WPC[W 2aBcR ZR#|o"m^36Gff%==\o3=33ffffffffff33oooQzKfzztzp=o=o\%ffQi\=bp:6m:p\ifQUGpbbbX=o=o=3============i:fffffQ\\\\K:K:K:K:p\\\\ppppbfi\\b\zifffQQQQi\\\\bbbbbbppK:K:K:K:fmz:z:z:z:z:pppp\\QQQtUtUtUtUzGzGzGppppppbpXpXpXiz:pQtUzGbbi\pNo3o\6QNNfff=7f=f=%GGf//\\pp%G=ooee3o<d<d<$YYdCCddooCYgn|g|n|SR}{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS2C=v,c3c}6c9"X^?S}}SSS}?S?F}}}}}}}}}}SS}a}SFS}S}ooS}FSF}oaS}}}oc7cS?SS*SSSSSSSSSSF}}}}}oooooaFaFaFaF}}}}}}}}}}}}}oooooooo}}}}}}aFaFaFaF}FFFFF}}oooaaaaSSS}oooFoaS}}}NX?}S}}}}}}KS}K}KF}}}SS}}S}KF*RRdE|>gn|g|n|SR{nnnRRnnnnnnnRRRRRRRRRRRRSS"m^*,:SS}z22K[*2**SSSSSSSSSS**[[[Collluldu}=Sudzudul_dzljj\2[2[KSSCVK2Q\/,Y/\KVSCE:\QuQQH2[2[2*222222222222V/lSlSlSlSlSwlClKlKlKlK=/=/=/=/z\uKuKuKuKz\z\z\z\jQlSuVuKuKjQuKdVlSlSlSlClClClCuVlKlKlKlKuQuQuQuQuQuQ}\}\=/=/=/=/SuYd/d/d/d/d/z\z\z\z\uKuK}lClClC_E_E_E_Ed:d:d:z\z\z\z\z\z\ujQ\H\H\HuVd/z\lC_Ed:jQjQuVuKz\N[*[K,C@@SSS2-}}S2ooS}2::S''KK\\:2[[RRk*[11RRRkskk[ZZ<[){kJ%>gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^*2gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkkl_dRZ>\J\B\JlZoN21mRgR\lNaJlRsRSRYZB\BhVrNlRwgsg_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^3=Iff%==\o3=3offffffffff33oooQzKpzzz~~z=o=o\%ifQpQ=bp=:f=p\ifQQAp_\\U=o=o=3============f=iiiiiQQQQQK=K=K=K=p\\\\pppp~\ip\\~\\ziiiiQQQQpQQQQbbbbbbppK=K=K=K=pfz=z=z=z=z=pppp\\QQQzQzQzQzQ~A~A~Apppppp~\zUzUzUpz=pQzQ~A~\~\p\pNo3w\=QNNfffMDf=f=3GG\==\\pp%G=ooee3o<>RRR1,zzR1llRz199R&&IIZZ91YYQQi)Y00QQQiqiiYXX;Y(yiH$<euXXqiiii@yqqqXXaHQQQiiij]bQXHYYY66^E@@@@(JEEE66;,1N11@@@A9<16%7,7(7,A6C/A1>1P7A/:,A1E12156(7(>4E/A1H>E>9(6144>986@9999999999999999999(((((((666666666666666666661111111444444444444>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>A7AA>E>1"m^!$/CCdb((gwZZskkkkB{sssZZcJRRRkkklWdPZH\I\I\IlWoY2(mWgRklWaMlWs\SCYG\IhSr\lWw_s\_BZ11RVVg_]Zk___________________BBBBBBBZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ111111111111RRRRRRRVVVVVVVVVVVVggggggggggggggggggggl\l2lhs2hR"m^!+==\Z%%7C%==========CCC1QOOOVOIV\-=VIhZVIVOEIZOlMMC%C%C7==1?7%;C#!A#bC7?=13+C;V;;5%C%C%%%n%%%%%%%%%%?#O=O=O=O=O=nXO1O7O7O7O7-#-#-#-#ZCV7V7V7V7ZCZCZCZCM;O=V?V7V7M;V7I?O=O=O=O1O1O1O1V?O7O7O7O7V;V;V;V;V;V;\C\C-#-#-#-#=VAI#I#I#I#I#ZCZCZCZCV7V7n\O1O1O1E3E3E3E3I+I+I+ZCZCZCZCZCZClVM;C5C5C5V?I#ZCO1E3I+M;M;V?V7ZCNCC7!1//===%!\\=%QQ=\%++=n77nCCn+n%CC<Jo uB# ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Gilbert held that it was permissible to dismiss an action brought in a District Court in New York by a Virginia plaintiff against a defendant doing business in Virginia for a fire that occurred in Virginia. Such a dismissal would be improper today because of the federal venue transfer statute, 28 U.S.C.  ! 1404(a): For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district"## court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought. By this statute, [d]istrict courts were given more discretion to transfer . . . than they had to  uB dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens. Piper Aircraft Co. v.  uBl Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981). As a consequence, the federal  uB# doctrine of forum non conveniens has continuing application only in cases where the alternative forum is abroad.>/BQ d "  Ԍ ( , ,  Although the origins of the doctrine in AngloAmerican  J law are murky, most authorities agree that forum non  J conveniens had its earliest expression not in admiralty  J but in Scottish estate cases. See Macmaster v.  J` ԚMacmaster, 11 Sess. Cas. 685, 687 (No. 280) (2d Div.  J8 Scot.) (1833); McMorine v. Cowie, 7 Sess. Cas. (2d ser.)  J 270, 272 (No. 48) (1st Div. Scot.) (1845); La Soci)t) du  J Gaz de Paris v. La Soci)t) Anonyme de Navigation Les  J Armateurs Fran'ais, [1926] Sess. Cas. (H. L.) 13 (1925). See generally Speck, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law in Admiralty: Time for an Overhaul, 18 J. Mar. Law & Com. 185, 187 (1987); Barrett, The Doctrine of  J Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Cal. L. Rev. 380, 386!387 (1947); Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908, 909 (1947); but see Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 867, 881, n. 58 (1935) (doctrine in Scotland was borrowed from elsewhere before middle of 19th century).  Even within the United States alone, there is no basis  J for regarding forum non conveniens as a doctrine that originated in admiralty. To be sure, within federal courts it may have been given its earliest and most  J frequent expression in admiralty cases. See The Maggie  Jh Hammond, 9 Wall. 435, 457 (1870); The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355, 365!366 (1885). But the doctrine's application has not been unique to admiralty. When the Court  J held, in Gilbert, supra, that forum non conveniens applied to all federal diversity cases, Justice Black's dissent argued that the doctrine had been applied in"   maritime cases [f]or reasons peculiar to the special  J problems of admiralty. Id., at 513. The Court disagreed, reciting a long history of valid application of the  J doctrine by state courts, both at law and in equity. Id., at 504!505, and n. 4. It observed that the problem of plaintiffs' misusing venue to the inconvenience of defendants is a very old one affecting the administration of the courts as well as the rights of litigants, and both in England and in this country the common law worked out techniques and criteria for dealing with it.  