WPC? 2ABcR Z23|["m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<gn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"X^?S}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}SS}a}SFS}S}ooS}FSF}oaS}}}oc7cS?SS*SSSSSSSSSSF}}}}}oooooaFaFaFaF}}}}}}}}}}}}}oooooooo}}}}}}aFaFaFaF}FFFFF}}oooaaaaSSS}oooFoaS}}}NX?}S}}}}}}KS}K}KF}}}SS}}S}KF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR2.#ccchc"m^!$/CCdb((gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkklWdPZH\I\I\IlWoY2(mWgRklWaMlWs\SCYG\IhSr\lWw_s\_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^3=Iff%==\o3=3offffffffff33oooQzKpzzz~~z=o=o\%ifQpQ=bp=:f=p\ifQQAp_\\U=o=o=3============f=iiiiiQQQQQK=K=K=K=p\\\\pppp~\ip\\~\\ziiiiQQQQpQQQQbbbbbbppK=K=K=K=pfz=z=z=z=z=pppp\\QQQzQzQzQzQ~A~A~Apppppp~\zUzUzUpz=pQzQ~A~\~\p\pNo3w\=QNNfffMDf=f=3GG\==\\pp%G=ooee3o<>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXHYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>1BQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote - Circv C   (  Cd  ( ( ( 25oM.H/T2 X4FTNFormats for each footnote,  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:! `findings' on `genderbased developmental differences' _!  on the ground that [t]hese `findings' restate the opinions of Virginia's expert witnesses, opinions about typically male  J or typically female `tendencies.' !  Ante, at 23 (quoting 766 F.Supp., at 1434!1435). How remarkable to criticize the District Court on the ground that its  JH findings rest on the evidence (i.e., the testimony of Virginia's witnesses)! That is what findings are supposed to do. It is indefensible to tell the Commonwealth that [t]he burden of justification is demanding and it  J rests entirely on [you], ante, at 15, and then to ignore "    J the District Court's findings because they rest on the evidence put forward by the Commonwealth"particularly when, as the District Court said, [t]he evidence in the  J case ... is virtually uncontradicted, 766 F.Supp., at 1415 (emphasis added).  Ultimately, in fact, the Court does not deny the  J evidence supporting these findings. See ante, at 24!29. It instead makes evident that the parties to this case could have saved themselves a great deal of time, trouble, and expense by omitting a trial. The Court simply dispenses with the evidence submitted at trial"it never says that a single finding of the District Court is clearly erroneous"in favor of the Justices' own view of the world, which the Court proceeds to support with (1) references to observations of someone who is not a witness, nor even an educational expert, nor even a judge who reviewed the record or participated in the judgment below, but rather a judge who merely dissented from the Court of Appeals' decision not to rehear  J this case en banc, see ante, at 24, (2) citations of  J Ԛnonevidentiary materials such as amicus curiae briefs  J filed in this Court, see ante, at 27, nn. 13, 14, and (3) various historical anecdotes designed to demonstrate that Virginia's support for VMI as currently constituted  J@ reminds the Justices of the bad old days, see ante, at 25!28.  It is not too much to say that this approach to the case has rendered the trial a sham. But treating the evidence as irrelevant is absolutely necessary for the Court to reach its conclusion. Not a single witness contested, for example, Virginia's substantial body of `exceedingly persuasive' evidence ... that some students, both male and female, benefit from attending a singlesex college and [that] [f]or those students, the opportunity to attend a singlesex college is a valuable one, likely to lead to better academic and professional achievement. 766 F.Supp., at 1411!1412. Even the`"   United States' expert witness called himself a `believer in singlesex education,' !  although it was his personal, philosophical preference, not one born of educationalbenefit considerations, that singlesex education should  J` be provided only by the private sector. Id., at 1412.  4. The Court contends that Virginia, and the District Court, erred, and misperceived our precedent, by train[ing] their argument on `means' rather than  J `end,'  ! ante, at 28. The Court focuses on VMI's mission, which is to produce individuals imbued with love of learning, confident in the functions and attitudes of leadership, possessing a high sense of public service, advocates of the American democracy and free enterprise system, and ready ... to defend their country in time of national peril. 766 F.Supp., at 1425 (quoting Mission Study Committee of the VMI Board of Visitors, Report, May 16, 1986). Surely, the Court says, that  JX goal is great enough to accommodate women. Ante, at 28.  This is lawmaking by indirection. What the Court  J describes as VMI's mission is no less the mission of all Virginia colleges. Which of them would the Old Domin J ion continue to fund if they did not aim to create individuals imbued with love of learning, etc. right down to being ready to defend their country in time of national peril? It can be summed up as learning, leadership, and patriotism. To be sure, those general educational values are described in a particularly martial fashion in VMI's mission statement, in accordance with the military, adversative, and allmale character of the institution. But imparting those values  J( in that fashion"i.e., in a military, adversative, allmale  J environment"is the distinctive mission of VMI. And as  J I have discussed (and both courts below found), that  J mission is not great enough to accommodate women.  