Special Report

• Political and economic liberalization in Africa have yielded mixed results, complicated by persistent armed conflicts.
• The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) is at the forefront of efforts to promote enhanced investments in poorer countries that undertake political, legal, and economic reforms.
• Although good governance has been high on the agenda of African countries since the 1980s, state erosion, corruption, and institutional weakness characterize the public sector in many countries.
• The declining security of African peoples as a consequence of warfare, predatory officials, and weak economies should not be eclipsed in the international community's pursuit of anti-terrorism campaigns.
• Two decades of economic reforms with high inflows of development assistance have failed to generate sustainable growth in Africa in large part because of profound institutional deficiencies.
• The "African predicament" is a global issue requiring the mobilization of institutional capacities in many sectors: corporate, civic, religious, philanthropic, governmental, and educational.
• "Smart partnerships" between peoples and institutions should be tailored to the wide divergences among African countries and even among zones within particular countries.
• A significant increase in the funding of policy-relevant research involving African and non-African institutions is needed to distill lessons learned regarding governance, state-building, human security, and impediments to economic growth.
• A new strategic framework for African development would take into account transnational demographic, communication, and governance trends that facilitate the pursuit of alternatives to state-centric models.

Introduction

The World Food Programme distributes food in Zimbabwe, Africa. 558,000 people face food shortages in Zimbabwe due to drought, Government land acquisition activities, rising maize prices and economic downturn.
Photo courtesy The World Food Programme

In February 1990, a new political era began in Africa with the convening of a national conference in the West African nation of Benin that led to the peaceful deposition of longtime ruler Mathieu Kerekou and a transition to a constitutional democracy. Although Kerekou returned to power via competitive elections in 1996, Benin has persisted as a pluralist democracy. The same is true of several other countries in Africa, such as Ghana, Mali, and Senegal. Less than five years after this dramatic start of what was optimistically hailed as Africa's "second independence," analysts began calling attention to its many shortcomings. The conclusions that emerged from these exercises have been regularly confirmed: many of the new democracies are really liberalized autocracies; public institutions continue to be fragile and inefficient; and deliberately instigated violence increasingly determines political outcomes.

The "African predicament" is one of the terms now used to refer to the overlapping and mutually reinforcing crises in many parts of contemporary Africa. These problems include state erosion, armed conflict, authoritarian governance, political corruption, low economic growth and stagnation, ethnic and religious clashes, the misuse of mineral and ecological resources, the pandemic of HIV/AIDS, and the wide impact of other debilitating afflictions such as malaria and tuberculosis. Despite two decades of intensive reform efforts backed by substantial foreign financial assistance, the basic security and quality of life of many of Africa's peoples remain highly deficient. An era that began with great hopes in Benin and several other African countries staggered to a close with the politically motivated turmoil in Zimbabwe and that country's disastrous presidential elections of March 2002.

Aid for Reforms: A New Era?

In July 2001, a bold document was endorsed in Lusaka, Zambia, in a summit of African heads of state that advances a comprehensive agenda for the promotion of peace, development, human rights, and sound economic management in the continent. After merging prior proposals from Senegal and South Africa, the program is now called the New Partnership for Africa's Development or NEPAD. There is near complete congruence between NEPAD and the Monterrey Consensus that issued from the International Conference on Financing for Development under the sponsorship of the United Nations in Mexico on March 18–22, 2002. The essence of NEPAD and the Monterrey Consensus was cogently expressed in a New York Times op ed by UN secretary general Kofi Annan on the eve of the Mexico meeting: "There is a new deal on the table: when developing countries fight corruption, strengthen their institutions, adopt market-oriented policies, respect human rights and the rule of law, and spend more on the needs of the poor, rich countries can support them with trade, aid, investment, and debt relief" (March 17, 2002).

Announcements by President George W. Bush before and after the Monterrey Conference signaled that the United States had adopted these principles and the main elements of this "new deal." While pledging a significant increase in U.S. foreign aid, the U.S. president emphasized that these commitments will be based on a "compact" between rich and poor nations in which the latter, to qualify for new aid allocations, must pursue "a broad range of political, legal, and economic reforms." Adopting the terminology prominent in African and UN documents, these supplementary allocations will constitute a Millennial Challenge Fund with its own criteria for disbursement.

