WPC,H 2BcR Z #|X "m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR2##cc"X^?Sf}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}FFoSaSFSu}So}o}oS}}FF}F}}}}SaF}}}}ox2xS?SS*SSSSSSSSSS}FooooooooooSFSFSFSF}}}}}}}}}}o}}}}}}ooooooo}oooo}}}}}}}}SFSFSFSFa}FFFFF}}}}}}SSSaaaaFFF}}}}}}}ooo}F}SaF}}}}}NX?q}So}}}}}EN}K}K-oo}SS}}SoKF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^3=Iff%==\o3=3offffffffff33oooQzKpzzz~~z=o=o\%ifQpQ=bp=:f=p\ifQQAp_\\U=o=o=3============f=iiiiiQQQQQK=K=K=K=p\\\\pppp~\ip\\~\\ziiiiQQQQpQQQQbbbbbbppK=K=K=K=pfz=z=z=z=z=pppp\\QQQzQzQzQzQ~A~A~Apppppp~\zUzUzUpz=pQzQ~A~\~\p\pNo3w\=QNNfffMDf=f=3GG\==\\pp%G=ooee3o<gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^)+9RRzx11IY)1))RRRRRRRRRR))YYYAljjjrjbrz>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXHYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>1"m^56=ii,GG\o3=33iiiiiiiiii33ooo\QwzzGoGo\,pwfziGp~DAzA~pzw_\N~pppbGoGo=3============pDpppppfiiiiQDQDQDQD~pppp~~~~ppzppppzpppffffziiiipppppp~~QDQDQDQDwzAAAAA~~~~pp___z\z\z\z\NNN~~~~~~pzbzbzbzA~_z\Nppzp~No3\6\\\iiiCCi?i?,XX\==\\~~,X?ooee3o<gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkklWdPZH\I\I\IlWoY2(mWgRklWaMlWs\SCYG\IhSr\lWw_s\_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR&)o=3no P['C&P  &![G' ԦGG P['C^P"DS?s\  PCP#DS?#皝4  p(AC&Iu![2*d[ P['CP  Ku![2*4[e xzCXP)o=34Roe xzC&X&r!Y1)LY P['CPQ)o=3no P['C&P&HUC%D4C P['CJP&JF66 P['CPdF*w=5R0wX pTC&&]I(!̤PI P['ChP u![2*d[ P['CP  x(BQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote - Circv C   (  Cd  ( ( ( 2FH=E@,E EFootnotestntesFormats for normal footnotes&Kn#[ P['CdP# ddf < X01Í Í01Í Í #o P['Cn&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: (emphases deleted). Rather, as we said in Dellmuth v.  J Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989), BQ C  , , (  To temper Congress' acknowledged powers of abrogation with due concern for the Eleventh Amendment's role as an essential component of our constitutional structure, we have applied a simple but stringent test: `Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmis J takably clear in the language of the statute.' f!  Id., at 227!228.  J evBQ d  ( , , See also Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public  J Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 474 (1987) (plurality opinion).  Here, we agree with the parties, with the Eleventh Circuit in the decision below, 11 F.3d, at 1024, and with virtually every other court that has confronted the  Je questionnoei uB ԍ   See Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1427!1428  uB (CA10 1994), cert. pending, No. 94!1029; Spokane Tribe v. Washington,"##  uB 28 F.3d 991, 994!995 (CA9 1994); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South  uBG Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 280!281 (CA8 1993); Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v.  uB Oklahoma, 834 F.Supp. 1341, 1345 (WD Okla. 1993); Maxam v. Lower  uB Sioux Indian Community of Minnesota, 829 F.Supp. 277 (D. Minn.  uBl 1993); Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Kansas, 818 F.Supp. 1423, 1427 (D.  uB# Kan. 1993); 801 F.Supp. 655, 658 (SD Fla. 1992) (case below); Sault Ste.  uB Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F.Supp. 1484,  uB 1488!1489 (WD Mich. 1992); Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Alabama, 776 F.Supp., at 557!558.XgEpXFr that Congress has in 2710(d)(7) provided ane "   unmistakably clear statement of its intent to abrogate. Section 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) vests jurisdiction in [t]he United States district courts ... over any cause of action ... arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations ... or to conduct such negotiations in good faith. Any conceivable doubt as to the identity of the defendant in an action under 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) is dispelled when one looks to the various provisions of 2710(d)(7)(B), which describe the remedial scheme available to a tribe that files suit under 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). Section 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)(II) provides that if a suing tribe meets its burden of proof, then the burden of proof shall be upon the State ....; 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) states that if the court finds that the State has failed to negotiate in good faith ..., the court shall order the State ...; 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) provides that the State shall ... submit to a mediator appointed by the court and subsection (B)(v) of 2710(d)(7) states that the mediator shall submit to the State. Sections 2710(d)(7)(B)(vi) and (vii) also refer to the State in a context that makes it clear that the State is the defendant to the suit brought by an Indian tribe under 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). In sum, we think that the numerous references to the State in the text of 2710(d)(7)(B) make it indubitable that Congress intended through the  J Act to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit. noi uB ԍ  ! The dissent argues that in order to avoid a constitutional question, we should interpret the Act to provide only a suit against state officials"##  uB rather than a suit against the State itself. Post, at 88!89. But in light of the plain text of 2710(d)(7)(B), we disagree with the dissent's assertion that the Act can reasonably be read in that way. We cannot press statutory construction `to the point of disingenuous evasion' even  uBl to avoid a constitutional question. See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S.  uB# 84, 96 (1985), quoting George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933) (Cardozo, J.). We already have found the clear statement rule satisfied, and that finding renders the preference for avoiding a constitutional question inapplicable.  "  Ԍ ;H2 d d9B؃  <2  Having concluded that Congress clearly intended to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity through 2710(d)(7), we turn now to consider whether the Act was passed pursuant to a valid exercise of power.  J Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S., at 68. Before we address that question here, however, we think it necessary first to define the scope of our inquiry.  Petitioner suggests that one consideration weighing in favor of finding the power to abrogate here is that the Act authorizes only prospective injunctive relief rather than retroactive monetary relief. But we have often made it clear that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is  Jf barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Cory v.  J> White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982) ( It would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the State itself simply because  J no money judgment is sought). We think it follows a  J fortiori from this proposition that the type of relief sought is irrelevant to whether Congress has power to abrogate States' immunity. The Eleventh Amendment does not exist solely in order to preven[t] federal court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury,  J Hess v. Port Authority TransHudson Corporation, 513 U.S. ___ (1994) (slip op., at 17); it also serves to avoid the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive  "   process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private  J parties, Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, 506 U.S., at 146 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, petitioner argues that the abrogation power is validly exercised here because the Act grants the States a power that they would not otherwise have, viz., some measure of authority over gaming on Indian lands. It is true enough that the Act extends to the States a power withheld from them by the Constitution. See  J California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). Nevertheless, we do not see how that consideration is relevant to the question whether Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment immunity may not be lifted by Congress unilaterally deciding that it will be replaced by  J grant of some other authority. Cf. Atascadero, 473 U.S., at 246!247 ( [T]he mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in federal court).  Thus our inquiry into whether Congress has the power to abrogate unilaterally the States' immunity from suit is narrowly focused on one question: Was the Act in question passed pursuant to a constitutional provision  Jh granting Congress the power to abrogate? See, e.g.,  J@ Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452!456 (1976). Previously, in conducting that inquiry, we have found authority to abrogate under only two provisions of the  J Constitution. In Fitzpatrick, we recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment, by expanding federal power at the expense of state autonomy, had fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by  J( the Constitution. Id., at 455. We noted that 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contained prohibitions expressly directed at the States and that 5 of the Amendment expressly provided that The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi J` sions of this article. See id., at 453 (internal quotation` "   marks omitted). We held that through the Fourteenth Amendment, federal power extended to intrude upon the province of the Eleventh Amendment and therefore that 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to abrogate the immunity from suit guaranteed by that Amendment.  In only one other case has congressional abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity been upheld.  J In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), a plurality of the Court found that the Interstate Commerce Clause, Art. I, 8, cl. 3, granted Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, stating that the power to regulate interstate commerce would be incomplete without the authority to render States liable  J in damages. Union Gas, 491 U.S., at 19!20. Justice White added the fifth vote necessary to the result in that case, but wrote separately in order to express that he [did] not agree with much of [the plurality's]  J0 reasoning. Id., at 57 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).  In arguing that Congress through the Act abrogated the States' sovereign immunity, petitioner does not challenge the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that the Act was passed pursuant to neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Interstate Commerce Clause. Instead, accepting the lower court's conclusion that the Act was passed pursuant to Congress' power under the Indian Commerce Clause, petitioner now asks us to consider whether that clause grants Congress the power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity.  JP  Petitioner begins with the plurality decision in Union  J( Gas and contends that [t]here is no principled basis for finding that congressional power under the Indian Commerce Clause is less than that conferred by the Interstate Commerce Clause. Brief for Petitioner 17.  