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Testimony: 

Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST: 

Tuesday, January 30, 2007: 

Wildland Fire Management: 

Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies' Cost-Containment Efforts: 

Statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment: 

GAO-07-427T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-427T, a testimony before the Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Over the past two decades, the number of acres burned by wildland fires 
has increased, often threatening human lives, property, and ecosystems. 
The cost of responding to wildland fires has also grown, especially as 
more homes are built in or near wildlands, an area called the wildland-
urban interface. Past management practices, including a concerted 
federal policy in the 20th century of suppressing fires to protect 
communities and ecosystems, unintentionally resulted in steady 
accumulation of dense vegetation that can fuel large, intense, and 
often costly wildland fires. 

GAO was asked to identify actions that federal wildland fire agencies 
need to take to help contain federal wildland fire expenditures. GAO 
has identified these actions in three of its reports addressing fuel 
reduction and cost-sharing efforts and as part of an ongoing review of 
federal agencies’ efforts to contain wildland fire preparedness and 
suppression costs for this committee. Specifically, GAO focused on 
examining agencies’ efforts to (1) reduce accumulated fuels and address 
wildland fire problems, (2) share with nonfederal entities the costs of 
responding to multijurisdictional fires, and (3) contain the costs of 
preparing for and responding to wildland fires. 

What GAO Found: 

Over the past 7 years, GAO has recommended a number of actions federal 
wildland fire agencies should take to improve their management of 
wildland fire activities, actions that could also help contain the 
rising federal expenditures for responding to wildland fires. These 
agencies—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and 
land management agencies within the Department of the 
Interior—concurred with GAO’s recommendations but have not completed, 
or in some cases have not yet begun, needed actions. GAO’s ongoing 
review of federal agencies’ efforts to contain wildland fire 
preparedness and suppression costs has also identified other actions 
that may be needed. Specifically, the agencies need to: 

* Develop a cohesive strategy that identifies the options and 
associated funding to reduce fuels and address wildland fire problems. 
In 1999, to address the problem of excess fuels and their potential to 
increase the severity of wildland fires and the cost of suppression 
efforts, GAO recommended that a cohesive strategy be developed that 
identified the available long-term options and associated funding for 
reducing these fuels. In 2005 and 2006, because the agencies had not 
yet developed one, GAO reiterated the need for such a strategy but 
broadened its focus to better address the interrelated nature of fuel 
reduction efforts and wildland fire response. GAO also recommended 
that, as an interim step, the agencies develop a tactical plan 
outlining the steps and time frames needed for completing a cohesive 
strategy. As of January 2007, the agencies had not developed either a 
cohesive strategy or a tactical plan. 

* Clarify their guidance for sharing wildland fire suppression costs 
with nonfederal entities. In 2006, to address the rising costs of 
responding to fires that threaten both federal and nonfederal lands and 
resources, GAO recommended that the federal agencies provide more 
specific guidance as to when particular cost-sharing methods should be 
used. The cost-sharing method used can have significant financial 
consequences for the entities involved—potentially amounting to 
millions of dollars. As of January 2007, the agencies were updating 
their guidance on possible cost-sharing methods and when each typically 
would be used, but it is unclear how the agencies will ensure that the 
guidance is followed. 

