

REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY REVIEW
OF THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE MY LAI INCIDENT (U)

VOLUME III
EXHIBITS
BOOK 2 - DIRECTIVES

BOOKS 1 & 2 CONTAIN ALL DIRECTIVES ENTERED
INTO THE INQUIRY RECORD INCLUDING THOSE
DESIGNATED AS MISCELLANEOUS EXHIBITS.

14 MARCH 1970

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E X T R A C T

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
C/O FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

ForO 1560.1A
1C/fhp
11 Sep 1967

FORCE ORDER 1560.1A

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Command Information and Indoctrination Program

Ref: (a) MCO 1510.2D

Encl: (1) Statement of Secretary of State Dean Rusk
(2) Indoctrination Subjects

1. Purpose. To reaffirm the continuing need for training coverage in the category of General Military Training to include information and education specifically related to the III MAF tactical area of operations.

* * * * *

5. Policy. It is the policy of this command that all personnel assigned to III MAF and its subordinate commands will be presented instruction specifically directed to Vietnam orientation and education. This orientation should not be a one time experience, but one of recurring frequency with continued command emphasis.

6. Orientation Topic Areas. The following list of recommended subjects will be included in the training syllabi of all III MAF commands. These subjects are considered to meet the minimum basic requirements. The addition of other subjects is strongly encouraged.

a. "Why we are in Vietnam."

b. "Our relationship with the Vietnamese people."
(Personal Response)

c. "Vietnamese History, Culture, and Customs." (Personal Response)

EXHIBIT D-20

- d. "The Code of Conduct; Discipline and Conduct."
- e. "The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; Missions and Objectives."
- f. "The Free World Effort in Vietnam."
- g. "The Nature of the Viet Cong."
- h. "Monthly Recapitulations of Military Activities in Vietnam."
- i. "Topics of Local Interest."
- j. "War Crimes."

* * * * *

11. Indoctrination. The unique character of service in Vietnam makes it mandatory that personnel reporting for duty receive an early indoctrination in those regulations which govern the actions of individuals, unusual conditions under which they must serve, and the goals and missions of the United States and this command. The directives listed in enclosure (2) contain subject matter which is required to be included in the indoctrination program.

12. Action. Commanders at all levels will continue to implement their General Military Subjects training programs with additional subjects specifically related to the commitment of the Force to military operations in Vietnam.

s/Duane L. Faw
s/Duane L. FAW
Deputy Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
Case 2

E X T R A C T

ForO 1560.1A
11 Sep 1967

INDOCTRINATION SUBJECTS FOR NEWLY ARRIVED PERSONNEL, CHECK LIST

<u>SUBJ</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
* * * * *	*
10. Untoward Incidents Involving Vietnamese Nationals	ICCI 1610.1
11. Respect for the Law, Property, Institutions, Traditions and Customs of the RVN	ICCI 5370.1
* * * * *	*
14. Processing, Exploiting, Evacuation and Handling of POW's	ForO 3461.2
15. "Nine Rules" (MACV Card issue one per individual)	
* * * * *	*

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For/SA I Corps ~~0-3040-2~~ 3040-3
3/jna
13 Dec 1966 ✓

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FORCE/SA I CORPS ORDER ~~3040-2~~ 3040-3

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Minimizing noncombatant Battle Casualties

Ref: (a) MACV Directive Number 525-3

1. Purpose. To publish policy designed to minimize noncombatant battle casualties and to provide guidance for the effective implementation of the policy, in accordance with reference (a).

2. Cancellation. ForO 08025.1. ✓

3. General

a. The principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience obligate those who conduct military operations in populated areas to cause as few noncombatant casualties as possible. The nature of the war in Vietnam strengthens the arguments for the use of only the minimum required force for the accomplishment of the military mission. The rural and smalltown Vietnamese have suffered greatly with the ebb and flow of war through their fields and homes. This poorly-educated, unsophisticated peasant understands little of the reasoning behind the actions of either the Viet Cong or the Government forces as they come and go; his only legacy is one of destruction or pilferage of his property and death or injury to his family and friends. Our use of unnecessary force leading to noncombatant battle casualties in the area temporarily controlled by the Viet Cong makes the long range goal of rural construction more difficult and more costly.

b. These circumstances demand an unusual restraint upon Marines trained to employ to the fullest the weapons at their command. Commanders at each echelon must strike a balance between the force necessary to accomplish their missions with due regard to the safety of their commands and the high importance of reducing to a minimum the casualties inflicted on the noncombatant populace.

EXHIBIT D-21

For/SA I CorpsO 3040.2

13 Dec 1966

c. The Viet Cong will exploit fully any incidents of noncombatant casualties and destruction of property by Marines, with the objective of fostering a resentment against the Government of Vietnam and the American troops.

4. Action

a. Commanders at every echelon are directed to plan and conduct operations in accordance with the following guidelines:

(1) Consider both the military and psychological objectives of each phase of each operation. Excessive military force which would tend to cause unnecessary casualties among the civilian population will not be used.

(a) Prestrikes and preparatory fires will not be put on areas populated by civilians.

(b) Reconnaissance by fire into areas populated by civilians is prohibited.

(c) Harassing and interdiction fires will not be placed on areas populated by civilians.

(2) Commanders will maintain and conduct a thorough and continuing program to emphasize both the short and long range importance of minimizing noncombatant casualties. Troop indoctrination briefings will be held before each operation. They will include the location of noncombatants and other friendly forces, measures to prevent mutual interference, safety precautions for fire control support, rules of engagement, identification and recognition signals, emergency procedures and other appropriate matters.

(3) The proper selection of landing zones, the careful planning and execution of air strikes, and the proper employment of artillery and armed helicopters will prevent unnecessary damage to lives and property of noncombatants.

(4) All persons involved in the control and coordination of supporting arms must be briefed on areas to be avoided because of the presence of friendly or potentially friendly population. Such information must be sought from local officials at province and district level.

For/SA I CorpsO 3060.2
13 Dec 1966

(5) With due regard to security and success of the mission, whenever possible the people will be warned by leaflets, and broadcasts of impending air strikes or operations. The onus for military action in the area should rest with the Viet Cong.

(6) A civic action plan will be developed to support each operation, even if the area has been controlled by the Viet Cong. Plan for the use of all available assets, to include the dispensing of medical supplies and emergency rations, evacuation of injured or sick regardless of political affiliation, and light engineering work within the capabilities of tactical units.

(7) Specified strike zones will be configured to exclude populated areas except those in accepted Viet Cong bases.

(8) Operations will be planned in coordination with province and district chiefs insofar as security allows. Coordination will be effected through established Marine liaison channels or through advisors when Marine liaison is not present.

(9) Assignment to Marine forces of qualified RVNAF liaison officers from appropriate RVNAF commanders is essential and will be arranged between Marine commanders and advisors for each significant operation. These liaison officers, through their knowledge of the area of operations and the population, can assist in identification of friend from foe and can help ensure close coordination with all Vietnamese forces.

(10) Participation of Vietnamese forces in operations, particularly in populated areas, should be encouraged so that the war does not appear to be an American action against the Vietnamese people. Regional Force and Popular Force participation should be sought at battalion or even company level so that they may assist in the search of private dwellings, obtain information, and contribute to the desired effect of the cooperative war effort.

(11) Include in each operation plan or order a psychological warfare annex and a civil affairs annex, and assure that all concerned are familiar with their provisions. Fragmentary orders will include reference to SOP's, including force orders, on civil affairs and psychological warfare.

b. Advisors will make every effort to convince their Vietnamese counterparts of the necessity for preservation of the lives and property of noncombatants. Counterparts will be encouraged to


For/SA I CorpsO 3040.2
13 Dec 1966

promulgate and implement directives parallel to this order.

c. Nothing in the above shall be construed to inhibit the inherent right of a Marine or other U. S. unit to defend itself against hostile action from any source. It is absolutely essential that our forces establish the valid reputation of being able to move at will throughout Vietnam and to defeat any enemy force encountered. This reputation for invincibility will produce innumerable psychological benefits and hasten the end of the war. On the other hand, these same forces must constantly demonstrate their concern for the safety of noncombatants, their compassion for the injured, and their willingness to aid the sick, the hungry, and the dispossessed.

5. Implementation. Implementing instructions and SOP's concerning this order and reference (a), fire control support and safety precautions will be promulgated by major commanders. Commanders will ensure distribution to the lowest echelons.

6. Applicability. This order is applicable to all forces under command or operational control of the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force and the Senior Advisor I Corps.


H. M. ELWOOD
Chief of Staff

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ForO P03121.5

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FORCE ORDER P03121.5 w/ch 1

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From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

HEADQUARTERS III MAF

036686 Stand Ops 5

Subj: Standing Operating Procedure for Ground and Air Operations (SOP)

Major/Small Unit Ops 6

Encl: (1) Locator Sheet

1. Purpose. This order encompasses procedures and policies for Ground and Air Operations of the III Marine Amphibious Force while operating in the I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ).

Air Ops 7

2. Recommendations. Subordinate Commanders are encouraged to submit recommendations for changes or modifications for the improvement of this Standing Operating Procedure. Recommendations will be submitted to this headquarters, Attn: G-3.

Herbicide 8

3. Certification. Reviewed and approved this date.

Pay Ops 10

R. G. Owens, Jr.
R. G. OWENS, JR.
Chief of Staff

Civil Action 11

C.M.P. 12

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- CO Long Lines Area DNG USA STRATCOM 2
- CO 37th Signal Bn 2
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CINCPAC	2
CINCPACFLT	2
COM 7th FLT	1
COMUSMACV	2
COMSERVPAC	2
COMCBPAC	2
CTF-79	2
7th AF	2
COMBLANT	2
COMNAVFORV	2
COMNAVFORV REP DANANG	2
HQ I FFORCEV Arty (Fwd)	2
1st Marine Division	70
3d Marine Division	70
1st Marine Aircraft Wing	30
Force Logistic Command	60
Sub-Zone Coordinator Southern Sector	25
Americal Division	70
CMC	2
MCS QUANT	2
FMFLANT	2
1st Mar Brig	2
MCEC, MCS, QUANT	2
MCLFDO, MCS, QUANT	1
MCCSC, MCS, QUANT	1
ForTrps, FMFPac	1
ForTrps, FMFLant	1

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SECTION III

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

301. GENERAL

1. In no other war, the requirement for specific Rules of Engagement has never been more necessary than in Vietnam. The war in Vietnam is a political war as well as a military war. It is political because the ultimate goal is to regain the loyalty and cooperation of the people, and to create conditions which permit the people to go about their normal lives in peace and security. At the present time, large geographical areas of Vietnam are dominated by the VC. Some areas are completely controlled, while in others, people live under the shadow of VC military forces and terrorists. Because of the situation described above, the application of US military force in Vietnam and the conduct of US troops must be carefully controlled at all times. On the one hand, maximum effectiveness must be achieved in operations against the VC; on the other hand, a conscientious effort must be made to minimize battle casualties among noncombatants and destruction of their property. This requires an extremely high caliber of leadership plus the exercise of judgment and unusual restraint. The following constitute the current Rules of Engagement for all III MAF commands, with the exception of those rules governing operations near the RVN boundaries, which are covered in separate directives.

302. MINIMIZING NONCOMBATANT BATTLE CASUALTIES

1. The government of Vietnam is engaged in a fight for its survival against the Communist NVA/VC. It is the objective of the NVA/VC to seize control of the hamlets, villages and towns by a combination of military actions, terrorism, political action and subversion. The government of Vietnam is resisting this process and where it has occurred, attempting to reverse it. This means that the battle flows backward and forward across the homes and fields of the rice farmer and small town inhabitant.

2. In order to reduce to a minimum the casualties inflicted on the noncombatant populace during the course of fighting in and around friendly civilian areas, commanders will ensure that the following actions are accomplished.

a. Conduct a thorough and continuing program to emphasize the importance of minimizing noncombatant casualties.

b. Extreme caution will be exercised in employing supporting arms near friendly noncombatant areas.

c. Plan operations in coordination with province and district chiefs with due regard to noncombatant casualties.

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d. Specified strike zones should be configured to exclude populated areas except those in accepted VC bases.

303. EMPLOYMENT OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND DEFENSE AGAINST CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL ATTACK.

1. In the Vietnam conflict, the enemy is frequently intermixed with noncombatants. The use of RCA is a particularly appropriate application of measured force in such situations. The agents have been proven useful in many tactical operations such as clearance of fortified positions and underground facilities, reconnaissance for concealed forces, capture of prisoners for intelligence purposes, preparation of landing zones and defense of fixed positions.

304. ECONOMIC WARFARE

1. Intelligence estimates indicate that there are certain basic items which are essential to the VC for their operations which we can effectively deny to them - money, foodstuffs, salt and medicines. Economic warfare measures are designed both to separate the Viet Cong from their sources of supply and to disrupt distribution of supplies they already have on hand.

305. AIR OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM

1. See Section VII (Air Operations) of this SOP.

306. INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY

1. The nature of the war in Vietnam has placed an unusual requirement on low ranking leaders to carry out sensitive combat operations, often in an environment where large numbers of civilians are present. The history of warfare embraces many examples of the proper and improper use of force in dealing with both noncombatants and prisoners of war. Determination of right and wrong in these cases has had to be made on the spot, and often in the heat of battle. Such decisions require keen, swift, decisive analysis of the factors involved and must be based on a thorough understanding of the legal and moral principles concerned. In the Vietnam Conflict, the weight of this decision often falls on the shoulders of the small outpost - individuals who, because of their relative youth and short time in service are least able to exercise mature, deliberate judgment under the pressure of combat. Nevertheless, unit leaders, regardless of rank, must be fully aware of their responsibilities, their conduct, and the conduct of their subordinates.

2. Detailed guidance concerning courses of action and specific instructions on this subject are contained in FMFPAC ORDER 01610.2 dated 28 November 1966,

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307. CONDUCT OF ARTILLERY/MORTAR AND NAVAL GUNFIRE

1. The nature of operations and of the battle area in Vietnam, and the frequent conduct of combined operations involving US, FW, and RVN Forces require that special emphasis be placed on procedures for the control of artillery and naval gunfire.
2. Restrictive controls should be held to the minimum necessary to ensure that:
 - a. Friendly forces and civilians are not endangered.
 - b. Property of friendly forces, RVN and friendly civilians is not destroyed or damaged.
 - c. National and operational boundaries are not violated.
3. Care and attention must be exercised continuously in the application of all artillery gunnery techniques. The full range of artillery gunnery techniques which ensure accuracy should be applied to the maximum extent permitted by the situation. The application of these techniques and the exercise of sound judgment on the part of all personnel involved in solving the artillery problem provide the best assurance against endangering friendly forces and civilians or destroying or damaging RVN, friendly forces and friendly civilians' property.
4. Detailed guidance concerning courses of action and specific instructions on this subject are contained in Force/SA I Corps Order 03330.1, Conduct of Artillery/Mortar and Naval Gunfire and Task Group 70.8 Gun 11 Operation Order 320.67.

308. CONTROL, DISPOSITION AND SAFEGUARDING OF VIETNAMESE PROPERTY AND FOOD SUPPLIES

1. In carrying out search and destroy operations in VC controlled areas, US and FW forces must take all practicable measures to minimize the destruction of indigenous private property and to insure proper control, disposition and safeguarding thereof. That people have lived under VC control does not make them irrevocably hostile, nor is it necessarily of their own choosing. To treat them as the enemy and deny them essential resources is incompatible with long-term GVN and US objectives.
2. Minimizing destruction of private property and supplies, coupled with proper control and disposition of excesses, requires continued command emphasis. Plans must include procedures for the protection of private property and the reporting, securing, and disposition of excess supplies.

NOV 10 1967

3. Detailed guidance concerning courses of action and specific instructions on this subject are contained in I Corps Coordinator Inst 05530.1 of 5Jan67; Control, Disposition, Safeguarding of VN Property and Food Supplies.

309. CAMPAIGN PLAN

1. The initiative achieved in the 1966 Campaign will be retained through a strategical and tactical offensive conducted in consonance with political, economic and sociological programs of GVN and US agencies. RVNAF, US and FW Forces will be employed to accomplish the mission in accordance with the objectives established and tasks assigned for this project. RVNAF will have the primary mission of supporting Revolutionary Development activities, defending governmental centers, protecting and controlling national resources, particularly rice and salt, and conducting clearing and securing operations in and around the National Priority Areas. US forces will reinforce RVNAF; operate with other FWMAF; and as necessary conduct unilateral operations. The primary mission of US and FW Forces will be to destroy the VC/NVA main forces, base areas, and resources and/or drive the enemy into the sparsely populated and food scarce areas; secure their base areas and clear in the vicinity of these bases; and as directed, assist in the protection and control of national resources.

2. Detailed guidance concerning courses of action and specific instructions on this subject are published yearly by COMUSMACV and updated as directed.

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SECTION IV

TACTICAL CONTROL MEASURES401. GENERAL

1. Tactical control measures established in USMC doctrinal publications are generally applicable to combat operations in RVN. However, the lack of an identifiable front, the need to minimize destruction of property and casualties to non-combatants, and the presence of other friendly combatant forces not under positive control of a single overall commander, combine to require modifications and some new definitions for tactical control measures whose primary purpose is to coordinate fires delivered within specified areas. The following tactical control and coordination measures are applicable to combat operations in RVN.

402. TACTICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (TAOR). A TAOR is a control measure which is employed to designate a land area in which responsibility/authority is specifically assigned to the commander of the area for the conduct of tactical operations. The commander of a unit assigned a TAOR is responsible for control and coordination of all activities within its periphery.

1. A TAOR is circumscribed by a boundary. The boundary may be located along identifiable terrain features or may coincide with a GVN political or military boundary to facilitate local coordination.
2. Within RVN, the term TAOR is reserved for describing an area within which the assigned unit conducts operations on a continuing basis. The term is not to be used in delineating areas in which operations of a temporary or transitory nature are conducted.
3. All fire and maneuver conducted within the TAOR or the effects of which impinge upon it are coordinated with the commander of the force assigned the TAOR. Exceptions to this are the fire and maneuver of GVN sub-sector/district forces. It is the responsibility of the TAOR commander to effect coordination with the sub-sector/district officials.
4. Attendant to the responsibility/authority for coordination assigned to the commander of a TAOR, is the authority to direct fire support means and maneuver elements therein to insure the safety of friendly forces. The commander assigned a TAOR has the added responsibility to insure the fire support by his forces, external to the TAOR, is delivered only subsequent to proper coordination with other interested forces.

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5. TACRs are assigned for the additional purpose of facilitating intimate familiarity of a unit with the local situation and continuity of civic action, counter-guerrilla operations and other programs of a continuing nature.
6. Operations conducted within assigned TACRs need not be coordinated above the sub-sector/district level.
7. In requesting TACRs or changes thereto, the detailed trace of the boundary will be submitted to the Commanding General, III MAF who in turn will make recommendations to the Commanding General, I Corps. When approved by the Commanding General, I Corps, the commander of the unit assigned the TACR has freedom of action to conduct tactical operations therein, in keeping with the Rules of Land Warfare and appropriate rules of engagement as contained in Section III of this SOP or as published by higher authority.

403. RECONNAISSANCE ZONE (RZ). An RZ is a control measure which is employed to designate a land area in which US/FWMA Forces may conduct reconnaissance or other combat operations after effecting coordination at the DTA/special military zone level. Within the limitations imposed by the requirement to coordinate his operations with DTA/special military zone officials and GVN sub-sector/district forces concurrently operating within the RZ, the commander of a unit assigned an RZ is responsible for coordination and control of all activities within its periphery.

1. An RZ is circumscribed by a boundary which is normally located along identifiable terrain features.
2. All fire and maneuver conducted within the RZ or the effects of which impinge upon it are coordinated with the commander of the force assigned the RZ. Exceptions to this are the fire and maneuver of GVN sub-sector/district forces. It is the responsibility of the RZ commander to effect coordination with the sub-sector/district officials.
3. Major unit operations within the assigned RZ need not be coordinated above the DTA/special military zone level.
4. Requests for the establishment of an RZ or changes to an existing RZ will be submitted through the Commanding General, III MAF to the Commanding General, I Corps for approval.

404. AREA OF OPERATIONS (AO). An AO is a control measure which is employed to designate land area in which US/FWMA Forces may conduct tactical operations after coordination is effected with the DTA/special military zone commander and after receiving approval from the I CTZ commander. The commander of a unit assigned an AO is responsible for coordination and control of all activities within its periphery.

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1. An AO is circumscribed by a boundary which is normally located along identifiable terrain features or broadly defined by the coordinates of the corners of a multilateral figure.

2. Tactical operations within an AO are transitory in nature. There is no intention of remaining in the area once the prescribed mission has been accomplished.

3. The abbreviation AO will not be used in any communication in which it could be mistaken for the term "Air Observer."

4. When approved, the commander of a unit assigned an AO has the same authority/responsibility therein as prescribed for a TAOR. All fire and maneuver conducted within an AO or the effects of which impinge upon it are coordinated with the commander of the force assigned the AO. It is the responsibility of the AO commander to effect coordination with the sub-sector/district officials.

5. For major operations, battalion size or larger, of an expected duration of 7 days or more, a request for an AO must be submitted to this Headquarters no later than 4 days prior to the commencement of the operation. For less than battalion size operations, or those of expected duration of less than 7 days, notification to this Headquarters by means of a standard concept of operations message (see section V, para 3.e.) submitted 48 hours in advance is sufficient. In such cases, prior coordination must be effected with the appropriate sub-sector/district headquarters.

6. This Headquarters is required to provide a concept of operation (see section V, para 3.e.) to COMUSMACV and to CG, FMFPAC, by separate message, within 48 hours prior to the commencement of major planned operations. For those operations generated on short notice, such as those in response to enemy activity, the required information must be submitted as soon as it becomes available.

405. NO FIRE ZONES/SPECIFIED STRIKE ZONES. The danger to noncombatants posed by unrestricted use of supporting arms has rendered the terms No Fire Line, Forward Bomb Line and Tactical Bomb Line less meaningful in the combat environment in RVN. These terms will not be used with the single exception of the Forward Bomb Line which is established as the line running from the coastline west along the northern boundary of the DMZ to NS grid line XD 90, then along the NS grid line XD 90 to the provisional military demarkation line (PMDL) to the Laotian border. All supporting arms fire delivered in accordance with procedures established for the use of supporting arms requires prior clearance either by a tactical unit operating within an AO/RZ/TAOR, or GVN political clearance or both. In place of those terms, two zone designations have been assigned.

1. No-Fire Zone. A No-Fire Zone is an area circumscribed by a boundary in which no supporting arms fire will be delivered. Religious establishments, friendly population or other politically significant objects are

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normally found within these areas. Friendly forces may or may not be located within these zones. No-Fire Zones are established by the CTZ commander. No supporting arms fire will be delivered into these zones under any circumstances. Designation of a No-Fire Zone does not preclude maneuver by ground forces through the area. Designated No-Fire Zones may be located within TAORs, RZs, and AOs.

2. Specified Strike Zone. Certain areas containing no friendly population nor religiously/politically significant structures and which are used by the VC/NVA; and wherein the civilian population in the area, if any, actively supports the VC/NVA, may be designated as Specified Strike Zones by the CTZ commander upon request of CG III MAF. Supporting arms fire may be delivered into these areas without further clearance. However, air strikes in an SSZ must be under positive control of FAC (airborne or ground), TAC (A), or TPQ-10. Designation as a Specified Strike Zone by the CTZ commander constitutes prior political clearance. Conduct of supporting arms fire into Specified Strike Zones will be in accordance with the established rules of engagement.

406. SPECIAL BOMB ZONE. A Special Bomb Zone is an area within a designated TAOR, RZ or AO, and so designated by the responsible ground commander, in which air strikes may be conducted without further coordination with the ground commander. Strikes must be under the positive control of a TAC (A) or FAC and be conducted in accordance with the normal rules of engagement as stated in section III of this SOP.

CAUTION: A Special Bomb Zone is not a Specified Strike Zone. The term is not in MACV-wide or USMC-wide use and will not be used in context with operations involving other than USMC units assigned to III MAF.

407. COORDINATION WITH CIDG

1. In addition to US/FWMA Forces, TAORs have been assigned to CIDG camps in I CTZ. US/FWMA Forces desiring to maneuver or fire into CIDG camp TAORs will coordinate such maneuver or fire with the Special Forces USASF A-Detachment in the same manner in which coordination would be effected with the commander in any US/FWMA Force TAOR.

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System (Directive)

S&C FILES
HEADQUARTERS: MAF

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
C/O FPO San Francisco, California 96602

For/SA I CorpsO 03330.1
3B/spw
Sez 027967
3 Feb 1967

FORCE/SA I CORPS ORDER 03330.1

From: Commanding General/Senior Advisor
To: Distribution List

Subj: Conduct of Artillery/Mortar and Naval Gunfire (U)

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV Directive Number 525-18, 19 October 1966 (C)

Encl: (1) Locator Sheet

1. Purpose. To provide guidance concerning the control of artillery and naval gunfire support provided by US/FWNA Forces. The terms artillery and artillery fire as used in this directive include mortars and mortar fire.

2. General

a. The nature of operations and of the battle area in Vietnam, and the frequent conduct of combined operations involving US, FW, and RVN forces require that special emphasis be placed on procedures for the control of artillery and naval gunfire.

b. Restrictive controls should be held to the minimum necessary to insure that:

(1) Friendly forces and civilians are not unnecessarily endangered.

(2) Property of friendly forces, RVN and friendly civilians is not destroyed or damaged.

(3) National and operational boundaries are not violated.

c. Care and attention must be exercised continuously in the application of all artillery gunnery techniques. The full range of artillery gunnery techniques which ensure accuracy should be applied to the maximum extent permitted by the situation. The application of these techniques and the exercise of sound judgement on the part

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For/SA I CorpsO 03330.1
3 Feb 1967

of all personnel involved in solving the artillery problem provide the best assurance against endangering friendly forces and civilians or destroying or damaging RVN, friendly forces and friendly civilians' property.

d. This order will serve as a basis for the preparation of standing operating procedures for the conduct of artillery and naval gunfire.

3. Action. Commanders and DSA, I Corps will:

a. In coordination with appropriate RVNAF commanders, develop procedures for the effective control and coordination of artillery and naval gunfire support based upon established artillery and naval gunfire procedures as modified by guidance herein.

b. In coordination with appropriate RVNAF commanders, develop positive target clearance procedures to include a system of double checks to preclude error or misunderstanding.

c. Conduct of Fire

(1) Procedures applicable to the control of naval gunfire are contained in Operation Order 320-67 (Gun 11), Commander Task Group 70.8 dated 22 July 1966. This document has the force of a USMACV Directive.

(2) Specified Strike Zones

(a) Requests for specified strike zones will be submitted to this Headquarters. These requests will then be forwarded to Commanding General, I Corps for approval.

(b) Unobserved fire may be directed against all targets and target areas located within specified strike zones.

(3) Uninhabited areas outside specified strike zones

(a) Fire may be directed against VC/NVA forces in contact in accordance with normal artillery procedures.

(b) Unobserved fires may be directed at targets and target areas, other than VC/NVA forces in contact, only after Province Chief, District Chief, Sector Commander, or Subsector Commander approval as appropriate.

(c) Observed fire may be directed against targets of opportunity which are clearly identified as hostile without obtaining Province Chief, District Chief, Sector Commander, or Subsector Commander approval.

(d) Appropriate Province Chief, District Chief, Sector Commander, or Subsector Commander approval is required before directing fire on targets of opportunity not clearly identified as hostile.

(4) Villages and Hamlets. Fire missions directed against known or suspected VC/NVA targets in villages and hamlets occupied by noncombatants will be conducted as follows:

(a) All such fire missions will be controlled by an observer and will be executed only after Province Chief or District Chief approval as appropriate.

(b) Villages and Hamlets not associated with maneuver of ground forces will not be fired upon without prior warning by leaflets and/or speaker systems or by other appropriate means, even though fire is received from them.

(c) Villages and hamlets may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving maneuver of ground forces through the area, and if in the judgement of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.

(d) The use of incendiary type ammunition will be avoided unless absolutely necessary in the accomplishment of the commander's mission.



H. M. ELWOOD
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

3460.3
ForO 1060.2A
1/ref
8 September 1966

3460.3
FORCE ORDER 1060.2A

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Treatment of Captured Personnel

1. Purpose. To reemphasize the personal responsibility of each member of this command for the proper handling of captives.

2. Cancellation. Force Order 1060.2.

3. Background. The United States has officially notified the International Committee of the Red Cross that the United States would continue to follow the Geneva Convention of 1949 for the protection of war victims in Vietnam. This agreement makes it an offense under appropriate articles of the UCMJ to treat captives in an inhumane manner.

4. Action

a. The following specific policy guidance for the treatment of captured personnel will be brought to the attention of each member of this command:

(1) Captives are in the power and custody of the detaining power, but not of the individuals or military units who have captured them.

(2) Each U. S. unit is responsible for the handling of captives whom it apprehends.

(3) Captives will in all circumstances be treated humanely while in the custody of U. S. forces and U. S. personnel, and must be protected particularly against acts of violence.

(4) No violence will be done to their life or person, no outrages of any kind committed upon them, and, pending delivery to higher headquarters, the wounded and sick will be cared for.

EXHIBIT D-24


3460.3
ForO 1060.2A
8 Sep 1966

b. A continuing program of indoctrination is essential so that each replacement is apprised of the contents of this Order as soon as he joins the Force.

J. M. PLATT
Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
Case 2

AUTHENTICATED


J. P. REVILLE
MAJOR USMC
FORCE ADJUTANT

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
APO, San Francisco, California 96302

FOR 3461.2A
2/67
5 Jul 1967

FORCE ORDER 3461.2A *Wahl*

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

*Amended By
FORO 3461.2B*

Subj: Processing, Exploiting, Evacuating and Accounting for Prisoners of War

Ref: (a) MACV Dir 190-3
(b) USARV Reg No. 190-2
(c) MACV 20-5
(d) MACV Dir 381-11
(e) COMUSMACV msg 250220Z May 67

Encl: (1) Detainee Report Form (USARV Form 364)
(2) Detainee Card (USARV Form 365)
(3) Format of Weekly Report of Detainees

Reports Required: I. Initial Interrogation Report, par 7.b.
II. Follow-up Interrogation Report, par 7.c
III. Weekly Report, par 7.g

1. Purpose. To establish responsibilities and procedures for processing, exploiting, evacuating and accounting for prisoners of war captured by or delivered to units under operational control of III Marine Amphibious Force.

2. Cancellation. Force Order 3461.2 and 03460.2.

3. Background

a. Reference (a) assigns to the Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, responsibility for the administration and operational supervision of the U. S. Forces Prisoner of War Program under existing policy in Vietnam.

b. Reference (b) establishes policies, responsibilities and procedures for the evacuation, processing and custodial accounting for prisoners of war captured by or delivered to U. S. Military Forces. Reference (b) further states that the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force is responsible for establishing procedures in consonance with reference (b).

c. Reference (c) prescribes policies and procedures for determining whether personnel in custody of the United States who have committed belligerent acts are entitled to prisoners of war status.

EXHIBIT D-25

d. Reference (d) announces policy and prescribes responsibilities and procedures for the intelligence exploitation of human sources captured or acquired by United States Military Forces. Reference (d) further provides that Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force will ensure compliance with the procedures contained in reference (d).

e. Reference (e) provides amplifying criteria for detainees who may be classified as prisoner of war.

4. Definitions

a. Detainees. Persons who have been detained but whose final status has not yet been determined. The following categories designate final status of detainees:

- (1) Prisoners of War.
- (2) Returnees.
- (3) Civil Defendants.
- (4) Innocent Civilians.

b. Prisoners of War. Persons who qualify under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). In addition, the following persons shall be extended the protection of the GPW in Vietnam.

(1) Persons who are captured while actually engaging in combat or a belligerent act other than an act of terrorism, sabotage or spying against the Republic of Vietnam (RVN or US and other Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMF)).

(2) Any captive member of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces (NVA) or Viet Cong (VC), whether captured in combat or not, except:

(a) Terrorists, saboteurs or spies.

(b) Members of the infrastructure, various associations, and political cadre, draft evaders, deserters, and those suspected of having violated the laws of RVN. (See paragraph 6.a.(1).(a).)

c. Returnees. Persons who voluntarily return to the Government of Vietnam (GVN) control through the Chieu Hoi Program after having actively supported the VC in some form of political or military activities.

d. Civil Defendants. Persons who are suspected of being spies, saboteurs, terrorists or criminals and who do not qualify as prisoners of war under Article 4 of the GPR.

e. Doubtful Cases. Persons who have committed a belligerent act and whose entitlement to status as a prisoner of war is in doubt. Doubtful cases will be processed as outlined in paragraph 8 below.

f. Innocent Civilians. Persons who are detained but subsequently determined to have committed no offense or do not meet the criteria set forth in paragraphs 4.b. through 4.e. above.

g. Very Important Sources. Human sources of significant intelligence and counterintelligence value. Examples are: NVA, regrouped, returnee, and VC military and paramilitary officers; officer aspirants and NCO's; cadre in charge of communication liaison and sea or land supply and infiltration routes; intelligence, signal, crypto, and medical specialists; university graduates; personnel who have studied abroad; communist party members and key personnel within the VC infrastructure.

h. Viet Cong Main Force. Those military units which are directly subordinate to the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), a Viet Cong Military Region, or Sub-Region.

i. Viet Cong Local Force. Those military units which are directly subordinate to a provincial or district party committee and which normally operate only within a specified VC province or district.

j. Irregulars (formerly referred to as militia). These are organized forces composed of guerrilla, self-defense, and secret self-defense elements subordinate to village and hamlet level VC organizations. These forces perform a wide variety of missions in support of VC activities and, in fact, provide a training and mobilization base for the VC maneuver and combat support forces.

(1) Guerrillas. Guerrillas are full-time forces organized into squads and platoons which do not always stay in their home village or hamlet. Typical missions for guerrillas are collection of taxes, propaganda, protection of village party committees, and unconventional military activities.

(2) Self-Defense Forces. A VC paramilitary structure responsible for the defense of hamlet and village areas controlled by the VC. These forces do not leave their home area, and they perform their duties on a part-time basis. Duties consist of conducting propaganda, constructing fortifications, and defending home areas.

(3) Secret Self-Defense Force. A clandestine VC organization which performs the same general function in SVN controlled villages and hamlets as do the self-defense forces in VC controlled areas. Their operations involve unconventional military activities, intelligence collection, and propaganda activities.

k. Infiltration Units

(1) North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Units. Units formed, trained and designated by North Vietnam as an NVA unit, and composed completely or primarily of North Vietnamese. At times, either VC or NVA units and individual replacements appear in units that are predominantly NVA or VC at the command level.

(2) Regroupees. Vietnamese who lived in what is now RVN and at the time of the 1954 Geneva accords, moved to the north, but later infiltrated into RVN and were captured.

5. Responsibilities

a. All US military personnel who take or have custody of a prisoner of war, returnee, innocent civilian, or civilian defendant will:

(1) Comply with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Violation of the humane provisions of the Geneva Conventions is an offense under the UMCJ. Persons who commit grave breaches of the Conventions may be tried for war crimes.

(2) Afford to each detainee in their custody treatment consistent with that of a prisoner of war, unless or until it has been determined by competent authority in accordance with paragraph 6 below that the detainee is not a prisoner of war.

(3) Insure that prisoners of war remain in the custody of US forces personnel until final release is made to the I Corps Combined Interrogation Center (CIC) or to the GVN at an I Corps ARVN Prisoner of War Camp.

• The Provost Marshal, III MAF has staff responsibility for:

(1) Operating the III MAF Prisoner of War Compound.

(2) Reviewing all Detainee Reports, USAFV Form 364 (see enclosure (1)), for correctness prior to their being forwarded to CG, USAFV.

(3) Submitting the weekly Prisoner of War Roster to CG, USAFV.

(4) Maintaining liaison with USAF 5-15 and USAF on all matters involving detainees.

(5) Supervising the Prisoner of War Program for the III MAF.

c. The capturing unit is responsible for completing Detainee Cards, USARV Form 365 (see enclosure (2)), on all captured personnel. The Detainee Card will remain with captured personnel until final disposition is accomplished. The Detainee Card must contain sufficient detail in order that interrogators can subsequently make a determination as to the status of the detainees. A major factor for determination of status is the act performed by the detainee at the time of capture, which should be reflected in circumstance of capture on the Detainee Card.

d. Divisions or separate brigades/regiments are responsible for:

(1) Evacuation of detainees to division, separate brigade/regiment Prisoner of War Collection Points.

(2) Determination of the final status of detainees captured or acquired by divisions or separate brigade/regiments, and other adjacent US units which do not have the capability to determine status, to include completion of Detainee Form (paragraph 5.c. above).

(3) Notification of III MAF POW of prisoners of war to be evacuated from divisions or separate brigades/regiments.

(4) Disposition of prisoners of war, returnees, civil defendants, and innocent civilians in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6.f below.

(5) Insuring use of back-haul transportation to the maximum extent in support of this program.

(6) Strict accountability for property taken from detainees.

(7) Turning all prisoners of war, returnees, civil defendants, and innocent civilians over to proper authorities in accordance with paragraph 6.f. below.

(8) Forwarding of one copy of each completed USARV Form 364 to this Headquarters (Attn: III MAF POW) for review prior to being forwarded to USAF.

e. The Interrogation Officer or Noncommissioned Officer:

(1) Will determine whether the status of a detained person is that of a prisoner of war, returnee, civil defendant, innocent civilian, or doubtful case, and complete and sign the applicable portion of Part I and II of the Detainee Report Form, USARV Form 364.

(2) Will refer the following cases to the appropriate Staff Legal Officer:

(a) Doubtful cases.

(b) Cases in which he has made an initial determination that the status of the detainee is that of a civil defendant.

(3) Will, in doubtful cases or in those cases in which he has made an initial determination that the status of a detained person is that of a civil defendant, forward the Detainee Report Form and a summary of the relevant facts upon which his decision was based (or a copy of the preliminary interrogation report) to the appropriate Staff Legal Officer for review.

6. Procedures

a. Determination of Status

(1) The determination of status of a detainee will fall within one of five categories as follows: Prisoner of war, returnee, civil defendant, innocent civilian, or doubtful case.

(a) Prisoner of War. In the classification of prisoners of war, units will be governed by the following in determining those persons that will be extended protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention:

1. Persons who qualify under Article 4 of the Geneva Conventions relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War.

2. Persons who are captured while actually engaging in combat or a belligerent act other than terrorism, sabotage, or spying against the republic of Vietnam, United States or other FWMAFs.

3. Any captive member of the North Vietnam Armed Forces or of the following type Viet Cong units:

- a Viet Cong Main Force.
- b Viet Cong Local Force.
- c Guerrillas.
- d Self Defense Forces.
- e Secret Self Defense Forces.
- f Infiltrating Units (NVA Units and regroupees).

4 Members of the VC infrastructure, various associations, political cadre, draft evaders, deserters and those suspected of having violated the RVN laws will normally be classified as civil defendants unless they are actually engaged in an overt hostile act at the time of capture.

(b) Returnees. Those persons who voluntarily return to GVN control after having actively supported the VC in some form of political or military activity will be classified as returnees.

(c) Civil Defendants. Normally, unless meeting with criteria for classification as prisoners of war, members of the VC infrastructure, various associations, political cadre, draft evaders, deserters, RVN law violators or those suspected of being spies, saboteurs, or terrorist will be classified as civil defendants.

(d) Doubtful Cases. In cases where the classification of a detainee is doubtful, action will be initiated by the division or separate brigade/regiment Staff Legal Officer in accordance with paragraph 8 of this order.

(e) Innocent Civilians. Those persons that do not meet the criteria for classification in one of the other four categories will be classified as innocent civilians.

b. Processing

(1) The capturing unit will complete USARV Form 365 (Detainee Card) on all captured personnel. The Detainee Card will remain with captured personnel until final disposition is accomplished.

(a) The VC interrogation officer or noncommissioned officer of the respective Interrogator Translator Team, or Military Intelligence Team, will make status determination and complete applicable portions of Part I and II, USARV Form 364. Final status will be determined as prisoner of war, returnee, civil defendant,

or innocent civilian, as set forth in paragraph 6.a. above. If status is determined to be civil defendant or doubtful case, further action will be taken by the Staff Legal Officer as provided in paragraph 8 below.

(b) Innocent civilians must be identified as soon as possible to minimize hardships and facilitate their return to their village or point of capture.

(2) Segregation. As a minimum, all detained personnel will receive treatment commensurate with that for prisoners of war until actual status is determined. In addition to the normal segregation procedures employed for prisoners of war, all returnees, civil defendants, innocent civilians, and doubtful cases will be segregated as soon as identified.

(3) Personal Effects. The retention of personal effects by detainees must be emphasized. Helmets, protective masks, and like articles issued for personal protection, remain available to detainees in the event of an emergency. Prisoners of war are entitled to retain all personal effects and badges of rank and nationality.

(4) Returnee Weapons and Documents. receipts for confiscated weapons and documents will be issued to the returnee by the receiving unit prior to the transfer of the returnee to a CHIEU HOI center.

(5) Reporting. Reporting procedures are contained in paragraph 7 below.

c. Exploitation

(1) Detainees will be screened expeditiously by the capturing unit for the purpose of segregating knowledgeable sources, establishing interrogation priorities, and determining the status of detainees in accordance with paragraph 6.a. above. Divisions or separate brigades/regiments will maintain records indicating disposition of each source who is interrogated.

(2) Interrogation of sources may be accomplished at all levels of command, however, detailed interrogation will formally be limited to that information which is of immediate value to the tactical commander or his subordinate units/agencies.

(3) The normal evacuation of sources is from the capturing unit, via the chain of command or direct, as appropriate, to division or separate brigade/regiment to the III MAF Prisoner of War Compound. Strict accountability will be maintained throughout the chain of evacuation.

(4) When directed by III MAF, selected very important sources will be evacuated directly from capturing unit to the III MAF Prisoner of War Compound.

(5) Sources should be exploited initially to satisfy the priority intelligence requirement of tactical units. There must be adequate cooperation at all levels so that common requirements are pooled for servicing by the unit having custody of the source. In accordance with collection priorities, but with emphasis on timely fulfillment of urgent military requirements, reciprocal arrangements should be made for subsequent access to sources by interrogators of other agencies' representatives, such as US Counterintelligence (CI), RVN Military Security Service (MSS), US advisors to National Police Special Branch, National Police Special Branch, and the Sector S2 Advisor and Sector S2.

(6) US captured prisoners of war undergoing interrogation by representatives of these units/agencies must remain in US custody at all times until custody is transferred to the I Corps CIC or to the I Corps ARVN Prisoner of War Camp.

(7) When it is not feasible for representatives of the above units/agencies to interrogate sources, the division or separate brigade/regiment will, when conditions permit, interrogate knowledgeable sources, based upon the requirements of these units/agencies.

(8) If it is necessary to reinterrogate a prisoner of war after he is turned over to the I Corps CIC or I Corps ARVN Prisoner of War Camp, the request will be made to III MAF G-2.

(9) Returnees may be detained for interrogation; however, the interrogation should be accomplished as expeditiously as possible. When intelligence exploitation of a returnee is complete, he will be transferred to the nearest CHIEU HOI Center.

(10) Returnees at CHIEU HOI Centers will be made available at the center for interrogation upon request of the local senior US intelligence officer to local CHIEU HOI officials. When returnees are evacuated through intelligence channels to higher headquarters, the local CHIEU HOI Center must be notified.

(11) Returnees being processed at CHIEU HOI Centers may be asked to volunteer to assist military operations as guides, MIT Camps, scouts or informants; however, such requests must be approved by the local senior US intelligence officer and CHIEU HOI official. Units using returnees in such operations will ensure that the

8 Jul 1967

Individuals are adequately protected, fed, housed, and treated at the CHIEW HOI Center in strictly non-combat and non-operational areas.

(12) To preclude and counter VC propaganda charges that returnees are maltreated, coerced or placed under duress, it is important that an effort be made to negate the distortion of facts by the enemy. Toward this end, the following procedure will be established for the interrogation of returnees:

(a) All interrogation will be conducted in the presence of a third person.

(b) Once placed in CHIEW HOI channels, returnees will be interrogated outside a CHIEW HOI Center only when necessary for strict security reasons.

(c) When removal from a CHIEW HOI Center is deemed essential, fair treatment and physical evidence of the returnees' well being will be assured and made evident to other returnees through his frequent presence.

(d) All evacuated returnees will be encouraged to write a letter to those remaining in the center from which evacuated. The letter should be accompanied by a photograph of the individual.

(e) Acts of physical assistance to friendly forces should be publicized in the light of a voluntary act performed by the individual to attest to his new allegiance. This might include a written account by the individual recounting his feats and explaining his reasons for cooperating.

3. Evacuation

(1) Transportation. Organic tactical transportation will be utilized for evacuation to the maximum extent possible, except when precluded by tactical or security considerations. Prisoners of war evacuated in aircraft will be secured in such a manner that a sudden movement at a critical time of flight, e.g., take-off and landing, will not jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or unnecessarily endanger life in case of emergency.

(2) Escort Guards. Escort guards for evacuation of prisoners of war from collection points will be provided by divisions or separate brigades/regiments. When it is possible, coordination should be made prior to and during operations between divisions or separate brigade/regiment FICs and III MAF FIC to insure efficient utilization of military police and transportation resources.

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Military police escort guard teams will normally retain custody of prisoners of war throughout the chain of evacuation, with the exception that custody of a prisoner of war released to I Corps CIC will be the responsibility of US Forces personnel at the CIC while the prisoner of war is at the facility.

(3) Medical

(a) US captured prisoners of war or other detainees who require medical care will be treated or evacuated through normal medical evacuation channels to the first US medical facility having the capability to treat the patient.

(b) The same medical treatment will be provided prisoners of war and other detainees as provided US personnel.

(c) A unit designated by the III MAF PMO will furnish guard personnel for security of prisoners of war and detainees at US hospitals and medical facilities, excluding medical facilities operated by divisions or separate brigades/regiments. However, other US personnel may receipt for and guard prisoners of war and other detainees temporarily if MP's are not immediately available to take custody at the medical facility.

(d) Medical facilities will be responsible for

1. Accounting for and safeguarding personal property and protective equipment.

2. Notifying the unit designated by the III MAF PMO when requiring MP guards to secure prisoners of war or other detainees.

3. Providing meals and quarters if necessary for prisoners of war, other detainees, and MP guard personnel.

4. Consolidating all wounded or sick detainees in one ward or facility, whenever possible.

(e) If USARV Form 365 has not been completed, MP guard personnel will complete this form as soon as practical.

(f) Upon arrival of a wounded detainee the hospital will request the local MP/T unit to make a status determination and complete Detainee Report Form.

(g) Prisoners of war and other detainees will be treated by US medical facilities until only minimal follow-up medical attention is required or, in the case of chronic conditions, until the condition is considered stable, at which time:

1 If processing has not been accomplished during hospitalization, detainees will be evacuated by MP escort guard teams to the nearest division or separate brigade/regimental Prisoner of War Collection Point or the III MAJ Prisoner of War Compound for determination of status.

