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orưN )l"  ԌN N  (ii) if a return is not required, a transaction occurring during the three years immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition.S4BQ d ưN  ( , , What the Government here claims to be an excise tax obligation arose under 26 U.S.C. 4971(a), which provides that BQ tC  , , (  [f]or each taxable year of an employer who maintains a [pension] plan ... there is hereby imposed a tax of 10 percent (5 percent in the case of a multiemployer plan) on the amount of the accumulated funding deficiency under the plan, determined as of the end of the plan year ending with or within such taxable year.9BQ d   ( , ,  No one denies that Congress could have included a provision in the Bankruptcy Code calling a 4971 exaction an excise tax (thereby affording it the priority claimed by the Government); the only question is whether  the exaction ought to be treated as a tax (and, if so, an  J; excise) without some such dispositive direction.  ;H2 d d-A؃  O2  Here and there in the Bankruptcy Code Congress has included specific directions that establish the significance for bankruptcy law of a term used elsewhere in the federal statutes. Some bankruptcy provisions deal specifically with subjects as identified by terms defined outside the Bankruptcy Code; 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(13), for example, addresses restitution issued under title 18, United States Code, and 507(a)(1) refers to any fees and charges assessed against the estate under chapter 123 of title 28. Other bankruptcy provisions directly adopt definitions contained in other statutes; thus 761(5), (7), and (8) adopt the Commodity Exchange Act's defini tionsof commodity option, contract market, contract of sale, and so on. Not surprisingly, there are places where the Bankruptcy Code makes referential use of theQ"   Internal Revenue Code, as 11 U.S.C. 101(41)(C)(i) does in referring to an employee pension benefit plan that is a governmental plan, as defined in section 414(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, and as 346(g)(1)(C) does in providing for recognition of a gain or loss to the same extent that such transfer results in the recognition of gain or loss under section 371 of the Internal Revenue Code.  It is significant, therefore, that Congress included no such reference in 507(a)(7)(E), even though the Bankruptcy Code itself provides no definition of excise, tax, or excise tax. This absence of any explicit connector between 507(a)(7)(E) and 4971 is all the more revealing in light of the following history of interpretive practice in determining whether a tax so called in the statute creating it is also a tax (as distinct from a debt or penalty) for the purpose of setting the priority of a claim under the bankruptcy laws.  ;H2 d d-B؃  l2  Although 507(a)(7), giving seventh priority to several different kinds of taxes, was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2590 (1978 Act), a priority provision for taxes was nothing new. Section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (1898 Act), which governed (as frequently amended) until 1978, gave priority to taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States [or a] State, county, district, or  J^ municipality. 30 Stat. 544, 563.{^; uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < This provision was modified slightly between 1898 and 1978, most notably in 1938, when it was moved to 64(a)(4) (and given fourth priority) and amended to apply to taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or any State or any subdivision thereof. 52 Stat. 874.{ On a number of occasions, this Court considered whether a particular exaction, whether or not called a tax in the statute#"   creating it, was a tax for purposes of 64(a), and in every one of those cases the Court looked behind the label placed on the exaction and rested its answer directly on the operation of the provision using the term in question.  The earliest such cases involved state taxes and are  J exemplified by City of New York v. Feiring, 313 U.S. 283 (1941). In considering whether a New York sales tax was a tax entitled to priority under 64(a), the Court placed no weight on the tax label in the New York law, and looked to the state statute only to ascertain whether its incidents are such as to constitute a  J taxwithin the meaning of 64. Id., at 285. See also  J New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 492 (1906); New  J York v. Jersawit, 263 U.S. 493, 495!496 (1924). The Court later followed the same course when a federal  J statute created the exaction. In United States v. New  JX York, 315 U.S. 510 (1942), the Court considered  J0 whether    `tax[es]' C  so called in two federal statutes, id., at 512, n. 2, were entitled to priority as taxes under 64(a). In each instance the decision turned on the ac tual  J effects of the exactions, id., at 514!517, with the Court  J citing Feiring and Anderson as authority for its enquiry.  Jh 315 U.S., at 514!516. See also United States v. Childs,  J@ 266 U.S. 304, 309!310 (1924); United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275 (1978) ( We ... cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the `penalty' language of Internal Revenue Code 6672 is dispositive of the status of respond J ent's debt under Bankruptcy Act 17(a)(1)(e)).; uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr ddf < As the Court stated in a different context, [a]lthough the statute ... terms the money demanded as `a further sum,' and does not describe it as a penalty, still the use of those words does not change the nature and character of the enactment. Congress may enact that such a provision shall not be considered as a penalty or in the nature of one, ... and it is the duty of the court to be governed by such statutory direction, but the intrinsic nature of the provisionR"## remains, and, in the absence of any declaration by Congress affecting the manner in which the provision shall be treated, courts must decide the matter in accordance with their views of the nature of  uB the act. Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 612!613 (1903).l"  Ԍ  Congress could, of course, have intended a different interpretive method for reading terms used in the Bankruptcy Code it created in 1978. But if it had so intended we would expect some statutory indication, see  J` Midlantic Nat. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Environmen J8 tal Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986), whereas the most obvious statutory indicator is very much to the contrary: in the specific instances noted before, it would have been redundant for Congress to refer specifically to Internal Revenue Code definitions of given terms if such crossidentity were to be assumed or presumed, as a matter of interpretive course.  J  While the Government does not directly FTN   XgEpXFr  ff  challenge the  J continuing vitality of the cases in the Feiring line, it seeks to sidestep them by arguing, first, that similarities between the plain texts of 4971 and 507(a)(7)(E) resolve this case. This approach, however, is inconsis JX tent with New York and Sotelo, in each of which the Court refused to rely on the terminology used in the  J relevant tax and bankruptcy provisions.0ol uBL ԍ FTN    XFrXFr ddf < Justice Thomas's suggestion that no case has denied bank uB ruptcy priority to a congressionally enacted tax, post, at 2, is true,  uB but not on point. United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510, 514!  uBq 517 (1942), employed the FeiringAnderson analysis to the exactions at issue there; the Court did not rely on the label that Congress  uB gave. See also United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275 (1978);  uB United States v. Childs, 266 U.S. 304, 309!310 (1924). The Court's conclusion that the exactions functioned as taxes does not change the fact that it employed a functional analysis.0 The argument is also unavailing on its own terms, for even if we were to accept the proposition that comparable use of similar terms is dispositive, the Government's plain text argument still would fail.h "  Ԍ The word excise appears nowhere in 4971 (whereas, by contrast, 26 U.S.C. 4401 explicitly states that it imposes an excise tax). And although there is one reference to excise taxes that applies to 4971 in the title of the chapter covering that section ( Subtitle D" Miscellaneous Excise Taxes), the Government disclaims any reliance on that caption. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14, 17! 20; see also 26 U.S.C. 7806(b) ( No inference, implication, or presumption of legislative construction shall be drawn or made by reason of the location or grouping of any particular section or provision or portion of this title). Furthermore, though 4971(a) does explicitly refer to its exaction as a tax, the Government disavows any suggestion that this language is disposi tiveas to whether 4971(a) is a tax for purposes of 507(a)(7)(E); while 4971(b) impos[es] a tax equal to 100 percent of [the] accumulated funding deficiency to the extent not corrected, the Government says that this explicit language does not answer the question whether 4971(b) is, in fact, a tax under 507(a)(7)(E). Reply Brief for United States 13!14; Tr. of Oral Arg. 19!24. The Government's positions, then, undermine its suggestion that the statutes' texts standing together demonstrate that 4971(a) imposes an excise tax.  J@  The Government's second effort to avoid a New York  J and Sotelo interpretive enquiry relies on a statement from the legislative history of the 1978 Act, that [a]llFederal, State or local taxes generally consid eredor expressly treated as excises are covered by 507(a)(7)(E). 124 Cong. Rec. 32,416 (1978) (remarks of  JP Rep. Edwards); id., at 34,016 (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). But even taking this statement as authoritative, it would provide little support for the Government's position. Although the statement may mean that all "    J exactions called] uBh ԍ FTN    XFrXFr ddf < Assuming that an exaction would not be generally considered an excise tax unless it would be reasonable to consider it such, thepossible application of this first prong of the legislators' statement of intent is answered by the analysis of 4971, below.] excise taxes should be covered by  J Ԛ507(a)(7)(E),l uB ԍ FTN    XFrXFr ddf < It should be noted, though, that such an interpretation may prove too much: the Government suggests that this statement fromthe legislative history does not affect the rule of construction that courts will look behind the denomination of state and local taxes, Reply Brief for United States 6, n. 4, but it is difficult to read that sentence as applying one rule for federal taxes andanother for state and local ones. 4971 does not call its exaction an excise tax. And although the section occurs in a subtitle with a heading of Miscellaneous Excise Taxes, the Government has disclaimed reliance on the subtitle heading as authority for its position in this case, recognizing the provision of 26 U.S.C. 7806(b) that no inference of legislative construction should be drawn from the placement of a provision in the Internal Revenue Code. See  J supra, at 8!9; Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. If, on the other hand, the statement in the legislative history is read more literally, its apparent upshot is that, among those exactions that are taxes, the ones that are expressly treated as excises are excise tax[es] within the meaning of 507(a)(7)(E). But that proposition fails, of course, to answer the question whether the exaction is a tax to begin with.  