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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@Final Op ##  ( ( ( (  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: Stones, and 89 Firearms. Because it provides a useful analytical tool, we conduct our inquiry within the  J framework of the twopart test used in 89 Firearms. First, we ask whether Congress intended proceedings under 21 U. S. C. 881, and 18 U. S. C. 981, to be criminal or civil. Second, we turn to consider whether the proceedings are so punitive in fact as to persuade us that the forfeiture proceeding[s] may not legitimately be viewed as civil in nature, despite Congress' intent.  J 89 Firearms, 465 U.S., at 366.  !There is little doubt that Congress intended these forfeitures to be civil proceedings. As was the case in  J^ 89 Firearms, Congress' intent in this regard is most clearly demonstrated by the procedural mechanisms it established for enforcing forfeitures under the statute[s]. 465 U.S., at 363. Both 21 U.S.C. 881 and 18 U.S.C. 981, which is entitled Civil forfeiture, provide that the laws relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture, and condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws ... shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred under 881 and 981. See 21"   U.S.C. 881(d); 18 U.S.C. 981(d). Because forfeiture  J proceedings under the customs laws are in rem, see 19  J U.S.C. 1602 et seq., it is clear that Congress intended that a forfeiture under 881 or 981, like the forfeiture  J` reviewed in 89 Firearms, would be a proceeding in rem. Congress specifically structured these forfeitures to be impersonal by targeting the property itself. In contrast  J to the in personam nature of criminal actions, actions in  J rem have traditionally been viewed as civil proceedings, with jurisdiction dependent upon seizure of a physical  Jp object. 89 Firearms, 465 U.S., at 363, citing Calero JH Toledo, 416 U.S., at 684.  !Other procedural mechanisms governing forfeitures under 981 and 881 also indicate that Congress intended such proceedings to be civil. Forfeitures under either statute are governed by 19 U.S.C. 1607, which provides that actual notice of the impending forfeiture is unnecessary when the Government cannot identify any party with an interest in the seized article, and by 1609, which provides that seized property is subject to forfeiture through a summary administrative procedure if no party files a claim to the property. And 19 U.S.C. 1615, which governs the burden of proof in forfeiture proceedings under 881 and 981, provides that once the Government has shown probable cause that the property is subject to forfeiture, then the burden of proof shall lie upon [the] claimant. In sum, [b]y creating such distinctly civil procedures for forfeitures under [881 and 981], Congress has `indicate[d] clearly that it intended a civil, not a criminal sanction.' !   JP 89 Firearms, supra, at 363, quoting Helvering v. Mitch J( ell, 303 U.S., at 402.o( uB ԍ Justice Stevens mischaracterizes our holding. We do not hold that  uBG in rem civil forfeiture is per se exempt from the scope of the Double  uB Jeopardy Clause. See post at 5!9. Similarly, we do not rest our conclusion in this case upon the longrecognized fiction that a forfeiture"##  uB in rem punishes only malfeasant property rather than a particular  uBG person. See post, at 18!21. That a forfeiture is designated as civil by  uB Congress and proceeds in rem establishes a presumption that it is not  uB subject to double jeopardy. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of  uBl 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984). Nevertheless, where the  uB#  clearest proof indicates that an in rem civil forfeiture is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to be equivalent to a criminal proceeding,  uB that forfeiture may be subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id., at 365.("  Ԍ !Moving to the second stage of our analysis, we find that there is little evidence, much less the  `clearest  J proof'  that we require, see 89 Firearms, supra, at 365,  J quoting Ward, 448 U.S., at 249, suggesting that forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6) and (a)(7), and 19 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(A), are so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal despite Congress' intent to the contrary. The statutes involved in this case are, in most significant respects, indistinguishable from those reviewed, and held not to be  Jp punitive, in Various Items, Emerald Cut Stones, and 89  JH Firearms.  !Most significant is that 981(a)(1)(A), and 881(a)(6) and (a)(7), while perhaps having certain punitive aspects, serve important nonpunitive goals. Title 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(7), under which Ursery's property was forfeited, provides for the forfeiture of all real property ... which is used or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of a federal drug felony. Requiring the forfeiture of property used to commit federal narcotics violations encourages property owners to take care in managing their property and ensures that they will not permit that property to be used for illegal purposes. See  J@ Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. ___, ___ (1996) (slip op., at 10) ( Forfeiture of property prevents illegal uses ... by imposing an economic penalty, thereby rendering  J illegal behavior unprofitable); 89 Firearms, supra, at"   364 (forfeiture discourages unregulated commerce in  J firearms); CaleroToledo, supra, at 687!688. In many circumstances, the forfeiture may abate a nuisance. See,  J e.g., United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870 (CA2 1990) (forfeiting apartment building used to sell  J8 crack cocaine); see also Bennis, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 10) (affirming application of Michigan statute abating car as a nuisance; forfeiture prevent[s] further illicit  J use of property); cf. 89 Firearms, supra, at 364 (forfeiture remov[ed] from circulation firearms that have been  Jp used or intended for use illegally); Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S., at 237 (forfeiture prevented forbidden merchandise from circulating in the United States).  !The forfeiture of the property claimed by Arlt and Wren took place pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(A), and 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6). Section 981(a)(1)(A) provides for the forfeiture of any property involved in illegal moneylaundering transactions. Section 881(a)(6) provides for the forfeiture of [a]ll ... things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for illegal drugs; all proceeds traceable to such an exchange; and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate a federal drug felony. The same remedial purposes served by 881(a)(7) are served by 881(a)(6) and 981(a)(1)(A). Only one point merits separate discussion. To the extent that 881(a)(6) applies to proceeds of illegal drug activity, it serves the additional nonpunitive goal of ensuring that persons do not profit from their illegal acts.  !Other considerations that we have found relevant to the question whether a proceeding is criminal also tend to support a conclusion that 981(a)(1)(A) and 881  J (a)(6) and (a)(7) are civil proceedings. See Ward, supra, at 247!248, n. 7, 249 (listing relevant factors and noting that they are neither exhaustive nor dispositive). First,  J` in light of our decisions in Various Items, Emerald Cut`"    J Stones, and 89 Firearms, and the long tradition of federal statutes providing for a forfeiture proceeding following a criminal prosecution, it is absolutely clear  J that in rem civil forfeiture has not historically been regarded as punishment, as we have understood that term under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Second, there is no requirement in the statutes that we currently  J review that the Government demonstrate scienter in order to establish that the property is subject to forfeiture; indeed, the property may be subject to forfeiture even if no party files a claim to it and the Government never shows any connection between the property and a particular person. See 19 U.S.C. 1609. Though both 881(a) and 981(a) contain an innocent owner exception, we do not think that such a provision, without more indication of an intent to punish, is relevant to the question whether a statute is punitive under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Third, though both statutes may fairly be said to serve the purpose of deterrence, we long have held that this purpose may serve civil as well as  J criminal goals. See, e.g., 89 Firearms, supra, at 364;  J CaleroToledo, supra, at 677!678. We recently reaf J firmed this conclusion in Bennis v. Michigan, supra, at ___ (slip. op., at 10), where we held that forfeiture ... serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose. Finally, though both statutes are tied to  J criminal activity, as was the case in 89 Firearms, this fact is insufficient to render the statutes punitive. See  J 89 Firearms, 465 U.S., at 365!366. It is well settled that Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil  JP sanction in respect to the same act or omission, Hel J( vering, 303 U.S., at 399. By itself, the fact that a forfeiture statute has some connection to a criminal violation is far from the clearest proof necessary to show that a proceeding is criminal.  J  !We hold that these in rem civil forfeitures are neither punishment nor criminal for purposes of the Double`"   Jeopardy Clause. The judgments of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in No. 95!345, and of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in No. 95!346, are accordingly reversed.  J8 ` JIt is so ordered.ă