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Peacock, 39 F.3d 493 (CA4 1994), Argento  uB v. Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483 (CA7 1988), Skevofilax v. Quigley, 810 F.2d 378 (CA3) (en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987),  uBc and Blackburn Truck Lines, Inc. v. Francis, 723 F.2d 730 (CA9  uB 1984), with Sandlin v. Corporate Interiors Inc., 972 F.2d 1212  uB (CA10 1992), and Berry v. McLemore, 795 F.2d 452 (CA5 1986).Z 514 U.S. ___ (1995). We now reverse.  9H1 dH""# Ԍd7II؃  2  Thomas relies on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 832, as amended,  J 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., as the source of federal jurisdiction for this suit. The District Court did not expressly rule on subject matter jurisdiction, but found that Thomas had properly stated a claim under ERISA for piercing the corporate veil. We disagree. We are not aware of, and Thomas does not point to, any provision of ERISA that provides for imposing liability for an  J extant ERISA judgment against a third party. See Mac Jz key v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988) ( ERISA does not provide an enforcement mechanism for collecting judgments ...).  We reject Thomas' suggestion, not made in the District Court, that this subsequent suit arose under 502(a)(3) of ERISA, which authorizes civil actions for appropriate equitable relief to redress violations of ERISA or the terms of an ERISA plan. 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3). Thomas' complaint in this lawsuit alleged no violation of ERISA or of the plan. The wrongdoing alleged in the complaint occurred in 1989 and 1990, some four to five years after TruTech's ERISA plan was terminated, and Thomas did not"indeed, could not"allege that Peacock  Jr was a fiduciary to the terminated plan.nr uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The District Court in the original ERISA suit ruled that Peacock was not a fiduciary to TruTech's plan. Thomas further concedes that Peacock's alleged wrongdoing did not occur with respect to the administration or operation of the plan. Brief for Respondent 11. Under the circumstances, we think Thomas failed to allege a claim under 502(a)(3) for equitable relief. Section 502(a)(3) does  J not, after all, authorize `appropriate equitable relief' at  JZ large, but only `appropriate equitable relief' for the purpose of `redress[ing any] violations or ... enforc[ing] any2"    J provisions' of ERISA or an ERISA plan. Mertens v.  J Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at5) (emphasis and modifications in original).  Moreover, Thomas' veilpiercing claim does not state a cause of action under ERISA and cannot independently support federal jurisdiction. Even if ERISA permits a plaintiff to pierce the corporate veil to reach a defendant not otherwise subject to suit under ERISA, Thomas could invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts only by independently alleging a violation of an ERISA provi Jp sion or term of the plan.p uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < This case is not at all like Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349  uB (1944), cited by Thomas' amici, in which the receiver of a federal bank, having obtained a judgment against the bank, then sued the  uB bank's shareholders to hold them liable for the judgment. In Ander uB son, federal jurisdiction was founded upon a federal law, 12 U.S.C. 63, 64 (repealed), which specifically made shareholders of an undercapitalized federal bank liable up to the par value of their stock, regardless of the amount actually invested. Piercing the corporate veil is not itself an independent ERISA cause of action, but rather is a means of imposing liability on an underlying cause of action. 1 C. Keating & G. O'Gradney, Fletcher Cyclopedia of Law of Private Corporations 41, p.603 (perm. ed. 1990). Because Thomas alleged no underlying violation of any provision of ERISA or an ERISA plan, neither ERISA's jurisdictional provision, 29 U.S.C. 1132(e)(1), nor 28 U.S.C. 1331 supplied the District Court with subject matter jurisdiction over this suit.  9H1 d dy7III؃  2  Thomas also contends that this lawsuit is ancillary to  J the original ERISA suit.%H uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Congress codified much of the commonlaw doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction as part of supplemental jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. 1367. We have recognized that a federal court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction (1) tom "   permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its author J` ity, and effectuate its decrees. Kokkonen v. Guardian  J8 Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 4!5) (citations omitted). Thomas has not carried his burden of demonstrating that this suit falls within either cate J gory. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 2) (burden rests on party asserting jurisdiction).  ;H2 d d8A؃  2   [A]ncillary jurisdiction typically involves claims by a defending party haled into court against his will, or by another person whose rights might be irretrievably lost unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a  J> federal court. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.  J Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978). Ancillary jurisdiction may extend to claims having a factual and logical de J pendence on the primary lawsuit, ibid., but that primary lawsuit must contain an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. The court must have jurisdiction over a case or controversy before it may assert jurisdic J& tion over ancillary claims. See Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). In a subsequent lawsuit involving claims with no independent basis for jurisdiction, a federal court lacks the threshold jurisdictional power that exists when ancillary claims are asserted in the same proceeding as the claims conferring federal juris J6 diction. See Kokkonen, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 6);  J H.C. Cook Co. v. Beecher, 217 U.S. 497, 498!499 (1910). Consequently, claims alleged to be factually interdependent with and, hence, ancillary to claims brought in an earlier federal lawsuit will not support federal jurisdiction over a subsequent lawsuit. The basis of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction is the practical need to protect legal rights or effectively to resolve an"    J entire, logically entwined lawsuit. Kroger, 437 U.S., at377. But once judgment was entered in the original ERISA suit, the ability to resolve simultaneously factu J ally intertwined issues vanished. As in Kroger, neither the convenience of litigants nor considerations of judicial economy can justify the extension of ancillary jurisdiction over Thomas' claims in this subsequent proceeding.  J Ibid.  In any event, there is insufficient factual dependence between the claims raised in Thomas' first and second suits to justify the extension of ancillary jurisdiction. Thomas' factual allegations in this suit are independent from those asserted in the ERISA suit, which involved Peacock's and TruTech's status as plan fiduciaries and their alleged wrongdoing in the administration of the plan. The facts relevant to this complaint are limited to allegations that Peacock shielded TruTech's assets from the ERISA judgment long after TruTech's plan had been terminated. The claims in these cases have little or no factual or logical interdependence, and, under these circumstances, no greater efficiencies would be created by the exercise of federal jurisdiction over them. See  J Kokkonen, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5).  ;H2 d d8B؃  2  The focus of Thomas' argument is that his suit to extend liability for payment of the ERISA judgment from TruTech to Peacock fell under the District Court's ancillary enforcement jurisdiction. We have reserved the use of ancillary jurisdiction in subsequent proceedings for the exercise of a federal court's inherent power to enforce its judgments. Without jurisdiction to enforce a judgment entered by a federal court, the judicial power would be incomplete and entirely inadequate to the purposes for which it was conferred by the Constitution.  JF Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166, 187 (1868). In defining that power, we have approved the exercise of"   ancillary jurisdiction over a broad range of supplementary proceedings involving third parties to assist in the protection and enforcement of federal judgments"including attachment, mandamus, garnishment, and the pre J` judgment avoidance of fraudulent conveyances. See, e.g.,  J8 Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486  J U.S. 825, 834, n.10 (1988) (garnishment); Swift & Co.  J Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U.S. 684, 690!692 (1950) (prejudgment attachment of  J property); Dewey v. West Fairmont Gas Coal Co., 123 U.S. 329, 332!333 (1887) (prejudgment voidance of  JH fraudulent transfers); Labette County Comm'rs v. United  J States ex rel. Moulton, 112 U.S. 217, 221!225 (1884) (mandamus to compel public officials in their official capacity to levy tax to enforce judgment against township);  J Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276, 282!285 (1884) (pre J judgment dispute over attached property); Riggs, supra, at 187!188 (mandamus to compel public officials in their official capacity to levy tax to enforce judgment against  J county).u n uBp ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The United States, as amicus curiae for Thomas, suggests that the proceeding below was jurisdictionally indistinguishable from  uB Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339  uB U.S. 684 (1950), Dewey v. West Fairmont Gas Coal Co., 123 U.S.  uBL 329 (1887), Labette County Comm'rs v. United States ex rel. Moul uB ton, 112 U.S. 217 (1884), and Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall.166 (1868), because it was intended merely as a supplemental bill to preserve and force payment of the ERISA judgment by voiding fraudulent transfers of TruTech's assets. Brief for United States as  uB Amicus Curiae 9!18. We decline to address this argument, because, even if Thomas could have sought to force payment by mandamus or to void postjudgment transfers, neither Thomas nor the courts below characterized this suit that way. Indeed, Thomas expressly rejects that characterization of his lawsuit. Brief for Respondent 4  uBr ( This action ... is not one to collect a judgment, but one to estab uB) lish liability on the part of the Petitioner) (emphasis in original);  uB see id., at 11. In any event, the United States agrees that the alleged fraudulent transfers totalled no more than $80,000, far less"## than the judgment actually