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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@Final Op ##  ( ( ( (  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:.!);5 Ellipsis!X @d XgEp The goal was to not only create a district that would maximize the opportunity for the black community to elect a Congressional candidate of its choice in 1992, but also one that included some of the major black growth areas which will assure continued electoral and economic opportunities over the next decades. App. 106!107. )BQ )d   ( , , As the District Court noted, testimony of state officials in earlier litigation (in which District 30 was challenged as a political gerrymander) contradicted part of their testimony here, and affirmed that race was the primary consideration in the construction of District 30. 861  J F.Supp., at 1338; see also id., at 1319!1321. And Johnson explained in a letter to the Department of Justice written at the end of the redistricting process that incumbency protection had been achieved by using race as a proxy: BQ C  , , (     `Throughout the course of the Congressional redistricting process, the lines were continuously reconfigured to assist in protecting the Democratic incumbents in the Dallas/Fort Worth metroplex area by spreading the Black population to increase the Democratic party index in those areas.' g  861P"   F.Supp., at 1322 (quoting Plaintiff Exh. 6E6).BQ d   ( , , This is not to say that the direct evidence of the districters' intent showed race to be the sole factor  J considered. As Justice Stevens notes, post, at 24!25, nn. 23!24, State officials' claims have changed as their interests have changed. In the prior political gerrymandering suit and to the Department of Justice, they asserted that race predominated. In this suit, their testimony was that political considerations predominated. These inconsistent statements must be viewed in light of their adversarial context. But such questions of credibility are matters for the District Court, and we  J simply differ from the dissenters in our reading of the record when they find insupportable the District Court's reliance on the State's own statements indicating the  J importance of race, see post, at 24!25, nn. 23!24, 34, n.  J 31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Finally, and most significantly, the objective evidence provided by the district plans and demographic maps suggests strongly the predominance of race. Given that the districting software used by the State provided only racial data at the blockbyblock level, the fact that District 30, unlike Johnson's original proposal, splits voter tabulation districts and even individual streets in many places, see App. 150; 861 F.Supp., at 1339, suggests that racial criteria predominated over other districting criteria in determining the district's boundaries. And, despite the strong correlation between race and political affiliation, the maps reveal that political considerations were subordinated to racial classification in the drawing of many of the most extreme and bizarre district lines. For example, the northernmost hook of the district, where it ventures into Collin County, is tailored perfectly to maximize minority population, see App. 153 (all whole and parts of 1992 voter tabulation districts within District 30's Collin County hook have a combined AfricanAmerican and Hispanic population in"   excess of 50%, with an average AfricanAmerican  J population of 19.8%, id., at 331, while the combined AfricanAmerican and Hispanic population in all surrounding voter tabulation districts, and the other parts of split districts, in Collin County is less than 25%), whereas it is far from the shape that would be necessary to maximize the Democratic vote in that area, see  J id., at 196 (showing a Republican majority, based on 1990 voting patterns in seven of the eight 1990 voter tabulation districts wholly or partly included in District 30 in Collin County).j*pf uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < In the application of our precedents to District 30, our disagree uB ment with Justice Stevens' dissent, post, at 13!32, is largely factual. In reviewing the District Court's findings of primary fact, we cannot ignore the reality that the District Court heard several days of testimony and argument and became significantly more familiar with the factual details of this case than this Court can be. We therefore believe that the dissent errs in secondguessing the  uB District Court's assessment of the witnesses' testimony, see post, at  uB 25, n. 24, and in dismissing as mere finetuning, post, at 31, the practice of using race as a proxy that the District Court found,  uB based on ample evidence, to be pervasive, see Vera v. Richards, 861 F.Supp 1304, 1322 (SD Tex. 1994).  