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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@Final Op ##  ( ( ( (  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987), and a state statute mandating certain minimum health  J benefits, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). Those statutes, however,  ! `neither encourage[d] nor discourage[d] the collectivebargaining processes that are the subject of the [federal labor  JN laws].' S !  Fort Halifax, supra, at 21 (quoting Metropolitan  J& Life, supra, at 755). Neither did those statutes come accompanied with antitrust's laborrelated history. Cf.  J Oliver, 358 U.S., at 295!297 (state antitrust law interferes with collective bargaining and is not applicable to labormanagement agreement).  Petitioners also say that irrespective of how the labor exemption applies elsewhere to multiemployer collective bargaining, professional sports is special. We can understand how professional sports may be special in terms of, say, interest, excitement, or concern. But we do not understand how they are special in respect to labor law's antitrust exemption. We concede that the clubs that make up a professional sports league are not completely independent economic competitors, as they"   depend upon a degree of cooperation for economic  J survival. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of  J Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101!102 (1984); App. 110!115 (declaration of NFL Commissioner). In the present context, however, that circumstance makes the league more like a single bargaining employer, which analogy seems irrelevant to the legal issue before us.  We also concede that football players often have special individual talents, and, unlike many unionized workers, they often negotiate their pay individually with  JH their employers. See post, at 5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But this characteristic seems simply a feature, like so many others, that might give employees (or employers) more (or less) bargaining power, that might lead some (or all) of them to favor a particular kind of bargaining, or that might lead to certain demands at the bargaining table. We do not see how it could make a critical legal difference in determining the underlying framework in which bargaining is to take place. See generally Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 Yale L. J. 1 (1971). Indeed, it would be odd to fashion an antitrust  exemption that gave additional advantages to professional  football players (by virtue of their superior bargaining power) that transport workers, coal miners, or meat packers would not enjoy.  The dissent points to other unique features of the parties' collective bargaining relationship, which, in the  Jx dissent's view, make the case atypical. Post, at 5. It says, for example, that the employers imposed the restraint simply to enforce compliance with leaguewide rules, and that the bargaining consisted of nothing more than the sending of a notice, and therefore amounted  J only to socalled bargaining. Post, at 6!7. Insofar as these features underlie an argument for looking to the employers' true purpose, we have already discussed`"    J them. See supra, at 15!16. Insofar as they suggest that there was not a genuine impasse, they fight the basic assumption upon which the District Court, the Court of Appeals, the petitioners, and this Court, rest the case. See 782 F.Supp. 125, 134 (DC 1991); 50 F. 3d, at 1056!1057; Pet. for Cert. i. Ultimately, we cannot find a satisfactory basis for distinguishing football players from other organized workers. We therefore conclude that all must abide by the same legal rules. 3 Stars %*** 3 Stars For these reasons, we hold that the implicit ( nonstatutory) antitrust exemption applies to the employer conduct at issue here. That conduct took place during and immediately after a collectivebargaining negotiation. It grew out of, and was directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process. It involved a matter that the parties were required to negotiate collectively. And it concerned only the parties to the collectivebargaining relationship.  