In sum, we conclude that the 1978 Act reveals no congressional intent to reject generally the interpretive principle that characterizations in the Internal Revenue Code are not dispositive in the bankruptcy context, and no specific provision that would relieve us from making a functional examination of 4971(a). We proceed to that examination.  ;H2 d@ m "  Ԍd-C؃  J  2  Anderson and New York applied the same test in determining whether an exaction was a tax under 64(a), or a penalty or debt: a tax is a pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property for the purpose of support Jj ing the Government. Anderson, 203 U.S., at 492; New  JB York, 315 U.S., at 515; accord Feiring, 313 U.S., at 285 ( 64 extends to those pecuniary burdens laid upon individuals or their property ... for the purpose of defraying the expenses of government or of undertakings authorized by it). Or, as the Court noted in a somewhat different context, [a] tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government; a penalty, as the word is here used, is an exaction imposed by  J statute as punishment for an unlawful act. United  J States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931).  J  We take La Franca's statement of the distinction to be sufficient for the decision of this case; if the concept of penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or omission, and a punishment for an unlawful omission is what this exaction is. Title 29 U.S.C. 1082 requires a pension plan sponsor to fund potential plan liability according to a complex statutory formula, see also 26 U.S.C. 412, and 26 U.S.C. 4971(a) requires employers who maintain a pension plan to pay the Government 10 percent of any accumulated funding deficiency. If the employer fails tocorrect the deficiency before the earlier of a notice ofdeficiency  J under 4971(a)  FTN   XFrXFr ff or an assessment of the 4971(a) exaction, the employer is obligated to pay an additional tax of 100 percent of the accumulated funding deficien JZ cy. 4971(b). Z uB ԍ FTN    XFrXFr ddf < The Government contends that 4971(b) is more similar to a penalty than 4971(a) is, because the Secretary of the Treasury canwaive liability under the former but not the latter. The suggestion is that the Secretary can waive the imposition of the 100"## percent tax, under ERISA 3002(b), 88 Stat. 997, or can eliminate a violationby reducing the employer's funding requirement, see 26 U.S.C. 412(d); see also 29 U.S.C. 1083(a). But 412(d) and 1083(a) provide for waiver of the minimum funding requirements, sotheir application would avoid a violation of either 4971(a) or(b); there simply would be no accumulated funding deficiency for purposes of either 4971(a) or (b). Thus the Government is incorrect in suggesting that the Secretary has the ability to waive the exaction under 4971(b) but not under 4971(a).  More fundamentally, even if the Secretary could waive only 4971(b), it is not clear why this would make any difference, as the exaction would still serve to reinforce a federal prohibition. The obviously penal character of theseZ $  "   exactions is underscored by other provisions, including one giving the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) an entirely independent claim against the employer for the total amount of the unfunded benefit liabilities, 29 U.S.C. 1362(b)(1)(A), (a claim which in this case the PBGC has asserted and which is still  J pending, see Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Reorga J nized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 179 B. R. 704 (ND Utah 1994)); see also 1306!1307. We are, indeed, unable to find any provision in the statutory scheme that would cast the tax at issue here in anything but this punitive light.  ;H2 d d-D؃  \ 2  The legislative history reflects the statute's punitive character: BQ > C  , , ( - -  The bill also provides new and more effective penalties where employers fail to meet the funding standards. In the past, an attempt has been made to enforce the relatively weak funding standards existing under present law by providing for immediate vesting of the employees' rights, to the extent funded, under plans which do not meet these standards. This procedure, however, has proved to be defective since it does not directly penalize thoseA $ "   responsible for the underfunding. For this reason, the bill places the obligation for funding and the penalty for underfunding on the person on whom it belongs"namely, the employer. H.R. Rep. No. 93!807, p. 28 (1974).BQ `d   ( , , Accord, S. Rep. No. 93!383, p. 24 (1973). The Committee Reports also stated that, [s]ince the employer remains liable for the contributions necessary to meet the funding standards even after the payment of the excise taxes, it is anticipated that few, if any, employers will willfully violate these standards. H.R. Rep. No.  J Ԛ93!807, supra, at 28; S. Rep. No. 93!383, supra, at 24!25.  Given the patently punitive function of 4971, we conclude that 4971 must be treated as imposing a penalty, not authorizing a tax. Accordingly, we hold that the tax under 4971(a) was not entitled to seventh priority as an excise tax under 507(a)(7)(E), but instead is, for bankruptcy purposes, a penalty to be dealt with as an ordinary, unsecured claim.  9H1 d dy,III؃  2  Hence, the next question: whether the Court of Appeals improperly subordinated the Government's 4971 claim to those of the other general unsecured creditors. Though we have rejected the argument that the 4971 claim is for an excise tax within the meaning of 507(a)(7)(E), both parties agree that the 4971 claim is  J allowable on a nonpriority unsecured basis.  