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Level 4 HdgSelect, type: Heading U&Lc, , 2 returns.lc.1   CRS Page #Select style at top of page. numbers2?l1+=/CRS 12Y03-4-5.6/ContentsSelect style at top of page, type text. type.3i*  Fn6>  PfQT TABLE OF CONTENTS ă e6>  PfQ Cover TitleTitle for Cover Page of CRS Reports4G;F h  6>  PfQa" 3 e6>  PfQT  Summary TitlSlct at top of pg, type: HEADING IN ALL CAPS, .5= { |3  Fn6>  PfQ  3  P 0 e6>  PfQT SUMMARY Đ3Short ReportUse at top of short report.6ES  @ 2x0CRS Ӄ227L0L2L#57io7"S^&*8KK~u*22:[&2&[KKKKKKKKKK&&[[[Cpu\jt\Sr}32m\}v[vdO\ulddd2[2[K*KSC\H2SW,#S,WRZT;@1ZU}MSK2[2[2&222222&92/22S+uKuKuKuKuKrjC\H\H\H\H3+3+3+3+}WvRvRvRvRuZuZuZuZdSuKt\}SvRdStR[ZuKuKjCjCjCjCt\\H\H\H\HrSrSrSrSrS}W}W3S3S323S22mS\,\/\9\2\,}W}W}WvRvR|d;d;d;O@O@O@O@\1\9\2uZuZuZuZ}dSdKdKN[&^K*CKKKKK22qqK-ppKq-KKK22KK[[*K-t[[RR[[ZZ&<[){kJ%>sk{ssscR1\mRgRZokRwg"S^&*sk{ssscR1\mRgR\okRwg"S^!%1CCph%,,4Q!,!QCCCCCCCCCC!!QQQ;dhQ_gQJfo-,aQ~oiQiYFRh`YYY,Q,QC%CJ;Q@,JN'J'vNIPK59+PKoEJC,Q,Q,!,,,,,,!3,*,,J&hChChChChC~e_;Q@Q@Q@Q@-&-&-&-&oNiIiIiIiIhPhPhPhPYJhCgQoJiIYJgIQPhChC_;_;_;_;gQQ@Q@Q@Q@fJfJfJfJfJoNoN-J-J-,-J,,aJQ'Q*Q3Q,Q'oNoNoNiIiInY5Y5Y5F9F9F9F9R+R3R,hPhPhPhPoYJYCYCNQ!TC%;CCCCC,,ddC(ddCd(CCC,,CCQQ%C(tQQIIQQPP!5Q%n_B!7f_nfffXsI1RaI[IPc_Ij[FootnoteSmall Text - Indenteded7*m2>8 898:y9;L<First LevelUnderlined Margin to Margin83i   yxdddy BulletPrint Indented Bullet9(3 2 pp(#p Chapter Head#One Line Chapter Head 14p with Lines:Dr8!'  #\  PBut\P#  yx5dddy yxndddy yxdddy yx dddy#\  PBut\P#2-Line HeadNon-published Header;<~˔' X #Xp\  PZuXP# yx1dddy   yxTdddy #Xp\  PZuXP#2ILD> L@ LB^(E"S^!%6CCwo%,,;Q!,!'CCCCCCCCCC!!QQQ;dhY`oQJoo44hQooQo`QYhhYYY,Q,QC%CQ;QC4JQ,,Q,wQJQQ4;,QJoCJC)Q)Q,!,,,,,,,,,,,,Q,hChChChChCh`;QCQCQCQC4,4,4,4,oQoJoJoJoJhQhQhQhQYJhCoQoJoJYJoJQQhChC`;`;`;`;oQQCQCQCQCoJoJoJoJoJoQoQ4Q4Q4,4Q4,hQQ,Q,Q,Q,Q,oQoQoQoJoJo`4`4`4Q;Q;Q;Q;Y,Y,Y,hQhQhQhQoYJYCYCNQ!UC%;CCCCC:AddC(ddCd(CCC44CCQQ,C(tQQIIQQPP!5Q%n_B!7f_nfffXsI1RaI[IQc_Ij["S^ +::b[ ''-G'G::::::::::GGG4W[GSZGAYa''UGna\F\N=H[TuNNN'G'G: :A4G8'AD"A"gD@FA.1&FBa]M"AAr2FF6hE"M$3ҊLH|(G]G G2I< United States Senate @ Committee on Rules and Administration Washington, DC 205106325  LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1994  THURSDAY, MAY 5, 1994 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:29 a.m., in room 301, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Wendell H. Ford, chairman of the committee, presiding. Present: Senators Ford, Pell, Moynihan, Feinstein, Mathews, Stevens, and Warner. Staff Present: James O. King, staff director; William McW. Cochrane, senior adviser; John L. Sousa, chief counsel; Gail S. Martin, chief clerk; Albert L. McDermott, Republican staff director; Carole J. Blessington, assistant chief clerk; and Mark Mackie, Republican counsel. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WENDELL H. FORD, CHAIRMAN, @ COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION The CHAIRMAN. Today this committee will continue consideration of S. 1824, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1994. Our witnesses on the joint committee provisions are Senator Moynihan, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Taxation, and Senator Sarbanes, Vice Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, respectively. With respect to the agencies, we will receive testimony from several members of those agencies. We have also received statements for the record on the agency provisions from the Government Printing Office and the Congressional Budget Office, whose leaders have already testified on this legislation earlier. I welcome you all to this hearing and look forward to your testimony on the provisions of this bill that affect your committee or agency. I also look forward to hearing the views of the legislative branch agency leaders on the evolving roles and missions of the organizations they each head. I have a full statement on the topics to be discussed this morning, and I ask unanimous consent that it be placed in the record at this time. [The prepared statement of Senator Ford follows:] STATEMENT OF HON. WENDELL H. FORD, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION #x6X@8X@#Today, this committee will continue consideration of S. 1824, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1994. We will receiveh)0*0*0* statements on provisions regarding the abolition of the joint committees and with respect to legislative branch support agencies. Our witnesses on the joint committees will include Senator Moynihan and Senator Sarbanes, Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Joint Economic Committee, respectively. We will also receive a statement from Senator Pell, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on the Library. With respect to the agencies, we will receive testimony from the leaders of four of Congress's most important entities. These include the Librarian of Congress, James Billington; the Director of the Congressional Research Service, Daniel Mulhollan; the Comptroller General of the United States and head of the General Accounting Office, Charles Bowsher; and the Director of the Office of Technology Assessment, Roger Herdman. We have also received statements for the record on the agency provisions from the Government Printing Office and the Congressional Budget Office, whose leaders have already testified on this legislation at earlier hearings. On behalf of the Committee, I welcome you all to this hearing and look forward to your testimony on the provisions of this bill that affect your committees or agencies. I also look forward to hearing the views of the legislative branch agency leaders on the evolving roles and missions of the organizations they each head. The Senate Members of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress have recommended that the Joint Committees on Printing, the Library, and Taxation, as well as the Joint Economic Committee, be abolished, and their responsibilities reassigned to appropriate Senate standing committees, or, in the case of the Joint Committee on Taxation, to the Congressional Budget Office. The Joint Committee on the Library was created in 1802 to oversee the Library of Congress, and the Joint Committee on Printing was created in 1846 to oversee government printing. Members of both are drawn from this committee and the Committee on House Administration, which committees retain all legislative jurisdiction. Under the provisions of this bill, these joint committees would be abolished and their functions assigned to this committee and the appropriate House committee. The Joint Taxation Committee, which was created in 1926 to perform responsibilities for the Senate and House tax writing committees, is similarly comprised of members from those standing committees, Senate Finance and House Ways and Means. The functions of the joint committee would be moved to CBO to be reconstituted as a new revenue division which will be primarily responsible to the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees in performing their functions. In 1946 the Joint Economic Committee was created as part of the Employment Act. Its primary responsibility is to review theh)0*0*0* Economic Report of the President. It also provides information regarding the economy to Congress. The study committee concluded that the joint committee's functions could more efficiently be done by the House and Senate Budget Committees who are primarily responsible for reviewing the President's budget and setting the overall budget targets. The reasons advanced by the Joint Committee in its recommendations for the abolition of these joint committees should be balanced against the desirability of encouraging greater coordination between the standing committees in both Chambers. I am aware that members of these joint committees do not agree with the recommendations of the study committee and I look forward to hearing their views on this important subject. The transfer of the responsibilities of the Joint Committees on Printing and the Library to this Committee would consolidate all responsibility in the Senate for information technology in this committee. S. 1824 will reassign the component functions of the Joint Committee on Printing by transferring its administrative role to the Public Printer and oversight of the GPO to this committee. Reform of government printing has received considerable attention in the past few years. This attention includes enactment of a law that will make materials available to the public by way of online computer systems and the advancement of proposals by the Clinton Administration in its National Performance Review to separate executive branch printing from that of the legislative branch. This measure addresses this need to reform government printing. It would create three new offices of Deputy Public Printer to be responsible for printing of the three branches of government. It would also raise the threshold under which an Executive Branch agency may procure printing at the best price. It would reform the printing process without sacrificing the efficiency of a centralized printing operation for the government. This committee and the appropriate House committee would be responsible for monitoring and adopting technology and information policies for the legislative branch agencies to assure the dissemination of public data in a timely and economical manner whether in printed or electronic format.  Earlier this year, we held a hearing on reform of government printing in connection with other legislation. That hearing record includes matters relevant to the proposals in this bill, so it will be incorporated in the record of the committee on S. 1824. It is surely the case that the U.S. Congress has the most sophisticated information support system of any legislative body worldwide. If "information is power," as the saying goes, then the House and Senate have this resource in abundance. In fact, a major problem that Members of Congress and staff face is that we are inundated with information and analysis. There is no question thath)0*0*0* much of it is valuable and useful. But much of it is hard to use because it may be too voluminous or not directly on target to what lawmakers need in addressing the major issues of the day. I believe it is fair to say as a broad generalization that our support agencies, with their highly professional staff, provide the Members and committees of Congress with timely, useful, and reliable information and analysis. However, any organization, including the Congress and its support units, can improve the way it does business. This was certainly a prime objective of the Joint Committee as it developed recommendations on a variety of topics, including staffing and the support agencies. On June 10, 1993, the Joint Committee heard from the leadership of the CRS, CBO, GAO, OTA, and GPO. The Librarian of Congress did not testify at this hearing. Prior to that hearing, the Joint Committee requested and received from the service arms of Congress detailed responses to questions that the joint panel asked of them. The various responses to these questions were printed as part of the June 10 hearing record. Among the concerns of the Joint Committee were issues such as these: the extent of duplication among the support agencies; the appropriate size of the agencies compared to their overall missions, especially in this costcutting era; and whether any changes are needed in the way each support agency interacts with the Congress. From this wealth of material, and other related information as well, the Senate members of the Joint Committee unanimously recommended a variety of changes that affect the support agencies. These proposals are contained in S. 1824, the proposed Legislative Reorganization Act of 1994. Several recommendations seem to stand out. These include:  ?  Periodic Reauthorization. To promote efficiency, limit duplication, and review the need to consolidate activities, the Joint Committee recommended that the permanent authorization status of Congress's support units be ended and that each entity be subject to an eightyear reauthorization schedule. The eight year schedule would occur on a staggered basis with GAO starting in Fiscal Year 1997; the Library of Congress, including CRS, in FY 1999; the GPO in FY 2001; and CBO and OTA in FY 2003. Responsibility for reauthorizations would be lodged in the Committee on Rules and Administration. As the Final Report (No. 103215, Vol. I) of the Senate Members of the Joint Committee stated: "Periodic reauthorization requires the [support] agencies to justify their continued operations, forces substantial oversight review by Senate legislative committees, and allows for periodic restructuring of the agencies to guarantee that they are performing their functions effectively and efficiently."  ?H&  Legislative Branch Streamlining. There is little question that there is broad concern in some quarters that congressional staff reductions are required. There is also little question that statements about ballooning staff growth on Capitol Hill are simply off the mark. Congressional staff sizes are in decline and budgetsh)0*0*0* for legislative entities, such as the support agencies, are also in decline. Some of the support agencies have already cut back on some of their current services in the face of declining budgets. The Joint Committee was mindful of the downsizing underway in the private sector and in the executive branch as a result of Vice President Gore's National Performance Review, which proposed a 12% cut in executive branch personnel by the year 2000. To insure that responsible staff reductions are made, rather than any simplistic acrosstheboard cuts, the Joint Committee proposed that the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration and the Appropriations Committee should "conduct a legislative branch performance review for the purpose of enacting staff reductions comparable to the executive branch reductions proposed and implemented as a result of the recommendations of the National Performance Review." I can assure everyone that this Committee will take seriously this type of mandate. I can also assure everyone that this Committee will seriously consider the implications of any staff reductions on the ability of Congress to perform its constitutional duties.  ?  Cost Accounting. S. 1824 recommends that the GAO, CBO, CRS, GPO, and OTA prepare annual reports, which are to be submitted to the Secretary of the Senate for publication, that detail "the cost to the instrumentality of providing support to each Senator and Senate committee." By monitoring use of the support agencies by Senators and Senate committees, such information would be helpful during the reauthorization process and assist in insuring that support agency resources are allocated in a fair and efficient manner. In CBO's cost estimate prepared for the Joint Committee, the statement is made that "GAO and OTA already have accounting systems that could serve as a foundation for a cost reporting system, CBO and CRS would have to start from scratch." The Committee on Rules and Administration would like to know more about how each of the support agencies would implement such a proposal.  ?  Voucher Allocation System. To aid the reauthorization process and to encourage Senators and Senate committees to more carefully consider the costs of the requests they make to the support agencies, S. 1824 recommends that the Senate authorizing committee "study the feasibility of establishing a voucher allocation system for committees and members using agency facilities." CBO's cost estimate for the Joint Committee states that the aforementioned cost accounting report could be used by Congress "to consider, design, and implement a voucher system for allocating the services of [the support agencies] among the users of the services in the Congress." This recommendation gives rise to many questions, and this Committee would appreciate your candid views on this topic. For example, how would each of the support agencies allocate vouchers among the Senators and Senate committees who use the services of the support agencies? And what form will the socalled vouchers take for each Senator and Senate committee, such as dollar accounts or product and service accounts? There are other proposals contained in S. 1824, as well as the companion House bill (H.R. 3801), that directly and indirectlyh)0*0*0* affect the workload and activities of the support agencies. Under the biennial budgeting proposal contained in S. 1824, for instance, the GAO is obligated during the second session of each Congress to give priority to committees in their authorization and oversight work. CBO would be obligated to issue quarterly, rather than semiannual, deficit reports. S. 1824 also requires that detailees from the support agencies to any Senate committee or senatorial office must be on a reimbursable basis. The House bill, as I understand it, requires at least two of the support agencies to assist committees in preparing oversight agendas. There are other proposals, too, in the House bill that will impact one or more of the support agencies. Suffice it to say that various recommendations of the Joint Committee will affect the management and activities of the several support agencies of Congress. Where past reorganization efforts strengthened Congress's professional staff assistance, today we all operate in a different environment. There is probably no question that Congress can engage in additional belt tightening. On the other hand, the search for savings and greater efficiencies must be done in a responsible manner to insure that Congress can carry out its fundamental responsibilities of resolving the nation's problems, serving our constituents, and overseeing the administration of laws. The CHAIRMAN. We have a full schedule this morning, and some of our witnesses have time restraints that I will do my utmost to accommodate. This is indicative of one of the problems that we are trying to address in this legislation, the one that Senator Byrd called ``fractured attention.'' Senator Stevens, do you have a statement this morning? Senator STEVENS. I do not have a statement. I do have a comment, and that is that I am disturbed about this bill to the extent that it wants to eliminate the joint committee structure, because I believe the joint committees really give us the ability to share staff between the House and the Senate. If we eliminate the joint committees, I think we are going to just end increasing the staff of both the House and the Senate and finding ourselves in endless battles over what to do about subjects that are of mutual concern. I do believe the joint committee structure saves money. It does not increase spending. The CHAIRMAN. I am inclined to agree with my good friend. We also have some other points that I want to make today in other testimonies as it relates to the independence of GAO. We have Senator Sarbanes, the distinguished senior Senator from Maryland, and we will proceed, Senator, with your statement and what questions we might have and try to expedite your attendance here. h)0*0*0*ԌTESTIMONY OF HON. PAUL S. SARBANES, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Stevens, and I will be brief. I will submit my full statement and abridge it. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your full statement will be included in the record as if given. Senator SARBANES. Of course, I was privileged to serve with you and Senator Stevens on the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress. I think it is an important obligation on our part to engage in a periodic review of congressional reform proposals. After 10 months of hearings, that joint committee made a number of recommendations, some of which I think are worthy and others with which, to be very candid, I disagree. Of course, we all went through that experience together, and I will not rehash that here this morning. Over the years, there have been a number of proposals to eliminate or restructure joint committees of the Congress. I am going to particularly address the Joint Economic Committee on which I serve, and I know you will be hearing from Senator Moynihan with respect to the Joint Tax Committee. Before I address the Joint Economic Committee specifically, I would like to, in a sense, following along Senator Stevens' comments, just make some general observations about joint committees. I am frank to tell you I think these proposals to simply eliminate joint committees are often based on the assumption that if you can take a box out of the organization chart, just get it off the page, you have done reform. But I think you ought to look at the joint committees in terms of the functions they do, what would happen to those functions if they were assigned elsewhere. I think Senator Stevens just made a very good point with respect to the duplicative staffing that may well arise as a consequence. Each joint committee performs specific duties assigned to it by the Congress. Some of these joint committees were, in fact, established as a consequence of reform proposals in earlier Congresses. They are the outgrowth of reform efforts. My own view is they often provide a valuable opportunity for members from the House and Senate to work together on matters of common concern in a focused and efficient manner. In fact, at a time when we hear complaints that the two Houses have difficulty communicating with one another or coming to closure on important issues, we should not lose sight of the value of the joint committee as a general proposition. So while I am going to specifically address the Joint Economic Committee, I have misgiving, as I have indicated, about this general attitude ofh)0*0*0* getting rid of the joint committee in order to get a box off the organizational chart. I have served on the Joint Economic Committee now for some time, and I believe it does provide an important place where forward thinking can be done on middle-range and long-range economic issues. It does not report legislation, and in many respects this is an advantage. We often bemoan the fact that we are not able to really think ahead or think in any depth. There is no other committee that is dedicated solely to looking at broad economic policies suggesting long-term economic solutions. Now, the committee was established by statute in the Employment Act of 1946. It was charged with a number of specific duties, including reviewing and commenting on the annual economic report of the President. In fact, the Joint Economic Committee just published its report on the President's 1994 economic report. That report engages in a detailed analysis of complex economic issues. Beyond that, the JEC has done work on very important economic issues such as infrastructure, productivity, the Nation's competitiveness, industrial policy, international economics, high technology, scientific and technical frontiers. In fact, Senator Bingaman, a member of our committee, did some really pioneer work on high technology and science, which represented an important breakthrough, later translated in important pieces of legislation. For years, the JEC monitored the Soviet economy, the Chinese economy. We did important studies on Taiwan, Korea, Japan. In fact, on the basis of those studies, important provisions were included in the Trade Act requiring the Treasury to report on countries that are manipulating the currency or the rules of trade in order to gain an advantage. Every one around here always says we do not have enough time to think about things, that we are always focused on the matter of the moment, and I think that is an apt observation about how we do our business. There is almost no way to escape that. The JEC, I think, has been more successful than most in being able to do that and to give some forward thinking, and I think it has made important contributions to the development of economic policy. Let me finally make this observation: The proposal to eliminate the JEC was not a recommendation of the full joint committee. The House members did not recommend abolishing the JEC. Under the charter under which we were established, the resolution, it provided that the members of one side could only deal with matters that only dealt with their side. If they dealt with both sides, like a joint committee, then it had to be, in effect, recommended by both sides in order to be on the agenda. As I said, the House members did not recommend abolishing theh)0*0*0* Joint Economic Committee. I very much hope that upon further review, the Rules Committee will agree with that position and will not move forward with respect to this proposal. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. I think Senator Stevens and I have expressed our feelings at the moment as it relates to the joint committees, and it will hopefully work out. I just have one question for you. Presently, three of the joint committees receive their funding directly from the Legislative Branch Subcommittee without going through the same budgetary review process that applies to all standing committees. If the abolition of the joint committees is not agreed to, would you support changing this procedure so that all committee budgets would be reviewed and approved in the same manner? Senator SARBANES. I would have no objection to that, Mr. Chairman. I think we would have to, in a sense, consult with the House to make sure our budget review procedures worked in a way that could harmonize with one another. But as far as I am concerned, I have no problem. The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator. Senator Stevens? Senator STEVENS. I only had one question, too. It just seems to me, Senator, that Congress has made a mistake in calling these ``joint committees.'' They are really assignments of members from separate committees of the House and the Senate to this permanent oversight or permanent conference committee of the Congress. Should we just change the name? It is really not a committee in the sense of either the House or the Senate. It is a joint conference or joint task force or oversight group, whatever you might call it. But I think that people who are wanting to do with the committees, as you said, just decided to lop off four committees. But I do not think they really understood the jointness of the concept involved in these committees. Senator SARBANES. I had not really thought of that. I think there is something to be gained by being constituted as a committee and functioning as committees do. We really need to just say, look, just because it is a box on a chart and you get it off the chart, you are not really doing reform. I mean, these committees do an important function. In fact, you know, you can make a strong argument that we ought to have more such collaborative efforts rather than less, as you did on staff. And I think you can also make that argument in terms of interaction between members of the House and members of the Senate and groups that report to the committees. It gives them a single place to report to rather than a double place to reporth) 0*0*0* to. We get complaints from people who come before us to testify that they are always running from one side of the Hill to the other side of the Hill to testify, in effect give duplicative testimony, and these joint committees avoid that, as a matter of fact. Senator STEVENS. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Moynihan, do you have a question of Senator Sarbanes? Senator MOYNIHAN. No. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feinstein? Senator FEINSTEIN. No questions. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, do you have any questions of Senator Sarbanes? Senator PELL. No questions. I will have a statement later. The CHAIRMAN. Well, fine. Senator Sarbanes, we thank you very much for coming today. The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness will be the distinguished Chairman of the Finance Committee and member of this committee that probably will support your position. Senator Moynihan, we are delighted to have you here this morning, and we look forward to your testimony. You may proceed, my friend. #I09TESTIMONY OF HON. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK Senator MOYNIHAN. Thank you, Chairman. I have a statement that I would ask be placed in the record. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your statement will be placed in the record as if given. Senator MOYNIHAN. I can be succinct, sir, but I hope I can be equally forceful. I appear on behalf of myself and Senator Packwood with respect to the proposal concerning the abolition of the Joint Committee on Taxation. I am chairman of the Joint Committee. Each year it is a tradition that we alternate the chair of the Joint Committee between the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Ways and Means. This, sir, and Senators, is the oldest of joint committees. Ith) 0*0*0* was established in 1926 by statute. Senator STEVENS. Sorry, Senator. We were the oldest, the Joint Committee on Printing. Senator MOYNIHAN. We are the second oldest. [Laughter.] The CHAIRMAN. No argument this morning. He is easy. Senator MOYNIHAN. Basically, what the Joint Committee on Taxation is, it begins, in effect, with the Internal Revenue Service and the Internal Revenue Code and the income tax, the constitutional amendment that creates income tax. And what it does, it has several functions, but the most important, the absolutely indispensable function is that it provides identical estimates to the tax-writing committees of the House and the Senate as to what will be the revenue effect of any particular proposal. By an agreement that goes really to the beginning of the income tax, corporate tax system, the House and Senate use identical numbers. We have the saying, ``Everybody is entitled to their own opinion, but not to their own facts.'' The facts of a tax measure are determined by the Joint Committee. They have great expertise in this matter. Some persons have spent their lives there; others leave because there is a huge demand elsewhere in the economy for their knowledge of the Code. And it makes tax writing possible; otherwise, you say it is $100 million, and we say it is $200 million, and there is no agreement. The committee staff drafts the text of tax measures after the Senators and the House members have agreed to what we would desire be done. The actual drafting is done by the technicians in the Joint Committee, work of enormous complexity and great consequence, has to be done right, is not done easily, is, in fact, I am sorry to say, in the main impenetrable to the layman, but that is the consequence of having a huge country and a large tax system. Finally, the committee has statutory responsibility to review refunds by the Internal Revenue Service of over $1 million to any given taxpayer. This is a routine matter, but also in that setting and for purposes of understanding the effects of revenue proposals, the committee staff members have access to tax returns. They take samples of tax returns to see how things work out so they can make estimates. It is an indispensable activity, sir. Absent that, you would double and treble the size of the committees, the Ways and Means Committee and the Committee on Finance. The Budget Committee could not handle this--I am sorry. The CBO could not handle it, should not handle it. It would fuse all together, be absolutely non-partisan, in this case, as between the two bodies' mutual activities. Just one quotation, if I could, sir. In the report of theh) 0*0*0* Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, they cite a study prepared jointly by the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution which states, and I quote, ``The Joint Tax Committee staff is truly one of Congress' success stories, with its consistently first-rate, non-partisan professional team.'' The CHAIRMAN. That kind of says it all, doesn't it, Senator? Senator MOYNIHAN. I think so. [The prepared statement of Senator Moynihan follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, AND CHAIRMAN, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION; AND HON. BOB PACKWOOD, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, AND MEMBER, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION Mr. Chairman, I appear before the Rules Committee today on behalf of Senator Packwood and myself to express our firm opposition to the proposal in section 362 of S. 1824, the "Legislative Reorganization Act of 1994", to abolish the Joint Committee on Taxation and transfer its functions to the Congressional Budget Office. Senator Packwood is on his way to Oregon to attend his daughter's wedding. Mr. Chairman, there is no justification for this proposal. It was recommended by the Senate Members of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress (JCOC), but the Final Report of the Senate Members offers no support for abolishing the Joint Tax Committee. Indeed, in the report, "Renewing Congress", prepared for the JCOC by the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution, the authors state: XThe Joint Tax Committee's staff is truly one of Congress' success stories, with its consistently firstrate, nonpartisan professional team.(# While the report continues with a suggestion that the Joint Tax Committee need not be organized as a separate entity and could be folded into CBO, the authors do not provide any justification for this suggestion. The Congressional Budget Office has concluded that the proposal to eliminate the Joint Tax Committee and transfer its functions to the CBO would, rather than result in any budgetary savings, actually be more costly than the present arrangement. We can assure this Committee that such a transfer would offer us no choice but to seek an increase in the Finance Committee's staff to meet current needs. Under the present arrangement, the Finance Committee draws heavily upon the tax policy expertise of the Joint Tax Committee staff in the development and drafting of tax legislation, to assist in ensuring technical accuracy and administrative feasibility, andh) 0*0*0* in determining anticipated revenue impact. The Joint Tax staff also assists in the drafting of Finance Committee and Conference Reports covering tax legislation. The CBO is not designed for or intended to offer this kind of support in the development and passage of legislation. Accordingly, the abolishment of the Joint Committee would absolutely result in the need for additional Finance Committee staff to meet current and anticipated workloads, and the Finance Committee would have to seek an increase in its budget. Under the present arrangement, the Finance Committee "shares" the staff expertise of the Joint Tax Committee with the House Committee on Ways and Means. Under the proposal in the Legislative Reorganization Act, the economies of this arrangement would be lost. The CBO Director has reached the same conclusion, and we refer you to his statement to be submitted to the Committee today. The Joint Tax Committee provides the taxwriting committees and all Members of Congress with indispensable legal and economic analysis of tax proposals on a nonpartisan basis and also provides the level of technical expertise in the drafting of legislation which is essential to good tax policy. Of equal importance are the revenue estimates which the Joint Tax Committee provides on all revenue proposals. Moreover, the organization, powers and duties of the Joint Committee on Taxation are expressly provided for in the Internal Revenue Code. The Joint Tax Committee is granted access under the Code to confidential tax return data. This access to tax return data is essential to the preparation of accurate revenue estimates and to fulfilling the Joint Committee's statutory duties of investigating the operation and administration of the tax laws and of reviewing all claims for tax refunds and credits in excess of $1 million. These revenue matters are solely within the jurisdiction of the Finance Committee and we would insist on our jurisdictional prerogative in that regard. Mr. Chairman, the proposal in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1994 to abolish the Joint Tax Committee and transfer its functions to the CBO is without justification on either a policy or budgetary basis. Indeed, it will cost money to do this. Given the unique services that the Joint Tax Committee provides to all the Members of Congress and the increasing role that revenue considerations play in all areas of legislative activity, we suggest that if the Joint Tax Committee did not already exist, the Congress would now have to create it. For the reasons we have outlined, we will oppose the Legislative Reorganization Act so long as it contains any proposal to eliminate the Joint Committee on Taxation. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the joint statement of Senator Packwood and myself be printed in the record along with additional materials. Thank you for allowing me to appear as a witness on thish) 0*0*0* most important issue. The CHAIRMAN. Just one question. I asked the same question of Senator Sarbanes. Should the recommendation under the legislation not be successful that the joint committees stay in place by statute, would you object to having the budget reviewed as we do with committees? Senator MOYNIHAN. Not in the least. I think that would be a useful idea. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Stevens? Senator STEVENS. You may not be the oldest committee, Senator, but you are the most important joint committee. I do not think anyone will disagree with your request that you not be disestablished. Senator MOYNIHAN. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feinstein? Senator FEINSTEIN. No questions. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, do you have any questions? Senator PELL. No questions. I just concur with what Senator Stevens said. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathews, welcome. Senator MATHEWS. Good morning. Senator MOYNIHAN. May I just make a point? Senator Packwood is not here. He is in Oregon attending the wedding of his daughter and sends his respects to the committee. Before I leave, may I make a passing favorable reference to the Joint Committee on the Library. That, too, is a venerable arrangement which ought not be disturbed. It works so very well, as evidenced by the quality of our Library. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, and I think Senator Pell has a statement to support that. So we will recognize Senator Pell at this time for a statement. TESTIMONY OF HON. CLAIBORNE PELL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for according me this opportunity to speak a word on behalf of the Joint Committee on the Library. I should note for the record that I served on the joint committee since 1961 and am its vice chairman during this, the 103d Congress. I might add that my father was also a member of the jointh)0*0*0* committee in the early 1920's. I can understand why the Joint Committee on the Library, which dates back to 1802 and is, I believe, the oldest extant congressional committee, might be dismissed as an obsolete anachronism. But I would contest that view, and I think it is more accurate to view our joint committee as a useful vestige, which has survived precisely because it is useful. In the early days of the Republic, such joint committees were established for administrative purposes, and the Joint Committee on the Library filled such a role for nearly a century. In effect, it managed the day-to-day operations of the Library, and it was not a too demanding task at that time. But with the explosive growth of the Library's collections following the passage of the 1870 copyright law requiring the deposit of copyright items, the management task outgrew the joint committee's capacity, and in 1897 Congress assigned to the Librarian of Congress the direct responsibility for day-to-day management. There remained a need to oversee and give policy direction to the Librarian, and that is what the role of the joint committee has been since that time. It is a role of consultative supervision akin to that of a board of directors. Since the joint committee has no legislative authority, it exerts its influence by verbal advice and written consent, which reflects its members' sense of congressional will. The consultative process is very informal and unstructured. Often the Librarian just gives the joint committee information on various matters, sometimes seeking the assent of the chairman and the vice chairman, representing, as they do, the two Houses.  On matters of substance on which the formal approval of the joint committee is necessary, the membership is generally polled by document, and assent is registered by signature. The joint committee meets only infrequently, and then generally for informational hearings when there would be a clear benefit from a multilateral exchange of viewpoints. This arrangement, while not perfect, serves effectively to coordinate congressional supervision of an institution which has a wholly unique relationship to the National Legislature. The Library is the creature of the Congress, and the Congress is in turn highly dependent on the Library for substantive support. There must be a continuing mechanism in place for transmitting the will of Congress to the Library, and the joint committee is, in my view, the most effective mechanism for this purpose. I would further submit that there are clear advantages to bothh)0*0*0* parties in having the mechanism of a joint committee. It gives the Library a single source to which it can turn for an expression of policy which represents the will of both bodies. In this connection, I would note that the joint committee structure forces inter-house consultation at the staff level, and then assent by members, before an action of the joint committee can result. The advantage, from the congressional viewpoint, is that the joint committee structure requires us to find a common ground of agreement on any given issue, and once having done so, we are protected to a good degree from having our client, the Library, play off one House against the other in seeking to manipulate congressional will. I would hasten to add, parenthetically, that in my own view the joint committee hardly poses a threat to the benefits of bicameralism which were argued so effectively by James Madison, because the function in this case is limited to consultation and administrative approval, relating to an institution which is intimately tied to the Congress as a whole. Finally, I would note that the work of the joint committee is performed by staff members who have many other duties but who would probably have to perform the same function with respect to the Library if the joint committee were to be abolished. So I submit that the proposed abolition would yield no significant economy and would only have the effect of removing a useful framework for coordinated oversight. Turning, if I might, Mr. Chairman, to another aspect of S. 1824, I would like to record my reservations about the proposal to limit the number of subcommittees that would apply to committees in the so-called Super A and A categories. Speaking from my perspective as the chairman of a super A committee, the Committee on Foreign Relations, to me this proposal seems arbitrary and unduly restrictive. Because the scope of the Foreign Relations Committee is worldwide, we traditionally have organized our subcommittee structure along geographic lines and to a lesser extent along substantive lines as circumstances dictate. We currently have seven subcommittees in all, of which five are regional ones: the Subcommittee on African Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European Affairs, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs. In addition, we have one on International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and Environment, and a Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations. Any requirement to merge or consolidate the work of these subcommittees could have the effect of reducing the focus and intensity of the committee's attention to the matters it must consider. And I might also note that most of the members of theh)0*0*0* committee already have limited themselves to only two subcommittees, so in that sense the objectives of the proposed reorganization are already attained. I have the same reservations as a member of an A committee, the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, and as chairman of one of its subcommittees. The Committee on Labor and Human Resources has broad jurisdiction over a wide range of social concerns and presently has six subcommittees to address these issues. They are the Subcommittees on Education, Arts and Humanities; Aging; Children; Disability; Employment and Productivity; and Labor. Given the broad scope of the committee's responsibilities, it seems to me that the consolidation of its structure into three subcommittees would make for unwieldy workloads at the subcommittee level and result in inefficiency and less effective operation of the committee. Here, too, to the extent that the purpose of the proposed limitation is to lighten the workload of Senators, that objective can readily be obtained by enforcing the limitation on the number of subcommittees each member of the committee can serve on, namely, limiting it to two. For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I would oppose the proposed limitation on the number of subcommittees and urge that it be deleted from the bill. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. I have no questions at this moment. I appreciate your expressing your position as it relates to the Joint Committee on the Library and your position as it relates to S. 1824 and its subcommittee limits. I thank the Senator. Does any other Senator have any questions for Senator Pell? Senator STEVENS. I do not have any questions, Mr. Chairman. I would like to put in the record a fact sheet on the Joint Committee on Printing, and I will point out that it was created in 1846. But I do think that the record ought to show the total authority of the Joint Committee on Printing. I believe that it, as the Joint Committee on Taxation, saves the taxpayers a considerable amount of money by assuring standardization and efforts to minimize the cost of printing for the Government as a whole. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be included in the record. [The material submitted by Senator Stevens is included in additional materials.] h)0*0*0*ԌThe CHAIRMAN. I might just back up, Senator Stevens. The Joint Committee on Printing has saved nearly $50 million in executive branch printing actions. The Joint Committee on Printing has an authorization of 17. We are only operating at 15. We have a very limited budget compared to the rest. In the past 5 years, the joint committee has moved the Government from virgin paper to highly recycled paper, such as the Congressional Record's 100 percent post-consumer waste newsprint and the new 100 percent recycled grayer copier paper, and saved money in the process. So I hope that that committee will be involved also. Thank you very much, Senator. We will proceed with the next witness. Senator PELL. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Next will be Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States General Accounting Office. Good to see you. Mr. Bowsher, you can have your statement put in the record and highlight it, or you can read it, whatever is your pleasure this morning. TESTIMONY OF CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. BOWSHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to just highlight my statement, and if you would put it in the record, I would appreciate it. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your statement will be included in the record as if given. Mr. BOWSHER. Thank you very much. The main concern we have about the reauthorization of GAO every 8 years, Mr. Chairman, is the issue of independence. In other words, when the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was enacted, which, I might point out, was a major reform at that time, as Senator Sarbanes said in his testimony, what they really wanted to do was to give the Budget Bureau to the President from the Treasury Department. At the same time they contemplated that move, they said that they wanted to get the Government's audit group out of Treasury and move it to the legislative branch, to the Congress, so that they would be able to get some independence on issues of how money was being spent and how well it was being spent. In other words, looking at how the programs are unfolding. So the issue of independence was very much in evidence in the legislative history, and I have included that in my statement here, showing the Congress trying to give the Comptroller General and the GAO as much independence as possible, recognizing that there would be many different partisan views on the various programs that theh)0*0*0* Congress would debate and the executive branch would try to execute. The auditing function in this country has a very interesting history. It started really when England came over here and brought English auditors to follow their investments in the New World, as they referred to us at that time. But the auditing profession in America has become the leading group in the whole world, and the auditing profession of the world today is basically patterned after the American system. The Securities Act of 1933 and 1934, which the Congress passed after the great stock market crash in 1929, addressed the issue of independence for the auditors of public companies and trying to set it up so that financial reporting would be sound and independently reviewed by the auditors. We in recent years here have had to go through a very difficult situationthe S&L crisis, and the Congress very rightfully was highly critical of Mr. Keating and some of the people in the S&L industry when they leaned on their auditors and even fired their auditors in some cases, to try to get the answers that they wanted. What worries me a great deal about the legislation that is pending here is that by including periodic reauthorization, pressures could be brought upon us. Although I will be concluding my 15year tenure here in 2 years, and this legislation would not become effective until 1997, I worry a great deal about the future, both for the organization of the General Accounting Office and for the Congress. Permanent reauthorization has worked well even though we have had to handle many difficult issues over the years. It basically has worked well, and we have been able to do the job that we were asked to do because of the independence provided by the foresight of the people that framed the 1921 act. I might add that Elmer Staats, the Comptroller General from 1966 to 1981, supports my concerns and urges the Congress not to enact this legislation. I believe he has sent a letter to the committee, and I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that this letter be placed in the record. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the letter will be placed in the record. [The letter of Mr. Staats is included in additional statements.] Mr. BOWSHER. Now, one thing I do believe greatly in is oversight. Our oversight committees--the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and the House Government Operations Committee--should be holding biennial or even annual hearings on us, and we should have to answer to them about the different issuesh)0*0*0* that come up from time to time, and I believe that we can make any needed changes based on their guidance. We also get very thorough oversight every year from the Appropriations Committees, so I think oversight, if it is operated properly, can handle the problems that maybe some people feel have to be dealt with. And I certainly am a strong supporter of that. That basically is our main point, Mr. Chairman, and we would be pleased to answer any questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Bowsher follows:] #x6X@CX@#PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: Thank you for requesting our views on the General Accounting Officerelated recommendations of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress as embodied in S.1824, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1994. Of greatest importance to GAO is the proposed repeal of its permanent authorization, which would be replaced with reauthorization every 8 years, beginning in 1997.  ?  REAUTHORIZATION WOULD JEOPARDIZE GAO'S INDEPENDENCE Repealing the General Accounting Office's permanent authorization would be a serious mistake. This change could subject the agency to partisan political pressure, thus jeopardizing its independence and credibility. These are the very characteristics that have made GAO valuable to the Congress, and which clearly distinguish its findings and recommendations from those of the executive branch and from those of private interests. In fact, the agency's independence and credibility were the primary considerations in its creation by Congress more than 70 years ago. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was drafted to severely limit the extent to which GAO could be subjected to partisan political pressure. This is apparent not only in the Act's provisions regarding the Comptroller General, but also in the debate prior to the Act's passage. For example, the debate repeatedly stressed that GAO and the Office of the Comptroller General were structured ". . . to make them absolutely independent  ?`" of the Executive in their decisions."X01Í ÍX81Í Í * `" ?$ ԍH.R. Rep. No. 16, 67th Cong., lst Sess., at 7 (1921). This quote and others contained in this statement are excerpted from a letter dated February 16, 1994 on the reauthorization issue prepared in response to a Senate Majority Leader request. (See attachment.)*X81Í Í X81Í Í  Representative Good, a principal sponsor of GAO's original authorizing legislation, voiced a similar theme during floor$0*0*0* debate. X In creating the general accounting office and providing for the comptroller general and the assistant comptroller general, the committee was guided by a single thought, and that was that these two officers should be placed upon a plane somewhat comparable to the position occupied by Federal judges. The positions are semijudicial, and it was the opinion of the committee that we should remove them as far as possible from political considerations.  The authors of the Act were concerned with insulating GAO from political pressures as evidenced by the following exchange: XMr. BLAND. Did not the committee contemplate that the comptroller general might not only be brought into conflict with the executive department and with the executive branches of the Government, but sometimes with one side or the other of the aisle in Congress, and possibly both sides, in the impartial discharge of his duties?  XMr. GOOD. Absolutely. That department ought to be independent and fearless to criticize wrong expenditures of money wherever it finds them. It ought to criticize inefficiency in every executive department where inefficiency exists, and one of the troubles with our present system is that the auditors dare not criticize. If they criticize, their political heads will come off.  Later debate linked the drafters' concerns regarding political pressure to the limitations on the circumstances under which the Comptroller General can be removed. XMr. SIMS. I appreciate the attempt to take this matter away from consideration as a political matter; but does the gentleman think that the President is more likely to act from partisan considerations than would a partisan Congress, where both Houses are of the same political party?  XMr. GOOD. That is one of the reasons why we provided in the law the causes for removal, and the only causes are inefficiency, incapacity, neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, or some offense that involves moral turpitude.  Representative Good summed up congressional intent with respect to GAO's independence this way: X It was the intention of the committee that the comptroller general should be something more than a bookkeeper or accountant; that he should be a real critic, and at all times should come to Congress, noh)0*0*0* matter what the political complexion of Congress or the Executive might be, and point out inefficiency, if he found that money was being misappliedwhich is another term for inefficiencythat he would bring such facts to the notice of the committees having jurisdiction of appropriations.  This concern for independence resulted in a statute that permanently authorized GAO, provided the Comptroller General with a 15year nonrenewable term of office, and set stringent requirements for his removal either by impeachment or by joint resolution of the Congress for specific cause. GAO has a dual mission as both a legislative branch support agency and as the federal government's independent external auditor. To adequately fulfill these complementary roles it must continue to have the independence of action to examine any program of the executive branch, and to do so without regard to political considerations, and in a way that preserves its credibility in our governmental system. Both I and Elmer Staats, the Comptroller General from 1966 to 1981, fear that repealing GAO's permanent authorization could destroy the sound legislative foundation created for the agency in 1921. To do so would also move in a direction opposite to that which the government is now pursuing for private sector auditors, where the executive branch and the Congress have been taking actions which would strengthen, not weaken, the independence of the external auditors in corporate oversight. If you'll allow me to reflect for a moment, when I first came before the Senate for confirmation well over a decade ago, I spoke as an individual with substantial experience in the executive branch in both the Johnson and Nixon administrations, as well as in a large public accounting firm. I had a healthy respect for both GAO's mission and its success in serving the Congress and the American people, and I was eager to take on the challenge of maintaining and building upon its past success. But I did not fully realize the difficulty that an agency like GAO has in effectively serving the information needs of an institution like the Congressan institution that by its very nature is divided on nearly every issue, not only by party, but by committee jurisdiction, procedural differences, regional concerns, and economic interests. It is a difficult task for any organization to serve the needs of such strongly opposing factions. Thus, it is a tribute to the foresight of the Congress that it anticipated this difficulty and created the GAO with a statute which charged it with an important job, while allowing it the ability to guard its independence and credibility. It is with this background in mind that I conclude that periodic reauthorization for GAO is not in the best interest of the Congress. Independence and indeed the mere perception of independence are critical to any auditor's credibility, and this is particularly true for GAO given its pivotal role in serving theh)0*0*0* Congress. To sum up then, periodic reauthorization could: ` ` expose GAO to strong partisan political pressures, and/or create the appearance that one faction or another in the Congress could hold the agency hostage in order to discourage it from taking, or encourage it to take, a particular position;(#` ` ` give the executive branch too large a role in influencing GAO's activities by subjecting the GAO reauthorization bill to a potential presidential veto or to other political pressure from the White House. A veto would mean that opponents comprising only onethird of the vote in the Senate or the House could prevent reauthorization; and finally (#` ` ` allow a small number of Senators (or a single Senator for that matter) to threaten to delay action on a reauthorization measure until some concession were granted by either a future Comptroller General or the Senate leadership.(#`  ?  