The Court's analysis at least has the benefit of producing foreseeable results. Applied generally, it means that`"   whenever a State's ultimate objective is great enough to accommodate women (as it always will be), then the State will be held to have violated the Equal Protection Clause if it restricts to men even one means by which it pursues that objective"no matter how few women are interested in pursuing the objective by that means, no matter how much the singlesex program will have to be changed if both sexes are admitted, and no matter how beneficial that program has theretofore been to its participants.  5. The Court argues that VMI would not have to  JH change very much if it were to admit women. See, e.g.,  J ante, at 22!25. The principal response to that argument is that it is irrelevant: If VMI's singlesex status is substantially related to the government's important educational objectives, as I have demonstrated above and as the Court refuses to discuss, that concludes the inquiry. There should be no debate in the federal judiciary over how much VMI would be required to change if it admitted women and whether that would constitute too much change.  But if such a debate were relevant, the Court would certainly be on the losing side. The District Court found as follows: [T]he evidence establishes that key elementsof the adversative VMI educational system, with its focus on barracks life, would be fundamentally altered, and the distinctive ends of the system would be thwarted, if VMI were forced to admit females and to make changes necessary to accommodate their needs and interests. 766 F.Supp., at 1411. Changes that the District Court's detailed analysis found would be required include new allowances for personal privacy in the barracks, such as locked doors and coverings on windows, which would detract from VMI's approach of regulating minute details of student behavior, contradict the principle that everyone is constantly subject to scrutiny by everyone else, and impair VMI's total`"   egalitarian approach under which every student must be treated alike; changes in the physical training program, which would reduce [t]he intensity and aggressiveness of the current program; and various modifications in other respects of the adversative  J8 training program which permeates student life. See id., at 1412!1413, 1435!1443. As the Court of Appeals summarized it, the record supports the district court's findings that at least these three aspects of VMI's program"physical training, the absence of privacy, and the adversative approach"would be materially affected by coeducation, leading to a substantial change in the egalitarian ethos that is a critical aspect of VMI's training. 976 F.2d, at 896!897.  In the face of these findings by two courts below, amply supported by the evidence, and resulting in the conclusion that VMI would be fundamentally altered if it admitted women, this Court simply pronounces that [t]he notion that admission of women would downgrade VMI's stature, destroy the adversative system and, with  J it, even the school, is a judgment hardly proved. Ante, at 25 (footnote omitted). The point about downgrad[ing] VMI's stature is a strawman; no one has made any such claim. The point about destroy[ing] the adversative system is simply false; the District Court not only stated that [e]vidence supports this theory, but specifically concluded that while [w]ithout a doubt VMI could assimilate women, it is equally without a doubt that VMI's present methods of training and education would have to be changed by a move away from its adversative new cadet system. 766 F.Supp., at 1413, and n.8, 1441. And the point about destroy[ing] the school, depending upon what that ambiguous phrase is intended to mean, is either false or else sets a standard much higher than VMI had to meet. It sufficed to establish, as the District Court stated, that VMI would be significantly different upon the admission of women,`"   766 F.Supp., at 1412, and would eventually find it  J necessary to drop the adversative system altogether, id.,  J at 1413.  uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The Court's doityourself approach to factfinding, which throughout is contrary to our wellsettled rule that we will not undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by two courts below in the ab uB= sence of a very obvious and exceptional showing of error, Graver  uB Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1949) (and cases cited), is exemplified by its invocation of the experience of the federal military academies to prove that not much  uB change would occur. See ante, at 25, n. 11; 27!28, and n. 15; 34, n.19. In fact, the District Court noted that the West Point experi uB ence supported the theory that a coeducational VMI would have to adopt a [different] system, for West Point found it necessary upon becoming coeducational to move away from its adversative system. 766 F.Supp., at 1413, 1440. Without a doubt ... VMI's present methods of training and education would have to be changed as  uB West Point's were. Id., at 1413, n. 8; accord, 976 F.2d, at 896!897 (upholding District Court's findings that the unique characteristics of VMI's program, including its unique methodology, would be destroyed by coeducation).  