Jp Id., at 507. Our most recent opinion dealing with forum  JH non conveniens, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), recognized that the doctrine originated in Scotland, and became part of the common law of many  J States, id., at 248, n. 13 (citation omitted), and treated  J the forum non conveniens analysis of Canada Malting  J Co. v. Paterson S. S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932), an admiralty case, as binding precedent in the nonadmiralty context.  J  In sum, the doctrine of forum non conveniens neither originated in admiralty nor has exclusive application there. To the contrary, it is and has long been a doctrine of general application. Louisiana's refusal to  Jh apply forum non conveniens does not, therefore, work material prejudice to [a] characteristic featur[e] of the  J general maritime law. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,  J 244 U.S., at 216.  \H2 -B؃  xC  Petitioner correctly points out that the decision here under review produces disuniformity. As the Fifth  Jk Circuit noted in Ikospentakis v. Thalassic S. S. Agency, 915 F.2d 176, 179 (1990), maritime defendants have  J access to a forum non conveniens defense in federal court that is not presently recognized in Louisiana state courts. We must therefore consider whether Louisiana's rule interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity"    J of maritime law, Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra, at 216.  J  In The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 575 (1875), Justice Bradley, writing for the Court, said of the Article III provision extending federal judicial power to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction: BQ C  , , ( N N  One thing ... is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign states.+MBQ d   J'  ( , , By reason of this principle, we disallowed in Jensen the application of state workers' compensation statutes to injuries covered by the admiralty jurisdiction. Later, in  J Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 163!164 (1920), we held that not even Congress itself could permit such application and thereby sanction destruction of the constitutionally prescribed uniformity. We have also relied on the uniformity principle to hold that a State may not require that a maritime contract be in writing where admiralty law regards oral contracts as  J valid, Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961).  The requirement of uniformity is not, however,  JG absolute. As Jensen itself recognized: [I]t would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness just how far the general maritime law may be changed, modified, or affected by state legislation. That this may be done to some extent cannot be denied. 244 U.S., at 216. A later case describes to what breadth this some extent extends:W"  ԌBQ C  , , (  It is true that state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this Court finds inroads on a harmonious system[,] [b]ut this limitation still leaves the States a wide scope. Statecreated liens are enforced in admiralty. State remedies for wrongful death and state statutes providing for the survival of actions ... have been upheld when applied to maritime causes of action.... State rules for the partition and sale of ships, state laws governing the specific performance of arbitration agreements, state laws regulating the effect of a breach of warranty under contracts of maritime insurance"all these laws and others have been accepted as rules of decision in admiralty cases, even, at times, when they conflicted with a rule of maritime law which did not require uniform J ity. Romero v. International Terminal Operating  J Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373!374 (1959) (footnotesomitted)._TBQ sd   ( , ,  It would be idle to pretend that the line separating permissible from impermissible state regulation is readily discernible in our admiralty jurisprudence, or indeed is even entirely consistent within our admiralty  J jurisprudence. Compare Kossick, supra (state law cannot require provision of maritime contract to be in writing),  J with Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) (state law can determine effect of  Jo breach of warranty in marine insurance policy). o  uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < Whatever might be the unifying theme of this aspect of our  uB admiralty jurisprudence, it assuredly is not what the dissent takes it to be, namely, the principle that the States may not impair  uB maritime commerce, see post, at 3, 6. In Fireman's Fund, for example, we did not inquire whether the breachofwarranty rule Oklahoma imposed would help or harm maritime commerce, but simply whether the State had power to regulate the matter. The noharmtocommerce theme that the dissent plays is of course"## familiar to the ear"not from our admiralty repertoire, however, but  uBG from our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see Bendix  uB Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 891 (1988). No Commerce Clause challenge is presented in this case.  