J Noting that the Union Gas plurality found the power to abrogate from the plenary character of the grant of` "   authority over interstate commerce, petitioner emphasizes that the Interstate Commerce Clause leaves the  J States with some power to regulate, see, e.g., West Lynn  J Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. ___ (1994), whereas the Indian Commerce Clause makes Indian relations  J8 ... the exclusive province of federal law. County of  J Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y., 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985). Contending that the Indian Commerce Clause vests the Federal Government with the duty of protect[ing] the tribes from local ill feeling and the  Jp people of the States, United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383!384 (1886), petitioner argues that the abrogation power is necessary to protect the tribes from state action denying federally guaranteed rights. Brief for Petitioner 20.  Respondents dispute the petitioner's analogy between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause. They note that we have recognized that the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses  J have very different applications, Cotton Petroleum Corp.  J v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989), and from that they argue that the two provisions are wholly dissimilar. Brief for Respondents 21. Respondents contend that the Interstate Commerce Clause grants the power of abrogation only because Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce would be incomplete  J without that necessary power. Id., at 23, citing Union  J Gas, supra, at 19!20. The Indian Commerce Clause is distinguishable, respondents contend, because it gives Congress complete authority over the Indian tribes. Therefore, the abrogation power is not necessary to the Congress' exercise of its power under the Indian Com J merce Clause. %i uBh ԍ & ! Respondents also contend that the Act mandates state regulation of Indian gaming and therefore violates the Tenth Amendment by allowing federal officials to avoid political accountability for those actions for "##  uB which they are in fact responsible. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). This argument was not considered below by either the Eleventh Circuit or the District Court, and is not fairly within the question presented. Therefore we do not consider it here. See this  uBl Court's Rule 14.1; Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992). # "  Ԍ Both parties make their arguments from the plurality  J decision in Union Gas, and we, too, begin there. We think it clear that Justice Brennan's opinion finds Congress' power to abrogate under the Interstate Commerce Clause from the States' cession of their sovereignty when they gave Congress plenary power to  J regulate interstate commerce. See Union Gas, 491 U.S., at 17 ( The important point ... is that the provision both expands federal power and contracts state power). Respondents' focus elsewhere is misplaced. While the plurality decision states that Congress' power under the Interstate Commerce Clause would be incomplete without the power to abrogate, that statement is made solely in order to emphasize the broad scope of  J Congress' authority over interstate commerce. Id., at 19!20. Moreover, respondents' rationale would mean that where Congress has less authority, and the States have more, Congress' means for exercising that power must be greater. We read the plurality opinion to provide just the opposite. Indeed, it was in those circumstances where Congress exercised complete authority that Justice Brennan thought the power to  J abrogate most necessary. Id., at 20 ( Since the States may not legislate at all in [the aforementioned] situations, a conclusion that Congress may not create a cause of action for money damages against the States would mean that no one could do so. And in many situations, it is only money damages that will carry out Congress' legitimate objectives under the Commerce Clause).  Jx  Following the rationale of the Union Gas plurality, our inquiry is limited to determining whether the IndianP# "   Commerce Clause, like the Interstate Commerce Clause, is a grant of authority to the Federal Government at the expense of the States. The answer to that question is obvious. If anything, the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government than does the Interstate Commerce Clause. This is clear enough from the fact that the States still exercise some authority over interstate trade but have been divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian tribes.  Jp Under the rationale of Union Gas, if the States' partial cession of authority over a particular area includes cession of the immunity from suit, then their virtually total cession of authority over a different area must also  J include cession of the immunity from suit. See Union  J Gas, supra, at 42 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.  J J., and O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) ( [I]f the Article I commerce power enables abrogation of state sovereign immunity, so do all the other Article I pow J ers); see Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1428 (CA10 1994) (Indian Commerce Clause grants power to abrogate), cert. pending, No. 94!1029;  J Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d  Jh 273, 281 (CA8 1993) (same); cf. Chavez v. Arte Publico  J@ Press, 59 F.3d 539, 546!547 (CA5 1995) (After Union  J Gas, Copyright Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 8, must grant Congress power to abrogate). We agree with  J the petitioner that the plurality opinion in Union Gas allows no principled distinction in favor of the States to be drawn between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause.  