Under the aegis of NEPAD, many African leaders have agreed to meet key preconditions for recovery: good governance, conflict resolution, the rule of law, macroeconomic stability, and the curbing of corruption. NEPAD deliberations, in which the South African government played the main mobilizing role, have generated a positive echo among Africa's major development partners, who have pledged to fulfil their side of the compact by providing enhanced financial assistance and greater facilitation of trade and investments. The most innovative dimension of NEPAD will be the creation of a "peer review mechanism." In place of the intrusive role that Western nations increasingly played in promoting economic and political reforms, African governments now promise to establish their own monitoring mechanism to devise more acceptable ways of ensuring compliance with international norms. At a NEPAD meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, on March 26, 2002, eight codes of behavior were proposed, and it was further agreed that a "credible African institute" would administer these codes "separate from the political process and structures."

The many meetings convened in Africa and internationally under the auspices of NEPAD have attracted attention to African commitments to major reforms and accelerated development. Moreover, NEPAD is at the forefront of activities to build a new relationship between poor countries and the world community with the aim of expanding private markets and increasing direct foreign investments. The Monterrey Consensus acknowledges NEPAD as embodying the kind of "development frameworks at the regional level" that should be encouraged. Moreover, the provisions of the consensus synthesize recommendations that can be found in many recent reports of the United Nations and its specialized agencies: "Good governance is essential for sustainable development. Sound economic policies, solid democratic institutions responsive to the needs of the people and improved infrastructure are the basis for sustained economic growth, poverty eradication and employment creation. Freedom, peace and security, domestic stability, respect for human rights, including the right to development, and the rule of law, gender equality, market-oriented policies, and an overall commitment to just and democratic societies are also essential and mutually reinforcing."

With everyone lining up smartly behind these principles and goals, we should be witnessing a new wave of enthusiasm about the prospects for African recovery and renewal. NEPAD is officially sanctioned by the Organization of African Unity, soon to be the African Union; it is spearheaded by two of the most powerful countries in Africa, South Africa and Nigeria, with further leadership provided by Algeria and Senegal; it has brought within its framework several African agencies such as the UN Economic Commission for Africa and the African Development Bank; it has become the basis for negotiations between African countries and bilateral and multilateral donors; and it has expanded its list of concerns to embrace almost the totality of political, economic, and social issues in the continent.

In effect, NEPAD has emerged as the "only game in town" on matters involving Africa's relationship with the industrialized world. Chaired by President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, NEPAD's Implementation Committee declared in October 2001: "all other initiatives promoted by individual African countries should be subsumed under the NEPAD process, [which will] represent a basis on which Africa can collectively and effectively cooperate with its development partners." Following a NEPAD meeting in Dakar in February 2002, led by Tony Blair and Abdoulaye Wade, leaders respectively of the British and Senegalese governments, a joint communiquÈ affirmed NEPAD's role as "the main vehicle for Africa's development."

NEPAD has therefore been extraordinarily successful in developing a continental framework in which to promote the "African Renaissance" long advocated by President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa. At the G-8 meeting in Alberta, Canada, on June 26-28 2002, it is expected that a formal response will be made by the industrialized countries to NEPAD's requests for various measures to accelerate African development. One of NEPAD's key targets is generating over $60 billion in annual investments for Africa to bring average economic growth to seven percent. While the stirring principles enunciated in NEPAD documents, especially African ownership, leadership, and responsibility, have been widely applauded, outside the circle of political leaders and government officials the response has been muted skepticism. In view of the high stakes involved, not only for Africa but the global community, it is important that all concerns be fully aired, and that a wider debate ensue regarding possible alternatives and complementary approaches.

Governance and State-Building in Africa

Good governance has been at the top of the agenda of international development agencies, alongside market reforms, since the 1980s. It featured prominently in meetings of the Global Coalition for Africa, sponsored initially by the Dutch Government and the World Bank, throughout the 1990s. Hopes for African sustainable development have come to rest on several "preconditions": the emergence of more effective governing institutions, respect for the rule of law, the curbing of corruption, the transparent management of public finances, and executive agencies being held accountable horizontally (by parliaments and judiciaries) and vertically (by civil society and periodic national elections). In its comprehensive draft of July 2001, NEPAD advocates "strengthening the political and administrative framework of participating countries, in line with the principles of democracy, transparency, accountability, integrity, respect for human rights and promotion of the rule of law." What remains to be demonstrated is how these longstanding aspirations will finally be reflected in actual practice. Many wonderful constitutions and codes of conduct have been devised in Africa that bear little relationship to how power is exercised.

