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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)2_HT HKV TX ZFootnotestntesFormats for normal footnotes$Kn#[ P['CdP# ddf < X01Í Í01Í Í #o P['Cn&P#X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:! 1983.n0I uP uBQ ԍ $FTN The District Court also held that Detective Oliver was entitled to a defense of qualified immunity, and that the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to support municipal liability against the city of Macomb. The District Court also dismissed without prejudice the commonlawv""## claim of malicious prosecution against Detective Oliver. These issues are not before this Court. The0""#  Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 975  J F. 2d 343 (1992), relying on our decision in Paul v.  J Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The Court of Appeals held that prosecution without probable cause is a constitutional tort actionable under  ! 1983 only if accompanied by incarceration or loss of employment or some other  J  palpable consequenc[e]. 975 F.2d, at 346!347. The panel of the Seventh Circuit reasoned that just as in the gardenvariety publicofficer defamation case that does not result in exclusion from an occupation, state tort remedies should be adequate and the heavy weap JH onry of constitutional litigation can be left at rest. Id.,  J at 347.(  uB ԍ $FTN As noted by the Court of Appeals below, the extent to which a claim of malicious prosecution is actionable under  ! 1983 is one on which there is an embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion. 975 F. 2d, at 345, citing  uB Brummett v. Camble, 946 F. 2d 1178, 1180, n.2 (CA5 1991) (cataloging divergence of approaches by the Courts of Appeals). Most of the lower courts recognize some form of malicious prosecution action under  ! 1983. The disagreement among the courts concerns whether malicious prosecutions, standing alone, can violate the Constitution. The most expansive approach is exemplified by the Third Circuit, which holds that the elements of a malicious prosecution action under  ! 1983 are the same as  uB the commonlaw tort of malicious prosecution. See, e. g., Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F. 2d 66, 70 (CA3 1988) ( [T]he elements of liability for the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution under  ! 1983 coincide with those of  uBA the common law tort). See also, Sanders v. English, 950 F. 2d 1152, 1159 (CA5 1992) ( [O]ur circuit recognizes causes of action under  ! 1983 for false arrest, illegal detention ... and malicious prosecution because these causes of action implicate the constitutional `guarantees of the  uB fourth and fourteenth amendments'...); Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F. 2d  uB 649 (CA10 1990); Strength v. Hubert, 854 F. 2d 421, 426, and n.5 (CA11 1988) (recognizing that freedom from malicious prosecution is a federal right protected by  ! 1983). Other Circuits, however, require a showing of some injury or deprivation of a constitutional magnitude in addition to the traditional elements of commonlaw malicious prosecution. The exact standards announced by the courts escape easy classification. See,g"##  uB e. g., Torres v. Superintendent of Police of Puerto Rico, 893 F. 2d 404, 409 (CA1 1990) (the challenged conduct must be so egregious that it violated substantive or procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth  uB Amendment); Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F. 2d 556, 561!562 (CA9 1987) ( [T]he general rule is that a claim of malicious prosecution is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C.  z! 1983 if process is available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy ... [h]owever, `an exception exists to the general rule when a malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights' h! );  uB Coogan v. ÚWixom, 820 F. 2d 170, 175 (CA6 1987) (in addition to elements of malicious prosecution under state law, plaintiff must show an egregious misuse of a legal proceeding resulting in a constitutional deprivation). In holding that malicious prosecution is not actionable under  E ! 1983 unless it is accompanied by incarceration, loss of protected status, or some other palpable consequence, the Seventh Circuit's decision below places it in this latter camp. In view of our disposition of this case, it is evident that substantive due process may not furnish the constitutional peg on which to hang such a tort.  We granted certiorari, 507 U.S. ___ (1993), %"   and while we affirm the judgment below, we do so on different grounds. We hold that it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which petitioner Albright's claims must be judged.  Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating  J federal rights elsewhere conferred. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3 (1979). The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right  J allegedly infringed. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,  Jp 394 (1989); and Baker v. McCollan, supra, at 140.  Petitioner's claim before this Court is a very limited one. He claims that the action of respondents infringed his substantive due process right to be free of prosecution without probable cause. He does not claim that Illinois denied him the procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does he claim a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, notwithstanding the fact that his surrender to the State's show0%"   of authority constituted a seizure for purposes of the  J Fourth Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19  J (1968); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596  J (1989).* uB ԍ $FTN Thus, Albright may have missed the statute of limitations for any claim he had based on an unconstitutional arrest or seizure. 975 F.2d 343, 345 (CA7 1992). We express no opinion as to the timeliness of any such claim he might have. *  We begin analysis of petitioner's claim by repeating  J8 our observation in Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 9). As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and openended. The protections of substantive due process have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procre J ation, and the right to bodily integrity. See, e. g.,  J Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 5!6) (describing cases in which substantive due process rights have been recognized). Petitioner's claim to be free from prosecution except on the basis of probable cause is markedly different from those recognized in this group of cases.  Petitioner relies on our observations in cases such as  J United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987), and  J Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986), that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers both substantive and procedural rights. This is undoubtedly true, but it sheds little light on the scope of substantive due process. Petitioner points in particu J lar to language from Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.  J 516, 527 (1884), later quoted in Daniels, supra, stating that the words by the law of the land" from the Magna Carta were   `intended to secure the individual from theP#"   arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.'   This, too, may be freely conceded, but it does not follow that, in all of the various aspects of a criminal prosecution, the only inquiry mandated by the Constitution is whether, in the view of the Court, the governmental  J8 action in question was arbitrary.  J  Hurtado held that the Due Process Clause did not make applicable to the States the Fifth Amendment's requirement that all prosecutions for an infamous crime be instituted by the indictment of a grand jury. In the  Jp more than 100 years which have elapsed since Hurtado was decided, the Court has concluded that a number of the procedural protections contained in the Bill of Rights were made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth  J Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),  J overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and holding the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule  JX applicable to the States; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1  J0 (1964), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), and holding the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination applicable to the States;  J Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), overruling  J Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), and holding the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment  J@ applicable to the States; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372  J U.S. 335 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and holding that the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel was applicable to the States. See also  J Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (Sixth Amendment speedy trial right applicable to the States);  JP Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process applicable to the  J States); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applicable to the States).  This course of decision has substituted, in these areas of criminal procedure, the specific guarantees of the`"   various provisions of the Bill of Rights embodied in the first 10 Amendments to the Constitution for the more generalized language contained in the earlier cases construing the Fourteenth Amendment. It was through these provisions of the Bill of Rights that their Framers sought to restrict the exercise of arbitrary authority by the Government in particular situations. Where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,'  JH must be the guide for analyzing these claims. Graham  J v. Connor, 490 U.S., at 395.  uB ԍ $FTN Justice Stevens' dissent faults us for ignoring, inter alia, our decision  uB? in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Winship undoubtedly rejected the notion that all of the required incidents of a fundamentally fair trial were to be found in the provisions of the Bill of Rights, but it did so as a matter of procedural due process:  z! `This notion [that the government must prove the elements of a criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt]"basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society"is a requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the  uB@ historic, procedural content of due process. \ '   Id., at 362, quoting  uB Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802!803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  uBe  Similarly, other cases relied on by the dissent, including Mooney v.  uB Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935), Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959),  uB Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405  uB U.S. 150 (1972), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), were accurately described in the latter opinion as dealing with the defendant's right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of  uB the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Id., at 107.   We think this principle is likewise applicable here. The Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty, and drafted the Fourth Amendment to  address it. The Fourth Amendment provides: BQ , ,    The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supportedn"   by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.UOBQ  , ,  We have in the past noted the Fourth Amendment's relevance to the deprivations of liberty that go hand in  J> hand with criminal prosecutions. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (holding that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to any extended restraint on liberty following an arrest). We have said that the accused is not entitled to judicial oversight or review of  J the decision to prosecute.  Id., at 118!119. See also  J Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 545 (1962); Lem  Jv Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913). But here petitioner was not merely charged; he submitted himself to arrest.  We express no view as to whether petitioner's claim would succeed under the Fourth Amendment, since he has not presented that question in his petition for certiorari. We do hold that substantive due process,  J with its scarce and openended guideposts, Collins v.  J Harker Heights, 503 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 9), can  J afford him no relief.J