6. Finally, the absence of a precise allwomen's ana J` logue to VMI is irrelevant. In Mississippi Univ. for  J8 Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), we attached no constitutional significance to the absence of an allmale nursing school. As Virginia notes, if a program restricted to one sex is necessarily unconstitutional unless there is a parallel program restricted to the other sex,  Jp  the opinion in Hogan could have ended with its first footnote, which observed that `Mississippi maintains no other singlesex public university or college.' !  Brief for  J CrossPetitioners in No. 94!2107, at 38 (quoting Missis J sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, supra, at 720, n.1).  Although there is no precise femaleonly analogue to VMI, Virginia has created during this litigation the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), a statefunded allwomen's program run by Mary Baldwin College. I have thus far said nothing about VWILn"   because it is, under our established test, irrelevant, so  J long as VMI's allmale character is substantially related to an important state goal. But VWIL now exists, and the Court's treatment of it shows how farreaching today's decision is.  VWIL was carefully designed by professional educators who have long experience in educating young women.  J The program rejects the proposition that there is a difference in the respective spheres and destinies of  J man and woman, Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130, 141 (1872), and is designed to provide an allfemale program that will achieve substantially similar outcomes [to VMI's] in an allfemale environment, 852 F.Supp. 471, 481 (WD Va. 1994). After holding a trial where voluminous evidence was submitted and making detailed findings of fact, the District Court concluded that there is a legitimate pedagogical basis for the different means employed [by VMI and VWIL] to achieve the substan J0 tially similar ends. Ibid. The Court of Appeals undertook a detailed review of the record and affirmed.  J 44 F. 3d 1229 (CA4 1995).  uBH ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The Court is incorrect in suggesting that the Court of Appeals applied a deferential brand of review inconsistent with the more  uB exacting standard our precedent requires. Ante, at 38. That court inquir[ed] (1) whether the state's objective is `legitimate and important,' and (2) whether `the requisite direct, substantial relationship between objective and means is present,' !  44 F. 3d, at 1235 (quoting  uB Hogan, 458 U.S., at 1235). To be sure, such review is deferential  uBI to a degree that the Court's new standard is not, for it is intermedi uB ate scrutiny. (The Court cannot evade this point or prove the Court of Appeals too deferential by stating that that court devised anoth uBn er test, a `substantive comparability' inquiry,' M!  ante, at 38 (quoting 44 F. 3d, at 1237), for as that court explained, its substantive  uB comparability inquiry was an additional step that it engrafted on th[e] traditional test of intermediate scrutiny, 44 F. 3d, at 1237 (emphasis added).) But it is Mary Baldwin College, which runs VWIL, that has made the pointI "   most succinctly: BQ C  , , ( N N " It would have been possible to develop the VWIL program to more closely resemble VMI, with adversative techniques associated with the rat line and barrackslike living quarters. Simply replicating an existing program would have required far less thought, research, and educational expertise. But such a facile approach would have produced a paper program with no real prospect of successful implementation. Brief for Mary Baldwin College as  J Amicus Curiae 5. vBQ d  ( , , It is worth noting that none of the United States' own experts in the remedial phase of this case was willing to testify that VMI's adversative method was an appropriate methodology for educating women. This Court, however, does not care. Even though VWIL was carefully designed by professional educators who have tremendous experience in the area, and survived the test of adversarial litigation, the Court simply declares, with  J no basis in the evidence, that these professionals acted  J on   ! `overbroad' generalizations, ante, at 24, 33.  ;H2 d d8C؃  2  A few words are appropriate in response to the concurrence, which finds VMI unconstitutional on a basis that is more moderate than the Court's but only at the expense of being even more implausible. The concurrence offers three reasons: First, that there is scant  J evidence in the record, ante, at 5, that diversity of educational offering was the real reason for Virginia's maintaining VMI. Scant has the advantage of being an imprecise term. I have cited the clearest statements of diversity as a goal for higher education in the 1990 Report of the Virginia Commission on the University of the 21st Century to the Governorand General Assembly, the 1989 Virginia Plan for Higher Education, the Budget Initiatives prepared in 1989 by the State Council of"   Higher Education for Virginia, the 1974 Report of the General Assembly Commission on Higher Education, and the 1969 Report of the Virginia Commission on Consti J tutional Revision. See supra, at 14, 17!18, and n. 2,  J` 19!20, n. 3. There is no evidence to the contrary, once one rejects (as the concurrence rightly does) the relevance of VMI's founding in days when attitudes towards the education of women were different. Is this conceivably not enough to foreclose rejecting as clearly erroneous the District Court's determination regarding the Commonwealth's objective of educational diversity? 