2 In the case of those previously processed, or for whom a Detainee Report Form has been completed and the individuals identified as prisoners of war, the hospital will contact the unit designated by the III MAF PMO to arrange for escort guards. Prisoners of war will then be evacuated from the hospital to the appropriate prisoner of war collection point/compound.

(h) Detainees whose status has been determined to be other than prisoners of war may be released to the appropriate GVN hospital when ambulatory. Determination of final status will be made on all detainees prior to release to GVN hospital to insure prisoners of war are not released to these facilities while in US custody.

(4) Prisoners of war of special intelligence value

(a) Escort guard teams as designated by the III MAJ PMO will evacuate prisoners of war of special intelligence value (very important sources) from capturing unit or division/separate brigade/regiment collection points to the I Corps CIC. The capturing unit or division/separate brigade/regiment requesting evacuation will insure coordination with the I Corps CIC prior to requesting MP escort guards.

(b) US Forces personnel at I Corps CIC will receipt for prisoners of war, retain the Detainee Report Form with the prisoner of war, and will be responsible for insuring proper treatment of the prisoner of war in accordance with the Geneva Conventions until returned to III MAF Prisoner of War Compound or turned over to I Corps ARVN Prisoner of War Camp.

(5) Evacuation flow. Prisoners of war will be evacuated from divisions or separate brigade/regiments directly to III MAF Prisoner of War Compound except for those evacuated through medical channels. A helicopter landing pad is located adjacent to the III MAF Prisoner of War Compound (grid coordinates AT 978728).

e. Treatment

(1) Detainees will be accorded the same treatment as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention until such time as their status is determined otherwise by the units Interrogator-Translators or a U.S. Military Tribunal.

(2) Detained persons will be treated humanely. No violence will be done to their life or person nor will outrages of any kind be committed upon them.

(3) Sick and wounded detainees taken by U.S. Forces will be provided medical treatment to the extent necessary to save life or limb (see paragraph 6.d.(3) above). Wounded or sick persons under medical care may be examined for information when permission is granted by competent medical authority.

(4) Once a person captured or acquired is determined by the capturing unit to be a returnee, he will be accorded favored treatment.

(5) Returnees will not be bound or separated from their belongings or otherwise treated as captives except that they will be disarmed while in U.S. custody. For additional information see paragraph 6.c.(9) through 6.c.(12) above.

(6) Since the CHIEU HOI Program stresses rewards paid by the GVN for weapons brought in, a receipt for the weapons confiscated by the capturing unit must be given to the returnee so that he can claim his reward. The confiscated weapon will be returned to the same collection point as the returnee. In the event the returnee claims he hid his weapon prior to rallying, reasonable efforts to recover same should be made.

(7) Except for completion of Captive Card (USARV 365) and for Detainee Report Form (USARV 364), returnees will not be documented as a captive nor will they be referred to a Military Tribunal.

(8) The great majority of detainees are eventually cleared and returned to the villages. Proper treatment of those individuals, especially until they are cleared, will enhance the GVN/US Civic Action Program.

(9) Once a captured or acquired person has been screened and tagged, that person is officially in the custody of III MAF and will be released only in accordance with paragraph 6.f below.

f. Transfer of Custody

(1) Upon transfer of custody of prisoners of war during evacuation from divisions or separate brigades/regiments to the III MAF Prisoner of War Compound, the individual who in each instance assumes custody of the prisoner of war will complete the appropriate portion of the USARV 364 Form.

(2) Other categories of personnel will be released as follows:

(a) Returnees will be released to the CHIEU HOI Center in the returnees home district.

(b) Civil defendants will be transferred to civil authorities in their home district.

(c) Innocent civilians will be released to the district chief in their home district.

(3) When releasing custody, Part V of the USARV 364 Form will be completed.

(4) US commanders may accept custody of prisoners of war captured by FWMAFs during combined US-FWMAF operations.

(5) Accountability for detainee personal effects. Any property taken from detainees prior to arrival at division or separate brigade/regimental collecting points will be listed on the detainee Card (USARV 365 Form).

(a) Personal effects of detainees are classified as follows:

1 Retained Property. This includes property which may be retained by the individual such as clothing, mess equipment, and badges of rank and nationality.

2 Impounded Property. This is property which may facilitate escape or be considered dangerous to the security of US Forces and includes cameras, radios, and monies.

3 Confiscated Property. This includes items such as weapons; ammunition; military equipment excluding mess equipment metal helmets, and gas masks; military documents; signal devices; and contraband items.

(b) Disposition of Property

1 Retained and Impounded Property. This property will be forwarded through the chain of evacuation with the prisoner escort.

2 Confiscated Property. This property will be evacuated as normal captured equipment.

7. Reports

a. The number of detainees and those classified as prisoners of war, returnees, civil defendants, and innocent civilians during a twenty-four hour period will be reported in the daily Intelligence Summary.

b. Initial interrogation reports will be identified as follows: originator's numerical unit designation; the number of the report assigned serially by calendar year; and the last two digits of the calendar year. If captured in a specific operation the name of the operation will be indicated in parenthesis.

(1) Examples:

3d ITT, III MAF, 138-67

569th MI Det, TFO, 138-67 (MALHEUR)

7th ITT, III MAF, 138-67 (PRAIRIE IV)

c. Follow-up interrogation reports will be identified by a sequential alphabetical designation after the numerical serial number.

(1) Example:

3d ITT, III MAF 138A-67 (first follow-up)

3d ITT, III MAF 138B-67 (second follow-up)

d. Initial interrogation reports of very important sources will be transmitted electrically as soon as possible, giving as a minimum the following information: (1) Name and alias; (2) Rank and position (NVA or VC); (3) Unit identification (NVA or VC), to include complete subordination of unit; (4) Date, time and location of capture/return; (5) Capturing unit or unit to which returned; (6) Statement of substantive information obtained from source,

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e.g., unit mission and plans; (7) Major areas and depth of knowledgeability; (8) Present locations of source and; (9) Originator's comments (status of interrogation, planned disposition of source, recommended further evacuation and exploitation, etc.).

e. When information gained through interrogations is included in Intelligence Summary or Periodic Intelligence Report, originators will as a minimum give the following identifying data: (1) Name and alias, (2) Rank and/or position (NVA or VC), (3) Unit identification (NVA or VC), to include complete subordination of unit, (4) Date, time and location of capture/return, (5) Capturing unit or unit to which returned; and (6) Disposition of source.

f. All administrative reports and completed USARV Forms pertaining to custodial procedures required by this order will be forwarded to the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (Attn: PMO) for review prior to being sent to the Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam.

g. A weekly report by Division or separate brigades/regiments as of 1200 each Saturday will be made to the III Marine Amphibious Force PMO to arrive not later than 1600 each Sunday indicating: (1) Number of detainees captured; (2) Number of detainees classified as prisoners of war and released to the I Corps Prisoner of War Camp; (3) Number of detainees classified as civil defendants and released to Government Civil Authorities; (4) Number of detainees classified as returnees and released to the CHIEU HOI Centers; and (5) The number of detainees classified as innocent civilians and released to their District Headquarters. In order to meet the deadline, reports may be made by telephone and then confirmed in writing in the format shown in enclosure (3).

h. Returnees will be reported to the local CHIEU HOI officials as soon as they come into US custody.

i. The local senior US intelligence officer will establish continued liaison with ARVN and GVN CHIEU HOI officials to ensure that returnees who report directly to CHIEU HOI centers are properly identified and reported.

8. Military Tribunal

a. Article 5, GPW, provides for the convening of tribunals by a detaining power. The sole purpose of a tribunal is to determine in doubtful cases whether a detained person who has committed a belligerent act is entitled to status as a prisoner of war.

b. The responsibility for determining the status of persons captured by US forces rests with divisions or separate brigades/regiments. Before any detainee is released or transferred from U.S. custody his status as prisoner of war, returnee, civil defendant or innocent civilian, must be determined.

c. Some persons obviously are prisoners of war; e.g., NVA or Viet Cong regulars taken into custody on the battlefield on which they are engaged in open combat. Others obviously are not prisoners of war; e.g., civilians who are detained as suspects, found to be friendly, and released; or returnees who receive favored treatment under the CHIEU HOI program. In other cases entitlement to prisoner of war status may be doubtful; e.g., when a person has committed a belligerent act and was not wearing a uniform or other responsible insignia, and it is questionable whether he was following the laws and customs of war. In such doubtful cases the necessity for a determination of status by a tribunal may arise.

d. A detainee will be referred to an Article 5 tribunal only when:

- (1) He has committed a belligerent act, and
- (2) Either of the following conditions exist

(a) There is doubt as to whether the detainee is entitled to prisoner of war status, or

(b) A determination has been made that the status of the detainee is that of a civil defendant and the detainee or someone in his behalf claims that he is entitled to prisoner of war status.

e. The Tribunal will:

(1) Consist of three or more officers. Where practicable the members should be judge advocates or other military lawyers lawyer familiar with the Geneva Conventions. The senior member shall act as president of the tribunal.

(2) Follow the procedures set forth in reference (c) and may make such additional rules of procedure consistent with the Geneva Conventions as are deemed necessary to insure a full and fair inquiry into matters before them.

Form 3461.2A
8 Jul 1967

(3) Apply the provisions of Article 4, GPW, and this paragraph in making a determination of entitlement or nonentitlement to prisoner of war status.

(4) Indicate its decision on a format as indicated in reference (c).

f. Convening Authorities. Divisions/separate brigade commanders are authorized to convene tribunals and will be guided by the specifications as outlined in reference (c).

R. B. Neville
R. B. NEVILLE
Deputy Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
Case 2

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

ForO 3461.2A Ch 1
2ITT/dwh
16 Sep 1967

FORCE ORDER 3461.2A Ch 1

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: Processing, Exploiting, Evacuating and Accounting for
Prisoners of War

Encl: (1) Initial Interrogation Report Form


1. Purpose. To transmit new page inserts and direct pen changes
to basic order.

2. Action

a. Insert enclosure (1) as enclosure (4) to basic order.

b. On page 1 to basic order add enclosure: (4) Initial
Interrogation Report Form.

c. To paragraph 7.b. add new first sentence to read,
"Initial Interrogation reports will follow the format set forth
in enclosure (4)".



Duane L. FAW
Deputy Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION
Case 2

DETAINEE CARD

1. Completed by capturing unit.
2. Personal-use and sentimental value property will not be taken by capturing unit.

FULL NAME:

TIME OF CAPTURE

DATE OF CAPTURE:

LOCATION OF CAPTURE:

CIRCUMSTANCE OF CAPTURE:

DOCUMENT(S):

WEAPON(S):

OTHER PROPERTY TAKEN FROM DETAINEE: (If none, so indicate)

CAPTURED BY:

NAME: (Print)

UNIT: (Print)

DAW Form 365 (21Dec66)

DETAINEE REPORT FORM (USARV FORM 364)

1. GENERAL. This form will be completed in two copies by US investigation personnel at divisions or separate brigade/regiment. One copy of this form will be forwarded to this headquarters (ATTN: PMO) on all persons detained by US Forces at division or separate brigade/regiment collecting points and on all prisoners of war released to US Forces by FROPP during combined-operations. One copy will be retained by division or separate brigade/regiment. It is of utmost importance that this form be complete and legible. If information is unknown and cannot be obtained, enter UNK. The form will not be forwarded to this headquarters until final status determination has been made.

2. DISPOSITION OF THE TWO COPIES OF DETAINEE REPORT FORM WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:

a. CHIEU NOI (Returnee). Signature of appropriate ARVN official will be obtained in Part V on both copies by division or separate brigade/regiment. One copy will be retained by divisions or separate brigade/regiment. One copy will be forwarded to this headquarters (ATTN: PMO) by division or separate brigade/regiment.

b. Civil defendant. Both copies will be retained by division or separate brigade/regiment until final determination is entered in Part II and signature of appropriate ARVN official is obtained in Part V. One copy will be retained by division or separate brigade/regiment. One copy will be forwarded to this headquarters (ATTN: PMO) by division or separate brigade/regiment.

c. Innocent civilian. Signature of person making disposition of the person will be entered in Part V, Detainee Report Form. One copy will be retained by division or separate brigade/regiment. One copy will be forwarded to this headquarters (ATTN: PMO) by division or separate brigade/regiment.

d. Prisoners of war. Division or separate brigade/regiment will obtain signature of escort guard on both copies of Detainee Report Form in Part V. Division or separate brigade/regiment will retain one copy and give the other copy to the escort guard to be forwarded to this headquarters upon release of the prisoner of war to ARVN I Corps Prisoner of War Camp. This copy will remain with the prisoner of war until signature is obtained in Part V, Detainee Report Form, from the ARVN I Corps Prisoner of War Camp at which time this copy will be forwarded to this headquarters (ATTN: PMO) by escorting MP unit.

DETAINEE REPORT FORM (USARV Reg 190-2)	
USARV Card No:	RCS exempt 1A4 Para 39H AP 335-5
TYPE OR PRINT ITEMS CLEARLY	
PART I - PERSONAL DATA	
TO:	
1. NAME: (Last-Middle-First)	2. RANK:
3. ORGANIZATION:	4. SN/ID NO:
4. STATUS: (Transcribe from Part II)	6. DOB (Day-Mo-Yr):
7. <input type="checkbox"/> NVA <input type="checkbox"/> VC <input type="checkbox"/>	8. CAPTURING FORCE: <input type="checkbox"/> US <input type="checkbox"/> FVMAF <input type="checkbox"/> RVNNAF
9. PLACE OF CAPTURE:	10. DATE OF CAPTURE:
11. CAPTURING UNIT:	
12. PHYSICAL CONDITION:	13. RELIGION:
14. SIGNATURE OF DETAINEE: CHU KY:	
15. REMARKS:	

USARV Form 364 (21 Dec 66)

PART V - CUSTODY RECORD AND PROPERTY RECEIPT

DATE	TIME	PHYS COND	DESTINATION	RECEIVED BY (Signature)	RECEIVED BY (Printed Name)	UNIT

Form 3461.2A
8 Jul 1967

FORMAT FOR WEEKLY REPORT OF DETAINEES

From:
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force

REPORT OF DETAINEES

1. Report for week of _____.
- a. Number of detainees taken during week _____.
- b. Number of detainees classified as PW and released to I Corps Prisoner of War Camp _____.
- c. Number of detainees classified as civil dependents and released to GVN civil authorities _____.
- d. Number of detainees classified as returnees and released to the Chieu Hoi Program _____.
- e. Number of detainees classified as innocent civilians and released to District Headquarters _____.
- f. Number of detainees classified as PW and transferred to III MAF POW facility _____.

INITIAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Date/Time
ITT Report No.

1. BIOGRAPHY.

- a. Name (AKA).
- b. Rank & Serial No. (NVA).
- c. Job Held with VC or NVA.
- d. DOB & POB.
- e. Parents Name.
- f. Date & Place of Capture.
- g. Capturing Unit.
- h. Circumstance of capture.

- i. Weapons & documents captured and disposition.

- j. Calendar used.

2. UNIT.

- a. Unit.
- b. LBN's, AKA's, Code #'s.

- c. Strength.

Area of operation (if any Surface).

- e. Area of operation.

Form 3461.2A
8 July 1967

f. Base Area.

g. Mission.

h. Personalities.

i. Knowledge of other enemy forces.

j. Morale.

k. Losses/replacements.

l. Supply.

3. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. (When applicable to include infiltration routes, infiltration group #'s, hospital stations, caches, resupply points, tactics, training, etc.)

Enclosure (4)
Ch 1 (16 Sep 1967)

~~OFFICIAL FILE COPY~~

Form 3451.2A
8 July 1967

- 4. This report answers the following SICR's and/or SSI's.
 - a.
 - b.
- 5. Interrogator's comments.
- 6. Current and future disposition of captive.

Interrogator _____ Reviewed by _____
DTG interrogation Completed _____

DISTRIBUTION

add page

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**HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
APO, San Francisco, California 96602**

ForO 5080.5
11/jmm
3 Oct 1966

FORCE ORDER 5080.5

**From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List**

Subj: Property Damage and Death or Personal Injury to Vietnamese Civilians

1. Purpose. To establish policies and procedures to minimize the adverse effects resulting from property damage, death, or injury to Vietnamese civilians.

2. Background

a. The conflict in which we are engaged is unlike any we have fought before. Our goal is not simply to inflict military defeat upon an armed enemy. We must also win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people, if our efforts here are to have any lasting meaning. We face an enemy who has the same goal. To achieve his ends, he uses the civilian community as a shield against our weaponry and then turns the resultant damage to his own advantage by using it to fashion a wedge between the Vietnamese population and our forces. We cannot ignore these tactics, nor can we refuse to recognize their potential for harm to our cause. We can and must, however, employ the power of our weaponry with skill and restraint to avoid, insofar as possible, creating situations which are subject to easy exploitation by the enemy. By careful coordination of supporting fires and their judicious employment, we can avoid inflicting unnecessary injury upon the people whose confidence and support we seek. It is too much to expect the Vietnamese civilian whose home is destroyed or whose family is injured, to recognize any meaningful distinction between the damage we inflict and that imposed by our enemy.

b. The following practices are self-defeating and will not be tolerated:

(1) The employment of unobserved and unregistered harassing and interdiction fires upon a populated area, when attack from that area is not indicated by the available information.

(2) The use of heavy supporting arms upon populated areas when the resistance received is not such as to impede the maneuver of our forces to the objective or the accomplishment of the mission.

EXHIBIT D-26

(3) The use of non-combatant civilians as the point for combat patrols or for a unit in the approach march.

3. Action. In a conflict such as this where enemy forces frequently lodge themselves among the non-combatant community, some incidents are inevitable. When they occur, we must do everything possible to minimize their adverse effects. To this end, the following actions are directed whenever serious injury, death, or severe property damage is inflicted upon the non-combatant population by our weaponry:

a. Whether the damage or injury occurs through error or is the unavoidable consequence of combat, the division/wing commander concerned will prepare a personal letter to the appropriate province chief containing at least the following information:

(1) The deep regrets of the commander concerned,

(2) A statement of the steps taken or to be taken to identify the cause of the incident and prevent a recurrence,

(3) A statement that the commander concerned will provide all relief possible from military resources available to him, upon receipt of a damage assessment from the sector advisor.

b. Examples of appropriate measures which should not be detailed in the letter, but which may be within the capabilities of units under the commander's control, are:

(1) Medical evacuation

(2) Medical Treatment

(3) Engineer reconstruction

(4) Provision of emergency food stocks through coordination with USAID and other organizations

(5) Legal determination as to whether the incident is combat or noncombat related, with advice as to processing claims, if appropriate

(6) Expeditious solatium payments

c. Immediate action to repair damage and alleviate suffering will be taken on the spot by the officer in command of the operation within the limit of his capabilities.

3 Oct 1966

d. In any case in which the division or wing commander believes the circumstances to be such that a personal letter from higher authority would be appropriate, he will so recommend and forward a full report of the circumstances upon which to base the letter.



L. W. WALT

DISTRIBUTION:
Case 6 (7)

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

ForO 5820.1
17/jsb
3 Jun 1967

FORCE ORDER 5820.1

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: War Crimes Investigation

Ref: (a) DA FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, July 1956
(b) MACV Dir 20-4, 27 April 1967
(c) ICCI 5830.1A

1. Purpose. To provide uniform procedures in compiling and submitting reports of investigations where alleged or apparent war crimes have been committed.

2. Background. References (a) and (b) set forth the definitions of a war crime. In addition, reference (b) prescribes procedures for reporting alleged war crimes. The aim of these procedures is to assure accurate and timely reports which can be acted upon promptly.

3. Scope. This directive is applicable to all alleged or apparent war crimes, whether inflicted by hostile forces upon U. S. military or civilian personnel, or by U. S. military personnel upon hostile military or civilian personnel.

4. Responsibilities. It is the responsibility of all military personnel having knowledge of or receiving a report of an incident thought to be a war crime, to make such incident known to his commanding officer as soon as practicable. Persons discovering war crimes will take all reasonable action to preserve physical evidence, to note witnesses present, and to record (by photograph, sketch or descriptive notes) the circumstances and surroundings to the extent possible.

5. Action

a. Upon receipt of a report of an alleged war crime, the commanding officer to whom the report has been submitted will submit a serious incident report in accordance with reference (c) to the III Marine Amphibious Force Combat Operations Center (Parchment COC).

b. Upon receipt of the initial report, the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force will designate an appropriate commander to appoint an investigating officer to prepare and submit a report

EXHIBIT M-8

ForO 5820.1
3 Jun 1967

of investigation. If appropriate, a qualified criminal investigator or CID agent will also be appointed as technical assistant.

c. The report of investigation will include the following:

- (1) Identity, organization, and status of victim.
- (2) Nature of violation committed.
- (3) Cause of injury or death and manner in which injury or death occurred.
- (4) Time and place of commission.
- (5) Identity of individuals or organizations suspected of commission of the act.
- (6) Names, identification, addresses (or units) of witnesses or suspected witnesses.
- (7) Medical or autopsy reports.
- (8) Photographic evidence, preferably taken at the scene of discovery, and properly identified as to time, place, subject, witnesses, and photographer.
- (9) Statements of witnesses of any of the circumstances surrounding the incident and the discovery of evidence regarding the incident. Whenever practicable, statements should be under oath.
- (10) Military reports, including after-action reports and those from intelligence sources, to identify suspected individuals and units.
- (11) Physical evidence, such as weapons, clothing, bullets, shell casings, rope, etc., pertinent to the case.

d. The Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force will make appropriate reports to higher authority.

R. B. Neville
R. B. NEVILLE
Deputy Chief of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:
Case 2

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96602

ForO 5820.1 Ch 1
17/jnd
16 OCT 1968

FORCE ORDER 5820.1 Ch 1

From: Commanding General
To: Distribution List

Subj: War Crimes Investigation

1. Purpose. To publish pen and ink changes to the basic Order.

2. Action

a. Change reference (b) of the basic Order to read "MACV Dir 20-4 of 18 May 1968".

b. Change reference (c) of the basic Order to read "ICCI 5830.1B".



L. E. POGGEMETER
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

DISTRIBUTION:
Case 2

HEADQUARTERS
III Marine Amphibious Force
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
c/o FPO San Francisco, California 95602

2 Mar 67

Subj: Spot/Serious Incident Reports

- Ref: (a) MCO 05740.2
(b) MACV Directive 335-1
(c) MACV Directive 335-12
(d) FMFPac Order 5740.1
(e) Force Order 5700.1A

- Encl: (1) Format for Spot Incident Report
(2) Format for Serious Incident Report (SIR)

1. Purpose. To prescribe policy and procedure for reporting of significant information to the CG, III MAF/I Corps Coordinator.

2. Cancellation. I Corps Coordinator Instruction 5830.1 and Force Order 3480.1A.

3. Background. References (1), (b) and (c) require immediate reports to higher headquarters of any incident that results in death or serious injury to friendly forces or noncombatants; and incident that may reflect adversely upon U. S. Forces and their mission in Vietnam; and any incident that may receive widespread adverse publicity. The requirement to report all types of serious incidents serves many purposes: (1) It permits sound command supervision of all related matters, so that appropriate corrective measures may be taken. For example, the cause of misdirected ordnance should always be determined and corrective action applied. (2) The appropriateness of existing procedures, orders, and instructions are tested by every incident. (3) Reports may indicate inadequate efforts to assist innocent victims of operational or administrative mishaps in every way possible. The aim of these procedures is to ensure timely and accurate reporting to higher authorities in order that they may meet their obligations to their superiors and to permit commanders at all levels to fulfill their command responsibilities. The Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force, has been directed to report all such incidents occurring within units under his operational control.

4. Action.

a. The Commanding Generals, 1st Marine Division, 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Force Logistic Command, Commanding Officer I Corps Advisory Group/Deputy Senior Advisor, I Corps, and Commanding Officers of units under operational control of III Marine Amphibious

EXHIBIT D-28

Force are responsible for the reporting of all incidents required to be reported hereunder arising out of operations conducted by their commands, or otherwise related to personnel and units under their operational control, and will take such action as is deemed necessary to implement these instructions. Such action will include designation of a single point of contact on their staffs to whom inquiries can be addressed to determine the status of a particular investigation or to secure such other information as may be necessary.

b. Commanders of other U.S. Armed Forces Commands, I Corps should provide the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force a copy of the report required by their respective service instructions. In this connection a timely wire or telephone report to III MAF Combat Operations Center (Parchment COC) may be in order depending on the seriousness of the situation. The telephone call should be followed by submission of a copy of the written report.

c. The Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Company, III Marine Amphibious Force is responsible to report all incidents, required to be reported hereunder arising out of the operations of, or otherwise related to, personnel of his command.

5. Reportable Incidents.

a. Operational incidents to be reported utilizing the Spct Report Format (enclosure (1)) include, but are not limited to the following:

- (1) Initiation and results of US or friendly tactical operations.
- (2) US casualties, regardless of cause.
- (3) Downed or missing friendly aircraft.
- (4) Relocation of major friendly combat/combat support units (company or larger).
- (5) Enemy initiated attacks on US or friendly forces and facilities.
- (6) Terrorist attacks on friendly localities or personnel.
- (7) Discovery of significant arms or supply caches and of infiltration operations.
- (8) VC atrocities or war crimes.

(9) Evidence of the VC use of new type of military equipment or VC adoption of new tactics.

(10) Capture of senior enemy officers or VC cadre.

(11) Sparrowhawk: Launch, retrieve and results.

(12) Other reaction forces: When launched, why, results.

(13) Launch of significant helilift, completion of lift.

(14) Significant visual reconnaissance sightings.

(15) Air to air contact, ground to air AS sightings.

(16) Motor vehicle convoys departing and arriving in TAORs; delays.

(17) Change in status of main LUC.

(18) Change in alert forces (units, times).

(19) Company or larger troop lifts.

(20) Suspected or alleged border violations of RVN or contiguous nations.

(21) Serious incidents involving prisoners of war for which the U. S. has responsibility under the Geneva Conventions, including death, serious injury, riots and successful escapes.

(22) Injury or death of noncombatants during tactical operations due to U.S. ordnance.

(23) Incidents, attacks, civil disturbances and natural disasters which physically or psychologically affect the people of Vietnam or the image of the central government. Of particular interest are incidents which have a direct impact on the revolutionary development program or the ability of the government to carry out the program.

b. Administratively processed incidents involving moral turpitude which may result in damaging public confidence in the U.S. Armed Forces and which, because of the nature of personnel involved, may be reasonably expected to arouse public interest and cause continuous or widespread adverse publicity, will be reported utilizing the Serious Incident Format (enclosure (2)). The following are illustrative of reportable incidents in this category:

(1) Mistreatment of noncombatants in the course of tactical operations.

(2) Death from other than natural causes.

(3) Rape or an assault with intent to commit rape or other serious sex offenses.

(4) Significant damage to Vietnamese property brought about by actions of Americans.

(5) Burglary, robbery, arson, misappropriation, fraud or extortion of major significance.

(6) Riots or other disorders resulting from an incident caused by Americans.

(7) Blackmarketing, smuggling, and currency manipulations.

(8) Involvement with military or civilian personnel of a foreign power in a criminal incident of immediate or potentially serious significance from a political, military or public relations standpoint.

c. Reporting Procedures.

(1) Initial Spot Reports will be made immediately by wire or telephone to the III Marine Amphibious Force Combat Operations Center (Parchment COC) at the earliest time that the significant facts can be determined and by the most expeditious means available, subject to security requirements. Normally, unclassified reports will be made telephonically.

(2) Initial serious Incident Reports may require more detailed information to be meaningful and this information should be included even at the cost of some delay in the report. Initial reports should be made not more than twenty-four hours from the time the event was known to military authorities. Such reports will be made by wire or telephone to the III Marine Amphibious Force Combat Operations Center (Parchment COC).

(3) Both spot and serious incident interim follow-up reports will be made by wire or telephone to the III Marine Amphibious Force Combat Operations Center as soon as information required is available, but no later than 72 hours after the incident was known to military authorities.

(4) A terminal written report, to the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force will be submitted (original and two copies) consolidating the initial and interim reports together with any additional information obtained. The final entry shall state "No fur-

ther report will be submitted unless investigation or developments warrant."

(5) Information Service Reports. A copy of the written report submitted hereunder is forwarded to the Combat Information Bureau obviating the necessity of submitting written reports required by paragraph 4007 of reference (c), unless specifically requested.

(6) Deleted

(7) Reports of serious injury or death of individual Marines need not normally be reported as serious incidents, since the details are reported to higher authority in the Casualty Report.

s/H. I. Elwood
t/H. I. ELWOOD
Chief of Staff

SPOT REPORT

(Initial)

(Follow on)

(Date)

Alpha - (UNIT SENDING REPORT)

Bravo - DTT of Activity/Incident occurred

Charlie - Location by Coordinates

Delta - (WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW)

Echo - (RESULTS OR ACTION TAKEN)

Foxtrot - (FRIENDLY KIA)

Gold - (FRIENDLY WIA)

India - (ENEMY KIA) (CONFIRMED)

Juliet - (ENEMY KIA) (CONFIRMED)

Kilo - (ENEMY CAPTURED)

Lima - (ENEMY SUSPECTS)

Mike - (WEAPONS CAPTURED)

November - (EQUIPMENT/DOCUMENTS)

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File #

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FM CG III MAF DANANG

TO III MAF

BT

UNCLAS

TOP SECRET
CG III MAF 153
1-3-68
ACTION

FOR ALL COMMANDING OFFICERS

YOU ARE DIRECTED TO BRING THIS MESSAGE TO THE ATTENTION OF ALL OFFICERS AND STAFF NCO'S.

AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH NEW YEAR IT IS TRADITIONAL FOR US TO MAKE "RESOLUTIONS" TO DO, OR AVOID, CERTAIN THINGS DURING THE ENSUING YEAR.

AS MILITARY MEN WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LEADERSHIP DURING WARFARE, IN WHICH THE LITTLE THINGS WE DO OR FAIL TO DO MAY RESULT IN THE SAVING OR LOSS OF MEN'S LIVES. I BELIEVE THOSE RESOLUTIONS WHICH BETTER OUR ROLE IN PROVIDING PROFESSIONAL LEADERSHIP WILL NOT ONLY IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY OF OUR UNITS BUT WILL ALSO PAY DIVIDENDS IN LIVES SAVED BOTH ON AND OFF THE BATTLEFIELD.

TOWARD THIS END I OFFER YOU, AS TROOP LEADERS, SOME RESOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE YOUR EFFECTIVENESS DURING THE COMING YEAR:

PAGE TWO RUMMNA 0003 UNCLAS

A. TO METICULOUSLY SUPERVISE ALL SUBORDINATES IN THE CARE AND HANDLING OF INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS UPON STRICT OBSERVANCE OF SAFETY PROCEDURES.

B. TO DEMAND STRICT FIRE CONTROL DISCIPLINE IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF ALL WEAPONS, NOT ONLY TO INSURE THAT THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE NOT VIOLATED, BUT ALSO TO INSURE THAT THERE IS NO NEEDLESS ENDANGERING OF NON-COMBATANTS DURING ENGAGEMENTS. PARTICULAR CARE IS REQUIRED IN THE TARGETING AND LAYING OF INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS.

C. TO INSIST UPON OBEDIENCE TO ALL SAFETY PROCEDURES BY THE OPERATORS OF MOTOR VEHICLES, MACHINERY AND HEAVY EQUIPMENT, AND TO TAKE IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION WHEN SAFETY REGULATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE DEMANDED BY COMMON SENSE, ARE BEING VIOLATED.

D. TO BE INTOLERANT OF MISTAKES AND CARELESSNESS ON THE PART OF YOURSELF OR YOUR SUBORDINATES AND TO DEVOTE TIME TO THE STUDY OF APPROPRIATE FIELD MANUALS SO THAT YOUR BATTLEFIELD ACTIONS AND DECISIONS WILL BE PROFESSIONAL.

E. TO BE ALERT TO THE PERSONAL PROBLEMS OF SUBORDINATES, AND TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO FORESTALL GREATER PROBLEMS.

THESE ARE BUT A FEW OF THE RESOLUTIONS WHICH YOU, AS A SMALL

PAGE THREE RUMWAA 0003 UNCLAS

UNIT LEADER CAN ADOPT TO IMPROVE YOUR EFFICIENCY AND TO MAKE YOUR UNIT MORE EFFECTIVE AND PRODUCTIVE. I AM CONVINCED THAT THESE, COUPLED WITH OTHER RESOLUTIONS YOU MAY IMPOSE UPON YOURSELF, WILL GO FAR TOWARD SAVING HUMAN LIVES AND CONTRIBUTE IMMEASURABLY TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF OUR MISSION.

MY BEST WISHES FOR CONTINUED SUCCESS TO YOU AND YOUR MEN DURING THE NEW YEAR.

BT

BT

HEADQUARTERS
TASK FORCE OREGON
APO San Francisco 96374

Record

21 March 1967

REGULATION
NUMBER 333-6

REPORTS

(Reports of Serious Crimes or Incidents)

1. PURPOSE:

a. To insure that this headquarters is immediately informed of all serious criminal offenses or serious disciplinary incidents occurring within the command.

b. To establish uniform procedures for reporting criminal offenses or serious disciplinary incidents occurring within the command to this Headquarters.

2. DEFINITIONS:

a. Task Force Personnel: United States military or civilian personnel who are assigned, attached, or on temporary duty with Headquarters, Task Force OREGON or a subordinate unit or command, and local national employees of Task Force OREGON when in duty status.

b. Serious Incidents: Any incident involving Task Force OREGON personnel, property or equipment which may be reasonably expected to arouse local public interest, cause continued or wide spread publicity, embarrass the US Government or military forces or which, for other important considerations, may warrant the personal attention of the CG, Task Force OREGON.

3. REPORTABLE INCIDENTS: Crimes, offenses, or incidents to be reported include, but are not limited to:

a. Death from other than natural causes.

b. Voluntary or involuntary manslaughter or assault with intent to commit manslaughter.

c. Rape or assault with the intent to commit rape or other serious sex offenses.

d. Aggravated assaults, unlawful or unauthorized discharge of firearms, or hit and run accidents resulting in serious injury or involving circumstances likely to cause unfavorable publicity.

e. Burglary, robbery, arson, and misappropriation, fraud, or extortion of major significance.

EXHIBIT D-30

f. Blackmarketing, smuggling, currency manipulation, postal violations, and offenses involving narcotics.

g. Riot or mutiny.

h. Involvements with military or civilian personnel of a foreign power in incidents of immediate or potentially serious significance from a political, military, or public relations standpoint.

i. Terrorist activities involving US personnel and/or US Government property.

j. Aircraft crashes, not involved in or resulting from tactical operations.

k. Fatal traffic accidents

l. Acts involving moral turpitude considered of sufficient importance to warrant the attention of the CG, this headquarters.

m. Serious incidents involving prisoners of war, detainees captured or in custody of US Forces, or other persons for which the US has responsibility under the Geneva Conventions, including death, serious injury, riot, and successful escape.

4. REPORTING PROCEDURES: There are three types of serious incident reports: Initial, Interim, and Final.

a. Initial Reports:

(1) Initial reports will be submitted by Brigade Provost Marshals and Commanders of other units on all serious crimes or incidents as defined by this regulation. Submit by the most expeditious means available, to the TF Provost Marshal. If those reports are unclassified, they will be reported by telephone.

(2) The TF Provost Marshal will notify the PM, USARN, ARVN, telephone 31475 or Army 648.

(3) The TF Provost Marshall will submit Serious Incident Reports to the Provost Marshal, USARV, immediately upon receipt.

(4) The initial report will be as complete as possible but reports will not be delayed awaiting receipt of additional information or results of investigation.

(5) In those cases in which foul play is not probable, such as suicide, or accidental deaths, and in all cases when sufficient information is available to ascertain that any indicated corrective action has been accomplished, the initial and final reports may be combined. In such cases, the combined report will contain a statement to the effect that "No further report will be submitted on this incident unless later investigation warrants."

b. Interim Reports:

(1) Interim reports will be submitted by the Provost Marshal as information becomes available and as a minimum, each 30 days until final action has been accomplished and a final report is submitted.

(2) Interim reports will reflect the current status of the incident, personnel involved, and in applicable cases, changes in local public reaction or attitudes.

c. Final Reports:

(1) Final reports will be submitted by the Provost Marshal immediately upon completion of appropriate action.

(2) Final reports will include the following:

(a) Report of any disciplinary action taken against personnel involved.

(b) Corrective administrative action taken to preclude a similar type of incident.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. Major subordinate commanders are responsible for the reporting serious crimes or incidents in accordance with this regulation.

b. Any agency or person having knowledge of a serious crime or incident is responsible for the reporting of the fact to the nearest Provost Marshal, Base Commander, or his commanding officer.

c. The TF Provost Marshal is responsible for notifying higher headquarters of any serious incidents.

6. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS:

a. Provost Marshal will consider security implications when incidents as outlined in this regulation are reported. The last paragraph of the reporting format requires the statement: G2 or Intelligence Officer (as appropriate) (has) (has not) been apprised of the incident.

b. All incidents reported as serious crimes or incidents remain open cases at Headquarters, USARV, until a final report is submitted.

Reg No 335-6, Hq TF OREGON, 21 March 1967

7. Format: Format for reporting serious crimes or incidents is attached.

8. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Reports submitted under the provisions of this regulation will be classified according to the nature of the incident; however, as a minimum, written reports will be classified "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY."

9. REFERENCES:


- a. USARPAC Reg 1-55
- b. MACV Directive 335-1
- c. USARV Reg 335-6

(AVDF-PM)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EDGAR R. POOLE
COL, GS
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:


RONALD J. ZAHR
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

B

FORMAT FOR REPORTING SERIOUS INCIDENTS

INITIAL REPORTS:

1. Type of Incident: Use appropriate terms; e.g., suicide, robbery, etc.
2. Time and Date of Incident.
3. Location of Incident: Report the exact location, using identifiable landmarks, miles to nearest town, city, or village, and grid coordinates.
4. Name of person(s) involved, to include victim(s), subject(s), and witnesses, including information as to their:
 - a. Name: Last name, first, middle initial, and DOB.
 - b. Grade or title.
 - c. Service number or ID number.
 - d. Organization or address.
 - e. If US civilian, indicate his status; e.g., DAC, dependent, etc., in place of grade or title.
 - f. If RVN civilian, indicate his age and sex; e.g., VN/M/24, in place of grade or title.
5. Extent of Injuries: Explain concisely, if applicable.
6. Narrative Summary of Factual Information Concerning the Incident:
 - a. Disposition of remains.
 - b. Location of confinement.
 - c. Proposed actions, either administrative or judicial, to insure that all possible measures have been taken immediately by commanders to reduce the impact of incident of US/VN relations.
 - d. Statement that the local G2 or intelligence officer has / has not been notified of the incident.
7. Reaction of Civil Populace.

APP I, Reg No 335-6, Hq TF OREGON, 21 Mar 67

8. Name, Grade, and Organization of Individual Rendering Report.
9. Name and Grade of Individual Receiving Report and Time/Date.
10. Persons/Agencies Notified: Applicable to PM, this headquarters,
only
11. Investigating Agency.

INTERIM REPORTS: These reports will be submitted in the same format as initial reports. When there is no change in the information originally reported, the letters "NA" will be used for that specific paragraph.

FINAL REPORTS. These reports will be submitted in the same format as initial reports. In incident reports, wherein the initial and final reports are combined, para 6 (Narrative Summary) will include as a final statement: "No further reports will be submitted on this incident unless later investigation warrants."

APP I, Reg No 335-6, Hq TF OREGON, 21 Mar 67

HEADQUARTERS
TASK FORCE OREGON (PROVISIONAL)
APO San Francisco 96374

CHANGE 1
REGULATION
NUMBER 335-6

14 August 1967

REPORTS

(Reports of Serious Crimes or Incidents)

Regulation Number 335-6, this headquarters, dated 21 March 1967, is changed as follows:

* * * * *

3. Add n. Suicides, attempted suicides, and self-inflicted gunshot wounds.

4. a. (2) (Superseded) The TF Provost Marshal will notify SIR Section, 18th MP Brigade, Telephone Long Binh 4775/4611.

4. a. (3) (Superseded) The TF Provost Marshal will submit Serious, Incident Reports to the Provost Marshal, USARV, through the 18th MP Brigade SIR Section, immediately upon receipt.

* * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

EDGAR . POOLE
Colonel, GS*
Chief of Staff

/s/Matthew W. Irvin
MATTHEW W. IRVIN
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

A plus
20-SJA

19A-4330-11

S

ADJUTANT

CG TF OREGON CHU IRI

CG III IAF DA IRI

copy #4

E-C
E-AC
E-C
E-C

REF ID: A65552

Operational Control (U)

(U) COMPLETING PERIODIC REPORT, CG, TF OREGON TO CG,
AMERICAN FORCE.

(S) TF OREGON UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL III IRI
AMERICAN FORCE EFFECTIVE 200001H APRIL 1967.

[See clear copy on following page]

22 16
37 67

378-5-19-67

CHARLES M. WILSON
Colonel, Infantry

403

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXHIBIT D-50

RONALD J. ZAHM, LTC, ACC, AGS

549

copy

DECLASSIFIED AT 5 YR
UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFIED AFTER 12 YR

S

IMMEDIATE

CG TF OREGON CHU LAI

CG III MAF DA NANG

1-CS
1-AG
1-COMCEN
1-G3

SECRET CITE _____

Subj: Operational Control (U)

1. (U) CONFIRMING PERSONAL REPORT, CG, TF OREGON TO CG,

III MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE.

2. (S) TF OREGON UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL III MARINE

AMPHIBIOUS FORCE EFFECTIVE 200001H APRIL 1967.

GP4

Apr 67.

1 1

403

GEORGE M. WALLACE
Colonel, Infantry
G3

550 RONALD J. ZAHM, LTC, AGC, Adj Gen
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTER
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PRIORITY

CO, TF OREGON ARTY

CO, 2D BN, 9TH ARTY

CO, 2D BN, 11TH ARTY

CO, 2D BN, 320TH ARTY

CO, 3D BN, 18TH ARTY

CO, 3D BN, 82D ARTY

FOUO EFTO AVDF-AT

1483

SUBJECT: Orientation and Training in Artillery Techniques

1. Reference: Letter, Hq TF Oregon, subject; Investigation of Artillery Incidents, AVDF-AT dated 17 May 67.

2. As stated in the referenced letter, "A system of double checks, in accordance with standard artillery procedures, will be utilized in all gunnery operations. Detailed instructions are included in the Task Force Oregon Artillery Field SOP, Appendix 2 (Gunnery Procedures) and Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex A (Operations)."

3. In addition to the TF Oregon Artillery Field SOP (including change 1) from time to time other artillery procedures and techniques are disseminated, usually as the result of a formal investigation of

May 67
1 3

428

/s/Mason J. Young Jr.
/t/MASON J YOUNG JR.
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

/s/O. A. Gerner Jr., CPT, ACC, Asst AG
/t/O. A. GERNER JR., CPT, AGC, Asst AG

EXHIBIT M-73

an artillery incident. This is normally done through artillery channels as it is not desirable to emphasize these incidents outside of artillery channels, and the questions involved are normally ones of techniques. When the question involved is one of infantry - artillery tactics, the instructions will be dispatched by CG, TF Oregon through command channels.

4. It is essential that these lessons learned, and detailed knowledge of proper artillery techniques, be disseminated down to each officer, NCO and key enlisted man in the gunnery chain. This is particularly necessary due to rotation of personnel, and is a continuing task.

5. One direct support artillery battalion of TF Oregon has a most effective method of getting the word out. "Redleg Tips" are published, which include items such as the following:

a. One section in a battery fired a wrong charge - Result one infantryman killed, 3 wounded. What standard artillery techniques will prevent this?

b. An FO on a high hill is adjusting in a deep valley in front of him. He calls for drop 400. The rounds catch on the hill, resulting in numerous casualties to the infantrymen he is supporting. What can be done to prevent this?

Each officer and each key NCO in the appropriate position of that DS artillery battalion is required to write out an answer to these questions and submit them through his chain of command to the battery commander for review.

6. Each addressee is requested to insure that orientation and training in artillery techniques is conducted, using methods considered appropriate by the respective commanders. The objectives is that sound artillery techniques are known and practiced throughout TF Oregon.

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE: MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		M	

PRECEDENCE

ORIGIN: PMIC: IPY

FROM: CPT, TF ORAGON, CHU LAI, RVN

- TO: CG, 1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV, BUC HHO, RVN
- CO, 2D BN, 9TH ARTY, BUC HHO, RVN
- CO, 2D BN, 11TH ARTY, BUC HHO, RVN
- CO, 3D BN, 16TH ARTY, CHU LAI, RVN
- CO, 3D BN, 18TH ARTY, CHU LAI, RVN
- CO, 3D BN, 82D ARTY, CHU LAI, RVN

UNCLASSIFIED CITE: AVOP-AT 2859 CG

1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV pass to CO, 2D BN, 320TH ARTY
 SUBJECT: Reporting and Investigation of Erratic Artillery
 Rounds.

1. Reference: Task Force Oregon Artillery Field SOP.
2. All erratic artillery rounds will be reported to the TF Oregon FSO. If no casualties have resulted, an informal investigation of such incidents will be made by the battalion firing to determine if the erratic behavior was due to an error in gunnery or due to faulty powder.

3. When an erratic round is reported to the primary FDC, commanders will be required to fall in to the rear of the piece in accordance with para 32, Appendix 2 (Gunnery Procedures) to Annex A

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DISTRIBUTION	
C/S	GI
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ENGR	IC
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JA	SSO
SIGC	SURF
ARTY(5)	
COORDINATION	
Cleared for Dispatch	
DATE	TIME
MONTH	YEAR
Jul	67
PAGE NO.	TOTAL PAGES
1	3

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

PHONE

SIGNATURE

/s/ Mason J. Young Jr.
 /s/ MASON J. YOUNG JR.
 Colonel, Artillery
 Commanding

223

TYPED (or PRINTED) NAME AND TITLE

/s/O.A. Clepper Jr., CPT AGC, Ass't AG
 /s/O.A. CLEPPER JR., CPT AGC, Ass't AG

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DATE OF REVISION

received to be included in the account books of the principal, and
 under his name, or as if they were his, as appropriate,
 and no part of the proceeds of any such account shall be
 included in the account books of the principal, or
 be subject to any claim of the principal, or be
 considered as being in the possession of the principal,
 or be subject to any liability of the principal, or be
 used for any purpose of the principal, or be
 included in any inventory of the principal, or be
 included in any list of the assets of the principal,
 or be included in any list of the liabilities of the principal,
 or be included in any list of the net worth of the principal,
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
1. Reference: Task Force Oregon Artillery Field SOP.

2. All erratic artillery rounds will be reported to the TF Oregon FSE. If no casualties have resulted, an informal investigation of such incidents will be made by the battalion firing to determine if the erratic behavior was due to an error in gunnery or due to faulty powder.