During the Joint Committee's deliberations we were told that reauthorization would force more systematic oversight. As a legislative agency, GAO is already subject to extensive oversight by the Congress through both the annual appropriations process and from its current authorizing committees. We welcome the oversight role of these committees. Nonetheless, as I noted in my letter to the Senate Majority Leader, I would support a requirement for biennial oversight hearings by our oversight committees as a desirable alternative to the repeal of GAO's permanent reauthorization. This could provide for more formal scrutiny of our operations on a predictable schedule by those committees which currently have jurisdiction. It would also avoid adding a fifth and possibly sixth committee to GAO's oversight process, and creating a mechanism that could threaten GAO's legislative mandate. Biennial oversight by the Governmental Affairs Committee would also be consistent with the desire of the Joint Committee to require each committee of the Congress to more systematically carry out oversight for those agencies under its jurisdiction. I strongly urge you to delete the provision for periodic reauthorization, and I would be happy to discuss this issue personally with any member of the Committee.  ?$  OTHER ISSUES Section 332(d) would require GAO and the other "instrumentalities" of the Congress to provide, at the end of each calendar year, a report detailing the cost of the support provided to each Committee of the Senate and each Senator. As you know, the House members of the Joint Committee explored a similar proposalh)0*0*0* and rejected it based upon the concerns raised by a number of committee chairs. With some minor caveats, GAO presently has a time charge system which would allow us to report such costs. The first caveat is that small efforts of a few hours or a few days are not charged in a way that would allow us to identify the committees or Senator who asked for the work. However, the bulk of our resources go to larger identifiable tasks which are charged to specific job codes and which in turn are linked to specific requests. The other caveat is that when two or more members or committees request our assistance on a single task, it would be impossible to logically break out the amount of effort allocable to each of the individual requestors. Although the Senate bill neither describes a specific system nor mandates the use of vouchers by committees requesting assistance from the support agencies, Section 332(e) does say that the feasibility of instituting such a system should be explored. A voucher system would create many complex problems for the congressional leadership in both political parties. For example, who would decide on the method for allocating vouchers to committees? To what would the bearer of a voucher be entitled? Would each voucher have dollars associated with it or simply the right to make a request? One would have to assume that prior to the beginning of a new fiscal year and once the GAO appropriation was approved, some mechanism would be used to allocate vouchers to each congressional committee. Questions would then arise such as: Do all committees in both the House and Senate receive the same number of vouchers or are they allocated based upon historical usage? Do the Senate and the House split the portion of GAO resources available for request work? How would vouchers be allocated within committees to chairs and ranking minority members? Would each subcommittee get the same number of vouchers from the full committee? Given the fact that power and decision making in Congress are diffused among the leadership and the committees and subcommittees, it is unclear how a voucher program would work. A voucher system would, therefore, most probably be administratively difficult, if not impossible, to operate. Finally, a voucher process could, if crafted incorrectly, jeopardize the independence that is vital to GAO's mission as an independent auditor. This could happen if the process in any way limited a future Comptroller General's ability to undertake work on his or her own initiative. Thus, if the decision were made to adopt such a voucher system, some mechanism would be needed to preserve this particularly vital aspect of GAO's independence. Doing otherwise would be tantamount to "muzzling the auditor," which has had disastrous consequences in both the private and public sectors.h)0*0*0*Ԍ ? ԙ The last issue I'd like to address is committee oversight of federal programs and agencies. Section 381 charges each standing committee of the House of Representatives and the Senate to prepare a longterm oversight agenda for laws, programs, or agencies under its jurisdiction, and, to the extent practicable, to do this in coordination with other committees having similar jurisdictions. Much of GAO's value to the Congress is its assistance to Congress in oversight of the executive branch. We believe that GAO could be more useful to the Congress in exercising its oversight responsibility if the committees of jurisdiction were encouraged to hold comprehensive oversight hearings on all major agencies annually or, as provided for in this bill, once during each Congress. Such hearings could utilize agency Chief Financial Officers' annual reports, audited financial statements, and their annual reports on the adequacy of internal controls, as well as evaluation and investigative work performed by GAO, the other congressional support agencies, and the Inspectors General. Federal agencies could also report on their progress against specific goals and provide information on the kind of performance measures envisioned in the Government Performance and Results Act. Mr. Chairman that concludes my prepared statement. I'd like to thank you for asking for our views on this important legislation. My colleagues and I would be happy to answer any questions you or other members of the committee may have at this time. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. I only have a couple of questions I would like to ask, maybe three. You insist in your statement that, and I quote, ``repealing the General Accounting Office's permanent authorization would be a serious mistake. This change could subject the agency to partisan political pressure, thus jeopardizing its independence and credibility.'' How is undergoing an 8-year periodic reauthorization more likely to subject GAO to political pressures than its existing requirement for an annual appropriation, which must also pass both chambers and be signed into law by the President? Mr. BOWSHER. Well, I think basically the difference is tht the appropriation process, of course, has to move forward every year, and we are part of the legislative appropriation. And there are some pressures that are brought at that time, but in my twelve-and-a-half years here, it seems to me that the Appropriation Committees and the leaders there have never at any time held us up in any way, shape, or form to pressures other than to discuss some of the issues, and, certainly, of course, the overall level of the budget deficit. And we have been level funded here the last 2 years, and we have been coming down in size. So I see it as quiteh)0*0*0* different. On page 3 of my testimony, I do try to make three major points on the reauthorization process. One, I think it would expose GAO to strong partisan political pressures or create the appearance that one faction or another in Congress could hold the agency hostage in order to discourage it from taking, or encourage it to take, a particular position. For example, during the S&L crisis, we had a lot of pressure brought to us by the U.S. Savings League, and they tried to reach us through some Members of Congress during that very difficult period. Two weeks from now, we will be issuing a very important report on derivatives, and the banking industry, the securities industry, the insurance industry, all will be very interested in what GAO is reporting to the two Banking Committees. There is so much interest on this that I am being asked to testify both in the morning and in the afternoon, once before the House, and once before the Senate. And we just think that in doing this very difficult work that the Congress continues to assign to us, we have to have this independence, and we do not in any way want to have a situation where every 8 years people start to say, well, your reauthorization is coming up, and we do not like this position that you are taking and we are going to remember it when your reauthorization is considered. That's the potential, I think, that worries me a great deal. The CHAIRMAN. Are you saying that that pressure would cause you to make a different decision? Mr. BOWSHER. It will not cause me to make a different decision. As long as I am in this office-- The CHAIRMAN. I understand. Mr. BOWSHER. But what I worry about in the future The CHAIRMAN. But the inference is that those who follow you would not make as wise a decision on independent positions that you have made or will make. Mr. BOWSHER. I think they could be swayed, and I think it could even lead someday maybe to a Comptroller General resigning over the issue if he or she does not feel they have the needed independence. That has not happened in 75 years, and I would hate to see something set up here that could bring that possibility into the picture. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bowsher, you also mention in your testimony that GAO should be exempt from periodic reauthorization because of its permanent roles and programs. Yet many other departments and agencies with permanent roles and missions do undergo annual orh)0*0*0* regular reauthorizations or authorizations. In 1976, for example, the crime control act of that year ended the permanent authorization status of the FBI. Why should GAO be exempt from periodic reauthorization when other agencies with permanent roles and missions undergo annual or regular authorizations? Mr. BOWSHER. I think it is basically the function of audit. In other words, you have to have an audit function. Every other country has it, 140 countries have it. All the States have it. The Congress has asked the private sector to include independent audits as part of the corporate governance of this country. And it seems to me that you want to make that audit function just as independent as possible. Now, I recognize that the reauthorization of some major agencies has been voted in, but one thing that we have noticed is that lots of times it is not followed very much. In other words, it is a real mixture. So I think what is being attempted here-- The CHAIRMAN. Would you explain ``a real mixture'' to me, please, sir? Mr. BOWSHER. Well, some agencies have permanent authorization. Others have periodic. But even when they have a requirement for periodic reauthorization, it does not seem like it always takes place, and it just does not change anything. I think if you look at the history of the Justice situation, it seems like the reauthorization has not been followed quite like the legislation. The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am going to look at that a little bit closer, then, and see if we are not following the authorization. We do authorize and not appropriate for a while, or we appropriate and later on authorize. That is a function that we have followed for some time. Mr. BOWSHER. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. Some have said it is getting the cart before the horse, but, nevertheless, one cannot function without the other. So if we appropriate in advance, then we have to follow through with authorization before the appropriation can be spent. One final question, Mr. Bowsher. The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, as I understand it, has contracted with the National Academy of Public Administration to conduct an organizational performance review of your organization. Has GAO provided ideas to the Governmental Affairs Committee on how it might improve the execution of its responsibilities? Mr. BOWSHER. Yes, we have, and we are expecting to have anh)0*0*0* oversight hearing as soon as they receive that report. And so one more time, we will go over some of these issues that are brought up in that report, or some of the issues raised by things I have been trying to change based on our TQM efforts and other initiatives, and we have been sharing these with the Senate Governmental- The CHAIRMAN. What is a TQM? Mr. BOWSHER. That is your total quality management approach, which, if you remember, was fathered by Professor Demming. We had him at GAO in 1990, and have been following that program and have developed that program and moved forward, and we have kept both the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and the House Government Operations Committee fully informed about those efforts. And I would expect all of that would be part of the discussion of the oversight hearing, once they receive the report from the National Academy. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathews? Senator MATHEWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one brief question. I came from State Government. In our arena, with respect to our auditing function, the auditor always had the same type of thoughts that you are expressing here today. You raise the question of independence when you audit the auditors, and I guess we came around to the point where we were doing peer reviews. I do not know whether there is such a thing as a peer review in this setting. Is this the type of thing that the chairman here was talking about, or do you have-- Mr. BOWSHER. That is a very good question, Senator, because in the auditing standards for government, there is a requirement for a peer review every 3 years. GAO should have a peer review every 3 years just like the State auditors have. And I have been discussing that with the Governmental Affairs Committee. They wanted to have this review by the National Academy first, and so we are going to get that report this year. But I am hoping in the next year or two to have a peer review very much like all the State auditors are doing now. I think the peer review is a very good periodic review for a professional organizations such as auditing organizations. Senator MATHEWS. Are there other means of really demonstrating the type of work that you do and the independence of that work other than peer review and this national group that you are recommending? Mr. BOWSHER. No. I think those are the two main approaches, and I think Senator Glenn and Senator Roth are both following along those lines. So I think that is the way to do it. That is what Ih)0*0*0* have recommended to the committee. Senator MATHEWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Warner, do you have questions? Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Bowsher, I think the record should reflect, of course, that you are speaking here today as a lame duck in the sense that, assuming this legislation passes, it will be beyond your term. You will have completed your term. Isn't that correct? Mr. BOWSHER. That is correct, Senator. Senator WARNER. Therefore, I would think there is a strong inference that you speak with total objectivity about this matter and there is no means by which you personally could benefit. Mr. BOWSHER. That is absolutely right. My real concern here about this provision is what it could possibly do after I am gone, and for the future Comptroller General. Senator WARNER. And Senator Ford, I think, asked a very pertinent question about the fact that--and it led to your response that you might have a subsequent occupant of your office confronted with resignation versus yielding to the pressure. But let's address all of the infrastructure that is below you that likewise would be subjected to pressure. We have got to recognize that in our system of Government that exists, and it exists here in the Congress, whether you like it or not. Would not a whole tier of professionals below you be subjected to the type of pressure that you reflected in your responses to Senator Ford? Mr. BOWSHER. Yes, we are subjected to a lot of pressure down the line in GAO as our teams are doing these various audits and program evaluations. But that is kind of part of the business. In other words, just like on this derivatives report, which I think will be one of the most important reports that we issue this year. There are some people who believe that derivatives are the greatest thing that has ever happened to Wall Street and that the Government should not regulate this new activity. Other people are very concerned that maybe derivatives are getting out of hand, and these companies are reporting $100 million losses. A German firm just had to put together a $2 billion bailout situation that involved 100 banks. So we get a lot of pressure from industry; we get a lot of pressure from people on different sides of the issue in the Congress and their staffs. But we can deal with that pressure as long as the top person is not getting the pressure when he or she signs the report, and sets the final position that you are going toh)0*0*0* take. One thing that has really impressed me since I have been in this office is how seldom I ever get a telephone call trying to pressure me as a report is coming out. We issue 1,000 audits and reports a year, roughly speaking, and I have been in office about 12 years, so that is about 12,000 reports. I do not think I have received more than a dozen calls in those 12 years, and three or four of them were on one report. I always remember that one report. And so I think that, to the credit of the members of Congress that set this function up, they have given us a structure that we can deal with, even though, as you say, Senator Warner, our people do get pressures down the line. The other thing, of course, is that we are a very unique organization in that we only have two Presidential appointees. Everybody else is career civil service. Senator WARNER. And if the objective of the legislation as now drafted were carried forward, this would then put out a target in the sense that the authorization bill would be subjected to all types of holds and filibuster, and, indeed, the President could veto it. Mr. BOWSHER. That is exactly right. In fact, what really happened was, in 1921, the Congress brought this function over, took it away from the executive branch because they felt that there was far too much pressure being put on the Comptroller when he was in the Treasury Department by the White House and others in the executive branch. So that was the reason for the change in 1921, and this legislation could put the White House back into the position of, as you say, Senator, vetoing the legislation even if the Congress reauthorized. Senator WARNER. Mr. Bowsher, going back some 20 years when you and I served together in the Department of the Navy, Elmer Staats was Comptroller. Mr. BOWSHER. Absolutely. Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read a paragraph from this letter because I think it captures precisely what our distinguished witness here today is trying to say and has said. Elmer Staats said in a letter to the chairman here, Senator Ford, dated April 28, this year, ``The framers of the statute enacted in 1921''--well, go to the first paragraph. ``As you know, I served as Comptroller General of the United States from 1966 to 1981. During that time, I became increasingly convinced that the value of the GAO in its credibility, objectivity, and freedom from political pressures both as to matters selected for audit and the conclusions reached.'' ``The framers of the statute enacted in 1921 had this clearlyh)0*0*0* in mind. They wanted the Comptroller General to have the status of and be subject to the same appointment, removal, and retirement provisions of Federal judges. The Comptroller General is appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and serves a non-renewable 15-year term. He can be removed only by impeachment or for specified cause by joint resolution of the Congress, the latter, of course, requiring approval of the President. The Comptroller General has, by statute, access to records of the executive branch.'' ``These independence safeguards are unique among the agencies in either the legislative or the executive branch. In short, they are designed to assure both the perception and the reality that the Comptroller General is independent in auditing the executive branch of the Federal Government. That independence is a cornerstone in the separation of powers.'' I judge from your testimony that those objectives would be undermined if we pursued this 8-year authorization. Mr. BOWSHER. That is correct. Senator WARNER. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Thank you very much. Any other questions? [No response.] The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bowsher. We appreciate your coming today. We appreciate your testimony and know the pressure that you are under as it relates to time. Mr. BOWSHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Next we will hear from a panel of twothe Librarian of Congress, Dr. James H. Billington; and the Director of the Congressional Research Service, Daniel P. Mulhollanfollowed by Mr. Roger C. Herdman, Director of the Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States. If all three of you gentlemen will come forward, we look forward to your testimony. Mr. Billington, you may proceed. We will take your full statement, then you can highlight it, or however you wish to do it. TESTIMONY OF A PANEL CONSISTING OF JAMES H. BILLINGTON, THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC; AND DANIEL P. MULHOLLAN, DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. BILLINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would propose to extract the highlights from the full statement. h)0*0*0*ԌThe CHAIRMAN. Your full statement, then, will be included in the record as if given. Mr. BILLINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall discussed, as we were asked to do, three specific areas, while expressing my appreciation for this opportunity to testify on the Legislative Reorganization Act and its likely impact on the Library. The three areas, as I was asked to do and as I am delighted to do, are on the applicability of certain Federal laws to the operations of the Library; the creation of a new 8-year reauthorization cycle for the Library; and, most critical of all to the Library, the provisions of the bill that would further reduce our staff. Let me begin with the applicability of certain Federal employment rights laws to the Library. The current Senate bill does not contain provisions on this subject, and the Senate members of the joint committee deferred action on this issue until the release of the findings of the study by the Bipartisan Task Force on Senate Coverage. So I will focus my remarks on the provisions contained in H.R. 3801, the House companion bill to S. 1824, which does contain specific provisions addressing applicability. The House bill sets up an Office of Compliance and mandates that its board conduct a study of the manner in which certain statutes should apply to congressional employees. The director of the office has to conduct a similar study relating to employees of the instrumentalities and submit a report to the Congress, presumably with recommendations, on the basis of which the board is then to issue regulations. The bill divides the laws to be studied into two groups. The first are laws which already apply to the Library: the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and so forth. The second set of laws are those that may become applicable to the Library if the formal study called for in the legislation so recommends. Some of these laws are named; others are not. And the vagueness of this section of the bill causes us, Mr. Chairman, considerable concern. Until the Office of Compliance determines what, if any, additional statutes will apply to the Library, there is virtually no way we can presently analyze the possible implications this portion of the bill would hold for the Library. The bill requires the Office of Compliance to study the possible application of the provisions of Federal law to the extent they relate to--and I am quoting here--``the terms and conditions of employment (including hiring, promotion or demotion, salary and wages, overtime compensation, benefits, work assignments or reassignments, termination, and family and medical leave)...''h) 0*0*0*ԌGiven this language, the Library could be asked, for instance, to apply the Veterans' Preference statute to the Library, which would require the Library to change its entire current selection and retention system and would probably work, for instance, to the disadvantage of a large number of women. Or the Library could be asked to allow our employees access to the Merit Systems Protection Board and the Office of Special Counsel, which would radically disrupt bargaining agreements currently in place with our three labor organizations. The Library has recently completely redesigned in the last year-and-a-half its personnel selection system to ensure that the procedures are fair and job-related and professionally validated--a long and expensive process--which puts us now in the forefront of government agencies for virtually all jobs. Some of the personnel laws applicable to the executive agencies would not mesh with our system and would upset current efforts to meet equal employment opportunity and affirmative action objectives because non-merit principles are taken into consideration in those statutes. Therefore, to make sure that gains in our new system are not inadvertently jeopardized, we request that we be allowed extensive involvement in any study you may conduct. We believe the Library has valuable experience in many of these areas that we would welcome the chance to share with the Congress. Now, the second area to which I think the committee should give particularly careful attention is the requirement that the Library and its programs be reauthorized every 8 years. Historically, the relationship between the Congress and its Library has been and remains today fundamentally different from the Congress's relationship with executive agencies. The Joint Committee on the Library is as old as the Library itself. For almost 200 years, there has been a close and effective working relationship in the Library and the Senate Rules Committee, its primary legislative committee, and its primary oversight committee, the Joint Committee on the Library, whose Senate members are drawn from the membership of this committee. Library officials maintain a close working relationship, often on a daily basis, with both the Senate Rules Committee and the Joint Committee on the Library. Our extraordinary institution is first and foremost the Congress's library, and we are in constant communication with our legislative oversight committees. The Library adopts no significant new policy and undertakes no significant new program or activity without the joint committee's full knowledge and approval. If a joint committee whose sole responsibility is to oversee the Library of Congress did not exist, I would urge you, Mr. Chairman, to create it. We could not possibly satisfy the often divergent, sometimes conflicting priorities and preferences of every one of the 540 Senators, Representatives, Delegates, and Resident Commissioners, nor could we discuss our own plans and proposalsh)!0*0*0* with each of them. We need a small bicameral group of Representatives and Senators to whom we can turn to learn what it is that the Congress wants us to do and how we should go about doing it. In short, we welcome this continuing accountability to the Congress, and our centuries-long dialogue with the Joint Committee on the Library underscores this vital principle. So, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully suggest that there is already sufficient oversight of the Library of Congress. Over the last several years, I have appeared not only before our oversight, authorizing, and appropriations committees in both Houses of the Congress, but I have also appeared before the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, and the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, and the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service on official Library business. I am concerned that adding the proposed 8-year reauthorization cycle could make it more difficult for the Library to respond effectively to congressional needs and preferences. One important virtue of our current relationship with the Congress and its committees is the flexibility it affords. As circumstances change--and they are changing very rapidly in the electronic age--and as new opportunities arise and as new problems develop, the Congress can act promptly with the current system to authorize changes in our policies, programs, or priorities. Many of the most important curatorial and service functions exercised by the Library are not matters of statute but have developed in response to the continuing and changing needs of the Congress and of the Nation. These functions are regularly vetted both with the Joint Committee on the Library as well as with our Appropriations Committee. And particularly as we enter this electronic age, it seems unwise to change over to an 8-year review cycle and to an increasing reliance on making too many matters statutory and, indeed, imposing an unnecessary burden on the congressional agenda. Especially at a time of diminishing resources, the Library of Congress needs the flexibility to move quickly to achieve savings and to take advantage of new and creative ways of doing more with less. Our current relationship with this committee and with the Joint Committee on the Library now satisfies this need. Of course, Mr. Chairman, if the Congress believes that its current oversight of the Library of Congress is insufficient and that the proposed reauthorization cycle is the best remedy, you may be sure that everyone at the Library will cooperate in every way we can to make the process a success. If reauthorization were enacted, I would support the Senate provisions that place the reauthorization of the Library and the legislative support agencies on staggered schedules. This would allow the Congress to focus better on the institutional uniquenessh)"0*0*0* of its Library and on the vital services it renders not just to the Congress but directly to the Nation. Libraries everywhere, blind and physically handicapped readers in particular, and many other groups and institutions depend heavily on services provided uniquely by the Library of Congress, and this institution, therefore, would benefit, I think, from being considered on its own as a unique national resource. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to address the third area I mentioned, the provisions of S. 1824 that would further reduce the Library staff. As we understand it, S. 1824 recommends downsizing the legislative branch in a manner comparable to that which Vice President Gore's National Performance Review suggested for the executive branch; that is to say, a 12 percent cut in legislative branch employees by the year 2000. The Library has already endured a 12 percent reduction in its staff since 1980, and a comparable further cut would be devastating. It would curtail not only the services that we provide to the Congress, but our basic ability to ensure the preservation and transmission of our incomparable collections to future generations. We have done everything in our power to adjust to the severe decline over the last 10 years in the purchasing power of our appropriations. But since 1980, we have lost 573 full-time equivalent positions, 395 in just the last two budget cycles alone, while our collections have grown by 22 percent and other various congressional and national service workloads have increased from between 33 to 75 percent. Funding constraints make it impossible to replace many key people who have left; just recently specialists in health care financing, crime, and gun control, forestry policy management, telecommunications policy, nuclear nonproliferation, Hispanic and Arabic laws, and many catalogers with unique language skills. The Library's institutional memory is in danger of being eroded and we are losing our ability to mine the over 104 million items, by far the largest in the world, unique American assets for both education and productivity. All of these items in the Library's collections exist for the benefit of the Congress and the American people. If the Library were to absorb an additional 12 percent reduction as called for in this legislation we would lose at least an additional 211 full-time-equivalent positions over and above those already lost, which would bring the total loss of positions since 1980 to 764, or 16 percent. The Library staff, I believe, has responded magnificently to the calls for stringency which are appropriate at this time, and I have attached a chart to my testimony that shows how the staff is doing more with less. But even with improved efficiencies and herculean efforts, we reluctantly have to cut back on some services to the Congress and the American people to compensate for reduced funding. But anyh)#0*0*0* further reduction in staff, effected either through this legislation or subsequent action on our appropriations bill, would seriously disrupt operations essential to the Congress and the Nation. We would have to delay some work of the Congressional Research Service. Our response for congressional requests and original analysis on issues and policies not subject to immediate legislative consideration would probably stop. The efficiency and objectivity inherent in maintaining a pool of expertise available to all the Congress would be undermined and such expertise would likely have to be replaced with costs borne directly by individual congressional offices. In addition, maintenance, preservation, security, and dissemination of what is the world's richest collection of knowledge would be affected with more reduced hours of service in reading rooms, and reductions in cataloging services, which now save America's already hard-pressed libraries at least $336 million annually. Cataloging costs would increase with these hard-pressed local libraries and the Library of Congress' own uncataloged arrearages would grow again after 3 years of very significant and dramatic decline. For the copyright office, further staff reductions would increase the backlog of claims and make the office less responsive to the needs of one of the Nation's largest export industries with profits of roughly $40 billion a year. So I have growing concerns that recent budget constraints will cripple the ability of the Library to serve as the anchor for the democratic conveyance of knowledge and information, and could even put the survival of this great institution at risk. As knowledge and information are growing and assuming greater importance than ever before, the Congress cannot afford to allow the Library to become simply a passive repository of information and knowledge available to those few who could travel to Washington. For the Library to remain a dynamic institution where Congress as well as the public seeks and receives the broadest access to the highest quality of information, the Library must be an assertive and innovative participant in the information age, which I believe we are still able to be, Mr. Chairman. But the Library must not only contribute to the design of the information infrastructure, it must actively convey knowledge and information to the public. Much, if not most, of our rapidly expanding electronic services to new users from all over the country is, and will be, financed privately. But the Library will not be able to sustain, let alone expand, our services if we continue to be subjected to forced reductions in staff and services. So I would strongly urge you to consider the serious implications that further staff reductions could have on this library. And I'd like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for givingh)$0*0*0* me the opportunity to discuss these issues with you today. [The prepared statement of Mr. Billington follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES H. BILLINGTON, LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate the opportunity to testify on S. 1824, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1994, and its likely impact on the Library of Congress. I know that this bill embodies recommendations made by the Senate members of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress and reflects concerns that many Senators share. I shall focus my remarks today on three specific areas. The first is the applicability of certain Federal laws, such as employment and discrimination laws or the principles they embody, to the operations of the Library. The second area is the creation of a new eightyear reauthorization cycle for the Library of Congress. And finally, I wish to discuss what I believe would be the most critical to the Librarythe provisions of the bill that would further reduce our staff. Applicability of Employment Rights Laws Let me begin with the applicability of certain Federal employment rights laws to the Library. Because the current Senate bill does not contain provisions on this subject, and since the Senate Members of the Joint Committee deferred action on this issue until the release of the findings of the study by the Bipartisan Task Force on Senate Coverage, I will focus my remarks on the provisions contained in H.R. 3801, the House companion bill to S. 1824, which does contain specific provisions addressing applicability. The House bill sets up an Office of Compliance that consists of a Board of Directors and a Director. The bill mandates that the Board shall conduct a study of the manner in which certain statutes should apply to congressional employees. The Director is to conduct a similar study relating to employees of the instrumentalities, submit a report to the Congress, which presumably would contain recommendations, and then the Board is to issue regulations which implement the recommended laws. The bill divides the laws to be studied into two groups. The first are laws which already apply to the Library. These laws are the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, sections 102 through 104 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Section 15 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993. h)%0*0*0*ԌThe second set of laws are those that may become applicable to the Library if the formal study called for in the legislation so recommends. Some of these laws are named; others not. Apart from those named in the bill, the breadth of the other laws, primarily personnel laws, to be studied is vast. The implications of the extension of these laws to the Library are potentially enormous. Because of the rather broad and generic reference to laws that cover the terms and conditions of employment, we find it difficult to comment on the full ramifications the applicability of these laws would have for the Library. It is this section of the bill that causes us considerable concern due to its vagueness. Until the Office of Compliance determines what, if any, additional statutes will apply to the Library, there is virtually no feasible or efficient way to analyze the possible implications this portion of the bill would hold for the Library were it enacted. To elaborate, the bill requires the Office of Compliance to study the possible application of the provisions of federal law to the extent they relate to ``(1) the terms and conditions of employment (including hiring, promotion or demotion, salary and wages, overtime compensation, benefits, work assignments or reassignments, termination, and family and medical leave)...'' For example, the Congress might consider 1.` ` Applying the Veterans' Preference statute to the Library? If so, it would require the Library to change its current selection and retention system in its entirety. Further, the effect of such a preference on our major occupationlibrarianshipmight well work to the disadvantage of a large number of women;(#` 2.` ` Giving the Library Schedule C (political appointments) authority, which would run afoul of our new validated selection system as well as an outstanding Court order which requires the Library to fill jobs competitively;(#` 3.` ` Directing the Library to use OPM as our testing source, when those tests might not be professionally validated; or(#` 4.` ` Allowing our employees access to the Merit Systems Protection Board and the Office of Special Counsel, which would have farreaching effects on our bargaining agreements currently in place with our three labor organizations.(#` The Library has recently completely redesigned its personnel selection system, to ensure that the procedures are fair and jobrelated. Those procedures have been professionally validateda long and expensive processbut one which puts us in the forefront of governmental agencies. We sincerely doubt that many other agencies have devised such a comprehensive system for virtually all jobs. Some of the personnel laws on the books applicable to the executive agencies would not mesh with our system and would upseth)&0*0*0* current efforts to meet equal employment opportunity and affirmative action objectives because nonmerit principles are taken into consideration in those statutes. Because we have invested so much in a new system, we request that we be allowed extensive involvement in any study you may conduct. We believe the Library has experience in many of these areas and we would welcome sharing our knowledge and expertise to assist the Congress in these studies. h#Reauthorization The second area to which I think the Committee should give particularly careful attention is the requirement that the Library and its programs be reauthorized every eight years. As the members of this Committee understand far better than I do, the tendency in recent decades has been for the Congress to impose such periodic reauthorization requirements on Executive Branch departments and agencies. This trend was motivated primarily by an interest in ensuring and improving congressional oversight of their programs and policies. This was an understandable reaction to the natural tensions that can arise between the Congress and departments or agencies subject to annual appropriations but that are not subject to direct congressional supervision through an authorization process. Reauthorization laws, and the committee hearings from which they are developed, enable the Congress to speak with a clear, authoritative, and compelling voice to sometimes recalcitrant department and agency officials. Historically, the relationship between the Congress and its Library has been, and remains today, fundamentally different. The Joint Committee on the Library is as old as the Library itself. For almost two hundred years, there has been a close and effective working relationship between the Library and the Senate Rules Committee, its primary legislative committee, and its primary oversight committee, the Joint Committee on the Library, whose Senate members are drawn from the membership of this Committee. The Library is committed to working with the Congress. Library officials maintain a close working relationship, often on a daily basis, with both the Senate Rules Committee and the Joint Committee on the Library. As the Librarian of Congress, I remain constantly alert to the fact that our extraordinary institution is first and foremost the Congress's library. I have never known there to be an adversarial relationship between the Library and our legislative and oversight committees. We are in constant communication with each other, and I make certain that the Library adopts no significant new policy and undertakes no significant new program or activity without the Joint Committee's full knowledge and approval. In fact, having a Joint Committee whose sole responsibility is to oversee the Library of Congress actually is a blessing. If it did not exist, I would urge you to create it. We could not possibly satisfy the oftenh)'0*0*0* divergent and sometimes conflicting priorities and preferences of every one of the 540 Senators, Representatives, Delegates, and Resident Commissioners, nor could we discuss our own plans and proposals with each of them. We need a small bicameral group of Representatives and Senators to whom we can turn to learn what it is that the Congress wants us to do and how we should go about doing it. In short, we welcome accountability to the Congress. Our centurieslong continuing dialog with the Joint Committee on the Library underscores this vital principle. So, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully suggest that there is already sufficient oversight of the Library by the Congress. Over the last several years I have appeared before our oversight, authorizing, and appropriations committees in both House of the Congress as well as before the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, and the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. I am concerned that adding the proposed eightyear reauthorization cycle could make it more difficult for the Library to respond effectively to congressional needs and preferences. One important virtue of our current relationship with the Congress and its committees is the flexibility it affords. As circumstances change, as new opportunities arise, and as new problems develop, the Congress can act promptly to authorize changes in our policies, programs, or priorities. The reauthorization requirement now in S. 1824 could undermine this valuable flexibility and the responsiveness it permits. As you well know, reauthorization bills almost always make some statutory changes in agency organization or procedures or policies or programs. Then, when these changes become the source of new, unanticipated problemsas they often dothe law once again must be changed through the full, and often slow, legislative process. I question, Mr. Chairman, if it is necessary or if it serves the interests of the Congress for me and my successors to return to the Congress for new legislation every time our statutory mandate is overtaken by events in any way. It seems to me that this would merely impose an unnecessary burden on the congressional agenda when we now achieve the same result with greater efficiency and less cost through the guidance and direction we receive from the Joint Committee. Especially at a time of diminishing resources, the Library of Congress needs the flexibility to move quickly to achieve savings and to take advantage of new and creative ways of doing more with less. Our current relationship with this Committee and the Joint Committee on the Library now satisfies this need while at the same time ensuring that we are acting in the best interests of the Congress and the Nation. Of course, if the Congress believes that its current oversight of the Library of Congress is insufficient and that the proposed reauthorization cycle is the best remedy, you may be sure that everyone at the Library will cooperate in every way we can to make this process a success. If reauthorization wereh)(0*0*0* enacted I would support the Senate provisions that place the reauthorization of the Library and the legislative support agencies on staggered schedules. This would allow the Congress to focus better on the institutional uniqueness of this Library and on the vital services it renders not just to the Congress but directly to the Nation. Libraries everywhere, blind and physically handicapped readers, and many other groups and institutions depend heavily on services provided uniquely by the Library of Congress; and this institution, therefore, would benefit from being considered as a unique national resource rather than simply being grouped with other legislative support entities. LFurther Staff Reductions Finally, Mr. Chairman I would like to address the provisions of S. 1824 that would further reduce the Library's staff. As I understand it, S. 1824 recommends downsizing the legislative branch in a manner comparable to that which Vice President Gore's National Performance Review suggested for the executive branch: a 12 percent cut in legislative branch employees by the year 2000. Let me simply say that the Library has already endured a 12 percent reduction in its staff since 1980, and that a comparable further cut would be utterly devastating to the Library. It would curtail not only the services that we provide to the Congress, but our basic ability to ensure the preservation and transmission of our incomparable collections to future generations. We have done everything in our power to adjust to the severe decline over the last ten years in the purchasing power of our appropriations. But since 1980, we have lost 573 fulltime equivalent positions while our collections have grown by 22 percent and other various congressional and national service workloads have increased from 33 to 75 percent. In the last two budget cycles the Library lost 395 full time equivalent positions. Funding constraints make it impossible to replace many key people who have left: CRS specialists in health care financing, crime and gun control, forestry policy management, telecommunications policy, and nuclear nonproliferation; Law Library specialists in Hispanic and Arabic laws; and catalogers with language skills in German, Greek, Scandinavian, Portuguese and Spanish. The Library's institutional memory is simply being eroded, and we are losing our ability to mine the over 104 million items in the Library's collections for the benefit of the Congress and the American people. If the Library were to absorb the 12 percent reductions called for in this legislation we would lose an additional 211 fulltime equivalent positions over and above those already lost, bringing the total loss of positions since 1980 to 784 positionsor 16 percent. The staff of the Library has responded magnificently so far to repeated calls for stringency. I have attached a chart to my testimony that shows how we are doing more with less. But even with improved efficiencies and continued herculean efforts on the part of dedicated Library staff, we are reluctantly cutting back on services to the Congress and the American people to compensate forh))0*0*0* our staff losses and reduced funding. Any further reduction in staff affected either through this legislation or subsequent action on our appropriations bill would seriously disrupt operations essential to the Congress and the Nation: 1.` ` We would be forced to increase by several weeks our present 5day backlog on Members and Committee reference requests by the Congressional Research Service. Delays of up to 10 weeks would probably also occur for constituent related requests. Staff furloughs would result in the reduction of customized services and information products to our 15,000 congressional clients. Original analysis on issues and policies not subject to immediate legislative consideration would stop. The efficiency and objectivity inherent in maintaining a pool of expertise available to all the Congress would be undermined. Costs to replace such expertise would likely be borne directly by individual congressional offices.(#` X2.X` ` Maintenance, preservation, security, and dissemination of the world's richest collection of knowledge would immediately be affected. We would have to further reduce hours of service in the Main Reading Room and other special reading room hours. Library of Congress Cataloging Services, which now save American libraries at least $336 million annually, would fall behind as a result of serious staff cuts. Cataloging costs would increase for America's already hardpressed local libraries, and the Library of Congress's uncataloged arrearages would grow again after 3 years of significant decline. (#` 3.` ` In the Copyright Office further staff reductions would increase the backlog of claims. The Nation's copyright industries, which rely on quick and efficient response to their needs, would suffer as a result. These industries are the third largest group of American export industries with profits of roughly $40 billion per year. (#` Since the day I became the Librarian of Congress I have worked to make the Library and its vast and wonderful collections of knowledge and information accessible to those who have supported and invested in its missionthe Congress and the American people. I have remained optimistic and true to this goal. But I have growing concerns that recent budget constraints will cripple the ability of the Library to serve as the anchor for the democratic conveyance of knowledge and information and will put the survival of this great institution at risk. %Conclusion When Senator Byrd, a distinguished member of this Committee,h)*0*0*0* testified before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, he made compelling observations about the state of the modern Senate. His extensive knowledge of the history of the Senate caused Senator Byrd to worry about the Senate's role as deliberative body. To quote Senator Byrd: "As an institution the Senate is more and more ceasing to perform that deliberative function. It is not the Senate that I once knew. The Senate has lost its soul." As the Librarian of Congress and a historian myself, I worry about the state of the Library. We all know that knowledge and information are assuming greater importance than ever before as the world undergoes massive transformation right before our eyes. The expansion of knowledge is escalating at a terrific rate, and the Library of Congress must be at the forefront to collect, organize and disseminate this knowledge to both the Congress and the general public. Quite frankly, given the pressures and demands on the Library, I am worried about the Library's ability to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow when its resources are being drained away. The Congress cannot afford to allow the Library to become simply a passive repository of information and knowledge available to those few who can travel to Washington. For the Library to remain a dynamic institution where the public seeks and receives the broadest access to the highest quality information resources, the Library must be an assertive and innovative participant in the information age. The Library must not only contribute to the design of the information infrastructure but it must be among the principal conveyors of knowledge and information to the public. Much, if not most, of our rapidly expanding electronic services to new users from all over the country isand will befinanced privately. But the Library will not be able to sustain, let alone expand, our services if we continue to be subjected to forced reductions in staff and services. I would strongly urge you to consider the serious implications that further staff reductions would have on the Library. I would like to thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to discuss these issues with you today. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Billington. Mr. MULHOLLAN. TESTIMONY OF DANIEL P. MULHOLLAN, DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Mr. MULHOLLAN. Thank you, Senator. Might I ask that my full statement be submitted for the record. I'll try to be brief and I'll just highlight major points. The CHAIRMAN. Your total statement will be included in theh)+0*0*0* record as if given, Mr. Mulhollan. Mr. MULHOLLAN. Thank you. What I'd like to do is address both S. 1824 and H.R. 3801 because the two bills need to be considered together to assess the impact of the Joint Committee's recommendations on the Congressional Research Service. We contributed a lot, I believe, to the work of the joint committee and we're proud of that work. I would like to take note that, in fact, there's a significant number of recommendations that have an impact on the Congressional Research Service. These recommendations could increase the workload of the Congressional Research Service. For example, the House bill explicitly states that House committees may request CRS and GAO assistance in preparing their oversight plans. The Senate bill is silent on this, but I think that Senate committees are likely to also ask CRS to assist in oversight agendas. The Joint Committee encourages CRS to update its versions of the Congressional Oversight Manual and conduct regular seminars on oversight as well. The House bill calls for assistance to the House Parliamentarian on recodification. Also to improve public understanding of the Congress and the media, the House bill suggests the media galleries receive briefings on congressional procedures citing the Congressional Research Service as one of the entities that may do that. All of these items, I'd like to emphasize, are very worthwhile matters, but they do call upon the constrained resources of the Congressional Research Service. My concern is that additional demands means that there are other things we can no longer do. Currently we are working with the Joint Committee on the Library on reducing certain services already to the Congress as a result of reductions that Dr. Billington just alluded to. Given the calls for additional reductions under the National Performance Review that's inherent in the the Senate bill--we welcome any performance review--it is likely that the congressional support agencies themselves would also take a fair proportion of those cuts, which means further staff reductions. So when you take into account the joint committees' recommendations, please also take into account what we already are doing and what you would have us no longer do in order to undertake new activities. There are important items under discussion. As just one example, we are talking with the Joint Committee on the Library now to no longer conduct briefings for non-congressional groups. But at the same time, one of the recommendations that the Joint Committee urges is to undertake briefings for the galleries on congressional procedures. How can we do this unless we take the people who would conduct those briefings away from work directly serving committees and their legislative functions? The Joint Committee makes two other recommendations I'd likeh),0*0*0* to address briefly, and that is, the cost accounting and voucher allocation proposals. I'd like to submit for the record a study that addresses that in more detail. But in those proposals there are certain practical questions of implementation that I think are detailed in the study that I'd like to raise for your consideration. With regard to the reauthorization, the Congressional Research Service welcomes a review by the Congress at any time. I'd like to point out a couple of differences between the Senate and the House bills. S. 1824, the Senate version, calls for the reauthorization of the Library of Congress on a staggered schedule. Meanwhile, the House bill, H.R. 3801, only refers to the Congressional Research Service, not to the Library, on an even schedule as well. I am confident that the members of the committee who have served on the Joint Committee on the Library will agree that we already make every effort to keep our oversight committees fully and promptly informed about any significant changes in our policies and practices. Indeed, during my years at the Congressional Research Service I've long been familiar with and impressed by the continuing record of close support and guidance of the Joint Committee on the Library to the Congressional Research Service. In fact, reviewing our records for the Joint Committee just recently, I looked at them over the past 35 years and was impressed with the kinds of directions from the committee, with regard to critical matters in testimony and committee hearings, the confidentiality of our work, providing information on members, and publication of service products. They have given us solid guidance on a continuing basis. I am confident that reauthorizing hearings every eight years would only supplement the less structured but continuing consultation and communication that we have. Nonetheless, I believe a reauthorization process could provide a useful and systematic opportunity for us to think together about how we can serve Congress most effectively and economically. As for whether congressional agencies' reauthorization should be staggered or occur at the same time, the staggered schedule proposed in the Senate bill will allow the committee to concentrate more fully the services and programs of the Library including those of CRS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by reflecting briefly on the changes that I observed in my 25 years here as a public servant of the Congress. To be sure, the mission and basic operating principles of CRS have not altered significantly, but the central role of CRS as a pool of shared staff available to all congressional offices has remained constant through our 80 years of existence. This year is our 80th birthday. Yet this continuity masks fundamental changes in the volumeh)-0*0*0* and complexity of congressional business. And it is that increased complexity of public policy issues and the absence of a national consensus that has no doubt contributed to the growing criticism of Congress as an institution. I believe this criticism, in significant portion and to the degree it has taken is misplaced. Faced with growing pressures to discharge both legislative and representative responsibilities, members and staff have taken a steadily increasing workload coverage and ever wider range of topics. Any observer of this process can only have enormous respect for those who have struggled to meet the task facing the Congress. We welcome any questions that you may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Mulhollan follows:] #x6X@CX@#PREPARED STATEMENT OF DANIEL P. MULHOLLAN, DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for your invitation to appear today before this committee to comment on the recommendations of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress and especially the recommendations that are embodied in S. 1824 and H.R. 3801, the two bills that have been introduced to implement these recommendations. Although this committee is concentrating on the Senate bill, I need to address both of them together in order to assess the potential impact of the Joint Committee's proposals on the Congressional Research Service. As you already appreciate, Mr. Chairman, we at CRS are very familiar with the activities and reports of the Joint Committee. Three CRS analysts were assigned to the Joint Committee on a fulltime basis, others for shorter periods of time, and many more analysts responded from their desks at CRS to more than 400 requests from the Joint Committee for information and analysis. In  ?  