766 F.Supp., at 1413. Especially since it is absurd on its  J face even to demand evidence to prove that the Commonwealth's reason for maintaining a men's military academy is that a men's military academy provides a  J distinctive type of educational experience (i.e., fosters  J diversity). What other purpose would the Commonwealth have? One may argue, as the Court does, that  J0 this type of diversity is designed only to indulge hostility towards women"but that is a separate point, explicitly rejected by the concurrence, and amply refuted by the evidence I have mentioned in discussing the Court's  J opinion. o uB ԍThe concurrence states that it read[s] the Court not as saying that the diversity rationale is a pretext for discriminating against women,  uBf but as saying merely that the diversity rationale is not genuine. Ante, at 5, n. *. The Court itself makes no such disclaimer, which would be difficult to credit inasmuch as the foundation for its conclusion that the  uB diversity rationale is not genuin[e], ante, at 22, is its antecedent discussion of Virginia's deliberate actions over the past century and a half, based on [f]amiliar arguments, that sought to enforce once widely  uB held views about women's proper place, ante, at 17!22.  What is now under discussion"the concurrence's making central to the disposition of this case the supposedly scant evidence that Virginia maintained VMI in order to offer a diverse educational experience"is rather like making crucial to the lawfulness of the United States Army record evidence that"   its purpose is to do battle. A legal culture that has  J forgotten the concept of res ipsa loquitur deserves the fate that it today decrees for VMI.  Second, the concurrence dismisses out of hand what it calls Virginia's second justification for the singlesex admissions policy: maintenance of the adversative  J method. Ante, at 7. The concurrence reasons that this justification does not serve an important governmental objective because, whatever the record may show about  J the pedagogical benefits of singlesex education, there is no similar evidence in the record that an adversative method is pedagogically beneficial or is any more likely to produce character traits than other methodologies.  J Ante, at 7!8. That is simply wrong. See, e.g., 766 F.Supp., at 1426 (factual findings concerning character traits produced by VMI's adversative methodology);  J id.,at 1434 (factual findings concerning benefits for many collegeage men of an adversative approach in general). In reality, the pedagogical benefits of VMI's adversative approach were not only proved, but were a  J given in this litigation. The reason the woman applicant who prompted this suit wanted to enter VMI was assuredly not that she wanted to go to an allmale school; it would cease being allmale as soon as she entered. She wanted the distinctive adversative education that VMI provided, and the battle was joined (in the main) over whether VMI had a basis for excluding women from that approach. The Court's opinion recognizes this, and devotes much of its opinion to demonstrating that  m! `some women ... do well under [the] adversative model' !  and that [i]t is on behalf of these women that the United  J( States has instituted this suit. Ante, at 33!34 (quoting 766 F.Supp., at 1434). Of course, in the last analysis it does not matter whether there are any benefits to the adversative method. The concurrence does not contest  J that there are benefits to singlesex education, and that alone suffices to make Virginia's case, since admission of`"   a woman will even more surely put an end to VMI's singlesex education than it will to VMI's adversative methodology.  A third reason the concurrence offers in support of the judgment is that the Commonwealth and VMI were not quick enough to react to the further developments in  J this Court's evolving jurisprudence. Ante, at 4. Specifically, the concurrence believes it should have been clear  J after Hogan that [t]he difficulty with [Virginia's] position is that the diversity benefited only one sex; there was singlesex public education available for men at VMI, but no corresponding singlesex public education  J available for women. Ante, at 6. If only, the concurrence asserts, Virginia had made a genuine effort to devote comparable public resources to a facility for women, and followed through on such a plan, it might  J well have avoided an equal protection violation. Ante, at 7. That is to say, the concurrence believes that after  J0 our decision in Hogan (which held a program of the Mississippi University for Women to be unconstitutional"without any reliance on the fact that there was no corresponding Mississippi allmen's program), the Commonwealth should have known that what this Court expected of it was ... yes!, the creation of a state allwomen's program. Any lawyer who gave that advice to the Commonwealth ought to have been either disbarred or committed. (The proof of that pudding is today's 6-Justice majority opinion.) And any Virginia politician who proposed such a step when there were already 4 4-year women's colleges in Virginia (assisted by state support that may well exceed, in the aggregate, what  J( VMI costs, see n. 3, supra) ought to have been recalled.  