For the same reason, we decline to debate the dissent on every factual nuance on which it diverges from the District Court's, and our, view. But two of its specific claims about District 30 merit a  uB response. First, the dissent asserts that [a] comparison of the 1992 precinct results with a depiction of the proportion of black population in each census block reveals that Democraticleaning precincts cover a far greater area [of District 30] than majorityblack census  uBm blocks. Post, at 31 (emphasis added). While that may be true, the  uB$ dissent's reliance on 1992 election results is misplaced. Those results were not before the legislature when it drew the district lines in 1991, and may well reflect the popularity and campaign success of Representative Johnson more than the party political predispositions of the District's residents. (The same error infects  uB the dissent's discussion of the Collin County hook, post, at 20!21, n. 19 (relying on 1992 election results).) And looking at totals, rather than at the difference between areas just inside and just outside the district lines, is misleading: race may predominate in the drawing of"## district lines because those lines are finely drawn to maximize the minority composition of the district, notwithstanding that in an overwhelmingly Democratic area, the total of Democrats in the district far exceeds its total minority population.  Second, the dissent suggests that strict scrutiny should not apply because District 30's compact core has a higher AfricanAmerican  uB population percentage than its wayward tentacles. Post, at 21!23. In doing so, it again ignores the necessity of determining whether  uBH race predominated in the redistricters' actions in light of what they  uB had to work with. Once various adjacent majorityminority populations had been carved away from it by the use of race as a proxy to enhance the electoral chances of neighboring incumbents, the core of District 30 was substantially too small to form an entire district. The principal question faced by the redistricters was, therefore, what territory to add to the core out of the remainder of the Dallas area, which remainder has an average AfricanAmerican population substantially below the 21% county average. In answering that question, as the District Court explained and the maps bear witness, the redistricters created bizarre, farreaching tentacles that intricately and consistently maximize the available remaining AfricanAmerican population.jp"  Ԍ The combination of these factors compels us to agree with the District Court that the contours of Congressional District 30 are unexplainable in terms other than race. 861 F.Supp., at 1339. It is true that District 30 does not evince a consistent, singleminded effort to  J8  segregate voters on the basis of race, post, at 22  J (Stevens, J., dissenting), and does not represent  J  apartheid, post, at 12, 33 (Souter, J., dissenting). But the fact that racial data were used in complex ways, and for multiple objectives, does not mean that race did not predominate over other considerations. The record dis closes intensive and pervasive use of race both as a proxy  to protect the political fortunes of adjacent incumbents, and for its own sake in maximizing the minority population of District 30 regardless of traditional dis trictingprinciples. District 30's combination of a bizarre, noncompact shape and overwhelming evidence "   that that shape was essentially dictated by racial considerations of one form or another is exceptional; Texas Congressional District 6, for example, which  J Justice Stevens discusses in detail, post, at 18!20, has only the former characteristic. That combination of characteristics leads us to conclude that District 30 is subject to strict scrutiny.  ;H2 d d-B؃  $2  In Harris County, centered on the city of Houston, Districts 18 and 29 interlock like a jigsaw puzzle ... in which it might be impossible to get the pieces apart. Barone & Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1996, at 1307!1308; see also Appendices B and C to this opinion (outlines of Districts 18, 29). As the District Court noted, these districts are so finely `crafted' that  J> one cannot visualize their exact boundaries without looking at a map at least three feet square. 861 F.Supp., at 1323. According to the leading statistical study of relative district compactness and regularity, they are two of the three least regular districts in the country. See Pildes & Niemi, 92 Mich. L. Rev., at 565.  District 18's population is 51% AfricanAmerican and 15% Hispanic. App. 110. It has some of the most irregular boundaries of any congressional district in the country[,] ... boundaries that squiggle north toward Intercontinental Airport and northwest out radial highways, then spurt south on one side toward the port  J^ and on the other toward the Astrodome. Barone &  J6 Ujifusa, supra, at 1307. Its many narrow corridors, wings, or fingers ... reach out to enclose black voters, while excluding nearby Hispanic residents. Pildes &  J Niemi, supra, at 556.  