3. When an erratic round is reported to the primary FDC, cannoneers will be required to fall in to the rear of the piece in accordance with para 8f, Appendix 2 (Gunnery Procedures) to Annex A (Operations) to reference para 1. If no errors are determined, the lot number of the powder, or semi-fixed ammunition, as appropriate, will be reported to supporting ordance as being suspect. A written informal report will be rendered to this headquarters.

4. Reference is made to para _d, Appendix 2 to Annex of the TF Oregon Artillery Field SOP concerning the handling and storage of ammunition. Particular care must be taken to avoid unnecessary handling and exposure of powder increments to moisture.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~



TASK FORCE

OREGON

FIELD

3 10/11/68

SEP

UNITED STATES ARMY
VIETNAM

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TF OREGON
TSN, RVN
21 March 1967

FIELD STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

FOREWARD

These standing operating procedures are published for the guidance of TF OREGON and attached or supporting units.

This document will be revised and changed as necessary to incorporate improved procedures and concepts. The format is designed to enable changes to be made as required.

Commanders and General and Special Staff Officers are required to review this SOP on a continuing basis and to submit recommendations for its improvement.

ROSSON
MG

OFFICIAL:

Wallace
WALLACE
G3

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TF OREGON
TSN, RVN
21 March 1967

Field Standing Operating Procedures

I. GENERAL. This SOP has been compiled following the guidelines of Field SOPs currently in use in South Vietnam.

II. PURPOSE. This SOP establishes routine and recurring field operational procedures within Task Force OREGON and applies except when modified by TF order.

III. SCOPE. These procedures apply to all units under the command or operational control of the Task Force. Supporting units will be familiar with this SOP and, where applicable, will comply.

IV. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Conformity: Subordinate unit SOPs will conform.

b. Revision: Recommendations for revision or change will be forwarded to the general staff section having primary staff responsibility. Following coordination with the general staff and approval by the Chief of Staff, changes will be forwarded to the Adjutant General for a change number and publication.

ROSSON
MG

- ANNEXES:
- A - Operations
 - B - Intelligence
 - C - Personnel and Administration
 - D - Logistics
 - E - Army Aviation
 - F - Engineer Combat Support
 - G - Signal
 - H - Chemical, Biological and Radiological Operations
 - I - Information
 - J - Civil Affairs

DISTRIBUTION: Special

OFFICIAL:

Wallace
WALLACE
G3

TF OREGON
TSN, RVN
21 March 1967

RECORD OF CHANGES TO TF OREGON FIELD SOP

CHANGE NUMBER	DATE POSTED	POSTED BY

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~TF OREGON
TSN, RVN
21 March 1967TASK FORCE OREGON
FIELD STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

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TF OREGON
FIELD STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
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Arty Bn (155T)	5		
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ABBREVIATIONS

AAC	Army Aviation Element
AACC	Army Aviation Control Center
AACO	Assault Aircraft Coordination Officer
ATFAO	Assistant Task Force Aviation Officer
ALOC	Air Line of Communication
AO	Area of Operation
TFAVMO	Task Force Aviation Officer
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
C&C	Command & Control
CILG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
COSVN	Central Office, South Vietnam
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
ENGLE	Engineer Element
FDP	Forward Distribution Point
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GRREG	Graves Registration
GVN	Government of Vietnam
II	Imagery Interpretation
ITR	Imagery Interpretation Report
IPIR	Immediate Photo Interpretation Report
JUSMAG	Joint United States Public Affairs Office
LIOC	Land Line of Communication
LMRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
NFLSB	National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
NLF	New Life Hamlet
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
PF	Popular Forces
PZ	Pick-up Zone
RF	Regional Forces
RU	Radio Research Unit
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SITREP	Situation Report
SLAR	Side Looking Airborne Radar
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TASE	Tactical Air Support Element
USARV	United States Army Vietnam
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VN	Vietnamese Navy

DEFINITIONS

Area of Operations (AO) - An area outside the TAOR in which US or FVMAF operate tactically for prescribed periods of time. These areas, and the responsibilities and authority of US or FVMAF within the area, will be coordinated with RVNAF officials in the course of operational planning.

Assault Aircraft Coordination Officer (AACO) - The AAACO is a rated pilot and air operations officer on duty with the TACF. His function is to advise and assist the commander and his staff on airlift matters. He works primarily with the G3 Air on tactical lift and the G4 and T0 on logistical lift.

Chieu Hoi Program - The "open arms" program of the RVN that permits VC and affiliates to return to GVN control of their own free will under full amnesty and a promise of retraining.

Combat Sky Spot - Bombing raid by radar controlled bomber aircraft during darkness or limited visibility.

Eagle Flight - Heliborne infantry troops on air alert to perform immediate reaction missions for a ground commander.

Extraction - The lifting of combat troops by helicopters from terrain in which the enemy has the capability to resist.

Firefly - A helicopter (UH-1) equipped with searchlights used to illuminate targets.

Heavy Fire Team - Three gunships operating as a tactical element.

Insertion - The lifting of combat troops by helicopter into a landing zone. Differs from combat assault in that insertion is normally used in reference to secretive movement of a patrol into a small, insecure LZ.

Light Fire Team - Two gunships operating as a tactical element.

Rallier - An individual who renounces support of the NFLSN and who voluntarily surrenders to GVN control under the "CHIEU HOI" Program.

Sector - The military organizational area equivalent to the province. The sector chief is a military officer charged with the security of the sector.

SLAR - Side looking airborne radar equipment AN/APS-94 mounted in OV-10B.

- b. When operating with US Marines, there is a requirement that advance warning of all artillery fires be given to the TF Fire Support Element of the TOC, which in turn passes the information to the USMC Direct Air Support Center (DASC). This information is then applied to the USMC Artillery Warning System called "Sav-a-Plane". A "Sav-a-Plane" number is assigned to the mission and returned to the unit. The unit will not fire unless it has received a "Sav-a-Plane" number except in an emergency, such as a fresh enemy contact. In such cases, safety to aircraft will be insured by posting an air sentinel at the piece and by alertness of the forward observer or air observer to airplanes which could cross the trajectory. Appendix A (Fire Support Coordination), Tab B (Safeguarding Aircraft from Artillery Fire).
- c. Deception plans are coordinated with the next higher headquarters.
- d. Coordination with RVNAF and other FMAF:
 - (1) Operations outside of TAOR:
 - (a) Initial coordination required for all Task Force operations is accomplished by this headquarters.
 - (b) Subordinate units accomplish detailed and continuing coordination with appropriate Regimental, Battalion and Sector/Sub-Sector Advisors in assigned AO.
 - (2) Operations in TAOR: Commanders will insure that direct and continuous coordination is maintained with applicable Sector/Sub-Sector Advisors. To assist in accomplishing this end, LNOs will be employed at Sector and Sub-Sectors.
 - (3) Road Security:
 - Route clearance and security for separate brigade operations and resupply convoys will be coordinate with the TF G3, appropriate Senior Advisors and commanders of FMAF concerned.
 - (4) Request for TAOR or AO:
 - (a) Request for change to permanent TAOR is forwarded to this headquarters in five copies with justification for change.
 - (b) Request for brigade AO is submitted in five copies to this headquarters a minimum of five days prior to the start of the operation.

5. PROCEDURES.

- a. Appendix 1 (Command Post)
- b. Appendix 2 (TF Tactical Operations Center)
- c. Appendix 3 (Close Air Support)
- d. Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination)
- e. Appendix 5 (Airmobile Operation)

- f. Appendix 6 (Airlift Operations)
- g. Appendix 7 (Base Area Security)
- 6. TRAINING.
Units not participating in operations and those conducting base area security missions conduct unit training programs. Emphasis is on squad, section and platoon tactics in accordance with applicable training directives and lessons learned.
- 7. MOBILITY: Appendices 5 and 6.
- 8. REPORTS: Appendix 10.

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- APPENDICES:
- 1 - Command Post
 - 2 - TF Tactical Operations Center (TFTOC)
 - 3 - Close Air Support (CAS)
 - 4 - Fire Support Coordination (FSC)
 - 5 - Airmobile Operations
 - 6 - Airlift Operations
 - 7 - Base Area Security
 - 8 - Psychological Operations
 - 9 - Reports

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TSN, RVN
21 March 1967

Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex A (Operations) to
TF OREGON Field SOP

1. TASK FORCE FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT (FSE).

- a. Composition: The Task Force Fire Support Element (FSE) is composed of the fire support coordinator, duty team chief, operations and intelligence representatives from HQ Task Force Artillery, and liaison officers from fire support agencies as required.
- b. Location: Component of Task Force Tactical Operations Center located adjacent to the operations element.
- c. The FSE contains those elements necessary to control the fires of the Task Force Artillery which are normally found in a Division Artillery Fire Direction Center.

2. TARGET NUMBERING SYSTEM.

- a. Task Force prefix: The letter (Y) is assigned to Task Force as an identification prefix for all targets.
- b. Unit prefixes: The originating unit or agency is indicated by a second letter. The assignment of this letter is as follows:

A - DS Arty Bn (Bde A)	N - ACR Sqdn
B - DS Arty Bn (Bde B)	P - Inf Bn A (Bde A)
C - DS Arty Bn (Bde C)	Q - Inf Bn B (Bde A)
D - *	R - Inf Bn C (Bde A)
E - GS Arty Bn (155mm)(T)	S - Inf Bn A (Bde B)
F - GS Arty Bn (8"/175mm)(SP)	T - Inf Bn B (Bde B)
G - *	U - Inf Bn C (Bde B)
H - *	V - Inf Bn A (Bde C)
J - Task Force FSE	W - Inf Bn B (Bde C)
K - Brigade A	X - Inf Bn C (Bde C)
L - Brigade B	Y - *
M - Brigade C	Z - *

* Assigned by FSE to attached units as required.

- c. Numerical designations: Units assigned a letter prefix use target numbers 001 through 999. Units allocate blocks of numbers to subordinate units. Targets are designated by two letter prefixes and three digits.

EXAMPLE: YE 005 - a target planned by the GS 155mm Bn.

YK 102 - a target planned by Bde A.

- d. Groups of Fires: Originating units assign a number preceded by Task Force prefix and followed by the unit's identification letter. (Example: Y5J - the fifth group of fires planned by the FSE).

3. SAFETY.

- a. Air Safety:

- c. Shore Fire Control Parties normally control and adjust naval gunfire. Adjustment of naval gunfire by Army observers is done only in emergencies.
 - d. Combat service support of naval parties is by units to which attached.
 - e. If Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) is attached, ANGLICO channels through FSE are employed for naval gunfire
 - f. Task Force Artillery is responsible for necessary survey to locate any naval gunfire radar beacons.
6. BATTLEFIELD ILLUMINATION.
- a. No restriction on illumination by organic weapons of maneuver units except for prior coordination with adjacent units.
 - b. Illumination by artillery on authority of direct support artillery.

7. MINIMIZING NONCOMBATANT CASUALTIES.

It is obvious that misdirected or unwarranted artillery fires into areas occupied by noncombatants adversely affect the Government of Vietnam effort to win the people. Artillerymen at every echelon will plan and conduct fire support in accordance with the following guidelines.

- (1) Both the military and psychological objective of each operation will be considered. Prestrikes in populated areas, reconnaissance by fire into hamlets, and poorly selected harassing and interdiction fires are examples of military measures which will be counter-productive.
- (2) A thorough and continuing program to emphasize both short and long range importance of minimizing non-combatant casualties will be conducted within each artillery unit. Troop indoctrination briefings will be held before each operation to include: location of noncombatants and other friendly forces, measures to prevent mutual interference, safety precautions for fire support, rules of engagement, identification of recognition signals, emergency procedures, and other appropriate matters.
- (3) The proper employment of artillery will contribute to the prevention of unnecessary damage to lives and property of noncombatants. Fire support of operations should be planned in coordination with province and district chiefs with due regard to security of plans. A US Artillery Liaison Officer should be utilized for this purpose. US Advisors can be asked to perform this function in the absence of other liaison personnel.

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TSN, RVN
21 March 1967

Annex B (Intelligence) to TF OREGON Field SOP

1. REFERENCES:
 - a. FM 30-5
 - b. FM 31-22
 - c. MACV Dir 381-21
 - d. USARV Reg 190-2
 - e. USARV Reg 643-20
 - f. USARV Reg 117-5
2. MISSION.

To provide accurate, timely and useful intelligence on the enemy, weather and terrain and to deny the enemy access to similar information on friendly forces.
3. GENERAL.
 - a. Electrically transmitted intelligence messages are identified by inserting the word "SPHINX" between the security classification and the message cite number.
 - b. Assessment of enemy killed in action:
 - (1) The number of enemy confirmed to have been killed in action is determined by body count. Body count, however, is not synonymous with body recovery but is a realistic appraisal of circumstances that leaves no doubt that a specific number of enemy have been killed.
 - (2) The number of enemy probably killed does not include those who were confirmed to have been killed. Probable kills are based on the enemy being in a specific area at a particular time when effective fires were brought to bear on the area and the evidence indicates that a number were killed although no bodies were recovered.
4. CAPTURED MATERIEL.
 - a. Definition: Includes all weapons, munitions, food stuff, medicine, clothing and other equipment taken from the enemy.
 - b. Evacuation: All weapons, except US and those authorized as trophies, are evacuated through intelligence channels to G2. Samples of munitions, two quarts of food stuffs, and samples of medical supplies, wearing apparel and unusual equipment are also evacuated. Spot reports are submitted describing fully all materiel and the circumstances of capture.
 - c. Trophies: Certain captured materiel meeting the criteria prescribed in USARV Reg 643-20 may be retained by units or individuals as war trophies. Processing will be in accordance with referenced regulation.
5. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS:
 - a. Captured documents are batched together, described on a tag accompanying the documents, to include the circumstance of capture, and forwarded through intelligence channels to G2.

B-1

- b. Cryptographic documents are handled as SECRET material and are delivered to the nearest Radio Research Unit.
 - c. The capture of film and tape recordings is reported immediately by spot report.
6. **DETAINÉES.**
- a. Detainees will be segregated and classified as prisoners of war, returnees, civil defendants, innocent civilians or doubtful cases.
 - b. All detainees will be treated humanely in accordance with the rules of the Geneva Convention. All will be tagged using USARV Form 364, and after preliminary questioning for information of immediate tactical value, will be released to the Military Intelligence Detachment interrogators accompanying each brigade. After completion of interrogation by MID personnel, detainees will be disposed of as directed by the Provost Marshal.
 - c. Sick or wounded detainees will be provided medical treatment to the extent necessary to save life or limb. Seriously wounded personnel will be treated or evacuated through normal medical evacuation channels.
7. **AIR RECONNAISSANCE.**
- a. Maximum use is made of organic, attached and direct support air reconnaissance resources.
 - b. G2 Air coordinates the air reconnaissance effort within the Task Force.
 - c. Air reconnaissance requests will be submitted on MACV Form 248, through channels, to the G2-Air.
8. **LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS.**
- a. Long range reconnaissance patrols operate under the staff supervision of the G2, and when employed in brigade operations are placed under the operational control of the brigades.
 - b. Patrols are normally infiltrated and exfiltrated by means of helicopter and are planned for a maximum stay of five days.
 - c. Reports are transmitted by radio to the forward operating base from where they are immediately passed to the G2 Operations Officer in the TF TOC.
9. **MAP DISTRIBUTION AND STORAGE.**
- a. Unit requisitions for maps are processed through intelligence channels to the G2-Air, who exercises staff supervision over the map distribution and storage program.
 - b. Unit commanders are responsible for maintaining a basic load of maps in accordance with USARV Reg 117-5.
 - c. Maps for Task Force Headquarters elements will be procured, stored, and issued by the G2-Air.

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TF OREGON
TSN. RVN
21 March 1967

Appendix 3 (Employment of Armed Helicopters) to Annex E (Army Aviation)
to TF OREGON Field SOP

1. GENERAL.

- a. Missions: Missions for gun ships are classified into three basic types. Operations may include any combination of the three:
- (1) Escort.
 - (2) Reconnaissance and security.
 - (3) Fire support.
- b. Armaments: All aircraft are armed with one or more of the following systems, fired by the pilot or co-pilot:
- (1) M-3 (48 2.75" Rockets).
 - (2) M-5 (Automatic 40mm grenade launcher).
 - (3) M-6 (Quad 7.62mm M-500 machine gun).
 - (4) M-16 (Combination M-6 and two 7.62mm rocket pods).
 - (5) Combination of M-5 and two 7.62mm rocket pods.
 - (6) In addition each aircraft is armed with two 7.62mm M-50 guns which are fired from the cargo doors by the crew chief and a door gunner.

2. EMPLOYMENT.

- a. Request for support: Request for armed helicopter support is made through AACC MTF LACC hours the day preceding mission execution. Emergency requests will be processed at any time.
- b. Escort missions: Escort missions are aerial escorts for flight helicopter formations and ground vehicle convoys.
- (1) While escorting lift formations, the mission of the gun helicopters is to suppress or neutralize enemy ground fire sufficiently to allow the lift formation to pass over or around the danger area.
 - (2) For vehicle convoy escort the mission of gun helicopters is of reconnaissance and security or fire support mission. The ground commander coordinates the vehicle route to include start point, release point, check points, and critical points or areas.
- c. Reconnaissance and security: The reconnaissance and security mission is combined with escort or may be accomplished by independent fire teams. The armament systems provide the necessary means for reconnaissance by fire and sufficient fire-power to effectively engage soft enemy targets.
- d. Fire support: Two types of fire are provided by armed helicopters: area fire and limited point target fire. Positive contact between ground troops and aircraft crews is mandatory prior to initiating gun ship support. Ground troops mark their positions to insure that the gun ships know their

location on the ground (troops in line mark both flanks and center positions). Gun ships will support ground troops by delivery of overhead fire either from a hover or while in forward flight. Ground commanders orient all personnel of the fact that expended brass may fall into friendly forces when overhead fire is delivered. Ground troops take cover, if feasible, during period of overhead firing.

e. Rules of engagement:

- (1) On escort mission with an airborne formation, the gun ships suppress and prepare LZ until first troop landing and then only when approved by the ground force commander. Only when in free fire zones are targets of opportunity engaged without approval from TF CREWON TOG.
- (2) Armed helicopters are not permitted to interfere with artillery fires and/or tactical air strikes but are permitted to exploit targets of opportunity and withdrawing enemy forces from the periphery of the area of air strikes or artillery fires.
- (3) On single team missions engagement of targets does not take place until cleared with supported ground commander.
- (4) In support of ground troops, the target must be positively identified as hostile before engagement.

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TSN, RVN
21 March 1967

Appendix 2 (Civil Affairs Reports) to Annex J (Civil Affairs) to
TF OREGON Field SOP

1. REFERENCES.

- a. USARV Regulation 515-1 (Psychological Operations-Military Civic Action).
- b. III MAF Order 1750.1 (Basic Concepts for Civic Action).
- c. III MAF Order 5800 (Criteria for Civic Action Projects).
- d. III MAF/NCCO 5081.1A (Policy and Requirements for Reporting Civic Action Programs).
- e. III MAF Order 5800.7 (Policy on Solatium Payment).
- f. Force/SA I Corps Order 3040.2 (Noncombatant Casualties, Civic Action/Psychological Operation Plans).

2. REPORTS.

It is important that each unit document civil affairs activity, and keep the commander informed of progress and accomplishments.

a. Referenced publications, para 1, and report forms will be distributed as required.

b. Report schedule:

<u>Report</u>	<u>Ref</u>	<u>Due Date</u>
Daily Civic Action Activity	Para 1c	Daily
Monthly Civic Action Report	Para 2e	Fifth day of month
Initial BACKLASH	Para 1f	As required
Interim BACKLASH	Para 1f	As required
Military Civic Action Project Request Format	Para 2g	As required

- c. Units to report. Battalions and separate companies submit reports through command channels. Monthly Civic Action Report only submitted by brigade and separate battalion.
- d. Daily Civic Action Activity Report. TAB A (Daily Civic Action Activity Report). Records the details of daily activity. Narrative portion includes information not covered elsewhere in report. Reporting period 0600-0600 hours daily.
- e. Monthly Civic Action Report. Reports activities performed by units during month. Brigades submit report in accordance with reference 1a, above, through command channels.
- f. Initial and Interim BACKLASH. TAB B (Format for Serious Incident/BACKLASH Report). Furnishes information on incident involving injury to Vietnamese nationals. Report as soon as possible.
- g. Project Request. TAB C (Military Civic Action Project Request Format). Advises of details of proposed project and establishes basis for issue of civic action supplies.

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TABS: A - Daily Civic Action Activity Report
B - Format for Serious Incident/BACKLASH Report
C - Military Civic Action Project Request Format

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TSN, RVN
21 March 1967

Tab B (Format for Serious Incident/BACKLASH Report) to Appendix 2
(Civil Affairs Reports) to Annex J (Civil Affairs) to TF
OREGON Field SOP

1. Type of incident.
2. Time and date of incident.
3. Location of incident. Report the exact location, using map grid coordinates and identifiable landmarks, miles to the nearest town, city or village.
4. Name, grade, and organization of individual rendering report.
5. Name of person(s) involved, to include victims, subjects and witnesses, including information as to their:
 - a. Grade or title.
 - b. First name, middle initial, last name.
 - c. Service number.
 - d. Organization or address.
 - e. Sex and date of birth.
 - f. If civilian, indicate their status, i. e., DAC, dependent, etc., in place of service number.
6. A complete narrative summary of factual information concerning the incident. When indicated because of the nature of the incident the extent of injuries to personnel and estimated dollar value of damages or loss will included.
7. Status and location of personnel involved.
8. Designation of the organization or office, military and civilian, conducting the investigation.
9. Statement as to actual or anticipated reaction, by the civil populace, to the incident and news items relative to the incident.
10. Include a statement that the local G2/S2 or Intelligence Officer has or has not been notified of this incident.
11. Additional information if applicable.

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HEADQUARTERS
TASK FORCE OREGON (PROVISIONAL)
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-AT

7 May 1967

SUBJECT: Investigation of Artillery Incidents

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Accuracy in the delivery of artillery fires on intended targets is of paramount importance. Commanders will insure that only fully qualified personnel process artillery fire missions at all levels. A system of double checks, in accordance with standard artillery procedures, will be utilized in all gunnery operations. Detailed instructions are included in the Task Force Oregon Artillery Field SOP, Appendix 2 (Gunnery Procedures) and Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex A (Operations).

2. In event there are indications that death or serious injury to U.S. or Allied troops, or friendly civilians, has been incurred by U.S. artillery firing, the Fire Support Element of the Task Force Tactical Operations Center will be immediately notified. Any other artillery incident that may result in adverse publicity or impairment of Vietnamese-U.S. relations will also be reported. The Task Force Oregon Artillery Officer will appoint an impartial investigating officer to investigate the circumstances under the provisions of AR 15-6. This procedure will be followed in all cases, to include cases where indications are that the error was made by artillery units attached to, or organic to brigades. The purpose of the investigation will be to determine the cause of the error, to fix responsibility, and to recommend procedures to preclude recurrence of the error.

3. Any disciplinary action considered appropriate after studying the facts as determined by the investigation will be handled through command channels. The investigation required by para 2 above will not make any specific recommendations as to punishment of any individuals; rather, a factual report of the investigation will be furnished the appropriate commander for his determination in this area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/Edgar R. Poole
/t/EDGAR R. POOLE
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

EXHIBIT M-70

HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAL DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96374

REGULATION
NUMBER 335-8

28 January 1968

REPORTS

Combat Action Reports (RCS AVDF-GC 1)

1. PURPOSE. To prescribe policies and procedures governing the submission of Combat Action Reports.

2. GENERAL. a. This regulation is applicable to all units assigned, attached or under the operational control of the Americal Division.

b. The information compiled from these reports will be used for analysis, publication of lessons learned and historical purposes.

c. A Combat Action Report does not supersede the requirement for a Combat Operation After Action Report at the termination of a named operation.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES. a. G3 is assigned staff responsibilities for:

(1) Collection of Combat Action Reports.

(2) Dissemination of information of an immediate value by Combat Newsletter.

(3) Publication of a quarterly summary pamphlet.

(4) Inclusion of Combat Action Reports in appropriate historical files.

(5) Circulation of Combat Action Reports to division command and staff agencies for information.

b. Unit Commanders:

(1) Submit a report on actions involving a lesson learned, a significant engagement or as directed by this headquarters.

*This regulation supersedes TFO Reg 335-8, 21 March 1967

EXHIBIT D-31

AMERICAL Reg 335-8

(2) Submit reports to the Commanding General, Americal Division, ATTN: AVDF-GC (DOT) in five copies within ten days of the action.

(3) Submit reports in accordance with format at Inclosure 1.

(4) Disseminate published Combat Action material to lowest possible echelon.

4. REFERENCE. MACV Dir 335-8.

(AVDF-GC)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT H. MUSSER
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

DONALD Y. B. CHUNG
LTC, GS
Adjutant General

1 Appendix
Format for Combat Action Report

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APPENDIX I

COMBAT ACTION REPORT

The format indicated below will be used as a guide for after action reports of designated combat actions. Paragraphs not applicable to a particular action may be omitted.

SUBJECT: Combat Action Report (RCS AVDF-GC 1)

TO: Commanding General
Americal Division
ATTN: AVDF-GC (DOT)

1. NAME OR TYPE OF OPERATION.
2. DATES OF OPERATION. (Inclusive date time group).
3. LOCATION: Name or coordinates as applicable.
4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS. (Next higher from engaged force).
5. REPORTING OFFICER. List the names of the unit commanders engaged in this operation.
6. TASK ORGANIZATION: Indicate control headquarters and units attached or detached.
7. SUPPORTING FORCES. List all supporting forces, both planned and actually used, and indicate their effectiveness. Supporting forces include artillery, naval forces, USA/VNAF air and USMC/USA aviation. If air was requested state whether preplanned or immediate request, reaction time and effectiveness. State for all: Size or quantity of force(s), how and when employed, results or effectiveness, and timeliness.
8. INTELLIGENCE. Give brief estimate of enemy strength, location, disposition and situation anticipated in objective area prior to operation to include current operation and, within classification limits, the source of intelligence. Make brief statement of enemy strength and situation actually found as operation was conducted. Name enemy units identified and any other significant intelligence gained. Include overlay, if appropriate, and describe the terrain in terms of cover and concealment, obstacles, critical features, observation and avenues of approach and weather in the area of operations. Include CA/PSYWAR evaluation of the population and attitudes, when appropriate.

9. MISSION. State mission as directed by higher authority. If the mission was self-initiated, state deduced mission.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION. Include who, what, when, where, and how for organic, attached and supporting units to include fire support. Include sketch of overlay when appropriate.

11. EXECUTION. Give in chronological order, a narrative statement of events. Start with receipt of issuance of order and end with termination of operation. Indicate time lapse between date operation was conceived and its implementation. Highlight significant actions and list losses, both friendly and unfriendly as they occurred. Indicate the duration of action (contacts) and state communication capability during contact. State range in meters at which the initial contact occurred. Indicate the duration of action and average range of engagement. Include unusual tactics and techniques, civil affairs, psywar activities, deception and important decisions including use of supporting forces by the commander to influence action. Supplement with sketches, pictures, maps as appropriate.

12. RESULTS. Summarize personnel and equipment losses, both friendly and enemy. Indicate whether enemy equipment was destroyed or captured. Regarding friendly forces, indicate number of personnel and quantities of equipment lost separately by ARVN, CIDG, RF/PF, US, Free World Forces, and other appropriate forces.

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. Note adequacy of administrative plans, commenting on procedures or actions which hindered or aided the operation. Indicate, as appropriate, the following:

- a. Supply, including methods and techniques or resupply. Comment on combat loads, ammunition and weapons carried by assault troops.
- b. Maintenance
- c. Treatment of casualties and evacuation and hospitalization.
- d. Transportation
- e. Communications
- f. Medical evaluation

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES. Comment on effectiveness of special equipment or techniques used such as scout dogs, personnel carriers, air-ground marking system, grenade launchers, swimmer support boats, etc.

15. COMMANDERS ANALYSIS. Include an analysis of timeliness, effectiveness and adequacy of lessons learned which are not common to most operations. The report should include coverage of plans or actions taken with noncombatants, in numbers affected, controlled, evacuated, medically treated relocated, tec. Include any known corrective actions taken.

16. RECOMMENDATIONS.

Signature Block

APPENDIX I, AMERICAL Reg 335-8

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AMERICAL Reg 525-4

HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAL DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96374

REGULATION
NUMBER 525-4

16 March 1968

COMBAT OPERATIONS

Rules of Engagement (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE. This regulation establishes criteria for employment of firepower in support of combat operations within the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and is applicable to all fires regardless of delivery means.
2. (U) SCOPE. This regulation is applicable to all combat and combat support units assigned, attached or in support of the Americal Division.
3. (U) DEFINITIONS.
 - a. Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). A land area in which responsibility/authority is specifically assigned to the commander of the area for conduct of tactical operations. The commander of the TAOR is responsible for control and coordination of all activities within its boundary, less those activities specifically retained under division or higher headquarters control.
 - b. Area of Operations (AO). A land area in which US/F/MAF units may conduct tactical operations after receiving approval from the ICTZ commander. The commander of the AO is responsible for coordination and control of all activities within its boundary. An AO is transitory in nature. There is no intention of remaining in the area once the prescribed mission has been accomplished.
 - c. Specified Strike Zone (SSZ). An area used by VC/NVA which contains no population nor distinctively marked hospitals or religiously or politically significant structures. A SSZ is designated by the ICTZ commander on request thru command channels and constitutes prior political clearance; however, the conduct of fire must be in accordance with the established rules of engagement.
 - d. Free Fire Zone (FFZ). An area designated by the responsible political authority (District/Province Chief) in which political clearance has been granted for the period specified. Military clearance and compliance with the established rules of engagement are required.
 - e. No-Fire Zone (NFZ). An area established by the ICTZ commander in which no supporting arms fire will be delivered under any circumstances.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR
INTERVALS; DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YRS
DOD DIR 5200.10

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587

EXHIBIT D-5

Religious establishments, friendly population or other politically significant objects are normally found within these areas. No-Fire Zones may be located within AO's and may or may not have friendly forces located within them. Designation of a No-Fire Zone does not preclude maneuver by ground forces through the area if prior military and political clearance has been obtained. With the exception of the use of supporting fires, rules of engagement for ground maneuver units as established herein apply while inside a NFZ.

f. Observed Fire. Employment of fire support under the direct observation and control of an artillery forward/air observer, FAC or other competent individual.

g. Unobserved Fire. Employment of fire support with no observer capable of adjusting or determining the effect or accuracy of the fire.

h. In Contact. A unit is considered "in contact" when it is engaged with an enemy force. Sniper fire or mortar fire is not considered "in contact" unless such fire interferes with the scheme of maneuver or is inflicting casualties or damage to friendly forces. The tactical unit commander is responsible for making the "in contact" determination.

i. Political Clearance. Approval to fire by the appropriate political authority, normally the District or Province Chief. This clearance may be obtained through US Artillery liaison teams assigned to district and province headquarters.

j. Military Clearance. Approval to fire by the military commander of the area of operations (AO). Necessary to insure that friendly military personnel are not brought under fire.

4. (C) GENERAL. a. The use of unnecessary force resulting in non-combatant casualties and property loss will embitter the population and make the long term goal of pacification more difficult and costly.

b. The VC/NVA exploit incidents of non-combatant casualties and destruction of property RVNAF/US/FWMAF to foster resentment and to alienate the people against the Government.

c. The circumstances of the conflict call for restraint not normally required of soldiers on the battlefield. Commanders must strike a balance between the force necessary to accomplish the mission, with due regard to the safety of their commands, and the importance attached to minimizing non-combatant casualties. This requires the highest order of leadership and judgement.

d. An unusual requirement is placed on junior leaders to carry out sensitive combat operations, often in an environment where large numbers

of civilians are present. The determination of right and wrong in the heat of battle requires a keen, swift, and decisive analysis of all contributing factors and must be based on a thorough understanding of the legal and moral principles involved.

e. A written set of rules cannot be provided that will apply to every situation. Therefore, the final decision on engagement will be at the discretion of the senior tactical commander present who must consider the mission and the situation as well as his responsibility to minimize both friendly and non-combatant casualties and destruction of private and public property. In cases where doubt exists concerning application of firepower, the commander will request guidance from higher headquarters. If the commander cannot contact higher headquarters or time does not permit contacting higher headquarters, the commander will take the action he deems appropriate and notify higher headquarters of his decision and subsequent actions as soon as possible.

f. Nothing shall infringe on the inherent right of a commander to exercise self-defense. The commander may take immediate action against an attacking force with all means available; however, every possible safeguard short of endangering life will be used to avoid non-combatant casualties and the destruction of private property. Firepower will be brought to bear on enemy in populated areas only to the extent required to accomplish an assigned mission.

5. (C) CONDUCT OF FIRE. a. Individual and crew served weapons:

(1) Pistols, rifles, grenade launchers, hand grenades, claymores, machine guns, and recoilless rifles may be employed by commanders under the conditions indicated below:

(a) Against targets that are observed and positively identified as enemy.

(b) Against point targets from which fire is being received. (Indiscriminate fire into populated areas is prohibited.)

(c) Against suspected enemy locations when non-combatants would not be endangered.

(2) Personnel positively identified as enemy who demonstrate an intent to surrender should not be engaged by fire.

b. Indirect fire support weapons (artillery, mortars and naval gunfire):

(1) Unobserved fire may be directed against all target areas located within specified strike zones (SSZ's) and free fire zones (FFZ's) and provided clearance is granted by the military commander in whose AO the SSZ or FFZ lies.

(2) Uninhabited areas outside SSZ's and FFZ's:

(a) When IN CONTACT, fire may be directed against VC/NVA forces at the request of a US/FWMAF unit. This situation is considered observed fire even though an artillery air/forward observer may not be the requestor.

(b) When NOT IN CONTACT, observed fire may be directed against targets of opportunity which are clearly identified as hostile, without political and military clearance.

(c) When NOT IN CONTACT with VC/NVA forces, unobserved fires may be directed at hostile targets and target areas, only after political and military clearance is obtained.

(d) Political and military clearance is required before directing either observed or unobserved fire on targets not clearly identified as hostile.

(3) Inhabited areas (Occupied groups of dwellings):

(a) The following conditions must be met in each instance before artillery, mortar, or naval gunfire is directed against enemy targets in inhabited areas.

- 1. Political and military clearance must be obtained.
- 2. An observer (FO, AO, FAC) must be on station to direct the fire.

3. Inhabitants must be warned in advance by leaflets and/or loudspeaker systems or by other appropriate means that artillery, mortars, and/or naval gunfire will be directed against enemy targets in the hamlet or village. The one exception is that prior warning is not required when the attack by fire is in conjunction with a ground assault by friendly forces and the ground commander determines that prior warning of inhabitants would jeopardize mission accomplishment.

(b) The employment of any ordnance which would cause intentional burning of dwellings will be avoided, unless absolutely necessary in the accomplishment of the commander's mission.

(c) Village and hamlet defensive fires will be executed when requested by GVN/RVNAF authority if such fires do not interfere with or materially reduce support of other friendly operations.

(d) Artillery air observers will be briefed on areas containing friendly or potentially friendly population, and will comply with rules of engagement listed in para 5a(3).

(e) Unobserved naval gunfire will be employed only when observed fire is not possible because of geography, weather, or lack of trained observer. Unobserved naval gunfire should not be undertaken in close proximity to friendly forces or areas known to be inhabited by non-combatants.

c. Aircraft Delivery Systems:

(1) Forward Air Controllers (FAC) and armed helicopter commanders will be briefed on locations of friendly and potentially friendly populated areas. Strikes will not be executed where identification of friendly elements is in doubt. FAC's and helicopter commanders will reconnoiter the strike area for friendly personnel and non-combatants prior to strike execution.

(2) All close air support missions that involve airstrikes not controlled by radar will be controlled by a FAC. As a portion of the FAC's target briefing to the strike pilots, he will include the location of the nearest friendly elements.

(3) Close air support missions that involve strikes on hamlets or villages must be controlled by a FAC. If the attack on a hamlet or village is deemed necessary and is executed in conjunction with a ground operation involving movement of ground forces through the area, the attack may be without warning; however, appropriate political and military clearance is required. If the attack on a village or hamlet is not in conjunction with any immediate ground operation, the inhabitants must be warned by leaflets and/or loudspeaker system prior to strike execution and must be given adequate time to evacuate the area.

(4) If an armed helicopter operation involves non-combatants, such as in an occupied hamlet or village, political and military clearance must be obtained unless the situation clearly presents an immediate threat to the lives of the crew.

(5) All aircraft receiving ground fire from friendly or potentially friendly populated areas will return the fire only when:

- (a) The sources of fire can be visually identified.
- (b) The strike or fire can be positively oriented against the source.
- (c) The fire is of such intensity that counter action is required.

6. (C) RULES GOVERNING DESTRUCTION OF DWELLINGS BY GROUND FORCES.

a. As a general rule, civilian dwellings or private property, including livestock, will not be destroyed except as an unavoidable consequence of combat actions.

b. The destruction of dwellings and livestock of noncombatants as a denial measure is to be left to GVN authorities or RVNAF units.

c. If US personnel are receiving fire from a house, the fire will be returned even though destruction of the house results. Destruction of structures in areas used as VC base camps, or those obviously built by the VC to fight from, is authorized.

7. (C) INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT WEAPONS CLEARANCE PROCEDURES. In addition to the previously mentioned restrictions and rules of engagement, the following clearance procedures are established for all artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire:

a. Military clearance will be obtained from the RVNAF/US/FWMAF unit in whose TAOR/AO the target is located. The appropriate liaison team or FSE will be contacted for this clearance.

b. Any indirect fires planned within 500 meters of an adjacent TAOR/AO will be coordinated with the corresponding commander.

c. SAV-A-PLANE date for all indirect fire missions must be submitted to FSE or AWCC in accordance with TAB B (Safeguarding Aircraft from Artillery Fires) to Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex A (Operations) to Americal Division Field SOP.

8. (C) PREVENTION OF MUTUAL INTERFERENCE ON INLAND AND COASTAL WATERWAYS.

a. The increase of the FWMAF in the Market Time (Coastal waters of RVN) areas require that the following measures be implemented to prevent incidents in which friendly watercraft are attacked by small arms, aircraft, mortars and/or artillery.

b. Watercraft on coastal waterways are not to be attacked unless one of the following conditions is satisfied:

(1) The watercraft is firing on friendly forces. The responsible Coastal Surveillance Center/TOC will be notified as soon as the situation permits.

(2) The watercraft is conducting hostile maneuvers or other actions and coordination has been effected with the responsible Coastal Surveillance Center.

(3) The watercraft has been certified as nonfriendly by the Coastal Surveillance Center.

c. Clearance from the Coastal Surveillance Center, Da Nang, can be obtained through Coastal Division 12, Chu Lai (Tel: SHELLBACK 115/217 or FM; OXCLIFF 37.50 MQ).

d. Watercraft on inland waterways are not to be attacked without prior political and military clearance. Clearances are a function of the color coding of all inland waterways as either BLUE (civilian traffic restricted during established curfew hours) or RED (civilian traffic restricted 24 hours per day) and are the responsibility of the ground commander in whose AO the waterway is located.

(1) Boats moving in unrestricted waters may be challenged at any time, but will not be destroyed unless positively identified as hostile watercraft.

(2) Boats moving at any time in 24 hour restricted waters, that are not properly lighted and boats moving after the established curfew in any inland waterway may be engaged and destroyed without the benefit of a challenge. If the situation permits, all boats should be challenged.

9. (U) IMPLEMENTATION. Implementing instructions and SOPs will be developed by major subordinate commanders to provide for control, coordination, and clearance of fires.

10. (U) REFERENCES. a. USMACV Directive (C) 95-4, Aviation - US Air Operations in RVN (U), dtd 28 June 1966 with change 1 dtd 14 February 1967.

b. USMACV Directive (C) 525-3, Combat Operations - Minimizing Noncombatant Casualties (U), dtd 14 October 1966.

c. USMACV Directive (C) 525-9, Combat Operations - Control, Disposition, and Safeguarding of Vietnamese Property, Captured Material and Food Supplies (U), dtd 10 April 1967.

d. USMACV Directive (C) 525-18, Combat Operations - Conduct of Artillery - Mortar and Naval Gunfire (U), dtd 21 January 1968.

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AMERICAL Reg 525-4

e. III MAF Force Order (C) P03121.5, SOP for Ground and Air Operations (U), dtd 10 November 1967.

(AVDF-GC)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

NELS A. PARSON, JR
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff


for:

DONALD B. CHONG
LTC, AGC
Adjutant General

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WILLIAM D. SHEEHAN
LTC, USA
Assistant Inspector General

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EXTRACTS OF OPORD 2-68

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Americal Division
Chu Lai (BT533094), RVN
230700H Jan 68

OPORD 2-68 (Redeployment and Realignment of Forces)

Reference: MAPS, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, Series L701A; Sheets 6638I,
II; 6639 I, II, IV; 6640 II, III; 6738 I, II, III, IV; 6739 I,
II, III, IV; 6710 III; 838 III, IV.

Task organization:

11th Lt Inf Bde

3-1 Inf

1-20 Inf

(-) 2 Co TF

Trp -, 1st Cav

6-11 Arty (-)

B/2-11 Arty

C/3-18 Arty

2 Sect/C 29 Arty (SLT)

C/26 Engr

6th Spt Bn

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1. SITUATION:

a. Enemy Forces. Current INTSUMS.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) 1st Mar Div continues current operations.
- (2) 2d ARVN Div continues current operations.
- (3) 2d ROK Marine Bde continues current operations.
- (4) 7th US Air Force provides TAC air support.
- (5) 1st Marine Air Wing provides TAC air support.
- (6) Current SITREPS.

c. Attachments and Detachments. Task organization.

2. MISSION. Americal Division executes relief relief of 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AML) with 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div commencing 23 Jan 68 and relinquishes OPCON 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AML) to 1st Cav Div (AML) upon closure PHU BAI area.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation.

(1) Maneuver. Americal Division continues current operations; executes relief of 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AML) with 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div, and relinquishes OPCON of 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AML) to 1st Cav Div (AML) upon closure at PHU BAI area. 11th Lt Inf Bde continues current operations and forms a two company task force for OPCON to 198th Lt Inf Bde. 196th Lt Inf Bde continues current operations in extended AO. 198th Lt Inf Bde, reinforced by a two company task force from 11th Lt Inf Bde, continues current operations and assumes complete control of MUSCATINE AO.

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* * * *

b. 11th Lt Inf Bde

(1) Continues current mission.

(2) 24 Jan organize and deploy a two company TF with a TF headquarters to MUSCATINE AO. OPCON to 198th Lt Inf Bde upon crossing southern MUSCATINE Boundary.

(3) On order be prepared to assume present MUSCATINE AO of 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div.

* * * *

d. 198th Lt Inf Bde.

(1) Continue current operations.

(2) O/A 25 Jan 68, be prepared to assume complete MUSCATINE AO from 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div.

(3) On deployment of 1-14 Inf to WHEELER/WALLOWA AO be prepared to assume the 1-14 Inf AO iwth TF provided by 11th Lt Inf Bde.

(4) Be prepared to assuem OPCON of a two company TF with TF headquarters from 11th Lt Inf Bde. OPCON effective upon TF crossing southern MUSCATINE boundary.

(5) Organize and be prepared to deploy a provisional artillery battery to LZ UPTIGHT to support operations in present 1-14 Inf AO.

(6) Be prepared on order to relinquish operations in southern portion of MUSCATINE AO to 11th Lt Inf Bde.

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* * * *

Acknowledge

KOSTER
MG

- Annexes: A - Operation Overlay
- B - Signal
- C - Distribution

OFFICIAL

/s/ Balmer

/t/ BALMER
G3

* * * *

Annex C (Distribution) to OPORD 2-68 (Redeployment and Re-alignment of Forces)

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KOSTER
MG

OFFICIAL

/s/ Balmer
/t/ BALMER
G3

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EXTRACTS OF FRAGORD #1 TO OPORD 2-68

* * * *

231000Z Jan 68
FROM CG, AMERICAL DIV, CHL

TO CG, 11TH LIB, DPO

CO, 3D BDE, 4TH INF DIV, CHL

INFO CG, USARV, LBN

CG, III MAF, DNG

* * * *

AVDF-GC 012

SUBJECT: FRAG O #1 TO OPORD 2-68 (REDEPLOYMENT AND REALIGNMENT
OF FORCES)

1. 11TH LT INF BDE.

ON 24 JAN 68, DEPLOY TF CONSISTING OF TF HQS, TWO COMPANIES
AND ONE PLAT TRP B, 1ST CAV TO MUSCATINE AO. UPON TF CROSSING
SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF MUSCATINE AO (BS633810) OPCON TO 3D BDE,
4TH INF DIV.

2. 3D BDE, 4TH INF DIV.

ON 24 JAN 68, ASSUME OPCON OF TF FROM 11TH LT INF BDE UPON
TF CROSSING SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF MUSCATINE AO (BS633810).

* * * *

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTRACTS OF FRAGORD # 2 OPORD 2-68

* * * *

260755Jan 68

FROM: CG, AMERICAL DIV, CHL, RVN

TO: CG, 196TH LT INF BDE, CHARGER HILL, RVN
CO, 1ST SQDN, 1ST CAV, HILL 29 (COURIER)

INFO: CG, USARV, LBN, RVN
CG, III MAF, DNG, RVN
CG, 11TH LIB, DPO, RVN

* * * *

AVDF-GC 015

SUBJECT: FRAG 0#2 TO OPORD 2-68

CONFIRMATION OF MISSIONS DIRECTED

* * * *

2. 198TH LT INF BDE.

ON 25 JAN 68, ASSUME MUSCATINE AO AND OPCON OF 4-3 INF AND TF BARKER FROM 3D BDE, 4TH INF DIV EFF 0700 HRS.

* * * *

4. 3D BDE, 4TH INF DIV.

A. ON 25 JAN 68, RELINQUISH MUSCATINE AO AND OPCON OF 4-3 INF AND TF BARKER TO 198TH LT INF BDE EFF 0700 HRS.

* * * *

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E X T R A C T

FROM: CG, AMERICAL DIVISION, CHU LAI

TO: CO, 3D BDE, 4TH INF DIV, DUC PHO (COURIER)
CG, 11TH LT INF BDE, DUC PHO (COURIER)
CO, 198TH LT INF BDE, CHU LAI (COURIER)
CO, AMERICAL DIV ARTY, CHU LAI (COURIER)
CO, 14TH AVN BN, CHU LAI (COURIER)
CO, 26TH ENGR BN, CHU LAI (COURIER)
CO, 123d AVN BN, CHU LAI (COURIER)
CO, 509th SIG BN, CHU LAI (COURIER)

INFO: CG, USARV, LONG BINH (AIRMAIL)
CG, III MAF, DANANG (COURIER)
CG, 2D ROK MAR BDE, QUANG NGAI (ELECTRICAL)
CG, 2d ARVN DIV, QUANG NGAI (COURIER)
CO, 3D BDE, 1ST CAV DIV (AML) LZ BALDY (COURIER)
CO, 196TH LT INF BDE, HILL 35 (COURIER)
CO, AMERICAL SPT COMD, CHU LAI (COURIER)
SA, 2D ARVN DIV, QUANG NGAI (COURIER)
CO, 1ST SQDN, 1ST CAV, HILL 29 (COURIER)
CO, B TROOP, 1ST SQDN, 9TH AIR CAV, CHU LAI (COURIER)
CO, C TROOP, 7TH SQDN, 17TH AIR CAV, CHU LAI (COURIER)
SPA, QUANG NGAI (COURIER)

191715Z Dec 67

CONFIDENTIAL AVDF-GC 7111

SUBJECT: OPORD AMERICAL 20-67 (OPERATION MUSCATINE) (U)

References:

a. AVDF-GC 7036, 152248Z Dec, subject: OPORD AMERICAL 19-67 (OPERATION CHECKERS) (U)

b. AVDF-GS 7059, 170607Z Dec, subject: Signal Instructions for Operation CHECKERS.