uB* ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < Compare 57(j) of the 1898 Act, 30 Stat. 561 ( Debts owing to the United States, a State, a county, a district, or a municipality asa penalty or forfeiture shall not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary loss sustained by the act, transaction, or proceeding out of which the penalty or forfeiture arose). CF&I's reorganization plan did not lump all unsecured claims in one nonpriority class, however, but instead createdr # "   four classes of unsecured creditors, only the first two of which would receive funds: Class 11 comprised small claims ($1,500 or less) grouped together for administrative convenience, see 11 U.S.C. 1122(b); Class 12 comprised general unsecured claims (except for those assigned to other classes); Class 13 covered the 4971 claim and some other (much smaller) subordinated penalty claims; and Class 14, claims between the CF&I Steel Corporation and its subsidiaries (all of which were bankrupt), the net value of which was zero. The plan provided, nonetheless, that if a court determined that a Class 13 claim should not be subordinated, or that the Class 13 claims should not be separately classified, the claim or claims would be placed in Class 12. Appellees' Appendix in No. 94!4034 et al. (CA 10), pp.95!101, 137!141, 196!200.  When the Government challenged the proposal to subordinate its claim, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the reorganization plan, App. to Pet. for Cert. A!31, and ordered that the 4971 claim be subordinated to the claims of all other general unsecured creditors of [CF&I]  J pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 510(c). Id., at A!21. The District Court subsequently ruled that the 4971 claim should be equitably subordinated to the claims of the  J@ general creditors under Section 510(c). Id., at A!18. In the Tenth Circuit, the Government again contested subordination under 510(c), which CF&I defended, even as it sought to sustain the Bankruptcy Court's result with two new, alternative arguments: first, that 11 U.S.C. 1122(a), restricting a given class to substantially similar claims, prohibited placement of the 4971 claim in Class 12, because of its dissimilarity to other unsecured claims; and second, that, because 11 U.S.C. 1129(a)(7) authorizes creditors with impaired claims  J (i.e., those getting less than full payment under the plan, like those in Class 12 here) to reject a plan that would give them less than they would get from a Chap` "  Ԯter 7 liquidation, courts must have the power to assign a claim the same priority it would have in a Chapter 7 liquidation (in which a noncompensatory prepetition penalty claim would be subordinated, 11 U.S.C. 726(a)(4)). The Court of Appeals addressed neither of these arguments, however, relying instead on the broad  J construction given 510(c) in In re Virtual Network  J Servs. Corp., 902 F.2d 1246 (CA7 1990) (subordinating a claim otherwise entitled to priority under 507(a)(7) to those of general unsecured creditors), and holding specifically that section 510(c)(1) does not require a finding of claimant misconduct to subordinate nonpecuniary loss tax penalty claims. 53 F. ! 3d, at 1159. The Court of Appeals took note of the Bankruptcy Court's finding that [d]eclining to subordinate the IRS's penalty claim would harm innocent creditors rather than punish the debtor and concluded that the bankruptcy court cor JX rectly addressed the equities in this case. Ibid.  Nothing in the opinion of the Court of Appeals (or, for that matter, in the rulings of the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court) addresses the arguments that the Bankruptcy Court's result was sustainable without reliance on 510(c). The court never suggested that either 1122(a) or the Chapter 7 liquidation provisions were relevant. We thus necessarily review the subordination on the assumption that the Court of Appeals placed no reliance on the possibility that the Bankruptcy Code might permit the subordination on any basis except equitable subordination under 510(c).  Jx  So understood, the subordination was error. In United  JP States v. Noland, 517 U.S. ___ (1996), we reversed a judgment said to rely on 510(c) when the subordination turned on nothing other than the very characteristic that entitled the Government's claim to priority under 507(a)(1) and 503(b)(1)(C). We held that the subordination fell beyond the scope of a court's authority under the doctrine of equitable subordination, because categori` "  Ԯcal subordination at the same level of generality assumed by Congress in establishing relative priorities among creditors was tantamount to a legislative act and therefore was outside the scope of any leeway under 510(c) for judicial development of the equitable subordi J8 nation doctrine. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). Of  J course it is true that Noland passed on the subordination from a higher priority class to the residual category of general unsecured creditors at the end of the line, whereas here the subordination was imposed upon a disfavored subgroup within the residual category. But  JH the principle of Noland has nothing to do with transfer between classes, as distinct from ranking within one of them. The principle is simply that categorical reordering of priorities that takes place at the legislative level of consideration is beyond the scope of judicial authority to order equitable subordination under 510(c). The order in this case was as much a violation of that prin J0 ciple as Noland's order was.  Without passing on the merits of CF&I's arguments that the 4971 claim is not similar to the other unsecured claims and that courts dealing with Chapter 11 plans should be guided by Chapter 7 provisions, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  J ` 3It is so ordered.ă