In any event, diversity in the form of singlesex, as  J well as coeducational, institutions of higher learning, is available to women as well as to men in Virginia.  J Ante, at 7. The concurrence is able to assert the  J` contrary only by disregarding the four allwomen's`"   private colleges in Virginia (generously assisted by public funds) and the Commonwealth's longstanding policy of coordinating public with private educational  J offerings, see supra, at 14!15, 17!18, and n. 2, 19, and  J` n. 3. According to the concurrence, the reason Virginia's assistance to its four allwomen's private colleges does not count is that [t]he private women's colleges are  J treated by the State exactly as all other private schools  J are treated. Ante, at 7. But if Virginia cannot get  J credit for assisting women's education if it only treats women's private schools as it does all other private  JH schools, then why should it get blame for assisting men's education if it only treats VMI as it does all other public schools? This is a great puzzlement.  9H1 d d7IV؃  2  As is frequently true, the Court's decision today will have consequences that extend far beyond the parties to the case. What I take to be the Court's unease with these consequences, and its resulting unwillingness to acknowledge them, cannot alter the reality.  ;H2 d d8A؃  2  Under the constitutional principles announced and applied today, singlesex public education is unconstitutional. By going through the motions of applying a balancing test"asking whether the State has adduced an exceedingly persuasive justification for its sexbased classification"the Court creates the illusion that government officials in some future case will have a clear shot at justifying some sort of singlesex public education. Indeed, the Court seeks to create even a greater illusion than that: It purports to have said  JT nothing of relevance to other public schools at all. We address specifically and only an educational opportunity  J recognized ... as `unique' .... Ante, at 16, n. 7.  The Supreme Court of the United States does not sit to announce unique dispositions. Its principal function "    J is to establish precedent"that is, to set forth principles of law that every court in America must follow. As we said only this Term, we expect both ourselves and lower  J courts to adhere to the rationale upon which the Court  J` based the results of its earlier decisions. Seminole  J8 Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. ___, ___ (1996) (slip op., at 21) (emphasis added). That is the principal reason we publish our opinions.  And the rationale of today's decision is sweeping: for sexbased classifications, a redefinition of intermediate scrutiny that makes it indistinguishable from strict  JH scrutiny. See supra, at 6!9. Indeed, the Court indicates that if any program restricted to one sex is uniqu[e], it must be opened to members of the opposite sex who have the will and capacity to participate in it.  J Ante, at 25. I suggest that the singlesex program that will not be capable of being characterized as unique is  JX not only unique but nonexistent.JX uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < In this regard, I note that the Court"which I concede is under no obligation to do so"provides no example of a program that  uB. would pass muster under its reasoning today: not even, for example, a football or wrestling program. On the Court's theory, any woman ready, willing, and physically able to participate in such a program  uBS would, as a constitutional matter, be entitled to do so. In any event, regardless of whether the Court's rationale leaves some small amount of room for lawyers to argue, it ensures that singlesex public education is  J functionally dead. The costs of litigating the constitutionality of a singlesex education program, and the risks of ultimately losing that litigation, are simply too high to be embraced by public officials. Any person with standing to challenge any sexbased classification can haul the State into federal court and compel it to establish by evidence (presumably in the form of expert testimony) that there is an exceedingly persuasive justification for the classification. Should the courtsx!"   happen to interpret that vacuous phrase as establishing a standard that is not utterly impossible of achievement, there is considerable risk that whether the standard has been met will not be determined on the basis of the record evidence"indeed, that will necessarily be the approach of any court that seeks to walk the path the Court has trod today. No state official in his right mind will buy such a highcost, highrisk lawsuit by commencing a singlesex program. The enemies of singlesex education have won; by persuading only seven Justices (five would have been enough) that their view of the world is enshrined in the Constitution, they have effectively imposed that view on all 50 States.  This is especially regrettable because, as the District Court here determined, educational experts in recent years have increasingly come to suppor[t] [the] view that substantial educational benefits flow from a single JX gender environment, be it male or female, that cannot be  J0 replicated in a coeducational setting. 766 F.Supp., at 1415 (emphasis added). The evidence in th[is] case, for example, is virtually uncontradicted to that effect.  