a statement inserted in the Congressional Record on March 7 of this year, Representative Lee Hamilton, one of the two cochairmen of the Joint Committee, identified by name more than 60 CRS staff members who contributed to the Joint Committee's work. The commitment of CRS resources to this undertaking was substantial; we estimate that the direct salary and benefit cost to CRS for the fulltime detailees alone was approximately $367,000. Yet the CRS participation provided major benefits to Congress through the expertise that CRS's pooled staff provided to all the committee's members. The efficiency and effectiveness of our involvement were recognized in a letter we received from the bipartisan House and Senate leadership of the Joint Committee: ``In our judgement, the working relationship between the committee and CRS exemplified the most effective manner in which staff assistance can be structured to assist a congressional committee. A small fulltime staff supplemented by support from the vast expertise of CRS is an excellent model for committee staffing arrangements forh).0*0*0* the future.'' In their reports and legislative proposals, the House and Senate members of the Joint Committee made a number of recommendations that would, or at least could, affect CRS directly. Both S. 1824 and H.R. 3801 seek to enhance congressional oversightfor example, by requiring committees to adopt oversight agendas and to report on the results of their oversight activities. The House bill states explicitly that House committees may request CRS (and GAO) assistance in preparing their oversight plans. Although the Senate bill is silent on this subject, I think that Senate committees would be equally likely to request CRS assistance. The House bill and the Senate report also address CRS's contributions to congressional oversight activities in two other ways: by encouraging CRS to publish regularly updated versions of our  ? Congressional Oversight Manual and to conduct on a regular basis seminars on oversight for Members and staff.7 On this topic, I would like to submit for your consideration a proposal that CRS and GAO explore the possibility of collaborating in support of selected oversight inquiries undertaken by House and Senate committees. Each agency has specialized talents in the oversight area. GAO's unique talents are its auditing, program evaluation, and field investigative capabilities. CRS's special strengths in oversight are grounded in the expertise of its policy analysts. Our specialists regularly monitor program and policy developments in the agencies and on Capitol Hill. CRS staff are skilled in assisting committees in preparing oversight hearings, identifying witnesses, preparing draft questions for witnesses, organizing briefing books, evaluating the legal implications of executive actions, and much more. CRS, for example, could help provide focus to an investigation and determine what information is required to assess program performance. GAO staff could actually gather the required materials or conduct an onsite evaluation. Several pilot projects will help us determine the efficacy of joint CRSGAO oversight projects. CRS believes this is an idea that merits exploration in assisting congressional committees to manage their oversight agendas. We have a specific pilot project in mind that we are discussing with GAO. The House bill also proposes some additional activities for CRS. H.R. 3801 directs the House Parliamentarian to propose a recodification of the House's standing rules and to draw on the services of CRS, as he sees fit, for that purpose. And to improve public understanding of Congress through the media, the House bill also encourages the media galleries of the House to organize briefings on congressional procedures ``through the Congressional Research Service or some other entity.'' Although these provisions of H.R. 3801 may not be of direct concern to this committee, they are additional potential mandates on CRS that I must take into account in assessing the collective impact of the Joint Committee's proposals on our services and resources. In addition, the Joint Committee made other recommendationsh)/0*0*0* that do not involve CRS directly but that could stimulate additional requests from Members and committees. For example, the House bill and the related Senate recommendations address what appears to be a widespread sentiment that Congress should increase the applicability of certain employment and other laws, or the principles they embody, to its own operations. The House and Senate members of the Joint Committee also agreed that the two houses should review and reduce the number of reports that Federal departments and agencies are required to submit to Congress. Furthermore, the House bill mandates a review and evaluation of current training and orientation programs for House employees, perhaps with a view toward developing the kinds of programs at which the staff of the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate Sergeant at Arms regularly invite CRS analysts to speak. Our experience satisfies me that implementing these recommendations also is very likely to stimulate new and additional requests for CRS participation and assistance. I certainly recognize the rationale underlying each of these proposals. I also find it gratifying, Mr. Chairman, that the Senators and Representatives on the Joint Committee specifically envisioned a role for CRS in implementing a number of their recommendations. Whether these recommendations should be approved and implemented, with or without change, is a matter to be decided by Congress. My concern is with the additional demands and costs that implementing the Joint Committee's recommendations would have on CRS. There really is one point that I particularly want to emphasize here today, and fortunately it is one that the members of this committee already recognize: it simply is no longer possible for CRS to continue doing more with less. If Congress directs us to undertake new or increased activities, we will do so and we will do them as well as we possibly can. But it will necessarily be at the expense of some things Congress already has asked us to do. As I recently advised the chairman and vicechairman of the Joint Committee on the Library, CRS has lost 58 positions during the past three years alone, and since 1980, our staff has declined by 14.8 percent while our workload has increased by 80 percent. If it had not been for the number of senior staff who took advantage of the early retirement ``buyout'' option late last year, we would not be able to fully fund staff salaries for this fiscal year. And as best we can now anticipate, we very likely will be compelled to resort to furloughs or reductions in force during FY 1995 unless Congress is able to increase our appropriation from this year's level. Yet S. 1824 and H.R. 3801 almost certainly would necessitate further, continuing, and much more drastic cuts in our staff. Both bills call for reductions in legislative branch employment levels to parallel staffing reductions to be achieved in the executive branch, as recommended by the National Performance Review. I recognize that the Joint Committee is not proposing acrosstheh)00*0*0*ԫboards cuts, but rather is calling for a performance review of legislative branch operations to determine priorities and allocate resources where they are most needed. CRS welcomes this approach. Nevertheless, it is clear that Congress's support agencies would be required to absorb at least their fair share of the proposed overall staff cuts. Such a proportionate cut would require that CRS reduce staff by another 18 FTE's, which, when added to the 82 FTE's already lost since July 1991, will compel CRS to reduce its services further. In short, Mr. Chairman, the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress would have CRS do more with less. For the past several years, that is exactly what we have been doing. In fact, we take considerable pride in having increased efficiency and productivity, reduced costs, and reallocated resources so that our services to Congress have not yet suffered appreciably as a result. I can assure you that these efforts are continuing, but even without considering the potential impact of the Joint Committee's recommendations, I already have concluded that we cannot avoid some reductions in the services we have been providing. With considerable reluctance, I recently initiated discussions with the Joint Committee on the Library regarding the curtailment or possible elimination of a number of services, primarily nonlegislative in character, so that we can devote additional resources to our primary statutory responsibilities. For example, under this proposal we would close one of the reference centers that serves the House. We would reduce the evening hours when our reading room in the Madison Building is open. We would establish an earlier daily closing time in the four remaining CRS reference centers in the House and Senate office buildings. We would reduce the translation services we provide, and limit the services we offer to unpaid student interns. We would not guarantee sameday responses to requests on nonlegislative topics. And we would decline many requests to present briefings for noncongressional groups unless doing so would benefit Congress, especially by enhancing the expertise of our analysts. This last proposed change in CRS services illustrates the challenge we face. For years, we have presented briefings for a wide range of individuals and organizations who want to learn about Congress, CRS, and current public policy issues. Many of these briefings have been requested by Senators or Representatives for groups of constituents or for state or local government officials. Executive branch agencies frequently have requested briefings as well, especially for visiting foreign parliamentary delegations. The increasing demand for such briefings is the best evidence that we do them well. We have concluded, however, that we may have to decline many of these requests in the future because too often they take staff time away from our capacity to assist Congress in directly meeting its legislative and oversight responsibilities. I focus on this reduction in service because the Joint Committee has suggested that we could present seminars onh)10*0*0* congressional procedures to the reporters who cover the Hill. These seminars could contribute to improving public understanding of Congress, which is precisely the purpose of many of the briefings we already have been presenting. So the proposed seminars could be very useful. But at what cost, Mr. Chairman? I repeat that we will fulfill whatever new or expanded mandates we receive from either or both houses. In doing so, however, we also will seek guidance from this committee and all Members with responsibility for oversight of CRS in identifying the corresponding reductions we will have to make in the services we currently are providing. The Joint Committee made two other recommendations that I would like to address briefly. First, S. 1824 includes certain cost accounting and voucher allocation proposals that would affect CRS. Second, both bills would make the congressional support agencies subject to periodic reauthorization. On the first matter, S. 1824 would require ``each instrumentality of the Congress,'' including CRS, to prepare an annual report detailing the cost it incurred in providing support to each Senator and Senate committee. In addition, this committee would be directed to report on the feasibility of implementing a voucher allocation system for committees using the services of CRS and the other support agencies. Clearly, these proposals are intended to encourage Senators and Senate committees to use their support agencies wisely and with restraint. While I certainly applaud this intent, I also think that certain practical questions would have to be answered before this committee could conclude that these recommendations are feasible and costeffective. For example, a cost accounting system would require CRS to allocate substantial time and manpower to the administrative tasks of gathering and processing the necessary data and so would reduce the resources available to us for responding to congressional requests. Implementing cost accounting and voucher systems in ways that would be generally perceived as fair and equitable also would prove difficult. Quite frequently, for example, we prepare studies that respond to related requests from several Members and committees. It is not clear in such cases how to allocate common research costs among several requesters or across several related projects in a way that would be generally accepted as fair. It clearly would be unfair and would detract from future efficient use of CRS resources to ascribe all costs of preparing such studies to the first requester, the most insistent requester, or the one with the most challenging and comprehensive needs. In many other situations affecting CRS products and services, allocating costs to individual Senators or committees would require difficult judgments which could not be subjected to meaningful audits and, therefore, would be impossible to defend if challenged. Likewise, instituting a voucher system raises complex questions with no obvious answers. Which services should beh)20*0*0* included in a voucher system and in what quantity? What priority should CRS give to requests placed by voucher holders as opposed to those placed by Members and committees who do not receive vouchers? Should each committee receive the same number of vouchers regardless of the breadth of its jurisdiction or the size of its workload? What should be the allocation of vouchers between the committee majority and minority? In light of such questions and concerns, Mr. Chairman, if this committee contemplates supporting either or both of these recommendations, I request that CRS first be allowed time to develop a proposed implementation plan so that all Senators could know how they and their committees would be affected. I am also submitting for the record a study prepared by CRS which analyzes in more detail the implications of cost accounting and voucherbased access to legislative support agencies. Another matter on which I would like to comment is the provision of S. 1824 (and the similar though somewhat different provision of H.R. 3801) that appropriations for the Library of Congress be authorized by law on an eightyear cycle beginning with FY 1999. Before commenting further, let me point to two differences between the House and Senate proposals on this subject. First, Sec. 332 of the Senate bill refers only to the Library of Congress and makes no specific reference to CRS. By contrast, Sec. 342 of the House bill refers only to CRS and makes no mention of the other departments of the Library. And second, the Senate bill calls for the various congressional agencies to be reauthorized on a staggered schedule, whereas the House bill apparently contemplates all of them being reauthorized at the same time every eighth year. Mr. Chairman, CRS will welcome a reauthorization process if the House and Senate agree that this is the best way to ensure effective congressional oversight of our activities. We welcome oversight. The only reason we exist is to do what Congress wants us to do. If a reauthorization process would stimulate the members of both houses to think about what it is they want us to do for them, then so much the better. I am confident that the members of this committee who also have served on the Joint Committee on the Library will agree that we already make every effort to keep our oversight committee fully and promptly informed about any significant changes in our policies and practices. Indeed, during my years at CRS, I have long been familiar with, and impressed by, the continuing record of close support and guidance provided by the Joint Committee to CRS. In recently reviewing our records of communications with the Joint Committee, I have been struck by the many occasions in the last thirtyfive years on which the committee has given directionboth formal and informalto the Service on such critical matters as the testimony of our staff at committee hearings, the confidentiality of our work, providing information on Members, and the publication of CRS products. I am confident that reauthorization hearings every eight years would only supplement the less structured but continuing consultation and communication that already takes place.h)30*0*0* Nonetheless, a reauthorization process could provide a useful and systematic opportunity for us to think together about how we can serve Congress most effectively and economically. As for whether congressional agency reauthorizations should be staggered or occur at the same time, there are potential advantages to both approaches. The staggered schedule proposed in the Senate bill will allow the committee to concentrate its full attention on the services and programs of the Library, including those of CRS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by reflecting briefly on the changes I have observed during my quarter of a century as a public servant for the legislative branch. To be sure, the mission and basic operating principles of the Service have not altered significantly, and the central role of CRS as a pool of shared staff available to all congressional offices has remained constant through our eighty years of existence. Yet this continuity masks fundamental changes in the volume and complexity of congressional business that have made all our jobs more challenging and, at times, more frustrating. Since all of you are familiar with these developments, I will only cite a few examples: twenty years ago, the average public law was less than four pages long; today, it requires almost thirteen pages. Similarly, the more than 7,500 pages of public law enacted during the last Congress represents almost a 75 percent increase during the past ten years and a more than 200 percent increase from twenty years ago. The increasing complexity of the public policy issues before Congress, and the absence of a national consensus on appropriate solutions, have no doubt contributed to growing public criticism of Congress as an institution. My own experience suggests that this ``Congressbashing'' is misplaced. Faced with growing pressures to discharge both legislative and representative responsibilities, Members and staff have taken on a steadily increasing workload covering an everwider range of subjects. Any observer of this process can only have enormous respect for those who have struggled to meet the tasks facing Congress in recent years. We all hope that the work of the Joint Committee will lead to significant efficiencies and improvements in the way Congress conducts its business, allowing all the components of the legislative branch to concentrate their limited time and resources on the most critical matters on the nation's agenda. I can assure you that the staff of CRS is eager to assist you in developing and implementing whatever reforms the Senate deems necessary. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. HERDMAN. TESTIMONY OF ROGER C. HERDMAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES Mr. HERDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have my remarks forh)40*0*0* the record. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your statement will be included in the record as if given. Mr. HERDMAN. I'm going to be very brief. It's the end of the hearing. OTA is a small agency. I don't think our testimony is particularly controversial. I appear today as a token of our respect for the committee, and I note also that several members of my congressional board are serving on this committee; Senator Stevens who was here earlier, as well as Senator Pell. I'll make brief comments on four aspects of S. 1824. First of all, reauthorization on an eight-year cycle, OTA has no particular concerns or objections to this provision. Secondly, beginning a reauthorization in the fiscal year 2003, this is a decision for the Congress to make. OTA at the moment is engaged in very substantial restructuring and undertaking a series of management improvements in response to the financial restrictions of the legislative branch and priorities in the budget process. So we appreciate some breathing space before we appear before the committees for reauthorization. Thirdly, we understand that we will be appearing before, if this legislation should be enacted, the Rules Committee and the Committee on Science, Space and Technology in the House. Again, I note that OTA has a congressional board. Several members of our board serve on the Rules Committee, as does the chairman of the Science, Space and Technology Committee also serves on our board. Our board meets with OTA every six weeks roughly while Congress is in session. It has the same priorities for managing and supervising and overseeing OTA as those which are listed in S. 1824; namely, to ensure that there is no duplication among the support agencies and that the business of the agency is carried out in an efficient and effective way. We would anticipate that this oversight would continue, and it enables me to say that we would be very comfortable with responding to additional oversight along these lines because we have so much of it already from our congressional board. Finally, the legislation proposes that there be a report submitted in 1995 regarding resources committed to the Senate, Senate committees and senators. I think there may be some problems with this. We have budgets for all of our proposals. These proposals are approved by our congressional board and we may not deviate from those budgets in excess of 15 percent. So we do stick very closely to them. We would propose that we simply aggregate these budgets and make these the basis of a report to the Senate. We would have some problems perhaps when multiple requesters ask for a particular OTA study. We would propose then to distribute the budget equally among the multiple requesters. I think, again, we would be prepared toh)50*0*0* comply with this provision and hope perhaps that we could be consulted if there are any particular problems that arise as we begin to work our way through it. That concludes my abbreviated remarks, Mr. Chairman, and I'm pleased to have the opportunity to appear before this committee and to be here to respond to any further questions that the committee might have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Herdman follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER C. HERDMAN, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, WASHINGTON, DC Chairman Ford, Ranking Member Stevens, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) is pleased to appear before you today to testify on the pertinent provisions of Title III, Subtitle B of S.1824. These provisions include: *` ` that congressional instrumentalities, including OTA, ` ` be authorized every eight fiscal years; *` ` that OTA's authorization begin with fiscal year 2003; *` ` that authorizing committees shall seek to eliminate ` ` duplication, consolidate activities, and increase ` ` efficiency; *` ` and, that not later than December 31, 1995, and each ` ` year thereafter, OTA shall prepare a report detailing ` ` the cost of supporting each committee of the Senate ` ` and each Senator. OTA has no comment on an 8year reauthorization cycle beginning with Fiscal Year 2003 except to say that this is clearly a decision for the Congress to make, and we would comply fully. We all realize that the time spent on reauthorization will compete with time needed for other Congressional work, but OTA's entire agenda and the priorities for work, are defined at Congressional discretion. The fiscal year chosen is also a matter of Congressional choice, but because OTA is currently occupied reacting and adjusting to budgetary economies, we appreciate the time provided in order to accommodate to organizational and management changes ongoing or planned for the future at OTA. OTA has in the past participated in oversight hearings before the House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, and we understand that our authorization would be before that Committee. The objectives of the authorizing committees are also the objectives of OTA management. More relevant, they are the objectives of OTA's Congressional Technology Assessment Board (TAB) whose current Chairman is Senator Edward Kennedy and Vice Chairmanh)60*0*0* is Representative Don Sundquist. OTA already enjoys substantial oversight from TAB which meets to review OTA's work and performance five or six times each year. TAB ensures that OTA's work is not duplicative of work at GAO, CRS or CBO. Additionally TAB has recently (1994) approved a major restructuring at OTA in which a significantly flatter organization with major consolidations and elimination of one third of management and other work saving efficiencies were carried out. OTA's management and TAB expect continued study and change toward better and more efficient administration in the years ahead. In this way OTA already benefits from repeated Congressional oversight each year involving the objectives of S.1824 and more, and so we believe we are in a good position to respond positively and constructively to those objectives. OTA does not provide work in support of individual Senators but rather to Committees and TAB. Each project requested by a Committee Chairman (and Ranking Minority) or by TAB is submitted for approval to TAB with a proposed budget. OTA tracks expenditures for each approved project budget, which must not deviate by more than 15 percent in excess of the approval level unless resubmitted to, and reapproved by, TAB. OTA would comply with the requirement for annually reporting the cost of our support to each Committee of the Senate by totaling the obligations for each TAB approved project, and allocating indirect costs to arrive at the total cost of work requested by a committee. Difficulties could arise in cases where multiple committee requested the work, but we contemplate splitting costs equally among such multiple requestors. We would begin to report with fiscal year 1995, submitting the report as soon after the end of the fiscal year as possible, but in no event later than December 31, 1995. Chairman Ford and Ranking Member Stevens, these brief comments cover the issues in Title III, Subtitle B of S.1824 for which OTA believes the Committee would expect to receive comment, and for which we think we should have pertinent and useful input to the Committee's deliberations regarding OTA. OTA appreciates the opportunity to appear before you, and we are prepared to respond to further requests and questions. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Herdman. I have a couple of questions for each of you, and there may be some questions that will come in writing. We'll submit those to you and hope you'll respond in a timely manner. Mr. Billington, what are the Library's current procedures for reviewing its organization and operation to ensure that what is done is relevant and helpful to the Congress, and particularly to the public? Mr. BILLINGTON. Of course, first and foremost it's the continuing relationship with the joint committee. There is, in terms of all policy questions--and I was perhaps inadequatelyh)70*0*0* expansive in discussing the role of the joint committee because that is a general subject. But this is--we believe it's the oldest standing committee of the Congress itself. The CHAIRMAN. We've had that argument all morning, so I'm going to yield that all joint committees were born at the same time. Mr. BILLINGTON. But ours is a genuine joint committee. It has extraordinary advantages because its small size and its single mission enables it to give a much more focused and continuing oversight than any possible, to my way of thinking, alternative structure of oversight and governance from the Congress. Of course, in addition we have the annual appropriation hearing, the legislative branch appropriation, and the relationship with the Senate Rules Committee and the House Administration Committee, and particularly the Subcommittee on Libraries and Memorials which also has a direct interest. I mentioned some of the other committees that I've appeared before. I've appeared as an individual witness on non-Library business, but those are simply the ones that we've been involved with. But the Joint Committee on the Library because of its continuity, its small size, and its clear focus and the fact that it is uniquely well-equipped to oversee it not only for its congressional functions but in terms of determining the importance of its national function, many of which are not really so much subjects of statute as they are of tradition and of the shifting and changing priorities of the whole national scene. It was a suggestion that the joint committee be changed to one on information and policy. But this would represent only a part of the enormous and important national function that the Library covers and would be, I think, a needless dilution of focus and may result in confusion of purpose. I've never known there to be an adversarial relationship between our governing body and the joint committee and the Library itself. So it's, I think, very efficient and I think really quite economical from the point of view of other concerns that I know lie behind these reforms. The CHAIRMAN. Maybe I can give you a question here which we can get a yes or no on. Today the Library is subject to review by, as you stated, the Joint Committee on the Library of Congress and especially by the legislative branch appropriations subcommittee. Would you agree that having periodic reauthorization would help to promote a better balance between program and policy issues, which is the responsibility of the authorizing committee versus the ``cut-the-budget'' of the appropriators? Mr. BILLINGTON. It could. It's always hard to know how it would in fact work out. It could also serve to create a large amount of subsequent statutory inactions which might then have to be revised or modified. In this vast changing world of electronic information delivery systems, rapidly changing technologies help ush)80*0*0* meet the educational needs and productivity demands of which we are going to increasingly become beneficiaries. I think a periodic reauthorization of this unique treasure house of material that the Congress has assembled could have a role in helping us do this. So it could very well have the outcome you suggested. It could also serve to create a lot of perhaps unnecessary legislation and then modification of legislation with long delays that could evolve as an alternative to a system in which the joint committee works these things out administratively on a continuing and more flexible basis with the Library. But it's a judgment call. I wouldn't take a firm position of opposing such a thing because, as you say, it could indeed have those benefits. But I think the present system can also accomplish many of the same benefits without producing the perhaps excessive complication in the administration of the Library and the excessive burdening of the legislative agenda of the Congress. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Mulhollan, one objective of the reauthorization process is to eliminate unnecessary duplication among support agencies. We find that is a real culprit in cost. How is this accomplished today, and are those methods really effective? Mr. MULHOLLAN. Everything can be improved, sir. But currently there is a continuing dialogue between the directors of each of the support agencies. In fact, Roger and I just had lunch 2 weeks ago. The CHAIRMAN. Was that more than $20? Mr. MULHOLLAN. I believe it was $11.40. [Laughter.] Mr. MULHOLLAN. I've met with Chuck Bowsher. We meet regularlyall of the support agencies do so. There also is a liaison group that meets every 8 weeks. Thirdly, there is a research notification system that identifies any major project, I believe it's 10 working days or more, that any of the support agencies undertakes. By this means, each of the support agencies is notified of those projects. I'd also like to underscore there are a number of occasions that have occurred in the past, and in the testimony we both have proposed one with GAO and ourselves for joint ventures as well. These are undertaken where the expertise of each of these support agencies can contribute to a particular topic. I believe that we continue to work at any concerns with regard to duplication. I believe Members in the past who have looked at this--I remember back in 1976 when this was a particular concernfound that Members themselves were explicitly asking each agency for the same project because they wanted the different agencies' strengths and perspectives to address the issue, whether it was CBO, GAO, orh)90*0*0* CRS, and I'm sure the same perspective as OTA. And that we're doing everything that we possibly can through negotiations with Member's offices, notifying them when they're asking the same questions, minimizing duplication. I think we're doing a very good job. The CHAIRMAN. We get all kinds of suggestions, as you know. Too many people sit back and think, or ask staff to think, and pretty soon we get all kinds of questions. But it's been suggested that the support agencies might work, I guess, more effectively with fewer full-time employees by contracting out more research projects. What are your views regarding such an approach at CRS? Mr. MULHOLLAN. At CRS, I have contracting authority by the 1970 Reorganization Act. We have found with the reduction of monies that that contracting money has dwindled significantly. But I want to underscore the uniqueness of the institutional memory that the Congressional Research Service provides to the Congress. The average lifespan--no offense to my colleagues here in the room--of a legislative assistant is now 3.4 years; legislative correspondent, 1.5 years here in Congress. Our average lifespan is 15.8 years. What you have, and I think the assistance to the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress is a good example, are CRS staff who have been here for years and have studied the institutionstaff who are objective, who are non-partisan, and who are dedicated to helping the Congress as a whole, both parties and both chambers. That is a valuable asset. Back in 1914 when we were established it was the innovation of a shared pool of expertise. Hence, today not every congressional office needs a field biologist, but when you need to call upon one, there's one at CRS to help a Member or a committee. That shared economic notion of pooled expertise, I think, is what the Congressional Research Service is today. That professional staff is our greatest asset and I would not want to lose it any further than we have already. I have to underscore Dr. Billington's remarks. I'm very concerned about the reductions that we have and I see it as my job to tell you the consequences of the reductions that are being asked of the legislative branch. The CHAIRMAN. I'm very pleased, when I thought about my office I've got at least 10 of the 19 in my office that have been with me more than 12 years. Mr. MULHOLLAN. That's quite unusual. The CHAIRMAN. Just a nice boss, I guess. Mr. MULHOLLAN. I have no doubt. [Laughter.] The CHAIRMAN. But I am fortunate. All but three of the 19 areh):0*0*0* Kentuckians, so that might have something to do with it. Mr. Herdman, what are some of the things the Technology Assessment Board does now to set policy for OTA and guide its operation? Do you think the congressional board arrangement is a good one? Mr. HERDMAN. Yes. Let me answer the second part of that question first by unequivocally saying, I think the congressional board is absolutely vital to OTA and I want to endorse the concept for us. That does not necessarily mean that it's a good concept for other agencies. But at least for us I think it's an incredibly valuable asset. The board actually exercises the sort of supervision that a board of directors might exercise over a corporation. That is to say, it sets general policy. I might say before I get into that that the board meets with OTA, as I said in my remarks, on the average about every six to eight weeks while the Congress is in session. So something like five or six times a year. And I am in contact with individual board members or groups of board members more frequently than that. So this is a very close and intimate relationship. Each board member has a staff person who is assigned to have the relationship with OTA and to keep the board member apprised of what's going on at OTA. And we meet with those staff members and communicate with those staff members essentially on a daily basis. This, as I say, is a very close and intimate relationship. The overall policies of OTA are approved by the board. We do not undertake any work for--as you know, our studies are undertaken at the request of the chairman and the ranking minorities of congressional committees or of members of the board. We do not undertake any work which is not approved by the board, and our work is not released to the Congress until the board has reviewed it. Not that they review--I want to make sure everybody understands. They do not review what we say or try to influence our work in terms of its content or its conclusions. But they do review it to make sure that our extensive process of peer review and the use of outside advisors and outside advisory panels, and that we've done our work well, and all that has taken place. They also, just to add to what Dan Mulhollan said in response to your question about duplication. The board also ensures that OTA does not undertake work unless we have carefully scrutinized and reviewed and queried the other support agencies. And indeed, more broadly than that; for example, like the National Academy of Sciences and the Institution of Medicine and so on, to see if they are doing work which is similar and might serve the purposes of the requesting committee as well. If that's the case, then we do not undertake it.h);0*0*0*ԌThey also endorse and approve joint efforts. We have joint efforts and we are publishing joint work in the very near future with CRS. That whole sort of thing is the province of the board. I think it's hard to overemphasize the value of our board in that continuous oversight to OTA. Finally, the board being equally bipartisan; that is, there's six Republicans and six Democrats, absolutely ensures that OTA is kept vitally aware of the need for non-partisan behavior and attention to both sides of the aisle with the courtesies due to both sides of the aisle. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Herdman. Senator Mathews? Senator MATHEWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I didn't realize what a good operation we have going here until I decided to listen to these three gentlemen this morning. Dr. Billington has a reservoir of knowledge on just about any subject in the world. And I think Mr. Mulhollan has a group of people who retain that knowledge and make it available to us when we have a need for it. And I don't know whether I understood Mr. Herdman right, but if I understand your function, you tell us whether either one of them are right or not. Mr. HERDMAN. We'd be happy to visit you and tell you all about OTA, Senator. Senator MATHEWS. I'm not sure we need oversight on this. I think they're looking at each other and keeping each other honest. But seriously, Mr. Mulhollan, I want to make sure that I understand the function of your office. I think tomorrow morning I'm meeting with some of your staff on a question that is of real importance to me, and I think to the people of this country as a whole. I believe we're about to have a real volcanic eruption in the Social Security area. I want to ask you if you can help me with it. If I understand it, when Social Security was approved or created in 1932 its stated purpose at that time was to provide a pension for the working people of this country. It was not to be set up as a hand-out. But it was set up on a contributory basis so that the person earned, so to speak, that pension or that retirement income that he would get in his retirement period. Further, that inasmuch as it was on a percentage basis, the higher paid of the workers of that time would be contributing more and the pensions were on somewhat of a sliding scale. We've gone through that period now and the thing that scares me is that we're diverting all of the funds out of that--I mean, we pay the current bills and use the balance of the funds for every other purpose in the world. I think once the American people find out that fund ish)<0*0*0* bankrupt, some of us have got a lot of explaining to do. But basically, I guess the thing that scares me is that, we're looking towards a means test to determine whether one is entitled to it. The actuaries that I have talked with suggest to me that if you take the contribution from the employer and the employee and invest them over the lifetime of the person you can already receive a much greater pension than what Social Security is producing. I want to ask your people if you can go back and look at some of this information that Dr. Billington has and tell me what the original purpose was, and as we moved forward where we've deviated from that. Then, do you have actuaries who can project-- Mr. MULHOLLAN. As a matter of fact, in reference actually to the chairman's question about contracting, we have an ongoing contract with an actuarial firm for modeling for just these kinds of questions. We have also on staff individuals who have worked for the past decade on Social Security legislation. We can have somebody at your office in an hour to talk to you about this. Senator MATHEWS. I think we've made an appointment. I think there's someone probably coming tomorrow. Is this the type of thing that you could provide for the Congress? Mr. MULHOLLAN. That's exactly what we're here for. If you're also looking for the historical research as far as the legislative history of the Social Security Act, the collections of the Library are there at our resource in order to help take a look at that as well and any other aspect that you have. We have people who have dealt with the issue and know the literature very well. That's what we're here to help you with. Senator MATHEWS. I'll be at your doorstep tomorrow morning then. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Senator Warner? Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The proposal we have before us would consolidate in the House of Representatives the oversight in one committee, such as we have it here in the Senate. I think, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, that is a very advisable provision. But as I look at our distinguished witnesses here today and the predecessor, Mr. Bowsher, the three of you, together with the GAO, constitute the four legs of the desk on which Congress works. In my research, I cannot find any parallel to this support system elsewhere in the world. Am I mistaken on that? Dr. Billington, or who would like to lead off on that? Mr. BILLINGTON. I don't think there's any exact parallel toh)=0*0*0* this in the comprehensiveness and in having a number of different agencies, like the Library, CRS, GAO, OTA, and of course, the Congressional Budget Office in addition. But what's interesting is the amount of imitation there has been of this system. Particularly all the countries, as you know, in Eastern Europe. Practically all of them are interested in setting something like this up as part of the formula of how a democracy-- Senator WARNER. So you're now serving as a model for others? Mr. BILLINGTON. Very much so. Senator WARNER. That's quite interesting. Mr. BILLINGTON. People come over here from practically all over the former communist countries, and a number of Third World countries. And of course, right after the war the Japanese and the Koreans both set up Diet libraries and, in effect, tried to model themselves somewhat after this system. So this is a kind of unique American formula which is very widely imitated, although no one has produced the range and the size of the support-- Senator WARNER. I invite our other witnesses to comment. Mr. HERDMAN. Yes, Senator Warner. The OTA, ever since I've been at OTA which is now about 11 years, has had a constant stream of international visitors coming through trying to decide what our formula for success is and to try to reproduce that in their home countries. So that there are OTA-like bodies, some of them with OTA-like names in fact in, I would say the majority of the European Community countries. In fact in the European Community itself Germany, France, England, Denmark, I think Belgium, Sweden certainly, and I'm probably forgetting some others. We have even had interest from some of the countries in Asia. Malaysia was over to look at our agency, and Indonesia, we've entertained people from those countries. So I think there's a lot of interest. The problem for OTA, and I think a lot of the agencies is that our Government lends itself to the creation of an agency which can be relatively non-partisan like OTA is with a board that's equally Republican and Democrat. When you get into parliamentary systems it's much harder to create that sort of non-partisan flavor to an agency. But I think a lot of people are trying with some mixed success. Mr. MULHOLLAN. Just to follow up on what was said, Senator. It is the uniqueness of the United States Congress that stands out with its support agencies. The strength of the constitutional powers of the Congress as the first branch of Government and the need for Congress to have its own independent resources separate from the Executive places itself in a unique situation as far as world governance is concerned. But there has been, as indicated and now in a systematic way,h)>0*0*0* an effort on the part of Congress in its outreach to help in sustaining parliamentary governments in themselves for strengthening their parliamentary research capacities so that they will have the kinds of, even on a much smaller scale, the kinds of help that they see that the members of Congress receive and that they like very much. Senator WARNER. I think we should also view your services not just in the context of the Congress but also the American public. Members of the public can walk in off the street, Dr. Billington, to your magnificent facility, and members of the public have access to the other two through their respected members in Congress. I frequently petition both of those agencies for response which I pass on then to constituents. So you do a great service not only to the Congress but to the general public. That's why we should approach trying to fix what has worked with the greatest of caution. Dr. Billington, I have to note here I was going back--one of the virtues of this hearing, Mr. Chairman, is to prompt your committee members and others to go back and do a little historical perspective on these four entities. Yours, Dr. Billington, 1802, burned by the Brits in 1812. But then it was Thomas Jefferson that sold his library and initiated the current institution. Am I not correct in that? Mr. BILLINGTON. Yes, sir. We don't think of our British friends as book-burners, but they did have a bad episode by destroying the Capitol and the Library as well pretty substantially with the fire. And it was the purchase of Thomas Jefferson's library that not only began the rebuilding and the building of the modern Library of Congress, but also gave it its universal outreach. Because there was the famous debate that Daniel Webster and many of the New England delegation opposed expenditure of appropriated funds on Mr. Jefferson's library, in part on the grounds that it was such a diverse collection and questioning the real need for all these things. And he said the famous quote he always liked to remind people of, he said there was no subject on which a legislator in our republic might not need be well-informed. Of course, as the world has gotten more complex and America's involvement in the world is economically, communication-wise and everything more intimate, the wisdom of his injunction is all the more prevalent. I mean, we have collections that are the greatest in the world--we have the greatest Spanish language library in the world here as well as English language. We have the greatest Arabic language library, the greatest collection of movies, greatest collection of maps, you name it. No other body of any kind, let alone legislative body, has supported and sustained anything even remotely like this. It's the modern Alexandria. It's, of course, our job to keep it from burningh)?0*0*0* and from going out of business by slow invisible steps, which is what actually happened at Alexandria. Senator WARNER. Let me intercede just for another observation. It's interesting, yesterday Senator Byrd hosted--a member of our committee here--hosted a luncheon for the British parliamentarians. And Senator Byrd commented how the British parliamentarian has statistically one-and-a-half staff members and doesn't have a fraction of the support that we have here in the United States Congress, yet somehow Great Britain muddles through. So somewhere in between, I suppose, rests the answer. The CHAIRMAN. Muddling through is probably a good word. Senator WARNER. Dr. Billington, back to burning. It looks as if Congress might be touching a match here in terms of their fiscal treatment of the Library. You commented in your comments concern not only for the eight-year authorization but the budget situation. You note that the Library staff has been reduced by 12 percent since 1980 yet the collection has grown by 22 percent. Might we not be indirectly inflicting damage, because that's going to impact on your three principal services, maintaining the collection, reducing acquisitions or cataloguing, and responding to congressional inquiries? How do you intend to continue this budget cut as it relates to those three functions? Mr. BILLINGTON. I think, as I tried to say in my testimony, if we incur the 12 percent cut, to be applied across-the-board to us, as would seem to be implied if the Vice President's prescription is extended to us, we would be in very deep trouble. I think he and Members of Congress are all very anxious to not only have the Library of Congress sustain its historic and unique mission in the world of being the world library, but making better use of this and using the new communications technologies so we can help with the educational problems and with the productivity problems of the country. They talk about the information superhighway, we are leading freight providers. We have 26 million items in our card catalog we've put online free into the internet to be used all over the country, and it's increasing the amount of service-- Senator WARNER. Again, public access. And that's likely to be diminished. Mr. BILLINGTON. Public access is likely to be diminished. Senator WARNER. To just close out on that observation then, Doctor-- Mr. BILLINGTON. Just at the time when it's needed more than ever. h)@0*0*0*ԌSenator WARNER. I'd like to ask one other question, because I can remember as a student myself using the Library of Congress; a magnificent collection. Then there was a period here recently where you suffered a great deal of destruction to your property, and indeed, theft of the property. Would you acquaint the committee on the current status of that tragic situation? Mr. BILLINGTON. Yes, sir. The Jefferson Building, as well as the other buildings were not built really with security in mind. And while theoretically the stacks had always been closed, there was broad permission for various people to move into the stacks. We simply found that there was a good deal of damage. Four people were arrested, with very respectable professions, and I'm happy to say, convicted for various forms of vandalism. This by the way is a very widespread phenomenon among other great repositories. So we decided that we had no choice but to close the stacks to all but the essential business for the Congress and for the Library. That was unfortunate. But on the other hand what it did was it increased the number of books on shelves for people using the books in the reading room. Because in addition to the vandalism, many books were simply misplaced. People would pick a book, look at it, and not put it right back in the correct spot. So security helped. There has been a 4 percent decrease in the not-on-shelf inconveniences for our readers in the reading room. So we're now integrating, and we have been putting in place for the last couple of years, a systematic, comprehensive security program with a lot of-- Senator WARNER. Can you conclude by saying that you now have--because I often think you manage one of the least manageable institutions and you manage it well. Have you got a grip on this situation? Mr. BILLINGTON. Yes, sir. Senator WARNER. Are you getting the support from the Congress you need to curtail this? Mr. BILLINGTON. Yes. Although again, it's expensive setting up a comprehensive security system. It's a one-time cost to get these things in place and we are having to trim some aspects of this because of the budget situation. Senator WARNER. I thank the chair and I thank the witness. Mr. BILLINGTON. But we have a program and we're proceeding with it. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator. Without objection, we'll have statements for the record from GPO, CBO, former Comptroller General Elmer Staats, a statement from the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and the Americanh)A0*0*0* Library Association. They'll all be included as additional statements submitted for the record. I want to announce that we'll hold the record open for statements through May 12. That's the last day I have announced for hearings on S. 1824. It may be that we will not have a hearing on S. 1824 on May 12, but we may. It just depends upon the requests that we have. So I want to keep the record open for statements through that day. Let me thank you gentlemen for being here today and we look forward to working with you closely. [Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the hearing was concluded.] % EXCERPT FROM THE OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WENDELL H. FORD, CHAIRMAN, AT THE COMMITTEE'S MEETING HELD MAY 12, 1994 X` ` On another matter, I would like to inform the Members of this committee about the hearing schedule and record for S. 1824, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1994. When this committee began its consideration of S. 1824, I stated that the committee would reserve time at the conclusion of today's FEC authorization hearing for any additional witness who wished to speak on that bill. The committee did not receive any requests to appear at today's hearing. However, Senator Helms has requested additional information from the General Accounting Office, and they have informed Senator Helms that the information will be furnished by May 20. Therefore, the hearing record of S. 1824 will remain open until the close of business May 20, at which time the committee's hearing record will close.(# X` ` While we are on the subject of S. 1824, let me also state that the Rules Committee hearing record on S. 1824 builds upon the record of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. Therefore, without objection, the record of that joint committee shall be incorporated, but not printed, in the record of this committee on S. 1824.(#@B0*0*0* $ ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD SUPPLEMENTARY WRITTEN STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE AND CHAIRMAN, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION; AND HON. BOB PACKWOOD, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON FINANCE AND MEMBER, JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) plays an integral role in every stage of the tax legislative process. Among other things, the JCT staff (1) prepares hearing pamphlets, committee reports, and conference reports (statements of managers) for both the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Ways and Means, (2) assists the office of legislative counsel in both chambers in the drafting of statutory language, (3) assists Members of Congress with the development and analysis of tax legislative proposals, (4) assists Members of Congress in addressing constituent issues and problems, (5) prepares revenue estimates of all revenue legislation considered by the Congress, (6) reviews proposed large income tax refunds by the IRS, and (7) initiates investigations of various aspects of the Federal tax system. The role of the JCT staff in the legislative process has expanded as the complexity of the Federal tax system has increased. Members of Congress, particularly Members of the taxwriting committees, have increasingly relied on the nonpartisan technical and policy expertise of the JCT staff to assist them in making objective and informed decisions with respect to proposed revenue legislation. @ WHY JCT SHOULD NOT BE MERGED INTO CBO 1. Little duplication between JCT and CBO There is little duplication of effort between the JCT and the CBO, so there would be no cost saving to combining the JCT and CBO; in fact, costs would likely increase. The CBO has so concluded in its testimony of May 5, 1994 before the Committee on Rules and Administration of the United States Senate. 2. JCT responsibilities are not of the same character as CBO's The JCT staff is directly involved in drafting tax legislation. JCT staff also provides policy advice to individual Members. JCT staff reviews large refunds made by IRS, and reviews how the IRS administers the tax laws. Historically, none of these functions has been performed by CBO. 3. JCT is legislative, CBO is analytical The JCT staff is a legislative staff, while the CBO is not. The primary purpose of the JCT staff is to help the Congress craft workable, effective tax legislation. To bury this function in an organization whose primary mission is analytic rather than legislative would diminish the tax legislative process.h)C0*0*0*Ԍ4. The tax legislative process requires a unique structure The staff of the JCT is organized to meet the requirements of the tax legislative process. Every element of the staff is necessary for the optimal functioning of the entire staff. For example, the staff attorneys are integral to the process of doing revenue estimates, and the economists are integral to producing legislation. It would diminish the work product of both groups if one were integrated into another organization. 