* Establish clear goals, strategies, and performance measures to help 
contain wildland fire costs. Preliminary findings from GAO’s ongoing 
work indicate that the effectiveness of agencies’ efforts to contain 
costs may be limited because the agencies have not clearly defined 
their cost-containment goals, developed a strategy for achieving those 
goals, or developed related performance measures. For these efforts to 
be effective, the agencies need to integrate cost-containment goals 
with the other goals of the wildland fire program—such as protecting 
life and property—and to recognize that trade-offs will be needed to 
meet desired goals within the context of fiscal constraints. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-427T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Robin M. Nazzaro at (202) 
512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the key actions that we 
believe federal wildland fire management agencies--the Forest Service 
within the Department of Agriculture and four agencies within the 
Department of the Interior--need to complete to help contain the rising 
costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires. Increasing 
wildland fire threats to communities and ecosystems, combined with 
rising costs of addressing those threats--trends that we and others 
have reported on for many years--have not abated. On average, the 
acreage burned annually by wildland fires from 2000 to 2005 was 70 
percent greater than the acreage burned annually during the 1990s. 
Appropriations for wildland fire management activities tripled from 
about $1 billion in fiscal year 1999 to nearly $3 billion in fiscal 
year 2005. Although the agencies are still refining their data, 2006 
was an especially severe year, with almost 10 million acres burned and 
what are likely to be the highest federal fire suppression expenditures 
ever. A number of factors have contributed to more-severe fires and 
corresponding increases in expenditures for wildland fire management 
activities. These factors include an accumulation of fuels due to past 
fire suppression policies; severe weather and drought in some areas of 
the country; and growing numbers of homes built in or near wildlands, 
an area often called the wildland-urban interface. In light of the 
federal deficit and the long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation, 
attention has increasingly focused on ways to contain these growing 
expenditures and to ensure that the agencies' wildland fire activities 
are appropriate and carried out in a cost-effective and efficient 
manner. 

My testimony today includes findings from three of our recent reports, 
plus preliminary findings from work under way, which together summarize 
key wildland fire management weaknesses we have identified over the 
last 7 years, as well as critical actions the agencies need to complete 
if they are to effectively contain the rising costs of responding to 
wildland fires. Specifically, my testimony focuses on three issues: the 
agencies' efforts to (1) reduce fuels and address wildland fire 
problems,[Footnote 1] (2) share with nonfederal entities the costs of 
responding to fires that burn or threaten to burn multiple 
jurisdictions,[Footnote 2] and (3) contain federal expenditures of 
preparing for and responding to wildland fires. To evaluate these 
issues, we reviewed selected reports that we have issued since 2000, as 
well as those by other federal agencies or outside organizations, that 
assessed federal wildland fire management. We reviewed pertinent agency 
plans, policies, procedures, reports, and financial documents, and we 
interviewed federal and nonfederal officials to identify steps federal 
agencies have taken to address these areas and the challenges 
remaining. We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards from May 2006 through January 2007. 

Summary: 

In summary, federal wildland fire management agencies need to take a 
number of actions to strengthen their overall management of the 
wildland fire program, actions that could lead to more effective and 
efficient use of scarce resources and help the agencies to better 
contain costs. While we have made a number of recommendations over the 
last 7 years to improve wildland fire management--and agencies have 
largely concurred with these recommendations--the agencies have made 
limited progress in implementing the needed changes. Further, our 
preliminary work on federal agencies' efforts to contain wildland fire 
preparedness and suppression costs has also identified other actions 
that may be needed. Specifically, we believe that the agencies need to: 

* Develop a cohesive strategy that identifies the options and 
associated funding to reduce fuels and address wildland fire problems. 
In 1999, to address the problem of excess fuels and their potential to 
increase the severity of wildland fires and cost of suppression 
efforts, we recommended that a cohesive strategy be developed that 
identified the available long-term options and associated funding for 
reducing fuels. By 2005, the agencies had yet to develop such a 
strategy, and we reiterated the need for a cohesive strategy and 
broadened our recommendation's focus to better address the interrelated 
nature of fuel reduction efforts and wildland fire response. We also 
recommended that the agencies develop a tactical plan outlining the 
steps and time frames needed for completing a cohesive strategy. Such a 
strategy and plan would be helpful to the Congress and the agencies in 
making informed decisions about effective and affordable long-term 
approaches to addressing the nation's wildland fire problems. Although 
the agencies concurred with our recommendations, as of January 2007, 
neither a cohesive strategy nor a tactical plan had been developed. 

* Clarify their guidance for sharing wildland fire suppression costs 
with nonfederal entities. In 2006, to help address the rising costs of 
responding to fires that threaten both federal and nonfederal lands and 
resources, we recommended that the federal agencies, working with 
relevant state entities, clarify the financial responsibility for these 
fires and provide more specific guidance as to when particular cost- 
sharing methods should be used. The method used to share the costs of 
suppressing a wildland fire among responsible entities can have 
significant financial consequences for the entities involved-- 
potentially amounting to millions of dollars. The need for clarity 
about how to share the rising costs of wildland fire protection is 
becoming more acute as increasing numbers of homes are built in areas 
at risk from wildland fires. As of January 2007, the agencies were 
updating guidance on possible methods for sharing costs between federal 
and nonfederal entities and the circumstances when each method 
typically would be used. It is unclear, however, how the agencies will 
ensure that such guidance is followed. 