1. (U) SITUATION. UNCHANGED FROM Ref a.

2. (C) MISSION. Americal Division relieves 2d ROK Marine Brigade in current AO, assuming phased responsibility for the AO and an extension thereof, and conducts Operation MUSCATINE to extend GVN control throughout the AO and AO extension.

3. (C) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of Operation. Americal Division, in cooperation with the 2d ARVN Division, will conduct a six-phase operation to relieve the 2d ROK Marine Brigade in the current AO, north of Quang Ngai, as follows:

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PHASE VI (28 Jan-indefinite) -- On 28 Jan 68, 198th Lt Inf Bde assumes responsibility for the remaining portion of the AO at a time mutually agreeable to the CG, 2d ROK Mar Bde and CO, 198th Lt Inf Bde. With passage of responsibility of final portion of 2d ROK Mar Bde AO to 198th Lt Inf Bde, the relief will be complete. 198th Lt Inf Bde and 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div will continue operations to destroy enemy forces and extend GVN control throughout the newly acquired AO.

* * * * *

d. 11th Lt Inf Bde.

(1) Initiate training of Bde in the DUC PHO AO, on closure.

(2) Be prepared, o/a 2 January 1968 to assume responsibility for the northern portion of the DUC PHO AO as part of a training program in a controlled combat environment.

* * * * *

KOSTER
MG

RELEASER
L. W. CUNNINGHAM
2LT, AGC
ASST AG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: CG, AMERICAL DIVISION, CHU LAI

TO: CO, 3D BDE, 4TH INF DIV, DUC PHO
CO, 198th LT INF BDE, CHU LAI (COURIER)

INFO: CG, USARV, LONG BINH (AIRMAIL)
CG, III MAF, DA NANG (COURIER)
CG, 11TH LT INF BDE, DUC PHO (COURIER)
CG, 2D ROK MAR BDE, QUANG NGAI (ELECTRICAL)
CG, 2D ARVN DIV, QUANG NGAI (COURIER)
CO, AMERICAL DIV ARTY, CHU LAI (COURIER)
CO, 14TH AVN BN, CHU LAI (COURIER)
CO, 39TH ENGR BN, CHU LAI (COURIER)
CO, 26th ENGR BN, CHU LAI (COURIER)
CO, 123d AVN BN, CHU LAI (COURIER)
CO, 509th SIG BN, CHU LAI (COURIER)
CO, 3D BDE, 1ST CAV DIV (AML) LZ BALDY (COURIER)
CO, 196TH LT INF BDE, HILL 35 (COURIER)
CO, AMERICAL DIV SPT COMD, CHU LAI (COURIER)
CO, 1ST SQDN, 1ST CAV, HILL 29 (COURIER)
CO, B TROOP, 1ST SQDN, 9TH AIR CAV, CHU LAI (COURIER)
CO, C TROOP, 7TH SQDN, 17TH AIR CAV, CHU LAI (COURIER)
SPA, QUANG NGAI (COURIER)

200405Z Dec 67

CONFIDENTIAL AVDF-GC 7116

SUBJECT: FRAGO #1 (OPERATION MUSCATINE) (U)

Reference: AVDF-GC 7111, DTG 191715Z Dec 67, subj: OPOD 20-67
(OPERATION MUSCATINE) (U)

1. (C) 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div.

Release one (1) additional rifle company to OPCON 198th Lt Inf Bde eff 210800H Dec 67, at location to be mutually agreed between commanders concerned. *scw.*

2. (c) 198th Lt Inf Bde.

Assume OPCON of company in para 1, above, eff 210800H Dec 67, for employment in Operation MUSCATINE.

S/Jesmond D. Balmer Mr.
JESMOND D. BALMER, JR.
LTC, GS
ACofS, G3

s/K KAMBELL
for L. W. CUNNINGHAM, 2LT, AGC, ASST AG

A true copy. Attest.

Joseph A. Dalton
J.A.D.

605

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: CG, AMERICAL DIVISION, CHL

TO: CG, 11TH LT INF BDE, DPO
CO, 198th LT INF BDE, CHL

INFO: CG, USARV, LBN
CG, III MAF, DNG
CG, 2D ARVN DIV, QNG (COURIER)
CO, 3d BDE, 4th INF DIV, LZ BALDY
CO, 1st SQDN, 1ST ARMD CAV, HILL 29 (COURIER)
CO, AMERICAL DIV ARTY, CHL (COURIER)
CO, AMERICAL SPT COMD, CHL (COURIER)
CO, 14TH CBT AVN BN, CHL (COURIER)
CO, 123D AVN BN, CHL (COURIER)
CO, 26th ENGR BN, CHL (COURIER)
CO, 523D SIG BN, CHL (COURIER)
SA, 2d ARVN DIV, QNG (COURIER)
SPA, QNG (COURIER)

040925Z Feb 68

CONFIDENTIAL: AVDF-GC 1093

SUBJECT: FRAG O # 2 TO OPORD 20-67 (OPERATION MUSCATINE) (U).

- 1. (C) 11th LT INF BDE.
 - a. ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR MUSCATINE AO FROM 198th LT INF BDE EFF 041200 FEB 68.
 - b. RESUME CONTROL OF 4-3 INF AND TF BARKER FROM 198TH LT INF BDE EFF 041200 FEB 68.

2. (C) 198th LT INF BDE.

RELINQUISH MUSCATINE AO AND OPCON OF 4-3 INF AND TF BARKER TO 11TH LT INF BDE EFF 041200 FEB 68.

3. (U) OVERLAY FOLLOWS SOONEST.

DRAFTER
s/ CARL S. KREBS
MAJ, GS
Asst G3, Plans

RELEASER
s/ F. H. GENEL, 2LT, AGC, ASST AG

A true copy. Attest:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Joseph D. Walton
Maj, I.G.

606

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: CG, AMERICAL DIV, CHL

TO: CG, III MAF, DNG
CO, 196th INF BDE (LT), LZ BALDY
CO, 198TH INF BDE (LT), LZ BAYONET
CO, 1ST SQDN, 1ST CAV, HAWK HILL
CO, DIV ARTY, CHL (COURIER)
CO, SPT COMD, CHL (COURIER)
CO, 14TH ABT AVN BN, CHL (COURIER)
CO, 123D AVN BN, CHL (COURIER)
CO, 26TH ENGR BN, FAT CITY (COURIER)
CO, 39TH ENGR BN, CHL (COURIER)
CO, 523D SIG BN, CHL (COURIER)

090958Z June 1968

CONFIDENTIAL AVDF-GC 6028

SUBJECT: FRAG O # 3 TO OPOD 20-67 (OPERATION MUSCATINE)(U)

1. (C) TERMINATE OPN MUSCATINE EFF 101200 JUN 68.
2. (C) THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA IN OPERATION MUSCATINE WILL BE KNOWN AS MUSCATINE AO.
3. (C) BOUNDARY WITH ^{192nd} ~~198th~~ INF BDE (LT) WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED.
4. (C) CONTINUE PRESENT FORCE LEVEL OPERATIONS.

ACKNOWLEDGE DTOC

DRAFTER
CROSBIE E. SAINT
MAJ, GS
ASST G3

RELEASER
F. H. GENEL, 1LT, AGC, ASST AG

A true copy. Attest.

Joseph D. Walton
Major, I.G.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: CG, AMERICAL DIV, CHL

TO: CG, III MAF, DNG

CONFIDENTIAL AVDF-GC 5979

SUBJECT: OPERATION MUSCATINE

081020 June 1968

1. (C) Operation Muscatine was initiated to effect relief of 1st ROK Bde and extend GVN control in that area previously operated in by the 1st ROK Bde.
2. (C) The missions of operation muscatine have been accomplished.
3. (c) This headquarters intends to terminate operation Muscatine 101200 June 1968. That area will become known as the Muscatine area of Operations.

DRAFTER
CROSBIE E. SAINT
MAJ, GS
ASST G3

RELEASER
F. H. GENEL, 1LT, AGC, Asst AG

A true copy. Attest.

Joseph D. Walton
Maj, I. G.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96374

12 October 1967

ATTN: AT

SUBJECT: Artillery Items for Command Emphasis

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Keep your powder dry. This has been a cardinal rule for artillerymen since the first cannon fired the first solid cannon ball. It remains equally valid today. The marine artillery in this area reported a number of erratic rounds during the last winter monsoon season which they attributed to damp powder. The following measures must be followed:

- a. Powder (or semi-fixed 105mm ammunition) comes in a sealed container and should remain sealed until just before firing, consistent with the anticipated expenditure rate.
- b. Waterproof bunkers for ammunition (particularly powder) should be constructed as soon as feasible in each position. A canvas covering to keep out blowing rain should be over the entrance. Dunnage should be used to keep ammunition up off the ground.
- c. The practice of removing the 105mm shell from the cartridge case on a few ready rounds (for speed in cutting charges) should not be tolerated during the monsoon season.
- d. Each Chief of Section should verify that his powder bags are dry before putting them in the breech. Powder which has once become wet should not be fired, even after it has dried out. It should be returned to the ASP with a written explanation.

2. "Danger Close" should be included in any "Fire Mission" request by the forward observer if normal dispersion could bring rounds within 200 meters of friendly troops. Normal dispersion is a function of caliber and type of weapon, range, and the relationship of the gun target line to the friendly troops. For instance, a 175mm gun firing directly over troops at a 30,000 meter range becomes "Danger Close" when fire is brought within 500 meters. On the other hand, a 105mm howitzer firing from the flanks such that the dispersion in the direction of friendly troops comes largely in deflection (i.e., an angle T of 1100-2100 mils) does not become "Danger Close" until fire is brought closer than 200 meters.

EXHIBIT M-68

SUBJECT: Artillery Items for Command Emphasis

3. The MACV rules of engagement will be strictly observed in the Americal Division. This applies equally to fires at the request of ARVN units. The rules are detailed in the Task Force OREGON Field SOP, Annex A (Operations,) Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination) paragraphs 3b(3) and 7. In the Task Force OREGON Artillery Field SOP they are detailed in Annex A (Operations) Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination), para 3.

4. The Task Force OREGON Artillery Field SOP, Annex D (Logistics), Appendix 1 (Operational Loads of Class V) prescribes a basic load which will be maintained as a minimum by batteries. This is 1500 rounds (all types) for a 105mm battery and 1200 rounds for a 155mm battery. This SOP does apply to artillery attached or organic to brigades and to artillery batteries being supplied by helicopter in an LZ. Of course any SOP is only a guide and may be amended by the commander on the ground for cogent tactical reasons. For example, the brigade or battalion commander may direct a level of 1000 rounds because of lack of helicopter lift or plans to displace in the near future. Normally, we plan to "fire down" in a fire base before displacement, so as to avoid "back hauling" large amounts of ammunition. Sufficient ammunition must always be on hand to accomplish the artillery mission of providing close and continuous support to the infantry. On several occasions in the Americal Division a battery has fired over 1000 rounds during the night in support of one infantry element under attack. As a rule of thumb, a tactical emergency exists if the ammunition level of a battery falls below 700 rounds. There is a firm requirement in the SOP that the Division Artillery S4 or the FSE be immediately notified when ammunition stockage falls below the prescribed minimum level or has not yet reached that level.

5. A Chief of Section and a battery executive officer or Chief of Firing Battery must be present and free to supervise during firing. They should not be tied to a telephone.

6. The Task Force OREGON Artillery Field SOP requires that a five man shift (including the Fire Direction Officer) be present on duty in a battery fire direction center at all times. This is still a requirement for batteries equipped with FADAC. Battalions must augment battery FDC's to attain this level.

7. Experience has shown that a minimum of sixty officers and men are required to safely operate a 105mm six howitzer battery from a helicopter supported fire base. When strengths fall below this level, artillery commanders should advise their next superior in the chain of command that an unsafe situation has developed, and that, statistically, based on experience in Vietnam, the chances of an artillery firing error have been increased.

8. Each firing battery and battalion CP should have a helicopter pad. It should be selected in an area free from obstructions to flying such as overhead wires. Any wires that could be a hazard to aircraft should be marked so that they

AVDF-AT

12 October 1967

SUBJECT: Artillery Items for Command Emphasis

are visible using material such as strips of white cloth. In semi-permanent positions the helicopter pad should be covered with pent-a-prime if necessary and feasible.

9. This letter will be filed in a folder along with the other letters required to be present in battalion and battery fire direction centers for use with the Division Artillery Gunnery Checklist.

/s/ Mason J. Young Jr.
/t/ MASON J. YOUNG JR.
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

ARTILLERYMEN ACCEPT WITH PRIDE THEIR MISSION TO SUPPORT THE GROUND GAINING ARMS

DISTRIBUTION:

12 - 2d Bn, 9th Arty
12 - 2d Bn, 11th Arty
12 - 3d Bn, 16th Arty
12 - 3d Bn, 18th Arty
12 - 3d Bn, 82d Arty
12 - 2d Bn, 320th Arty
12 - 1st Bn, 14th Arty
12 - 1st Bn, 21st Arty
10 - S1
30 - S3
4 - S4
1 - G3
1 - G4
1 - Comm O
1 - Avn O

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96374**

AVDF-AT

15 January 1968

SUBJECT: Investigation of Artillery Incidents

TO: Sec Distribution

1. References:

- a. AR 15-6.
- b. USARV Reg 525-7.
- c. Letter, Headquarters III MAF, Subject: Spot and Serious Incident Reports.
- d. Letter, Headquarters TFO, Subject: Investigation of Artillery Incidents, dated 7 May 1967.

2. All artillery firing incidents involving injury or death to US, Allied or RVN military personnel or Vietnamese civilians will be investigated in accordance with the above references. Investigating officers will be designated by the Commanding Officer, American Division Artillery and will be of Field Grade Rank. Injury is defined as one requiring evacuation to a medical facility and absence from the unit for more than 24 hours. Orders appointing the investigating officer under provisions of AR 15-6 will be out by his parent organization citing as authority: VOOO, American Division Artillery.

3. Minor injuries resulting from mis-directed ordnance or firing errors which result in no injuries may be investigated by the Battalion Commander. In such cases an informal letter report without sworn statements will be submitted to the Commanding Officer, American Division Artillery.

4. For artillery incidents covered in para 2 above a formal report in five copies will be forwarded by the investigating officer to reach this headquarters not more than 4 days following notification to the Battalion Commander to appoint an investigating officer. Format for the report is as prescribed in Inclosure 1. Copies of all exhibits will be attached to each copy of the investigating officer's report.

AVDF-AT

15 January 1968

SUBJECT: Investigation of Artillery Incidents

5. Investigations should include sworn statements taken on DA Form 19-24; however, reports should not be delayed because of inability to have statements typed or to obtain signatures. Statements of verbal testimony certified by the investigating officer or true copies of hand written statements by the individual concerned will suffice. In any case, personnel giving testimony will be warned of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ and their testimony sworn to. Where negligence is indicated on the part of an individual he should be advised of his right to legal counsel.

6. If the investigating officer's findings indicate that US Artillery or Naval gunfire were not the cause of the incident, an informal report will be made to the Commanding Officer, Americal Division Artillery within 48 hours by the most expeditious means. Report should include findings, conclusions and possible cause if it can be determined. Sworn statements may not be required in this case.

1 Incl
as

MASON J. YOUNG JR.
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

5-G-28
2-G-3
10-Americal Div Arty
5-2d Bn, 9th Arty
5-6th Bn, 11th Arty
5-1st Bn, 14th Arty
5-3d Bn, 16th Arty
5-3d Bn, 18th Arty
5-1st Bn, 21st Arty
5-3d Bn, 82d Arty

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY:

JOSEPH A. WALTON
MAJ, DIG
Deputy Inspector General

HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAN DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-CG

24 March 1968

SUBJECT: The Safeguarding of Noncombatants

All Commanders

1. Reference American Div Reg 525-4, Rules of Engagement. (U)
2. The recent emphasis on the NVA/VC objectives of seizing control of the hamlets, villages and towns has caused an increase in the frequency of US combat operations in the vicinity of built-up areas where noncombatants are known to reside. The resultant likelihood of endangering innocent civilians must be a matter of great concern to every commander, and every possible safeguard short of endangering US lives will be used to avoid noncombatant casualties.
3. It is imperative that a thorough and continuing program be developed at the lowest command level which will keep every soldier mindful of the importance of safeguarding noncombatants, both from a humanitarian standpoint as well as from the standpoint of the prestige of US Forces and the Government of Vietnam.
4. The implementing instructions and SOP's developed by commanders in accordance with the above reference will place particular emphasis on the following:
 - a. Discriminate use of firepower in vicinity of built-up areas.
 - b. Safeguards against the needless destruction of private property.
 - c. A civilian control plan for all ground operations in built-up areas suspected of housing noncombatants to include:
 - (1) The warning of inhabitants by loudspeaker or other appropriate means.
 - (2) Route of withdrawal for civilians in cases where prior warning of the populace would have jeopardized accomplishment of the mission.
 - (3) Establishment of marking and evacuation procedures, collecting points and medical treatment for wounded civilians.


AVDF-CG

24 March 1968

SUBJECT: The Safeguarding of Noncombatants

(4) Control procedures for civilians within a battle area which will allow them to be collected and detained without injury.

5. A thorough knowledge and strict adherence to the rules of engagement and a concerted effort on the part of every soldier to minimize noncombatant battle casualties is essential if we are to gain the loyalty and cooperation of the people and create the conditions necessary to permit them to go about their normal lives in peace and security.



S. W. KOSTER
Major General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: B

HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-CS

5 February 1968

SUBJECT: Gunnery Checklist

TO: Commanding General, 11th Light Infantry Brigade
APO San Francisco 96217
Commanding Officer, 196th Light Infantry Brigade,
APO San Francisco 96256
Commanding Officer, 198th Light Infantry Brigade,
APO San Francisco 96219
Commanding Officer, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division,
APO San Francisco 96262

1. Attached as Inclosure #1 is a letter published by Headquarters, Americal Division Artillery, with a Gunnery Checklist attached. Thirty copies were provided to each direct support artillery battalion.

2. It is requested that action be taken to insure that:


a. Artillery battalions organic or attached to brigades comply with the instructions for the use of this checklist in accordance with Inclosure #1.

b. All references, with changes, of the attached Gunnery Checklist are on file in all Fire Direction Centers of artillery organic or attached to the brigades.

c. The inspections required on a monthly basis by the Battery and Battalion Commanders be completed, and a written record of deficiencies noted be posted in appropriate Fire Direction Centers.

3. Inspecting Officers from Headquarters, Americal Division Artillery will spot check units from time to time, using this checklist to evaluate the results of the inspections required by para 2c above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



NELS A. PARSON JR
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

30-Each Addressee: 1-G3
1-C/S 1-G4
1-G1 80-ARTY
1-G2

EXHIBIT M-67

617

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96374

AVDF-AT

5 February 1968


SUBJECT: Gunnery Checklist

TO: Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 16th Artillery, APO 96374
Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery, APO 96374

1. The attached "Gunnery Checklist" is forwarded for your use in checking the fire direction centers and firing batteries under your command.

2. Each Battery and Battalion Commander in Americal Division Artillery will personally inspect each fire direction center and firing battery under his command, using technical assistants as appropriate, once each month, using this checklist. A copy of the checklist, with deficiencies noted thereon, will be posted in the FDC and at the battery executive post until the next inspection is made.

3. Inspecting officers from Headquarters Americal Division Artillery will spot check units from time to time using this checklist, in order to evaluate the results of the inspections required by paragraph 2, above.



MASON J. YOUNG JR
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

30-Each Addressee
30-CO, 2d Bn, 9th Arty
30-CO, 6th Bn, 11th Arty
30-CO, 1st Bn, 14th Arty
30-CO, 3d Bn, 82 Arty
1-S1
80-S3
1-S4

AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY GUNNERY CHECKLIST

A. Are the following references on hand

1. FM 6-40 dated October 1967 or FM 6-40 dated November 1960 with changes 1, 2, 3 and DA Training Circular 6-1.
2. Americal Division Artillery Field SOP
3. CO, TF OREGON Artillery message AVDF-AT 2790, subject: Selection of Ammunition, DTG 260830Z Jul 67.
4. CO, AMERICAL DIVISION Artillery letters, subject: Artillery Items for Command Emphasis, dated:
 - a. 23 April 1967 i.
 - b. 13 June 1967 j.
 - c. 20 June 1967 k.
 - d. 12 October 1967 l.
 - e. 15 October 1967 m.
 - f. 26 November 1967 (FADAC) n.
 - g. 26 November 1967 (Slings) o.
 - h. 2 December 1967 p.
5. CO, TF OREGON Artillery message, AVDF-AT 1483, subject: Orientation and Training in Artillery Techniques, DTG 201501Z May 67.
6. CG, TF OREGON message (to brigade commanders) AVDF-AT 1669, subject: Adjustment of Artillery Defensive Concentrations, DTG 270330Z May 67.
7. CG, TF OREGON message (to brigade commanders) AVDF-AT 2128, subject: Double Check Procedures for Artillery Units, DTG 060806Z Jul 67
8. CG, TF OREGON message AVDF-AT 2859, subject: Reporting and Investigation of Erratic Artillery Rounds, DTG 300810Z Jul 67.
9. Artillery Incident File to include:
 - a. Headquarters, TF OREGON letter, subject: Investigation of Artillery Incidents, dated 7 May 1967.
 - b. Headquarters, III Marine Amphibious Force letter subject: Spot/Serious Incident Reports, undated.

Americal Division Gunnery Checklist

c. All CO, Americal Division Artillery messages, subject: Artillery Incident.

10. CG, TFO letter, subject: Safety in Artillery Firing, dated 26 Aug 67.

11. CG, TF OREGON message AVDF-AT 1570, subject: Adjusting with Shell Smoke prior to firing Shell HE, DTG, 230740Z May 67.

B. FDC Checklist:

1. Are standard Gunnery procedures and the "new" terminology used? (Ref 1)

2. Is a complete FDC team of five men on duty 24 hours a day? (Ref 2)

3. Does the FDC possess all the required equipment to perform its mission? (Chap 16, FM 6-40; TOE)

4. Is there adequate light and working space in the FDC?

5. Is a thorough briefing conducted between personnel when shifts are changed?

6. Is there an overlap of shift personnel to insure continuity?

7. Is there an adequate system of checks in the FDC to prevent errors from being transmitted to the guns? (App 2, Annex A, SOP; Ref 7)

8. Is a Fire Order issued for each mission? (Para 18-15, FM 6-40)

9. Are fire commands transmitted in proper sequence? (Sec IV, Chap 4, FM 6-40)

10. Is a complete and consolidated record of ammunition kept indicating rounds on hand and expended? (Para 18-32, FM 6-40)

11. Is an independent check of computations made at all times? (App 2, Annex A, SOP)

12. Is a fire capabilities overlay maintained? (Para 24-40, FM 6-40)

13. Is the situation map kept current, to include locations of all friendly forces, patrols, LRRF's observation posts, ambushes, no fire areas, free fire areas, fire coordination lines, built up areas, villages and hamlets? Is the map updated to reflect current inhabited areas? Are the limits of villages, refugee camps, etc, corrected as information is received from the district or by aerial reconnaissance? (Annex A. SOP)

Americal Division Gunnery Checklist

14. Is the grid of all fire requests checked with the situation map to assure an unsafe condition does not exist and then cleared with both the U.S. DS Artillery Liaison Officer, the local ARVN authorities (District) and/or other allied troops in the area, as appropriate?
15. Are fire direction records properly maintained? (Para 18-32, FM 6-40; Annex A, SOP)
16. Does the HCO determine Angle T to the nearest 10 mils and announce it when its value is 500 mils or greater? (Para 18-21, FM 6-40)
17. Are deflection indexes properly constructed and identified for 6400 mil operation? (Para 16-18, FM 6-40; Annex A, SOP)
18. Does the FDC always fire with the best data available? (Para 7f, App 2, Annex A, SOP)
19. Are GFT corrections being kept current by registration and/or MET plus VE?
20. Are registrations being conducted, as a minimum, every third day, and upon occupation of a new position? (For 105mm howitzers a daily registration is desirable.) Is the "full fork" method of registration being used? (Para 9i, Annex A, SOP)
21. Are MET Messages being received on a regular basis? (Every 6 hours) (Para 9m, Annex A, SOP)
22. Is the MET Message computed immediately upon receipt for all appropriate ranges and directions?
23. Is there an independent check of each battery computer by the chief computer or battery FDO, as appropriate? (App 2, Annex A, SOP)
24. Are at least 2 independent computations being made of each MET Message? (App 2, Annex A, SOP)
25. During computation is each computer extracting data from the firing tables independently of the other computers?
26. Is a check made between battalion and battery FDC's in order to compare met computations?
27. Is all encoding/decoding performed independently by at least two individuals?
28. Are registration transfer limits adhered to at all times? (Chap 20, FM 6-40)

Americal Division Gunnery Checklist

29. Are corrections for targets outside transfer limits computed using Met plus VE technique? (Para 21-15, FM 6-40)

30. Are comparative VE's known for all guns?

31. Are all targets plotted neatly and accurately? (Para 16-3, FM 6-40)

32. Is the 100/R factor used properly in Time and VT missions? (100/R determined at initial chart range) (Para 18-26, FM 6-40)

33. Is battery Executive Officer familiar with the Executive's High Burst? (Para 4-25, FM 6-40)

34. After the second and any subsequent registration, regardless of the point registered on (it may be the same point initially registered on), does the FDO assure that the deflection index is not moved? (Para 20-12, FM 6-40)

35. Are all FDO's familiar with high burst registration and registration by radar? (Sec IV, Chap 19, FM 6-40)

36. Are computers able to solve a high burst registration using logarithms? (Sec IV, Chap 19, FM 6-40)

37. Are FDO's familiar with the basic survey operations?

38. Are FDO's asking observers if "Adjust Fire" missions are Close Danger Close or Deep if appropriate? If "Close" are they asking "How Close"? It should be remembered that a two way channel exists over the radio to advise of unusual situations and difficulties which might produce safety hazards, such as friendly troops forward of the FO, on his flanks, jungle which hampers observation, etc. The FDO has a responsibility to question the FO if there is any indication that friendly troops or civilians may be endangered.

39. Is an officer present and awake at all times in the FDC?

40. Are artillery defensive concentrations plotted and have they been fired in prior to darkness unless a command decision has been made not to do so for cogent reasons? (Para 9i(7), SOP and ref A6).

41. Do the FDC personnel know the proper procedure for properly computing an adjustment with shells: smoke, base ejection and WP and then changing to shell HE? (Sec I, Chap 24, FM 6-40)

Americal Division Gunnery Checklist.

42. Is the FDC properly protected against mortar/small arms fire to include overhead cover? (Para 9c, SOP)
43. Does each DS Artillery Battalion maintain a liaison officer with the U.S. advisor to all districts in his brigade AO? (Para 6b, Appendix 4, Annex A, SOP)
44. Are new forward observers given a thorough orientation and a test (as applicable) prior to being sent up on the hill? (Para 10 Annex SOP and message reference A5 above)
45. Are new FDO's given a thorough orientation, and an apprentice period under an experienced FDO prior to going on shift? (reference A5)
46. Does each battalion have an FDC test which all officers in the gunnery chain are required to pass?
47. Is the prohibition against beer in the FDC or Executive Post strictly enforced? (Ref 4b)
48. Do some H&I fires commence promptly at dusk? (Letter, "Artillery Items for Command Emphasis", dated 13 June 1967)
49. Is responsibility fixed with a specific individual on each shift for each link in the gunnery chain, and its independent check? (Letter "Artillery Items for Command Emphasis", dated 20 June 1967)
50. Does the battery FDC compute the minimum CE to clear all intermediate crests occupied by friendly troops, and have on file the minimum CE to clear masks visible from the battery position as computed by the battery executive officer (Sec II, Chap 3, FM 6-40)
51. Does the FDC have wind data cards and are they using them correctly?
52. Does the FDO monitor the read back from the guns to insure that the correct data was received?
53. Are program tests of FADAC made periodically to check computer functioning?
54. Is the data on the computer visually checked by a second individual before the operator presses the "ENTER" button?
55. Are current registration corrections (deflection, time, range) being determined and entered into FADAC?
56. Is a primary check of data produced by FADAC made by either a second FADAC or by the manual system?
57. Is the solution of a MET check point for a target at maximum range checked between two different FADAC's to insure that all applicable MET lines have been entered correctly?

Americal Division Gunnery Checklist

10. Is the last motion in setting OE in the direction of greatest resistance? (Para 5-4, FM 6-40)
11. Is the Gunner's Quadrant used properly?
12. Are the guns loaded only after 'E' is announced?
13. Is the hand wheel touched after announcing "Ready"?
14. Are the bubbles leveled after firing?
15. Is the "read back" accomplished properly?
16. Does the Chief of Firing Battery and/or the Executive Officer inspect all pieces daily for maintenance, serviceability, safety and cleanliness?
17. Does the Chief of Section insure that his prime mover and his portion of the basis load of ammunition is properly maintained?
18. Does the Battery Executive Officer check the azimuth of the orienting line for general direction by setting up his aiming circle and "floating a needle" over the OL? (Para 4-5, FM 6-40)
19. Are aiming circles properly declinated? (Applicable TM)
20. Is the "basic periodic check" performed on a regular basis?
21. Are powder pits or containers of sufficient size to prevent over flow during periods of heavy firing? (Para 8d(2), App2, Annex A, SOP)
22. Is unused powder burned regularly?
23. Are azimuth markers placed around each howitzer to provide a visual check of the correct azimuth of fire? (Para 8b(3), App2, Annex A, SOP)
24. Is proper protection provided for personnel, weapons and ammunition? (Para 9c(2)(a), Annex A, SOP) Is overhead protection provided for all personnel in their sleeping and working areas within a reasonable time here defined as 3-5 days?

ARTILLERY DIVISION GUNNERY CHECKLIST

25. Is an air sentinel posted at the firing position during missions? (Letter, "Artillery Items for Command Emphasis", dated 23 April 1967)

26. Is ammunition stored in accordance with the letter, "Artillery Items for Command Emphasis", dated 13 June 1967?

27. Is responsibility fixed on a specific individual at all times (including chow times) for each link in the gunnery chain, to include responsibility for supervision? (Letter, "Artillery Items for Command Emphasis", dated 20 June 1967)

28. Does the battery Executive Officer compute the minimum OE to the visible task, adding the required safety factor if it is occupied by friendly troops? (Sec II, Chap 4, FM 6-40)

29. Does the Executive Officer insure that the maximum rate of fire of the weapon is not exceeded? (Para 27-6, FM 6-40)

30. Are the powder increments removed from each semi-fixed round to verify that the complete and correct increments are present before the charge is cut? (Table II, FM 6-75)

31. Does the XO or Chief of Firing Battery visually check the powder increments held up by the Chief of Section to insure that the correct charge has been cut? (Reference 4d)

32. Are procedures established to insure that a round is not allowed to sit in a "hot" chamber an excessive period of time, i.e. not more than 2 minutes, without unloading by firing into a "safe" area?

33. Are there frequent, short, brisk periods of "Cannoneers Drill" with checks for accuracy, to insure high standards are maintained?

34. Are personnel provided protection, to include overhead cover, before ammunition, in accordance with the priorities established in Para 9c(2) Annex A, SOP?

35. Is ammunition properly protected from weather and rain?

36. Are wooden gun platforms provided for heavy artillery as soon as practicable?

37. Are all personnel in the firing battery familiar with the plan to defend their gun position against ground attack?

38. Have bunkers in front of 105mm howitzers been provided with sandbag protection to their rear so as to allow the safe firing of "Beehive" ammunition overhead in defense of the fire base?

AMERICAN DIVISION GUNNERY CHECKLIST

39. Is there a system of incentives to reward gun sections with an unbroken record of accuracy in firing?

40. Is the battery position neat and orderly?

41. Have howitzers been electronically calibrated? How recently? Are calibration corrections recorded and available?

42. Are ME's recorded at the piece by azimuth of fire to obstructions such as tall trees, towers, etc?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORD COPY

K
FILE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96374

ADF-GC

7 December 1967

SUBJECT: Phased Schedule of 11th Lt Inf Bde (U)

TO: Commanding Officer
3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96374

Commanding Officer
11th Light Infantry Brigade
APO San Francisco 96374

1. (U) Reference USARV Regulation 350-1 with Change 1.

2-61
JSA

2. (C) The 11th Lt Inf Bde will conduct a phased in-country training program after arrival of its main body of troops. The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division will assist the 11th Brigade in the conduct of this program. The purpose of the program is to bring the 11th Brigade to maximum combat readiness in a minimum of time with the major emphasis toward tactical conditions as encountered in I CTZ. On completion of the training phase the 11th Brigade will assume the mission of operating in the Duc Pho AO.

3. (C) Minimum training requirements:

a. Commanders (to company level) and staffs.

(1) Develop operational techniques in order to permit the brigade to assume its function as part of the Americal Division.

(2) Provide training on the conduct and techniques of airmobile operations.

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(3) Provide advanced training in the exploitation of supporting fires as conducted in the Vietnamese environment.

OPA - DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR
INTERVALS, DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YRS DOD DIR
5200-10.

EXHIBIT M-54

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AVDF-GC

7 Dec 67

SUBJECT: Phased Schedule of 11th Lt Inf Bde (U)

(4) Provide orientation on Revolutionary Development and Civic Action operations performed in support of combat operations.

(5) Application of actual operations under controlled combat environment in the Duc Pho area.

b. Training of junior leaders and individual soldiers.

(1) Conduct normal in-country orientation training for all personnel, as required.

(a) Mines and booby traps

(b) Health and sanitation

(c) Actions necessary to cope with environment of Vietnam (terrain and weather).

(d) Individual actions relative to Civic Action, Med'ap and Psychological Operations.

(e) Employment of CS; use of protective mask.

(f) Familiarization on small arms and crew-served weapons, to include maintenance.

(g) Maintenance of individual and organizational clothing and equipment.

(h) Land navigation.

(i) Convoy procedures and safety

(j) Battlefield police

(k) PW handling

(l) Adjustment of artillery and mortar fire

(m) Communications techniques and procedures

(n) Sentry duty (including perimeter defenses of static positions.)

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDP-GC

SUBJECT: Phased Schedule of 11th Lt Inf Bde (U)

7 Dec 67

c. Unit training.

- (1) Aircraft operations
- (2) Meeting engagements
- (3) Advance to contact
- (4) Use of supporting fires
- (5) Night operations
- (6) Patrol techniques and planning
- (7) Ambush and counter-ambush
- (8) Operations with armor

4. (C) Initial training will be devoted to in-country orientation and general subjects of value to all personnel; thereafter, the training will specialize according to type of unit with maximum emphasis on practical work, to include actual limited combat operations within the Duc Pho AO.

5. (C) As general guidance, the following phasing will govern with actions being initiated on arrival at Duc Pho:

a. 3/1, 4/3, 1/20 Inf Bns

D-Day	Arrival Duc Pho
D+1	Stand-down at Duc Pho
D+2 to D+29	Orientation and unit training
D+30	Relieve 3/4 Bde and assume responsibility for designated AO

b. E Trp/1st Cav

D-Day	Arrival Duc Pho
D+1	Stand-down at Duc Pho

AVDF-CC
SUBJECT:

Phased Schedule of 11th Lt Inf Bde (U)

7 Dec 67


- D+2 to D+14 Orientation and unit training
- D+14 to D+24 Train with 3/4 Bde
- D+30 Assume combat mission
- c. 6th Engr Co
- D-Day Arrival Duc Pho
- D+1 Stand-down at Duc Pho
- D+2 to D+19 Orientation and unit training
Duc Pho
- D+19 to D+29 Train with 3/4 Bde
- D+30 Assume Combat mission

6. (C) Responsibilities.

a. The 11th Light Infantry Brigade will develop a detailed training program within the parameters stated herein, and will be prepared to relieve the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division in place at the dates indicated.

b. 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division will assist the 11th Light Infantry Brigade in the preparation and conduct of the training program.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


 K. KAWABATA
 CPT, AGC
 Asst. AG

DISTRIBUTION:

4 plus
26 - G3

AVDF-IO

7 April 1968

SUBJECT: INFORMATION OFFICE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP)

1. GENERAL

a. The Information Officer, Americal Division, is responsible to the Commanding General for planning, executing, supervising and evaluating the Americal Information program.

b. This SOP provides guidelines for Information activities within the Republic of Vietnam for Americal Division units and personnel.

2. OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Information program are, within the limits of military security and good taste, to release complete, accurate and timely information concerning the accomplishments of individuals and units within the Americal program and to develop public awareness and understanding of the aims, missions, objectives, and professionalism of the Americal Division. This includes, but is not necessarily limited to:

a. Preparing and disseminating general news releases to appropriate news media.

b. Preparing and disseminating hometown news releases and taped interviews to insure that individuals receive recognition in their hometowns.

c. Assisting accredited correspondents in securing facts for preparation of news stories. Assistance includes transporting, billeting, briefing, and providing escorts when required.

3. POLICY

a. The Information program is a command responsibility.

RULES GOVERNING PUBLIC RELEASE OF MILITARY INFORMATION IN VIETNAM

BACKGROUND

The basic principle governing the public release of military information in Vietnam is that the maximum amount of information will be made available, consistent with the requirement for security.

In past wars a great deal of information could be, and was, denied to the enemy on the basis that he did not have ready access to it. This is not the case in Vietnam. By their very nature, subversion and guerrilla warfare make it impossible to safeguard many types of information that once were carefully protected. Thus, the arrival of a major US unit is announced immediately, rather than weeks or even months later. Pin-point datelines are permitted. In-country strength figures, by service, are released at regular intervals. Casualty figures are released weekly.

In Vietnam the greatest problem in achieving a full flow of information to newsmen and thence to the public is not that of deciding whether information is releasable, but that of physically gathering, transmitting and checking information from widely scattered locations linked together only by air transportation and an almost saturated communications system.

In the past, certain ground rules have defined the items of information that are not releasable and those that are releasable. The ground rules have been reviewed to insure that they are clearly stated, that they are limited to those required to preserve military security and that the principle of making the maximum amount of information available to the public is being followed.

The situation in South Vietnam is such that correspondents may come into possession of information which has not been released officially under the ground rules set forth herein. Such information is not to be transmitted or released to the public until officially released by Vietnamese, American or other Free World spokesmen in regard to their respective national forces. Official Government of Vietnam (GVN) and US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) accreditation is issued on this condition. Deliberate violation of these conditions or ground rules by a correspondent will be regarded as a basis for suspension or cancellation of accreditation.

Incl 1¹

Correspondents may find that, at times, their movements may be restricted in certain tactical areas. These restrictions are kept to a minimum but they may be applied by a commanding officer when in his opinion the nature of an operation warrants such action. Correspondents will be advised of such restrictions by the commanding officer of the unit or by the IO representative of the headquarters involved, or by the unit G2/S2 if there is no IO representative present.

GROUND RULES

1. The Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam is the sole releasing authority for all information material, including photography, pertaining to US military activities of Vietnam and gathered or produced by military individuals or organizations. Local commanders are delegated the authority to release hometown news material. As authorized by COMUSMACV, the Chief of Information or his duly appointed representative is the official MACV military spokesman.

2. Information cleared for release will be made available to the press by MACV through one or more of the following means.

- a. Daily press release.
- b. Daily press briefing.
- c. Call outs.
- d. Special press handouts.

3. Releasable Information

a. General:

(1) Arrival of major units in country when officially announced by COMUSMACV.

(2) Strength figures of US forces, by service, when announced by COMUSMACV.

(3) Official total casualty figures on a weekly and cumulative basis, as furnished by Department of Defense on the basis of reports from the Services.

(4) Enemy casualty figures for each action or operation, daily and cumulatively.

b. Ground/Naval Operations

(1) Casualties suffered by friendly units in an announced operation in terms of number killed in action (KIA) or wounded in action (WIA).

(2) Size of friendly forces involved in an action or operation using general terms such as "multi-battalion".

(3) Information regarding details of a tactical operation when release has been authorized by COMUSMACV (See paragraph 1., General Notes).

c. Air Operations

(1) Target or targets hit, to include general location and category of target.

(2) Identification as to whether it was VNAF, US or a joint VNAF/US strike.

(3) Whether aircraft were land-based or carrier-based. Names of carriers when their aircraft are involved.

(4) Time of attack in general terms.

(5) General evaluation of success of the mission.

(6) Types of ordnance expended in general terms, such as 250-pound fragmentation bombs, 500-pound general purpose bombs, rockets, .50 caliber ammunition, 20MM cannon fire.

(7) Number of missions over North Vietnam; number of sorties over the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

(8) Types of aircraft involved.

(9) Weather enroute and over the target during a strike.

(10) Pilot sightings of unfriendly aircraft.

(11) Periodically, the number of aircraft downed:

(a) By hostile fire in South Vietnam.

(b) By hostile fire in North Vietnam.

(12) Volume of enemy anti-aircraft fire in general terms.

4. Information not releasable under any circumstances.

a. General

(1) Future plans, operations, or strikes.

(2) Information on or confirmation of Rules of Engagement.

(3) Amounts of ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units, unless cleared by MACOI.

b. Ground/Naval Operations

(1) During an operation, unit designations and troop movements, tactical deployments, name of operation and size of friendly forces involved, until officially released by MACV.

(2) Intelligence unit activities, methods of operation, or specific location.

c. Air Operations

(1) The number of sorties and the amount of ordnance expended on strikes outside the RVN.

(2) Information of aircraft taking off for strikes, enroute to, or returning from target area. Information on strikes while they are in progress.

(3) Identity of units and locations of air bases from which aircraft are launched on combat operations.

(4) Number of aircraft damaged or any other indicator of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground anti-aircraft defenses.

(5) Tactical specifics, such as altitudes, course, speeds, or angle of attack. (General items such as "low and fast" may be used.)

(6) Information of or confirmation of planned strikes which do not take place for any reason, including bad weather.

(7) Specific identification of enemy weapons system used to down friendly aircraft.

(8) Details concerning downed aircraft while SAR operations are in progress.

GENERAL NOTES

1. The initial release of information pertaining to any tactical operation in the field will be made by the MACV Office of Information (MACOI) when, in the opinion of the Field Force commander concerned, the release of such information will not adversely affect the security of his command. This condition will exist when it can be presumed that the enemy is aware of the general strength and location of the friendly force(s), and may occur either before or after there has been significant contact. The Field Force commander's recommendation for release does not constitute authority for commanders subordinate to MACV to effect release to news media. Initial announcement of an operation will be made only by MACOI.

2. Casualty information, as it relates to the notification of the next of kin, is extremely sensitive. By Executive direction, next of kin of all military fatalities must be notified in person by an officer of the appropriate service. There have been instances in which next of kin have first learned of the death or wounding of a loved one through news media. The problem is particularly difficult for visual media. Casualty photographs can show a recognizable face, name tag, jewelry or other identifying feature or item. The anguish that sudden recognition at home can cause is out of proportion to the news value of the photograph or film. Although the casualty reporting and notification system works on a priority basis, correspondents are urged to keep this problem in mind when covering an action in the field. Names of casualties whose next of kin have been notified can be verified by the MACV Information Office and by the Directorate of News Services in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs).

3. Only two enemy casualty figures are released - "killed in action and detained". There is no way to get a "wounded" figure although there are indications that for every enemy killed, one-and-one-half enemy are wounded seriously enough to require hospital treatment. The total is a firm figure. Any "enemy killed" figure released by MACV will have been verified on the scene by US personnel to the extent

permitted by the military situation. It cannot be an exact figure, but it is probable that duplications and other errors on the high side are more than offset by the number of enemy dead who are carried away or buried nearby, by those who subsequently die of wounds and by those killed by artillery concentrations and air strikes not followed up by ground action. Thus, when the briefer announces a specific number of enemy killed in a particular operation or over a given period, that figure is not as precise as the popular term "body count" would imply. Neither is it a guess or loose estimate. It is the best figure that can be developed and, as noted, probably is conservative in the long run.

4. Members of the Military Assistance Command Information Office are available to discuss any questions which may arise concerning the release of military information.

5. Requests for information concerning non-military activities and Republic of Vietnam military activities should be addressed to the Government of Vietnam, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, the US Mission or the Public Information representative of the appropriate Free World Force or activity.

6. Whenever possible, changes to this memorandum will be brought to the attention of correspondents before they are put into effect.

AMERICAL DIVISION

INFORMATION OFFICE

1 - 5505	Major	Information Officer
1 - 5505	Captain	Deputy Information Officer
1 - 71Q50	E-8	Information Supervisor
2 - 71B20	E-4	Clerk Typist

PRESS OPERATIONS

1 - 5505	CPT,	Asst Info Off
1 - 71Q50	E-7,	Info Supv
1 - 71R20	E-5,	Sr Broadcast Spec
1 - 71Q20	E-5,	Sr Info Spec
1 - 71R20	E-4,	Broadcast Spec
2 - 71Q20	E-4,	Info Specialist
1 - 71B20	E-4,	Clerk Typist

COMMAND INFORMATION ELEMENT

1 - 5505	CPT,	Asst Info Off
1 - 71R40	E-6,	Broadcast Supv
2 - 71Q20	E-5,	Sr Info Spec
2 - 71Q20	E-4,	Info Specialist
1 - 71B20	E-4,	Clerk Typist

Excerpts from "Rules Governing Public Release of Military Information"
(31 Oct 1966 & 29 March 1967)

The following information is not releasable, unless and until released by MACV:


1. Future plans, operations, or strikes.
2. Information on or confirmation of Rules of Engagement.
3. Amounts of ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units (ordnance includes weapons or weapons systems).
4. During an operation, unit designations and troop movements, tactical deployments, name of operation and size of friendly forces involved.
5. Intelligence unit activities, methods of operation, or specific locations.
6. Exact number and type of casualties or damage suffered by friendly units.
7. Number of sorties and the amount of ordnance expended on strikes outside of RVN.
8. Information on aircraft taking off for strikes, enroute to, or returning from target area. Information on strikes while they are in progress.
9. Identity of units and locations of air bases from which aircraft are launched on combat operations.
10. Number of aircraft damaged or any other indicator of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground anti-aircraft defenses.
11. Tactical specifics, such as altitudes, course, speeds, or angle of attack. (General descriptions such as "low and fast" may be used.)
12. Information on or confirmation of planned strikes which do not take place for any reason, including bad weather.
13. Specific identification of enemy weapons systems used to down friendly aircraft.
14. Details concerning downed aircraft while SAR operations are in progress.
15. Aerial photos of fixed installations.

