WPCN 2ABcR Z23|o "m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<gn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR2.#acchc"X^?S}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}SS}a}SFS}S}ooS}FSF}oaS}}}oc7cS?SS*SSSSSSSSSSF}}}}}oooooaFaFaFaF}}}}}}}}}}}}}oooooooo}}}}}}aFaFaFaF}FFFFF}}oooaaaaSSS}oooFoaS}}}NX?}S}}}}}}KS}K}KF}}}SS}}S}KF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXHYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>1&()o=3no P['C&P &([G' ԦGG P['C^P(DS?s\  PCP(DS?#皝4  p(AC&)u![2*d[ P['CP (u![2*4[e xzCX&r!Y1)LY P['CP()o=3no P['C&P()o=34Roe xzC&X&)UC%D4C P['CJP&F66 P['CPPo .zz-ccM^^^^272o2H4b6BQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote - Circv C   (  Cd  ( ( ( FTNFormats for each footnote,  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: XFrXFr ddf < [ Instead, such bans often serve only to obscure an underlying governmental policy that could  J be implemented without regulating speech. Central  J Hudson, 447 U.S., at 566, n.9. In this way, these commercial speech bans not only hinder consumer choice, but also impede debate over central issues of  J public policy. See id., at 575 (Blackmun, J., concurring  J in judgment).  `l uBa ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < This case bears out the point. Rhode Island seeks to reduce alcohol consumption by increasing alcohol price; yet its means of achieving that goal deprives the public of their chief source of information about the reigning price level of alcohol. As a result, the State's price advertising ban keeps the public ignorant of the key barometer of the ban's effectiveness: The alcohol beverages' prices.   Precisely because bans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech rarely seek to protect consumers from either deception or overreaching, they usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that the public will  J0 respond irrationally to the truth. Linmark, 431 U.S., at 96. The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good. That teaching applies equally to state attempts to "   deprive consumers of accurate information about their chosen products: BQ C  , , (  The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented. Thus, even a communication that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First  J Amendment. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,  Jc supra, at 762. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).BQ ; d   Jw  ( , , See also Linmark, 431 U.S. at 96 (1977); Rubin v.  JO Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S., at ___ (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); Tribe, American Constitutional Law 12!2, at790, and n.11.  9H1 d d-V؃  2  In this case, there is no question that Rhode Island's price advertising ban constitutes a blanket prohibition against truthful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful product. There is also no question that the ban serves an end unrelated to consumer protection. Accordingly, we must review the price advertising ban with special  JU care, Central Hudson, 447 U.S., at 566, n.9, mindful that speech prohibitions of this type rarely survive  J constitutional review. Ibid.  J  The State argues that the price advertising prohibition  J should nevertheless be upheld because it directly advances the State's substantial interest in promoting temperance, and because it is no more extensive than  J= necessary. Cf. Central Hudson, 447 U.S., at 566. Although there is some confusion as to what Rhode Island means by temperance, we assume that the State asserts "    J an interest in reducing alcohol consumption.`l uBh ԍBefore the District Court, the State argued that it sought to reduce consumption among irresponsible drinkers. App. 67. In its brief to this Court, it equates its interest in promoting temperance with an interest  uB in reducing alcohol consumption among all drinkers. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents 28. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has characterized the State's interest in promoting temperance as both the state's  uB interest in reducing the consumption of liquor, S&S Liquormart, Inc. v.  uBi Pastore, 497 A. 2d 729, 734 (1985), and the State's interest in discourag uB  ing excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages. Id. at 735. A state statute declares the ban's purpose to be the promotion of temperance and for the reasonable control of the traffic in alcoholic beverages. R.I. Gen. Laws  3!1!5 (1987).  J  In evaluating the ban's effectiveness in advancing the  J State's interest, we note that a commercial speech regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose.  J8 Central Hudson, 447 U.S., at 564. For that reason, the State bears the burden of showing not merely that its regulation will advance its interest, but also that it will  J do so to a material degree. Edenfield, 507 U.S., at  J 771; see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 8!9). The need for the State to make such a showing is particularly great given the drastic nature of its chosen means"the wholesale suppression of truthful, nonmisleading information. Accordingly, we must determine whether the State has shown that the  J price advertising ban will significantly reduce alcohol consumption.  We can agree that common sense supports the conclusion that a prohibition against price advertising, like a collusive agreement among competitors to refrain from  J such advertising,$ `l uB ԍ &  XFrXFrSee, e.g., Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735 (1988) (considering restriction on price advertising as  uBJ evidence of Sherman Act violation); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388  uB U.S. 350, 355 (1967) (same); Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825, 828 (CA7 1995) (considering restrictions on the location of advertising as"(( evidence of Sherman Act violation). will tend to mitigate competitionG"   and maintain prices at a higher level than would prevail in a completely free market. Despite the absence of proof on the point, we can even agree with the State's contention that it is reasonable to assume that demand, and hence consumption throughout the market, is somewhat lower whenever a higher, noncompetitive price level prevails. However, without any findings of fact, or indeed any evidentiary support whatsoever, we cannot agree with the assertion that the price advertising ban  J will significantly advance the State's interest in promot Jp ing temperance.   Although the record suggests that the price advertising  J ban may have some impact on the purchasing patterns  J of temperate drinkers of modest means, 829 F.Supp., at 546, the State has presented no evidence to suggest that  J its speech prohibition will significantly reduce market J wide consumption. G`l uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < The appellants' stipulation that they each expect to realize a $100,000 benefit per year if the ban is lifted is not to the contrary. App. 47. The stipulation shows only that the appellants believe they will be able to compete more effectively for existing alcohol consumers if there is no ban on price advertising. It does not show that they believe either the number of alcohol consumers, or the number of purchases by those consumers, will increase in the ban's absence. Indeed, the State's own expert conceded that plaintiffs' expectation of realizing additional profits through price advertising has no necessary relationship to increased overall consumption. 829 F.Supp., at 549.  Moreover, we attach little significance to the fact that some studies suggest that people budget the amount of money that they will spend on alcohol. 39 F. 3d 5, 7 (CA1 1994). These studies show only that, in a competitive market, people will tend to search for the cheapest product in order to meet their budgets. The studies do not suggest that the amount of money budgeted for alcohol consumption will remain fixed in the face of a marketwide price increase.  Indeed, the District Court's considered and uncontradicted finding on this point isX"    J directly to the contrary. Id., at 549.o`l uBh ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < Although the Court of Appeals concluded that the regulation directly advanced the State's interest, it did not dispute the District Court's conclusion that the evidence suggested that, at most, a price advertising ban would have a marginal impact on overall alcohol  uBD consumption. Id., at 7!8; cf. Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers  uB Assn. v. Attorney General, 142 Mich. App., at 311, 370 N.W. 2d, at 336 (explaining that any additional impact on the level of consumption attributable to the absence of price advertisements would be negligible). Moreover, the evidence suggests that the abusive drinker will probably not be deterred by a marginal price increase, and that the true alcoholic may simply reduce his purchases of other necessities.  In addition, as the District Court noted, the State has not identified what price level would lead to a significant reduction in alcohol consumption, nor has it identified the amount that it believes prices would decrease  J without the ban. Ibid. Thus, the State's own showing reveals that any connection between the ban and a significant change in alcohol consumption would be purely fortuitous.  As is evident, any conclusion that elimination of the ban would significantly increase alcohol consumption would require us to engage in the sort of speculation or conjecture that is an unacceptable means of demonstrating that a restriction on commercial speech directly  J0 advances the State's asserted interest. Edenfield, 507  J U.S., at 770.o`l uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < Outside the First Amendment context, we have refused to uphold alcohol advertising bans premised on similarly speculative assertions  uBM about their impact on consumption. See Capital Cities Cable, Inc.  uB v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 715!716 (1984) (holding ban preempted by  uB Federal Communications Commission regulations); California Retail  uBr Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (holding ban violated the Sherman Act). It would be anomalous if the First Amendment were more tolerant of speech bans than federal regulations and statutes.  Such speculation certainly does notn"   suffice when the State takes aim at accurate commercial information for paternalistic ends.  The State also cannot satisfy the requirement that its restriction on speech be no more extensive than necessary. It is perfectly obvious that alternative forms of regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech would be more likely to achieve the State's goal of promoting temperance. As the State's own expert conceded, higher prices can be maintained either by direct regulation or by increased taxation. 829 F.Supp., at 549. Per capita purchases could be limited as is the case with prescription drugs. Even educational campaigns focused on the problems of excessive, or even moderate, drinking might prove to be more effective.  As a result, even under the less than strict standard that generally applies in commercial speech cases, the State has failed to establish a reasonable fit between  J0 its abridgment of speech and its temperance goal.  J Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S.  J 469, 480 (1989); see also Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 15) (explaining that defects in a federal ban on alcohol advertising are further highlighted by the availability of alternatives that would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment's  J Ԛprotections for commercial speech); Linmark, 431 U. S.,  J at 97 (suggesting that the State use financial incentives or counterspeech, rather than speech restrictions, to ad J vance its interests). It necessarily follows that the price advertising ban cannot survive the more stringent con JP stitutional review that Central Hudson itself concluded was appropriate for the complete suppression of truth J ful, nonmisleading commercial speech. Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 566, n. 9.  9H1 d"  Ԍd,VI؃  2  The State responds by arguing that it merely exercised appropriate legislative judgment in determining that a price advertising ban would best promote temperance.  J Relying on the Central Hudson analysis set forth in  Jj Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of  JB P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), and United States v. Edge  J Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. ___ (1993), Rhode Island first argues that, because expert opinions as to the effectiveness of the price advertising ban go both ways, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the ban constituted a reasonable choice by the legislature. 39 F. 3d, at 7. The State next contends that precedent requires us to give particular deference to that legislative choice because the State could, if it chose, ban the  J sale of alcoholic beverages outright. See Posadas, 478 U. S., at 345!346. Finally, the State argues that deference is appropriate because alcoholic beverages are so Jb called vice products. See Edge, 509 U.S. ___ (slip op.,  J: at ___); Posadas, 478 U.S., at 346!347. We consider each of these contentions in turn.  The State's first argument fails to justify the speech prohibition at issue. Our commercial speech cases recognize some room for the exercise of legislative judg Jr ment. See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507!508 (1981). However, Rhode Island errs in  J" concluding that Edge and Posadas establish the degree of deference that its decision to impose a price advertising ban warrants.  J  In Edge, we upheld a federal statute that permitted only those broadcasters located in States that had legalized lotteries to air lottery advertising. The statute was designed to regulate advertising about an activity that had been deemed illegal in the jurisdiction in which the broadcaster was located. 509 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 14!15). Here, by contrast, the commercial speech ban  J targets information about entirely lawful behavior."  Ԍ J  Posadas is more directly relevant. There, a fiveMem J ber majority held that, under the Central Hudson test, it was up to the legislature to choose to reduce gam J bling by suppressing instate casino advertising rather  J` than engaging in educational speech. Posadas, 478 U. S., at 344. Rhode Island argues that this logic demonstrates the constitutionality of its own decision to ban price advertising in lieu of raising taxes or employing some other less speechrestrictive means of promoting temperance.  Jp  The reasoning in Posadas does support the State's argument, but, on reflection, we are now persuaded that  J Posadas erroneously performed the First Amendment  J analysis. The casino advertising ban was designed to keep truthful, nonmisleading speech from members of the public for fear that they would be more likely to gamble if they received it. As a result, the advertising ban served to shield the State's antigambling policy from the public scrutiny that more direct, nonspeech  J regulation would draw. See Posadas, 478 U.S., at 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Given our longstanding hostility to commercial speech  J regulation of this type, Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was up to the legislature to choose suppres J@ sion over a less speechrestrictive policy. The Posadas majority's conclusion on that point cannot be reconciled  J with the unbroken line of prior cases striking down similarly broad regulations on truthful, nonmisleading advertising when nonspeechrelated alternatives were  Jx available. See Posadas, 478 U.S., at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (listing cases); Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company:  ! `Twas Strange, `Twas Passing Strange; `Twas Pitiful, `Twas Wondrous Pitiful, 1986 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 12!15.  J  Because the 5to4 decision in Posadas marked such a sharp break from our prior precedent, and because it concerned a constitutional question about which this`"   Court is the final arbiter, we decline to give force to its highly deferential approach.. Instead, in keeping with our prior holdings, we conclude that a state legislature does not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes  J8 that the Posadas majority was willing to tolerate. As  J we explained in Virginia Pharmacy Bd., [i]t is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us.  Jp 425 U.S., at 770.  We also cannot accept the State's second contention, which is premised entirely on the greaterincludesthelesser reasoning endorsed toward the end of the  J Ԛmajority's opinion in Posadas. There, the majority stated that the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban  JX advertising of casino gambling. 478 U.S., at 345!346.  J0 It went on to state that because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of [casino gambling] it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but reducing  J the demand through restrictions on advertising. Id., at 346. The majority concluded that it would surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity through advertising on behalf of those who  Jx would profit from such increased demand. Ibid. On the basis of these statements, the State reasons that its undisputed authority to ban alcoholic beverages must include the power to restrict advertisements offering them for sale.  J  In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. ___ (1995), the United States advanced a similar argument as a basis for supporting a statutory prohibition against`"   revealing the alcoholic content of malt beverages on product labels. We rejected the argument, noting that  J the statement in the Posadas opinion was made only after the majority had concluded that the Puerto Rican  J` regulation survived the Central Hudson test. 514 U.S., at ___, n.2 (slip op., at 5, n.2). Further consideration persuades us that the greaterincludesthelesser argument should be rejected for the additional and more important reason that it is inconsistent with both logic and wellsettled doctrine.  Although we do not dispute the proposition that greater powers include lesser ones, we fail to see how that syllogism requires the conclusion that the State's power  J to regulate commercial activity is greater than its  J power to ban truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech.  J Contrary to the assumption made in Posadas, we think it quite clear that banning speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct. As a venerable proverb teaches, it may prove more injurious to prevent people from teaching others how to fish than to  J prevent fish from being sold. %`l uBH ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf <  Give a man a fish, and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime. The International Thesaurus of Quotations 646 (compiled by R. Tripp 1970).  Similarly, a local ordinance banning bicycle lessons may curtail freedom far more than one that prohibits bicycle riding within city limits. In short, we reject the assumption that words are necessarily less vital to freedom than actions, or that logic somehow proves that the power to prohibit an activity is necessarily greater than the power to suppress speech about it.  J  As a matter of First Amendment doctrine, the Posadas syllogism is even less defensible. The text of the First Amendment makes clear that the Constitution presumes that attempts to regulate speech are more dangerous than attempts to regulate conduct. That presumption"   accords with the essential role that the free flow of information plays in a democratic society. As a result, the First Amendment directs that government may not suppress speech as easily as it may suppress conduct, and that speech restrictions cannot be treated as simply another means that the government may use to achieve its ends.  These basic First Amendment principles clearly apply  J to commercial speech; indeed, the Posadas majority im J pliedly conceded as much by applying the Central Hud Jp son test. Thus, it is no answer that commercial speech concerns products and services that the government may  J freely regulate. Our decisions from Virginia Pharmacy  J Bd. on have made plain that a State's regulation of the sale of goods differs in kind from a State's regulation of accurate information about those goods. The distinction that our cases have consistently drawn between these two types of governmental action is fundamentally incompatible with the absolutist view that the State may ban commercial speech simply because it may  J Ԛconstitutionally prohibit the underlying conduct.`l uBH ԍ &  It is also no answer to say that it would be strange if the First Amendment tolerated a seemingly greater regulatory measure while forbidding a lesser one. We recently held that although the government had the power to proscribe an entire category of speech, such as obscenity or socalled fighting words, it could not limit the scope of its ban to obscene or fighting words that expressed a point of view with  uB which the government disagrees. R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377  uBI (1992). Similarly, in Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), we assumed that States could prevent all newsracks from being placed on public sidewalks, but nevertheless concluded that they could not ban only those newsracks that contained certain commercial  uB% publications. Id., at 428.  That the State has chosen to license its liquor retailers does not change the analysis. Even though government is under no obligation to provide a person, or the public, a particular benefit, it does not follow that con@$ "  Ԯferral of the benefit may be conditioned on the surren J der of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Frost & Frost  J Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583,  J 594 (1926). In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), relying on a host of cases applying that principle during the preceding quartercentury, the Court explained that government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests"especially his interest in freedom of  J speech. Id., at 597. That teaching clearly applies to state attempts to regulate commercial speech, as our cases striking down bans on truthful, nonmisleading  J speech by licensed professionals attest. See, e.g., Bates  J v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S., at 355; Virginia Bd. of  J Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  Thus, just as it is perfectly clear that Rhode Island could not ban all obscene liquor ads except those that advocated temperance, we think it equally clear that its power to ban the sale of liquor entirely does not include a power to censor all advertisements that contain accurate and nonmisleading information about the price of the product. As the entire Court apparently now  Jh Ԛagrees, the statements in the Posadas opinion on which Rhode Island relies are no longer persuasive.  Finally, we find unpersuasive the State's contention  J that, under Posadas and Edge, the price advertising ban should be upheld because it targets commercial speech that pertains to a vice activity. The appellees premise their request for a socalled vice exception to our  JP commercial speech doctrine on language in Edge which  J( characterized gambling as a vice. Edge, 507 U.S., at  J ___ (slip op., at ___); see also Posadas, 478 U. S., at  J 346!347. The respondents misread our precedent. Our decision last Term striking down an alcoholrelated  J advertising restriction effectively rejected the very con J` tention respondents now make. See Rubin v. Coors`"    J Brewing Co., 514 U.S., at ___, ___, n.2.  Moreover, the scope of any vice exception to the protection afforded by the First Amendment would be difficult, if not impossible, to define. Almost any product that poses some threat to public health or public morals might reasonably be characterized by a state legislature as relating to vice activity. Such characterization, however, is anomalous when applied to products such as alcoholic beverages, lottery tickets, or playing cards, that may be lawfully purchased on the open market. The recognition of such an exception would also have the unfortunate consequence of either allowing state legislatures to justify censorship by the simple expedient of placing the vice label on selected lawful activities, or requiring the federal courts to establish a federal common law of vice. See Kurland, 1986 S.Ct. Rev., at 15. For these reasons, a vice label that is unaccompanied by a corresponding prohibition against the commercial behavior at issue fails to provide a principled justification for the regulation of commercial speech about that activity.  9H1 d d\,VII؃  2  From 1919 until 1933, the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution totally prohibited the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors in the United States and its territories. Section 1 of the Twentyfirst Amendment repealed that prohibition, and 2 delegated to the several States the power to prohibit  J6 commerce in, or the use of, alcoholic beverages.S6`l uB ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf <  Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. U.S. Const., Amdt. 21, 2.S The States' regulatory power over this segment of commerce is therefore largely unfettered by the Commercel"    J ԚClause. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939).  As is clear, the text of the Twentyfirst Amendment supports the view that, while it grants the States authority over commerce that might otherwise be reserved to the Federal Government, it places no limit whatsoever on other constitutional provisions. Nevertheless, Rhode Island argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that in this case the Twentyfirst Amendment tilts the First Amendment analysis in the State's favor. See 39 F. 3d, at 7!8.  In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied  J on our decision in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109  J (1972). `l uB` ԍ FTN  &  XFrXFr ddf < The State also relies on two per curiam opinions that followed  uB the 21st Amendment analysis set forth in Larue. See New York  uB State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981), and New uB port v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92 (1986). In LaRue, five Members of the Court relied on the Twentyfirst Amendment to buttress the conclusion that the First Amendment did not invalidate California's prohibition of certain grossly sexual exhibitions in premises licensed to serve alcoholic beverages. Specifically, the opinion stated that the Twentyfirst Amendment required that the prohibition be given an  J added presumption in favor of its validity. See id., at 118!119. We are now persuaded that the Court's analy J sis in LaRue would have led to precisely the same result if it had placed no reliance on the Twentyfirst Amendment.  Entirely apart from the Twentyfirst Amendment, the State has ample power to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages in inappropriate locations. Moreover, in subsequent cases the Court has recognized that the States' inherent police powers provide ample authority to restrict the kind of bacchanalian revelries described  J( in the LaRue opinion regardless of whether alcoholic(l"    J beverages are involved. Id., at 118; see, e.g., Young v.  J American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976);  J Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). As  J we recently noted: LaRue did not involve commercial speech about alcohol, but instead concerned the regulation of nude dancing in places where alcohol was  J Ԛserved. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S., at ___, n.2 (slip op., at 4, n.2).  J  Without questioning the holding in LaRue, we now disavow its reasoning insofar as it relied on the Twentyfirst Amendment. As we explained in a case decided  JH more than a decade after LaRue, although the Twentyfirst Amendment limits the effect of the dormant Commerce Clause on a State's regulatory power over the delivery or use of intoxicating beverages within its borders, the Amendment does not license the States to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the  JX Constitution. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 712 (1984). That general conclusion reflects our specific holdings that the Twentyfirst Amendment does not in any way diminish the force of the Suprem J acy Clause, id., at 712; California Retail Liquor Dealers  J Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 112!114  Jh (1980), the Establishment Clause, Larkin v. Grendel's  J@ Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122, n.5 (1982), or the Equal  J Protection Clause, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 209 (1976). We see no reason why the First Amendment should not also be included in that list. Accordingly, wenow hold that the Twentyfirst Amendment does not qualify the constitutional prohibition against laws abridging the freedom of speech embodied in the FirstAmendment. The Twentyfirst Amendment, therefore, cannot save Rhode Island's ban on liquor price advertising.  9H1 d"  Ԍd6+VIII؃  2  Because Rhode Island has failed to carry its heavy burden of justifying its complete ban on price advertising, we conclude that R.I. Gen. Laws 3!8!7 and 3!8!8.1, as well as Regulation 32 of the Rhode Island Liquor Control Administration, abridge speech in violation of the First Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed.  J ` 3It is so ordered.ă