Our holding is not intended to insulate from antitrust review every joint imposition of terms by employers, for an agreement among employers could be sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collectivebargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not significantly interfere with that  J process. See, e.g., 50 F. 3d, at 1057 (suggesting that exemption lasts until collapse of the collectivebargaining relationship, as evidenced by decertification of the  J. union); El Cerrito Mill & Lumber Co., 316 N.L.R.B., at 1006!1007 (suggesting that extremely long impasse, accompanied by instability or defunctness of multiemployer unit, might justify union withdrawal from group bargaining). We need not decide in this case  Jf whether, or where, within these extreme outer boundaries to draw that line. Nor would it be appropriate for>"   us to do so without the detailed views of the Board, to whose specialized judgment Congress intended to leave many of the inevitable questions concerning multiemployer bargaining bound to arise in the future.  J` Buffalo Linen, 353 U.S., at 96 (internal quotation  J8 marks omitted); see also Jewel Tea, 381 U.S., at 710, n. 18.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  J ` It is so ordered.ă"    J Opin Init ##  , , ( (     I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@%%") uB  ddh < #[ P['CdP##95!388"APPENDIX  uBn BROWN v. PRO FOOTBALL, INC.%%#) uB  ddh < #[ P['CdP##95!388"APPENDIX  uBn BROWN v. PRO FOOTBALL, INC.`=؃&Footnotes#[ P['CdP# ff 1*'(Í Í , , 01Í Í ( ( #o P['Cn&P#XgEpXgEph APPENDIX TO OPINION OF BREYER, J.  d ;TABLE A  F #e P['C|P# C  Major Bargaining Units and Employment in Private  F P Industry, by Type of Bargaining Unit, 1994.  F *V( @ (Covers bargaining units of 1,000 or more workers.)ă F( #uQe xzC X# ! XgEpx( ( NumberPercent x( x( u " ( ( TypeJHUnitsJEmploymentJUnitsJxEmployment *#e P['C|P#*ЇIp"   `k522"   `2,305,478"   ` 44"   `43"   P"  2  PԯM&Sp"   `k664"   `3,040,159"   ` 56"   `57"   P"  2ZZZZZ  PԯTotalpZ"   `1,186Z"   `5,345,637Z"   `100Z"   `g100Z"   PZ"  2Z  Pԯ  y( |dddy ! x( u " x(  ""( (  #uQ P['ClP#I  ^=Multiemployer. M  ^=One company, more than one location. S  ^=One company, single location. Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, unpublished data (Feb. 14, 1996) (available in Clerk of Court's case file). &Footnotes#[ P['CdP# ff 01Í Í ( ( 01Í Í ( ( #o P['Cn&P#x(  ""XgEp(   C !  d ! &Footnotes#[ P['CdP# ff 01Í Í ( ( 01Í Í ( ( #o P['Cn&P#XgEpXgEp;TABLE B  F #e P['C|P#  C G Major Multiemployer Collective Bargaining Units and  F&  Employment in Private Industry, by Industry, 1994.  F *V( @ (Covers bargaining units of 1,000 or more workers.) ! F( F( #uQe xzC X#у XgEpx( ( NumberPercent x( x( u " ( ( TypeJHUnitsJEmploymentJUnitsJxEmployment *#e P['C|P#*ЇAll industriesp#"   `k522#"   `2,305,478#"   `100#"   `g100#"   P#"  2#  PԯManufacturingp"   `45"   `210,050"   `i9"   `%9"   P"  2  Pԯ \Foodp"   `13"   `v50,750"   `i2"   `%2"   P"  2HHHHH  Pԯ \ApparelpH"   `23H"   `141,600H"   `i4H"   `%6H"   PH"  2H  Pԯ \Otherp"   `)9"   `v17,700"   `i2"   `%1"   P"  2  PԯNonmanufacturingp"   `k477"   `2,095,428"   ` 91"   `91"   P"  2mmmmm  Pԯ \Miningpm"   `)2m"   `v67,500m"   `/(1m"   )`%3m"   Pm"  2$$$$$m  Pԯ \Constructionp$"   `k337$"   `995,443$"   ` 65$"   `43$"   P$"  2$  Pԯ \Railroadsp"   `12"   `189,183"   `i2"   `%8"   P"  2  Pԯ \Other transportationp"   `20"   `156,662"   `i4"   `%7"   P"  2IIIII  Pԯ \Wholesale tradepI"   `)6I"   `8,500I"   `i1I"   `(1I"   )PI"  2I  Pԯ \Retail tradep"   `37"   `314,100"   `i7"   `14"   P"  2  Pԯ \Real estatep"   `11"   `v85,800"   `i2"   `%4"   P"  2nnnnn  Pԯ \Hotels and motelspn"   `11n"   `v79,200n"   `i2n"   `%3n"   Pn"  2%%%%%n  Pԯ \Business servicesp%"   `13%"   `v63,200%"   `i2%"   `%3%"   P%"  2%  Pԯ \Health servicesp"   `)8"   `v65,100"   `i2"   `%3"   P"  2  Pԯ \Otherp"   `20"   `v70,740"   `i4"   `%3"   P"  2JJJJJ  Pԯ J #uQ P['ClP#y( (dddy !  (1)=More than 0 and less than 0.05 percent. Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, unpublished data (Apr. 17, 1996) (available in Clerk of Court's case file).&Footnotes#[ P['CdP# ff 01Í Í ( ( 01Í Í ( ( #o P['Cn&P#x( u " XgEp(