-END-

EXTRACTS

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AMERICAN DIVISION



COMBAT SOP

Vietnam 1966

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

EXHIBIT M-106

EXTRACTS

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AMERICAL DIVISION
CHU LAI, RVN
15 April 1968

FIELD STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

FOREWARD

These standing operating procedures are published for the guidance of the Americal Division and attached or supporting units.

This document will be revised and changed as necessary to incorporate improved procedures and concepts. The format is designed to enable changes to be made as required.

Commanders and general and special staff officers are required to review this SOP on a continuing basis and to submit recommendations for its improvement.

OFFICIAL:

KOSTER
MG

Balmer
BALMER
G3

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AMERICAL DIVISION
FIELD STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

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AMERICAL DIVISION
FIELD STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES
DISTRIBUTION LIST

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G2	4
G3	10
G4	4
G5	4
AG	50
AVN	2
CHAP	1
CHEM	1
ENGR	2
HQ COMDT	1
IO	2
PM	2
SIG	1
Finance	1
HIST	1
SURG	1
HHC, Americal Div	2
196th Lt Inf Bde	20
198th Lt Inf Bde	20
11th Lt Inf Bde	20
1-1 Cav	7
26th Engr Bn	5
39th Engr Bn	5
SPT COMD	15
DIV ARTY	15
523d Sig Bn	5
123d Avn Bn	5
14th Cbt Avn Bn	5

▼

ABBREVIATIONS

AAE	Army Aviation Element
AACC	Army Aviation Control Center
AACO	Assault Aircraft Coordination Officer
ADAO	Assistant Division Aviation Officer
ALOC	Air Line of Communication
AO	Area of Operation
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DAVNO	Division Aviation Officer
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
C&C	Command & Control
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
COSVN	Central Office, South Vietnam
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
ENGRE	Engineer Element
FDP	Forward Distribution Point
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GRREG	Graves Registration
GVN	Government of Vietnam
II	Imagery Interpretation
IIR	Imagery Interpretation Report
IPIR	Immediate Photo Interpretation Report
JUSPAC	Joint United States Public Affairs Office
LLOC	Land Line of Communication
LRRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
NFLSN	National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
NLH	New Life Hamlet
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
PF	Popular Forces
PZ	Pick-up Zone
QU1	RVN National Route Number
RF	Regional Forces
RRU	Radio Research Unit
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SITREF	Situation Report
SLAR	Side Looking Airborne Radar
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TASE	Tactical Air Support Element
USARV	United States Army Vietnam
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN	Vietnamese Navy

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DEFINITIONS

Area of Operations (AO) - An AO is an area where a Commander is temporarily authorized to conduct the necessary operations for a certain period of time. An AO is located outside of TAORs and RZs.

Assault Aircraft Coordination Officer (AACO) - The AACO is a rated pilot and air operations officer on duty with the TACP. His function is to advise and assist the commander and his staff on airlift matters. He works primarily with the G3 Air on tactical lift and the G4 and TO on logistical lift.

Chieu Hoi Program - The "open arms" program of the RVN that permits VC and affiliates to return to GVN control of their own free will under full amnesty and a promise of retraining.

Combat Sky Spot - Bombing raid by radar controlled bomber aircraft during darkness or limited visibility.

Eagle Flight - Heliborne infantry troops on air alert to perform immediate reaction missions for a ground commander.

Extraction - The lifting of combat troops by helicopters from terrain in which the enemy has the capability to resist.

Firefly - A helicopter (UH-1) equipped with searchlights used to illuminate targets.

Heavy Fire Team - Three gunships operating as a tactical element.

Insertion - The lifting of combat troops by helicopter into a landing zone. Differs from combat assault in that insertion is normally used in reference to secretive movement of a patrol into a small, insecure LZ.

Light Fire Team - Two gunships operating as a tactical element.

Rallier - An individual who renounces support of the NFLSN and who voluntarily surrenders to GVN control under the "CHIEU HOI" Program.

Revolutionary Development Area (RDA) - An RDA is an area where the civil and military activities aim at restoring, consolidating and expanding GVN-controlled areas in order to liberate the local people from the VC yoke, restore public security, develop political, economic and social activities to gain the people's support and strengthen the National Government.

Reconnaissance Zone (RZ) - An RZ is an area adjacent to a TAOR, in which the TAOR Commander is authorized to expand his reconnaissance efforts by means of normal reconnaissance operations.

Sector - The military organizational area equivalent to the province. The sector chief is a military officer charged with the security of the sector.

DEFINITIONS (Continued)

SLAR - Side looking airborne radar equipment AN/APS-94 mounted in OV-1B.

Slick - A UH-1D (or UH-1B) utility helicopter used primarily for carrying troops, equipment or supplies. Used to distinguish these aircraft from other UH-1s used as gunships.

Sub-sector - The military organizational area directly subordinate to the sector and comparable to the GVN district.

Starlight Mission - A night reconnaissance or surveillance mission employing a light intensifier scope.

Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) - A TAOR is an area in which responsibility is especially entrusted to a Commander for conducting tactical operations.

Field Standing Operating Procedures

I. GENERAL. This SOP has been compiled following the guidelines of Field SOPs currently in use in South Vietnam.

II. PURPOSE. This SOP establishes routine and recurring field operational procedures within the Americal Division and applies except when modified by Division order.

III. SCOPE. These procedures apply to all units under the command or operational control of the Division. Supporting units will be familiar with this SOP and, where applicable, will comply.

IV. RESPONSIBILITIES. a. Conformity: Subordinate unit SOPs will conform.

b. Revision: Recommendations for revision or change will be forwarded to the general staff section having primary staff responsibility. Following coordination with the general staff and approval by the Chief of Staff, changes will be forwarded to the Adjutant General for a change number and publication. Changes will be on a page for page basis only.

KOSTER
MG

ANNEXES:

- A - Operations
- B - Intelligence
- C - Personnel and Administration
- D - Logistics
- E - Army Aviation
- F - Engineer Combat Support
- G - Signal
- H - Chemical, Biological and Radiological Operations
- I - Information
- J - Civic Action

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ANNEX A

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65J ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AMERICAL DIVISION
CHU LAI, RVN
15 April 1968

ANNEX A (Operations) to Americal Division Field SOP

1. REFERENCES.

- a. MACV Directive 525-3
- b. MACV Directive 525-4
- c. MACV Directive 525-6
- d. DA TC 101-2
- e. FM 101-5
- f. FM 33-5
- g. MACV Directive 10-1
- h. MACV Combined Campaign Plan AB 142

2. COMBAT ORDERS. a. When practical, written orders are published. Maximum use is made of overlays, tables, and charts. During the conduct of operations, verbal fragmentary orders are followed by written orders.

b. Subordinate units submit to this headquarters 5 copies of operations orders/plans for brigade operations a minimum of 24 hours prior to starting the operations. Operations of smaller than brigade size are included in the plans summary of the SITREP.

3. LIAISON. a. Americal Division provides liaison officers to the next higher headquarters. Liaison is provided to divisions and allied forces as required. Liaison will be established with appropriate ARVN units when operations are conducted in their areas.

b. Brigades and separate maneuver battalions, not under the control of a major subordinate headquarters, maintain liaison with Americal Division Headquarters.

c. Liaison officers to this headquarters are under the supervision of the Chief of Staff and attend daily staff briefings.

d. Liaison between subordinate units is from supporting to supported, from subordinate units to their controlling headquarters and laterally between units from left to right.

4. COORDINATION. a. When forces of adjacent brigades are operating in close proximity, maximum coordination is accomplished between brigades to insure that converging or adjacent forces have clearly defined areas of responsibility. Boundaries between units constitute FCLs. Additional FCLs are established as needed.

ANNEX A (Operations) to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

b. When operating with US Marines, there is a requirement that advance warning of all Artillery fires be given to the Americal Division Fire Support Element of the DTOC, which in turn passes the information to the USMC Direct Air Support Center (DASC). This information is then applied to the USMC Artillery Warning System called "Sav-a-Plane". A "Sav-a-Plane" number is assigned to the mission and returned to the unit. The unit will not fire unless it has received a "Sav-a-Plane" number except in an emergency, such as a fresh enemy contact. In such cases, safety to aircraft will be insured by posting an air sentinel at the place and by alertness of the forward observer or air observer to airplanes which could cross the trajectory. Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination), Tab B (Safeguarding Aircraft from Artillery Fires).

c. Deception plans are coordinated with the next higher headquarters.

d. Coordination with RVNAF and other FWMAF:

(1) Operations outside of TAOR:

(a) Initial coordination required for all Americal Division operations is accomplished by this headquarters.

(b) Subordinate units accomplish detailed and continuing coordination with appropriate Regimental, Battalion and Sector/Sub-Sector Advisors in assigned AO.

(2) Operations in TAOR: Commanders will insure that direct and continuous coordination is maintained with applicable Sector/Sub-Sectors.

(3) Road Security: Route clearance and security for separate brigade operations and resupply convoys will be coordinated with the Division G3, appropriate senior Advisors and commanders of FWMAF concerned.

(4) Request for TAOR or AO:

(a) Request for change to permanent TAOR is forwarded to this headquarters in five copies with justification for change.

(b) Request for brigade AC is submitted in five copies to this headquarters a minimum of five days prior to the start of the operation.

e. DOUBLE CHECK PROCEDURES FOR ARTILLERY UNITS. The counterinsurgency environment in Vietnam represents a continuing challenge to artillery units to render accurate, responsive, reliable fires without injury to friendly troops or non-combatants. The applicable provisions of Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination) and the Americal Division Artillery Field SOP as artillery techniques, gunnery procedures and tactical operations will be

ANNEX A (Operations) to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

adhered to by all artillery units under the control of Americal Division to include direct support artillery battalion organic to brigades.

5. PROCEDURES.

- a. Appendix 1 (Command Post)
- b. Appendix 2 (Americal Division Operations Center)
- c. Appendix 3 (Close Air Support)
- d. Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination)
- e. Appendix 5 (Airmobile Operation)
- f. Appendix 6 (Airlift Operations)
- g. Appendix 7 (Base Area Security)
- h. Appendix 8 (National Police Field Forces)
- i. Appendix 9 (Reports)

6. TRAINING. Units not participating in operations and those conducting base area security missions conduct unit training programs. Emphasis is on squad, section and platoon tactics in accordance with applicable training directives and lessons learned.

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APPENDICES:

- 1 - Command Post
- 2 - Division Tactical Operations Center (DTOC)
- 3 - Close Air Support (CAS)
- 4 - Fire Support Coordination (FSC)
- 5 - Airmobile Operations
- 6 - Airlift Operations
- 7 - Base Area Security
- 8 - Psychological Operations
- 9 - Reports

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Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex A (Operations) to Americal Division Field SOP

1. DIVISION FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT (FSE). a. Composition: The Division Fire Support Element (FSE) is composed of the fire support coordinator, duty team chief, operations and intelligence representatives from HQ Div Artillery, and liaison officers from fire support agencies as required.

b. Location: Component of Division Tactical Operations Center located adjacent to the operations element.

c. The FSE contains those elements necessary to control and coordinate the fires of the Division Artillery.

2. TARGET NUMBERING SYSTEM. (TAB C)

3. SAFETY. a. Air Safety:

(1) Restrictions on artillery and/or mortar fire are not required during air strikes unless risk to friendly aircraft is sufficiently great to justify the loss of such fires. When restrictions are necessary they are planned and coordinated by the fire support coordinator and instructions are issued through fire support channels. It is necessary to effect coordination between the forward air controller (FAC) and the appropriate forward observer/fire support coordinator to insure aircraft safety.

(2) Artillery:

(a) Brigade Fire Support Coordination Centers (FSCC) report artillery advisory warning data as prescribed at TAB B (Safeguarding Aircraft from Artillery Fires) to FSE for all artillery fires originating in a brigade area of operations (AOR).

(b) Anytime a brigade operates in an area of operations not contiguous to the Division tactical area of operations (TAOR), brigade FSCCs will establish Artillery Warning Control Sub Centers (AWCSC). Further instructions will be included in operation orders establishing the separate AOR.

(c) When operating an independant AWCSC in a USMC Tactical Zone, the USMC Direct Air Support Center (DASC) will be notified of operating frequency and call sign of AWCSC. AWCSC receives data from local artillery units in format shown at TAB B (Safeguarding Aircraft from Artillery Fires) and provides artillery data to all aircraft on individual request.

(3) Corridors are normally assigned only for heliborne assaults and on fixed wing approaches. Aircraft contact appropriate air warning control center for artillery advisory when outside established corridors.

Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex A (Operations) to
Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

(4) Artillery and mortar units will post air sentries during all fire missions and suspend firing when aircraft which will cross line of fire are sighted. Air sentries must be alert for aircraft approaching from any direction. If more than one fire mission is being conducted by the battery, an air sentry will be provided for each mission in progress. In addition, each forward observer or air observer will follow the same precaution with regard to the forward end of the trajectory during adjustment of fire.

(5) VT (proximity) fuze is not used during periods when friendly air might be endangered.

(6) Antiaircraft suppression fires are coordinated by FSE with Division Tactical Air Support Element (TASE) and/or Army Aviation Element (AAE). Implementation will be accomplished by FSE.

b. Ground Safety:

(1) No fire line/fire coordination line (NFL/FCL).

(a) Location established by direct support artillery battalion commanders in coordination with commanders of supported units. Normally TAOR and AO boundaries are NFL's unless otherwise designated.

(b) All fires to include artillery, naval gunfire and airstrikes delivered or having possible effect across a NFL/FCL will be cleared with the responsible direct support artillery unit. Possible effect will be considered to be fires delivered within 500 meters of a boundary.

(2) No Fire Areas: No fire areas are established around isolated units, outposts, friendly villages and other installations/units where positive safety measures are required.

(3) Clearance of Fires:

(a) Artillery, naval gunfire, and air missions are conducted in accordance with the following rules:

1. Harassing, interdiction and preparatory missions lying outside of free fire areas are executed only after receipt of Government of Vietnam (GVN)/Army of Vietnam (ARVN) clearance as appropriate.

2. Target of opportunity missions, clearly identified as hostile (with the mission under the control of a forward/aerial observer or FAC) require no clearance. Targets not clearly identified as hostile are cleared by GVN/ARVN agencies as appropriate prior to firing.

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Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex A (Operations) to
Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

2. Missions against known or suspected enemy targets in hamlets and villages occupied by noncombatants are conducted as follows:

a. May be fired when defensive fires are requested by an appropriate GVN or ARVN authority.

b. All missions on hamlets or villages are controlled by a forward/aerial observer or Forward Air Controller (FAC).

c. Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations are not attacked by gunfire without prior warning (leaflets and/or speaker systems or other appropriate means) even though light fire is being received from them.

d. Hamlets and villages may be attacked without warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, and if, in the judgement of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.

e. None of the above controls abridge the right of self defense. Artillery may fire without clearance at the request of any unit in contact when the senior commander present directs.

(b) The senior direct support artillery commander present in a TAOR or AO is the fire support coordinator. His responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

1. Establishing NFL/FCL.

2. Coordinating all fire and air support missions conducted within the TAOR/AO.

3. Providing an artillery Liaison Officer (LNO) to the senior ARVN commander, province, or district chief as appropriate. The duties of LNO will include, but are not limited to the following:

a. Obtaining clearance to fire.

b. Keeping US Forces informed as to activities and disposition of Regional Forces, Popular Forces and ARVN Forces.

c. Keeping ARVN commanders informed as to disposition and activities of US Forces.

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Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex A (Operations) to
Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

(c) Free Fire Areas may be established by GVN and ARVN authorities. When so established, accurate location and other pertinent information is forwarded to Division Artillery FSE for dissemination to all interested agencies. When a free fire area has been established no other clearance to fire is necessary.

(d) All fires from outside TAOR/AO which enter or have possible effect as described in (b) above, on the TAOR/AO are cleared with the appropriate fire support coordinator.

4. TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT (USAF). a. TASE is responsible for informing requesting unit of final action taken on reconnaissance or close air support requests.

b. FACs are briefed at Division TASE or by supported unit. Allocation is made by TASE.

5. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT (NGFS). a. Naval gunfire is fired by direct support ships of the echelon concerned. If additional naval gunfire support is required, it is requested from next higher FSE through naval gunfire channels or through normal artillery fire support channels.

b. Requests for NGFS will include:

(1) Type operation (troop support, H&I, etc.).

(2) Location of AO or target(s) (by grid coordinates).

(3) Nature of target(s) (if enemy force, include size).

(4) Type of ammunition and fuze.

(5) Commencement and duration of operation, or the time that fire is desired.

(6) Radio frequencies and call signs of supported element to be contacted by US Navy spotting team or ship(s).

c. Shore Fire Control Parties normally control and adjust naval gunfire. Adjustment of naval gunfire by Army observers is done only in emergencies.

d. Combat service support of naval parties is by units to which attached.

e. If Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) is attached, ANGLICO channels through FSE are employed for naval gunfire.

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Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex A (Operations) to
Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

f. Division Artillery is responsible for necessary survey to locate any naval gunfire radar beacons.

6. BATTLEFIELD ILLUMINATION. a. No restriction on illumination by organic weapons of maneuver units except for prior coordination with adjacent units.

b. Illumination by artillery on authority of direct support artillery.

7. MINIMIZING NONCOMBATANT CASUALTIES. It is obvious that misdirected or unwarranted artillery fires into areas occupied by noncombatants adversely affect the Government of Vietnam effort to win the people. Artillerymen at every echelon will plan and conduct fire support in accordance with the following guidelines.

(1) Both the military and psychological objective of each operation will be considered. Prestrikes in populated areas, reconnaissance by fire into hamlets, and poorly selected harassing and interdiction fires are examples of military measures which will be counterproductive.

(2) A thorough and continuing program to emphasize both short and long range importance of minimizing noncombatant casualties will be conducted within each artillery unit. Troop indoctrination briefings will be held before each operation to include: location of noncombatants and other friendly forces, measures to prevent mutual interference, safety precautions for fire support, rules of engagement, identification of recognition signals, emergency procedures, and other appropriate matters.

(3) The proper employment of artillery will contribute to the prevention of unnecessary damage to lives and property of noncombatants. Fire support of operations should be planned in coordination with province and district chiefs with due regard to security of plans. A US Artillery Liaison Officer should be utilized for this purpose. US Advisors can be asked to perform this function in the absence of other liaison personnel.

8. DEFENSIVE TARGETS/CONCENTRATIONS. Defensive targets/concentrations will be fired in routinely prior to darkness. It is recognized that there will be situations when this procedure is not appropriate. However, this should be a judgement of the commander familiar with the existing situation. In the absence of factors to the contrary, defensive targets/concentrations will be fired in prior to darkness.

9. COUNTERMORTAR AND COUNTERROCKET PROGRAM. a. Confidential letter, Headquarters, Task Force GREGON, subject: Countermortar and Counterrocket Measures (U), dated 4 August 1967.

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Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex A (Operations) to
Americal Division Field SOI (Continued)

b. OPLAN Americal 18-67 (Defense Against Rocket or Mortar Attack)
(U) dated 7 November 1967.

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TABS:

- A - Landing Zone Preparation
- B - Safeguarding Aircraft from Artillery Fires
- C - Target Numbering System

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TAB A (Landing Zone Preparation) to Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex A (Operations) to Americal Division Field SOP

1. CONCEPT. The decision to prepare a landing zone (LZ) is made by the commander based on his evaluation of the enemy situation. A preparation may be conducted on the assault LZ by artillery, air, naval gunfire and/or helicopter gunships or any combination thereof. The preparation is violent, continuous and terminated only on order of the commander. Segments of large LZs are selected for concentrated preparation. Periphery fires to preclude enemy reinforcements are maintained throughout the assault.

2. ARTILLERY. a. When security operations prevent registration on the LZ, the artillery preparation is observed and sufficient time allowed for fires to be adjusted for maximum effectiveness.

b. Upon completion of the preparation, artillery fires are shifted to likely areas of entrance and exit to the assault area.

3. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. a. Close air support fires will be carefully planned to insure that tree lines are adequately covered.

b. Caution is exercised in selecting incendiary ordnance when seasonal dryness might cause fires which could restrict maneuver of the assaulting force.

c. The maximum amount of ordnance is placed on the LZ in the shortest time possible.

d. CAP is on station to attack targets of opportunity that develop during the assault phase.

e. The attack is continuous throughout the assault, shifting to likely routes of reinforcement or withdrawal when the assault landing commences.

4. ARMED HELICOPTERS. a. Armed helicopters are used for suppressive fires prior to and during the landing phase of the assault. Fires are placed on approach and departure lanes and in the tree line under the canopy bordering the LZ.

b. Door gunners of troop carrying helicopters fire suppressive fires on initial lift only or as directed by the ground commander.

5. COORDINATION. a. Communication is maintained between the commander of assaulting elements, the fire support coordinator, ALO/FAC, and the troop lift commander.

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TAB A (Landing Zone Preparation) to Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination)
to Annex A (Operations) to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

b. Concurrent artillery fires and close air support require close coordination of the gun target line and attack direction of aircraft. Area of responsibility of air/artillery in concurrent preparations must be clearly defined by the commander.

c. Preparation of LZs are planned with sufficient flexibility to support the assaulting force most efficiently. Consideration is given to delays in arrival of troop lift aircraft at the LZ, and the necessity for modification of the preparation because of the delay.

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Appendix 8 (National Police Field Forces) to Annex A (Operations) to
Americal Division Field SOP

1. GENERAL a. Purpose. The purpose of this SOP is to set forth the operational concepts for use of National Police Field Forces (NPF) assigned or attached to the Americal Division for counterinsurgency operations.

b. General. A principal mission of the Americal Division is the elimination of the VC infrastructure. Experience has shown that in order to accomplish this mission in populated areas where the VC is in strength, the Division succeeds initially by waging counter-guerilla combat operations. As the VC is reduced in numbers and effectiveness, he "goes underground", from where he wages a war of terrorism and other covert tactics. At this stage of final elimination of the VC is effected by conducting population and resources control operations. NPF are of significant value in assisting the Division in carrying out these operations.

c. NPF. National Police Field Forces are specially trained to execute population and resources control measures in GVN controlled and contested areas. Their greatest asset when employed with the Division is the Division's greatest liability - communication with the Vietnamese people. By eliminating the lingual and cultural barrier, the NPF can more efficiently obtain intelligence through screening the people and searching their dwellings and vehicles.

2. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF NPF. a. The basic NPF unit is the company. It consists of two patrol platoons of six (6) man teams each and a company headquarters. It's authorized strength is six officers and 89 enlisted men. It is oriented to the area in which it operates by receiving attachment of Special Police and Military Security Service personnel from local districts.

b. The NPF are basically National Policemen who have received additional training in infantry techniques and tactics. They normally serve as a para-military force to augment the activities of the National Police throughout GVN controlled areas. Within the protective security of military forces they will operate in contested and VC controlled areas. They are not, however, infantry men and will not be used as such. They have neither the required training nor adequate equipment to engage in combat operations with the VC or NVA.

3. COMMAND AND CONTROL. a. As appropriate, Police Operations Centers will be established at division and/or brigade level to monitor and coordinate the activities of the NPF. The Division Police Operations Center (DPOC) is headed by the Provost Marshal and is staffed by NPF supervisors, province Special Police and Military Security Service representatives, military intelligence and G5 representatives. The Brigade Police Operations Centers (BPOC's) are headed by the Provost Marshals at each brigade. BPOC's are staffed by the NPF company commander or platoon leaders, district national

Appendix 8 (National Police Field Forces) to Annex A (Operations) to
Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

police, S2 and special police representatives, and Brigade MI and S5 representatives. Close and continuous coordination is necessarily maintained with GVN officials at province and district level and with TOC's at each level. POC's provide an operations and intelligence center for NPPF operations at each level. A major task of the POC's is the compilation of blacklists used to identify VC during search and screening operations.

b. For specific operations NPPF elements are attached to maneuver battalions, usually for use in conjunction with a rifle company.

c. The NPPF company is commanded by a Vietnamese National Policeman equivalent in rank to a captain. A US civilian police advisor is provided by OCO. The Provost Marshal of the brigade to which the NPPF company (platoon) is attached doubles as the military advisor and point of coordination between the brigade and the NPPF company.

d. Americal MFs should habitually accompany NPPF elements during their operations.

4. EMPLOYMENT OF NPPF. a. When attached, the division has operational control of the NPPF and responsibility for supporting the NPPF with Class I supplies and Class V items that are common to US and NPPF needs. Hospitalization, evacuation and transportation is provided by the Division. All other classes of supply and discipline, law and order and personal administration are the responsibility of the attached NPPF unit.

b. NPPF will normally be employed in either one of two tactical missions - attachment to a brigade or other major command or general support of the Division where the element is attached to the Americal MF Co.

5. USE OF NPPF IN EXECUTING POPULATION AND RESOURCES CONTROL MEASURES.

a. Cordon and Search. This type measure is carried out in GVN controlled, contested and VC controlled areas. Usually a US rifle company will establish the cordon around a target hamlet prior to dawn. At dawn, a NPPF platoon (or company, depending on the situation) is airlifted to a secure LZ or LZs on the cordon and from there commences detailed searching of the hamlet for VC suspects, weapons, radios, ammunition and supply caches, and screens the population on the scene. These operations are normally scheduled for one day's operations. When the situation requires, a battalion can cordon a group of hamlets while up to two NPPF companies search. On the spot interrogation of the population and of VC suspects helps to develop the enemy situation as the operation continues. Civil Affairs teams conduct sick calls and issue commodities to reduce the negative aspects of the inconvenience to the population of the target hamlet, particularly if it is in a GVN controlled or contested area. Meanwhile, psyops and armed propaganda teams can conduct political psyops efforts toward the captive audiences

Appendix 8 (National Police Field Forces) to Annex A (Operations) to
Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

within the cordon. The use of force in interrogation must be more discrete in GVN controlled areas in order not to alienate the population against the GVN.

b. Checkpoints.

(1) Fixed checkpoints are established by NPFF on lines of land and water communications in GVN controlled areas to check the flow of contraband and unregistered civilians. Normally, a NPFF team mans a checkpoint 24 hours a day. On routes where US traffic is regular, US MP's are represented at each checkpoint. NPFF should search a large percentage of the vehicles and persons that pass through the checkpoint to confiscate contraband and check for permits issued by local districts.

(2) Mobile or spot checkpoints can be established by mobile patrols on alternate routes of communication and at varying locations and times throughout the GVN controlled area. Helicopters are used for flexibility and surprise by intercepting suspect vehicles and infiltrators.

c. Raids and ambushes. NPFF are used in varying sized forces to conduct police raids and ambushes of targets developed through intelligence. US Forces are used for security in VC controlled and contested areas, while NPFF provide their own security when conducting raids and ambushes in GVN controlled areas.

d. Patrols. Patrol operations are conducted in reasonably secure areas to gain intelligence, intercept infiltrators and make a show of GVN presence. The patrol moves from hamlet to hamlet over a zig-zag random route to reduce the possibility of ambush. Hamlets are thoroughly searched and all inhabitants questioned. Each evening, the platoon will establish an ambush after dark, away from the immediate proximity of hamlets, to intercept infiltrators. Curfews imposed by local district authorities are enforced by NPFF as they conduct each type measure discussed above.

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Appendix 9 (Reports) to Annex A (Operations) to Americal Division Field SOP

<u>TITLE OF REPORT</u>	<u>FORMAT</u>	<u>SUBMITTED BY</u>	<u>METHOD OF TRANSMISSION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Spot Reports	NA	All Units	Fastest means to G3	Submit without delay after incident occurs or becomes known.
2. Ground Commanders Daily Situation Report	Tab A	Major subordinate comds and sep bns under Div control	RTT or LNO	Submit for each 24 hour period ending 2000H by fastest means, normally teletype, to reach G3 NLT <u>2400H</u> .
3. Operation Report Lessons Learned (ORLL)	USARV Reg 1-19 and Div Reg 1-19	Historical Sec	Letter	G3 will make distribution to other agencies outside the Division.
4. Combat After Action Report	MACV Reg 335-8	Comdr of Ground Forces		Fastest means to DS Arty Bn S2 and Div Arty S2. Can be sent through S2/G2 channels
4. SHELREP BOMREP MORTREP	FM 30-5 App II, Pg 74	All Units		Due USARV NLT 12 hrs after "as of" time.
6. REDOPS	USARV Reg 335-19	Daily as Applicable	Priority Msg	

TAB: A - Daily SITREP

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TAB A (Daily SITREP) to Appendix 9 (Reports) to Annex A (Operations) to
Americal Division Field SOP

Issuing HQ
Place if issue
Date-time group

SITREP NO. _____

Period Covered: (Date - 2000H to date - 2000H).

Reference: Maps (Country, Scale, and sheet numbers of maps)

1. ENEMY: a. Units in contact.
 - b. Enemy reserves which can affect the accomplishment of unit mission.
 - c. Brief estimate of enemy strength, material means, morale, and his probable knowledge of our situation.
2. OWN SITUATION: a. Location of forward elements by reporting two six digit coordinates (each flank).
 - b. Location of artillery battalion by six digit coordinates, indicating battalion headquarters location.
 - c. Location of brigade and Division reserve units. Reserve reported by six digit coordinates indicating center mass.
 - d. Location of brigades and battalion CP by six digit coordinates.
 - e. Location of brigade and battalion limiting points, GOPL, and FEBA by six digit coordinates.
 - f. Brief description and results of operation during period.
 - g. Statement of the combat efficiency of the command, to include any pertinent changes during the period. Consider morale, strength, status of training, status of supplies, and equipment.
 - h. Summary of actions planned for next 24 hours.
3. ADMINISTRATION: General statement of the administrative situation, if other than normal, as it directly affects the tactical situation.

TAB A (Daily SITREF) to Appendix 9 (Reports) to Annex A (Operations) to
Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

4. GENERAL: Any significant items not previously discussed.

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ANNEX B

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Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division Field SOP

1. REFERENCES:

- a. FM 30-5
- b. FM 31-22
- c. FM 101-5
- d. MACV Dir 381-21 (C)
- e. USARV Reg 190-2
- f. USARV Reg 643-20
- g. USARV Reg 117-5

2. GENERAL. a. Combat intelligence is evaluated information of the enemy, to include conclusions as to his capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions; geographic features of the terrain; and the weather. Reliable and timely combat intelligence is essential to commanders at all echelons in order that they may estimate the probable effects of these factors on their available courses of action. Without this type of intelligence, a commander is unable to determine the best method of employment of his available forces to accomplish his mission and maintain the security of his unit.

b. Collection capabilities available to a command are seldom sufficient to satisfy all intelligence requirements. Therefore, it is imperative that all possible sources of information be exploited to the maximum extent and further that all such information be immediately reported to all levels of intelligence activity within the Americal Division in order that it may be collated, evaluated, and disseminated.

3. MISSION. To obtain timely and usable information of the enemy, weather, and terrain to satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements and to deny the enemy access to similar information of our forces.

4. CONCEPTS. a. General

(1) ACoFS, G2 coordinates and provides staff supervision over all intelligence activities organic to the Americal Division.

(2) Brigade and separate unit commanders retain operational control over intelligence activities of their respective command.

(3) Intelligence activities of subordinate commands are responsive to Division requirements for collection, dissemination, and forwarding of all information received concerning composition, disposition, strength, tactics, training, logistics, combat efficiency and other miscellaneous data on the enemy.

(4) Maximum interchange of intelligence information at all echelons is required.

Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division Field SCP (Continued)

b. Responsibilities:

(1) AcofS, G2 will establish intelligence reporting requirements for all Division elements consistent with requirements levied by higher headquarters.

(2) Brigade and separate unit commanders will report significant intelligence by most expeditious means available to DTOC G2 representative as provided in Appendix 11.

5. CAPTURED MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT. Appendix 1. Handling and processing of all material and equipment.

6. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. Appendix 2. Handling and processing of all captured documents, written, printed, drawn, engraved, sound or voice recording, photographs exposed films or reproduction of same.

7. DETAINEES. Appendix 3. Level and detail of interrogation for proper fulfillment of intelligence requirements and classification of detainees.

8. AIR RECONNAISSANCE. Appendix 4. Procedures for requesting aerial surveillance and reconnaissance; and the planning and coordination incident to the collection processing and dissemination of information obtained by aerial means.

9. LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS (LRRP). Appendix 5. Provides reliable and timely intelligence on the enemy, weather, and terrain. Assets organic to separate brigades remain as such and are responsive to requirements levied by G2.

10. MAP DISTRIBUTION AND STORAGE. Appendix 6. Policies and procedures for the procurement, storage, and distribution of maps within the Americal Division.

11. WEATHER AND TERRAIN. Appendix 7. Policies and procedures for obtaining, reporting, and disseminating weather and terrain information.

12. COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE/SECURITY. Appendix 8. Provide rapid communication in support of the Americal Division and conduct research into natural electromagnetic phenomena.

13. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Appendix 9. Responsibilities, policies, and procedures as apply to counterintelligence operations in the Americal Division.

14. ENEMY BODY COUNT. Appendix 10. Policy and procedures within the Americal Division.

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Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

15. OTHER INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY REPORTS. Appendix 11. Policy, procedures, formats of reports by Hqs, Americal Division.

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- Appendices:
- 1 - Captured Materiel and Equipment
 - 2 - Captured Documents
 - 3 - Detsinees
 - 4 - Air Reconnaissance
 - 5 - LRRP
 - 6 - Map Distribution and Storage
 - 7 - Weather and Terrain
 - 8 - Communication/Electronic Intelligence and Security
 - 9 - Counterintelligence
 - 10 - Enemy Body Count
 - 11 - Other Intelligence and Security Reports

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Appendix 3 (Detainees) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division
Field SOP

1. REFERENCES:

- a. FM 19-40
- b. MACV Dir 20-5
- c. MACV Dir 190-3
- d. MACV Dir 381-11
- e. USARV Reg 190-2

2. STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES. a. ACoS, G1 coordinates and supervises handling of detainees.

b. PM develops plans, policies, and procedures for the handling of detainees and operates PW collecting points.

c. ACoS, G2 coordinates and supervises interrogation and classification of detainees.

d. ACoS, G4 coordinates and supervises logistical and transportation services for detainees.

3. DEFINITIONS. See reference c.

4. TREATMENT OF DETAINEES. a. All persons detained by Americal Division units will be afforded treatment consistent with that of a prisoner of war unless or until it has been determined that the detainee is not a prisoner of war.

b. All detainees will be treated humanely in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Violation of the humane provisions of the convention is an offense of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

c. Sick or wounded detainees will be provided medical treatment and care as required. Detainees under medical care may be interrogated for intelligence information when permission is granted by competent medical authority.

d. Once a detainee is tentatively determined to be a returnee, he will be accorded favored treatment.

e. Since a large percentage of detainees are eventually classified as innocent civilians and returned to their villages, proper treatment while in US custody will enhance the GVN/US civic action and psychological operations programs.

Appendix 3 (Detainees) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division
Field SOP (Continued)

5. SCREENING. a. Initial screening should be done at the point of capture whenever possible to preclude the unnecessary and undesirable evacuation of large numbers of innocent civilians. Mere presence in an area does not necessarily qualify a person as a detainee. In particular, old men, women and children should not normally be detained unless there is reason to believe that they are, or have assisted, Viet Cong, or that they have information of intelligence value.

b. Maximum use should be made of MID interrogators and interpreters to conduct initial screening at the point of capture. National Police, Military Security Service, ARVN MI Detachments and other GVN officials and agencies may also be of assistance, both in initial screening and in classification.

6. INTERROGATION OF DETAINEES. a. Interrogations at all levels will be limited to the information required to meet the needs of that command.

b. Capturing units will normally not interrogate detainees unless interrogator personnel are present. Capturing units may interrogate detainees for information of immediate tactical value if necessitated by the tactical situation.

c. Interrogation at brigade collecting points will be limited to that necessary to obtain information of immediate tactical value and to attempt to classify the detainee.

d. Interrogation at the Division collecting point will be limited to that necessary to obtain information of tactical value to the Division and to classify those detainees not classified by the brigades.

e. Returnees in the custody of GVN will be made available for interrogation by US Forces upon request. Liaison should be maintained with Chieu Hoi Centers and other GVN agencies likely to receive returnees to insure that knowledgeable returnees are interrogated.

7. HANDLING AND EVACUATION. a. Capturing units will tag detainees using USARV Form 365 (Detainee Card) as soon as they have been disarmed, secured, and segregated. The Detainee Card will remain with the detainee until final disposition is accomplished. Capture data must be as complete as possible to assist in interrogation and classification.

b. Upon completion of interrogation, MID interrogators will complete Part I and applicable portions of Part II of USARV Form 364 (Detainee Report Card). This form will be prepared in triplicate for PWs and in duplicate for all other detainees. Item 1, Part II must be signed by an officer. If there is no officer in the Brigade MID,

Appendix 3 (Detainees) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division
Field SCP (Continued)

no entries will be made in Part II before forwarding to the Division collecting point. Upon completion of interrogation and classification all copies will be given to the CIC of the PW collecting point.

c. Disposition of detainees from brigade collecting points will be made by Military Police as follows:

(1) Innocent civilians will be returned to the point of capture and released or released to GVN officials in the district where they were captured.

(2) Prisoners of war will be evacuated to the Division collecting point for further interrogation and evacuation to the III MAF collecting point.

(3) Civil defendants will be released to GVN officials for trial. Brigades without an SJA available will forward USARV Form 364, one copy of the interrogation report and any other related papers to the Division SJA for action. Upon concurrence of the SJA, the detainee will be released to GVN officials by the Brigade. If the SJA does not concur, the detainee will be reclassified and handled in accordance with his new classification.

(4) Returnees will be released to the nearest Chieu Hoi Center upon notification by ACofS, G2 that further interrogation by Brigade or Division MID personnel is not required. Preliminary interrogation reports submitted in accordance with paragraph 9c below will be expedited to allow a rapid determination of the need for further interrogation.

(5) Doubtful cases will be referred to Brigade or Division SJAs who will grant PW status or refer the case to a Military Tribunal in accordance with MACV Dir 20-5. Disposition will be in accordance with the classification assigned by the Tribunal.

(6) PWs and, if the Brigade does not have an SJA available, civil defendants and doubtful cases will be evacuated to the Division collecting point within 48 hours from their arrival at the Brigade collecting point. Units desiring to retain detainees in excess of 48 hours for exploitation will request authorization from ACofS, G2 Americal Division. Request will contain full identifying data, a summary of information obtained and plans for and expected results of exploitation.

d. Detainees may voluntarily accompany units on operations for the purpose of leading them to enemy units, installations, caches, etc. or to identify enemy personnel. However, all possible measures will

Appendix 3 (Detainees) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division
Field SOP (Continued)

be taken to prevent their escape since escaped detainees are a valuable source of intelligence to the enemy. As a minimum, protective measures will include keeping the detainee under the personal supervision of an armed guard. The guard will be assigned no duties other than guarding the detainee and will be instructed to use all necessary force to prevent the detainees' escape.

e. Normally, detainees requiring medical care will be treated by the first medical facility in the medical evacuation system. The Provost Marshal will designate units to provide the required guards during the periods of medical treatment and/or hospitalization. If USARV Form 365 has not been completed, MP guard personnel will complete this form as soon as practical. Subsequent evacuation will be made as follows:

(1) PWs requiring additional and/or definitive medical care will be evacuated through normal medical channels.

(2) All other ambulatory detainees will be released to GVN officials for disposition following final status determination.

(3) Final status determination will be made on all detainees prior to release to GVN officials to preclude release of PWs.

8. CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION. a. Detainees will be classified in accordance with the definitions in para 3 above. However, it must be realized that classification may be difficult to apply in certain cases. A degree of judgement by the interrogating officer will be required. This judgement should be based on an appreciation of all the facts gained from the interrogation and other sources. In questionable cases, consideration should be given to:

(1) Whether the individual performed willingly or under duress.

(2) Whether the individual performed continually or in isolated instances.

(3) Whether the individual made any attempt to avoid assisting the Viet Cong.

(4) Whether the individual was cooperative and truthful or evasive in answering questions.

(5) The age of the individual at the time of the act(s).

(6) Any other facts which tend to indicate the individual's degree of involvement in Viet Cong activities.

Appendix 3 (Detainees) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division
Field SCP (Continued)

b. A major factor for determination of status is the act being performed by the detainees at the time of capture. Capture data on Detainee Cards must be completed in sufficient detail to allow interrogators to make an intelligent determination as to the status of the detainee. Interrogation reports should contain the detainee's version of the circumstances of capture.

c. Maximum use should be made of blacklists and GVN agencies such as National Police and the Military Security Service to assist in verifying the information obtained from the detainee.

d. Classification should be made by Brigade interrogating officers prior to forwarding to the Division collecting point. This can normally be done within the time limits established by para 7c(6) above. If classification cannot be made within these time limits, the detainee should be sent to the Division collecting point for more detailed interrogation. When detainees are forwarded in this manner, the classification and signature blocks on USARV Form 364 (Detainee Report Form) should be left blank and a detailed interrogation report forwarded with the detainee.

9. REPORTS. a. The number of detainees taken in an action will be reported as part of the spot report of that action.

b. Returnees and very important human sources will be spot reported to the DTCC using the format in Tab A.

c. Brigades will prepare preliminary interrogation reports (PIR) on all NVA and VC Fws, military returnees, returnees identified as political cadre and all other detainees possessing information of intelligence or counterintelligence interest. PIRs will be prepared on MACV Form 370-1EV. (If forms are not available, PIRs will be prepared in the same format and contain the same information as MACV Form 370-1EV).

(1) FIRs will be numbered according to the standard MACV interrogation report numbering system. Report numbers will consist of the originator's numerical unit designation, the number of the report assigned serially by calendar year, and the last two digits of the calendar year, followed by the name of the operation during which they were captured, if applicable. For example, report number 181-401-67 (Malheur) would represent the 401st PIR prepared by the 181st Military Intelligence Detachment during 1967 and indicate that the detainee was obtained during Operation Malheur.

(2) FIRs will be forwarded to this headquarters ATTN: ACofS, G2 in three copies by the fastest means available. One copy will accompany the detainee when evacuated to this headquarters.

Appendix 3 (Detainees) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division
Field SOP (Continued)

d. Significant information obtained from detainees will be spot reported to DTCC G2 representative and included in the next INTSUM. These reports will contain as a minimum, the following identifying data:

- (1) Name/alias
- (2) Rank/position (NVA or VC)
- (3) Unit (NVA or VC) to include complete subordination of unit.
- (4) Date/place of capture/return.
- (5) Capturing unit.
- (6) Disposition of source

e. Results of exploitation of information furnished by detainees and/or the use of detainees to lead US Forces to enemy installations, units, caches, etc., will be spot reported to the DTCC G2 representative and included in the next INTSUM.

f. Detainees will not be included in unit totals unless they are actually evacuated to the Brigade or Division collecting point. Returnees will not be included in unit totals unless they actually turn themselves in to the US military unit. Units will not take credit for returnees who turn themselves in to GVN officials or agencies. Returnees will be reported to local Chieu Hoi officials as soon as they come in to US custody.

10. REQUESTS FOR AUGMENTATION. a. Request for permanent Interrogator/Interpreter augmentation will be submitted through S1, G1 channels in accordance with current directives. Information copies will be forwarded to ACofS, G2.

b. Requests for temporary augmentation will be forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: ACofS, G2. Request will give as much advance notice as possible and contain, as a minimum, the following information:

- (1) Number and type of personnel requested.
- (2) Date required.
- (3) Estimated length of time required.

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Appendix 3 (Detainees) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division
Field SCF (Continued)


- (4) Number of interrogators and interpreters available within the brigade.
- (5) Planned method of employment.
- (6) Other resources available (Counterintelligence Personnel, ARVN MI Detachments, National Police, Military Security Service, etc.)
- (7) Complete justification for request to include:
 - (a) Number and type of detainees on hand.
 - (b) Number and type of detainees expected.
 - (c) Any additional facts which support the request.

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Tabs: A - Very Important Human Sources Spot Report

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Tab A (Very Important Human Sources Report) to Appendix 3 (Detainees)
to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division Field SCP

REPORT FORMAT

1. Name/Alias
2. Rank/Position (NVA or VC)
3. Unit/Organization (NVA or VC); complete subordination of his unit; i.e., company, battalion, regiment, division, or infiltration group.
4. Date of Capture/Return.
5. Place of Capture/Return.
6. Capturing Unit.
7. Present Location of Source.
8. Statement of substantive information obtained from source.
9. Major areas and depth of source knowledgeability.
10. Originator's comments (status of interrogation, planned disposition of source, recommended further evacuation and exploitation, etc.)

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Appendix 10 (Enemy Body Count) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal
Division Field SOP

1. REFERENCES. There are no known references.
2. PURPOSE. To accurately account for enemy casualties and to provide the basis for an estimate of enemy strengths, losses, capabilities and vulnerabilities.
3. RESPONSIBILITY. Each brigade is responsible for reporting all enemy killed within its AO or TAOR by organic, attached, and supporting units, and by units under their operational control.
4. DEFINITIONS. Enemy killed in action will be accounted for as either NVA or VC Killed in Action (KIA). The term KIA is reserved exclusively for enemy whose bodies have been confirmed. Confirmation will consist, as a minimum, of visual examination of the body from a distance of less than 50 feet. There is no longer a category of "PROBABLE" kills.
5. PROCEDURES. a. The official accounting document for enemy killed in action is the Americal INTSUM. The following accounting procedures will be used:

(1) Enemy killed will be credited to the brigade whose attached, assigned, or supporting units make the kills. Kills made by units under operational control will be credited to the brigade which has operational control. The parent brigade may report kills made by an organic unit under operational control of another unit but the report will be preceded by the statement: "FOR INFO ONLY, NOT CREDITED."

(2) Kills made by units under Division control (as opposed to Brigade control) will be credited to the Brigade in whose AO the kill is made, or to the AO nearest the kill.

(3) Enemy killed by Americal units. Artillery and/or air in support of non-divisional (US/FWMAF/RVNAF) operations or in reaction to a request for assistance from these forces and reported by these forces will not be credited to Americal units. Such kills may be reported by the brigades involved but will be preceded by the statement: "FOR INFO ONLY, NOT CREDITED." The above rule applies unless the supported forces fail to report and claim credit for the kills. In this event, the Americal brigade providing support and/or nearest the action (in case of artillery/air support) will claim credit and report the kills.

(4) Enemy killed by artillery or air will be credited to the Brigade responsible for the area or nearest the area where the bodies are located regardless of what artillery unit fires the mission or air support provided. When it is possible to identify enemy bodies as having been killed by artillery or air the report will reflect "KILLED BY ARTILLERY" or "KILLED BY AIR."