District 29 has a 61% Hispanic and 10% AfricanAmerican population. App. 110. It resembles BQ FC  , , (  a sacred Mayan bird, with its body running eastward along the Ship Channel from downtowna"   Houston until the tail terminates in Baytown. Spindly legs reach south to Hobby Airport, while the plumed head rises northward almost to Intercontinental. In the western extremity of the district, an open beak appears to be searching for worms in Spring Branch. Here and there, ruffled feathers jut  J out at odd angles. Barone & Ujifusa, supra, at 1335.\BQ d   ( , , Not only are the shapes of the districts bizarre; they also exhibit utter disregard of city limits, local election  J precincts, and voter tabulation district lines. See, e.g., 861 F.Supp., at 1340 (60% of District 18 and District 29 residents live in split precincts). This caused a severe disruption of traditional forms of political activity. Campaigners seeking to visit their constituents had to carry a map to identify the district lines, because so often the borders would move from block to block; voters did not know the candidates running for office because they did not know which district they lived in.  Jl Ibid. In light of Texas' requirement that voting be arranged by precinct, with each precinct representing a community which shares local, state, and federal representatives, it also created administrative headaches for local election officials: BQ C  , , (  The effect of splitting dozens of [voter tabulation districts] to create Districts 18 and 29 was an electoral nightmare. Harris County estimated that it must increase its number of precincts from 672 to 1,225 to accommodate the new Congressional boundaries. Polling places, ballot forms, and the number of election employees are correspondingly multiplied. Voters were thrust into new and unfamiliar precinct alignments, a few with populations as low as 20  J voters. Id., at 1325.wBQ d   ( , , See also App. 119!127 (letter from local official setting forth administrative problems and conflict with local"    J districting traditions); id., at 147 (map showing splitting  J of city limits); id., at 128, Plaintiffs' Exh. 6E1, Attachment A (map illustrating splitting of voting precincts).  As with District 30, appellants adduced evidence that incumbency protection played a role in determining the bizarre district lines. The District Court found that one constraint on the shape of District 29 was the rival ambitions of its two functional incumbents, who distorted its boundaries in an effort to include larger areas of their existing state legislative constituencies. 861 F.Supp., at 1340. But the District Court's findings amply demonstrate that such influences were overwhelmed in the determination of the districts' bizarre shapes by the State's efforts to maximize racial divisions. The State's VRA 5 submission explains that the bizarre configuration of Districts 18 and 29 result[s] in the maximization of minority voting strength in Harris County, App. 110, corroborating the District Court's finding that [i]n the earliest stages of the Congressional redistricting process, state Democratic and Republican leaders rallied behind the idea of creating a new Hispanic safe seat in Harris County while preserving the safe AfricanAmerican seat in District 18. 861 F.Supp., at 1324. State officials testified that it was particularly necessary to split [voter tabulation districts] in order to capture pockets of Hispanic residents for District 29, and that a 61% Hispanic population in that  J district"not a mere majority"was insisted upon. Id., at 1340!1341. The record evidence of the racial demographics and voting patterns of Harris County residents belies any suggestion that party politics could explain the dividing lines between the two districts: the district lines correlate almost perfectly with race, see App.  J 151!152, while both districts are similarly solidly  J Democratic, see id., at 194. And, even more than in District 30, the intricacy of the lines drawn, separating Hispanic voters from AfricanAmerican voters on a block`"  ԫbyblock basis, betrays the critical impact of the blockbyblock racial data available on the REDAPPL program. The District Court's conclusion is, therefore, inescapable: Because Districts 18 and 29 are formed in utter disregard for traditional redistricting criteria and because their shapes are ultimately unexplainable on grounds other than the racial quotas established for those districts, they are the product of [presumptively] unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. 861 F.Supp., at 1341.  9H1 d dy,III؃  2  Having concluded that strict scrutiny applies, we must determine whether the racial classifications embodied in any of the three districts are narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. Appellants point to three compelling interests: the interest in avoiding liability under the results test of VRA 2(b), the interest in remedying past and present racial discrimination, and the nonretrogression principle of VRA 5 (for District 18 only). We consider them in turn.  ;H2 d d-A؃  2  Section 2(a) of the VRA prohibits the imposition of any electoral practice or procedure that results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen ... to vote on account of race or color. In 1982, Congress amended the VRA by changing the language of 2(a) and adding 2(b), which provides a results test for violation of 2(a). A violation exists if, BQ C  , , (  based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the"   political process and to elect representatives of their choice. 42 U.S.C. 1973(b). vBQ d  ( , , Appellants contend that creation of each of the three majorityminority districts at issue was justified by Texas' compelling state interest in complying with this results test.  As we have done in each of our previous cases in which this argument has been raised as a defense to charges of racial gerrymandering, we assume without deciding that compliance with the results test, as  J interpreted by our precedents, see, e.g., Growe v.  J Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 37!42 (1993), can be a compelling  J state interest. See Shaw II, ante, at 13; Miller, 515 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 19!20). We also reaffirm that the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny allows the States a limited degree of leeway in furthering such interests. If the State has a strong basis in  J evidence, Shaw I, 509 U.S., at 656 (internal quotation marks omitted), for concluding that creation of a majorityminority district is reasonably necessary to comply with 2, and the districting that is based on race  J  substantially addresses the 2 violation, Shaw II, ante, at 18, it satisfies strict scrutiny. We thus reject, as impossibly stringent, the District Court's view of the narrow tailoring requirement, that a district must have the least possible amount of irregularity in shape, making allowances for traditional districting criteria.  J, 861 F.Supp., at 1343. Cf. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of  J Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 291 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (state actors should not be trapped between the competing hazards of liability by the imposition of unattainable requirements under the rubric of strict scrutiny).  J<  A 2 district that is reasonably compact and regular, taking into account traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries, may pass strict scrutiny without having to"   defeat rival compact districts designed by plaintiffs'  J experts in endless beauty contests. The dissenters misread us when they make the leap from our disagreement about the facts of this case to the conclusion that we are creating a stalemate by requiring the States to  J8  get things just right, post, at 21 (Souter, J., dissenting), or to draw the precise compact district that a  J court would impose in a successful 2 challenge, post,  J at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Shaw II, ante,  J at 34 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Rather, we adhere to our longstanding recognition of the importance in our federal system of each State's sovereign interest in  J implementing its redistricting plan. See Voinovich v.  J Quilter, 507 U.S. 147, 156 (1993) ( [I]t is the domain of the States, and not the federal courts, to conduct  J apportionment in the first place); Miller, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 14) ( It is well settled that reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under our cases, the States retain a flexibility that federal courts enforcing 2 lack, both insofar as they may avoid strict scrutiny altogether by respecting their own traditional districting principles, and insofar as deference is due to their reasonable fears of, and to their reasonable efforts to avoid, 2 liability. And nothing that we say today should be read as limiting a State's discretion to apply  J traditional districting principles, post, at 3 (Souter, J., dissenting), in majorityminority, as in other, districts. The constitutional problem arises only from the subordination of those principles to race.  Strict scrutiny remains, nonetheless, strict. The State must have a strong basis in evidence for finding that the threshold conditions for 2 liability are present: BQ C  , , (  first, `that [the minority group] is sufficiently large  J and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district'; second, `that it is politically cohesive'; and third, `that the white"   majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candi! J date.' m !  Growe, supra, at 40 (emphasis added) (quot J ing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50!51 (1986)). BQ `d   ( , , And, as we have noted above, the district drawn in order to satisfy 2 must not subordinate traditional districting principles to race substantially more than is reasonably necessary to avoid 2 liability. Districts 18, 29, and 30 fail to meet these requirements.  