Similarly misdirected is the dissent's complaint that Article 123 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure unfairly discriminates against  uB maritime defendants because it permits application of forum non  uB conveniens in nonmaritime cases, see post, at 1!2. The only issue raised and argued in this appeal, and the only issue we decide, is  uB whether state courts must apply the federal rule of forum non  uB conveniens in maritime actions. Whether they may accord discrimi uBm natory treatment to maritime actions by applying a state forum non  uB$ conveniens rule in all except maritime cases is a question not remotely before us. o "   Happily, it is unnecessary to wrestle with that difficulty today. Wherever the boundaries of permissible state regulation may lie, they do not invalidate state rejection  J of forum non conveniens, which is in two respects quite dissimilar from any other matter that our opinions have held to be governed by federal admiralty law: it is procedural rather than substantive, and it is most unlikely to produce uniform results.  As to the former point: At bottom, the doctrine of  J forum non conveniens is nothing more or less than a supervening venue provision, permitting displacement of the ordinary rules of venue when, in light of certain conditions, the trial court thinks that jurisdiction ought to be declined. But venue is a matter that goes to process rather than substantive rights"determining which among various competent courts will decide the case. Uniformity of process (beyond the rudimentary elements of procedural fairness) is assuredly not what the law of admiralty seeks to achieve, since it is supposed to apply in all the courts of the world. Just as state courts, in deciding admiralty cases, are not bound by the venue requirements set forth for federal courts in the United States Code, so also they are not bound by "   the federal commonlaw venue rule (so to speak) of  J forum non conveniens. Because the doctrine is one of procedure rather than substance, petitioner is wrong to  J claim support from our decision in Pope & Talbot, Inc.  J` v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953), which held that Pennsylvania courts must apply the admiralty rule that contributory negligence is no bar to recovery. The other case  J petitioner relies on, Garrett v. MooreMcCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 248!249 (1942), held that the traditional maritime rule placing the burden of proving the validity of a release upon the defendant preempts state law placing the burden of proving invalidity upon the plaintiff. In earlier times, burden of proof was regarded as procedural for choiceoflaw purposes such as the  J one before us here, see, e. W! g., Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919); Restatement of Conflict of Laws   ! 595 (1934). For many years, however, it has  JX been viewed as a matter of substance, see Cities Service  J0 Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939)"which is  J unquestionably the view that the Court took in Garrett, stating that the right of the plaintiff to be free of the burden of proof inhered in his cause of action, was a part of the very substance of his claim and cannot be considered a mere incident of a form of procedure. 317 U.S., at 249. Unlike burden of proof (which is a sort of default rule of liability) and affirmative defenses such as contributory negligence (which eliminate liability),  J forum non conveniens does not bear upon the substantive right to recover, and is not a rule upon which maritime actors rely in making decisions about primary conduct"how to manage their business and what  J( precautions to take.no(  uB ԍ FTN    XgEpXFr  ddf < It is because forum non conveniens is not a substantive right of the parties, but a procedural rule of the forum, that the dissent is  uB wrong to say our decision will cause federalcourt forum non conven uB iens determinations in admiralty cases to be driven, henceforth, by"##  uB state law"i. e., that the federal court in a State with the Louisiana rule may as well accept jurisdiction, since otherwise the state court  uB will. See post, at 7!8. That is no more true of forum non conveni uB ens than it is of venue. Under both doctrines, the object of the dimissal is achieved whether or not the party can then repair to a state court in the same location. Federal courts will continue to  uB invoke forum non conveniens to decline jurisdiction in appropriate cases, whether or not the State in which they sit chooses to burden its judiciary with litigation better handled elsewhere.n( "  Ԍ J  But to tell the truth, forum non conveniens cannot  J really be relied upon in making decisions about secondary conduct"in deciding, for example, where to sue or where one is subject to being sued. The discretionary nature of the doctrine, combined with the multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application, see the  J quotation from Gilbert, supra, at 4!5, make uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible. The  J forum non conveniens determination, we have said, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision  J deserves substantial deference. Piper Aircraft Co. v.  