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Appendix 10 (Enemy Body Count) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal
Division Field SOP (Continued)

6. OTHER. Cases not covered in the procedures specified above will
be referred to the G2 TOC Duty Officer.

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Appendix 11 (Other Intelligence and Security Reports) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division Field SOP

1. REFERENCES.

- a. III MAF Force O 443820.2, dtd 1 Apr 67
- b. III MAF Force O 5213.2, dtd 12 Apr 67
- c. MACV Dir 335-22 (S)
- d. USARV Reg 380-5
- e. III MAF Msg, Unclas. DTG 050152Z July 1967
- f. III MAF Msg, (C), DTG 180706Z Feb68

2. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, SHORT TITLE (INTSUM). Cut off effective 1900H daily, and forwarded to reach this headquarters NLT 2300H. (See Tab A).

3. TELEPHONIC INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, SHORT TITLE (SPOT REPORT). Submitted to ACoS, G2 (TOC) on significant incidents as they occur. (See Tab B).

4. LONG RANGE RECCN SITREP REPORT. Submitted to reach this headquarters NLT 2400 daily. Negative reports are required. (See Tab C).

5. BASE AREA DENIAL. A consolidated report of MACV Assigned Base Areas to be submitted to III MAF COC G2, the first day of each month as of the last day of the preceding month. (See Tab D.) (Published separately)

6. LOC REPORT. Overlay (1:500,000) submitted on first day of each month as of the last day of the preceding month, current classification as red, amber, or green. For definitions of classification see Tab E.

7. KIT CARSON SCOUT REPORT. Report on program for employing returnees on tactical operations to be submitted by the 1st and 16th of each month to ACoS, G2. Reporting periods are 1st - 15th and 16th - last day of the month. (See Tab F).

8. DETAINEE REPORTS. Cover a 24-hour period as of 1700H will be submitted telephonically to the Division G2 (TOC) by 1800H. Negative reports required. (See Tab G).

9. CURRENT ENEMY HOLDING REPORTS. Included in paragraph 8 of unit intelligence summaries (INTSUMs) on a weekly basis, every Tuesday, (See Tab H).

10. CLEARANCE, ACCESS, AND APPOINTMENT ROSTER. Roster will be submitted on USARV Form 152R to this headquarters, ATTN: ACoS, G2 NLT the 10th of each month and correct as of the first of each month. These rosters will reflect commanders, executive officers, key staff officers, liaison officers, authorized couriers, and other individuals whose duties require frequent visits to this headquarters to discuss classified information. (See Tab I).

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Appendix 11 (Other Intelligence and Security Reports) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

- Tab A - INTSUM Format
- B - Spot Report Format
- C - Recon SITREP Format
- D - Base Area Denial Format (Published separately)
- E - Lines of Communication C/A
- F - Kit Carson Scout Report Format
- G - Detainee Report Format
- H - Current Unit Holdings Report Format
- I - Clearance, Access, and Appointment Roster

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Tab A (INTSUM Format) to Appendix 11 (Other Intelligence and Security Reports) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division Field SOP

- *1. Issuing Unit and INTSUM Number.
- *2. Local DTG for beginning and end of reporting period.
- *3. SUMMARY OF ENEMY ACTIVITY.

*a. Ground Activity.

*(1) Area of operation (includes the total number of incidents involving any contact with the enemy. Include also the total number of enemy initiated incidents, and the number of enemy initiated by type. In each sub-paragraph, e.g.)

(a) DTG, Unit, Coordinate, complete summary of each incident to include all equipment, weapons w/serial numbers, rice, salt, tobacco, tunnels, structures captured and whether it was evacuated or destroyed.

*(2) When more than one area of operation.

*b. Other

(1) Air activity

(a) Air Strikes: Preplanned _____ Msns (_____ Sorties); Immediate _____; Missions _____; (_____ Sorties); Sky Spots _____ Msns (_____ Sorties).

(b) Bomb Damage Assessment.

(c) Visual Reconnaissance: _____ Sorties: 100% Coverage: _____ Partial: _____.

(d) Significant Sightings.

(2) Anti-Air: Incidents of enemy ground fire against aircraft. Report time, A/C unit, type A/C, type mission, coordinates, altitude, type and intensity of fire, number of hits, number of casualties, status of A/C (continues to fly, forced to land, crashed, etc.).

(3) Administration: All corrections to past INTSUMS will be made with reference to the item being corrected. i.e., Ref INTSUM #36-68 para 3 a (1) (6) as reads 2 VC KIA is corrected to read: 1 VC KIA.

4. ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT LOSSES.

**a. KIA

(1) NVA (Total for Reporting Period)

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Tab A (INTSUM Format) to Appendix 11 (Other Intelligence and Security Reports) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

(2). VC (Total for Reporting Period)

b. Detainees (Total for Reporting Period)

c. NVA PW/VC PW/NVA Returnee/VC Returnee/Civil Defendant/Innocent Civilian (Detainees not classified during reporting period.) (Total for Reporting Period)

**d. Weapons, Individual/weapons, Crewserved. (Total for Reporting Period).

e. Equipment/Facilities; Captured/Destroyed.

(1) Weapons: DTG, Unit, Coordinates, Number and type of wpns with serial number

(2) Equipment: Captured: All equipment captured and evacuated:
Destroyed: All equipment destroyed during the reporting period.

(3) Facilities Destroyed: All facilities destroyed during the reporting period.

**These totals, both daily and cumulative, must agree with S3s daily SITREP.

*5. NEW OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS: Report description of obstacles emplaced during the reporting period, location, estimate of damage, whether or not road is passable.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES: Include information on enemy logistics, infiltration routes, lines of communication.

7. NEW IDENTIFICATIONS: Report all new unit identifications of platoon size or greater obtained from "hard" sources (PWs, Documents, Hoi Chanh) and reliable low level agents. Include all information of intelligence value including: unit identification, location, mission, strength, major weapons, personalities (cadre only), infiltration date (when applicable), equipment and uniforms (if other than normal TO&E; i.e., identifying insignias, flags, special commo equipment, etc.), Composition & Subordination and training and tactics (if other than normal military training and tactics). Add appropriate S2-OB comment evaluating above information.

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Tab A (INTSUM Format) to Appendix 11 (Other Intelligence and Security Reports) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

8. ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND LOCATIONS:

a. Enemy movements (Movement of an enemy unit outside of its normal AO) Report all enemy movements of platoon size and larger obtained from "hard" sources (PWs, Documents, Hoi Chanhs, SLAR, IR) and reliable low level agents. Include all information of intelligence value including: unit identification, location, mission, strength, major weapons, personalities (cadre only), infiltration data (when applicable), equipment and uniforms (if other than normal TC&E; i.e., identifying insignias, flags, special commo equipment, etc.), Composition and subordination and training and tactics (if other than normal military training and tactics). Add appropriate S2-OB comment evaluating above information.

b. Enemy Locations (Further confirmation of an enemy unit at a specific location within its normal AO or the relocating of an enemy unit within its normal AO). Report all enemy locations of platoon size and larger obtained from "hard" sources (PWs, documents, Hoi Chanhs, SLAR, IR) and reliable low level agents. Include all information of intelligence value including: unit identification, location, mission, strength, major weapons, personalities (cadre only), infiltration data (when applicable), equipment and uniforms (if other than normal TC&E; i.e., identifying insignias, flags, special commo equipment, etc.), composition and subordination and training and tactics (if other than normal military training and tactics). Add appropriate S2-OB comment evaluating above information.

NOTE: Contact with enemy units. Subordinate units, when possible, should spot report any identification of enemy units in contact to DTOC; this includes preliminary screening of documents and field interrogation of PWs, Hoi Chanhs, etc. This information should be entered with INTSUM entry denoting contact.

9. ESTABLISHED NUMBER AND TYPE OF VEHICLES OR CRAFT:

10. WEATHER AND TERRAIN CONDITIONS:

a. Weather: (Include temperature range, average humidity, precipitation, wind velocity and direction, visibility, and general statement of weather for period).

b. Terrain: (Include the effect of the weather on the terrain).

c. Astronomical Data:

BMNT:

SR:

Tab A (INTSUM Format) to Appendix 11 (Other Intelligence and Security Reports) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

SS:

ELNT:

MR:

MS:

Illumination:

11. DISCUSSION OF CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS:

12. CONCLUSIONS:

13. NUMBER OF INSTANCES OF VIETNAMESE NATIONALS VOLUNTEERING INFORMATION ABOUT VC/NVA DIRECT TO US ARMY: (Include description of circumstances, to include DTG, friendly unit identification, location by coordinates, details of information furnished, and any follow-up action).

14. OTHER: (Include weekly OB changes, specials, wrap-ups, etc, as appropriate.

* These items will be included in each INTSUM regardless of whether or not there is information to report. Statements such as "7-9 Negative" will be used. All items in the format not marked "*" may be deleted from the body of the INTSUM in their entirety if no information is reported. Paragraphs will not be renumbered to retain a numerical sequence.

On the first day of each calendar month, the previous month's cumulative totals will be shown in paragraph 14 as shown below:

- a. Total NVA KIA
- b. Total VC KIA
- c. Total monthly enemy killed
 - (1) Total NVA KIA
 - (2) Total VC KIA
- d. Total Detainees

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Tab A (INTSUM Format) to Appendix 11 (Other Intelligence and Security Reports) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division Field SCP (Continued)

- e. NVA PW/VC PW/NVA Returnees/VC Returnees/CD/IC
- f. IWC/CSWC

This SCP format details the minimum requirement and format. Reporting units may include additional information of an intelligence value if desired.

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Tab B (Spot Report Format) to Appendix 11 (Other Intelligence and Security Reports) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division Field SOP

SPOT REPORT

Initial _____ FOLLOW UP _____

a. Reporting HQ _____ d. TOR _____

b. Source _____ e. Coord _____

c. TOI _____ f. Coord (EN) _____

Incident: _____

Results:

_____ KHA _____ VC KIA (C) Journal No _____

_____ WHA (evac) _____ NVA KIA (C) Notified:

_____ WHA (minor) _____ IW/CIA _____

_____ _____ CS/CIA _____

_____ _____

_____ _____

Report taken by _____

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Tab G (Detainee Report Format) to Appendix 11 (Other Intelligence and Security Reports) to Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division Field SOP

1. Number of detainees received that day.
2. Number of detainees classified as prisoners of war.
3. Total number of detainees in PW collecting point.
4. Number of PWs in PW collecting point.

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ANNEX C

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Appendix 5 (Graves Registration) to Annex C (Personnel and Administration)
to Americal Division Field SOP

1. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY. Units evacuate remains to closest collection point by vehicles/aircraft not carrying troops.
2. GRAVES REGISTRATION SERVICE. Collection and evacuation teams from S&S Bn, Support Command, and Brigades. Teams receive remains, assemble identifying media and personal effects and prepare remains for evacuation to the Division collection point. Brigades and Division Artillery assist teams and arrange for air/land transportation of required.
3. SEARCH AND RECOVERY OF REMAINS.
 - a. All units and individuals are responsible for conducting search and recovery of US remains.
 - b. When initially moving remains units be aware of booby traps. Remove weapons and ammunition from remains prior to evacuation.
 - c. Units guard remains to prevent improper handling, desecration or pilferage.
 - d. Remove Government property, except clothing and items of identification from remains at Division collecting point.
 - e. Deliver enemy dead to nearest ARVN unit.
 - f. Deliver allied dead to nearest unit of decedent's country.
4. IDENTIFICATION.
 - a. Identify remains as soon as possible.
 - b. Forward when possible, written confirmation of positive identification (viz, by an acquaintance) with remains. DD Form 565, Statement of Recognition, is available at all collecting and evacuation points.
5. PERSONAL EFFECTS.
 - a. Do not remove personal effects from remains, except items of value which may be pilfered. Responsible individual may remove such items prior to arrival at collecting and evacuation point.
 - b. Maps, other papers or items of tactical importance, may be removed.
 - c. Record removal of items from remains on personal effects form.
 - d. If positive identification is impossible, personal effects accompany remains to mortuary facility located at Da Nang Air Base.
6. TEMPORARY BURIALS.
 - a. Bury temporarily only if tactical situation does not permit evacuation of deceased.

Appendix 5 (Graves Registration) to Annex C (Personnel and Administration)
to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)


b. Individuals making temporary burials report date, location, identity of deceased (if known) and circumstances to this headquarters.

c. Recover remains temporarily buried as soon as possible.

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Appendix 9 (Reports) to Annex C (Personnel and Administration) to Americal Division Field SOP

TITLE OF REPORT	FORMAT	SUBMITTING UNIT	METHOD OF TRANSMISSION	REMARKS
1. G1 REPORTS:				
a. ATTN: AVDF-AG				
(1) Daily Strength Report	USARV Form 175 & 176	All Units	Courier, radio RPT, Telephone	Daily - as of 2400 hours NLT 1200 hours
(2) Spot Casualty	DD Form 173	All Units	Most Expeditious	When unit suffers mass casualties, report will contain only essential elements of information to include time casualties were inflicted and estimate of casualties in percent. Follow up detailed report will be submitted within 12 hours. Initial report will be immediate.
b. ATTN: AVDF-AG				
(1) Casualty Report	TAB B, Appendix 1 to Annex C	Major Commanders	Courier, Telephone	AR 600-6, -67, -65, Americal Reg 600-6
(2) Letters of Symmetry/Circumstances	TAB C, Appendix 1 to Annex C	Immediate Unit CO Bdes rpt direct to USARV	Courier	Within 3 days after casualty AR600-6 or para 10, Appendix VII, AR 600-67. Letter of transmittal will contain statement of any pending awards.
(3) Daily Casualty Summary	TAB A, Appendix 1 to Annex C	Major Commanders	Telephonically	Daily as of 2400 hours to arrive NLT 0400 hours. Confirmation within 24 hours.

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Appendix 9 (Reports) to Annex C (Personnel and Administration) to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

TITLE OF REPORT	FORMAT	SUBMITTING UNIT	METHOD OF TRANSMISSION	REMARKS
(4) R&R Report	Letter	Major Comds	Courier	Monthly - NLT 5th of each month
c. ATTN: AVDF-AVN Aircraft Accident, Aircraft Crash Facts Message	Appendix I, II, III, TF OREGON Reg No 385-10	Major Comds	Courier	As required
d. ATTN: AVDF-GA Accident Report	DA Form 285 AR 385-40 AR 385-6	All Units	Courier	9 Working days after the accident
e. ATTN: AVDF-GA Accident Exposure Report	Americal Div Form 713 AR 385-6	All Units	Courier	Within 5 working days after the end of the reporting period.
2. PROVOST MARSHAL:				
a. ATTN: AVDF-PM (1) Serious Incident Report	Appendix 1 Division Reg 335-6	Bde PMs and all other Commanders	If Unclassified Telephone Others-Courier	Initial-expedite Interim-each 30 days after accident Final-upon completion of final action

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ANNEX E

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Appendix 3 (Employment of Armed Helicopters and Rules of Engagement) to Annex E (Army Aviation) to Americal Division Field SOP

1. General. a. Mission. Missions for armed helicopters are classified into three basic types. Operations may include any combination of the three.

- (1) Escort
- (2) Reconnaissance and Security
- (3) Fire Support

b. Armament. All aircraft are armed with one or more of the following systems:

- (1) M-3 (48 2.75 Rockets)
- (2) M-5 (Automatic 40MM Grenade Launcher).
- (3) M-6 (Quad 7.62MM M-600 Machine Guns).
- (4) M-16 (Combination M-6 and two Rocket Pods).
- (5) M-21 (Combination Mini-gun and two 7 Rocket Pods).

(6) In addition each aircraft is armed with two 7.62mm M-60 guns (M-23) which are fired from the doors by the crew chief and door gunner.

2. Employment. a. Armed helicopters are without exception employed as teams, a minimum being one pair.

b. Escort missions for helicopter formations and ground vehicle convoys.

(1) While escorting lift formations, the mission of the armed helicopters is to suppress or neutralize enemy ground forces and fire sufficiently to allow the lift formation to pass over or around the danger area.

(2) For vehicle convoy escort the mission of armed helicopters is to provide reconnaissance and/or fire support.

c. Reconnaissance and security. The reconnaissance and security mission may be combined with escort or may be accomplished by independent fire teams. The armament systems provide the necessary means for reconnaissance by fire and sufficient fire power to effectively engage soft enemy targets.

Appendix 3 (Employment of Armed Helicopters and Rules of Engagement) to Annex E (Army Aviation) to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

d. Fire support. Two types of fires are provided by armed helicopters; area fire and limited point fire. Positive radio communication between ground troops and aircraft crews is mandatory prior to initiating armed helicopter support. Ground troops mark their positions to inform the pilots of the armed helicopters their locations. Ground commanders inform all personnel of the fact that expended brass may fall into friendly forces when overhead fire is delivered.

e. Rules of engagement.

(1) On escort missions with an airmobile formation, armed helicopters suppress and prepare LZ, until first troop landing and then only when approved by the ground commander. Only when in free fire zones are targets of opportunity engaged.

(2) Armed helicopters are not permitted to interfere with artillery or tactical air strikes but are permitted to exploit targets of opportunity forced from the periphery of the area of air strikes or artillery fires.

3. Targets will be engaged only when: a. The crew has direct radio contact with a designated control agency or supported unit.

b. The crew can visually identify the target or target markers.

c. Friendly and civilian positions are positively identified. Identification will be established by radio contact and panel code and recognition signals as listed in current SSI/SOI.

d. The crew is defending itself against ground fire and:

(1) Can visually identify the target.

(2) Can positively orient strikes against the source of fire.

(3) The fire is of such intensity to warrant counteraction.

e. Targets of opportunity, acquired in an unexpected area, are cleared by the ground commander responsible for that area. For this reason helicopter crews should be thoroughly briefed on the disposition of friendly forces in areas over which they fly. Appropriate frequencies and call signs will be carried on the pilots person secured in such a manner that it cannot be misplaced.

f. Targets of opportunity acquired in a specified strike zone (Free Fire Area) are cleared by FSE.

g. Permission to fire has been prearranged during mission briefing for specific troop support missions.

Appendix 3 (Employment of Armed Helicopters and Rules of Engagement) to
Annex E (Army Aviation) to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

4. Door gunners fire only on command of the aircraft commander.
5. Action upon notification of incidents involving firing from Army helicopters.

a. Upon notification of an incident in which friendly troops or other friendly persons have been fired on from helicopters, the commander of the unit to which the helicopters crews are assigned will cause an immediate investigation of the incident UP AR 15-6.

b. An interim report either written or verbal will be submitted to Commanding General, Americal Division, ATTN: G-3, within twenty four (24) hours following notification of the incident.

c. Within twenty five (25) days following the incident, a copy of the completed report of investigation will be forwarded to Commanding General, Americal Division, ATTN: G-3.

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Appendix 4 (Aviation Reports) to Annex E (Army Aviation) to Americal Division Field SOP

The Army Aviation Element (AAE) receives periodic reports from subordinate aviation units, assembles Aviation Information for the Commanding General and his staff, and submits required periodic reports to Headquarters.

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TABS:
A - Incoming Reports
B - Outgoing Reports

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TAB A (Incoming Reports to AAE) to Appendix 4 (Aviation Reports) to Annex E (Army Aviation) to Americal Division Field SOP

ITEM NO	TITLE	TYPE/Form	ORIGINATOR	DUE	REFERENCE	PURPOSE	REMARKS
1.	A/C Status Report	Americal Div Form 818A	All Inf Bdes Div Arty, 14th & 123d Avn Bns	1200 daily	Incl 1	Statistics for AAE's records	
2.	A/C Assigned & Flyable Report	Americal Div Form 752	All Inf Bdes Div Arty, 14th & 123d Avn Bns	0700 daily	Incl 2	Information for Commanding General & Staff	
3.	Information on downed A/C	USARV Form 193-R	All Inf Bdes Div Arty, 14th & 123d Avn Bns	ASAP	Incl 3	Information for G1 Safety Officer	
4.	Joint Services Anti A/C Fire, Incident & Damage Report	Americal Div 732	All Inf Bdes Div Arty, 14th & 123d Avn Bns	ASAP	Incl 4	Information for G2 Air	
5.	Unsatisfactory Mission Report		All Inf Bdes Div Arty, 14th & 123d Avn Bns	As required	Incl 5		Further Disposition of this report will be determined by Div Avn Officer.
6.	Unusual Incidents Involving A/C	Verbal/Letter	All Inf Bdes Div Arty, 14th & 123d Avn Bns	Interim report written or verbal within 24 hrs; final within 25 days			Further Disposition of this report will be determined by Div Avn Officer.
7.	Consolidated Mission Ready Helo Report PtlI		123d Avn Bn	0700 daily	Incl 6	Statistics for III MAF COC	

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Inclosure 6 (Consolidated Mission Ready Helo Report) to Tab A (Incoming Reports to AAE) to Appendix 4 (Aviation Reports) to Annex E (Army Aviation) to Americal Division Field SOP

CONSOLIDATED MISSION-READY HELO REPORT

FROM: AMERICAL DIVISION TOC

TO: III MAF COC (ATTN: G-3 Air)

C O N F I D E N T I A L _____ Date/Time Grp

<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>ACFT ASSIGNED</u>	<u>MSN READY</u>
UH-1B & C	_____	_____
UH-1D & H	_____	_____
CH-47	_____	_____




D O R M A

As of _____ 0500 Date/Time Grp

LINE NO	UNIT A	ASSIGNED MSN RDY				PCT AVAIL F	NON-MSN READY				SLICK K	ARMED L
		SLICK B	ARMED C	SLICK D	ARMED E		OM G	FM H	EDP I	OTHER J		
18	F/8 Cav											
70	123 Avn											

Instructions:

Col F:



1. Total % Mission ready 2. Total % Mission ready if crew were available.

Col G: OM includes A/C on special one time inspection, awaiting turn in, awaiting acceptance inspection, and awaiting test flight.

Col J: CODE: Crew N/A--NC XM-21 Arm inop--MT Avionics deficiency--AV M-16 Arm Inop--MS M-5 Arm inop--MF Not Armed--NA

Col K & L: Show the projected number of msn rdy a/c which the commander feels will be available at 0700 hrs the day following this rpt.

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TAB B (Outgoing Reports from AAE) to Appendix 4 (Aviation Reports) to Annex E (Army Aviation) to Americal Division Field SOP

OUTGOING REPORTS TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL AND STAFF

ITEM NO	TITLE	TYPE/FORM	ORIGINATOR	DUE	RECIPIENT	REFERENCE	REMARKS
1.	A/C Assigned and Flyable Report	Americal Div Form 752	AAE	0800 Daily	CG, ADC's C/S, G3	Incl 1	
2.	Joint Services Anti A/C Fire, Incident and Damage Report	Americal Div Form 732	All Inf Bdes Div Arty, 14th & 123d Avn Bns	ASAP	Div G2 Air	Incl 2	
3.	Information on Downed A/C	USARV 193-R	All Inf Bdes Div Arty, 14th & 123d Avn Bns	ASAP	Div G1 Safety Officer	Incl 3	

OUTGOING REPORTS TO OTHER HEADQUARTERS

ITEM NO	TITLE	TYPE/FORM	ORIGINATOR	DUE	RECIPIENT	REFERENCE	REMARKS
1.	Consolidated Mission Ready Helo Report		AAE	Pt I-1800 Daily Pt II-0730 Daily	III MAF TOC (ATTN: G3, Air)	Incl 4	Extracted from Americal Form 752
2.	A/C Operational Rpt		AAE	2400 Daily	123d Avn Bn S3	Incl 5	Extracted from Americal Form 752
3.	Oprep 5 (weekly)	USARV 265 1-5	All Inf Bdes Div Arty & 123 Avn Bn	0100 ea Thurs	CG, USARV	Incl 6 USARV Reg 95-1 Msg 38595	
4.	Oprep 5 (Daily)	USARV 265-3 (back)	All Inf Bdes Div Arty & 123 Avn Bn	0030 daily	CG, USARV	Incl 7 USARV Reg 95-1 Msg 38595	

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ANNEX I

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AMERICAL DIVISION
CHU LAI, RVN
15 April 1968

ANNEX I (Information) to Americal Division Field SOP

1. OBJECTIVES. The objectives of the Information Program are, within the limits of military security and good taste, to release complete, accurate and timely information concerning the accomplishments of individuals and units within the Division, and to develop public awareness and understanding of the aims, missions, objectives, and professionalism of the Division. This includes, but is not necessarily limited to:
 - a. Preparing and disseminating news releases to appropriate news media.
 - b. Preparing and disseminating hometown news releases to insure that individuals receive recognition in their hometowns.
 - c. Assisting accredited correspondents in securing facts for preparation of news stories. Assistance to include transportation, billeting, and providing escorts when it does not interfere with tactical operations.
 - d. Preventing premature disclosure of unannounced operations through embargo procedures determined by MACV-IO.
 - e. Controlling the movement of news correspondents to operations as prescribed by MACV-IO.
2. POLICY.
 - a. The Information Program is a command responsibility.
 - b. The Information Officer, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam is the sole releasing authority for all news stories originated by US Military Personnel in Vietnam.
 - c. The Information Officer, is the releasing authority for all news stories originated within the Division, unless otherwise directed, and will coordinate all material for clearance and release with MACV-IO. News correspondents' embargoed materials will remain in US/FWMAF control and forwarded to MACV-IO for further distribution to the appropriate agency.
 - d. The Information Program of the Division will be directed to focus attention on the professionalism of actions and accomplishments of individuals and units and their roles in the Division mission.
 - e. Embargoed news materials will be controlled by processing envelopes, packets and film through US/FWMAF hands to PID, MACV-IO, APO 96222.
3. PROCEDURES.
 - a. Major subordinate commands will maintain Information Sections for collection and preparation of news items for clearance and dissemination through the Division Information Office. News value, timeliness, and propriety will be determined by the Division Information Officer;

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ANNEX I (Information) to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

however, every effort will be made, including rewriting if necessary, to place each story with news media most likely to use it.

b. Awards for Valor below the Silver Star, Awards for Merit below the Legion of Merit, promotions to officer grades below Colonel and enlisted grades below E8, assignments and reassignments will normally be released only to military journals and hometowns. DA Form 1526 (Hometown News Release) will be submitted with all stories of this nature.

c. Initial announcements of Code Named operations will be made by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam on recommendation of the Commanding General, Americal Division. News stories, including feature type material and hometown releases which are directly related to specific operations may not be made prior to MACV announcement.

d. Commanders and staff officers will insure cooperation with accredited news media representatives and will provide information consistent with the military situation and security. Contact with news media representatives will be conducted in a direct positive manner with maximum candor.

e. The Division Information effort is concentrated into two major areas of responsibility:

- (1) Public Information (Division Reg 360-1).
- (2) Command Information (Division Reg 360-81).

5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. a. Required Command Information supporting materials, as available, will be supplied by the Information Office, Americal Division.

b. DA Form 1526 (Hometown News Release) will be requested through normal publication channels.

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ANNEX J

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AMERICAL DIVISION
CHU LAI, RVN
15 April 1968

ANNEX J (Civic Action) to Americal Division Field SOP

1. REFERENCES.

- a. FM 41-5 Joint Manual for Civil Affairs
- b. FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations
- c. Combined Campaign Plan 1967
- d. USARV Reg 515 Series
- e. III MAF Orders, 5080 Series
- f. MACV Dir 37-13, US/FWMAF Military Civic Action and PSYWAR Fund
- g. Americal Division Reg 27-21, Solatium (Condolence) Payments
- h. ICCI 5080.2B, Designation of Civil Affairs Coordinators.

2. RESPONSIBILITIES. a. The ACoFS, G5 plans, coordinates, and provides staff supervision for civic action.

b. Brigade commanders and commanders indicated in paragraph 2d, below, plan, coordinate and supervise civic action in their civic action areas of responsibility.

c. Brigade civic action areas of responsibility coincide with TAOR's, with the exception of specific areas indicated in paragraph 2d, below.

d. Commanders of Division combat support and combat service support units, and commanders of USMC and USN units located in the Chu Lai base plan, coordinate and supervise civic action in the civic action areas of responsibility assigned to them by the sub-zone coordinator, southern sector I Corps Tactical Zone.

e. 29th Civil Affairs Company, III MAF, provides civil affairs platoons to Divisional area support and functional teams as required for specific surveys and evaluations (agriculture, education, public safety, legal, refugee).

f. CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) Provincial Advisory Teams provide limited food commodities and building supplies for refugee relief and civic action projects.

g. III MAF provides limited supplies for civic action projects and acts as purchasing agent for US/FWMAF civic action funds.

3. PROCEDURES. a. Commanders will, consistent with the accomplishment of their mission, conduct a civic action program to strengthen the CVN and promote the security and economy of the civil population in the TAOR.

ANNEX J (Civic Action) to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

b. During combat operations civic action functions include:

- (1) Emergency medical assistance to noncombatants.
- (2) Emergency care and evacuation of refugees.
- (3) Emergency repair to damaged structures and roads.
- (4) Extraction of captured food commodities and equipment of great value to civil economy.

c. The ACofS, G5, will coordinate refugee operations and civic action programs with CORDS Province Advisor Teams.

d. Civic action programs and projects in secure or semi-secure areas include:

- (1) Construction and repair of public buildings and facilities (school-houses, dispensaries, market places, water wells, drainage systems, and roads).
- (2) Initiation of agricultural projects (vegetable gardens, pig farms, repair of rice paddie dikes, and reclamation of fallow land).
- (3) Initiation of social and educational programs (English classes, public health aide training, athletic teams and leagues, and development of cottage industry).
- (4) MEDCAP (Medical Civic Action Program) activities to provide out-patient medical service to the civil population at a hamlet or village location.

e. Programs and projects will be initiated at the request of the civil population and approved by elected or appointed GVN government officials at hamlet, village, district and province levels (See Tab D, Appendix 1, Civic Action Reports).

(1) US Forces supply III MAF or CORDS provided civic action materials and the Vietnamese people supply the labor (See Tab D, Appendix 1, Civic Action Reports).

(2) Civic action projects will not be conducted in hamlets where GVN Revolutionary Development Teams are stationed.

(3) Credit for program or project will be given to appropriate GVN officials at initiation or dedication ceremonies.

f. Close coordination will be maintained with the District US Army Advisor Team to assure priority of effort, coordination of program, and equitably distributed supplies.

ANNEX J (Civic Action) to Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

4. SUPPLIES. a. Military supplies will be used only as an emergency measure when CORDS relief supplies are unavailable.

b. CORDS Province Advisory Teams provide emergency food commodities and building materials (cement and roofing tin).

c. III MAF provides food, school supplies, self-help kits, clothing, and civic action supplies available from International Volunteer Agencies.

d. Civic action supplies and materials from CORDS and III MAF will be requested through the ACofS, G5. (See Tab E, Appendix 1, Civic Action Reports).

e. Supplies and materials will be provided to the civil populace through GVN officials at district, village, and hamlet level.

f. Captured food supplies will be extracted from operational areas when ever possible and delivered to the appropriate GVN district chief. If extraction of captured food supplies in excess of 4000 pounds is beyond the operational capability of the capturing unit, the ACofS, G3, will advise the commander on extraction or destruction procedure.

g. MEDCAP supplies are provided through military medical supply channels.

h. Civic action supplies may be purchased using US/FWMAF Civic Action Fund in accordance with reference 1f, above. Upon request, 29th CA Co, III MAF, will act as purchasing agent for both in and out of country items.

i. Solatium (condolence) payments to civilians injured by noncombat accidents or misdirected fire will be made in accordance with reference 1g, above.

5. ADMINISTRATION. a. Normal channels are used for reporting.

b. Reports (Appendix 1, Civic Action Reports).

- Appendices:
- 1 - Civic Action Reports
 - 2 - Psychological Operations

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Appendix 2 (Psychological Operations) to Annex J (Civic Action) to
Americal Division Field SOP

1. REFERENCES.

- a. FM 33-1 Psychological Operations US Army Doctrine
- b. FM 33-5 Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures
- c. III MAF Force Order 3121.3 SOP for County Fair Operations
- d. III MAF Force Order 3410.1A SOP for Psychological Operations
- e. III MAF Force Order 3410.2 Employment of the 244th PSYOP Co.
- f. III MAF Force Order 3410.3 "Chieu Hoi" Psychological Operations Campaign

2. RESPONSIBILITIES. a. ACoS, G5 provides overall staff supervision to PSYOP Section.

b. The PSYOP Officer plans, coordinates, and provides staff supervision for psychological operations.

c. Brigade commanders and separate battalion commanders plan and implement psychological operation programs in their area of operation.

d. 7th PSYOP Bn, provides tactical psychological operations support to Americal Div in the form of quick reaction leaflets, posters, newspapers, loudspeakers, and audio visual teams.

e. CORDS Province Advisory Teams provide limited leaflet, poster, magazine, and newspaper support. The teams also provide Cultural Drama teams on request.

f. 9th Air Commando Squadron provides C-47 aircraft for large leaflet drops and night broadcasts, and O-2B aircraft to broadcast messages and drop leaflets on smaller targets.

3. PROCEDURES. a. PSYOP exploitation is most effective when a situation is still fresh in the minds of the target audience. Rapid response material is available on call from 7th PSYOP Bn or can be developed and delivered within 24 hours. Normal reproduction time for leaflets and posters is five to seven days. See TAB A (Procedures for requesting psychological material and aircraft support.

b. Exploitation. Following are situations which can be exploited by the use of PSYOP:

(1) Explain the presence of Americal and friendly powers and show that the VC cannot match the GVN, US and Allied commitments.

(2) Exploit the CHIEU HOI program to encourage VC ralliers at every opportunity.

Appendix 2 (Psychological Operations) to Annex J (Civic Action) to
Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

(3) Exploit victories by both ARVN and friendly forces to maintain a winning spirit within the ARVN and friendly populace.

(4) Take advantage of VC/NVA vulnerabilities, such as mounting casualties, alienation of population due to increased terrorism, taxation, impressment, low living conditions, low morale, and increasing defection.

(5) Exploit information from VC/NVA ralliers or POW.

c. Mobile PSYOP (HB) Teams. PSYOP HB (Loudspeaker) teams are available from the 7th PSYOP Bn. Capabilities include the following:

(1) Support of civil affairs and tactical operations with appropriate PSYOP media.

(2) Assisting in the preparation of a campaign, based on the National PSYOP plan and the National CHIEU HOI plan, which includes themes, target groups, vulnerabilities, and phases of exploitation. Each campaign is aimed at specific objectives and supports the tactical concept of the commander.

(3) Preparation of loudspeaker appeals, and other propaganda in coordination with US and GVN agencies. All media are utilized to the maximum.

(4) Coordination with US, ARVN, and GVN information agencies concerning local implementing procedures. Contact with agencies not under control of Division is made by coordinating with Division PSYOP Officer.

d. Catalogs from the 7th PSYOP Bn, and JUSPAO, reflecting the tapes, leaflets and posters presently in use are available. Units are encouraged to develop and/or suggest additional PSYOP material designated to fill particular requirements.

e. All requests for existing leaflets and posters are forwarded to Division PSYOP Section, indicating catalog number and quantity required.

f. When a new leaflet or poster is desired, the following information is required:

(1) Target audience.

(2) Objective and theme.

(3) Suggested wording of text.

(4) Type of material requested, i.e., leaflet, poster, recorded tapes (normally 45 seconds).

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Appendix 2 (Psychological Operations) to Annex J (Civic Action) to
Americal Division Field SOP (Continued)

- (5) Amount and date required.
 - (6) Type of delivery
 - (7) Other information that may be helpful in designing, producing or delivering the material.
- g. Requests for leaflets, posters and recorded tapes should be forwarded to PSYOP Section at least five days prior to an operation.
- h. Information required for aircraft support of PSYOP missions:
- (1) Date and time required.
 - (2) Type of mission, i.e., loudspeaker, leaflet or both.
 - (3) Location of target area (grid coordinates).
 - (4) Name, unit and telephone number of requestor.
 - (5) Other information as applicable.
- i. Requests for aircraft support are submitted to PSYOP Section prior to 1700 on the day before the planned mission.
4. ADMINISTRATION. a. Normal channels are used for reporting.
- b. Reports (Tab A, PSYOP Reports).

Tabs:
A - PSYOP Reports

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TAB A (PSYOP Reports) to Appendix 2 (Psychological Operations) to Annex J (Civic Action) to Americal Division Field SOP

1. DAILY REPORT. a. Report by telephone (Chu Lai 158/Americal 497) by 1700 hours of the reporting day. Negative reports are required.

b. Reports will contain the following:

(1) Printed material: Total number of leaflets, posters, JUSPAC newspaper, or special materials distributed by the unit.

(2) Loudspeaker: Total number of hours of ground loudspeaker time.

(3) Themes and audiences.

(4) Special events: Any performance out of the ordinary, i.e. Cultural Drama Team or MEDCAP.

(5) Remarks and/or comments: This must be a significant action which occurs as a result of a PSYOP program. Including number of Chieu Hoi returnees.

(6) Problem areas and recommendations.

2. SPECIAL REPORT. a. Two copies of PSYOP annex to operations orders for BDE sized units.

b. Two copies of PSYOP after action report of BN & BDE sized units (Submit ASAP following termination of operation).

c. Extraordinary PSYOP feed-back such as operation resulting in large number of returnees, surrender of VC/NVA, exploitation of major victories, enemy losses, or PSYOP which produce significant response, i.e. reporting of VC mines, caches, VC atrocities, etc.

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AMERICAL

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ARTILLERY

FIELD SOP

UNITED STATES ARMY
VIETNAM

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EXHIBIT M-66

EXTRACT

(717 B)

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HEADQUARTERS
AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY
Republic of Vietnam


1 December 1967

SUBJECT: Americal Division Artillery Field Standing Operating Pro-
cedures

TO: See Distribution

1. This standing operating procedure is published for informa-
tion and guidance to the units of the Americal Division Artillery and
attached or supporting units. Artillery battalions organic or at-
tached to brigades will comply with this SOP. In event the provisions
of this SOP conflict with the brigade SOP the differences will be re-
ported to the Division Artillery Commander, who will either waive the
requirement to comply with this SOP or refer the matter to the Division
Commander for decision, as appropriate.

2. It is intended that this SOP be revised and changed as neces-
sary to incorporate improved procedures and new concepts. Commanders
and staffs are requested to review this SOP on a continuous basis and
make recommendation for its improvement.


MASON J. YOUNG JR.
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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Americal Division Artillery
Republic of Vietnam
1 December 1967

AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY
FIELD STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

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H - Chemical Operations (to be published)	H-1
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J - PSY Ops/Civic Action (to be published)

K - Employment of Special Weapons (Omitted)

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<u>AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>CY</u>
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SGM	1	
S1	1	
S2	1	
S3	30	
S4	1	
FSE	3	
Commo	1	
Avn	1	
LNO	1	
2d Bn, 11th Arty	6	
3d Bn, 16th Arty	6	
3d Bn, 18th Arty	6	
<u>HQB, Div Arty</u>	3	
G2	1	
G3	1	
3d Bde, 4th Inf Div	1	
2d Bn, 9th Arty	7	
11th Lt Inf Bde	1	
6th Bn, 11th Arty	7	
196th Lt Inf Bde	1	
3d Bn, 82d Arty	7	
198th Lt Inf Bde	1	
1st Bn, 14th Arty	7	
3d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div	1	
1st Bn, 21st Arty	8	

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1 December 1967

FIELD STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

1. GENERAL.

- a. Purpose. This SOP constitutes the Americal Division Artillery Field SOP and establishes routine and recurring field operational procedures within Americal Division Artillery. This SOP applies except when modified by Americal Division or higher authority.
- b. Scope. These procedures apply to all units under the command or operational control of Americal Div Arty and to artillery battalions organic or attached to brigades of Americal Division.
- c. Responsibilities.
 - (1) Conformity: Subordinate unit SOPs will conform.
 - (2) Revision. Recommendations for revision will be forwarded to HQ, Americal Div Arty.

2. USE.

- a. This SOP follows the format of the Division SOP in so far as is practicable.
- b. Where a paragraph does not show the words "Division SOP", all necessary information is contained in the paragraph.
- c. The Table of Contents reflects those annexes and appendices which appear in this SOP. See annexes and/or appendices of Division SOP if omitted in this SOP.

Annexes: A - Operations

B - Intelligence

C - Personnel and Administration

D - Logistics

E - Aviation

F - Engineer Combat Support (omitted)

G - Signal

H - Chemical Operations (to be published)

I - Information

J - PSY Ops/Civic Action (to be published)

K - Employment of Special Weapons (to be published)

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Annex A (Operations) to Americal Division Artillery Field SOP

1. REFERENCES.
 - a. Americal Division Field SOP
 - b. FM 6-20-1 w/changes
 - c. FM 6-20-2 w/changes
 - d. FM 6-40 w/changes
 - e. FM 101-5
2. PURPOSE.

This annex establishes the regular policies, procedures, and techniques that the Division Arty will follow in conduct of tactical operations in Vietnam or in a similar counterinsurgency environment.
3. ORGANIZATION: (Div SOP).
 - a. Normal Div Arty organization for combat:
 - (1) 2d Bn, 9th Arty - DS 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div
 - (2) 6th Bn, 11th Arty - DS 11th Lt Inf Bde
 - (3) 1st Bn, 14th Arty - DS 198th Lt Inf Bde
 - (4) 1st Bn, 21st Arty - DS 3d Bde, 1st Air Cav Div
 - (5) 3d Bn, 82d Arty - DS 196th Lt Inf Bde
 - (6) 2d Bn, 11th Arty - reinforcing
 - (7) 3d Bn, 16th Arty - reinforcing
 - (8) 3d Bn, 18th Arty - GS
 - b. For the purpose of this SOP, artillery battalions organic or attached to brigades will hereafter be called DS battalions or DS artillery.
4. COMBAT ORDERS (Div SOP).

One copy of operation plans and orders that are published in support of battalion or larger sized operations will be submitted by DS battalions to Div Arty twelve hours prior to beginning of operation. When publication of plans and orders is delayed, the concept of operation and support requirements will be communicated to Div Arty S3 as soon as possible.
5. TYPE OPERATIONS (Div SOP).
6. LIAISON.
 - a. Division Artillery will provide liaison personnel to ARVN as necessary.
 - b. In addition to normal supporting to supported and reinforcing to reinforced liaison requirements, DS battalions will furnish LNO to all District Headquarters within their AO, unless an exception is approved by the Division headquarters. This includes Special Forces Camps where the Special Forces Command is the District Advisor.
 - c. In situations where supporting/supported relationships are changed due to temporary changes in organization for combat, LNO's and FOs will remain with the unit they normally support. Coordination will be made with new supporting artillery unit at earliest opportunity.

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- d. Artillery liaison officers at Brigade Ho are responsible for control and coordination of artillery LNOs at infantry battalions. Likewise, artillery LNOs at infantry battalion level are responsible for control and coordination of artillery FOs supporting the infantry companies.
- 7. COORDINATION (Div SOP).
Fire support coordination. Appendix 4.
- 8. PROCEDURES.
 - a. Command and Control. Appendix 1.
 - b. Gunnery Procedures. Appendix 2.
 - c. Fire Planning. Appendix 3.
 - d. Fire Support Coordination. Appendix 4.
 - e. Airmobile and Airlift Operations. Appendix 5.
 - f. Adjustment Procedures for Naval Gunfire. Appendix 6.
- 9. TACTICAL OPERATIONS TECHNIQUES (Div SOP).
 - a. General.
 - (1) Units will conduct daily stand-to of all perimeter defense personnel immediately prior to BMNT and EENT. When operating away from base camps commanders will have all personnel stand-to at those times when the situation dictates. Battle stations will be manned during these periods to insure maximum state of readiness.
 - (2) All personnel are required to carry their individual weapon with ammunition or have it within arms reach at all times.
 - (3) Commanders will insure that personnel are thoroughly familiar with the operation and capabilities of individual and crew-served weapons organic to their particular unit.
 - (4) For the purposes of this SOP reports to be rendered to the Div Arty S3 or S2 will be rendered to the FSE of the Div TOC.
 - b. Reconnaissance.
 - (1) Normally initial reconnaissance of position areas must be made from the air. Deception measures must be taken to prevent premature disclosure of intention to occupy the position.
 - (2) When movement to position is to be made by road or trail, careful route reconnaissance must be made and likely ambush areas noted.
 - (3) Every aerial flight made by artillery officers should be considered a reconnaissance, and maps of the area to be covered, 1:50,000 scale or larger, will be carried.
 - (4) Observations of suspected or actual VC activity and/or unusual sightings will be reported to Div Arty S2 as soon as possible.
 - (5) Location of possible artillery position areas observed during flight will be recorded and coordinates forwarded to Div Arty S3 upon termination of flight.

10. TRAINING (DIV SOP).

- a. Units not actively engaged in support of tactical operations will conduct unit training programs.
- b. Maximum advantage must be taken of every opportunity to conduct on-the-job training and to integrate training with conduct of tactical operations.
- c. Battalions will insure that liaison and forward observer personnel are thoroughly instructed in their duties prior to reporting to the supported unit. A carry over period with the old FO or LNO will normally last at least 24 hours.
- d. Accuracy and then speed will be emphasized in all artillery training with special emphasis being given to FDC, Survey and Howitzer section training. Periodic testing of unit firing capabilities and accuracies will be accomplished by all levels of command to include Division Artillery.
- e. The Division Artillery Gunnery Checklist will be used for monthly inspections by the Battalion and Battery commanders, and for spot checks by representatives of Division Artillery. All references specified in the checklist will be on hand in each FDC.
- f. Shelling Report Team Training. FM 6-121.
- g. Frequent training will be conducted in all FDC's in high angle fire so that this capability is always ready for use.

11. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT.

- a. Naval gunfire is fired by direct support ships of the echelon concerned. If additional naval gunfire support is required, it is requested from the next higher FSE through naval gunfire channels or through normal artillery fire support channels.

- b. US Naval ships are capable of providing naval gunfire support as follows:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>SHORE APPROACH</u>	<u>EFFECTIVE RANGE</u>
Destroyer	5"/38 cal guns	6 fathom curve	13,700 meters
	5"/54 cal guns		16,400 meters
Light Cruiser	6"/47 cal guns	10 fathom curve	19,100 meters
Heavy Cruiser	8"/55 cal guns	10 fathom curve	23,600 meters
Battleship	16"/50 cal guns	10 fathom curve	29,400 meters
Landing Ship	5" rocket	No restrictions	2280 - 9090 meters
Medium Rocket/ Inshore Fire Support			

- c. The following selection of ammunition and fuzes is normally available.

- (1) Ammunition: HE, WP, AP, CP, and Illum (5" & 6" guns only).
- (2) Fuzes: BD, PD, MTSQ and VT.

- d. Requests for NGFS will include:

- (1) Type operation (troop support, H&I, etc).
- (2) Location of AOR or target(s) (by grid coordinates).

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- (3) Nature of target(s) (if enemy force, include size).
 - (4) Type of ammunition and fuze.
 - (5) Commencement and duration of operation, or the time that fire is desired.
 - (6) Radio frequencies and call signs of supported element to be contacted by US Navy spotting team or ship(s).
- e. Shore Fire Control Parties normally control and adjust naval gunfire. Adjustment of naval gunfire by Army observers is done in an emergency only. See Appendix 6 (Adjustment Procedures for Naval Gunfire).
 - f. Combat service support of naval parties is by unit to which attached.
 - g. If Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) is attached, ANGLICO channels through FSE are employed for naval gunfire.

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- Appendices: 1 - Command and Control
2 - Gunnery Procedures
3 - Fire Planning
4 - Fire Support Coordination
5 - Airmobile and Airlift Operations
6 - Adjustment Procedures for Naval Gunfire

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Appendix 2 (Gunnery Procedures) to Annex A (Operations) to Americal Div
Arty Field SOP

1. GENERAL. Gunnery procedures in Americal Division Artillery will conform to FM 6-40 and this directive. The new field artillery observation terminology as prescribed in DA Training Circular 6-1 dtd 17 May 1966 will be used by all observers and fire direction centers when processing fire missions. Accurate and timely delivery of artillery fire is the mission of this command. This mission can only be accomplished by strict adherence to the norms of accuracy which have been traditional in the field artillery. Constant and continuous checks will be instituted and observed to insure fire where and when the maneuver elements desire. Every artilleryman, officer and enlisted, in this command will seek to broaden his knowledge of gunnery and strive to maintain the tradition of accuracy and timeliness characteristic of United States Artillery. Each artillery officer in the gunnery chain of command will check fire missions against a map and question data that apparently would be unsafe.
2. STANDARDS FOR ARTILLERY OFFICERS. Each commissioned artillery officer who performs duty in an artillery firing battery or in a battalion FDC will be sufficiently proficient in the following artillery techniques to insure that he can adequately perform these duties if required. It is recognized that speed of performance comes only with daily practice and will be found in those officers whose primary duty calls for such operations.
 - a. Lay a battery by azimuth and orienting angle.
 - b. Check the lay of a battery by azimuth and orienting angle.
 - c. Measure adjusted azimuth and orienting angle.
 - d. Check the measurement of angle of sight to mask and the computation of minimum elevation.
 - e. Compute a simple observed adjustment of fire on a target of opportunity.
 - f. Check a record of precision fire to insure accuracy of GFT setting.
 - g. Be sufficiently familiar with the computation of Met+VE to insure that gross errors have not been made.
 - h. Supervise a battery FDC for a short period during observed fire adjustments or the computation of unobserved data such as H&I fires.
 - i. Check the accuracy of a firing chart, particularly the map inspected location of the firing battery or registration point.
 - j. Be sufficiently familiar with the Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer (FADAC) to insure that the operator enters data correctly and accurately and that proper care and first echelon maintenance is performed.

- k. Locate a target from the air on a 1/50,000 map to an accuracy of 100 meters.
 - l. Be familiar with the new field artillery observation terminology.
 - m. Bring fire on a target of opportunity from the air or ground in a reasonable period of time using correct observer procedures.
 - n. Conduct a destruction mission or precision registration.
 - o. Provide surveillance after visual recon or after completion of a fire mission.
3. STANDARDS FOR ARTILLERY NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS.
- a. A chief of firing battery must be able to accomplish all duties of the executive officer in a firing battery.
 - b. A chief of section must be proficient in laying the battery by azimuth or orienting angle in addition to his duties as chief of section.
4. DEFINITIONS.
- a. Technical Fire Direction (para 243, FM 6-40): Conversion of fire missions to appropriate firing data and fire commands.
 - b. Tactical Fire Direction (para 243, FM 6-40): Exercise of tactical command of one or more units in the selection of targets, designation of units to fire, and the allocation of ammunition for each mission.
 - c. Control Fire Direction Center (FDC): The FDC which has assumed or has been delegated the responsibility to convert a fire mission to appropriate firing data and fire commands. (Technical Fire Direction).
 - d. Primary Check: An independent check of data and commands produced within a control FDC. No mission will be fired within this command without a primary check.
 - e. Secondary Check: An independent check, always in addition to a primary check, conducted in an FDC other than the control FDC.
5. THE BATTALION FDC.
- a. Each artillery battalion is provided minimum essential personnel to conduct technical and tactical fire direction. Battalion commanders will augment the fire direction center from sources available to them to insure a twenty-four hour capability achieving minimum standards of speed and accuracy as set forth herein.
 - b. The battalion commander will decide, based on the disposition of his batteries, whether he will operate both a tactical and technical fire direction center or only a tactical fire direction center. In the latter case he will still maintain the capability of exercising technical fire direction, and of making the secondary check on the control fire direction center if it is located at the battery.

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- c. The battalion FDC when operating as the control FDC will be capable of conducting primary checks on all data it produces. The method of conducting the primary check will conform to the following standards.
- (1) A check chart will be maintained at the same scale as the primary chart and will be manned by an operator independent of the primary chart. The charts will be identical and will be pre-checked to insure minimum accuracy of comparison to within 2 mils in deflection and 20 M in range. The check chart may be maintained by the vertical control operator (VCO) or may be in addition to the VCO. If FADAC is being used to compute data, the primary chart will be used to check deflection and range.
 - (2) A separate GFT will be used to check all data prepared by the computer. This check may be made by another computer if his battery is not firing, by the chief computer, or by the FDO. Each FDO will insure that a positive system is established to insure that the check computer is clearly identified for each mission fired.
 - (3) The FDO will check the initial plot on the primary and check charts, the computation of site by the VCO, and the initial orientation of the target grid. During precision registrations, a separate record of precision fire will be maintained by a check computer.
 - (4) Following is a guide to FDOs for initial check of firing charts:
 - (a) Check plot of battery center(s) and other surveyed points with coord square.
 - (b) Check initial deflection index and insure it corresponds to base deflection; insure that deflection corresponds to azimuth of fire.
 - (c) Check supplemental indices.
 - (d) Insure that range deflection protractor is numbered properly.
 - (e) Double check plot of battery using 1/25,000 or 1/50,000 map. Double check rough direction of fire and corresponding azimuth by visual observation.
 - (5) The FDO will insure that old GFT settings have been removed if required and new settings placed on each GFT.
 - (6) Metro corrections, high burst registrations, etc., will be computed independently by two individuals.
- d. Each battalion FDC will be capable of conducting secondary checks on data produced by battery FDC's. Normally, the Battalion FDC will check initial data on all fire missions. The method of conducting the secondary check will conform to the following standards.

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- (1) When fire is being conducted by wire, the secondary check at battalion will approximate the detail of the primary check discussed previously.
- (2) When firing is being conducted exclusively by radio, battalion FDC will monitor the fire mission and subsequent corrections to insure that accurate and timely fire is being delivered.
- (3) Secondary checks do not replace primary checks and in no way relieve the control FDC of the responsibility of conducting primary checks.
- (4) If the battalion FDC, conducting secondary checks, believes at any time that data may have been transmitted or computed in error, he will command HOLD and suspend firing until he is satisfied that correct data has been obtained.
- (5) Since the secondary check in many instances is the only direct assurance the commander has of the accuracy of fires, such checks will be abandoned only by the express order of the battalion commander concerned. A report of such action will be made to this headquarters as expeditiously as possible.

6. THE BATTERY FDC.

- a. Each battery is provided minimum essential personnel to conduct technical fire direction. Augmentation is required to enable the battery FDC to operate continuously. The battery FDC is not capable of computing firing data for more than one battery location at a time. In the event that the battery is split, the FDC must be augmented by battalion FDC or one segment of the battery may be controlled directly by battalion FDC.
- b. The battery FDC, when operating as the Control FDC, will be capable of conducting primary checks on any data it produces. The battery FDC will be prepared and will conduct secondary checks on data produced at battalion FDC (when battalion is the control FDC) and transmitted to the battery for firing. In the event that the battery FDC disagrees to a marked degree with data transmitted by battalion FDC, the battery FDC will command HOLD and will notify the battalion FDC of the discrepancy without delay. The battalion FDC will decide on the correct data to be fired.
- c. Primary and secondary checks will be conducted at battery FDC when operating as control FDC in the same general manner and with the same guidance as at battalion level, as specified in paragraph 5.
- d. A battery fire direction center, when operating as a control FDC, will have as a minimum the following five personnel on duty at all times: one FDC; a chart operator; a FADAC operator; a computer; and a RTO, who may also be a check computer. When FADAC is not operational, a check chart operator will be used. Battalions will augment batteries as necessary to meet this requirement on a shift basis 24 hours a day.

7. STANDARDS FOR THE FIRE DIRECTION CENTER. These standards are equally applicable to the battery and battalion FDC. Deviations from these standards may be made only by authority of the Division Artillery Commander or his representative.
- a. Accuracy. Speed will never be given as an excuse for lack of accuracy. Proper techniques of plotting and computation will be maintained and constantly practiced in all FDC's. It is recognized that accuracy required for precision registration is greater than that required for a target of opportunity in a VC-held jungle area. However, the accuracy required of the chart operator and computer will be constant; the FDC may use accepted "short cuts" in the interest of timely fire. At no time will primary checks be deleted in the interest of speed.
 - b. Speed. True speed comes only with constant and repetitious drill in sound procedures. Each battalion must maintain the ability to provide timely fires. FDC's and S3s must remain alert for sloppy FDC, observer, or firing battery procedures which give a false and temporary impression of speed in firing.
 - c. Firing Charts. Both primary and check charts will be maintained on plastic grid sheets. The normal scale used on the grid sheet is:
 - (1) 105mm howitzer FDC - 1/25,000.
 - (2) The 155mm and 8" How FDC - 1/25,000 (1/50,000 acceptable).
 - (3) 175mm gun - 1/50,000.The same firing chart will not be used as both primary and check chart. Grid sheets will be changed as frequently as required to maintain a neat, readable appearance.
 - d. Battle Maps. Each FDC will maintain a 1/50,000 battle map on which the following items will be plotted:
 - (1) General location of friendly forces.
 - (2) Battery location(s).
 - (3) No fire areas, FCLs, FSCLs, and Free Fire areas.
 - (4) Locations of friendly patrols, US, FWF, and ARVN or RF/PF outposts.
 - (5) Built up areas, villages and hamlets will be marked or outlined to be readily recognizable, based on the latest data. These maps will be up dated to represent actual conditions by frequent checks with the District and by aerial reconnaissance.
 - e. Such data from the battle map as is practicable will be placed on the firing chart. Permanent NFL will normally be so outlined.
 - f. GFT Settings, Met Corrections, and Registration Data. FDCs will always fire with the best data available. The battalion FDC will insure that corrections are available for all batteries in every direction. This requires met computations concurrent with precision registration and

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Appendix 3 (Fire Planning) to Annex A (Operations) to Americal Division Artillery Field SOP

1. GENERAL.
 - a. Fire planning is conducted at all levels and is continuous.
 - b. The detail with which fire plans will be made is dependent upon:
 - (1) The time available for planning.
 - (2) The extent and accuracy of target information.
 - (3) The type operation being conducted.
 - (4) The fire support requirements of higher echelons.
 - (5) The fire support means available.
 - c. Target lists will suffice as fire plan until completion of detailed plan.
2. RESPONSIBILITIES.
 - a. Direct Support Artillery battalions prepare artillery fire plans to support the scheme of maneuver of supported brigades.
 - b. Reinforcing artillery fires are planned by reinforced artillery unit.
 - c. General support and GS reinforcing fires are planned by Division Artillery.
3. TARGET DESIGNATION SYSTEM.

Tab A.
4. LANDING ZONE PREPARATIONS.
 - a. Preparation of LZs are fired using best data available.
 - b. The preparation will be observed and fires adjusted for maximum effectiveness whenever possible.
 - c. LZ preparation fires should be:
 - (1) Heavy in volume initially.
 - (2) Adjusted to the scheme of maneuver.
 - (3) Planned around the periphery of the LZ in the forward edge of the tree lines and expanding outwards.
 - d. Upon completion of the preparation, artillery fires are shifted to likely areas of entrance and exit to the assault area.
5. SUPPORTING FIRES.
 - a. Supporting fires in the defense should be planned on likely avenues of approach such as roads, trails and streamlines. Targets should also be planned on clearly identifiable terrain features from which fires may be quickly shifted.
 - b. Close-in supporting fires will be shot-in prior to darkness. A single round will be used as an initial check. A full battery sheaf will be subsequently fired if time and ammunition permit. Individual piece corrections, if known, will be applied.
 - c. Special sheafs should be utilized to increase the effectiveness of fires placed upon roads, trails, streamlines or similar target areas.

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Appendix 4 (Fire Support Coordination) to Annex A (Operations) to
Americal Division Artillery Field SOP.

1. GENERAL.

- a. The Fire Support Element (FSE) operating within the Div TOC represents the Division Artillery Commander and is charged with carrying out his policies and guidance with respect to fire support coordination within the Division Artillery.
- b. The direct support artillery commander in the brigade AO is the fire support coordinator.

2. RESPONSIBILITIES.

- a. The responsibilities of the fire support coordinator include but are not limited to the following:
 - (1) Planning, allocating, coordinating, and integrating all available fire support means in accordance with the directives, policies, and priorities of the supported force commander.
 - (2) Establishing No Fire Lines and Fire Coordination Lines in coordination with commanders of supported units.
 - (3) Providing a LNO to the senior ARVN commander, and to each district chief in his AO. The duties of the LNO will include:
 - (a) Obtaining clearance to fire.
 - (b) Keeping US Forces informed of activities and disposition of Regional Forces, Popular Forces, and ARVN Forces.
 - (c) Keeping ARVN commanders informed of disposition and activities of US Forces.
 - (4) Maintaining latest targeting information for inclusion in fire plans and/or H&I programs.

3. CLEARANCE OF FIRES.

- a. Artillery, naval gunfire, and air missions will be conducted in accordance with the following rules.
 - (1) Harassing, interdiction, and preparatory missions located outside of free fire areas are executed only after GVN/ARVN approval as appropriate.
 - (2) Target of opportunity missions clearly identified as hostile with the mission under control of an AO/FO or FAC require no clearance. Targets not clearly identified as hostile must be cleared by GVN/ARVN agency prior to firing.
 - (3) Missions against known or suspected VC targets in hamlets and/or villages occupied by noncombatants will be conducted as follows:

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- (a) Defensive fires will be fired as requested by appropriate GVN or ARVN authority. Proper clearance must still be obtained.
 - (b) All missions on hamlets or villages will be controlled by either an FO, AO or FAC.
 - (c) Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked without prior warning (leaflet or loudspeaker) even though light fire is being received from them.
 - (d) Hamlets and villages may be attacked without warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, and if in the opinion of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.
 - (e) None of the above controls abridge the right of self-defense, and artillery may be fired without clearance at the request of any unit in contact. The decision to do so will be made by the senior officer present.
- c. Fires near inhabited areas will be governed by the following additional guidance:
- (1) Target plots will be compared with best available data on locations of inhabited areas.
 - (2) Unobserved fires will not be planned closer than 1000 meters from friendly villages or hamlets unless specifically requested by ARVN or clearly identified as hostile and cleared for firing by ARVN/GVN authorities.
- d. Free Fire Areas are established by GVN or ARVN authorities. Americal Division Artillery will disseminate to appropriate agencies and units.
- e. No fire areas may be established by GVN/ARVN authorities or US Forces commanders. No Fire Areas will be disseminated by Americal Division Artillery to all interested agencies and units and will be graphically portrayed on artillery situation maps, (firing charts when feasible) if within range of organic, attached, or supporting artillery.
- f. All fires to include artillery, naval gunfire and airstrikes delivered or having possible effect across a NFL/FCL will be cleared with the fire support coordinator of the TAOR/AO effected by the fires. Possible effect will be considered to be fires delivered within 500 meters of a boundary.
- g. Fires outside a brigade TAOR will be submitted to FSE for clearance with proper authorities.
4. BATTLEFIELD ILLUMINATION.
- a. Illumination by artillery will be fired on authority of DS Artillery commander.
 - b. Consideration should be given to patrol activity of adjacent units prior to firing illumination except in case of emergency.

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5. SIGNAL SMOKE.

- a. It is imperative that artillery personnel, particularly FOs, AOs and LNOs have a thorough knowledge of the use of smoke.
- b. Division SOI outlines use of smoke.
- c. Whenever possible, confirmation of use and meaning will be obtained by radio.

6. SAFETY.

- a. Safeguarding aircraft from Artillery Fire: Tab A (Safeguarding Aircraft from Artillery Fire).
- b. Artillery units will habitually post an air sentry during all fire missions. Firing will be suspended when aircraft cross line of fire. Air sentries must be alert for aircraft approaching from any direction. If more than one fire mission is being conducted by the battery, an air sentry will be provided for each mission in progress. In addition, each forward observer or air observer will follow the same precaution with regard to the forward end of the trajectory during adjustment of fire.
- c. VT fuze will not be used during periods when aircraft are endangered.
- d. Restriction on artillery fire is not required during air-strikes unless risk is excessive. When restrictions are necessary they are planned and coordinated by the Brigade FSCC on Div FSE, as appropriate. Positive coordination will be effected to insure aircraft safety.
- e. No Fire Areas should be established around isolated units, outposts, friendly villages, and other installations where positive safety measures are required.

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Tab A - Safeguarding Aircraft from Artillery Fire
B - Countermortar and Counterrocket Program

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Annex B (Intelligence) to Americal Division Artillery Field SOP

1. REFERENCES.
 - a. FM 30-5.
 - b. FM 31-22.
 - c. FM 101-5.
 - d. MACV Dir 190-3.
 - e. MACV Dir 381-11.
 - f. MACV Dir 381-22.
 - g. Americal Division Field SOP.
2. PURPOSE.

To establish procedures for the execution of the intelligence function within the Division Artillery.
3. MISSION.

To provide accurate, timely and useful intelligence on the enemy, weather and terrain and to deny the enemy access to similar information on friendly forces.
4. CAPTURED MATERIEL.
 - a. Includes all weapons, munitions, foodstuffs, medicine, clothing and other equipment taken from the enemy, his bases, his caches or that policed from the battlefield.
 - b. Evacuation.
 - (1) Captured materiel having intelligence value is evacuated through intelligence channels to G2, Americal Division.
 - (2) The following are evacuated:
 - (a) All weapons, except US, and those authorized for retention as war trophies.
 - (b) Samples of all munitions except common US and foreign hand grenades, mines, mortar and artillery projectiles.
 - (c) Two quarts of rice, salt, flour, wheat, corn and other foodstuffs, from each cache.
 - (d) Samples of each type of medicine and medical supplies.
 - (e) Samples of clothing, footwear, bolts of cloth, plastics and other materiel.
 - (f) Samples of all unusual equipment.
 - (3) Evacuated materiel is tagged and identified as to the time, date, and place of capture, capturing unit, and complete description of the materiel.
 - (4) Materiel that cannot be evacuated is described thoroughly and photographed or sketched, if possible, prior to destruction.
 - c. War Trophies (USARV Regulation 643-20).
5. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.
 - a. Captured documents are batched along with a batch slip and

B-1

CANCELLATION DATE OF PROTECTIVE
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- evacuated to S2. A document inventory sheet is prepared in duplicate (one copy accompanies the document and one is filed).
- b. Cryptographic documents are handled as SECRET and delivered promptly to the nearest supporting Radio Research Unit.
6. PRISONERS OF WAR, SUSPECTS, CIVIL DEFENDANTS AND RETURNEES (Div SOP).
- a. PWs will be evacuated to the nearest PW collection point on organic transportation of the capturing unit. All detainees are accorded the same treatment as prisoners of war until their status is determined.
 - b. Capturing unit disarms, searches, silences, and segregates prisoners into groups: officers, noncommissioned officers, enlisted men, dependents, returnees, and suspects. PWs will not be allowed to eat, drink, or smoke prior to interrogation by IPW personnel unless the length of time would make such practice inhumane.
 - c. The capturing unit tags each person with a Captive Card (MACV Form 340).
 - d. Wounded and seriously ill captives are evacuated through medical channels. Information on location of the medical facility to which the captive is evacuated is reported to the Division Artillery S2 as a spot report.
 - e. Handling of captives will be in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva treaties.
7. MAPS.
- a. Div Arty S2 has staff responsibility for distribution and storage of maps.
 - b. Requests for maps or aerial photographs will be processed by the Div Arty S2. These requests may be made telephonically or by writing. DS Artillery units obtain maps through Brigade S2.
8. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
- a. Complete operations orders will not be carried forward of battery positions. Forward observers, air observers, and liaison parties will utilize need to know extracts.
 - b. All installations will be searched prior to evacuation to insure no printed material, ammunition, or items usable by the enemy are left behind. Whenever possible, post evacuation search will be by CI personnel assigned to the MID. Special care should be taken to avoid leaving any type of dry batteries, communication wire, food, and metal. All C ration cans should be perforated and flattened.
 - c. Known or suspected loss or compromise of classified material will be immediately reported to the Div Arty S2.
9. REPORTS.
- a. Spot Report. By telephone or over the Div Arty Intelligence Net. Reports answer the questions WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW and WHY.

B-2

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Americal Division Artillery
Republic of Vietnam
1 December 1967

Annex C (Personnel and Administration) to Americal Division Artillery SOP

1. REFERENCES:

- a. Americal Division Field SOP.
- b. USARV Regulation 614-30.
- c. USARV Regulation 360-81.
- d. Americal Division Regulation 22-1.
- e. Americal Division Regulation 27-20.
- f. Americal Division Regulation 335-6.
- g. Americal Division Regulation 690-5.
- h. Americal Division Regulation 672-1.
- i. Americal Division Regulation 630-1.
- j. Americal Division Regulation 28-1.
- k. Americal Division Regulation 230-60.
- l. Americal Division Regulation 60-5.
- m. Americal Division Regulation 670-5.
- n. Americal Division Regulation 385-8.
- o. Americal Division Regulation 385-10.

2. PURPOSE:

To prescribe policies and procedures for conduct of personnel and administrative services within Americal Division Artillery.

3. GENERAL.

In order to minimize administrative traffic of troops to the rear CP, mobile AG and finance teams will be provided periodically or on an on-call basis. S1s and personnel sergeants can reduce this administrative traffic by frequent visits to the forward areas.

4. MAINTENANCE OF STRENGTH.

- a. Mass Casualty Reporting. Spot Casualty Reports will be submitted immediately following attacks producing mass casualties in the units (battery size or larger) to the Americal Division G1. Format for reports will be USARV Form 173 or 173-1. An information copy of all spot casualty reports will be provided immediately to the Division Artillery S1. (See Americal Division Field SOP).
- b. Casualty Reports. (See Americal Division Field SOP). Information copy of casualty reports to Division Artillery S1 ASAP. Accuracy must be emphasized. A notation will be made thereon of any pending awards for deceased or wounded personnel.
- c. Replacements. (See Americal Division Field SOP). Requisitions for replacements for separate artillery battalions will be processed through Division AG.
- d. Strength Reports. (See Americal Division Field SOP). An information copy of daily strength reports will be submitted to Division Artillery S1 NLT 0930 hours daily. Morning Reports will be

C-1

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submitted through previously established channels.

5. DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER.

a. Commanders are responsible to properly orient newly assigned personnel concerning their expected high standards of conduct and discipline. It is considered that as a minimum this orientation should include information on the local customs, proper conduct toward the civilian population, and the role of the US Army in RVN. This orientation will be given by the battery commander and will meet all requirements of USARV Regulation 360-81.

b. Military Justice.

(1) See Americal Division Regulation 22-1.

(2) Claims processed IAW Americal Division Regulation 27-20.

(3) Legal assistance and services will be provided by teams from the SJA Americal Division travelling to the field on an announced basis.

c. Provost Marshal. See Americal Division Regulation 335-6.

6. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.

a. US Military Personnel.

(1) Personnel Actions. All 1049s to include requests for extension, or curtailment of foreign service tours, ITTS or other transfers will be processed thru parent organizations.

(2) Rotating personnel will be returned to parent unit base camps at least one week prior to DEROS. In-country transportation will be coordinated through Division AG.

b. Local National Personnel.

(1) Civilian Personnel. Battalions will submit requirements to Americal Division G1.

(2) Imprest Fund. Americal Division Regulation 690-5.

(3) Interpreter Control. (See Americal Division Field SOP).

7. GRAVES REGISTRATION. See Americal Division Field SOP.

8. MORALE AND PERSONNEL SERVICES.

a. Finance. See Americal Division Field SOP.

b. Awards and Decorations. Americal Division Regulation 672-1.

c. Leaves. Americal Division Regulation 630-1.

d. Emergency and Compassionate Leaves. Emergency and compassionate leaves will be processed through Americal Division AG section. Personnel, with approved emergency or compassionate leaves will depart for CONUS from DA NANG.

e. Special Services.

(1) Movies: Americal 16mm movie accounts will be established with the Americal Division Special Services Officer.

(2) A&R and other special services equipment will be drawn from the Americal Division Special Services Officer.

f. Chaplain. Americal Division Field SOP.

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AMERICAL TOC NR 468.....468.....468

OOINXR 105V
DE I REL 21131 2982512
ZNY 00000
08705102 APR 68
FM CG AMERICAL DIV CH1
TO CG 11 TH LT INF BDE SFC
INFO CG 198 TH LT INK BDE CH1

BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L A V D F - C C
SUBJECT: FRAG O 24-68

1. TASK FORCE BARKER DISCONTINUED OPERATIONS IN MISORTINE AQ. AND IS DISBANED EFFECTIVE 081200H APR 68
2. ACKNOWLEDGE

SP-4
BT

NNNN
AMD MATE QSL AT 0522
K K K K K

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JOINT MESSAGE FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
	B		

PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

ACTION
ROUTINE

INFO
ROUTINE

11th LT INF BDE

FROM: CG, AMERICAL DIVISION, CHU LAI

TO: CO, 3D BDE, 1ST CAV DIV (AFL) LZ BALDY (COURIER)

CO, 3D BDE, 11TH INF DIV, DUC PHO (COURIER)

CO, 196TH LT INF BDE, HILL 25 (COURIER)

CO, 198TH LT INF BDE, CHU LAI (COURIER)

CO, AMERICAL DIV ARTY, CHU LAI (COURIER)

CO, AMERICAL SPT COMB, CHU LAI (COURIER)

CO, 1ST SQDR, 1ST CAV, HILL 29 (COURIER)

CO, 14TH AVN BN, CHU LAI (COURIER)

CO, 39TH ENGR BN, CHU LAI (COURIER)

INFO: CG, 11TH LT INF BDE (ADV PLAN GP), CHU LAI (COURIER)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS	
DISTRIBUTION	
C/S	G1
1	1
G2	G3
1	70
G4	G5
1	1
1 TOC	1
1 NGLO	1 RRU
ENGR	ID
1	1
1 HIST	1
1 CLDC	1
1	1
1 FSE	1 CHEM
1 TACP	1 COMCON
CLEARED FOR DISPATCH	
DATE	TIME
02	0100Z
MONTH	YEAR
DEC	67
PAGE NO.	NO OF PAGES
1	4

UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO AVDFCC 6660

SUBJECT: Reporting

Reference: TF Oregon/Americal Div Field RCP, 21 Mar 67.

1. (FOUO) The following data is extracted from Appendix 9 (Reports) to Annex A (Operations) to ref for information and compliance:

a. Spot Reports:

DISTRIBUTION	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	PHONE	SIGNATURE
	CLINTON E. GRANGER, JR. LTC, GS ACofS, G3	403	<i>[Signature]</i>
			TYPED NAME AND TITLE
			K. KAWAWATA, CPT, AGC, ASST AG

PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION	ROUTINE	K. KANEHATA, CMC, CG	CLINTON B. GRANGER, JR.	
INFO	ROUTINE	ASST AG	LTC. GS, ACoFS, G3	403

- (1) Format: no required format
- (2) Submitting unit: all units
- (3) Method of transmission: fastest means to G3 (TOC)
- (4) Remarks: submit without delay after incident occurs

or becomes known.

b. Hourly SITREP:

- (1) Format:
 - (a) Line 1 - Unit identification - unit, SITREP as of hour.
 - (b) Line 2 - Center of mass of each company size element, if changed from previous report.
 - (c) Line 3 - Points of friendly contact - coordinates and units.
 - (d) Line 4 - Command location - changes in CP locations.
 - (e) Line 5 - Actions since last report; actions anticipated for next hour.

2. (U) Spot reports will be rendered, at a minimum, on the following.

- a. Initial contact with an enemy force.
- b. Detaining of suspects.

Granger

CONTROL NO.	TOR/TOP	PAGE NO.	NO OF PAGES	MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	INITIALS
		2	4		<i>WJ</i>
RETRAINING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
UNCLASSIFIED					

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE	K. KAWANATA, CPT, AGC	CLINTON E. GRANGER, JR.	
INFO ROUTINE	ASST AG	LTC, GS, AGOFS, G3	403

- c. Capture of prisoners
- d. Aircraft accidents.
- e. Significant results of prisoner interrogation.
- f. Initial sighting of enemy personnel or units.
- g. Combat loss of vehicles.
- h. Enemy or friendly casualties.
- i. Use of enemy mortars, rockets, or crew-served weapons.
- j. Enemy efforts to maneuver, reinforce or disengage, while
in contact.
- k. Breaking contact.
- l. Delivery of first left for combat assault, together with
report on whether the enemy contested this assault or not.
- m. Closure of last left of a combat assault.
- n. Ground to air firing by the enemy, to include any casual-
ties or damage to the aircraft.
- o. Insertion or extraction of Long Range Reconnaissance
Patrols.
- p. Discovery of weapons, food, signal equipment, or medical
caches or facilities.
- q. Capture of signal equipment.
- r. Capture of unusual weapons.

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		3	4		<i>WJC</i>

REGULATING INSTRUCTIONS

745

UNCLASSIFIED

FFG, Japan

ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGE FORM
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

PRECEDENCE	RELEASED BY	DRAFTED BY	PHONE
ACTION ROUTINE	K. KABAYATA, CPT, ACC	CLINTON E. GRANGER, JR.	
INFO ROUTINE	ASST AG	LTC, GS, ACofS, G3	403

s. Heavy friendly or civilian casualties occurring in a short period of time.

3. (U) Spot reports will not be delayed pending obtaining additional information, but will be rendered promptly with such information as may be available. Reports will be expanded or corrected as additional information becomes known.

BT

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ERRATA INSTRUCTIONS

746

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

70

M

PRIORITY

CG, TF OREGON, CHU LAI, RVN

CG, 1ST BDE, 101ST ABN DIV, DUC PHO, RVN

CG, 196TH INF BDE (LT), CHU LAI, RVN

CO, 3D BDE, 25TH INF DIV, DUC PHO, RVN

CO, TF OREGON ARTY, CHU LAI, RVN

Copies for:
C/S
G3
G1
Arty

INFO: CO, 3D BN, 16TH ARTY, CHU LAI, RVN

CO, 3D BN, 18TH ARTY, CHU LAI, RVN

CO, 2D BN, 11TH ARTY, DUC PHO, RVN

CO, 2D BN, 9TH ARTY, DUC PHO, RVN

CO, 3D BN, 82D ARTY, CHU LAI, RVN

CO, 2D BN, 320TH ARTY, DUC PHO, RVN

Concurrence:
G3 _____

F O U O - E F T O AVDF-AT CITE 2128

SUBJECT: Double Check Procedures for Artillery Units (U)

KNOWLES SENDS FOR MATHESON, LINNELL, WEAR AND YOUNG

Cleared for
Dispatch: _____

1. The counterinsurgency environment in Vietnam represents a continuing challenge to artillery units to render accurate, responsive, reliable fire without injuring friendly troops or non-combatants.

Detailed instructions are included in the TF OREGON Field SOP (Appendix 4, Fire Support Coordination to Annex A, (Operations) and the TF

OREGON Artillery Field SOP. Compliance with these directives is

essential.

July 1967
1 4

428

/s/Mason J. Young Jr.
/t/MASON J. YOUNG JR.
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

/s/O.A. Cerner Jr., CPT, AGC, Asst AG
/t/O.A. CERNER JR., CPT, AGC, Asst AG

747

EXHIBIT M-72

i. FDC's must be adequately manned for 24 hour operation. The TF GREGON Artillery Field SOP requires as a minimum two five man shifts, each with an FDC. In a battery which is operating the primary fire direction center. Battalions must augment batteries to make these personnel levels attainable.

j. Each battalion must have a continuing program of orientation and training in artillery techniques for FDC's, FDC's and key enlistedmen, in accordance with the TF GREGON Artillery message AVDF-AT 1483 DTG 201501Z May.

3. A copy of this message will be on file in each artillery battalion or battery FDC, along with references specified in the recently issued primary checklist.

4. If compliance with these instructions is not possible because of personnel shortages or other problems, commanders are enjoined to make these problem areas known to this headquarters.

2. Continuing command emphasis is required on the following points:

- a. Operation of the double check system in all fires, to include, but not limited to:
 - (1) Read back of all fire commands.
 - (2) Independent computation of data.
 - (3) Use of an FDC check chart and a check computer on all FDC's.
 - (4) Insuring that qualified supervisory personnel are present during firing on a shift basis and are free from other duties; specifically this includes personnel fulfilling the duties of the Chief of Section, the Firing Battery Executive Officer or Chief of Firing Battery and the Fire Direction Officer.
 - (5) Use of air sentinels to warn of aircraft approaching the trajectory.
- b. All artillerymen in the gunnery chain must be alert as to where their unit is firing. Fire commands which place fire in uncharted areas, or cause a drastic change in direction or range from previous firings, should be questioned.
- c. Locations of friendly units, to include SEVN and allied units nearby, should be kept current and be plotted on the situation map of all FDC's. Current boundaries, No Fire Zones or Lines, should be plotted.
- d. It is essential that the FDC check the plot of each fire

mission against an up-to-date situation map, and question fire missions that appear to be too close to friendly troops or inhabited areas.

e. Instructions in the Task Force Order 1001 referenced in para 1 above must be complied with as regards air safety (SAV-4-20000 advisories), ground safety, clearance of fires, and minimizing non-combatant casualties. Most particularly the restrictions against firing on hamlets and villages will be complied with.

f. When infantry is in contact they will be accorded all fire support required. However, commanders should guard against needlessly expending ammunition in H&I fires and unobserved fires which do not contribute directly to the commanders plan of maneuver.

g. When artillery fires are called in closer than 200 meters by infantry in contact, the FDC will require the FC to advise the infantry commander as concerns the probabilities that dispersion might cause friendly casualties. The degree of risk varies with the caliber, direction of fire and range. It is understood that in some cases the tactical situation will require that fire be brought in closer to the infantry than 200 meters.

h. Requests to fire outside assigned boundaries will be the exception and should be fully justified as well as cleared with the adjacent unit. Intelligence of enemy outside a units boundary is normally passed to the adjacent unit for such action as they consider is appropriate.

*REGULATION
NUMBER 1-3

31 March 1967

ADMINISTRATION

Reporting of Serious Incidents

1. PURPOSE: This regulation establishes procedures and responsibility to insure prompt and uniform reporting of serious incidents involving 11th Infantry Brigade equipment, personnel and their dependents when such incidents are not reportable as "Blue Bell" under the provisions of Brigade Regulation 1-1.

2. INCIDENTS TO BE REPORTED: An incident which adversely affects community or public relations and may result in derogatory press, radio or television coverage on a local or national level, or reflects adversely on the capability and effectiveness of the U.S. Army will be reported. Types of incidents to be reported include:

- a. Deaths from other than natural causes to include deaths of foreign national personnel when U.S. Army personnel or equipment are involved.
- b. Burglary, robbery and mutiny.
- c. Suicides and attempted suicides.
- d. Self inflicted gunshot wounds.
- e. Mass escape from U.S. Army confinement facilities.
- f. Aggravated assaults when committed against a foreign national.
- g. Terrorist activities involving U.S. personnel and/or U.S. Government property.
- h. Any incident meeting the criteria of paragraph 5b, 11th Infantry Brigade Regulation 1-1 ("BLUE BELL" Reports, RCS CSOCS-62) and not considered reportable as a "BLUE BELL" under the provisions of AR 1-55.

3. REPORTING PROCEDURES WITHIN THE 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE:

- a. Incidents reported as "Blue Bell" under the provisions of 11th Infantry Brigade Regulation 1-1 will not be additionally reported as a serious incident.

*This regulation supersedes Regulation No. 600-3, HQ, 11th Inf Bde, 26 Oct 66.

b. During duty hours the person first receiving information on a serious incident will immediately bring it to the direct attention of:

- (1) Brigade S1, or if not present,
- (2) Adjutant General.

c. The responsible person as listed above will notify Headquarters, USARHAW as soon as possible after the occurrence of a reportable incident, but no later than eight hours thereafter. During duty hours, reports will be forwarded to the Office of the Provost Marshal, Headquarters, USARHAW.

d. The 11th Infantry Brigade Staff Duty Officer will be notified during non-duty hours, who will in-turn notify USARHAW Staff Duty Officer.

e. Initial Reports:

(1) Reports (as indicated in Inclosure 1) are required from the reporting units as soon as possible after the reportable incident occurs, but not later than eight hours after occurrence. In those cases where a death from other than natural causes occurs at some time subsequent to the incident, the reporting requirements of this regulation will be followed.

(2) Speed in transmitting initial reports is stressed. Reports will not be delayed awaiting the receipt of additional information or the results of investigation. Reports may be made by telephone; however, a written report will be submitted the following duty day.

(3) In those cases in which foul play is not probable (such as suicides or accidental deaths) and in all other cases when sufficient information is available to indicate corrective action has been accomplished, the initial and final reports may be combined. In these instances paragraph 13, of the combined report, will contain a statement to the effect that "no further report will be submitted on the incident unless later investigation warrants".

f. Supplementary Reports:

(1) Supplementary reports will be submitted as information becomes available and, as a minimum, each 45 days until final action has been completed and a terminal report is submitted.

(2) These reports will reflect the current status of the incident, personnel involved, and, in applicable cases, changes in local public reactions or attitudes.

g. Terminal Reports:

(1) Terminal reports will be submitted immediately upon completion of appropriate action.

(2) Terminal reports will include the following:

(a) Report of any disciplinary action taken against personnel involved.

(b) Corrective administrative action taken to preclude a similar-type incident.

h. Reports submitted under the provisions of this regulation are unclassified except when the nature of the incident requires classification.

i. Instructions or Standing Operating Procedures implementing the procedures outlined in this regulation will be submitted to this headquarters, ATTN: XIPE.

4. REFERENCES: a. AR 1-55.


b. USARHAW Reg No. 1-55.

c. USARHAW Reg No. 1-1.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(XIPE)

1 Incl
as


C. KASTENBAUM
MAJ, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

B plus

2 - CG, USARHAW, ATTN: AG

5 - CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPAG

FORMAT FOR REPORTING SERIOUS INCIDENTS

INITIAL REPORTS

1. Security classification.
2. Date of report.
 - a. Cite symbol "Serious Incident."
 - b. Reports Control Sumbol PPE-22(R2).
3. Nature of incident. A synopsis, to include such factual data available at time of reporting as the answers to what, how and why.
4. Place where incident occurred. Report exact location, using identifiable landmarks, miles to nearest town, city or village. Do not report location by map coordinates.
5. Date of incident.
6. Personnel involved.
 - a. Military: Name, grade, service number, security clearance, duty assignment, organization and station.
 - b. Civilian:
 - (1) DA: Name, grade, position, security clearance and station assignment.
 - (2) Individual: Name and address.
 - (3) Business firm: Name and address.
 - (4) Dependents overseas: Name, location and sponsor.
7. Source of information.
8. Any other pertinent comments to include, but not limited to:
 - a. Degree of access to classified information of those involved when relevant to incident.
 - b. Agencies investigating.
 - c. Disposition of remains.

- d. Location of confinement.
- e. Bail establishment.
- f. Proposed actions, either administrative or judicial.

9. An opinion as to whether widespread or continuing local publicity of a derogatory nature can be expected.

10. Statement as to whether or not the incident might embarrass or otherwise be of concern to the Department of Defense, Department of the Army, or USARPAC. If affirmative, state the reason(s).

11. Notification: G2 or Intelligence Officer (as appropriate) (has) (has not) been apprised of this incident.

12. Name, grade and station of commander making the report to USARPAC.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORTS

Pertinent information submitted in the same format as Initial Reports.

TERMINAL REPORTS

Pertinent information submitted in the same format as Initial and Supplementary Reports. A paragraph 13 will be added to each terminal report or combined report submitted pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3e(3) of this regulation as follows: "No further report will be submitted on this incident unless later investigation warrants."

NOTE: When there is no information to be reported in a paragraph, the term "NA" will be used.

Incl 1 to Bde Reg 1-3, 31 March 1967

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96217

11th Bde Reg 525-1

REGULATION
NUMBER 525-1

30 January 1968

COMBAT OPERATIONS

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (U)

1. (U) Purpose: This regulation establishes criteria for engaging targets by direct and indirect fire in combat operations.
2. (U) Scope: Applicable to all combat and combat support units assigned, attached or in support of the 11th Light Inf Bde.
3. (U) General:
 - a. Indiscrimination in engaging targets that are not clearly defined as being hostile which result in numerous non-battle casualties and property loss will tend to embitter the population and make the long term goal of pacification more difficult and costly.
 - b. The VC/NVA exploit incidents of non-combatant casualties and property destruction by Free World Forces to alienate the people from the government.
 - c. This situation creates an environment not normally found on the battle field. Commanders must use sound judgment when determining the type and amount of combat power in accomplishing a mission, particularly in populated areas, so as to preclude "over kill" on a target which could result in unnecessary non-battle casualties and property damage.
 - d. Nothing shall infringe on the right of a commander to exercise self defense. The commander must take immediate action against an attacking force with all available means in unpopulated areas, however, every possible safeguard short of endangering friendly lives will be used to avoid non-combatant casualties and indifferent and indiscriminate destruction of private property when such action is being conducted in populated areas.
4. (C) Employment of small arms and automatic weapons:
 - a. Individual and crew served weapons to include: M-16, M-60, M-79, M1A1 claymore, M-26 grenade, 50 cal MG, 90MM and 106RR may be employed by commanders against:
 - (1) Enemy personnel observed with weapons who demonstrate hostile intent either by taking a friendly unit under fire, taking evasive action, or who occupy a firing position or bunker.

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EXHIBIT D-7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(2) Targets which are observed and positively identified as enemy.

(3) Point targets from which fire is being received. (This will not be construed as permission for indiscriminate firing into areas inhabited by non-combatants).

(4) Suspected enemy locations when non-combatants will not be endangered.

b. Artillery, mortar, naval gunfire, tactical air and armed helicopters:

(1) General: Restrictive controls should be applied only to insure that danger to non-combatants and private property is kept to the very minimum and that national borders are not violated. Proper gunnery techniques will be applied to insure maximum accuracy as this is the best assurance against endangering non-combatants and private property.

(2) Employment:

(a) Exclusive of populated areas, unobserved fires may be directed against enemy forces in contact in accordance with normal procedures. When not in contact unobserved fire will be directed only in areas declared hostile by GVN/RVNAF/PWMAF authorities.

(b) Unobserved naval gunfire will not be employed when there is a means of observation i.e., NGLO, FAC, or artillery observer.

(3) Specified strike zones:

(a) Specified strike zones must be approved by GVN/RVNAF as appropriate.

(b) Unobserved fires to include naval gunfire may be directed against all targets and target areas located within specified strike zones.

(4) Uninhabited areas outside specified strike zones:

(a) Fire may be directed against VC/NVA Forces in combat.

(b) Unobserved fires may be directed at targets and target areas, other than VC/NVA Forces in contact only with Province Chief, District Chief, Sector Commander, or Sub-sector Commander approval as appropriate. (this includes 11th Inf Bde Recon Zone).

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(c) Observed fire may be directed against targets of opportunity which are clearly defined as hostile without obtaining approval from Province Chief, District Chief, Sector Commander, or Sub-sector Commander.

(d) Appropriate Province Chief, District Chief, Sector Commander, or Sub-sector Commander approval is required before directing fire on targets of opportunity not clearly identified as hostile.

(5) Villages and hamlets: Fire missions directed against known or suspected VC/NVA targets in villages and hamlets occupied by non-combatants will be conducted as follows:

(a) All such fire missions will be controlled by an observer and will be executed only with Province Chief or District Chief approval as appropriate.

(b) Villages and hamlets not associated with maneuver of ground forces will not be fired upon without prior warning by leaflet and/or loud speaker systems or by other means, even though fire is received from them.

(c) Villages and hamlets may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving maneuver of ground forces through the area, and if in the judgement of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning as specified in (b) above.

(d) The use of incendiary type ammunition will be avoided unless absolutely necessary to successful accomplishment of the mission.

(e) Following criteria will be used against known or suspected enemy targets in areas occupied by non-combatants:

105MM fires - no closer than 500 meters plus 4 range PEs (prob errors).

155MM fires - no closer than 800 meters plus 4 range PEs (prob errors).

8" & 175MM fires - no closer than 1000 meters plus 4 range PEs (prob errors).

(f) Fires will be placed no closer than 200 meters of any main paved road. When targets are located on or near a road VT fuze will be used to the maximum extent possible.

d. Free Fire Zones: All targets may be engaged at any time by any fire delivery means available to the commander.

e. No Fire Zone: No firing permitted by any weapon without prior approval from this headquarters.

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f. Pacified Areas:

(1) Units may conduct cordon and search at request or with approval of the district or village chief and the approval of this headquarters. VN officials and/or advisor personnel must accompany US Forces on such an operation.

(2) Commanders will exercise utmost care to insure maximum non-combatant casualties and property damage.

(3) Fire discipline will be strictly observed. Rules of engagement and types of weapons to be used will be coordinated by the commander and sector/sub-sector advisor, if possible, prior to commencing the operation.

5. (C) Application:

a. Commanders at all echelons will plan and conduct operations in accordance with this directive.

6. (C) Miscellaneous:

a. Immediately following the attack of areas inhabited by non-combatants, the force commander will insure that an explanation is given to the populace of the need for firing, stressing the point that the enemy forced the action.

b. If non-combatant casualties occur regardless of safeguards, medical treatment and evacuation should be provided by the responsible commander, subject to tactical considerations and resources available.

c. Destruction of fortified villages, structures in VC base camps, or structures that are obviously VC fighting positions is authorized without approval from this headquarters.

d. Coordination must be made with ARVN/civilian authorities to determine the exact hour of curfew. Movement outside of the immediate perimeter after those hours will be construed as hostile. Villagers may move around within confines of a village after curfew, therefore, this must be taken into consideration if a unit is located adjacent to a village.

e. Individuals that appear to be attempting to escape or evade may be frightened, innocent civilians. The commander on the site must exercise judgement as to whether to engage these individuals or not. The commander must base his decisions on his overall knowledge of the area, situation, mission, and safety of his command.

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f. Personnel who attempt to evade and are identified as members of NVA or VC Forces by the wearing of a uniform, web gear or pack and/or have possession of a weapon may be engaged. Every attempt will be made to halt these personnel by giving the command halt (Dung Lai) and firing warning shots overhead. If attempts to halt evading personnel fail they will then be engaged by fire with intent to wound by firing at lower extremities. The wounded captive will then be treated and evacuated as rapidly as possible for exploitation of intelligence he may possess.

g. Maneuver or fire support elements will not expand the Bde AO without approval of this headquarters: prior coordination with the adjacent AO commander; and Americal Division Headquarters, will be made by Bde.


h. Perimeter defense (as opposed to a maneuvering force).