We assume, without deciding, that the State had a strong basis in evidence for finding the second and third threshold conditions for 2 liability to be present. We have, however, already found that all three districts are bizarrely shaped and far from compact, and that those characteristics are predominantly attributable to gerrymandering that was racially motivated and/or achieved by the use of race as a proxy. See Part II,  J supra. District 30, for example, reaches out to grab small and apparently isolated minority communities which, based on the evidence presented, could not possibly form part of a compact majorityminority district, and does so in order to make up for minority populations closer to its core that it shed in a further suspect use of race as a proxy to further neighboring  J| incumbents' interests. See supra, at 10!11, 14!17.  These characteristics defeat any claim that the districts are narrowly tailored to serve the State's interest in avoiding liability under 2, because 2 does not require a State to create, on predominantly racial lines, a district that is not reasonably compact. See  J Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 10). If, because of the dispersion of the minority population, a reasonably compact majorityminority district cannot be created, 2 does not require a majorityminority district; if a reasonably compact district can be created, nothing in 2 requires the racebased"    J creation of a district that is far from compact.  Appellants argue that bizarre shaping and noncompactness do not raise narrow tailoring concerns.  J Appellants Lawson et al. claim that under Shaw I and  J` Miller, [s]hape is relevant only as evidence of an improper motive. Brief for Appellants Lawson et al. 56.  J They rely on our statement in Miller: BQ C  , , (  Shape is relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary element of the constitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of proof, but because it may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines. 515 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 11).BQ  d   ( , , The United States takes a more moderate position, accepting that in the context of narrow tailoring, consideration must be given to the extent to which the districts drawn by a State substantially depart from its customary redistricting practices, Brief 36, but asserting that insofar as bizarreness and noncompactness are necessary to achieve the State's compelling interest in compliance with 2 while simultaneously achieving  J other legitimate redistricting goals, id., at 37, such as incumbency protection, the narrowly tailoring require J ment is satisfied. Similarly, Justice Stevens' dissent argues that noncompact districts should ... be a  Jo permissible method of avoiding violations of [2]. Post, at 35.  These arguments cannot save the districts before us.  J The Lawson appellants misinterpret Miller: district shape is not irrelevant to the narrow tailoring inquiry.  J Our discussion in Miller served only to emphasize that the ultimate constitutional values at stake involve the harms caused by the use of unjustified racial classifications, and that bizarreness is not necessary to trigger/"    J strict scrutiny. See Miller, 515 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 11). Significant deviations from traditional districting principles, such as the bizarre shape and noncompactness demonstrated by the districts here, cause constitutional harm insofar as they convey the message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly racial. For example, the bizarre shaping of Districts 18 and 29, cutting across preexisting precinct lines and other natural or traditional divisions, is not merely evidentially significant; it is part of the constitutional problem insofar as it disrupts nonracial bases of political identity and thus intensifies the emphasis on race.  Nor is the United States' argument availing here. In determining that strict scrutiny applies here, we agreed with the District Court that in fact the bizarre shaping and noncompactness of these districts were predominantly attributable to racial, not political, manipulation. The United States' argument, and that of the dissent,  J0 post, at 34!36 (Stevens, J., dissenting), address the case of an otherwise compact majorityminority district that is misshapen by predominantly nonracial, political  J manipulation. See also post, at 26 (Souter, J., dissenting) (raising the possibility that a State could create a majorityminority district that does not coincide with the  J@ Gingles shape so long as racial data is not overused).  J We disagree with the factual premise of Justice  J ԚStevens' dissent, that these districts were drawn using racial considerations only in a way reasonably designed  J to avoid a 2 violation, post, at 36. The districts before us exhibit a level of racial manipulation that exceeds what 2 could justify.  ;H2 d d-B؃  d2  The United States and the State next contend that the district lines at issue are justified by the State's compelling interest in ameliorating the effects of racially polarized voting attributable to past and present racial"   discrimination. Brief for United States 32; Brief for Appellants Bush et al. 24!25. In support of that contention, they cite Texas' long history of discrimination against minorities in electoral processes, stretching from the Reconstruction to modern times, including violations  J8 of the Constitution and of the VRA. See, e.g., Williams  J v. Dallas, 734 F.Supp. 1317 (ND Tex. 1990); White v.  J Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Terry v. Adams, 345  J U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649  J (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v.  Jp Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); see also 861 F.Supp., at 1317 (because of its history of official discrimination, Texas became a covered jurisdiction under VRA 5 in 1975, and the Department of Justice has since frequently interposed objections against the State and its subdivisions). Appellants attempt to link that history to evidence that in recent elections in majorityminority districts, Anglos usually bloc voted against Hispanic  J0 and AfricanAmerican candidates. Ibid.  A State's interest in remedying discrimination is compelling when two conditions are satisfied. First, the discrimination that the State seeks to remedy must be specific, identified discrimination; second, the State must have had a `strong basis in evidence' to conclude  J@ that remedial action was necessary, `before it embarks  J on an affirmative action program.' 3!  Shaw II, ante, at 9!10 (citations omitted). Here, the only current problem that appellants cite as in need of remediation is alleged vote dilution as a consequence of racial bloc voting, the same concern that underlies their VRA 2 compliance defense, which we have assumed to be valid for purposes of this opinion. We have indicated that such problems will not justify racebased districting unless the State employ[s] sound districting principles, and ... the affected racial group's residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in  J` the majority. Shaw I, 509 U.S., at 657 (internal`"   quotation marks omitted). Once that standard is applied, our agreement with the District Court's finding that these districts are not narrowly tailored to comply with 2 forecloses this line of defense.  ;H2 d d-C؃  2  The final contention offered by the State and private appellants is that creation of District 18 (only) was justified by a compelling state interest in complying with VRA 5. We have made clear that 5 has a limited substantive goal:  ! `to insure that no votingprocedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.' h!   J Miller, 515 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 25) (quoting Beer  Jf v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)). Appellants contend that this nonretrogression principle is implicated because Harris County had, for two decades, contained a congressional district in which AfricanAmerican voters had succeeded in selecting representatives of their choice, all of whom were AfricanAmericans.  The problem with the State's argument is that it seeks to justify not maintenance, but substantial augmentation, of the AfricanAmerican population percentage in District 18. At the previous redistricting, in 1980, District 18's population was 40.8% AfricanAmerican. Plaintiffs' Exh. 13B, p. 55. As a result of Hispanic population increases and AfricanAmerican emigration from the district, its population had reached 35.1% AfricanAmerican and 42.2% Hispanic at the time of the 1990 census. The State has shown no basis for conclud J ing that the increase to a 50.9% AfricanAmerican population in 1991 was necessary to insure nonretrogression. Nonretrogression is not a license for the State to do whatever it deems necessary to insure continued  JF electoral success; it merely mandates that the minority's  J opportunity to elect representatives of its choice not be"   diminished, directly or indirectly, by the State's actions.  J We anticipated this problem in Shaw I, 509 U.S., at 655: A reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression. Applying that principle, it is clear that District 18 is not narrowly tailored to the avoidance of 5 liability. - 9H1 dЃ d,IV؃  2  The dissents make several further arguments against today's decision, none of which address the specifics of this case. We have responded to these points previously.  J Justice Souter, for example, reiterates his contention  J from Shaw I that because districts created with a view  Jf to satisfying 2 do not involve racial subjugation, post, at 12, and may in a sense be  )! `benign[ly]' !  motivated,  J Shaw I, 509 U.S., at 685 (Souter, J., dissenting), strict scrutiny should not apply to them. We rejected that  J argument in Shaw I, and we reject it now. As we  J explained then, see id., at 653, we subject racial classifications to strict scrutiny precisely because that scrutiny is necessary to determine whether they are benign"as  J& Justice Stevens' hypothetical of a targeted outreach program to protect victims of sickle cell anemia, see  J post, at 33, would, no doubt, be"or whether they misuse race and foster harmful and divisive stereotypes without a compelling justification. We see no need to revisit our prior debates.  