* Establish clear goals, strategies, and performance measures to help 
contain wildland fire costs. Preliminary findings from our work under 
way for this committee indicate that, although the agencies have taken 
certain steps to help contain wildland fire costs, the effectiveness of 
these steps may be limited because agencies have not established clear 
cost-containment goals, strategies to achieve those goals, or effective 
performance measures to track their progress. 

Each of these efforts plays an important role in addressing the issue 
of containing wildland fire costs, but none of them alone can solve the 
problem. For cost-containment efforts to be effective, the agencies 
need to integrate cost-containment goals with the other goals of the 
wildland fire program--such as protecting life, resources, and 
property--and to recognize that trade-offs will be needed to meet 
desired goals within the context of fiscal constraints. Further, 
because the agencies' efforts to reduce fuels and to prepare for and 
suppress wildland fires are interrelated, the cohesive strategy we 
previously recommended for responding to wildland fires is fundamental 
if agencies are to contain costs. 

Background: 

Wildland fires ignited by lightning are both natural and inevitable and 
play an important ecological role on the nation's landscape. In 
addition to maintaining habitat diversity, releasing soil nutrients, 
and causing the seeds of fire-dependent species to germinate, fire 
periodically removes undergrowth, small trees, and vegetation that can 
otherwise build up and intensify subsequent fires. However, various 
human land use and management practices, including decades of 
suppressing wildland fires, have altered the normal frequency of fires 
in many forest and rangeland ecosystems, leading to 
uncharacteristically dense vegetation and atypical fire patterns in 
some places. At the same time, more homes and communities are being 
built in areas where fires can occur, increasing risks to human life, 
property, and infrastructure. Experts estimate that between 1990 and 
2000, 60 percent of all new housing units in the United States were 
built in the wildland-urban interface, and by 2000, about 38 percent of 
housing units overall were located in the wildland-urban 
interface.[Footnote 3] Recent media reports indicate that this trend of 
growth in the wildland-urban interface continues. Finally, agency 
analyses indicate that climate change and related drought may also be 
responsible for significant increases in the occurrence of, and costs 
of responding to, wildland fire. 

Increases in the size and severity of wildland fires, and in the cost 
of fighting them, have led federal agencies to fundamentally reexamine 
their approach to wildland fire management. For decades, federal 
agencies aggressively suppressed wildland fires and were generally 
successful in decreasing the number of acres burned. In some areas of 
the country, however, rather than eliminating severe wildland fires, 
decades of suppression disrupted ecological cycles and began to change 
the structure and makeup of forests and rangelands, increasing the 
land's susceptibility to fire. Increasingly, the agencies have 
recognized the key role that fire plays in many ecosystems and the 
utility of fire itself as a tool in managing forests and watersheds. 
The agencies worked together to develop the Federal Wildland Fire 
Management Policy in 1995, which for the first time formally recognized 
the essential role that fire plays in maintaining natural systems. This 
policy was subsequently reaffirmed and updated in 2001. In addition to 
noting the negative effects of past wildland fire suppression, the 
policy also recognized that continued development in the wildland-urban 
interface has placed more values at risk from wildland fire while 
increasing the complexity and cost of wildland fire suppression 
operations. 

To help address these trends, the policy directed agencies to consider 
management objectives and the values at risk when determining how or 
whether to suppress a wildland fire. Under this approach, termed 
"appropriate management response," the agencies may fight fires that 
threaten communities or other highly valued areas more aggressively 
than they fight fires in remote areas or in areas where natural fuel 
reduction would be beneficial. In some cases, the agencies may simply 
monitor the fire, or take only limited suppression actions, to ensure 
that it continues to pose little threat to valued resources. Under 
current interagency policy, local federal units must develop land 
management and fire management plans that document approved fire 
management strategies for each acre of burnable land and other 
important information about how the land will be managed, including 
local values at risk, needed local fuel reduction, and rehabilitation 
actions. Once a fire starts, land management and fire management 
specialists are to identify and implement the appropriate management 
response, in accordance with the unit's approved land and fire 
management plans. 

