Project Scope

In our examination of responder safety management during disaster response, we defined the scope of the study with the following terminology:

• Emergency Responders. Because of the nature of large-scale response operations, we adopted a broad definition of disaster rescue and recovery workers. Beginning with the career responders and volunteers typically labeled as emergency responders—emergency management, fire service, law enforcement, and emergency medical service responders—we also included a range of other workers likely to be involved in disaster response. These individuals encompass federal, state, and local personnel; public health professionals; skilled support personnel (including construction/demolition workers, transit workers, and utility services workers); disaster relief workers; and members of volunteer organizations.¹
  
  
• Convergent Volunteers. In addition, we looked at “convergent” volunteers —individuals who respond to a disaster but who are not connected to an organization involved in the response or who are not directed by their organization to participate.
  
  
• Safety Management. We defined “safety management” as the methods, principles, and organizational structures through which the manager or managers of a response operation protect the safety and health of the responders. We understand the focus of safety management to be risk management—ensuring that responders clearly understand the risks involved in their activities, eliminating or reducing as many of those risks as possible, recognizing any risks that cannot be fully controlled, and weighing the need for responders to carry out their duties against the dangers involved. Effective risk management ensures that a response organization accepts no unnecessary risk, makes risk decisions in a way that guarantees clear accountability, and manages risk by planning [ALSAC 2001].²

The focus of the study was to develop recommendations directed at the strategic goal of improving safety management. An analysis of the practical details of how each recommendation should or might be implemented is beyond the scope of this project and requires consideration of regional- and locality-specific factors. The overall issues associated with implementation are briefly discussed in the final chapter of the report.

Because of the project’s focus on safety management, a range of important issues fall outside the scope of the study. For example, responders raised a number of technical issues during the research—specific concerns about protective equipment, problems with communications interoperability, specific techniques for monitoring hazards, and individual technical solutions for management issues. We recognize such issues briefly in this report if they pertain to our central theme of safety management structures and processes, but we do not discuss them in depth.

The Research Team

Recognizing the multidisciplinary nature of safety management, the research team was composed of a mix of researchers whose work is based in the NIOSH Division of Safety Research; RAND Science and Technology; RAND Health; RAND National Security Research Division; and RAND Arroyo Center, which supports the United States Army and provided important expertise on command structures and processes, along with a very useful understanding of how military organizations have wrestled with problems similar to those facing civilian responder organizations.

Methodology

Having established the scope of the project, we took three approaches to gathering information and data:

1. review of the professional and technical literature
2. interviews with members of the response community
3. discussions at a workshop focused on improving safety management in disaster response.

Review of the Professional and Technical Literatures
We examined more than 800 published sources on topics including:

• emergency response strategies and tactics
• incident command and management
• safety issues during emergencies
• characteristics of individual disaster responses
• command of major multiagency operations
• health and medical care issues in disasters.

The literature review captured relevant safety lessons from previous disasters and provided the study team access to the formidable body of previous work on incident management and command. The review also enabled identification of areas that would require specific attention in later phases of the study.³

Interviews with Members of the Response Community
Interviews with experts from the responder community were utilized as a major source of safety management information. To provide a structure for the interview process, we used information that we assembled during the literature review to select four major disaster-response operations:

• the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center (New York)⁴
• the September 11, 2001, attack on the Pentagon (Virginia)⁵
• Hurricane Andrew (Florida)⁶
• the Northridge earthquake (California).⁷

We chose these four crises because of their scale, national impact, and the challenges they presented for responder safety. Our aim was not to produce case studies, but to provide relevant examples that would elicit important insights from interviewees. These four disasters formed the basis of an extensive interview process with individuals who had been directly involved in the operational and safety management of each event.

We interviewed approximately 70 emergency responders about these four operations and supplemented these interviews with approximately 20 more with other experts from the response community on the general topic of safety management.⁸ We then combined analysis of the information developed in these interviews with data drawn from the literature review to develop a set of preliminary recommendations for improving safety management in future incidents.

Responder Workshop
A workshop was held at RAND’s Washington, D.C., office on February 27, 2003. We sought participants for their experience, expertise, and interest in safety and health management issues.⁹ More than 100 members of the responder community attended the workshop, representing organizations from the emergency management, firefighting, law enforcement, emergency medical service, public health, skilled support and trades, public works, and disaster relief communities. Representatives from local and state governments and professional organizations also participated. Key federal organizations relevant to disaster and terrorism response were represented as well, including NIOSH; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); the Department of Defense and three defense services—the Army (including the Army Corps of Engineers), the Navy, and the Marine Corps; the Department of Justice; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); FEMA; the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences; the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy.

We drew the main topics for workshop discussions from the results of the initial phases of our research, including our preliminary recommendations for improving safety management. Attendees participated in three groups of their choice from among the following five:

• safety management within disaster incident management/command systems
• improving coordination and control of personnel and resources during disaster response
• hazard information, intelligence, and risk assessment
• improving training for disaster response
• responder health care.

A RAND researcher with subject matter expertise in the topic guided each panel. The groups were free to focus attention on the topics within each area that they felt were most interesting or important. To encourage candid discussion, the breakout sessions were held with the understanding that no statements would be attributed to specific individuals or organizations.¹⁰ Not only were the workshop discussions an effective way of gathering information and input from the disaster response community, they also provided an invaluable opportunity to obtain comments and feedback on our preliminary recommendations.

Analytical Framework

In examining the data collected from the literature and the responder community, the study team relied on the three-stage model of safety management shown in Figure 1.1 to structure the analytical effort. The model’s core components—gathering information, analyzing options and making decisions, and taking action—are similar to those found in a range of other management decisionmaking models. By providing a framework to systematically examine the management practices and requirements to effectively manage responder safety, the model helped assure that the study fully explored both the opportunities and shortfalls associated with responder safety in disaster response.

¹ In addition to “emergency responders,” we also use the term “emergency response community,” particularly in discussions of previous efforts in disaster management and safety planning. By this, we mean both individuals currently employed by or active in response organizations and the larger group of people who have contributed to the existing body of knowledge on response strategy, operations, and tactics.

² We also use the term “operational management,” by which we mean the processes, methods, and organizational structures used to manage response activities at a disaster. Central to that discussion is the Incident Command System, which is described in Chapter Three. While operational management is not the topic of this study, how safety management fits into overall disaster management and comparisons between the way safety is managed and the management of response operations overall were important in developing the study’s findings.

³ The bibliography presents a selection of the literature relevant to the analyses and recommendations of this report.

⁴ On September 11, 2001, the World Trade Center’s twin towers collapsed after being struck by two hijacked commercial airliners, with the result that more than 2,800 people were killed and many more injured. Among the fatalities were more than 400 emergency responder (fire, police, emergency medical services, and Port Authority) personnel, while many more emergency workers were exposed to multiple hazards while subsequently working at the collapse site.

⁵ On September 11, 2001, a third hijacked airliner crashed into the Pentagon and caused 189 deaths, including all aboard the aircraft and personnel working in the Pentagon. Emergency responders involved in rescue operations contended with substantial damage to the Pentagon structure from the impact of the aircraft crash, a partial building collapse that occurred later that day, and protracted fire suppression operations.

⁶ Hurricane Andrew, which struck Florida and Louisiana in August 1992, was one of the most destructive natural disasters to occur in the United States and presented an overwhelming event for local and state emergency response organizations. The greatest devastation occurred in south Florida, resulting, both immediately and during the storm’s aftermath, in more than 45 deaths and thousands of injuries, over $25 billion in property and infrastructure damage, and a need for protracted recovery efforts.

⁷ The Northridge earthquake occurred in the predawn hours of January 17, 1994, with its epicenter located under the suburban communities northwest of Los Angeles. The earthquake damage covered a large area (hundreds of square miles); included building collapses, major fires, and infrastructure damage; and resulted in 57 deaths and the displacement of numerous people [FEMA 1994a].

⁸ The names of the interviewees are included in Appendix A.

⁹ The names and affiliations of workshop attendees are included in Appendix A.

¹⁰ Therefore, all citations of “Study Workshop” are to study workshop discussions at the RAND-NIOSH workshop Protecting Emergency Responders: Safety Management in Major Disaster and Terrorism Response in Arlington, VA, on February 27, 2003. In addition, all citations of “Study Interviews” are to not-for-attribution interviews held with members of the response community between November 2002 and March 2003.