Despite the abundance of scholarly analyses of state failure, erosion, contraction, and declining legitimacy in Africa, these studies have had little discernible impact on the policies of major donors. NEPAD acknowledges the importance of building state capacity, and it identifies many of the relevant needs, such as strengthening parliamentary oversight, increasing participatory decision-making, combating corruption, and implementing judicial reforms. The gap between these laudatory objectives and the realities of institutional ineffectiveness in Africa, however, is considerable. Some of the pertinent studies of these phenomena include J. F. Bayart, R. Ellis, and B. Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa (1999), R. Joseph, ed., State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa (1999), J. Herbst, States and Power in Africa (2000), and P. Englebert, State Legitimacy and Development in Africa (2000). According to Englebert, "there is now a broad consensus that what has most distinguished Africa from the rest of the world over the last three-and-a-half decades is the weak capacity of its states to respond to environmental, external, and other supply shocks and to design appropriate policies and institutions for growth."

Almost a decade ago, I made the following relevant observation in a seminar presentation that has been echoed in many other studies: "Zaire is not the only country in which the 'state' disappears a short drive outside its capital or the area of residence of its president. Where civil servants are irregularly paid and funds for normal functions are absent, government offices may exist in various localities but nothing of consequence takes place within them. The governing structures have thus joined the hospitals and infirmaries that lack medicines and equipment and schools that lack books and chairs. In addition to the 'failed or collapsed states,' there are many cases in Africa of the advanced erosion or atrophy of the state."

Today, for most students of African government and politics, the African "state" has become a problematic entity (Will Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, 1998). The evidence is extensive: citizens no longer looking to the state for basic protection of life and property but rather seeking escape from predatory state officials; the state becoming an instrument of domination by one or other ethnic group or clan; warlords bulldozing their way to control of the state; and entrenched leaders turning national armies into private militias. These and other documented trends cannot be overlooked as donor countries are asked to increase resource flows substantially, and private investors are encouraged to take up the many lagging economic opportunities in Africa.

Recommendations

• A major research initiative is needed that focuses on the realities of weak governance and declining stateness in Africa and seeks to identify what can be done, in concrete ways, to bring about positive changes. In this effort, Africa must be disaggregated. There are different Africas, ranging from highly functional and democratic states to the dysfunctional and conflict-plagued. There is an urgent need for policy-relevant research projects that would identify incremental advances that can be made within countries depending on the presence or absence of critical features. In brief, plausible and differentiated road maps of reform and recovery should be designed.
• There are valuable lessons to be distilled from the multiplicity of governance reforms attempted in Africa during the past two decades by the World Bank and the overseas development agencies of several countries. What are the examples of moderate success and what factors explain them? There should be greater sponsorship of the work of African institutes in such efforts and support for collaborative work between these centers and their counterparts in other countries. And donors should take greater account of their findings in the design of assistance programs.
• Democracy promotion, considered intrinsic to improving governance in Africa, has become increasingly problematic. It is now the exceptional case, such as Ghana between 1992 and 2000, that national elections contribute to the consolidation of constitutional government, permit the popular will to be manifested, and facilitate peaceful transfers of power. In particular, new strategies should be devised to counter the systematic undermining of multiparty elections as vehicles for democratic change. Although these issues have been debated extensively by Africa scholars and civil society activists, their deliberations have had little apparent impact on the ritualistic conduct of election monitoring. The continued entrenchment of "democracy as presentability" fosters cynicism among all participants: regimes, opposition groups, and external agencies.
• One of the most vital issues in Africa today, for which there has been even less of a policy response than for election reform, concerns the non-viability of many states as nation-states. The story of how African states derived their particular territorial configurations is well known, and so also is the commitment to maintaining the boundaries bequeathed by colonialism. Misgivings about the design of African states, in their international boundaries as well as their structures of government, can no longer be sidestepped, especially in view of the proliferation of armed conflicts. The initiation of a new era of internationally supported reforms is an ideal moment to grapple with this issue. Even elected governments, such as Nigeria's since 1999, have preferred to evade rather than address demands for the restructuring of the federation. The 120th anniversary of the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, which commenced the "Scramble for Africa" among aspirant colonial powers, would be an appropriate time to initiate a thorough examination of the coherence, legitimacy, viability, and configuration of Africa's states. Of relevance to this effort, in addition to studies already cited, are Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System (1996), and Crawford Young and Mark Beissinger, Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective (2002).