Responding to wildland fires--which can burn across federal and 
nonfederal jurisdictions--often requires coordination and collaboration 
among federal, tribal, state, and local firefighting entities to 
effectively protect lives, homes, and resources. Five federal agencies--
the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife 
Service, and National Park Service within the Department of the 
Interior--fight wildland fires. These federal agencies work together 
with nonfederal firefighting entities to share personnel, equipment, 
and supplies and to fight fires, regardless of which entities have 
jurisdiction over the burning lands. Agreements developed and agreed to 
by cooperating entities, commonly referred to as master agreements, 
govern cooperative fire protection efforts and include general 
provisions for sharing firefighting costs among responsible entities. 

Agencies Need a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Problems: 

Agencies need a cohesive strategy that identifies the available long- 
term options and associated funding for reducing excess vegetation and 
responding to wildland fires if the agencies and the Congress are to 
make informed decisions about an effective and affordable long-term 
approach for addressing problems that have been decades in the making. 
We first recommended that the agencies develop such a strategy for 
addressing fuels in 1999. After we evaluated a number of related 
wildland fire management issues, we reiterated our recommendation in 
2005 and 2006 but also recognized that a comprehensive solution needs 
to address not only reducing fuels but also an overall response to 
wildland fire. To develop an effective overall strategy, agencies need 
to complete several key tasks, which address weaknesses we previously 
identified. 

Our 2005 report summarized several weaknesses in the federal 
government's management of fuel reduction and related wildland fire 
programs and identified a number of actions to address these 
weaknesses.[Footnote 4] Specifically, these weaknesses included the 
following: the agencies lacked basic data, such as the extent and 
location of lands needing fuel reduction; the agencies needed to 
identify and prioritize fuel reduction projects; many federal land 
management units did not have fire management plans that met agency 
requirements designed to restore fire's natural role in ecosystems 
consistent with human health and safety; and the agencies were unable 
to assess the extent to which they were reducing wildland fire risks, 
to establish meaningful fuel reduction performance measures, or to 
determine the cost-effectiveness of these efforts because they lacked 
needed data. We also identified a number of tasks the agencies needed 
to complete to develop a cohesive strategy. These tasks included 
finishing data systems that are needed to identify the extent, 
severity, and location of wildland fire threats in our national forests 
and rangelands; updating local fire management plans to better specify 
the actions needed to effectively address these threats; and assessing 
the cost-effectiveness and affordability of options for reducing fuels 
and responding to wildland fire problems. 

The agencies have made some progress on the three primary tasks we 
identified as important to developing a wildland fire management 
strategy, although concerns have been raised about when or whether the 
agencies will successfully complete them. More specifically, 

* LANDFIRE, a geospatial data and modeling system, is being designed to 
assist the agencies in identifying the extent, severity, and location 
of wildland fire threats to the nation's communities and ecosystems. 
LANDFIRE data are nearly complete for most of the western United 
States, with data for the remainder of the country scheduled to be 
completed in 2009. The agencies will need to ensure, however, that 
LANDFIRE data are kept current in order to reflect landscape-altering 
events, such as large fires and hurricanes, and they do not yet have a 
plan to do so. 

* In 2006, we reported that 95 percent of the agencies' individual land 
management units had completed fire management plans in accordance with 
agency requirements promulgated in 2001. However, the agencies do not 
require regular plan updates to ensure that new data (from LANDFIRE, 
for example) are incorporated into the plans. Moreover, in the wake of 
two court decisions--each holding that the Forest Service was required 
to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental impact 
statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)[Footnote 
5] to accompany the relevant fire management plan--the Forest Service 
decided to withdraw the two plans instead of completing them. It is 
unclear whether the agency would withdraw other fire management plans 
successfully challenged under NEPA; nor is it clear whether or to what 
extent such agency decisions could undermine the interagency policy 
directing that every burnable acre have a fire management plan. Without 
such plans, however, current agency policy does not allow use of the 
entire range of wildland fire response strategies, including less 
aggressive, and potentially less costly, strategies. 

* The Fire Program Analysis (FPA) system is a computer-based model 
designed to assist the agencies in cost-effectively allocating the 
resources necessary to address wildland fires. FPA is being designed in 
two phases. Phase I was intended to provide information for use in 
allocating resources for the initial responses to fires and in 
developing estimates for agencies' fiscal year 2008 budgets. Phase II 
was to be focused on additional activities, including fuel reduction 
and large-fire suppression. A "midcourse review" of FPA, completed in 
2006, however, has resulted in recent endorsement by the Wildland Fire 
Leadership Council[Footnote 6] of what may be significant design 
modifications to FPA--ones that may not fulfill key project goals of 
(1) optimizing how resources are allocated, (2) linking fuel reduction 
to future preparedness and suppression costs, (3) ensuring 
comparability among different agencies' analyses and resulting 
decisions, and (4) enabling aggregation of local costs to identify 
national options and related budgets. Agencies plan to have a prototype 
of phase II, reflecting this design modification, completed by June 
2007. According to a program official, the prototype will enable 
project managers to assess and report to the leadership council on the 
planned scope, schedule, and cost of FPA, including whether or not they 
will meet the scheduled completion date of June 2008. Further, gaps in 
the data collected for FPA may also reduce its usefulness in allocating 
resources. 

Although the agencies had made progress on these three primary tasks at 
the time of our 2006 update, they had not developed either a cohesive 
strategy identifying options for reducing fuels or a joint tactical 
plan outlining the critical steps, together with related time frames, 
the agencies would take to complete a cohesive strategy, as we 
recommended in our 2005 report. In February 2006, the agencies issued 
an interagency document titled Protecting People and Natural Resources: 
A Cohesive Fuels Treatment Strategy, but we found that the document did 
not identify long-term options or associated funding for reducing fuels 
and responding to wildland fires. During our update, officials from the 
Office of Management and Budget stated that it would not allow the 
agencies to publish long-term funding estimates until the agencies had 
sufficiently reliable data on which to base the estimates. The agencies 
commented that having such data would not be possible until LANDFIRE 
and FPA were more fully operational. We continue to believe that until 
a cohesive strategy can be developed, it is essential that the agencies 
create a tactical plan for developing this strategy, so the Congress 
understands the steps and time frames involved in completing the 
strategy. 

Better Guidance Needed to Clarify Sharing of Suppression Costs between 
Federal and Nonfederal Entities: 

Federal agencies need to take steps to improve the framework for 
sharing wildland fire suppression costs between federal and nonfederal 
entities. Effective sharing of suppression costs among responsible 
entities can play a role in helping to contain federal expenditures, 
especially with the growing number of homes in areas at risk from 
wildland fire that may require protection. We recommended in our 2006 
report that federal agencies work with relevant state entities to 
clarify the financial responsibilities for suppressing fires that burn, 
or threaten to burn, across multiple jurisdictions and provide more 
specific guidance as to when particular cost-sharing methods should be 
used.[Footnote 7] As of January 2007, the agencies were updating 
guidance on options for sharing costs and under what circumstances each 
would typically be used, but it is unclear how the agencies will ensure 
that such guidance is followed. 

We found that federal and nonfederal entities used a variety of methods 
to share the costs of fighting wildland fires affecting both federal 
and nonfederal lands and resources. Agreements between federal and 
nonfederal entities--known as master agreements--provide the framework 
for those entities to share suppression costs for wildland fires that 
burn or threaten both federal and nonfederal lands and resources. These 
agreements typically list several available cost-sharing methods. The 
agreements we reviewed, however, often lacked clear guidance for 
officials to use in deciding which method to apply for a specific fire. 
Clear guidance is important because local representatives of federal 
and nonfederal firefighting entities responsible for protecting lands 
and resources affected by the fire use this guidance in deciding which 
costs will be shared and for what period. We found, however, that cost- 
sharing methods were applied inconsistently within and among states, 
even for fires with similar characteristics. For example, in one state 
we reviewed, the costs for suppressing a large fire that threatened 
homes were shared solely according to the proportion of acres burned 
within each entity's area of fire protection responsibility, a method 
that has traditionally been used. Yet costs for a similar fire within 
the same state were shared differently. For this fire, the state agreed 
to pay for certain aircraft and fire engines used to protect the 
wildland-urban interface, while the remaining costs were shared on the 
basis of acres burned. In contrast to the two methods applied in this 
state, officials in another state used yet a different cost-sharing 
method for two similar large fires that threatened homes, apportioning 
costs each day for personnel, aircraft, and equipment deployed on 
particular lands, such as the wildland-urban interface. The type of 
cost-sharing method ultimately used can have significant financial 
consequences for the entities involved, potentially amounting to 
millions of dollars. Moreover, as we reported, federal officials 
expressed concern that the existing cost-sharing framework insulated 
state and local governments from the cost of providing wildland fire 
protection in the wildland-urban interface, thus reducing the incentive 
for state and local governments to adopt laws--such as building codes 
that require fire-resistant materials in areas at high risk of wildland 
fires--that in the long run could help reduce the cost of suppressing 
wildland fires. 

We recommended in our 2006 report that the federal agencies work with 
relevant state entities to clarify the financial responsibility for 
fires that burn, or threaten to burn, across multiple jurisdictions and 
develop more specific guidance as to when particular cost-sharing 
methods should be used. The federal agencies generally agreed with our 
findings and recommendations and agreed to improve the guidance on 
sharing suppression costs. As of January 2007, the agencies were 
updating guidance that can be used when developing master agreements 
between cooperating federal and nonfederal entities, as well as 
agreements on how to share costs for a specific fire. Agency officials 
said that this guidance provides additional information about potential 
methods for sharing costs and about the circumstances under which each 
cost-sharing method would typically be used. It is unclear, however, 
how the agencies will ensure that the guidance is followed. Further, 
because master agreements are updated only every 5 years, it may take a 
number of years before the new guidance is fully incorporated into 
master agreements between cooperating entities. 

Lack of Clear Goals and Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies' Efforts to 
Contain Wildland Fire Costs: 

Preliminary findings from our ongoing work for the committee show that, 
despite dozens of federal and nonfederal studies issued since 2000 that 
consistently identified similar areas needing improvement to help 
contain wildland fire costs, the agencies have made little progress in 
addressing these areas. Areas identified as needing improvement to help 
contain costs--in addition to reducing fuels and cost sharing discussed 
previously--include acquiring and using firefighting personnel and 
equipment, selecting appropriate strategies for responding to wildland 
fires, and effectively managing cost-containment efforts. Although the 
agencies have begun taking steps to address some of the areas previous 
studies have identified as needing improvement, much work remains to be 
done. For example: 

* Acquiring and using personnel and equipment. The agencies have taken 
steps to improve their ability to track and deploy personnel and 
equipment, but they have made little progress in completing the more 
fundamental step of determining the quantity and type of firefighting 
assets needed based on an analysis of values at risk and appropriate 
suppression strategies. Further, although the Forest Service has 
identified a series of improvements it plans to make in the acquisition 
process, it has so far made little progress. 

* Selecting appropriate suppression strategies. The agencies have also 
begun to improve analytic tools that assist land and fire managers 
identify the appropriate suppression strategy for a given fire, but 
shortcomings remain. Federal policies encourage the use of less 
intensive suppression strategies when possible, strategies that may 
also be less costly. Land and fire managers, however, may be reluctant 
to employ anything less than full suppression because of concerns that 
a fire will escape control. Currently, much of the information managers 
use to estimate potential fire size, risks, and costs are based on 
their individual experiences, which can vary widely. Researchers are 
developing a new suite of tools that will analyze fuel conditions and 
predicted weather conditions to model expected fire growth and behavior 
and provide better information for managers making fire response 
decisions, but as of January 2007, these new tools were still being 
developed and tested. 