5. The unique nature of tax laws requires specialization The unique and complex nature of the tax laws places a high premium on objective technical advice. Because JCT is devoted solely to tax issues, its focus on fulfilling its statutory mandate is undiluted by the need to respond to other legislative pressures. The nonpartisan JCT staff is large enough to respond to the needs of the tax writing committees, but is also small enough that it can respond quickly to the exigencies of the tax legislative process. For example, JCT has its own computer system to enable it to respond quickly to the demands of the tax legislative process. 6. An independent JCT serves the taxwriting committees well The JCT staff has a 68year history of providing nonpartisan analysis and advice on tax policy. Where it has been necessary, close cooperation between the CBO and JCT staff has been easily achieved. The JCT staff provides vital continuity from the beginning to the end of the tax legislative process. This continuity minimizes the necessity of "reinventing the wheel" as proposals move through the various stages of the tax legislative process. This continuity also ensures that proposals are consistently evaluated throughout the tax legislative process from the perspectives of tax policy, technical accuracy, administrative feasibility, and revenue impact. This function of the Joint Committee staff complements, but does not duplicate, the work of the tax staffs of the taxwriting committees. 7. JCT membership does not represent a regular committee workload The Congressional membership of JCT, as opposed to its staff, meets infrequently, usually only for an annual organizational meeting. Consequently, JCT membership per se places minimal time demands on Members. As a normal part of the tax legislative process, however, the Members of the JCT informally consult with each other and with the staff on a continuous basis. The JCT is much more analogous to a continuous conference committee than it is to any other regular committee of the Congress. This is to be expected, in light of the continuous stream of major tax legislation that the Congress has considered in the past several decades. 'D0*0*0* STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. REISCHAUER, DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to submit this statement on the recommendations of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress for authorizing the legislative branch support agencies. These recommendations are included in S. 1824, which was recently introduced by Chairman Boren and ViceChairman Domenici. In addition to the authorization recommendations, Title III, Subtitle B of the bill includes a number of provisions that restructure the legislative branch and affect operations of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in a variety of ways. 0 REPEALING PERMANENT AUTHORIZATION Both the House and Senate reports of the Joint Committee would repeal the permanent authorization for CBO and other congressional support agencies and would reauthorize them on an 8year cycle beginning in 1997 (the House does not specify a timetable, while the Senate would have CBO reauthorized in 2003). The House did not identify the committee(s) that would have jurisdiction over the reauthorization, but the Senate gives responsibility to the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. The Congress should periodically reassess the operations of its support agencies. Since CBO is such an integral part of the congressional budget process, reconsidering its mission and operation is inseparable from reconsidering the entire budget process, which may not warrant a fixed timetable. Under the current budget process, CBO provides the Congress with the technical support necessary to operate the system. Any new budget process would presumably need such support. Although reauthorization may bring about needed changes, it raises risks as well. Because the analysis and reports of the Congressional Budget Office and other support agencies can be controversial, the reauthorization process could be used to bring pressure on the support agencies. This potential would jeopardize the true value of the agencies as sources of professional, nonpartisan information to the Congress. Moreover, even though the Congress might choose to reauthorize a support agency, a President unhappy with the work of that agency could easily veto the measure. Does the Congress wish to give the executive branch an opportunity to exercise that type of control over congressional support agencies? As an alternative to reauthorization, the Congress could rigorously conduct more systematic oversight hearings of all support agencies. Oversight does not include some of the significant drawbacks that are inherent in reauthorization, such as susceptibility to a Presidential veto, but preserves the primaryh)E0*0*0* thrust of more closely managing the support agencies. As outlined in the legislation, the intent of oversight is to eliminate duplication, consolidate activities, and increase efficiency. For over a decade, the congressional support agencies have had in place an interagency coordination system specifically designed to eliminate duplication among them. The system includes an exchange and review of project proposals by an interagency board, comprehensive project listings, analysttoanalyst contacts to ensure against duplication before a project is begun, and meetings of subjectarea specialists, as well as informal troubleshooting by members of the interagency board. Each agency's mission is unique and, even when working in the same subject area, each offers the Congress very different types of information. Moreover, in the event of overlapping congressional requests, the agencies regularly divide the labor according to each one's strength, as the General Accounting Office and CBO have done recently in a couple of different subject areas. Finally, efficiencies are being gained technologically through such shared services as CAPNET, the Capitol Hillwide fiber optic cable network. This network should lead to an increased ability to share other services more readily, including data bases. If reauthorization is the course chosen for CBO, the Congress might consider two other issues. First, perhaps the timing of the reauthorization schedule should not coincide with the timing of the appointment of CBO directors, who are appointed to 4year terms. The bill's current reauthorization schedule for CBO, beginning in 2003, would coincide with the start of a new 4year term for CBO's director. Given past experience, a permanent director might not be named immediately and the reauthorization process could be set back as a result. Moreover, a director with a few years' experience in the job would be in a better position to respond appropriately to concerns raised in a reauthorization process than a newly appointed director. Second, it is not immediately clear which committees in the House would be the most appropriate ones to undertake CBO's reauthorization. Currently, in the Senate, both the Budget Committee and the Committee on Governmental Affairs have jurisdiction over the budget process. In the House, legislation on the budget process is shared by the Committee on Rules and the Committee on Government Operations. Under the Congressional Budget Act, however, the House Budget Committee has oversight responsibility for CBO. MERGING THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION WITH CBO The Senate Members of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress have recommended that the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) be abolished as a congressional committee and merged with CBO. I do not support this change for two reasons. First, the merger of JCT and CBO would be inefficient. Theh)F0*0*0* proposed merger would not produce any budgetary savings and, in fact, would be more costly than at present. If the JCT's technical staff of economists were transferred to CBO, the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees would still require technical expertise on tax policy and economic modeling that would probably call for additional staff for those committees. This change would be less efficient than the current arrangement, in which the House and the Senate can share such staff expertise. Further, the demands on CBO for tax analysis would be substantially greater than those the JCT currently bears, since we would need to serve many more requestors, including the chairs and ranking members of committees in the Congress without primary responsibility for tax policy. Second, assuming that the existing resources of the JCT were transferred to CBO to accompany the increase in responsibility (which is the only circumstance under which such a change would be viable), the resulting 30 percent increase in staff could undermine one of CBO's strengths: a relatively small size. I fear that an increase of this magnitude would inevitably make us less responsive and more bureaucratic. It would also spread our managerial resources even more thinly than they already are. REQUIRING COST ACCOUNTING The Senate Members of the Joint Committee would also require support agencies to prepare reports annually detailing the cost of providing support to each Senator and Senate Committee. For CBO this recommendation could be costly and unwieldy to comply with, and the potential benefits would be limited. Establishing and maintaining a reliable and accurate cost management information system would require the development of new timeconsuming and costly reporting systems and would place a significant new burden on CBO staff at a time when CBO's funding and staffing levels are being reduced. I believe the limited scope of CBO's mission and its size already address the problem of allocating our limited analytical resources efficiently. Most of CBO's analyses are either specifically mandated by the Budget Act or are prepared at the request of the Budget, Appropriations, and financing committees (our highest priorities as required by the Budget Act). And committees requesting programmatic studies often must make choices. Since we have a limited number of staff who study health care, for example, any study done at the request of the committees responsible for health care issues always comes at the expense of other studies that might have been done for those same committees. We also get a great many informal requests from committees and Members that result in responses that take much less timesuch as preparing or procuring a table, providing advice about costs, or providing counsel on budget or economic issues over the telephone. It would be nearly impossible to collect meaningful information on the cost of providing this kind of information. Moreover, trying to detail these costs could take as much time as answering the initialh)G0*0*0* request. | STUDYING A VOUCHER ALLOCATION SYSTEM The Senate Members of the Joint Committee have asked the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration to study the feasibility of a voucher allocation system to provide the Congress with better management of the resources of its support agencies. As with the cost accounting provision, we do not believe a voucher allocation system will produce much in the way of savings or better management of CBO's resources by the Congress. It would not do so mainly because of the type and timing of the analyses provided by CBO, which are either tied directly to the budget or legislative processes, or are selflimiting because of our small staff size, in the manner described above. CBO's bill cost estimates, for example, are done in conjunction with bill markup in the authorizing committees. Since this type of analysis must be provided by a committee on reporting a bill, CBO could not simply stop providing the information because a committee ran out of vouchers. The most effective way to limit the expending of resources for bill cost estimating is to define the scope of the analysis narrowly, such as limiting it to the budgetary impact of the bill. Recent legislation passed by the Senate, however, broadens the scope of bill cost estimates to include analysis of the bill's economic impact, which will require additional resources for CBO. A similar argument can be made for the inappropriateness of vouchers for the use of CBO's resources by the Budget and Appropriations Committees in both Houses and the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees during the various stages of the budget process. These activities constitute the bulk of CBO's work. CBO's program analysis, which is done at committee request, is often timed to coincide with committee consideration of reauthorization legislation. The reports are thorough, consider a range of policy options, and are often more than a year in the making. As a result of the substantial amount of CBO staff resources needed to produce such analysis, and because CBO is seldom more than onedeep in analysts in most policy areas, committees are effectively limited in the amount of analysis they can expect from CBO at any time. Finally, the amount of work done for individual membersanswering telephone inquiries and letters requesting economic and budget information, mostly with information already prepared in some other contextconstitutes a very small claim on our time and resources. I am, however, strongly in support of oversight activities that would survey and evaluate committees' experiences with CBO studies. We try to accomplish this ourselves, informally, but would welcome outside assessments of our work. \ REDUCING STAFF BY 12 PERCENT The most significant Joint Committee recommendation affecting CBO calls for a staff reduction of 12 percent in the legislativeh)H0*0*0* branch by fiscal year 1999. This step could have a substantial effect on CBO's ability to assist the Congress in making budgetary decisions. To illustrate, let me point out the increasing pressures that we have been under in the past decade, as the budget and the deficit have remained on top of the political agenda. Since 1987, we have been holding staffing constant at our current level of approximately 220 employees. During that time, however, the budget has commanded more and more of the Congress's attention, and therefore the demands on our resources have grown substantially. In fact, several laws that have been enacted in the last 10 years, including GrammRudmanHollings and the Budget Enforcement Act, have created additional requirements for CBO. Further, the attention paid to issues with economic and budgetary ramificationssuch as the deposit insurance crisis, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and health care reformhave led to increased requests for analytic studies. In short, CBO could not absorb a 12 percent staff reduction without reducing the services that we are able to provide to the Congress. A staff cut of this size would require CBO to eliminate 20 current positions in addition to the 9 fulltime employees already eliminated as a result of the 1994 legislative branch appropriation act. The Congressional Budget Act lays out priorities for CBO's assistance to the Congress, which results in our doing the majority of our work for the Budget Committees, the Appropriations Committees, and the taxwriting committees. An additional reduction of this size would have several specific effects, including significantly reducing our ability to do timely cost estimates and ending our support to individual Members when they are drafting legislation with budgetary impact. In addition, we would be much less able to respond with analyses for the Congress when new issues arise that have significant economic and budgetary implications. Moreover, our recent experience suggests that, in an effort to get the budget and the deficit under control, the Congress needs more assistance from CBO, not less. Currently, CBO is finding it very difficult to keep up with the many and varied requests from the Congress for its analyses. And both the Senateapproved budget resolution and the Competitiveness Act of 1994 mandated significant new responsibilities for CBO. For this reason, scaling back our staffing at this time would be particularly costly. %CONCLUSION In S. 1824, the Joint Committee has presented the Senate with a series of recommendations to increase the Congress's management of its support agencies, especially replacing permanent authorization with 8year reauthorizations. CBO has reservations about ending its permanent authorization. CBO's value to the Congress is secured by its ability and reputation for providing nonpartisan, professional analysis of economic, budgetary, and programmatic policy issues. Our ability to provide such objective analysis, a function that has well served the Congress, could beh)I0*0*0* hampered by any change in process that disrupted the flow of anticipated analysis. Requests for CBO's analyses are increasing, not decreasing, and the Senate itself has included additional duties for CBO in several of the legislative actions it has taken just this year. In addition, CBO does not endorse a Joint Committee recommendation that the Joint Committee on Taxation be merged with the Congressional Budget Office. We feel the JCT serves the Congress in a timely and constructive fashion and that the relationship between the JCT and CBO has been most productive. As for the Joint Committee recommendations designed to limit the use of support agencies by committees and Members, these are not appropriate controls considering that much of CBO's work is done as an integral part of the current budget and legislative processes. Such controls as vouchers and cost accounting might be successful in certain instances, but would not be considered useful in the case of CBO. Finally, CBO could not absorb additional cuts in its staffing level, such as those contemplated by the Joint Committee, without a significant reduction in its output. hJ0*0*0*  ? STATEMENT OF MICHAEL F. DIMARIO, PUBLIC PRINTER,  GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee on Rules and Administration, I appreciate this opportunity to submit the views of the Government Printing Office (GPO) on the proposal for authorizing appropriations for certain Congressional support agencies contained in Title III, Subtitle B of S. 1824, the ``Legislative Reorganization Act of 1994.'' I commented briefly on this provision in my testimony before this Committee on February 3, 1994, concerning various proposals to reform Government printing. GPO stands ready to support Congress in its efforts to improve the operations of the legislative branch of the Federal Government. However, we have some concerns about the provisions being examined today that we would like to bring to this Committee's attention. Under section 332 of S. 1824, GPO's permanent authorization would be eliminated in fiscal year 2001 and replaced with a ``sunset'' procedure requiring the review of GPO's authorization every 8 years thereafter. This section would repeal any authorization of appropriations for GPO that is in effect on the effective date of this section. GPO's permanent authorization was first established in the Act of June 23, 1860, A Joint Resolution in Relation to Public Printing (12 Stat. 117). Under this law, the Superintendent of Public Printing (later renamed as the Public Printer) was: Xauthorized and directed to have executed the printing and binding authorized by the Senate and House of Representatives, the executive and judicial departments, and the Court of Claims...  GPO's authorization to perform public printing was subsequently included and expanded in the Printing Act of 1895 (28 Stat. 601). This Act became GPO's organic law and the basis for the public printing and documents statutes of Title 44 of the U.S. Code. Unlike more modern legislation, the public printing and documents statutes of Title 44 do not include a separate provision for authorization of appropriations. Instead, the statutory authority for GPO's appropriations lies in the multiple requirements of GPO established by law. As a result, the statutory authority that is the basis for GPO's annual Congressional Printing and Binding Appropriation is found in 44 U.S.C. 501, 701, 702, 703, 704, 706, 708, 709, 711, 712, 713, 715, 716, 717, 719, 720, 721, 723, 724, 727, 728, 733, 734, 735, 737, 901, 902, 906, 907, 1107, 1301, 1703, 1713, 1714, 1717, 1718, and 1908, as well as 1 U.S.C. 205, 208, 211, and 212. GPO's Salaries and Expenses Appropriation of the Superintendent ofh)K0*0*0* Documents is authorized by 44 U.S.C. 305, 309, 1702, 1703, 1704, 1710, 1711, 1719, 1902, 1903, 1909, and 4102. The Revolving Fund is authorized by 44 U.S.C. 301, 309, 317, 1502, 1504, 1509, 1510, and 4102; 5 U.S.C. 5901; 31 U.S.C. 1343 and 9104. These multiple authorizations not only describe the work GPO is to perform, such as the form and style of publications and the specification and designation of recipients, but implement broader concepts and purposes. For example, the provisions under chapters 7, 9, and 19 of Title 44 relate to printing, binding, and dissemination to support the Constitutionallymandated legislative function of Congress; these activities not only facilitate the conduct of legislative business but provide a means of informing the public of legislative activities. As another example, 44 U.S.C. 305 empowers GPO's employees to bargain for wages. Under the sections of chapter 19, the Depository Library Programa function of the Government since 1813is established. If section 332 of S. 1824 is enacted, all of these provisions apparently would be repealed, requiring their reenactment, either as a whole or potentially separately, in order to continue GPO's authorization. By repealing these provisions, Congress could generate issues and impacts that fall far beyond the legislative intent of this section. Additionally, unlike most other agencies, since 1957 GPO's appropriations have been made available ``for the payment of obligations incurred under the appropriations for similar purposes for preceding fiscal years.'' This clause, created with the concurrence of the Comptroller General, acknowledges that the obligation of GPO appropriations is not in control of GPO but results from the operation of law, i.e., by the Congressor a Congressional committeeordering a document to be printed, bound, and/or distributed as required by Title 44, or by the publication of a document for the executive branch which must be distributed to depository libraries and other entities pursuant to law. This is why GPO remains open to support Congress during periods of Governmentwide funding lapses during which most other Federal agencies are forced to shut down their operations. Because GPO cannot control its workload, but must perform all work requisitioned according to Title 44, GPO's obligations frequently exceed its appropriations, requiring an overlap of appropriations authority in order to avoid repeated requests for supplemental and deficiency funding. If Congress were to repeal GPO's appropriations authorities by a date certain, some provision would still need to be made to fund the completion of all work requisitioned while those authorities were still intact. Moreover, as noted above, if Congress repealed the authorities for Congressional printing, the legislative function of Congress would continue to require support by a printing function. If this function were not performed by GPO, it would still have to be performed by some entity for Congress. h)L0*0*0*ԌThe intent of section 332, as set forth in subsection (c), appears to be to eliminate duplication between instrumentalities of the legislative branch, consolidate activities, and increase efficiency within instrumentalities. GPO supports all of these goals. However, GPO's mission is to replicate and disseminate information from all three branches of the Federal Government, a responsibility that does not appear to duplicate or inefficiently reproduce the missions of the other legislative branch entities named in this section: the General Accounting Office, the Library of Congress, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Office of Technology Assessment. Indeed, as I stated in my testimony on February 3, these sunset provisions would be appropriate for GPO if GPO's programs and services were of limited duration or experimental in nature. But there has been a longstanding consensus on the continuing nature of GPO's mission. The production and dissemination of Government publications to the publicindeed, the function of informing the Nationhas been a component activity of the Federal Government since the days of the Founding Fathers. Sunsetting these programs would signal that they are no longer considered as fundamental as they once were. From an administrative standpoint, sunsetting GPO's programs could discourage investment in more productive plant and equipment. GPO is building a new system for the online dissemination of the  ? Congressional Record and the Federal Register, in fulfillment of the requirements in Pub. L. 10340, the GPO Electronic Information Dissemination Enhancement Act of 1993, which this Committee was instrumental in guiding through Congress. A shortterm outlook for GPO's authority could negatively impact the kinds of investment decisions GPO would make to ensure a more efficient future. Finally, sunsetting GPO's authority could jeopardize the stability of Federal depository libraries, which depend on the consistent availability of Government documents. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to submit this statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions the Committee may have with regard to it.  M0*0*0* STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. BOARMAN, VICE PRESIDENT,  COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFLCIO Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Rules and Administration Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to submit this short statement for the record to discuss the matter relating to the abolishing of the Joint Committee on Printing as recommended in the Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. I would like to take this opportunity to urge retention of the Joint Committee on Printing, perhaps a Joint Committee on Printing and Information Management, which is what the House has recommended in its report. As a labor representative, I have nothing to gain by this recommendation; as a citizen, however, I have seen that this joint authority Congress bestows on the committee works well on overseeing the Federal Government's printing program. Its ability to standardize, where appropriate, results in a tremendous saving to the American people. Imagine there was no Joint Committee on Printing. It's a frightening vision of babble in type sizes, publication sizes and whatnot. Picture your office shelves and files after everybody's run amuck doing their own thing. Think about Special Orders in the House, where Members talk to an empty chamber for 5 hours to educate the folks back home. Then whatperhaps a fullcolor, foliosized document with charts and embossed covers. That vision alone justifies the Joint Committee's continued existence. Without it, there is no one to force Congress and the agencies to cut to the bone on their printing expenses. The Public Printer would not be able to force Congress and executive branch agencies to do the right thing. With the seemingly speedoflight changes being wrought in the way private sector information is delivered to the American people, and the potential for similar advances in the dissemination of government informationboth internally and externallyit is all the more reason that the Joint Committee maintain its vigorous oversight and involvement. As I have said, the Joint Committee's charter should appropriately be expanded to include not simply printing, but information management as well. Let me note here that Section 332(b)(3), which provides for reauthorization of the GPO every 8 years, is a proposal that gravely concerns us. The climate in Congress today is often controlled by individual Members' interests that can have nothing to do with the matter at hand. To expose GPO to such regular lifeanddeath review is to build into the system a guarantee of disruption and trauma. GPO has functioned for more than a centurysetting a schedule for potential elimination every 8 years makes no sense. Mr. Chairman, committee members, the Joint Committee onh)N0*0*0* Printing has served this Congress and Nation well since it was created. It operates efficiently, effectively and economically, providing a service that is fundamental to both Houses of Congress. I urge you to keep this Joint Committee intact and working for us all. O0*0*0* Facsimiles of the following letters will appear in the printed volume, available through the Government Printing Office, Congressional Document Sales Division: Letter of Elmer B. Staats, former Comptroller General of the United States, to Hon. Wendell H. Ford, Chairman, and Hon. Ted Stevens, Ranking Member, Committee on Rules and Administration. Letter of Carol C. Henderson, American Library Association, Washington Office, to Hon. Wendell H. Ford, Chairman, and Hon. Ted Stevens, Ranking Member, Committee on Rules and Administration. P0*0*0* ` FACT SHEET ON THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON PRINTING Submitted by Hon. Ted Stevens The JCP was created in 1846 and is one of four Joint Committees. The JCP consists of ten members; five from the Senate Rules Committee and five from the House Administration Committee. As a joint committee, the chairmanship changes from Congress to Congress. The members of the JCP act as a tenmember Board of Directors to oversee all Federal printing activities and more specifically the management and operation of the Government Printing Office. The JCP is authorized a 17 person staff and has a FY '94 budget of $1.34 million. The responsibilities of the Joint Committee are located in title 44 USC and include authorization: *XTo set printing policy for the Federal Government to minimize costs and effect standardization of products.  *XTo ensure oversight and distribution of publications and public access to Government information through the Depository Library Program.  *XTo charter and oversee printing plants in the United States and throughout the world177 plants today.  *XTo establish specifications for all paper purchased by the Government.  *XTo oversee the publishing of the daily Congressional Record, the Congressional Directory, and other publications to ensure uniform standards and to oversee the operation of the Congressional Record Index Office.  *XTo review and adjudicate any impasses or disputes in wage negotiations in which members act as the final authority in GPO labor/management wage mattersreview and ratify all agreements arising from negotiations;  *XTo remedy neglect, delay, duplication, or waste in the printing and binding and the distribution of Government publications by holding appropriate oversight hearings on the financial management of federal printing and publishing.  #Q0*0*0* LETTER FROM CHARLES A. BOWSHER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC, TO HON. GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MAJORITY LEADER, U.S. SENATE ` `  hh#(February 16, 1994 The Honorable George J. Mitchell Majority Leader United States Senate Dear Senator Mitchell: Thank you for requesting our views on a recommendation of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress to repeal the permanent authorization for GAO and mandate reauthorization every 8 years. I believe periodic reauthorization would be a serious mistake. Independence and the perception of independence are critical to any auditor's credibility. Periodic reauthorization would make GAO subject to partisan political pressures and compromise our credibility. Our legislative history clearly shows that protecting the agency's independence and assuring its credibility were critical considerations when the agency was created. GAO was permanently authorized and the Comptroller General was given a nonrenewable 15year term to help assure these objectives. Reauthorization would impair GAO's independence by giving the executive branch too large a role in GAO's activities, subjecting any GAO reauthorization bill to a presidential veto. A veto, in turn, would mean that opponents comprising only onethird of the vote in the Senate or House could prevent reauthorization. As a legislative agency, GAO is already subject to review by the Congress through both the appropriations process and our oversight committees. I welcome the oversight role of these committees, and would strongly support a requirement for biennial oversight hearings. I hope you will oppose periodic reauthorization, and I would be happy to discuss this matter with you personally. In the meantime, I have enclosed a staff paper discussing the issue in greater detail. ` `  hh#(Sincerely, ` `  hh#(Charles A. Bowsher ` `  hh#(Comptroller General ` `  hh#(of the United States Enclosure 'R0*0*0* ASSURING GAO'S INDEPENDENCE AND CREDIBILITY GAO is a legislative branch agency and the federal government's independent auditor whose operations and ways of accomplishing its basic mission are subject to congressional review and oversight in numerous ways. Recent proposals to subject the agency to more direct and immediate control, including periodic reauthorization discussed in this paper, risk significant damage to the value of GAO in assisting the Congress in its oversight of governmental operations. Independence was the primary consideration when GAO was created by the Congress. An essential purpose underlying GAO's creation by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was to limit the extent to which the agency would be subject to partisan political pressure from either the executive branch or the Congress. Both the Act's provisions and its legislative history reflect this core purpose. The legislative history of the 1921 Act repeatedly emphasized that the GAO and the Office of the Comptroller General were structured in order "to make them absolutely independent of the Executive in their decisions." H.R. Rep. No. 16, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., at 7 (1921). Representative Good, a principal sponsor of the legislation, reiterated this theme during floor debate: X In creating the general accounting office and providing for the comptroller general and the assistant comptroller general, the committee was guided by a single thought, and that was that these two officers should be placed upon a plane somewhat comparable to the position occupied by Federal judges. The positions are semijudicial, and it was the opinion of the committee that we should remove them as far as possible from political considerations. [59Cong. Rec. 8610 (1920)]  As the following colloquies illustrate, the authors of the Act were also concerned with insulating GAO from political pressures emanating from Congress: XMr. BLAND. Did not the committee contemplate that the comptroller general might not only be brought into conflict with the executive department and with the executive branches of the Government, but sometimes with one side or the other of the aisle in Congress, and possibly both sides, in the impartial discharge of his duties?  XMr. GOOD. Absolutely. That department ought to be independent and fearless to criticize wrong expenditures of money wherever it finds them. It ought to criticize inefficiency in every executive department where inefficiency exists, and one of the troubles with ourh)S0*0*0* present system is that the auditors dare not criticize. If they criticize, their political heads will come off. [58Cong. Rec. 7252 (1919)]  XMr. SIMS. I appreciate the attempt to take this matter away from consideration as a political matter; but does the gentleman think that the President is more likely to act from partisan considerations than would a partisan Congress, where both Houses are of the same political party?  XMr. GOOD. That is one of the reasons why we provided in the law the causes for removal, and the only causes are inefficiency, incapacity, neglect of duty, malfeasance in office, or some offense that involves moral turpitude. [59Cong. Rec. 8612 (1920)]  Representative Good later summarized the congressional intent with respect to the independence of the Comptroller General as follows: X It was the intention of the committee that the comptroller general should be something more than a bookkeeper or accountant; that he should be a real critic, and at all times should come to Congress, no matter what the political complexion of Congress or the Executive might be, and point out inefficiency, if he found that money was being misappliedwhich is another term for inefficiencythat he would bring such facts to the notice of the committees having jurisdiction of appropriations. [61Cong. Rec. 1090 (1921)]  These congressional concerns are reflected in key provisions of the 1921 Act. It establishes GAO as "an instrumentality of the United States Government independent of the executive departments." [31 U.S.C. 702(a)] It provides for the appointment of the Comptroller General by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. [Id., 703(a)] The Comptroller General serves a 15year term of office, and cannot be reappointed. [31 U.S.C. 703(b)] The only means provided for removal of the Comptroller General are by impeachment or by joint resolution of Congress, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, on the grounds of permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance or conduct involving moral turpitude. [Id.,  703(e)] The provisions governing the Comptroller General's annuity are similar to those applicable to federal judges. [Id., 772] Independence from partisan political influence remains vital to GAO's credibility and continued effectiveness. GAO's independence from partisan political influence has served the agency, the Congress and the public well. In fact,h)T0*0*0* during the years since 1921 the Congress has enhanced GAO's role in auditing, investigating and evaluating government programs, making even more important the need for GAO to be, in the words of RepresentativeGood, a "real critic no matter what the political complexion of Congress or the Executive might be." In its early days, GAO's work consisted largely of reviewing the legality of federal expenditures through the audit of individual vouchers. In this context, the agency's independence served to assure that the executive branch expended appropriations as the Congress intended. The importance of this independence is perhaps typified by the statement attributed to President Cleveland about his Comptroller of the Treasury: "[I]f I cannot change the opinion of my comptroller, I can change my comptroller." [61Cong. Rec. 982 (1921)] The modern GAO serves the Congress through audits, investigations and program evaluations with far greater immediate relevance to the legislative and congressional oversight process than was the case in 1921. GAO has no direct power over government programs and activities. The value of its work to the Congress is entirely dependent upon the credibility of GAO's reports and testimony. That credibility is, in turn, dependent upon the agency's reputation for independence, objectivity and accuracy. In recognition of this, the Congress has continued to reaffirm the importance of GAO's independence. For example, in 1980 the Congress separated GAO's personnel system from executive branch authorities, thereby eliminating the possibility that GAO's independence could be compromised through control of its personnel system when GAO reviews the activities of executive branch authorities. Independence of the auditing function has also been embraced by state and local governments and the private sector. For the former, states assure independence by statutory provision; for the private sector, the Securities and Exchange Commission has issued regulations to achieve the same result. If GAO's independenceor even the perception of its independenceis seriously compromised, so too would its value to the Congress and the public. Indeed, even GAO's critics do not dispute the importance of the agency remaining free from partisan political influence. Periodic reauthorization would impair GAO's independence and could disrupt its operations by giving the executive branch and partisan political interests substantial influence over future GAO activities. Reauthorization would do much to impair GAO's independence by creating a major role for the executive branch in GAO's continued activities. The President would have the power to veto reauthorization legislation and thereby seek political compromises or even the elimination of GAO. A veto would mean that opponents with a narrow political interest could prevent reauthorization withh)U0*0*0* only onethird of the vote in the Senate or House of Representatives. Consequently, any number of political factions or interests could exercise leverage and exact concessions through the reauthorization process. Further, delays in the reauthorization process, brought on by political impasses, could cause temporary lapses in GAO's authorities and attendant disruption to its operations. Reauthorization is inconsistent with the permanent nature of GAO's function. Statutory "sunset" and similar provisions requiring periodic reauthorization are not unusual for specific programs and activities, or for agencies created to carry out a mission that is expected to be temporary or evolve over time. The basic concept of such provisions is to force reexamination of whether the program, activity or agency has completed its mission or accomplished its objectives and, therefore, should terminate, or whether statutory modifications are required in order to achieve success. Because of the permanency of their roles and programs, agencies such as the Departments of Treasury and Justice as well as their central functions of tax collection and law enforcement are not subject to periodic reauthorization. Similarly, it is difficult to see how the concept applies to a permanent agency of the government whose basic missionassisting congressional oversight through auditing of the operations of governmenthas continued for over 70years. Periodic "reauthorization" of such a permanent agency seems incongruous, if not wholly unprecedented. Clearly, the authors of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 envisioned the permanency of GAO and its activities. Congress has on many occasions since creation of the agency added particular audits, investigations, and evaluations to GAO's responsibilities, and those additional functions have been directly related to the agency's original purpose. Indeed, just as none of GAO's critics has questioned the importance of its independence, none has challenged the need for the continued existence of the agency or its mission. Periodic reauthorization is unnecessary as a means to provide oversight of GAO and to effect changes in its operations. GAO is a legislative branch agency currently subject to oversight by the Congress in many ways. In fact, most of its activities are performed at the request of committees and Members of Congress who provide constant feedback on the value and effectiveness of GAO's work. Under current law, GAO submits annual reports to the Congress and to designated committees covering a wide range of subjects. Of course, GAO's operations also are intensely scrutinized every year through the appropriations process in the Senate and House of Representatives. GAO is subject to oversight by its authorizing committees in the Senate and House, which have periodically conducted broadh)V0*0*0* oversight hearings of agency operations. The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs has commissioned a study of GAO by the National Academy of Public Administration that is now ongoing, and the House Committee on Government Operations recently conducted two days of oversight hearings on GAO. In testimony presented during the latter hearings, the Comptroller General discussed a number of recent changes made in GAO policies and practices to reinforce and demonstrate the agency's strong commitment to objectivity and nonpartisan assistance to the Congress. These changes, many of which responded to concerns raised by minority Members, provide tangible evidence of GAO's continual efforts to improve its responsiveness to the Congress and, thereby, to maximize the value of its work to the Congress and the public. Finally, over the course of GAO's existence, the Congress has enacted numerous statutes effecting changes in the nature and scope of the agency's audits and evaluations as well as the processes by which GAO does its work. Just a few examples are: the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, and the General Accounting Office Act of 1980. Through these and many other enactments, the Congress addressed how GAO accomplishes its basic mission. It is hard to imagine how a mandate for periodic reauthorization could produce more active and effective oversight of the agency. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY DANIEL P. MULHOLLAN, DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE  ?   COST ACCOUNTING REPORTS AND VOUCHERBASED ACCESS TO CONGRESSIONAL AGENCIES:  ? @ IMPLICATIONS FOR CRS AND THE CONGRESS ă Prepared by the CRS Key Indicators Team: Roger White, Jeffrey Griffith, Sharon House, Lynne McCay, Kent Ronhovde, Brenda Wesner, Leneice Wu #April 28, 1994 S. 1824 proposes that each congressional instrumentality, including CRS, prepare annual reports "detailing the cost to the instrumentality of providing support to each committee of the Senate and Senator." It would also require studies of the "feasibility of establishing a voucher allocation system for committees using the services of instrumentalities." The basic objective of these proposals is to ensure "that all resources are allocated in the most fair and efficient manner possible." All public institutions, of course, should be accountable for achieving fairness, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of resources. CRS has established many practices and continues to explore new ideas in pursuit of those objectives. It is not apparent, however, that the cost accounting and voucher proposals presented in S. 1824 would promote those objectives. This document explores implications for CRS and the Congress of cost accounting reports from and voucherbased access to CRS. First, the nature of CRScongressional relations under the proposed system is highlighted. The next section identifies basic characteristics of CRS interactions with the Congress that would make it difficult for CRS to obtain meaningful data from the proposed cost accounting system. Additional sections discuss current and proposed disclosure of information about CRS workload in the context of the proposal to publish information obtained from the proposed cost accounting system. Another section outlines current CRS practices for fostering fairness, efficiency and effectiveness in congressional use of its resources. A concluding section identifies implications of establishing a voucher system for allocating access to congressional instrumentalities. CRSCONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS UNDER PROPOSED COST ACCOUNTING AND VOUCHER SYSTEMS CRS currently conducts a large volume of ongoing, interactive support for the Congress on a full range of public policy issues. Most transactions are completed within a day and about 90 percent within a week. Daily, interactive CRS support for the Congress would likely be a casualty of instituting the proposed costh)X0*0*0* accounting system or a voucherbased access system. The proposals would effectively transform CRS from a support agency to a contractbased consulting operation. Currently, a steady flow of support services is available through a retainerlike arrangement and is delivered on a need basis. Under the proposed systems, staff from both CRS and congressional offices would negotiate, monitor and verify costs attributed to each client for each transaction or the quantity and quality of services rendered against redemption of each voucher. The transformation of relationships between CRS and the Congress, away from interactive, ondemand services toward fully negotiated or prepackaged units of service, would be the greatest cost of adopting these proposals. CALCULATING CRS COSTS OF SERVING EACH SENATOR AND COMMITTEE In support of their cost accounting proposal, the Senate Members of the Joint Committee observe that congressional support agencies "currently track the thousands of individual requests from Members and committees through accounting and information systems for internal purposes." Thus one is left with the impression that basic data systems are in place for calculating costs of serving each congressional office. This is not the case. Moreover, the validity of data needed for making such calculations would be questionable because of production and service characteristics of CRS. The basic elements of the cost accounting process anticipated in S. 1824 are easy to understand and seem easy to implement. The application of cost accounting is easiest and most appropriate in  ?p situations in which a specific set of professional staff work on an  ?8 exclusive assignment for a specified period of time to complete a  ? relatively unique service for a single client. In such situations direct costs of completing a service can be readily determined and an allocation scheme can be designed for incorporating overhead costs. In CRS, several factors seriously complicate the application of cost accounting. These include the prevalence of joint costs in preparing and delivering products and services, highly variable and unpredictable demand for specific products and services, and high costs (and probable impossibility) of recording reasonably accurate and useful cost data. The prevalence of joint costs The prevalence of joint costs would be the most critical complication in a CRS cost accounting system. Joint costs exist when the same activity contributes to more than one product or service. The major problem arising from joint costs is determining how to make a meaningful allocation of costs across several products or services. Joint costs occur, beneficially, throughout CRS on an ongoingh)Y0*0*0* basis because each staff member typically works concurrently on several closely related projects for several clients. This situation results from assigning work according to subject expertise. On any given work day, telephone consultations, a quick memorandum, updating an issue brief, work toward a seminar or a report may all relate, for the same subject expert, to some major public policy concern such as health care cost containment or relationships between trade and environmental degradation. Joint costs arise in each of these subject areas because work on one project typically furthers work on another. The expert is better informed for conducting a telephone consultation because of work in progress on a report. Likewise, information obtained from a telephone consultation may enhance the quality of a report in progress. Also, reading professional and trade literature and discussions with other experts often contribute to work on more than one project. Another example of joint costs is found in the effort expended with the first request received about a new development such as the resignation of a world leader, the announcement of a new Administration initiative, or a business decision with major implications for jobs, competition, or technological advancement. An initial response to the first request may take hours of work. Responses to subsequent requests and preparation of any subsequent written product handled by the same subject expert would benefit from work on earlier requests, including interactions with congressional offices in responding to those requests. The prevalence of joint costs in daily research and reference activities in CRS would make it difficult and timeconsuming to allocate costs to specific products and services. Furthermore, such allocations would necessarily be based largely on arbitrary decisions. Thus CRS efforts to allocate costs across individual transactions and to aggregate costs of individual transactions by congressional client would be vulnerable to and indefensible against charges of unfairness. Variable demands across individual products and services Another complication in applying cost accounting in CRS is difficulty in forecasting demand for products or services. Reliable information for each product and service on the quantity that is likely to be delivered is needed to determine the unit costs of products and services delivered to each congressional client. There is wide variation in the number of copies of different CRS reports and issue briefs delivered to Congress, in attendance at various CRS seminars and workshops and in the use of other specific CRS products and services. Among the explanations for this occurrence is that CRS supports Congress on a full range of policy issues at all stages of the legislative process and supports representational activities of the Congress as well. Thus, a report or seminar on an issue for which policy proposals are under early stages of development might attract relatively few readers orh)Z0*0*0* participants. In contrast, products or services on an issue which has become a national debate topic generally enjoy a very large audience. Forecasts of how large or how small, however, are unreliable. Also, using data on the number of products and services actually delivered is complicated by the fact that the life of products or services often transcends reporting periods, in part because CRS products are frequently maintained for extended periods through revisions and updating. High record keeping costs The volume of and interactive nature of CRS support for the Congress would result in sizeable record keeping costs for CRS if it instituted a cost accounting system. In its final report, the Senate Members of the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress state that congressional "instrumentalities currently track the thousands of individual requests from Members and committees through accounting and information systems for internal purposes." Actually, in the case of CRS, the numbers of individual requests tracked are not  ?h thousands but hundreds of thousands each year (See Table 1).  ?0 Requests are tracked only in information systems, not in accounting systems. A cost accounting system would necessary center on recording staff time, the principal element in the cost of providing CRS products and services. A staff of hundreds completes thousands of requests and services each day. Staff members may require only minutes (ignoring ongoing study and preparation time of subject experts) to complete some transactions such as many telephone consultations. At the other extreme, most are also engaged in several projects on which they work intermittently over many days as time allows or as information becomes available. Given the difficulties of allocating joint costs, the high daily volume of activity, and the interspersing of work on different projects for different clients, CRS staff would have to incur substantial recordkeeping costs to report reasonably accurate cost data. The effort by staff to report costs incurred for individual transactions would diminish time available for responding to congressional requests and would inescapably result in arbitrary decisions about allocating substantial costs incurred jointly in support of many projects for different clients. Implementing and mainting the proposed cost accounting system would be costly and would not help in accomplishing objectives of fairness and efficiency. COST ESTIMATES AS ALTERNATIVES TO COST ACCOUNTING: Estimating costs through one of several approaches could be pursued instead of trying to establish actual costs through cost accounting. One approach would be to develop refinements to a rather crude method, dividing the CRS budget by the number ofh)[0*0*0* transactions per year. Given the diversity of CRS products and services, however, weights would need to be assigned to major types, such as preparing reports, presenting seminars, providing briefings, sending prepared materials, etc. Two factors significantly complicate assigning weights. One is the prevalence of joint costs across different types of products and services. The other is great variability within each category with respect to difficulty and intensity of work required. For example, two reports of similar length often require vastly different expenditures of resources because of different research requirements based on the relative availability of information, the complexity of the topic, and the extent to which researchers have had previous experience with the topic.  Another approach would be to conduct surveys of all costs incurred in sample time periods or to determine costs incurred in preparing a sampling of products and services. Again, difficulties would arise from prevalence of joint costs in preparing products and services and great variability in resources required for preparing products and services within any category. Because of these difficulties, cost estimates based on averaging or sampling processes could greatly misstate costs actually incurred in supporting individual congressional clients. For example, two clients placing the same number of requests for each of several different types of CRS products and services would appear to require the same costs in support of their needs, even if one placed relatively easy demands on CRS resources and the other always required the expenditure of substantial resources to respond to complex requests requiring especially challenging research. DISCLOSING CRS WORKLOAD INFORMATION S. 1824 would require that costs incurred in providing support to each Senator and Senate committee be published in the Secretary  ? of the Senate's semiannual report.  Provision for disclosure may be proposed because of concerns that current reporting is inadequate: "...the overall demands, as well as the specific distribution of workload among the instrumentalities and the needs of individual Members and committees, are not known to the Congress as a whole." Information about the nature and volume of congressional demands placed on CRS is readily available in annual reports submitted to the Joint Committee on the Library pursuant to Section 321 of Public Law 91510. Data from the most recent report, for fiscal year 1993, depicting CRS workload are reproduced in Table 1. The annual report also lists, by individual title and by broad subject area, more than 1,700 general distribution products prepared and maintained during the fiscal year. Not included in the CRS annual report are data depicting "needs of individual Members and committees." Disclosing information about the number and type of requests individual Members or committees place with CRS would represent a sharp departure from the CRS practice of affording confidentiality to the Congress. HOW WOULD DISCLOSING OF COST INFORMATION ASSIST IN ACHIEVING EFFICIENCY AND FAIRNESS? Efficiency and fairness in allocating the resources of congressional instrumentalities is clearly a major objective of the proposal to report costs of providing support to each Senator and Senate committee. Even if these costs could be accurately and meaningfully determined, however, it is not clear how disclosure of cost data would improve fairness and efficiency in allocating resources. To make some assessment about fairness and efficiency in the use of resources, criteria would be needed for evaluating the cost data. Among the first steps would be agreeing on the size of the Senate's share of total support costs. Within the Senate, criteria could be adopted to establish one or a combination of many alternative cost outcomes as "fair," including the following: .Bullets` ` equal costs for each Senator, committee and, possibly, subcommittee;(#` .Bullets` ` higher costs for Senators with greater tenure and for major committees(#` .Bullets` ` higher costs for Senators from more heavily populated states;(#` .Bullets` ` higher costs for Senators from states with greater economic, geographic and demographic diversity (because of a presumed need for involvement in a greater range of public policy issues and representational matters);(#` .Bullets` ` higher costs for committees considering comprehensive legislation with broad national interests (an omnibus trade, bill, health care reform proposals) or a large volume of legislation, etc.(#` TABLE 1: CRS PRODUCTS AND SERVICES FOR CONGRESS: FY 1993 COMPLETED REQUESTS AND SERVICES PROVIDED X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: