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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 92–833

KEVIN ALBRIGHT, PETITIONER v. ROGER

OLIVER, etc., et al.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit

[January 24, 1994]

Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice Ginsburg joined.

A warrant was issued for petitioner's arrest by Illinois authorities, and upon learning of it he surrendered and was released on bail. The prosecution was later dismissed on the ground that the charge did not state an offense under Illinois law. Petitioner asks us to recognize a substantive right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. We decline to do so.

This case comes to us from a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirming the grant of a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we must therefore accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true. Illinois authorities issued an arrest warrant for petitioner Kevin Albright, charging him on the basis of a previously filed criminal information with the sale of a substance which looked like an illegal drug. When he learned of the outstanding warrant, petitioner surrendered to respondent, Roger Oliver, a police detective employed by the city of Macomb, but denied his guilt of such an offense. He was released after posting bond, one of the conditions of which was that he not leave the State without permission of the court.

At a preliminary hearing, respondent Oliver testified that petitioner sold the look-alike substance to Moore, and the court found probable cause to bind petitioner over for trial. At a later pretrial hearing, the court dismissed the criminal action against petitioner on the ground that the charge did not state an offense under Illinois law.

Albright then instituted this action under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983, against Detective Oliver in his individual and official capacity, alleging that Oliver deprived him of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment—his "liberty interest"—to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. The District Court granted respondent's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that the complaint did not state a claim under §1983. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 975 F. 2d 343 (1992), relying on our decision in Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976). The Court of Appeals held that prosecution without probable cause is a constitutional tort actionable under §1983 only if accompanied by incarceration or loss of employment or some other "palpable consequenc[e]." 975 F. 2d, at 346–347. The panel of the Seventh Circuit reasoned that "just as in the garden-variety public-officer defamation case that does not result in exclusion from an occupation, state tort remedies should be adequate and the heavy weaponry of constitutional litigation can be left at rest." Id., at 347. We granted certiorari, 507 U. S. ___ (1993), and while we affirm the judgment below, we do so on different grounds. We hold that it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which petitioner Albright's claims must be judged.

Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights," but merely provides "a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U. S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979). The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 394 (1989); and Baker v. McCollan, supra, at 140.

Petitioner's claim before this Court is a very limited one. He claims that the action of respondents infringed his substantive due process right to be free of prosecution without probable cause. He does not claim that Illinois denied him the procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does he claim a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, notwithstanding the fact that his surrender to the State's show of authority constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19 (1968); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 596 (1989).

We begin analysis of petitioner's claim by repeating our observation in Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 9). "As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." The protections of substantive due process have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity. See, e. g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 5–6) (describing cases in which substantive due process rights have been recognized). Petitioner's claim to be free from prosecution except on the basis of probable cause is markedly different from those recognized in this group of cases.

Petitioner relies on our observations in cases such as United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 746 (1987), and Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986), that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers both substantive and procedural rights. This is undoubtedly true, but it sheds little light on the scope of substantive due process. Petitioner points in particular to language from Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 527 (1884), later quoted in Daniels, supra, stating that the words "by the law of the land" from the Magna Carta were "`intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.'" This, too, may be freely conceded, but it does not follow that, in all of the various aspects of a criminal prosecution, the only inquiry mandated by the Constitution is whether, in the view of the Court, the governmental action in question was "arbitrary."

Hurtado held that the Due Process Clause did not make applicable to the States the Fifth Amendment's requirement that all prosecutions for an infamous crime be instituted by the indictment of a grand jury. In the more than 100 years which have elapsed since Hurtado was decided, the Court has concluded that a number of the procedural protections contained in the Bill of Rights were made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), and holding the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applicable to the States; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908), and holding the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination applicable to the States; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), and holding the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), and holding that the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel was applicable to the States. See also Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (1967) (Sixth Amendment speedy trial right applicable to the States); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14 (1967) (Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process applicable to the States); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applicable to the States).

This course of decision has substituted, in these areas of criminal procedure, the specific guarantees of the various provisions of the Bill of Rights embodied in the first 10 Amendments to the Constitution for the more generalized language contained in the earlier cases construing the Fourteenth Amendment. It was through these provisions of the Bill of Rights that their Framers sought to restrict the exercise of arbitrary authority by the Government in particular situations. Where a particular amendment "provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection" against a particular sort of government behavior, "that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S., at 395.

We think this principle is likewise applicable here. The Framers considered the matter of pretrial deprivations of liberty, and drafted the Fourth Amendment to address it. The Fourth Amendment provides:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

We have in the past noted the Fourth Amendment's relevance to the deprivations of liberty that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975) (holding that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to any extended restraint on liberty following an arrest). We have said that the accused is not "entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute." Id., at 118–119. See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 545 (1962); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U. S. 586 (1913). But here petitioner was not merely charged; he submitted himself to arrest.

We express no view as to whether petitioner's claim would succeed under the Fourth Amendment, since he has not presented that question in his petition for certiorari. We do hold that substantive due process, with its "scarce and open-ended" "guideposts," Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9), can afford him no relief.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

Affirmed.