Anti-Terrorism and Africa's Security Needs

Slow or stagnant economic growth in much of Africa, state erosion, and the instrumental use of violence by autocratic and militia leaders have steadily eroded the security of Africa's peoples. Catastrophic incidents such as the eruption of a volcano in Goma, Congo, the explosion of an armory in Lagos, Nigeria, the generally poor state of health and education facilities, and sluggish government responses to the HIV/AIDS pandemic are just some of the indications of diminished popular security. While attention is occasionally drawn to the security needs of civilians trapped between armed groups, or confined to refugee camps, the more common whittling away of the securities of life and property is seldom considered in its breadth and depth. A notable exception was a joint meeting of the International Peace Academy and the Economic Commission of West African States in Abuja, Nigeria, in September 2001, which concluded that "the link between security, democratization and governance is made more explicit by the increasing demand by ordinary people for a more people-centered approach to security than the traditional focus on regime survival. In West Africa, security forces (police, military, paramilitary and intelligence) still remain a source of great insecurity. These forces often mete out indiscriminate violence against civilians."

A global anti-terrorism campaign, under the leadership of the United States government, was launched following the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Some African countries, such as Somalia and Sudan, consequently became targets of intense scrutiny. Of wider concern is the danger of African governments shielding domestic misrule—as occurred frequently during the Cold War—by manipulating the security anxieties of Western powers. It would be tragic if Africa's considerable security needs were eclipsed by the hunt for Islamic extremists. Here are some of the factors that should be taken into consideration:

• The combined effects of Cold War geopolitics and predatory governance have rendered many Africans wards of the international community.
• Excess deaths (civilian deaths that exceed normal mortality rates) from warfare are estimated in the millions, and would be multiples of that figure if the social consequences of misrule were included.
• Outward migration continues to drain Africa of many of its skilled and educated citizens, but also of individuals with modest credentials who brave immense hardship to reach the shores of southern Europe.
• Even countries with large resource flows from mineral exports (Angola, Cameroon, Nigeria) have not demonstrated the capacity to channel these into productive economic and social investments.
• States, and proto-state entities led by warlords, are the principal progenitors of terror in Africa. In much of the continent, warfare and civil politics have become flip sides of the same coin as rulers neutralize resurgent civil society and political groups through the instrumental use of state violence (R. Joseph, "Africa 1990–1997: From Abertura to Closure," Journal of Democracy, 1998). In the case of Liberia, massive insecurities have induced political and civic leaders to appeal to the world community for the creation of "an International Security Stabilization Force to take charge of national security."

Recommendations

• A comprehensive evaluation of Africa's homeland security needs should be undertaken. To render such a task manageable, it should be broken down according to the "different Africas" mentioned above. The views of civil and community groups should be given as much consideration as those of existing governments. The initial aim of such an exercise would be to establish the degrees of security and insecurity actually experienced by the people of Africa. This exercise would provide a mapping of different zones of insecurity (which would not necessarily coincide with national boundaries), identify their main causes, and advance practical remedies.
• Many Africa observers would concur with the recommendation made by Robert Rotberg: "an absolute refusal to lend and donate in the absence of the rule of law, good governance, and sensible economic policy" ("Africa's Mess, Mugabe's Mayhem," Foreign Affairs, 2000). At a time when enhanced financial transfers are being advocated by African leaders, and when the U.S. government is preparing strict criteria for their disbursement, an authoritative review should be conducted of the achievements and failures of political and economic conditionalities since the 1980s. In view of the growing distress of many of Africa's peoples, and the responsibility of many existing regimes for it, a promise by such regimes that things will be different this time around is obviously insufficient. Since external conditionalities have often failed, and the peer review mechanism proposed by NEPAD remains to be seen, alternative approaches should be developed with the aim of enhancing the security of the African poor, who constitute an overwhelming majority of their countries' population.
• The use of violence and terror, especially against non-combatants, is today a major international concern, especially after the World Trade Center attack and the intensification of Israeli-Palestinian warfare. In the case of Africa, politically motivated violence and terror, complicated by vigilantism, are becoming commonplace. Few inroads have been made against the "culture of impunity" that gravely undermines state legitimacy. The time has come for the many human rights organizations involved in Africa to mount an international campaign aimed at calling attention to this scourge. There should be vigorous condemnation and prosecution of its perpetrators. The systematic compiling of the evidence that resulted in the prosecution of the former Yugoslav ruler, Slobodan Milosevic, can be replicated with regard to the most egregious purveyors of war crimes in Africa. The establishment of the International Criminal Court should facilitate such exercises.

Political Impediments to Economic Growth

NEPAD and the Monterrey Consensus both emphasize the importance of sound economic policies, especially those that facilitate the expansion of the private sector. Africa's marginalization from the global economy has been reflected in its declining share of world trade and direct foreign investment. The relevant data has been systematically collected and presented by a consortium of African and international agencies in Can Africa Reclaim the 21st Century? (World Bank, 2000). Most African countries have now undergone between one and two decades of externally supported programs aimed at generating more efficient and productive market economies. The African Growth and Opportunity Act, enacted during the Clinton administration and currently being broadened by its successor, places the expansion of trade and investment at the center of U.S.-Africa policy.

Urgent attention should be devoted to the many studies that highlight the political impediments to economic growth in Africa. A leading student of these efforts, Nicolas van de Walle, has investigated "the failure of African economies to renew with sustained economic growth over the last twenty years." Here are the main causes he identifies in his study, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–99 (2001): "The central argument of this book is that . . . the real constraints on policy are to be found within the state itself. Three kinds of factors are emphasized in particular: clientelism, low state capacity, and the ideological preferences of decision makers. . . . Second, I argue that the aid relationship between Western donors and most African regimes has exacerbated these domestic obstacles to reform. Neo-patrimonial rulers could not have resisted the pressure of international markets for two decades had they not had the assistance of the international community; large amounts of aid to the state coupled with imperfect conditionality of reform program lending have allowed African governments to get away with partial reform."

Van de Walle's study is not only a sweeping portrayal of the failure to transform Africa's low-performing economies, it also makes a strong case that the factors most responsible for the disappointing outcomes are largely unchanged. The wave of democratic transitions since 1990, he argues, has not altered the exercise of power nor the "toothless conditionality" of external donors. It is difficult to reconcile van de Walle's critique with the promises currently being made by African governments and major international donors. The criteria for granting aid and loans have been refined, over and again, and applied by the U.S. Agency for International Development and other agencies. Van de Walle's conclusions confirm earlier studies of the ineffectiveness of the conditionalities regime by such scholars as Thomas Callaghy and BÈatrice Hibou. Other factors and considerations usually intervened to influence the allocation of grant funds and distort their utilization (T. M. Callaghy and J. Ravenhill, eds., Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline, 1993; and B. Hibou, L'Afrique est-elle protectionniste? 1996).

Recommendations

• The marriage of external donors and reform-promising governments has not produced the desired offspring of sustainable growth in Africa. Instead, according to van de Walle, there has been a recentralization of executive power, decline in the capacity of public institutions, reduced social services, heightened corruption, and the intensification of factional struggles over state offices. Simultaneously, the greater intrusiveness of donors in determining economic strategies, and the provision of a "large and historically unprecedented flow of resources," have resulted in the entrenchment of regimes irrespective of their economic failings. Can these cycles be broken? This vital question should not be left to the efforts of a few determined scholars. Tens of billions of dollars in new aid funds are currently being requested in the name of Africa's distressed peoples and societies. The Office of the UN Secretary General, which has been successful in generating increased commitments to development assistance, can perhaps take the lead in demonstrating that now more is on the table than elaborate promises that the old practices will somehow work again.
• Alongside the omnibus framework created by NEPAD, a variety of leaner or "smart" partnerships should be considered. Several African countries—or particular states or provinces of large countries such as Nigeria—that have achieved even the partial reforms described by van de Walle in governance, the rule of law, and economic policy should be invited to take part in multi-year engagements in which key institutions in each field would be matched with their counterparts overseas. Instead of envisioning partnerships at the level of governments, what should be considered are partnerships between peoples and institutions. In the case of the United States, an important component of the Millennial Aid Fund proposed by President Bush could provide support for strategic partnerships between American and African institutions that would be rigorously based on performance rather than promise. Many of the trained Africans who now migrate to the United States can be encouraged to work at home if afforded institutional contexts in which they can effectively use their talents. The great potential for American corporations, universities, health care institutions, policy and training institutes, and religious and charitable bodies to contribute to African development through the creation of smart partnerships has been barely tapped. The record is clear: commitments made only between governments are subject to dilution because of national security concerns and patrimonial politics.
• Sustainable development is not possible in Africa without, at a minimum, better-run public institutions, law-based governance, and a sharp reduction in corruption. Development organizations such as the World Bank, bilateral agencies of many Western countries, and scholarly and policy centers have acquired considerable knowledge about governance, stateness, and market reforms in Africa. There is a need to translate this knowledge into action. Using the model of smart partnerships, it should be possible to establish, concretely, what must be achieved for participating countries, or sub-sections of them, to meet the UN Millennial goals for 2015, such as the halving of the poverty rate. The transnationalizing of Africa, best typified by proliferating networks of traders operating in many Western cities, inexpensive communication technologies, and the declining significance of sovereignty in this global era, may provide unique opportunities and pathways.

Toward a New Strategic Policy Framework

The depths and pervasiveness of the African predicament render it imperative that more fundamental reforms be devised and implemented. Instead of simply echoing, applauding, or criticizing the NEPAD initiative, we need to consider alternative approaches. In addition to the points made above, a coordinated international response could take account of the following observations:

• The African predicament has reached such a scale and has such wide implications that it should be regarded as a global issue. A new strategic policy framework would emphasize, in this globalizing age, the need to mobilize, in Africa and internationally, a wide array of capacities in many sectors—corporate, civic, religious, philanthropic, governmental, educational—to tackle the many problems. What is recommended here would go well beyond the ad hoc and uncoordinated nature of such prior linkages. The ideals of African ownership, leadership, and responsibility are laudable. They are not contradicted, however, by the equally pertinent ones of shared global responsibility and leadership.
• Viable partnerships for development would be premised on a renewal of the social compact and "social citizenship" within Africa. (See Adebayo Olukoshi's concluding chapter in State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa). Partnerships among Africa's diverse peoples, and between governments and their societies, would create firmer bases for partnerships promoted externally. One of the NEPAD leaders, President Abdoulaye Wade, recently referred to the "trade union of presidents" that refused to condemn gross governmental misconduct in Zimbabwe (New York Times, April 10, 2002). It is critical that the voices of other "trade unions" in Africa—of civic, community, educational, business, and religious groups—be heard and that they become active participants in the design and operation of smart partnerships.
• There should be a significant increase in funding for policy-relevant research and collaborative investigations by researchers and practitioners concerned with Africa. In June 1994, a White House Conference on Africa was convened, and academic researchers on Africa worked alongside practitioners in specialized working groups. There was, however, no follow-up to this important and promising initiative. An appropriate and continuing forum should be established and given the mandate to distill policy-relevant findings on the key issues discussed above: governance, state-building, human security, and political impediments to economic growth. Simultaneously, enhanced research, training, and policy dialogues should be sponsored involving Africans and non-Africans.
• The erosion of public institutions in Africa has resulted in the steady expansion of the activities of non-governmental entities, both domestic and international. Thousands of humanitarian and relief organizations have assumed responsibility for providing food, clothing, and health services for the populations of many countries. In responding to the unmet needs of Africa's peoples, the role of these organizations has expanded inexorably and they now provide many basic public goods. The terrain occupied by these organizations will not be reoccupied by most states for the foreseeable future. They are already involved in partnerships for progress and their activities constitute a significant part of the web of Africa's connection with the global community. A new strategic policy framework would take into consideration the structures and dynamics of this shared governance that has evolved de facto in much of the continent.
• What constitutes Africa? The member countries of NEPAD, mirroring the African Union, include democratic, nominally democratic, and authoritarian governments. In addition to the tens of millions of Africans on the continent who are still denied an effective say in how, by whom, and for what ends they are governed, there are now extensive African diasporas that consist of individuals whose talents and energies are fruitfully invested in the development of other lands. In essence, Africa is no longer only in Africa. Vibrant organizations have sprung up among these diasporas. They should be considered essential components of the institutional infrastructure of a Greater Africa with much to contribute to the design and operation of the new partnerships.
• Considerable attention has been directed to making the case for increasing financial flows to Africa though various mechanisms, including debt relief, development grants, and private investments. Attention should also be paid to the abundant resources that have been, and continue to be, dissipated. The hundreds of billions of dollars that Nigeria, for example, has earned from petroleum export since the end of the Biafran war in 1970 should have already made that country, as The Economist once wrote, an "economic colossus." Today, Nigeria's poverty rate is estimated at 70 percent. The discovery of new oil fields in the Gulf of Guinea, is—based on past experience—alarming rather than reassuring news. How can it be assured that these resources will contribute to eliminating the deficiencies discussed above rather than merely fostering more corruption, violent conflict, political disarray, and economic decline in the petro-states bordering the gulf? With the exception of Botswana, no mineral-rich African country has avoided this syndrome after gaining independence from colonial or settler rule. There are undeniably major external barriers to African development, especially access to the markets of industrialized countries. However, African competitiveness in the current global economy will eventually depend on the emergence of domestic politico-economic systems that can match the performance of Africa's competitors. The smart partnerships proposed here could involve corporations, research centers, and government agencies in demonstration projects of how Africa's great underground wealth could contribute to social wealth and welfare above ground.
• At the heart of the African predicament is Africa's failure to establish viable institutions of public life. From Aristide Zolberg's Creating Political Order (1966), Peter Ekeh's "Colonialism and the Two Publics" (1975), Goran Hyden's No Shortcuts to Progress (1983), my own "Affluence and Underdevelopment" (1978) and Democracy and Prebendal Politics (1987), and Michael Bratton and van de Walle's Democratic Experiments in Africa (1997), Africa scholars have returned, time and again, to this critical observation. Africa's future will not differ from the grim present if a Weberian culture of effective and legitimate bureaucratic organization does not take root in African soil. This precept applies to institutions in the private as well as public realm and, of course, to the state itself, which is a complex of institutions. At the center of smart partnerships for African development will be one overriding commitment: building sustainable institutions that actually work as intended. Millions of African economic exiles throughout the world work successfully in such institutions. How this very fundamental but revolutionary step can be made at home is a question for which answers have not been found since Ghana led the way to independence in 1957. From this perspective, Africa's renaissance will be enacted in myriad sites, via partnerships within and without Africa, and will be reflected in the flourishing of legitimate institutions of all types that perform their assigned tasks. Such a process will necessarily involve the adaptation and renewal of institutional forms already present in Africa. Moreover, the dynamic agents of this revolution will be the tens of millions of Africans freed at home from repressive, ineffective, and venal governance.

Conclusion

"Life More Abundant" was one of the slogans used by African nationalist leaders to mobilize their people in the struggle to rid the continent of colonial rule. Four decades later, Africa is mired in a complex of crises. According to Pierre Englebert, "since 1960, Africans have seen their income rise by less than one-half of a percent per year, leaving the continent with the worst development record and the highest concentration of countries with negative growth of all the regions of the world." Today, one of every five Africans lives in a country "severely disrupted by conflict," while the continent's share of the world's absolute poor continues to "grow rentlessly," increasing from 25 to 30 percent in the 1990s (Can Africa Reclaim the 21st Century?). Africa has proportionately more armed conflicts and refugees than any other region; and many African countries cluster at the top of the "corruption scale" of Transparency International and at the bottom of the Human Development index of the United Nations Development Program. To these woes is added the catastrophic impact of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis on African societies.