Respondents argue, however, that we need not conclude that the Indian Commerce Clause grants the power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity. Instead, they contend that if we find the rationale of the  J Union Gas plurality to extend to the Indian Commerce  J` Clause, then Union Gas should be reconsidered and` "   overruled. Brief for Respondents 25. Generally, the  J principle of stare decisis, and the interests that it serves, viz., the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, ... reliance on judicial decisions, and ... the actual and perceived integrity of  J8 the judicial process, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991), counsel strongly against reconsideration of our precedent. Nevertheless, we always have treated  J stare decisis as a principle of policy, Helvering v.  J Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940), and not as an  Jp  inexorable command, Payne, 501 U.S., at 828. [W]hen governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, `this Court has never felt constrained to follow  J precedent.'  !  Id., at 827 (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)). Our willingness to reconsider our earlier decisions has been particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases `correction through legislative action is practically impossible.'  !   J0 Payne, supra, at 828, (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil  J & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  J  The Court in Union Gas reached a result without an expressed rationale agreed upon by a majority of the Court. We have already seen that Justice Brennan's opinion received the support of only three other Justices.  J See Union Gas, 491 U.S., at 5 (Marshall, Blackmun,  J and Stevens, JJ., joined Justice Brennan) Of the other five, Justice White, who provided the fifth vote for the result, wrote separately in order to indicate his disagree Jx ment with the majority's rationale, id., at 57 (White, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part), and four Justices joined together in a dissent that rejected the  J plurality's rationale. Id., at 35!45 (Scalia, J., dissent J ing, joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor and  J Kennedy, JJ.). Since it was issued, Union Gas has created confusion among the lower courts that have sought to understand and apply the deeply fractured` "    J decision. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, supra, at 543!545 ( Justice White's concurrence must be taken on its face to disavow the plurality's theory); 11 F.3d, at 1027 (Justice White's vague concurrence renders the  J` continuing validity of Union Gas in doubt).  The plurality's rationale also deviated sharply from our established federalism jurisprudence and essentially  J eviscerated our decision in Hans. See Union Gas, supra,  J at 36 ( If Hans means only that federalquestion suits for money damages against the States cannot be brought in federal court unless Congress clearly says so, it  JH means nothing at all) (Scalia, J., dissenting). It was  J  well established in 1989 when Union Gas was decided that the Eleventh Amendment stood for the constitutional  principle that state sovereign immunity limited the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III. The text of the Amendment itself is clear enough on this point: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit .... And our decisions  J since Hans had been equally clear that the Eleventh Amendment reflects the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity [that] limits the grant of judicial  J authority in Article III, Pennhurst State School and  Jh Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97!98 (1984); see  J@ Union Gas, supra, at 38, (  `[T]he entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a  J State without consent given ...' ) (Scalia, J., dissent J ing) (quoting Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497  Jx (1921)); see also cases cited at n. 7, supra. As the  JP dissent in Union Gas recognized, the plurality's conclusion"that Congress could under Article I expand the scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III" contradict[ed] our unvarying approach to Article III  J as setting forth the exclusive catalog of permissible  J federal court jurisdiction. Union Gas, 491 U.S., at 39.  J`  Never before the decision in Union Gas had we` "   suggested that the bounds of Article III could be expanded by Congress operating pursuant to any constitutional provision other than the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, it had seemed fundamental that Congress could not expand the jurisdiction of the federal  J8 courts beyond the bounds of Article III. Marbury v.  J Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). The plurality's citation of prior decisions for support was based upon what we  J believe to be a misreading of precedent. See Union Gas,  J 491 U.S., at 40!41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The plurality claimed support for its decision from a case holding the unremarkable, and completely unrelated, proposition that the States may waive their sovereign  J immunity, see id., at 14!15 (citing Parden v. Terminal  J Railway of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964)), and cited as precedent propositions that had been merely assumed for the sake of argument in earlier cases, see  JX 491 U.S., at 15 (citing Welch v. Texas Dept. of High J0 ways and Public Transp., 483 U.S., at 475!476, and  J n.5, and County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of  J N.Y., 470 U.S., at 252).  The plurality's extended reliance upon our decision in  J Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), that Congress could under the Fourteenth Amendment abrogate the States' sovereign immunity was also, we believe, mis J placed. Fitzpatrick was based upon a rationale wholly inapplicable to the Interstate Commerce Clause, viz., that the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the preexisting balance between state and federal power achieved by  J( Article III and the Eleventh Amendment. Id., at 454.  