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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@EFinal Op  ##  ( ( ( (  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: primarily on Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), that whenever the President acts in excess of his statutory authority, he also violates the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. Thus, judicial review must be available to determine whether the President has statutory authority for whatever action he takes. 995 F. 2d, at 409. In terms of this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that the President's statutory authority to close and realign bases would be lacking if the Secretary and Commission violated the procedural requirements of the Act in formulating their  J recommendations. Ibid.  Accepting for purposes of decision here the propriety of examining the President's actions, we nonetheless believe that the Court of Appeals' analysis is flawed. Our cases do not support the proposition that every action by the President, or by another executive official,  J in excess of his statutory authority is ipso facto in violation of the Constitution. On the contrary, we have often distinguished between claims of constitutional violations and claims that an official has acted in excess "    J of his statutory authority. See, e. .! g., Wheeldin v.  J Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 650!652 (1963) (distinguishing between rights which may arise under the Fourth Amendment and a cause of action for abuse of the  J` [statutory] subpoena power by a federal officer); Bivens  J8 v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396!397 (1971) (distinguishing between actions contrary to [a] constitutional prohibition, and those merely said to be in excess of the authority delegated ... by the Congress).  Jp  In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691, n.11 (1949), for example, we held that sovereign immunity would not shield an executive officer  J from suit if the officer acted either unconstitutionally or  J beyond his statutory powers. (Emphasis added). If all executive actions in excess of statutory authority were  J ipso facto unconstitutional, as the Court of Appeals seemed to believe, there would have been little need in  J0 Larson for our specifying unconstitutional and ultra  J vires conduct as separate categories. See also Dugan v.  J Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621!622 (1963); Harmon v.  J Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581 (1958) ( In keeping with our duty to avoid deciding constitutional questions presented unless essential to proper disposition of a case, we look  J@ first to petitioners' nonconstitutional claim that respond J ent [Secretary of the Army] acted in excess of powers  J granted him by Congress (emphasis added)).  J  Our decision in Youngstown, supra, does not suggest  J a different conclusion. In Youngstown, the Government disclaimed any statutory authority for the President's seizure of steel mills. See 343 U.S., at 585 ( [W]e do not understand the Government to rely on statutory authorization for this seizure). The only basis of authority asserted was the President's inherent constitutional power as the Executive and the Commanderin J Chief of the Armed Forces. Id., at 587. Because no statutory authority was claimed, the case necessarily` "   turned on whether the Constitution authorized the  J President's actions. Youngstown thus involved the  J conceded absence of any statutory authority, not a claim that the President acted in excess of such authority. The case cannot be read for the proposition that an action taken by the President in excess of his statutory  J authority necessarily violates the Constitution. i uBx ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), the other  uB/ case (along with Youngstown) cited in Franklin as an example of  uB when we have reviewed the constitutionality of the President's actions, likewise did not involve a claim that the President acted in  uBT excess of his statutory authority. Panama Refining involved the National Industrial Recovery Act, which delegated to the President the authority to ban interstate transportation of oil produced in violation of state production and marketing limits. See 293 U.S., at 406. We struck down an Executive Order promulgated under that Act not because the President had acted beyond his statutory authority, but rather because the Act unconstitutionally delegated  uBU Congress' authority to the President. See id., at 430. As the Court pointed out, we were not dealing with action which, appropriately belonging to the executive province, is not the subject of judicial review, or with the presumptions attaching to executive action. To repeat, we are concerned with the question of the delegation of  uB legislative power. Id., at 432 (footnote omitted). Respondents have not alleged that the 1990 Act in itself amounts to an unconstitutional delegation of authority to the President.   The decisions cited above establish that claims simply alleging that the President has exceeded his statutory authority are not constitutional claims, subject to  Jp judicial review under the exception recognized in Frank JH lin.JH %i uBE ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < As one commentator has observed, in cases in which the President concedes, either implicitly or explicitly, that the only source of his authority is statutory, no constitutional question whatever is raised. J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 316 (1980). Rather, the cases concern only issues of  uB statutory interpretation. Ibid.  As this case demonstrates, if every claim alleging that the President exceeded his statutory authority were considered a constitutional claim, the exception identified o"    J in Franklin would be broadened beyond recognition. The distinction between claims that an official exceeded his statutory authority, on the one hand, and claims that he acted in violation of the Constitution, on the other, is too well established to permit this sort of evisceration.  