J6  Both dissents contend that the recognition of the Shaw  J I cause of action threatens public respect for, and the independence of, the federal judiciary by inserting the courts deep into the districting process. We believe that the dissents both exaggerate the dangers involved, and fail to recognize the implications of their suggested  JF retreat from Shaw I.  As to the dangers of judicial entanglement, the"   principal dissent makes much of cases stemming from  J State districting plans originally drawn up before Shaw  J I, in which problems have arisen from the uncertainty in the law prior to and during its gradual clarification  J` in Shaw I, Miller, and today's cases. See post, at 38!39  J8 Ԛ(Stevens, J., dissenting). We are aware of the difficulties faced by the States, and by the district courts, in confronting new constitutional precedents, and we also know that the nature of the expressive harms with which we are dealing, and the complexity of the districting process, are such that brightline rules are not available. But we believe that today's decisions, which both illustrate the defects that offend the princi J ples of Shaw I and reemphasize the importance of the  J States' discretion in the redistricting process, see supra, at 23!24, will serve to clarify the States' responsibilities. The States have traditionally guarded their sovereign districting prerogatives jealously, and we are confident that they can fulfill that requirement, leaving the courts  J to their customary and appropriate backstop role.  This Court has now rendered decisions after plenary  J consideration in five cases applying the Shaw I doctrine  J (Shaw I, Miller, Hays, Shaw II, and this case). The dissenters would have us abandon those precedents, suggesting that fundamental concerns relating to the  J judicial role are at stake. See post, at 36, 39, 43  J (Stevens, J., dissenting); post, at 3!4 & n. 2, 9, 22, 32,  J 35 (Souter, J., dissenting); Shaw II, ante, at 2!3, 5!6  J & n. 3, 11!12 (Stevens, J., dissenting); but see id., at 16!17 (noting that the judicial task of distinguishing  JP racebased from nonracebased action in Shaw I cases is far from unique). While we agree that those concerns are implicated here, we believe they point the other way. Our legitimacy requires, above all, that we adhere to  J stare decisis, especially in such sensitive political contexts as the present, where partisan controversy  J` abounds. Legislators and district courts nationwide have`"   modified their practices"or, rather, reembraced the traditional districting practices that were almost universally followed before the 1990 census"in response to  J Shaw I. Those practices and our precedents, which acknowledge voters as more than mere racial statistics, play an important role in defining the political identity of the American voter. Our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence evinces a commitment to eliminate unnecessary and excessive governmental use and  J reinforcement of racial stereotypes. See, e.g., Georgia v.  Jp McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) ( the exercise of a peremptory challenge must not be based on either the race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by the  J party); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630!631 (1991) ( If our society is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress and causes continued hurt and injury);  J0 Powers, 499 U.S., at 410 ( We may not accept as a defense to racial discrimination the very stereotype the  J law condemns); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484, n. 2 (1990) ( [A] prosecutor's `assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black' ... violates the Equal Protection Clause);  J@ Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104 (1986) ( the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a State from taking any action based on crude, inaccurate racial stereotypes). We decline to retreat from that commitment today. 3 Stars (*** )3 Stars The judgment of the District Court is  J `z;Affirmed.ă "    1  1 %%ed uB  ddh < #[ P['CdP#)94!805, 94!806 & 94!988"APPENDIX  uBn 'BUSH v. VERA%%fd uB  ddh < #[ P['CdP#)94!805, 94!806 & 94!988"APPENDIX  uBn 'BUSH v. VERA`B؃ APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF THE COURT y!p44  ,p4dd940805J1.TIF! y   TEXAS CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 30!"   APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF THE COURT yAp4 pdd940805J2.TIF" y   TEXAS CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 18""   APPENDIX C TO OPINION OF THE COURT ya ,  dd940805J3.TIF# y   TEXAS CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 29