J As the dissent in Union Gas made clear, Fitzpatrick cannot be read to justify limitation of the principle embodied in the Eleventh Amendment through appeal to  J antecedent provisions of the Constitution. Union Gas,  J` 491 U.S., at 42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).` "  Ԍ J  In the five years since it was decided, Union Gas has proven to be a solitary departure from established law.  J See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v.  J Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993). Reconsid J` ering the decision in Union Gas, we conclude that none  J8 of the policies underlying stare decisis require our continuing adherence to its holding. The decision has, since its issuance, been of questionable precedential value, largely because a majority of the Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of the plurality. See  Jp Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 8) (the degree of confusion following a splintered decision ... is itself a reason for reexamining that decision). The case involved the interpretation of the Constitution and therefore may be altered only by constitutional amendment or revision by this Court.  J Finally, both the result in Union Gas and the plurality's rationale depart from our established understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and undermine the accepted function of Article III. We feel bound to conclude that  J Union Gas was wrongly decided and that it should be, and now is, overruled.9  The dissent makes no effort to defend the decision in  Jh Union Gas, see post at 2, but nonetheless would find  J@ congressional power to abrogate in this case. n@i uB ԍ & ! Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the dissent are to the  uB_ dissenting opinion authored by Justice Souter. Contending that our decision is a novel extension of the Eleventh Amendment, the dissent chides us for attend[ing] to dicta. We adhere in this case, however, not  J to mere obiter dicta, but rather to the wellestablished rationale upon which the Court based the results of its earlier decisions. When an opinion issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound.  "    J Cf. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 613 (1990) (exclusive basis of a judgment  J is not dicta) (plurality); Allegheny County v. American  J Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) ( As a general rule, the principle  J8 of stare decisis directs us to adhere not only to the holdings of our prior cases, but also to their explications  J of the governing rules of law.) (Kennedy, J., concurring  J and dissenting); Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 490 (1986) ( Although technically dicta, . . . an important part of the Court's rationale for the result that it reache[s] . . . is entitled to greater weight . . .)  J (O'Connor, J., concurring). For over a century, we have grounded our decisions in the oftrepeated understanding of state sovereign immunity as an essential part of the  J Eleventh Amendment. In Principality of Monaco v.  J Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit brought against a State by a foreign state. Chief Justice Hughes wrote for a unanimous Court: BQ C  , , (  [N]either the literal sweep of the words of Clause one of 2 of Article III, nor the absence of restriction in the letter of the Eleventh Amendment, permits the conclusion that in all controversies of the sort described in Clause one, and omitted from the words of the Eleventh Amendment, a State may be sued without her consent. Thus Clause one specifically provides that the judicial power shall  J extend `to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.' But, although a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens. ... N N # Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal "   application of the words of 2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against nonconsenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. There is the essential postulate that the controversies, as contemplated, shall be found to be of a justiciable character. There is also the postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where there has been a `surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.' BQ d   J\  ( , , Id., at 321!323 (citations and footnote omitted); see id.  J4 at 329!330; see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S., at 98 ( In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established  J in Art. III); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S., at 497 ( [T]he entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given . . .). It is true that we have not had occasion previously to apply established Eleventh Amendment principles to the question whether Congress has the power to  J abrogate state sovereign immunity (save in Union Gas). But consideration of that question must proceed with fidelity to this centuryold doctrine.  The dissent, to the contrary, disregards our case law in favor of a theory cobbled together from law review articles and its own version of historical events. The  J dissent cites not a single decision since Hans (other than  J Union Gas) that supports its view of state sovereign immunity, instead relying upon the nowdiscredited  J< decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793).  J See, e.g., post, at 57 n. 47. Its undocumented and highly speculative extralegal explanation of the decision  J in Hans is a disservice to the Court's traditional method "    J of adjudication. See post, at 23!26.  J  The dissent mischaracterizes the Hans opinion. That decision found its roots not solely in the common law of England, but in the much more fundamental  `jurispru J` dence in all civilized nations.'  Hans, 134 U.S., at 17,  J8 quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527, 529 (1858); see also The Federalist No. 81, p. 487 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (sovereign immunity is the general sense and the general practice of mankind). The dissent's proposition that the common law of England, where adopted by the States, was open to change by the legislature, is wholly unexceptionable and largely beside the point: that common law provided the substantive  J rules of law rather than jurisdiction. Cf. Monaco, supra, at 323 (state sovereign immunity, like the requirement that there be a justiciable controversy, is a constitutionally grounded limit on federal jurisdiction). It also is noteworthy that the principle of state sovereign immunity stands distinct from other principles of the common law in that only the former prompted a specific constitutional amendment.  J  Hans"with a much closer vantage point than the  J dissent"recognized that the decision in Chisholm was contrary to the wellunderstood meaning of the Constitution. The dissent's conclusion that the decision in  J Chisholm was reasonable, post, at 8, certainly would have struck the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment as quite odd: that decision created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed and  Jx adopted. Monaco, supra, at 325. The dissent's lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh Amendment is directed at a straw man"we long have recognized that blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh Amendment is  Z  `to strain the Constitution and the law to a construc J tion never imagined or dreamed of.'   Monaco, 292  J U.S., at 326, quoting Hans, 134 U.S., at 15. The text dealt in terms only with the problem presented by the` "    J decision in Chisholm; in light of the fact that the federal courts did not have federal question jurisdiction at the time the Amendment was passed (and would not have it until 1875), it seems unlikely that much thought was given to the prospect of federal question jurisdiction over the States.  That same consideration causes the dissent's criticism of the views of Marshall, Madison, and Hamilton to ring hollow. The dissent cites statements made by those three influential Framers, the most natural reading of which would preclude all federal jurisdiction over an  JH unconsenting State. K H i uB ԍ & ! We note here also that the dissent quotes selectively from the Framers' statements that it references. The dissent cites the following, for instance, as a statement made by Madison: the Constitution `give[s] a citizen a right to be heard in the federal courts; and if a state should condescend to be a party, this court may take cognizance of it.' b  See  uBC post, at 47. But that statement, perhaps ambiguous when read in isolation, was preceded by the following: [J]urisdiction in controversies between a state and citizens of another state is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court. The only operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought before the federal courts. It appears to me that this can have no operation but this: See 3 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 67 (1866).  Struggling against this reading, however, the dissent finds significant the absence of any contention that sovereign immunity would affect the new  J federalquestion jurisdiction. Post, at 46!54. But the lack of any statute vesting general federal question jurisdiction in the federal courts until much later makes the dissent's demand for greater specificity about a then J0 dormant jurisdiction overly exacting. J&0 i uB ԍ & ! Although the absence of any discussion dealing with federal question jurisdiction is therefore unremarkable, what is notably lacking in the Framers' statements is any mention of Congress' power to abrogate the States' immunity. The absence of any discussion of that power is particularly striking in light of the fact that the Framers virtually always were very specific about the exception to state sovereignv "##  uB immunity arising from a State's consent to suit. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 81, pp. 487!488 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) ( It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an  uB individual without its consent. . . . Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States and the danger intimated must be merely ideal.) (emphasis in the  uB original); Madison in 3 Elliot, supra n. 11 ( It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court. . . . [The Constitution] can have no operation but this: . . . if a state should condescend to be a party, this court may take cognizance of it).0 "  Ԍ In putting forward a new theory of state sovereign immunity, the dissent develops its own vision of the political system created by the Framers, concluding with the statement that [t]he Framer's principal objectives in rejecting English theories of unitary sovereignty . . . would have been impeded if a new concept of sovereign immunity had taken its place in federal question cases, and would have been substantially thwarted if that newimmunity had been held untouchable by any con J gressional effort to abrogate it.O&i uB& ԍ & ! This argument wholly disregards other methods of ensuring the States' compliance with federal law: the Federal Government can bring  uB suit in federal court against a State, see, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644!645 (1892) (finding such power necessary to the permanence of the Union); an individual can bring suit against a state officer in order to ensure that the officer's conduct is in compliance with  uBp federal law, see, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); and this Court is empowered to review a question of federal law arising from a  uB state court decision where a State has consented to suit, see, e.g., Cohens  uB v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821).O Post, at 62. This sweeping statement ignores the fact that the Nation survived for nearly two centuries without the question of the existence of such power ever being presented to this Court. And Congress itself waited nearly a century before even conferring federal question jurisdiction on  J the lower federal courts.