So the claim raised here is a statutory one: The President is said to have violated the terms of the 1990 Act by accepting procedurally flawed recommendations.  J The exception identified in Franklin for review of constitutional claims thus does not apply in this case. We may assume for the sake of argument that some claims that the President has violated a statutory mandate are judicially reviewable outside the framework  J of the APA. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 667 (1981). But longstanding authority holds that such review is not available when the statute in question commits the decision to the discretion of the President.  J  As we stated in Dakota Central Telephone Co. v. South  J Dakota ex rel. Payne, 250 U.S. 163, 184 (1919), where a claim  BQ C  , , (  concerns not a want of [presidential] power, but a mere excess or abuse of discretion in exerting a power given, it is clear that it involves considerations which are beyond the reach of judicial power. This must be since, as this court has often pointed out, the judicial may not invade the legislative or executive departments so as to correct alleged mistakes or wrongs arising from asserted abuse of discretion. ]w BQ d   J  ( , ,  In a case analogous to the present one, Chicago &  J Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948), an airline denied a certificate from the Civil Aeronautics Board to establish an international air route sought judicial review of the denial. Although the/ "   Civil Aeronautics Act, 49 U.S.C.  ! 646 (1946 ed.), generally allowed for judicial review of the Board's decisions, and did not explicitly exclude judicial review of decisions involving international routes of domestic airlines, we nonetheless held that review was unavailable. 333 U.S., at 114.  In reasoning pertinent to this case, we first held that the Board's certification was not reviewable because it  J was not final until approved by the President. See id., at 112!114 ( orders of the Board as to certificates for overseas or foreign air transportation are not mature and are therefore not susceptible of judicial review at any time before they are finalized by Presidential approval). We then concluded that the President's decision to approve or disapprove the orders was not reviewable, because the final orders embody Presidential discretion as to political matters beyond the compe JX tence of the courts to adjudicate. See id., at 114. We fully recognized that the consequence of our decision was to foreclose judicial review: BQ C   , , (  The dilemma faced by those who demand judicial review of the Board's order is that before Presidential approval it is not a final determination ... and after Presidential approval the whole order, both in what is approved without change as well as in amendments which he directs, derives its vitality  J3 from the exercise of unreviewable Presidential  J  discretion. Id., at 113 (Emphasis added)._ BQ d   JG  ( , , Although the President's discretion in Waterman S.S.  J Corp. derived from the Constitution, we do not believe the result should be any different when the President's  J discretion derives from a valid statute. See Dakota  J Central Telephone Co., supra, at 184; United States v.  J George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940).  The 1990 Act does not at all limit the President's discretion in approving or disapproving the Commission's/ "    J recommendations. See  ! 2903(e); see also Specter II, 995 F. 2d, at 413 (Alito, J., dissenting). The Third Circuit seemed to believe that the President's authority to close bases depended on the Secretary's and Commission's compliance with statutory procedures. This view of the statute, however, incorrectly conflates the duties of the Secretary and Commission with the authority of the President. The President's authority to act is not contingent on the Secretary's and Commission's fulfillment of all the procedural requirements imposed upon them by the 1990 Act. Nothing in  $! 2903(e) requires the President to determine whether the Secretary or Commission committed any procedural violations in making their recommendations, nor does  K! 2903(e) prohibit the President from approving recommendations that are procedurally flawed. Indeed, nothing in  ! 2903(e) prevents the President from approving or disapproving the recommendations for whatever reason he sees fit.  J0 See   ! 2903(e); Specter II, 995 F. 2d, at 413 (Alito, J., dissenting).  How the President chooses to exercise the discretion Congress has granted him is not a matter for our  J review. See Waterman S.S. Corp., supra; Dakota  Jh Central Telephone Co., supra, at 184. As we stated in  J@ George S. Bush & Co., supra, at 380, [n]o question of law is raised when the exercise of [the President's] discretion is challenged.  9H1 d dy,III؃  2  In sum, we hold that the actions of the Secretary and the Commission cannot be reviewed under the APA because they are not final agency actions. The actions of the President cannot be reviewed under the APA because the President is not an agency under that Act. The claim that the President exceeded his authority under the 1990 Act is not a constitutional claim, but a statutory one. Where a statute, such as the 1990 Act,"   commits decisionmaking to the discretion of the President, judicial review of the President's decision is not available.  Respondents tell us that failure to allow judicial  J` review here would virtually repudiate Marbury v.  J8 Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), and nearly two centuries of constitutional adjudication. But our conclusion that judicial review is not available for respondents' claim follows from our interpretation of an Act of Congress, by which we and all federal courts are bound. The judicial power of the United States conferred by Article III of the Constitution is upheld just as surely by withholding judicial relief where Congress has permissibly foreclosed it, as it is by granting such relief where authorized by the Constitution or by statute.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is  J `{;Reversed.ă