NEPAD contends that yearly investments in Africa of $64 billion, together with the promise of correcting many operational failings, will generate the level of annual economic growth needed to lift the continent's people from poverty. This Special Report, while acknowledging the admirable principles and aims of NEPAD, advocates a different approach that emphasizes performance over promises. Genuine excitement would be generated worldwide by an Africa in which governments demonstrated respect for their constitutions and laws, state officials at all levels responsibly executed the duties of their offices, public institutions made efficient use of funds provided, political violence and corruption were sharply reduced, the people's needs were dutifully addressed by public and private services, elections were fairly conducted, and the state, once again, became the collective property of its citizens. While none of these virtues are new, in the contemporary African context they would be revolutionary.

It was believed during the 1990s that such an Africa was being nurtured and that power embedded in institutions would thenceforward characterize governance in most states. These hopes have not been realized. While more liberties of speech, association, and movement have been accorded, these are often abruptly circumscribed when invoked to hold governments accountable, or to replace them democratically. Incremental democratization will continue to occur in disparate sites, a few emergent democracies will succeed in becoming consolidated, and such advances will be accompanied at times by improved governance. However, there is little to suggest that these advances will take the form of a wave of irresistible change in the near future.

The likely persistence in Africa during this decade of internecine warfare, institutional fragility, mass poverty, and state weakness compel a more sober, realistic, and differentiated approach to renewal and development. The watchword of such an approach should indeed be "partnership," as I advocated at the start of the continent's last "renaissance" ("Partnership not Patronship," Africa Report, September 1990). However, the last thing Africa needs is another grandiose operation that soaks up massive funds with little to show after myriad meetings have been held and lengthy documents disseminated. Having stumbled in the closing decades of the last century, Africa can regain lost ground by taking advantage of transnational trends. Legitimate and responsible leaders of African institutions at local, provincial, state, and interstate levels should be provided enhanced facilities to forge partnerships with their counterparts throughout the world. The extensive commitments currently being made in response to the AIDS crisis provide ample opportunities to implement such an approach. "Living an ordinary life is a luxury that we can only enjoy in times of peace" (Junji Ito, Asia Society). This statement can serve as the motto of the approach being advocated here. Instead of experiencing "the luxury of an ordinary life," many Africans have had to adapt to the relentless rise in insecurity and uncertainty. As Tony Blair acknowledged at the conference of the British Labour Party in October 2001, endemic poverty and political turmoil in Africa had become "a scar on the conscience of the world." Idealism should be wedded to realism. At the core of the new strategic framework would be smart partnerships in development based on lessons learned during a half-century of experimentation and scholarly research. Multi-year partnerships would be jointly designed and administered by institutions in Africa and overseas with the support of governments and philanthropic organizations. It is not meant to be a dazzling plan but rather a realistic one that can work.

"Living an ordinary life is a luxury that we can only enjoy in times of peace" (Junji Ito, Asia Society). This statement can serve as the motto of the approach being advocated here. Instead of experiencing "the luxury of an ordinary life," many Africans have had to adapt to the relentless rise in insecurity and uncertainty. As Tony Blair acknowledged at the conference of the British Labour Party in October 2001, endemic poverty and political turmoil in Africa had become "a scar on the conscience of the world." Idealism should be wedded to realism. At the core of the new strategic framework would be smart partnerships in development based on lessons learned during a half-century of experimentation and scholarly research. Multi-year partnerships would be jointly designed and administered by institutions in Africa and overseas with the support of governments and philanthropic organizations. It is not meant to be a dazzling plan but rather a realistic one that can work.

About the Report

Overlapping and mutually reinforcing crises in Africa have attracted increased attention from policymakers and researchers. A major outcome of these reflections is the creation of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), a comprehensive reform program sponsored by African government leaders.

Richard Joseph, a senior fellow in the Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace at the United States Institute of Peace, has studied and actively participated in efforts to promote peace, democracy, and development in Africa. In this report, he proposes a strategic framework of developmental partnerships based on the realities of contemporary Africa. During a period when international financing of development is being actively re-examined, the aim of this report is to promote a wider debate of available policy.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policies.

Of Related Interest

• Managing Natural Resource Wealth
• Downward Spiral: HIV/AIDS, State Capacity, and Political Conflict in Zimbabwe
• Nigeria's Hopes for Democracy
• Conflict and Democracy in Africa Senior Fellow Report
• Dilemmas of Self-Determination: A Challenge to African Constitutionalism Senior Fellow Report
• Publications: Africa
• On the Web: African Development

See our complete list of reports.