% i uB\ ԍ & ! Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, makes two points that merit separate response. First, he contends that no distinction may be drawn between state sovereign immunity and the immunity enjoyed by"## state and federal officials. But even assuming that the latter has no constitutional foundation, the distinction is clear: the Constitution specifically recognizes the States as sovereign entities, while government  uB officials enjoy no such constitutional recognition. Second, Justice  uBl Stevens' criticizes our prior decisions applying the clear statement rule, suggesting that they were based upon an understanding that Article I allowed Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity. His criticism, however, ignores the fact that many of those cases arose in the context of a statute passed under the Fourteenth Amendment, where  uB Congress' authority to abrogate is undisputed. See, e.g., Quern v.  uB Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). And a more fundamental flaw of the criticism is its failure to recognize that both the doctrine requiring avoidance of constitutional questions, and principles of federalism, require us always to apply the clear statement rule before we consider the constitutional question whether Congress has the power to abrogate. I "  Ԍ J  In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government. Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of  J suits by private parties against unconsenting States.  I i uB ԍ & ! Justice Stevens understands our opinion to prohibit federal jurisdiction over suits to enforce the bankruptcy, copyright, and antitrust laws against the States. He notes that federal jurisdiction over those statutory schemes is exclusive, and therefore concludes that there is no  uB remedy for state violations of those federal statutes. Post, at 2 n. 1.  That conclusion is exaggerated both in its substance and in its  uB significance. First, Justice Stevens' statement is misleadingly overbroad. We have already seen that several avenues remain open for  uBq ensuring state compliance with federal law. See supra, at n.13. Most  uB( notably, an individual may obtain injunctive relief under Ex parte Young in order to remedy a state officer's ongoing violation of federal law. See  uB supra, at n.14. Second, contrary to the implication of Justice Stevens' conclusion, it has not been widely thought that the federal antitrust, bankruptcy, or copyright statutes abrogated the States' sovereign immunity. This Court never has awarded relief against a State under"##  uB any of those statutory schemes; in the decision of this Court that Justice  uBG Stevens cites (and somehow labels incompatible with our decision here), we specifically reserved the question whether the Eleventh Amendment would allow a suit to enforce the antitrust laws against a  uBl State. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 n. 22 (1975). Although the copyright and bankruptcy laws have existed practically since our nation's inception, and the antitrust laws have been in force for over a century, there is no established tradition in the lower federal courts of allowing enforcement of those federal statutes against  uB the States. Notably, both Court of Appeals decisions cited by Justice  uB Stevens were issued last year and were based upon Union Gas. See  uBm Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F. 3d 539 (CA5 1995); Matter of  uB$ Merchants Grain, Inc. v. Mahern, 59 F.3d 630 (CA7 1995). Indeed, while  uB the Court of Appeals in Chavez allowed the suit against the State to go forward, it expressly recognized that its holding was unprecedented. See  uBI Chavez, 59 F.3d at 546 ( we are aware of no case that specifically holds that laws passed pursuant to the Copyright Clause can abrogate state immunity). n"   The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. Petitioner's suit against the State of Florida must be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.  9H1 d dy8III؃  t2  Petitioner argues that we may exercise jurisdiction over its suit to enforce 2710(d)(3) against the Governor notwithstanding the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment. Petitioner notes that since our decision in  J Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), we often have found federal jurisdiction over a suit against a state official when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing violation of federal  Jf law. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S., at 68. The situation presented here, however, is sufficiently different  J from that giving rise to the traditional Ex parte Young action so as to preclude the availability of that doctrine.   Here, the continuing violation of federal lawn"   alleged by petitioner is the Governor's failure to bring the State into compliance with 2710(d)(3).PPI But the duty to negotiate imposed upon the State by that statutory provision does not stand alone. Rather, as we  J` have seen, supra, at ___, Congress passed 2710(d)(3) in conjunction with the carefully crafted and intricate remedial scheme set forth in 2710(d)(7).  