* Managing cost-containment efforts. The steps the agencies have taken 
to date to contain wildland fire costs lack several key elements 
fundamental to sound program management, such as clearly defining cost- 
containment goals, developing a strategy for achieving those goals, and 
measuring progress toward achieving them. First, the agencies have not 
clearly articulated the goals of their cost-containment efforts. For 
cost-containment efforts to be effective, the agencies need to 
integrate cost-containment goals with the other goals of the wildland 
fire program--such as protecting life, property, and resources. For 
example, the agencies have established the goal of suppressing wildland 
fires at minimum cost, considering firefighter and public safety and 
values being protected, but they have not defined criteria by which 
these often-competing objectives are to be weighed. Second, although 
the agencies are undertaking a variety of steps designed to help 
contain wildland fire costs, the agencies have not developed, and 
agency officials to this point have been unable to articulate, a clear 
plan for how these efforts fit together or the extent to which they 
will assist in containing costs. Finally, the agencies are developing a 
statistical model of fire suppression costs that they plan to use to 
identify when the cost for an individual fire may have been excessive. 
The model compares a fire's cost to the costs of suppressing previous 
fires with similar characteristics. However, such comparisons with 
previous fires' costs may not fully consider the potential for managers 
to select less aggressive--and potentially less costly--suppression 
strategies. In addition, the model is still under development and may 
take a number of years to fully refine. Without clear program goals and 
objectives, and corresponding performance measures to evaluate 
progress, the agencies lack the tools to be able to determine the 
effectiveness of their cost-containment efforts. 

Conclusions: 

The federal government is expending substantial effort and billions of 
dollars in attempting to address our nation's wildland fire problems. 
Yet despite promises to do so, the agencies still cannot articulate how 
the steps they are taking fit together to form a comprehensive and 
cohesive strategy to contain costs or to address the many wildland fire 
management problems we and others have reported over the last 7 years. 
Given the interrelated nature of wildland fire issues, they cannot be 
addressed in isolation but must be viewed from and addressed within a 
broader perspective. Agencies need to understand how each issue affects 
the others and determine the trade-offs required to effectively meet 
program goals while containing program costs. Therefore, if the 
agencies and the Congress are to make informed decisions about an 
effective and affordable long-term approach to responding to these 
issues, agencies need to first develop clearly defined program goals 
and objectives and a strategy to achieve them, including identifying 
associated funding. Because it will likely be at least 2009 before the 
agencies develop a strategy for fuel reduction efforts that would meet 
standards required by the Office of Management and Budget, we continue 
to believe that in the interim, it is essential that the agencies 
create a tactical plan for developing this strategy, so that the 
Congress understands the steps and time frames involved with its 
completion. In doing so, the agencies need to make very clear how the 
final design of FPA will meet the key program goals enumerated here, 
how and when the agencies will complete all fire management plans, and 
what schedule they envision for periodically updating LANDFIRE data. At 
the same time, to help address the rising cost of protecting the 
growing number of homes built in the wildland urban interface--a cost 
that may be disproportionately borne by the federal government--federal 
agencies also need to work with relevant state entities to ensure that 
appropriate methods are used for sharing the costs of suppressing fires 
that burn, or threaten to burn, across multiple jurisdictions. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Committee may 
have at this time. 

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For further information about this testimony, please contact me at 
(202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this statement. David P. Bixler, Assistant Director; Ellen W. 
Chu; Jonathan Dent; Janet Frisch; Chester Joy; and Richard Johnson made 
key contributions to this statement. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to 
Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats, GAO-06-
671R (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006); Wildland Fire Management: 
Important Progress Has Been Made, but Challenges Remain to Completing a 
Cohesive Strategy, GAO-05-147 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005). 

[2] GAO, Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises 
Concerns about Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities, 
GAO-06-570 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2006). 

[3] The wildland-urban interface is defined as the area where 
structures and other human developments meet or intermingle with 
undeveloped wildland. 

[4] GAO-05-147. 

[5] For major federal actions that significantly affect the quality of 
the human environment, the National Environmental Policy Act requires 
all federal agencies to analyze the environmental impact of the 
proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 

[6] The Wildland Fire Leadership Council was established in April 2002 
to support the implementation and coordination of federal wildland fire 
management activities. The council includes membership from Agriculture 
and Interior, as well as the agencies with wildland fire management 
responsibilities. 

[7] GAO-06-570. 

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