction is subject to a"   separate and independent underinclusiveness evalua J tion. Id., at 387 ( In our view, the First Amendment imposes not an `underinclusiveness' limitation but a `content discrimination' limitation upon a State's prohibi J` tion of proscribable speech). See also ante, at 28 ( Congress need not deal with every problem at once). Also, petitioners' claim is in tension with the constitutional principle that Congress may not impose a remedy that is more restrictive than necessary to satisfy its asserted compelling interest and with their own arguments  Jp pressing that very principle. Cf. R. A. V., supra, at 402 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (though the overbreadth doctrine has the redeeming virtue of attempting to avoid the chilling of protected expression, an underbreadth challenge serves no desirable function).  In arguing that Congress could not impose a blocking requirement without also imposing that requirement on public access and nonaccess channels, petitioners fail to allege, much less argue, that doing so would further Congress' compelling interest. While it is true that indecent programming appears on nonaccess channels, that programming appears almost exclusively on perprogram or per channel services that subscribers must specifically request in advance, in the same manner as under the blocking approach mandated by section 10(b).  J First Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd, at 1001, n. 20.. uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < In examining the restrictions imposed by the 1996 Act, the majority is probably correct to doubt that sexdedicated channels  uB are all (or mostly) leased channels, ante, at 27, but surely the majority does not doubt that most nonleased sexdedicated channels are premium channels that must be expressly requested. I thus disagree that the provisions of the 1996 Act address a highly  uB similar problem. Id., at 28.. In contrast to these premium services, leased access channels are part of the basic cable package, and the segregation and blocking scheme Congress imposed does"   nothing more than convert sexually oriented leased  J access programming into a free premium service.F uB@ ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf <  FTN  <  XFrXFr ff Unlike Congress' blocking scheme, and the market norm of requiring viewers to pay a premium for indecent programming, lockboxes place a financial burden on those seeking to avoid indecent programming on leased access channels. See 47 U.S.C. 544(d)(2) ( [A] cable operator shall provide (by sale or lease) a device by which the subscriber can prohibit viewing of a particular cable service during periods selected by that subscriber).F Similarly, Congress' failure to impose segregation and blocking requirements on public access channels may have been based on its judgment that those channels presented a less severe problem of unintended indecency"it appears that most of the anecdotal evidence before Congress involved leased access channels. Congress may also have simply decided to permit the States and local franchising authorities to address the issue of indecency on public access channels at a local level, in accordance with the local rule policies evinced in 47 U.S.C. 531. In any event, if the segregation and blocking scheme established by Congress is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest, it does not become constitutionally suspect merely because Congress did not extend the same restriction to other channels on which there was less of a perceived problem (and perhaps no compelling interest).  The United States has carried its burden of demonstrating that 10(b) and its implementing regulations are narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling governmental interest. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety. I therefore concur in the judgment upholding 10(a) and respectfully dissent from that portion of the judgment striking down 10(b) and (c).