Where Congress has created a remedial scheme for the enforcement of a particular federal right, we have, in suits against federal officers, refused to supplement that  Jp scheme with one created by the judiciary. Schweiker v.  JH Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) ( When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional ... remedies). Here, of course, the question is not whether a remedy should be created, but instead is whether the Eleventh Amendment bar should be  J lifted, as it was in Ex parte Young, in order to allow a suit against a state officer. Nevertheless, we think that the same general principle applies: therefore, where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state  J officer based upon Ex parte Young.  Here, Congress intended 2710(d)(3) to be enforced against the State in an action brought under 2710(d)(7); the intricate procedures set forth in that provision show that Congress intended therein not only to define, but also significantly to limit, the duty imposed by 2710(d)(3). For example, where the court finds that the State has failed to negotiate in good faith, the only remedy prescribed is an order directing the State and the Indian tribe to conclude a compact within 60 days. And if the parties disregard the court's order and fail to`"   conclude a compact within the 60day period, the only sanction is that each party then must submit a proposed compact to a mediator who selects the one which best embodies the terms of the Act. Finally, if the State fails to accept the compact selected by the mediator, the only sanction against it is that the mediator shall notify the Secretary of the Interior who then must prescribe regulations governing Class III gaming on the tribal lands at issue. By contrast with this quite modest set of sanctions, an action brought against a state official  Jp under Ex parte Young would expose that official to the full remedial powers of a federal court, including, presumably, contempt sanctions. If 2710(d)(3) could be  J enforced in a suit under Ex parte Young, 2710(d)(7) would have been superfluous; it is difficult to see why an Indian tribe would suffer through the intricate scheme of 2710(d)(7) when more complete and more  JX immediate relief would be available under Ex parte  J0 Young. 0i uB ԍ & ! Contrary to the claims of the dissent, we do not hold that Congress  uBO cannot authorize federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young over a cause of action with a limited remedial scheme. We find only that Congress did not intend that result in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Although one might argue that the text of 2710(d)(7)(A)(i), taken alone, is broad enough to encompass both a suit against a State (under an  uB abrogation theory) and a suit against a state official (under an Ex parte  uB Young theory), subsection (A)(i) of 2710(d)(7) cannot be read in isolation from subsections (B)(ii)(vii), which repeatedly refers exclusively to the  uB State. See supra, at 10!11. In this regard, 2710(d)(7) stands in contrast to the statutes cited by the dissent as examples where lower  uBu courts have found that Congress implicitly authorized suit under Ex  uB, parte Young. Compare 28 U.S.C. 2254(e) (Federal court authorized to issue an order directed to an appropriate State official); 42 U.S.C. 11001 (1988 ed.) (requiring the Governor of a State to perform certain actions and holding the Governor responsible for nonperformance); 33 U.S.C. 1365(a) (authorizing a suit against "any person" who is alleged to be in violation of relevant water pollution laws). Similarly the duty imposed by the Act"to negotiate . . . in good faith to enter into av"## compact with another sovereign"stands distinct in that it is not of the sort likely to be performed by an individual state executive officer or  uB even a group of officers. Cf. State ex rel Stephan v. Finney, 836 P. 2d 1169, 251 Kan. 559 (1992) (Governor of Kansas may negotiate but may not enter into compact without grant of power from legislature). 0#"  Ԍ Here, of course, we have found that Congress does not have authority under the Constitution to make the State suable in federal court under 2710(d)(7). Nevertheless, the fact that Congress chose to impose upon the State a liability which is significantly more limited than would  J8 be the liability imposed upon the state officer under Ex  J parte Young strongly indicates that Congress had no wish to create the latter under 2710(d)(3). Nor are we free to rewrite the statutory scheme in order to approximate what we think Congress might have wanted had it known that 2710(d)(7) was beyond its authority. If that effort is to be made, it should be made by Con J gress, and not by the federal courts. We hold that Ex  J parte Young is inapplicable to petitioner's suit against the Governor of Florida, and therefore that suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and must be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.  9H1 d d8IV؃  2  The Eleventh Amendment prohibits Congress from making the State of Florida capable of being sued in federal court. The narrow exception to the Eleventh  JN Amendment provided by the Ex parte Young doctrine cannot be used to enforce 2710(d)(3) because Congress enacted a remedial scheme, 2710(d)(7), specifically designed for the enforcement of that right. The Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of petitioner's suit is hereby  J affirmed.%#i uB ԍ & ! We do not here consider, and express no opinion upon, that portion of the decision below that provides a substitute remedy for a tribe bringing suit. See 11 F. 3d 1016, 1029 (CA11 1994) (case below).  J^ `DIt is so ordered.