J Ibid. Until quite recently, some public officials have attempted to institute new singlesex programs, at least as experiments. In 1991, for example, the Detroit Board of Education announced a program to establish three boysonly schools for innercity youth; it was met with a lawsuit, a preliminary injunction was swiftly entered  J by a District Court that purported to rely on Hogan, see  J Garrett v. Board of Education of School Dist. of Detroit, 775 F.Supp. 1004, 1006 (ED Mich. 1991), and the Detroit Board of Education voted to abandon the litigation and thus abandon the plan, see Detroit Plan to Aid Blacks with AllBoy Schools Abandoned, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 8, 1991, p. A4, col. 1. Today's opinion assures that no such experiment will be tried again.  ;H2 d`""  Ԍd8B؃  2  There are few extant singlesex public educational programs. The potential of today's decision for widespread disruption of existing institutions lies in its  J application to private singlesex education. Government support is immensely important to private educational institutions. Mary Baldwin College"which designed and runs VWIL"notes that private institutions of higher education in the 1990!1991 school year derived approximately 19 percent of their budgets from federal, state,  J and local government funds, not including financial aid  Jz to students. See Brief for Mary Baldwin College as  JR Amicus Curiae 22, n. 13 (citing U.S. Dept. of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, p. 38 and Note (1993)). Charitable status under the tax laws is also highly significant for private educational institutions, and it is certainly not beyond the Court that rendered today's decision to hold that a donation to a singlesex college should be deemed contrary to public policy and therefore not deductible if the college discriminates on the basis of sex. See Note, The Independent Sector and the Tax Laws: Defining Charity in an Ideal Democracy, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 461,  J 476 (1991). See also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).  The Court adverts to private singlesex education only briefly, and only to make the assertion (mentioned above) that [w]e address specifically and only an educational opportunity recognized by the District Court  J and the Court of Appeals as `unique.' T!  Ante, at 16, n.7.  J As I have already remarked, see supra, at 32!33, that assurance assures nothing, unless it is to be taken as a promise that in the future the Court will disclaim the reasoning it has used today to destroy VMI. The Government, in its briefs to this Court, at least purports to address the consequences of its attack on VMI for public support of private singlesex education. It#"   contends that private colleges which are the direct or indirect beneficiaries of government funding are not thereby necessarily converted into state actors to which the Equal Protection Clause is then applicable. See Brief for United States in No. 94!2107, at 35!37  J8 (discussing RendellBaker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982),  J and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982)). That is true. It is also virtually meaningless.  The issue will be not whether government assistance turns private colleges into state actors, but whether the  Jp government itself would be violating the Constitution by providing state support to singlesex colleges. For  J example, in Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), we saw no room to distinguish between state operation of racially segregated schools and state support of privately run segregated schools. Racial discrimination in stateoperated schools is barred by the Constitution and `[i]t is also axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage or promote private persons to accomplish  J what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.' 1!  Id.,  J at 465 (quoting Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Ed., 267  J F.Supp. 458, 475!476 (MD Ala. 1967)); see also Cooper  J v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958) ( State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or property cannot be squared with the [Fourteenth] Amendment's command that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal  J protection of the laws); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 565 (1984) (case arising under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and stating that [t]he economic effect of direct and indirect assistance often is indistinguishable). When the Government was pressed at oral argument concerning the implications of these cases for private singlesex education if governmentprovided singlesex education is unconstitutional, it stated that the implications will not be so disastrous,  J` since States can provide funding to racially segregated`$"   private schools, depend[ing] on the circumstances, Tr. of Oral Arg. 56. I cannot imagine what those circumstances might be, and it would be as foolish for privateschool administrators to think that that assurance from the Justice Department will outlive the day it was made, as it was for VMI to think that the Justice Department's unequivoca[l] support for an intermediatescrutiny standard in this case would survive the Government's loss in the courts below.  