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Most of the MX missiles the Air Force plans to buy are earmarked for the test program, which establishes and monitors--system capability and reliability over the system life. Thus, though the Congress halved the planned deployment of MX, the total system's size--and hence its cost--has not fallen in proportion. As requested by the Senate Committee on Armed Services, this paper analyzes the basis for the planned test program-determined largely by statistical guidelines established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In accordance with the Congressional Budget Office's mandate to provide objective analysis, the paper makes no recommendations.

Bonita J. Dombey of CBO's National Security Division prepared the study, under the general supervision of Robert F. Hale and John D. Mayer, Jr. Jeffrey A. Merkley of CBO assisted with statistical analysis; Joel Slackman also provided assistance. Johanna Zacharias edited the manuscript.
 

Rudolph G. Penner
Director
January 1986
 
 

The MX, a highly accurate intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) carrying ten nuclear warheads, has long been a source of contention. Debate centers on the 195,000-pound missile's production, basing, and cost. These issues have been put to rest, at least temporarily, with fiscal year 1986 Congressional action specifying that no more than 50 MX missiles be deployed (in Minuteman silos) at any one time. Twelve MX missiles were authorized for fiscal year 1986, bringing the total number authorized thus far (including 20 research and development test missiles) to 74--enough to complete the deployment.

Though the planned deployment of MX has been numerically halved, from 100 to 50, the total purchase of missiles--and hence the system's cost-has not been cut by a proportionate amount. The reason for this disparity is that the program for testing the MX missile is not subject to change as the planned deployment decreases. Of the total 193 MX missiles that have been or will be bought (including Research and Development missiles), 143 are designated for testing. All 119 missiles still to be bought are earmarked for the test program. Specifically, the Congress provided that from 12 to 21 missiles be procured for this purpose in fiscal year 1987.

In this paper, the Congressional Budget Office examines the basis for that test program, which will consume about three-fourths of all MX missiles purchased. The study focuses on Operational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E), which constitutes the largest segment of the test program and is to proceed in two phases:

• Phase I of OT&E follows Research and Development (R&D) testing and is designed to establish an estimate--with a high degree of confidence--of the accuracy and reliability of the system. This baseline estimate is important both for operational and target planning, and for monitoring the MX system's capability over time. The Air Force program calls for 24 missiles to be tested over three years (1988-1990) for Phase I.
  
  
• Phase II of OT&E, designed to monitor degradation in system performance and reliability, then tests on a yearly basis over the remaining system life. A total of 84 missiles, or about seven per year, are planned to be tested over the 12 years (1991-2003) of Phase II.

Analysis of Current Plans

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have established general guidelines for weapons systems included in the strategic nuclear war plan--also known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)--designed to ensure an acceptable level of testing. These guidelines form the foundation for the sizing of a ballistic missile test program. They specify annual testing to maintain the statistical level of confidence required in each service's estimate of weapon system reliability. However, the guidelines leave the statistical analysis and details of the test program to the individual services. The services often prefer to test to more strict criteria than specified by the JCS, especially in Phase II where the guidelines are less stringent.

The CBO analysis finds that the 24 missiles allocated by the Air Force for Phase I testing might not suffice to meet the statistical guidelines set out by the JCS and the Air Force's Strategic Air Command (SAC). Assessment based on the Air Force's assumptions and Classical statistical techniques indicates that at least 36 missiles would be needed. The Air Force rationale for using only 24 missiles for Phase I testing, however, rests on experience with land-based missiles and a judgment that, in light of constraints on the total test program, additional test missiles should be shifted to Phase II of the program.

The seven missiles per year allocated to Phase II slightly exceed numbers necessary to meet JCS guidelines as interpreted by the Air Force: about six missiles per year would suffice. The Air Force wants more Phase II missiles, because it believes JCS guidelines for Phase II are not demanding enough, and also because the Air Force wants flexibility to meet diverse needs. Extra test missiles would be needed, for instance, if the MX remained in service longer than the 15 years currently planned--as has happened with past generations of U.S. land-based missiles--or if the MX at some point requires a major modification. Minuteman II missiles have been deployed for about 20 years, and although there are only 26 test missiles remaining, the Minuteman is likely to remain deployed through the end of this century.

Given the objectives of a ballistic missile test program, when Phases I and II are considered together, the MX test program seems modest in size. Phase I is actually too small as judged by Classical statistical techniques; the extra missiles in Phase II might be needed if the MX stays in the inventory for more than 15 years. The MX test program is also modest in size compared to test programs for other U.S. ballistic missiles.

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