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The Government and the Court of Appeals read too much into 3553(a)(2). The statute requires a court to consider the listed goals in determining the particular sentence to be imposed. The wording suggests that the goals should be considered in determining which sentence to choose from a given Guideline range or from outside the range, if a departure is appropriate. The statute says nothing about requiring each potential departure factor to advance one of the specified goals. So long as the overall sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the abovelisted goals, the statute is satisfied. 3553(a).  Even if the text of the statute were ambiguous, we would reject the Government's interpretation. The Government's theory"that 3553(a)(2) directs courts to decide for themselves, by reference to the broad, openended goals of the provision, whether a given factor ever can be an appropriate sentencing consideration" would impose widespread judicial control over sentencing policy. This in turn would nullify the Commission's treatment of particular departure factors and its determination that, with few exceptions, departure factors"   should not be ruled out on a categorical basis. The sparse text of 3553(a)(2) cannot support this implausible result. Congress created the Commission to establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system, 28 U. S. C. 991(b)(1), and Congress instructed the Commission, not the courts, to review and revise the Guidelines periodically, 994(o). As a result, the Commission has assumed that its role is over time [to]... refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when departures should and should not be permitted. 1992 USSG ch. I, pt. A, intro. comment. 4(b). Had Congress intended the courts to supervise the Commission's treatment of departure factors, we expect it would have said so in a clear way. It did not, and we will not assume this role.  We conclude, then, that a federal court's examination of whether a factor can ever be an appropriate basis for departure is limited to determining whether the Commission has proscribed, as a categorical matter, consideration of the factor. If the answer to the question is no"as it will be most of the time"the sentencing court must determine whether the factor, as occurring in the particular circumstances, takes the case outside the heartland of the applicable Guideline. We now turn to the four factors underlying the District Court's threelevel departure.  =H3 d d-1؃  ,2  The first question is whether the District Court abused its discretion in relying on the collateral employment consequences petitioners would face as a result of their convictions. The District Court stated: BQ C  , , (  Defendants Koon and Powell will be subjected to a multiplicity of adversarial proceedings. The LAPD Board of Rights will charge Koon and Powell with a felony conviction and, in a quasijudicial proceeding, will strip them of their positions and tenure. Koona"   and Powell will be disqualified from other lawenforcement careers. In combination, the additional proceedings, the loss of employment and tenure,prospective disqualification from the field of law enforcement, and the anguish and disgrace these deprivations entail, will constitute substantial punishment in addition to any courtimposed sentence. In short, because Koon and Powell are police officers, certain unique burdens flow from theirconvictions. 833 F.Supp., at 789 (footnotes omitted).BQ pd   ( , ,  The Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's analysis, noting among other things the ease with which this factor can be used to justify departures that are based, either consciously or unconsciously, on the  J defendant's socioeconomic status, a factor that is never a permissible basis for review. 34 F. 3d, at 1454. We agree with the Court of Appeals that a defendant's career may relate to his or her socioeconomic status, but the link is not so close as to justify categorical exclusion of the effect of conviction on a career. Although an impermissible factor need not be invoked by name to be rejected, socioeconomic status and job loss are not the semantic or practical equivalents of each other.  We nonetheless conclude that the District Court abused its discretion by considering petitioners' career loss because the factor, as it exists in these circumstances, cannot take the case out of the heartland of 1992 USSG 2H1.4. As noted above, 18 U.S.C. 242 offenses may take a variety of forms, but they must involve willful violations of rights under color of law. Although cognizant of the deference owed to the district court, we must conclude it is not unusual for a public official who is convicted of using his governmental authority to violate a person's rights to lose his or her job and to be barred from future work in that field. "   Indeed, many public employees are subject to termination and are prevented from obtaining future government employment following conviction of a serious crime, whether or not the crime relates to their employment. See Cal. Govt. Code Ann. 19572(k) (West 1995) ( Conviction of a felony or conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude constitutes cause for dismissal); 18935(f) (State Personnel Board may refuse todeclare eligible for state employment one who has been convicted of a felony, or convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 18A.146(2) (Michie 1992); 4 Pa. Code 7.173 (1995). Public officials convicted of violating 242 have done more than engage in serious criminal conduct; they havedone so under color of the law they have sworn to uphold. It is to be expected that a government official would be subject to the careerrelated consequences petitioners faced after violating 242, so we conclude these consequences were adequately considered by the Commission in formulating 2H1.4.  =H3 d d-2؃  2  We further agree with the Court of Appeals that the low likelihood of petitioners' recidivism was not an appropriate basis for departure. Petitioners were firsttime offenders and so were classified in Criminal History Category I. The District Court found that [w]ithin Criminal History Category I, the Guidelines do not adequately distinguish defendants who, for a variety of reasons, are particularly unlikely to commit crimes in the future. Here, the need to protect the public from the defendants' future criminal conduct is absent `to a degree' not contemplated by the Guidelines. 833 F.Supp., at 790, n. 20. The District Court failed to account for the Commission's specific treatment of this issue, however. After explaining that a district courtF"   may depart upward from the highest Criminal Offense Category, the Commission stated: BQ C  , , (  However, this provision is not symmetrical. The lower limit of the range for Criminal History Category I is set for a first offender with the lowest risk of recidivism. Therefore, a departure below the lower limit of the guideline range for Criminal History Category I on the basis of the adequacy of criminal history cannot be appropriate. 1992 USSG 4A1.3 vBQ d  ( , , The District Court abused its discretion by considering appellants' low likelihood of recidivism. The Commission took that factor into account in formulating the criminal history category.  =H3 d d-3؃  2  The two remaining factors are susceptibility to abuse in prison and successive prosecutions. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in considering these factors. The Court of Appeals did not dispute, and neither do we, the District Court's finding that [t]he extraordinary notoriety and national media coverage of this case, coupled with the defendants' status as police officers, make Koon and Powell unusually susceptible to prison abuse, 833 F.Supp., at 785!786. Petitioners' crimes, however brutal, were by definition the same for purposes of sentencing law as those of any other police officers convicted under 18 U.S.C. 242 of using unreasonable force in arresting a suspect, sentenced under 2H1.4, and receiving the upward adjustments petitioners received. Had the crimes been still more severe, petitioners would have been assigned a different base offense level or received additional upward adjustments. Yet, due in large part to the existence of the videotape and all the events that ensued, widespread publicity and emotional outrage ... have surrounded this case from the outset, 833 F.Supp., at 788, which led the"   District Court to find petitioners particularly likely to  J be targets of abuse during their incarceration, ibid. The District Court's conclusion that this factor made the case unusual is just the sort of determination that must be accorded deference by the appellate courts.  As for petitioners' successive prosecutions, it is true that consideration of this factor could be incongruous with the dual responsibilities of citizenship in our federal system in some instances. Successive state and federal prosecutions do not violate the Double Jeopardy  Jp Clause. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985). Nonetheless, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a federal conviction following a state acquittal based on the same underlying conduct ... significantly burden[ed] the defendants. 833 F.Supp., at 790. The state trial was lengthy, and the toll it took is not beyond the cognizance of the District Court.  9H1 d d-V؃  l2  The goal of the Sentencing Guidelines is, of course, to reduce unjustified disparities and so reach towards the evenhandedness and neutrality that are the distinguishing marks of any principled system of justice. In this respect, the Guidelines provide uniformity, predictability, and a degree of detachment lacking in our earlier system. This too must be remembered, however. It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue. We do not understand it to have been the congressional purpose to withdraw all sentencing discretion from the United States District Judge. Discretion is reserved within the Sentencing Guidelines,F"   and reflected by the standard of appellate review we adopt. 3 Stars (*** 3 Stars The Court of Appeals identified the wrong standard of review. It erred as well in finding that victim misconduct did not justify the fivelevel departure and that susceptibility to prison abuse and the burdens of successive prosecutions could not be relied upon for the threelevel departure. Those sentencing determinations were well within the sound discretion of the District Court. The District Court did abuse its discretion in relying on the other two factors forming the threelevel departure: career loss and low recidivism risk. When a reviewing court concludes that a district court based a departure on both valid and invalid factors, a remand is required unless it determines the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent reliance on the  J invalid factors. Williams, 503 U.S., at 203. As the District Court here stated that none of the four factors standing alone would justify the threelevel departure, it is not evident that the court would have imposed the same sentence if it had relied only on susceptibility to abuse in prison and the hardship of successive prosecutions. The Court of Appeals should therefore remand the case to the District Court.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  J. ԋ` 3It is so ordered.ă