The only hope for stateassisted singlesex private schools is that the Court will not apply in the future the principles of law it has applied today. That is a substantial hope, I am happy and ashamed to say. After all, did not the Court today abandon the principles of law it has applied in our earlier sexclassification cases? And does not the Court positively invite private colleges to rely upon our adhocery by assuring them this case is unique? I would not advise the foundation of any new singlesex college (especially an allmale one) with the expectation of being allowed to receive any government support; but it is too soon to abandon in despair those singlesex colleges already in existence. It will certainly be possible for this Court to write a future opinion that ignores the broad principles of law set forth today, and that characterizes as utterly dispositive the opinion's perceptions that VMI was a uniquely prestigious allmale institution, conceived in chauvinism, etc., etc. I will not join that opinion. 3 Stars 3*** #^3 Stars Justice Brandeis said it is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to  J the rest of the country. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (dissenting opinion). But it is one of the unhappy incidents of the federal system that>%"   a selfrighteous Supreme Court, acting on its Members' personal view of what would make a more perfect  J Union, ante, at 41 (a criterion only slightly more restrictive than a more perfect world), can impose its own favored social and economic dispositions nationwide. As today's disposition, and others this single Term, show, this places it beyond the power of a single courageous State, not only to introduce novel dispositions that the Court frowns upon, but to reintroduce, or indeed even adhere to, disfavored dispositions that are  Jp centuries old. See, e.g., BMW of North America, Inc. v.  JH Gore, 517 U.S. ___ (1996); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. ___ (1996). The sphere of selfgovernment reserved to the people of the Republic is progressively narrowed.  In the course of this dissent, I have referred approvingly to the opinion of my former colleague, Justice  J Powell, in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Many of the points made in his dissent apply with equal force here"in particular, the criticism of judicial opinions that purport to be  J Ԛ narro[w] but whose logic is sweepin[g]. Id., at 745!746, n. 18. But there is one statement with which I cannot agree. Justice Powell observed that the Court's  Jh decision in Hogan, which struck down a singlesex program offered by the Mississippi University for Women, had thereby [l]eft without honor ... an element of diversity that has characterized much of American education and enriched much of American  J life. Id., at 735. Today's decision does not leave VMI without honor; no court opinion can do that.  In an odd sort of way, it is precisely VMI's attachment to such oldfashioned concepts as manly honor that has made it, and the system it represents, the target of those who today succeed in abolishing public singlesex education. The record contains a booklet that all firstyear VMI students (the socalled rats) were required to keep in their possession at all times. Near the end`&"   there appears the following periodpiece, entitled The Code of a Gentleman: BQ C  , , ( N N " Without a strict observance of the fundamental Code of Honor, no man, no matter how `polished,' can be considered a gentleman. The honor of a gentleman demands the inviolability of his word, and the incorruptibility of his principles. He is the descendant of the knight, the crusader; he is the defender of the defenseless and the champion of justice ... or he is not a Gentleman. N N "A Gentleman ... N N "Does not discuss his family affairs in public or with acquaintances. N N "Does not speak more than casually about his girl friend. N N "Does not go to a lady's house if he is affected by alcohol. He is temperate in the use of alcohol. N N "Does not lose his temper; nor exhibit anger, fear, hate, embarrassment, ardor or hilarity in public. N N "Does not hail a lady from a club window. N N "A gentleman never discusses the merits or demerits of a lady. N N "Does not mention names exactly as he avoids the mention of what things cost. N N "Does not borrow money from a friend, except in dire need. Money borrowed is a debt of honor, and must be repaid as promptly as possible. Debts incurred by a deceased parent, brother, sister or grown child are assumed by honorable men as a debt of honor. N N "Does not display his wealth, money or possessions. N N "Does not put his manners on and off, whether in the club or in a ballroom. He treats people with courtesy, no matter what their social position may be. N N "Does not slap strangers on the back nor so much as lay a finger on a lady.'"  ԌN N "Does not `lick the boots of those above' nor `kick the face of those below him on the social ladder.' N N "Does not take advantage of another's helplessness or ignorance and assumes that no gentleman will take advantage of him. N N "A Gentleman respects the reserves of others, but demands that others respect those which are his. N N "A Gentleman can become what he wills to be...iBQ d   ( , , I do not know whether the men of VMI lived by this Code; perhaps not. But it is powerfully impressive that a public institution of higher education still in existence sought to have them do so. I do not think any of us, women included, will be better off for its destruction.