Summary

The United States has long controlled the export of high-performance computers to sensitive destinations, such as Russia and China. These computers have both civil and military uses, and technological advances in computing power have been rapid. The Commerce Department has primary responsibility for managing the licensing of these dual-use items and weighing the promotion of commercial interests in exporting items against the protection of national security interests. Congress has raised concerns in recent years about whether U.S. national security is being harmed by relaxing export controls on high-performance computers and over the rationale for subsequent revised controls. The executive branch has yet to clearly articulate the specific national security interests to be protected by controlling the export of computers at various performance levels. It also has not indicated how countries of military concern could benefit from using such technology. Without a clear statement of these interests, it is unclear how the executive branch determines what are militarily critical applications that may affect U.S. national security. Also, the executive branch has revised export controls on computers because it believes that these machines, at the previously approved levels, had become so widely available in the market that their export is uncontrollable. However, GAO could not assess the justification for the July 1999 export control levels because the terms "widely available" and "uncontrollable" used to explain the policy change are not clearly defined and are not found in law or regulation.

GAO noted that: (1) the executive branch has not yet clearly articulated the specific national security interests to be protected in controlling the export of computers at various performance levels, nor has it stated how countries of military concern could benefit from using such computers; (2) without a clear statement of these interests, it is unclear how the executive branch determines what are militarily critical applications that may affect U.S. national security; (3) in addition, the executive branch has revised export controls on computers because it believes that these machines, at the previously approved levels, had become so widely available in the market that their export is uncontrollable; and (4) however, GAO could not assess the justification for the July 1999 export control levels because the terms "widely available" and "uncontrollable" used to explain the policy change are not clearly defined and are not found in law or regulation.