J Reyno, 454 U.S., at 257. We have emphasized that `[e]ach case turns on its facts' and have repeatedly rejected the use of per se rules in applying the doctrine.  J0 Id., at 249; Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut.  J Casualty Co., 330 U.S., at 527. In such a regime, one can rarely count on the fact that jurisdiction will be declined.  \H2 -C؃  @C  What we have concluded from our analysis of admiralty law in general is strongly confirmed by examination of federal legislation. While there is an established and3 "   continuing tradition of federal common lawmaking in admiralty, that law is to be developed, insofar as possible, to harmonize with the enactments of Congress in the field. Foremost among those enactments in the field of maritime torts is the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. App.   ! 688.  That legislation, which establishes a uniform federal law that state as well as federal courts must apply to the determination of employer liability to seamen,  J Garrett, supra, at 244, incorporates by reference all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the commonlaw right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees. 46 U.S.C. App.  3! 688(a). Accordingly, we have held that the Jones Act adopts the entire judicially developed doctrine of liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 35  J Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C.  ! 51 et seq. Kernan  JX v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 439 (1958). More particularly, we have held that the Jones Act adopts the uniformity requirement of the FELA, requiring state courts to apply a uniform federal law.  J Garrett, supra, at 244. And"to come to the point of this excursus"despite that uniformity requirement we  Jh held in Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 5 (1950), that a state court presiding over an action pursuant to the FELA should be freed to decide  J the availability of the principle of forum non conveniens in these suits according to its own local law. We  J declared forum non conveniens to be a matter of local  Jx policy, id., at 4, a proposition well substantiated by the  JP local nature of the public factors relevant to the forum  J( non conveniens determination. See Reyno, supra, at 241,  J and n. 6 (quoting Gilbert, 330 U.S., at 509).  J  We think it evident that the rule which Mayfield announced for the FELA applies as well to the Jones Act, which in turn supports the view that maritime commerce in general does not require a uniform rule of` "    J forum non conveniens. Amicus Maritime Law Association of the United States argues that whether or not it is appropriate to analogize from FELA to the Jones Act,  J Mayfield cannot save the result below because the  J` Louisiana statute abolishes the forum non conveniens  J8 doctrine in all maritime cases, not just those arising under the Jones Act. Brief for Maritime Law Associa J tion as Amicus Curiae 16. It is true enough that the  J Mayfield rule does not operate ex proprio vigore beyond the field of the FELA and (by incorporation) the Jones Act. But harmonization of general admiralty law with congressional enactments would have little meaning if  J we were to hold that, though forum non conveniens is a local matter for purposes of the Jones Act, it is nevertheless a matter of global concern requiring uniformity under general maritime law. That is especially so in  J light of our recognition in McAllister v. Magnolia  JX Petroleum Co., 357 U.S., at 224!225, that, for practical reasons, a seaman will almost always combine in a single action claims for relief under the Jones Act and general maritime law. It would produce dissonance rather than harmony to hold that his claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure, but not his Jones  Jh Act claim, could be dismissed for forum non conveniens.  The Jones Act's treatment of venue lends further  J support to our conclusion. In Bainbridge v. Merchants  J & Miners Transportation Co., 287 U.S. 278, 280!281 (1932), we held that although 46 U.S.C. App.  {! 688(a) contains a venue provision, venue [in Jones Act cases brought in state court] should ... [be] determined by the trial court in accordance with the law of the state. The implication of that holding is that venue under the Jones Act is a matter of judicial housekeeping that has been prescribed only for the federal courts. We noted  J earlier that forum non conveniens is a sort of supervening venue rule"and here again, what is true for venue under the Jones Act should ordinarily be true under`"   maritime law in general. What we have prescribed for  J the federal courts with regard to forum non conveniens is not applicable to the States. i)* * *  J8  Amicus the Solicitor General has urged that we limit  J our holding, that forum non conveniens is not part of the uniform law of admiralty, to cases involving domestic entities. We think it unnecessary to do that. Since the parties to this suit are domestic entities it is quite impossible for our holding to be any broader.  The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is  J ;zAffirmed.