imposed on Peacock. Brief for United  uBG States as Amicus Curiae 3.u"  Ԍ Our recognition of these supplementary proceedings has not, however, extended beyond attempts to execute, or to guarantee eventual executability of, a federal judgment. We have never authorized the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in a subsequent lawsuit to impose an obligation to pay an existing federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment. Indeed, we re J jected an attempt to do so in H. C. Cook Co. v. Beecher,  J 217 U.S. 497 (1910). In Beecher, the plaintiff obtained a judgment in federal court against a corporation that had infringed its patent. When the plaintiff could not collect on the judgment, it sued the individual directors of the defendant corporation, alleging that, during the pendency of the original suit, they had authorized continuing sales of the infringing product and knowingly permitted the corporation to become insolvent. We agreed with the Circuit Court's characterization of the suit as an attempt to make the defendants answerable for the judgment already obtained and affirmed the court's decision that the suit was not ancillary to the  J judgment in the former suit. Id., at 498!499. Beecher governs this case and persuades us that Thomas' attempt to make Peacock answerable for the ERISA judgment is not ancillary to that judgment.  J@  Labette County Comm'rs and Riggs are not to the contrary. In those cases, we permitted a judgment creditor to mandamus county officials to force them to levy a tax  J for payment of an existing judgment. Labette County  J Comm'rs, supra, at 221!225; Riggs, supra, at 187!188. The order in each case merely required compliance with the existing judgment by the persons with authority to comply. We did not authorize the shifting of liability for payment of the judgment from the judgment debtor to"   the county officials, as Thomas attempts to do here.  In determining the reach of the federal courts' ancillary jurisdiction, we have cautioned against the exercise of jurisdiction over proceedings that are entirely new  J` and original, Krippendorf v. Hyde, supra, at 285 (quot J8 ing Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 2 Wall. 609, 633 (1865)), or where the relief [sought is] of a different kind or on a different principle than that of the prior  J decree. Dugas v. American Surety Co., 300 U.S. 414, 428 (1937). These principles suggest that ancillary jurisdiction could not properly be exercised in this case. This action is founded not only upon different facts than the ERISA suit, but also upon entirely new theories of liability. In this suit, Thomas alleged civil conspiracy and fraudulent transfer of TruTech's assets, but, as we have noted, no substantive ERISA violation. The alleged wrongdoing in this case occurred after the ERISA judgment was entered, and Thomas' claims"civil conspiracy, fraudulent conveyance, and veilpiercing"all involved new theories of liability not asserted in the ERISA suit. Other than the existence of the ERISA judgment itself, this suit has little connection to the ERISA case. This is a new action based on theories of relief that did not exist, and could not have existed, at the time the court entered judgment in the ERISA case.  Ancillary enforcement jurisdiction is, at its core, a  J creature of necessity. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S., at ___  J (slip op., at 5!6); Riggs, 6 Wall., at 187. When a party has obtained a valid federal judgment, only extraordinary circumstances, if any, can justify ancillary jurisdiction over a subsequent suit like this. To protect and aid the collection of a federal judgment, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide fast and effective  J mechanisms for execution. uB@ ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Rule 69(a), for instance, permits judgment creditors to use any@"## execution method consistent with the practice and procedure of the state in which the district court sits. Rule 62(a) further protects judgment creditors by permitting execution on a judgment at any time more than 10 days after the judgment is entered. In the event a stay is l"   entered pending appeal, the Rules require the district court to ensure that the judgment creditor's position is  J secured, ordinarily by a supersedeas bond.Jl uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < The district court may only stay execution of the judgment pending the disposition of certain posttrial motions or appeal if the court provides for the security of the judgment creditor. Rule 62(b) (stay pending posttrial motions on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper); Rule 62(d) (stay pending appeal by giving a supersedeas bond). The Rules cannot guarantee payment of every federal judgment. But as long as they protect a judgment creditor's ability to execute on a judgment, the district court's authority is adequately preserved, and ancillary jurisdiction is not justified over a new lawsuit to impose liability for a judgment on a third party. Contrary to Thomas' suggestion otherwise, we think these procedural safeguards are sufficient to prevent wholesale fraud upon the district courts of the United States.  9H1 d d7IV؃  \ 2  For these reasons, we hold that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Thomas' subsequent suit. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is  J `{JReversed.