(1) A person not belonging to any Free World Armed Force, observed carrying a weapon will be immediately engaged. It must be remembered that within the Americal AO there are FD Teams which have civilian personnel assigned. These civilians who belong to GVN, normally wear black pajamas and are legally armed with carbines. These personnel will not be engaged. Coordination with District Chiefs of the area is directed in order to ascertain identification of, and how to identify these personnel.

(2) Any person attempting to enter the perimeter by other than recognized routes will be challenged, apprehended, or identified as enemy and will be engaged immediately.

(3) Unidentified personnel inside the perimeter will not be fired on unless positively identified as enemy. All measures will be taken to establish identity of personnel, i.e., challenging, apprehension of unidentified persons, sealing and searching the area, and sounding the alert.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


WILLIAM R. DAKNIS
MAJ, Inf
Adjutant

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C1; 11th LIB Reg 525-1 (C-2)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, 11th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division
APO San Francisco 96217

Change 1
Regulation
525-1

10 April 1968

COMBAT OPERATIONS
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (U)

11th Infantry Brigade Regulation 525-1, dated 22 Mar 68, is changed as follows:

* * * * *

Page 4, paragraph 4b(5)(e). (Superceded) (C) Unobserved fires will not be fired closer than 1000 meters to non-combatant or friendly troop locations when engaging known or suspected targets. The only exception to this policy is as outlined in paragraph 5, confidential letter, Americal Division, Subject: Countermortar and Counterrocket Measures (U), dated 29 Mar 68.

* * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WILLIAM R. DAKNIS
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

Distribution: A

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Posted
30 MAR 68
D.J.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96217

61, Bde Reg 525-1

Change 1
REGULATION
NUMBER 525-1

9 February 1968

COMBAT OPERATIONS

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (U)

Brigade Regulation 525-1, this headquarters, 30 January 1968, is changed as follows:

* * * * *

4. (C) Employment of small arms and automatic weapons.

f. * * *

* * * * *

(2) (Superseded) Commanders will exercise utmost care to insure minimum non-combatant casualties and property damage.

* * * * *

FOR THE COMMANDER:



WILLIAM R. DARNIS
MAJ, Inf
Adjutant

Distribution: A

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HEADQUARTERS
11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96355

Training Memorandum
350-2

EDUCATION AND TRAINING

1. (C) Purpose: To prescribe policies and guidance for units of this command in planning and conducting a phased in-country training program after arrival of the Brigade Main Body at Duc Pho, RVN.

2. (C) Scope: This Training Memorandum is applicable to all units assigned or attached to this headquarters and pertains to individual and unit training requirements during the first 30 days of the Brigade in the Duc Pho area.

3. (C) Mission:

a. The 11th Infantry Brigade training mission is to attain a maximum state of combat readiness in a minimum amount of time with major emphasis toward tactical conditions as encountered in I CTZ.

b. Upon completion of the training program the 11th Infantry Brigade will assume the mission of operating in the Duc Pho AO.

4. (U) Responsibilities:

a. 3d Brigade 4th Infantry Division will provide assistance in the conduct of training.

b. Battalion and separate unit commanders will develop a detailed training program based on the guidance provided in this training memorandum. A copy of unit training programs will be forwarded to this headquarters.

c. Brigade 83 will monitor and supervise the conduct of all training and will assist commanders in scheduling specialized training not within unit capabilities.

5. (U) Training Requirements: As a minimum the following training will be conducted:

a. Individuals and Junior Leaders

(1) Mines and booby traps.

(2) Health and Sanitation.

(3) Actions necessary to cope with environment of Vietnam (terrain and weather).

(4) Individual actions relative to Civic Action, Medcap and Psychological Operations.

(5) Employment of CB; use of protective mask.

(6) Familiarization on small arms and crew-served weapons, to include maintenance.

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Handwritten signature or initials at the bottom right.

Handwritten initials and marks at the bottom right.

- (7) Maintenance of individual and organizational clothing and equipment.
- (8) Land navigation.
- (9) Convoy procedures and safety.
- (10) Battlefield police.
- (11) P handling.
- (12) Adjustment of artillery and mortar fire.
- (13) Communications techniques and procedures.
- (14) Sentry Duty (including perimeter defense of static positions).

b. Unit Training:

- (1) Airmobile operations.
- (2) Meeting engagements.
- (3) Advance to contact.
- (4) Use of supporting fires.
- (5) Night operations.
- (6) Patrol techniques and planning.
- (7) Ambush and counter-ambush.
- (8) Operations with armor.

6. (C) Unit Training Programs. As general guidance the following phasing of training will govern (D-Day will be 24 December 1967):

a. All Units:

D-Day	Arrival Duc Pho
D+1	Stand-down at Duc Pho
D+2 to D+7	Individual and junior leader training

b. Infantry Battalions:

D+8 to D+30	Unit Training
D+31	Relieve 3/4 Bns and assume responsibility for designated m's.

c. 5/11 Arty:

D+8 to D+30	Train with 2/9 Arty
D+31	Assume combat mission

d. Trip E 1st Cav

D+8 to D+14	Unit Training
D+14 to D+30	Train with Trip C 1/10 Cav
D+31	Assume combat mission

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e. 6th Engr Co

D+8 to D+19
D+20

Unit Training
Assume combat mission

f. 6th Spt Bn, Bde SMC, and attachments

D+8

Assume normal support mission

FOR THE COMMANDER:



CHARLES C. CALHOUN
MAJ, INF
ADJ

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1 plus 3 AERICAL DIV
10 3d Bde 4th Inf Div

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To S-3
File
as

Annex A (Planning Guidance) to Training Memo 330-2

1. Purpose: To announce guidance for implementation of the basic memorandum.

2. General:

a. D Day is established as 24 December 1967.

b. D Day for Lift Planning instruction is equivalent to D+2 on the Training Program planning calendar.

c. Training other than that shown on the planning calendar will be scheduled by units IAW the basic memorandum.

3. Coordinating Instructions:

a. Lift Planning conducted by 174 Avn Co.

b. Airmobile Training.

(1) Conducted by 174 Avn Co.

(2) All Inf Cos and Arty Btys have been programmed for the orientation portion of this instruction. Only rifle companies will participate in CA's. Units have responsibility for CA planning. CA's will be planned with an 0900 hr lift and 1500 hr pick up.

(3) Cycle of Airmobile Training.

	<u>FIRST DAY</u>	<u>SECOND DAY</u>	<u>THIRD DAY</u>	<u>FOURTH DAY</u>
Inf -	Orientation	CA	Orientation	CA
Arty -	Orientation	CH47	None	None

(4) Airmobile orientation will be conducted from 0800 to 1200 hrs and cover the following subjects: 1 hr Slick, 1 hr Gunship & 2 hr Ride.

(5) Inf units will not participate in CA's prior to receiving the orientation.

(6) Arty units should be scheduled for orientation prior to CH47 instruction.

c. VN Village

(1) Conducted by 2d ARVN Div.

(2) Each Co size unit is programmed for 2 hrs of instructions. Selected elements of Cmbt Spt. & HQ Company of the Inf Bns will be integrated with the rifle companies.

(3) Arty Bn will integrate selected elements of HCS Btry with the firing batteries.

(4) Units scheduled for D+7 will attend in the following sequence:

- (a) Bde HHC - 0800 hrs
- (b) E Trp - 1000 hrs
- (c) 6th Engr - 1300 hrs
- (d) 6th Spt - 1300-1700 hrs

d. VN Orientation.

(1) Conducted by 3-4 Inf.

(2) Max attendance limited to 200, except as noted below. Units will prepare schedules to insure max attendance and completion within the allotted time.

(3) Arty Bn is authorized direct coordination with Inf Bns for integration of DS Btrys within above guidance.

(4) Classes conducted on D+3, D+8, D+20, D+15 and D+17 will be limited to 150 students.

3 Incl

- 1. Trg Program Planning Calendar BG
- 2. Lift Planning Schedule
- 3. VN Orient Subject Schedule

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S3

LEFT PLANNING

CODE	SUBJECT	AREA	ATTENDEES
A	BN EVAL LEFT PLANNING	BDE GRASS HUT	BDE CO + BDE STAFF, HHC CO, BN COs + STAFF COMPANY COs
B	CHAT USE	LZ LIVING END	BDE CO, STAFF AND HMC CO, BN COs #53, S3 AIR S4, SPT PLAT LDR, Co COs AND SPT PLAT LDRS SEP Co COs
C	SMALL UNIT LEFT PLANNING	LZ LIVING END	HMC CO, COMPANY COs, PLAT LDRS AND INCOME STAFF, PLAT LDRS, SPT LDRS, SEP Co COs + PLAT LDRS
D	UNIT RESUPPLY	LZ LIVING END	HMC CO, + SUPPLY AGES, BN S4, SPT PLAT LDR AND BN SUPPLY PERSONNEL, SEP Co SUPPLY AGES
E	GUN SHIPS	LZ LIVING END	BDE STAFF + HMC CO, BN CO, S3 and S3 AIR CO COs, PLAT LDRS, SPT LDRS AND SEP Co COs + PLAT LDRS
F	DUST OFF	LZ LIVING END	ALL OF THE ABOVE PLUS UNIT MEDICAL PERSONNEL MINUS SUPPLY AGES

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Copy No 1 of 75 copies
HQ, 11th Inf Bde
DUC PHO (BS814385) RVN
221700 Jan 68
SP7

FRAGORD: 3-68

Reference: Maps Vietnam, 1:50,000. Series L7014, 6738I, 6738II,
6838III, and 6838IV.

Task Organization. See OPOFD 15-67. No change except as follows:

TF BARKER

A-3-1

B-4-3

C-1-20

Squad C-26 Engr

Squad HHC MP Plat

Designated HQ elements

1. (c) SITUATION.

a. Enemy forces. Current INTSUMS.

b. Friendly forces.

(1) Americal Division executes relief of 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AML) with 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div commencing 23 Jan 68 and relinquishes OPCON 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AML) to 1st Cav Div (AML) upon closure Phu Bai area.

(2) 2d ARVN Div continues present operations.

(3) 2d ROK Marine Bde continues present operations.

(4) 198th Lt Inf Bde assumes complete control of MUSCATINE AO from 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div O/A 25 Jan 68.

(5) 7 US AIR FORCE provides TAG air support.

EXHIBIT D-15

c. Attachments and Detachments. OPOFD 15-67. TF BARKER released to initial OPCON 3d Bde, 4th Inf, effective 24 Jan 68 on crossing Southern boundary of MUSCATINE AO. On order OPCON passed to 198th Inf Bde.

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2. (S) MISSION.

11th Inf Bde continues current operations; forms and releases a two company task force to OPCON 3d Bde, 4th Inf and on order assumes responsibility for Southern portion of MUSCATINE AO.

3. (S) EXECUTION.

a. Concept of operation. Annex A, Operations Overlay.

(1) Maneuver. Bde continues current operations with 3-1 Inf (-) and 1-20 Inf(-) in sector; forms TF BARKER with A-3-1, B-4-3, C-1-20, combat support elements C-26 Engr, Bde HHC and a provisional TF headquarters drawn from Bde resources, and releases TF BARKER to initial OPCON 3-4 Inf for employment in MUSCATINE AO. On order Bde will assume responsibility for Southern portion of MUSCATINE AO with 4-3 Inf and TF BARKER continuing operations in assigned sector.

(2) Fires. No change.

b. 3-1 Inf (-).

(1) Continue present operations.

(2) Release A-3-1 Inf to OPCON TF BARKER effective on 24 Jan 68 at a mutually agreeable time.

(3) Resume control of 4.2-E-3-1 effective 271300 Jan 68.

c. 4-3 Inf.

(1) Effective on return to Bde control be prepared to continue operations in assigned AO.

(2) Provide combat service support to TF BARKER as required to sustain their combat operations.

d. 1-20 Inf.

(1) Continue present operations.

(2) Release C-1-20 Inf to OPCON TF BARKER.

(3) Terminate defense of LZ 00 (BS787371) and withdraw defense forces on completion of withdrawal of 3-1 Inf and 6-11 Arty elements on 27 Jan 68.

(4) Relinquish OPCON of 4.2-E-3-1 to control of parent unit effective 271300 Jan 68.

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e. TF BARKER.

(1) Assume OPCON of designated TF units effective 24 Jan 68 at a time mutually agreeable with commanders concerned except OPCON of C-1-20 effective 240900 Jan 68.

(2) Organize and prepare TF for sustained combat operations.

(3) Move TF (-) to AO GRANT by road on 24 Jan 68 and be prepared for release to OPCON 3d Bde, 4th Inf upon crossing Southern MUSCATINE AO boundary.

(4) Release C-1-20 Inf to Bde control effective 240900 Jan 68.

(5) Be prepared to resume control of C-1-20 Inf effective on order for deployment in designated sector of AO GRANT.

f. 6-11 Arty.

(1) DS

(2) Relocate counter-mortar radar section from LZ OD (BS787371) to selected site at LZ BRONCO (BS814385) and revise counter-mortar plans accordingly.

g. E-1 Cav.

(1) Continue present operations.

(2) Be prepared to release one provisional platoon including 4.2 mortar Squad, (5PCS), to OPCON of 4-3 or TF BARKER on order.

h. C-26 Engr.

(1) Continue present operations.

(2) Release Engr Sqd with mine clearing and pioneer capability to OPCON TF BARKER at a mutually agreeable time on 24 Jan 68.

i. 6th Spt Bn.

(1) Continue present operations.

(2) Augment 4-3 Inf with personnel and equipment necessary to sustain combat service support of TF BARKER.

(3) Provide medical team for deployment w/TF BARKER 24 Jan 68.

3

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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j. Bde Avn.

(1) Continue present operations.

(2) On order, be prepared to support combat operations of 4-3 Inf and TF BARKER in Southern portion of MUSCATINE AO.

k. PHC.

(1) Continue present operations.

(2) Release one MP squad to OPCON TF BARKER on 24 Jan 68.

l. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Direct coordination between commanders concerned is authorized and directed.

(2) Implementing plans will be prepared and forwarded to reach this HQ within 12 hours following receipt of this order.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. ADMINO 5-67.

5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Signal.

(1) Annex E, Signal, to OPOPD 15-67.

(2) SOI, Index 1-1.

b. Command. Bde CP LZ CABENTAN (BS844370) displaces to LZ BRONCO (BS844385) on order.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

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BG

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LZ BRONCO (BS812383) RVN
24 March 1968
SP 21

FRAGORD 8-68

Reference: Maps, South Viet Nam; Series L7014; Sheets 6738I, 6738II, 6838LII, and 6838IV.

Task Organization: No change except:

TF BARKER

B/4-3

C/1-20

D/6-11 Arty (DS)

Sqd/C-26 Engr

Sqd/23d MP Plat

3-1 INF

A/3-1

Plat/E-1 Cav

1. (S) SITUATION

a. Enemy forces: Current INTSEM

b. Friendly forces: Americal Division releases OPCON 2-35 Inf and C/2-9 Arty to 3d Bde 4th Inf Div.

c. Attachments and Detachments:

(1) 2-35 Inf released to OPCON 3d Bde 4th Inf Div.

2. (S) MISSION

Bde continues current operations and missions in DUC PHO and MUSCATINE AO's and releases 2-35 Inf to OPCON 3d Bde 4th Inf Div on or about 26 Mar 68 and redistributes organic forces in DUC PHO and MUSCATINE AO's.

3. (S) EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operation:

(1) Maneuver: Bde continues present operations and missions in DUC PHO AO with 3-1 Inf and in MUSCATINE AO with 4-3 Inf and TF BARKER. Bde releases 2-35 Inf to OPCON 3-4 Inf Div on or about 26 Mar 68. 3-1 Inf assumes responsibility for entire DUC PHO AO, on order, prior to departure of 2-35 Inf. TF BARKER releases A/3-1 to OPCON 3-1 Inf.

b. 3-1 Inf:

EXHIBIT D-51

(1) Continue present operations and missions and assume tactical responsibility for entire DUC PHO AO.

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XI-S-68-92

777

XIOP.S-68-2
EG-S-8-68

(2) Assumes responsibility for planning and executing OPLAN 1-68 (Relief/Reinforcement of DUC PHO-MO DUC District Headquarters. "CATALYST").

(3) Assume OPCON of A/3-1 from TF BARKER on or about 26 Mar 68 effective on departure from MUSCATINE AO.

(4) On order, 26 Mar 68, assume OPCON of one Cav Plat from E/1 Cav.

(5) Secure remaining bridge sites on Hwy 1 in DUC PHO AO as outlined in Annex A - Bridge Security.

(6) Secure logistical base at SA HUYNH (BS932222) with not less than one rifle platoon.

(7) Conduct day and night security operations vicinity LZ BRONCO with not less than one platoon.

(8) Establish OP on LZ TRIPOLI with not less than one fire team to include qualified FO.

(9) Relinquish responsibility for planning and execution of OPLAN 4-68 (GOLDEN VALLEY) to 4-3 Inf (-).

c. 4-3 Inf (-):

(1) Continue present operations and missions.

(2) Assume responsibility for planning and execution of OPLAN 4-68 (GOLDEN VALLEY) from 3-1 Inf.

d. 2-35 Inf: Be prepared, on order, 26 Mar 68 to move by airlift to destination specified by 3d Bde 4th Inf Div and release to OPCON 3-4 Inf Div effective upon departure from DUC PHO AO.

e. Task Force BARKER:

(1) Continue present missions and operations.

(2) Be prepared to move A/3-1 by airlift, on order, 26 Mar 68 to LZ THUNDER for release to OPCON 3-1 Inf effective on departure of MUSCATINE AO.

f. 6-11 Arty:

(1) Continue present missions.

(2) Employ C/6-11 Arty in DS 3-1 Inf.

g. E-1 Cav:

(1) Continue present missions.

(2) Release one platoon (7 personnel carriers) to OPCON 3-1 Inf, on order, 26 Mar 68.

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h. C-26 Engr: Continue present missions.

i. HHC Avn Sec: Continue present missions.

j. Coordinating Instructions: Direct coordination between commanders concerned is authorized and directed.

4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

Admino 1-68.

5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Signal: Current SOL.

b. Command:

(1) Bde CP remains LZ BRONCO (BS812363).

Acknowledge.

HENDERSON
COL

Annex A - Bridge Security

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Annex A (Bridge Security) to FRAGORD 8-68

<u>ENGR NO</u>	<u>LOCAL</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>BY PASS</u>	<u>SEC REQ</u>
S25	115	BS769407	Wood Beam	Fordable on West during dry season	PF
	114	BS798599	Steel Culvert		PF
S26	114	BS791240	New Bridge	Easy-West	1 Sqd
S27	113	BS795404	Steel Culvert 60"	Easy-West	PF
S28	112	BS811368	Steel w/wood covered w/tin	Diff-use RR by pass West	PF
S29	111	BS813363	Bailey Bridge	Easy-8'4" w/RR bridge-West	PF
S30	110	BS815359	Steel w/wood covered w/tin	Easy-use RR bridge	PF
S31	109	BS821347	Wood Beam	Easy-West	PF & 1 APC
S32	108	BS840330	Bailey Bridge	Difficult	PF & 1 APC
S33	107	BS843327	Bailey Bridge	Diff-rice paddy	PF & 1 APC
S34	106A	BS855322	Steel w/wood covered w/tin	Diff-East	PF & 1 APC
	106	BS857310	Wood Beam		PF & 1 APC
S35	105	BS867314	Steel Culvert	Diff-rice paddy	1 Sqd
S36	104	BS883304	Steel w/wood covered w/tin	Diff-West	1 Sqd
S37	101	BS885288	Bailey	Easy-East-by pass has 60" culvert	
S38	100	BS897268	Reinf concrete/ wood w/tin plating	Easy-East-RR bridge	1 Sqd
S39	99	BS901267	Wood w/tin plate	Easy-East- in use	1 Sqd
S40	98	BS911264	Bailey Bridge	Diff-steep slopes	MIKE FORCE
S41	97	BS915245	Wood w/tin plat over deck	Easy	1 Sqd
S42	95	BS920233	Bailey	Easy-West	1 Sqd

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GROUP 4

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11th Infantry Brigade
LZ BRONCO
BS812383
261600 Feb 68

ADMNO 1-68

Reference: Maps, Vietnam 1:50,000; Series L7014; 6738 II (AN LOC),
6739 I (BINH SON), 6739 II (QUANG NGAI), 6739 III (SON HA),
6739 IV (TRA BONG), 6838 III (TAM QUAN), 6838 IV (TRANG
GIEN)

1. GENERAL.

This ADMNO provides for the administration and logistical support for the 11th LIB, in the MO DUC, DUC PHO and MUSCATINE AO's. The Brigade Base Camp will remain at MT BRONCO and continue to support operations in both AO's as required. Primary source of logistical support for 4-3 Infantry and TF BARKER will be 9th Spt Bn, 198th LIB, Chu Lai, VN.

2. MATERIAL AND SERVICES.

a. Supply.

(1) Class I.

(a) Battalions and Separate Companies will maintain 3 days rations, Meal Combat Individual.

(b) 6th Support Battalion will maintain (10) days rations, combat type C for all organic, attached and/or direct support elements of the Brigade.

(c) 6th Support Battalion will provide Brigade Class I ration breakdown point operations.

(d) Class I method of issue will be unit pile breakdown to battalions and separate companies/detachments.

(2) Class II and IV.

(a) MO DUC - DUC PHO AC.

(1) Requisitions for II and IV type supplies will be submitted to BSO.

(2) Battalions and separate companies/detachments will accrue and maintain thirty (30) days expendable supplies and thirty (15) days PLL.

(b) MUSCATINE AO.

EXHIBIT D-16

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(1) Limited II and IV type supplies (Barrier material) will be provided through BSO 9th Support Battalion, 198th LIB.

(2) TOE items and limited II - IV equipment/materials will be provided through BSO 6th Support Battalion.

(3) Battalions and separate companies/detachments will accrue and maintain thirty (30) days expendable supplies and thirty (15) days PLL.

(3) Class III, IIIA and JP-4.

(a) Battalions and separate companies will maintain a (15) day level of POL packaged products in their respective AO's.

(b) In the MO DUC - DUC PHO AO, Class III will be distributed (Supply point distribution) vicinity BS817387.

(c) Class IIIA supply point distribution by the 1st LOG FSA, vicinity coordinates BS815388.

(d) In the MUSCATINE AO Class III, IIIA will be distributed as required by the 9th Support Battalion, 198th LIB, vicinity Chu Lai.

(e) JP-4 will be provided by the 1st LOG FSA in DUC PHO - MO DUC AO and the 9th Support Battalion, 198th LIB for units in the MUSCATINE AO.

(4) Class V.

(a) MO DUC - DUC PHO AO.

1. Supply point distribution at coordinates 812385.

2. MUSCATINE AO, supply point distribution as established by the 9th Support Battalion, 198th LIB, Chu Lai VN. To 4-3d Combat Trains. To be further broken down and delivered to 4-3 Inf and TF BARKER.

(b) Artillery batteries will maintain 2000 rounds per firing battery, on position.

(c) 6-11th Arty Bn will maintain 1000 rounds per firing battery, packaged and prepared for slingout for immediate resupply as necessary.

(d) Artillery attachments or provisional batteries formed will follow the above procedures.

(5) Water.

(a) In the MO DUC - DUC PHO AO water points are located at

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(Primary) BS817376 (Alternate) BS810330. These water points are operated by 1st LOG FSA.

(b) In the MUSCATINE AO water points established by the 9th Support Battalion, 198th LIB will be jointly used by the 4-3 Inf and TF BARKER.

(6) Salvage.

(a) Units will turn in property to be salvaged to "B" Co 6th Spt Bn for classification. Equipment damaged through other than fair wear and tear will be accompanied by proper documentation, i.e. release from Survey Officer, statement of charges etc. Brigade Supply Officer and/or Bde Maintenance Officer will be contacted after classification to facilitate proper turn-in.

(b) Units are responsible to arrange for their own evacuation but all items for salvage or turn-in will be processed through "B" Co 6th Spt Bn.

b. Transportation.

(1) Unit requirements in excess of TOE capability will be requested through S-3 6th Spt Bn.

(2) Where possible, the Bde PMO will be notified 24 hours in advance of convoys requiring escort. PMO will provide security and coordinate support as required for intra AO convoys.

3. MEDICAL.

a. Mission.

(1) To provide primary medical care both in the field and at base camp areas for units operating in the MUSCATINE AO.

(2) To provide medical evacuation in the MUSCATINE AO.

(3) To provide medical supply in the MUSCATINE AO.

b. Primary Medical Care.

(1) Task Force BARKER.

(a) Company aidmen. Provide by rifle companies attached to TFB.

(b) Aid station. A provisional battalion aid station will be operated in the Task Force CP area by one medical officer, one NCO, and 3 EM, special duty from 6/11 Artillery (medical officer), Co C (MED) 6th Spt Bn (NCO and 2 EM), and HHC 11th Inf Bde (1 EM).

(2) 4th Bn 3d Inf. Will use organic medical platoon for full support.

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GROUP 4
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Declassification after 12 years.

c. Medical Evacuation.

(1) Routine.

(a) TFB will be evacuated by ground ambulance to Chu Lai as the tactical situation permits.

(b) 4-3 will be evacuated by available air to Chu Lai.

(2) Priority and Urgent. Will be evacuated by air ambulance to Chu Lai provided by Chu Lai Dustoff.

d. Hospitalization. Quarters patients may be held for 7 days.

e. Medical Supply. Will be requisitioned through normal channels from 11th Bde Medical Supply at BRONCO Base. Supplies will be transported by available aircraft.

f. Miscellaneous.

(1) Preventive Medicine. Battalion surgeons will provide preventive medical care supported by Americal Preventive Medicine Officer.

(2) All medical reports will be submitted by usual suspense dates to the 11th Brigade Surgeon's Office.

4. PERSONNEL.

No change from ADMINO 5-67.

5. CIVIL AFFAIRS.

a. Attachments and Detachments.

(1) PSYOP detachment (3 men) DS 11th Inf Bde effective date TBA.

(2) 4 AA Civil Affairs Platoon - Area support DUC PHO AO, OPCON to Americal Division.

b. Vietnamese Civilian Personnel.

(1) Civil populace in RD (Revolutionary Development) areas generally friendly.

(2) Civil populace outside RD areas generally sympathetic to the enemy.

(3) Enemy takes every opportunity to exploit civil populace for supplies of all types.

(4) Civil population in AO approximates 225,000, approximately 22,000 of these are refugees.

c. Mission.

To provide CA support for military operations, insure the commanders legal responsibilities towards the civilian population are complied with, insure effective population and resources control and support revolutionary development by conducting an active Pacification Program.

d. Execution.

(1) Concept of Operation. CA personnel will conduct normal CA activities in the RD areas. Priority for assistance will go to refugees. Primary goals should be to insure refugees have the basic necessities of life. MDCAP, construction projects and improvement of refugee internal organization leadership will be aggressively pursued. Pacification programs will be conducted in contested areas as tactical situation permits. Primary goal is to have the Vietnamese identify themselves with and support the GVN.

(2) Coordinating Instructions.

(a) Report any refugees to Bde S-5 for placement in a refugee camp. Collection points will not be established unless a developing tactical situation so dictates.

(b) Curfew in the AO is dusk to dawn. Exceptions are the RD areas (See Annex A overlay) where the curfew is 2100.

(c) All Commanders will brief their troops concerning proper conduct towards civilians.

(d) Request for PSYOP support (leaflets & loudspeakers) will be coordinated through S-5, 11th Inf Bde (Lt). S-5 4-3 requests leaflets for his Bn directly from G-5 PSYOP in Chu Lai, recommended themes will be furnished by Bde S-5.

(e) If US military activity causes civilian property loss, injury or death notify Bde S-5 immediately. Report must include brief description of incident, name of individuals (US and Vietnamese) involved, personal statistical data of individuals, location of incident, home address of Vietnamese involved and next of kin, disposition of individual involved, other pertinent data considered necessary. All solatium payments will be made by Bde S-5. Excepting those in 4-3 AO and TF BARKER AO; Solatium payments in those areas will be made by 4-3, S-5 and TF BARKER S-5 respectively.

e. Administration & Logistics.

(1) Civilian Labor and Materials.

(a) Units obtain money for civilian labor through Bde S-5. Civilian laborers may be hired at the rate of 80 VN (piasters) per day. At no time will laborers be utilized for filling sandbags, constructing defensive positions, etc. None will be hired as personal servants or to

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perform Kitchen Police duties.

(b) Except in emergency cases, the use of volunteer civilian labor for CA projects is mandatory if it is within their capability. US assistance should be limited to heavy equipment, building material, and technical supervision.

(c) Civilians should use their own supplies for self help projects if they are available and suitable for the intended project.

(d) No civilians, supplies or equipment will be used for military purposes except by order of this Headquarters. Civilian labor is limited to daily hire.

(2) Civilian Supply.

(a) There will be no food distribution to civilians from military stores except in cases of planned CA activities or emergency situations.

(b) Contact Bde S-5 to coordinate the evacuation of captured foodstuffs for storage. Captured foodstuffs will later be redistributed on a most needed basis.

(c) MEDCAP is supervised by the Bde Surgeon. An active MEDCAP program will be conducted by all units as the tactical situation permits. Request for medical supplies submitted to Medical Company, 6th Spt Bn.

(3) Reports.

(a) Each S-5 maintain a log of his daily activities.

(b) Effective 2 Jan 68, each unit conducting CA activities will submit the following reports. A daily telephonic report to S-5 nlt 1900 hours with the following information:

1. Number of refugees generated.
2. Amount of rice captured.
3. Amount of rice destroyed.
4. Amount of rice evacuated to GVN control.
5. Civilian casualties due to combat operations.
6. Civilian casualties due to non-combat operations.

(c) A weekly written CA Report covering period from Friday through Thursday. Due NLT 1600 hrs each Saturday. Show information as follows:

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1. Medical and Dental assistance, name of hamlet, village and coordinates (6 digits) where assistance rendered.

2. Total number of persons receiving medical and dental treatment.

3. Number of surgical operations performed.

4. Number of Vietnamese health nurses and workers assisting in the MEDCAP. Indicate how many, which were volunteers, which were paid by GVN funds.

(d) Personal Assistance.

1. Number of Vietnamese medical workers in training.

2. Total number of persons assisted during week.

3. Amount of each commodity distributed and number of persons to whom distribution is made.

4. Amount of any money distributed, (does not include daily hires) source of money, to whom distributed.

(e) Evacuation Assistance.

1. Number of adults, and children (separate categories).

2. Location (6 digit coord) of where evacuation originated and where terminated.

(f) Public Improvements.

1. Types of construction, what it is, how constructed, when constructed, where constructed (6 digit coord), source of material, source of labor. If not completed, give percentage of completion.

2. English classes, where, number of hours, number of students.

3. Vocational training, type, where, number of hours, number of students.

4. Contact with local officials. (US & GVN) who, where, (6 digit coord) when, why.

5. Self Help Projects. What, where (6 Digit coord), when, how done, amount of US Military participation. If not completed give percentage of completion.

6. Other US agency support, agency, item, amount.

7. Attitude of people. Brief narrative description

7

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GROUP 4

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of peoples attitude, attitude changes, Reception to US, etc.

8. A narrative report. Briefly describe what above figures do not clearly portray.

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11th Inf Bde
12 BRONCO (BS812383)
041200 Feb 68
SP 13

OPORD 1-68

Reference: Maps, Vietnam 1:50,000; Series L7014; Sheets 6738I (MO DUC), 6738II (AN LOC), 6739I (BINH SON), 6739II (QUANG NGAI), 6739III (SON HA), 6739IV (TRA BONG), 6838III (TAM QUAN), 6838IV (THANG GIENG).

Task Organization: Current task organization except as shown.

4-3 INF (-)
B-6-11 Arty (DS)(-)
Sqd-C-26 Engr

TF BARKER
A-3-1
B-4-3
C-1-20
Composite Btry -6-11 Arty (DS)
3-2-1 Cav (-)
Sqd-C-26 Engr
Sqd-23d MP Plat

1. SITUATION

- a. Enemy forces. Current INTSUM.
- b. Friendly forces. 198th Inf Bde (LT) relinquishes responsibility for OPERATION MUSCATINE to 11th Inf Bde.
- c. Attachments and Detachments: Task organization.

2. MISSION: 11th Inf Bde continues operations in DUC PHO - MO DUC AO, assumes responsibility for MUSCATINE AO from 198th Inf Bde (LT) and commences OPERATION MUSCATINE.

3. EXECUTION

- a. Concept of operation: Annex A, Operation Overlay.
 - (1) Maneuver: Bde continues operations in the DUC PHO AO with 3-1 Inf (-) and 1-20 Inf (-) and assumes responsibility for OPERATION MUSCATINE with 4-3 Inf (-) and TF BARKER in sector.

(2) Fires: Annex B, Artillery Fire Support Plan.

- b. 3-1 Inf (-). Continue present missions in DUC PHO AO.
- c. 4-3 Inf (-).

EXHIBIT D-35

(1) Conduct defensive and offensive operations to locate and destroy NVA units, main force units, local force units, guerillas and the Viet Cong infrastructure.

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(2) Coordinate with appropriate GVN provincial and district authorities to assist in the training and support of RF and PF forces as directed.

(3) Conduct operations for the harassment and interdiction of approaches to US and GVN installations in MUSCATINE AO and likely rocket and mortar firing sites threatening base areas.

(4) Provide maximum support of Revolutionary Development (RD).

(5) Deny needed food stuffs to the enemy.

(6) Protect VN nationals against reprisals.

(7) Increase US/GVN influence over hamlet areas.

(8) Conduct psychological operations in support of tactical operations.

d. 1-20 Inf (-) Continue present mission in DUC PHO AO.

e. TF BARKER:

(1) Conduct defensive and offensive operations to locate and destroy NVA units, main force units, local force units, guerillas and the Viet Cong infrastructure.

(2) Provide tactical security for Hwy #1 and insure that Hwy #1 is available and useable for tactical and logistical movement within MUSCATINE AO.

(3) Coordinate with appropriate GVN provincial and district authorities to assist in the training and support of RF and PF forces as directed.

(4) Conduct operations for the harassment and interdiction of approaches to US and GVN installations in MUSCATINE AO and likely rocket and mortar firing sites threatening base areas.

(5) Provide maximum support of Revolutionary Development (RD).

(6) Conduct counter infiltration operations in coastal area within MUSCATINE AO.

(7) Deny needed food stuffs to the enemy.

(8) Protect VN nationals against reprisals.

(9) Increase US/GVN influence over hamlet areas.

(10) Conduct psychological operations in support of tactical operations.

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f. 6-11 Arty:

(1) DS.

(2) Organize and move composite Btry of not less than four Howitzers to TF BARKER.

(3) Continue present missions in DUC PHO and assume FS control for MUSCATINE AO as soon as practical.

g. E-1 Cav. Continue present missions in DUC PHO AO.

h. C-26 Engr:

(1) Continue present missions in DUC PHO AO.

(2) Be prepared to support combat operations and base development in MUSCATINE AO as required.

i. Avn Section:

(1) Continue present missions in DUC PHO AO.

(2) Provide first and last light surveillance of MUSCATINE AO.

j. Coordinating instructions:

(1) Direct coordination between commanders concerned is authorized and directed.

(2) Commanders are authorized direct coordination with GVN officials for the conduct of combat operations and RD activities.

(3) This order confirms oral instructions and is effective 041200 Feb.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: ADMINO 1-68 (TBP);

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Signal: SOI, Index 1-1.

b. Command:

(1) Bde CP remains LZ BRONCO (BS812383).

Acknowledge.

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Annexes: A -- Operations Overlay.

B -- Artillery Fire Support Plan (TFP).

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
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Hq, 11th Inf Bde (LT)
DUC PHO (BS812383), RVN
290800 Mar 68
SP22

OPLAN 7-68 (GOLDEN FLEECE Support and Security for Rice Harvest)

Reference: Maps RVN, 1:50,000 Series L7014, Sheets 6738I, 6730II, 6838III, 6838IV.

Task Organization: FRAGO 8-68

1. SITUATION:

- a. Enemy Forces: Annex B, Intelligence
- b. Friendly Forces: FRAGO 8-68
- c. Attachments and Detachments: FRAGO 8-68
- d. Assumptions:

(1) Enemy forces will collect and harvest large quantities of rice in the absence of security operations designed to protect loyal farmers from VC intimidation and interference with harvest activities.

(2) Cultivated ricelands near RD areas, GVN and US installations will require minimum security operations during the harvest season.

(3) GVN forces and laborers will conduct the harvest with minimum assistance from US forces.

(4) Dispositions of friendly units will remain relatively unchanged during the rice harvest season.

2. MISSION. 11th Inf Bde conducts security and denial operations commencing H-hour, D-day to protect the Spring rice harvest.

3. EXECUTION.

- a. Concept of Operation. Annex A, Operations Overlay.

(1) Maneuver: Brigade provides protection for the rice harvest with 3-1 Inf, 4-3 Inf and TF Barker in coordination with GVN officials, to enable loyal citizens to enter riceland areas controlled or influenced by the enemy to harvest the spring rice crop. Operations will be conducted at varying times and in those areas where GVN authorities anticipate enemy intimidation of harvest activities. Security operations will be conducted by units in their assigned AO and will consist of local security in the immediate harvest area and small unit patrolling and ambushes along primary

Group 4.

EXHIBIT D-36

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approaches to prevent VC interference with the collection of the harvest. Denial operations will be executed by each rifle company employing not less than two rifle platoons during daylight hours to screen and interdict primary infiltration and exfiltration routes into harvest areas. Saturation ambush tactics will be employed by squad and fire team size elements at night in the same areas.

(2) Fires: Priorities to units in contact. Maximum H&I fires will be planned during the harvest period to supplement security and denial operations.

b. 3-1 Inf:

(1) Conduct local security operations as indicated in Duc Pho and Mo Duc Districts to protect field workers during the harvest period.

(2) Interdict primary infiltration and exfiltration routes into principal harvest areas with not less than two platoons from each rifle company during the harvest season to deny the VC access to crops and harvested rice.

(3) Conduct patrols and employ saturation ambush tactics to destroy enemy forces, their routes of communication, to detect and recover their supply caches and to prevent movement of harvested rice into VC dominated areas.

(4) Provide security and assist in movement of rice into secure areas.

(5) Establish mobile check points in coordination with GVN authorities to interrupt movement and confiscate unauthorized supplies enroute to VC areas.

(6) Conduct operations in Duc Pho and Mo Duc Districts within assigned AO to preempt hostile elements and their sympathizers from carrying out harvest activities.

c. 4-3 Inf:

(1) Interdict primary infiltration and exfiltration routes into the principal harvest area south of Tra Bong river and west of Highway 1 to deny the VC access to crops and harvested rice.

(2) Conduct patrols and employ saturation ambush tactics to destroy enemy forces, their routes of communication, to detect and recover their supply caches and to prevent movement of harvested rice into VC dominated areas.

(3) Conduct operations in Song Tinh and Binh Son Districts within assigned AO to preempt hostile elements and their sympathizers from carrying out harvest activities.

(4) Provide security and assist in movement of rice to secure areas.

(5) Establish mobile check points in coordination with GVN authorities to interrupt movement and confiscate unauthorized supplies enroute to VC areas.

d. TF Barker:

(1) Interdict primary infiltration and exfiltration routes into the principal harvest area vic Binh Son RD area with one rifle company, to deny the VC access to crops and harvested rice.

(2) Conduct patrols and employ saturation ambush tactics to destroy enemy forces, their routes of communication, to detect and recover their supply caches, and to prevent movement of harvested rice into VC dominated areas.

(3) Conduct operations in Son Tinh And Bin Son Districts within assigned AO to preempt hostile elements and their sympathizers from carrying out harvest activities.

(4) Provide security and assist in movement of rice to secure areas.

(5) Establish mobile check points in coordination with GVN authorities to interrupt movement and confiscate unauthorized supplies enroute to VC areas.

e. 6-11 Arty:

(1) DS

(2) Plan and execute an intensified H&I program during the harvest season to supplement ground combat and security operations.

f. E-1 Cav: Provide security forces as required.

g. C-26 Engrs:

h. HHC: Provide MP control and escort vehicles for movement of rice along Hwy 1 to central collecting point.

i. Bde Avn Sec:

j. Coordinating instructions:

(1) This plan effective for planning on receipt and for execution as indicated in Annex A, Operations Overlay.

(2) Direct coordination between commanders concerned and GVN officials is authorized and directed.

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(3) Physical security and complete interdiction of VC harvest and collection efforts is impractical. However, extensive day and night operations will be conducted to cover primary trails, water-crossing sites and near rural hamlets which offer the greatest probability of interception.

(4) Maximum use will be made of night reconnaissance operations to detect hostile elements attempting night harvest of the rice crops.

(5) Intelligence reports of VC attempts to levy rice taxes and incidents of VC threats and intimidations will receive prompt attention and subsequent commitment of US forces if indicated by the nature of the report.

(6) H&I impact areas will be searched as practicable for hasty caches and damage assessment.

(7) Military age males participating in the rice harvest will receive close scrutiny.

(8) Operations will be planned and conducted in the RZ and other isolated areas after the harvest is well underway in an attempt to locate rice stores.

(9) Units will submit daily reports to include size of area protected (Sq Km), daily and cumulative totals of rice harvested (lbs), RF/PF participation, number of civilians engaged in harvest activity and other information resulting from Golden Fleece operations.

(10) Responsible units conduct aerial reconnaissance of cultivated areas not included in attached overlay in concert with the appropriate District Chief and develop scheme for harvest of these areas upon completion of or simultaneous with those areas indicated herein.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. ADMINO 1-68

b. 6th Spt Bn provides transportation as indicated in Annex A, Operations Overlay.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Signal: Current SOI

b. Command: Brigade CP remains at LZ Bronco (BS812383).

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ACKNOWLEDGE:

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Annexes:

- A - Operations Overlay
- B - Intelligence

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HEADQUARTERS
11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
APO San Francisco 96557

XIOP

1 November 1967


SUBJECT: Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM)

TO: See Distribution

1. Attached is Appendix II (Overseas Orientation) to Annex A (Training) to 11th Inf Bde Reg 220-10.

2. This appendix is classified "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" (FOUO). It must be filed separately from basic regulation or the entire regulation must be protected as required for FOUO information.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


F. H. GENEL
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

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Appendix II (Overseas Orientation) to Annex A (Training) to 11th Inf Bde
Reg 22C-10

1. Commanders are responsible for insuring that personnel being moved overseas receive as a minimum, 2 hours of formal instructions in the subjects listed in para 14d (1), (a) Section III, AR 360-81 change 4.

2. The following are references to be utilized as guides in preparing and presenting this orientation.

- a. AR 612-35
- b. AR 350-30 -- Code of Conduct
- c. DA Pamphlet 360-5, 8 March 66. "Know Your Enemy: The Viet Cong"
- d. DA Pamphlet 360-230, Sep 65. Troop Topics. "Prisoners of War"
- e. DA Pamphlet 27-1, Dec 56, "Treaties Governing Land Warfare"
- f. DA Pamphlet 20-198, Pocket Guide to Vietnam
- g. DA Pamphlet 360-206 "Why We Serve"
- h. DA Pamphlet 360-214 "Our Mission in Vietnam"
- i. DA Pamphlet 360-219 "International Communism"
- j. Letter HQ 11th Inf Bde 24 Oct 67, Subj: Civil Affairs-Civic Action Instruction
- k. Letter HQ 11th Inf Bde 24 Oct 67, Subj: Civil Affairs-Civic Action Reference Material
- l. Letter HQ 11th Inf Bde 24 Oct 67, "How to Behave in Vietnam"
- m. Letter HQ 11th Inf Bde 30 Oct 67, Subj: Legal Rights of US Military Personnel in an Overseas Area

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11TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (LIGHT)

EXTRACTS



TACTICAL SOP FOR
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
(DRAFT)

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EXHIBIT M-56

EXTRACTS

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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION

1. GENERAL:

- a. Purpose: This SOP standardizes routine recurring operational and combat service support procedures within the brigade and applies except when modified by division order.
- b. Conformity: Subordinate unit SOP's will conform.
- c. Recommendations for changes are encouraged and should be forwarded in two copies to the brigade S3. Recommendations will refer to a specific paragraph, section and chapter.
- d. This SOP will be reviewed and changed as necessary to incorporate improved procedures, new concept, and lessons learned.

2. SCOPE: This SOP is applicable to field combat operations in a non-nuclear, counterinsurgency environment when opposed by an unsophisticated or semi-sophisticated enemy. Procedures for the accomplishment of requirements peculiar to base camp operations and these administrative and logistical matters not concerned with the immediate support of combat operations are covered in brigade regulations, memorandums, policy letters, and in the regulations of higher Headquarters.

3. OBJECTIVES: Within the context of the specific procedures outlined in this SOP, subordinate commanders will initiate programs and projects, establish goals, develop new procedures and techniques and make comments and recommendations to attain or assist the brigade in attaining the following objectives:

- a. Find, fix, and destroy or capture the enemy, his equipment, supplies, bases, and installations.
- b. Maintain pressure on the enemy. Give him no respite. Establish and maintain contact. Pursue!
- c. Maximum integrations of military, paramilitary and civic indigenous forces to improve their training, increase their confidence, stimulate aggressive action; and, at the same time provide our forces with area intelligence, interrogations capability, static security forces; and, more importantly, maximum economy in the employment of forces.
- d. Promote confidence in the local and national government.
- e. Assist in the revival of the local economy and avoid inflationary pressures by enforcing price control measures.
- f. Win the hearts and minds of the people through effective civic actions, psychological warfare and information programs.

CHAPTER II
COMMON ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS USED IN THIS SOP AND IN RVN

AA	Anti-Aircraft	CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
AACG	Arrival Airfield Control Group	CCP	Communications Check Point
AAE	Army Aviation Element	CCT	Combat Control Team
AAF	Arrival Airfield	CDEC	Combined Document Exploitation Center
AAT	Army Assault Team	CFA	Call Forward Area
AC	Aircraft Commander	CICV	Combined Intel Center Vietnam
ACFT	Aircraft	CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
ACL	Allowable Cargo Load	CKC	Chicom Carbine
ACP	Air Control Point	CMDR	Commander
ADAO	Assistant Division Aviation Officer	CNA	Coordinates Not Available
AF	Air Force	COC	Combat Operations Center
AHC	Assault Helicopter Company	CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
AK47	7.62 Kalashnikov Assault Rifle	COSVN	Control Officer for South Vietnam
AKA	Also Known As	CRD	Control Registry Detachment
ALCE	Air Land Control Element	CSD	Combined Studies Detachment
ALO	Air Liaison Officer (AF)	CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
AM	Airmobile	DACG	Departure Airfield Control Group
AMTF	Airmobile Task Force	DARN	Direct Air Request Net
AO	Area of Operations	DASC	Direct Air Support Center
AR	Agent Reports	DET	Detainee
ARA	Aerial Rocket Artillery	DIOCC	District Intel/Operations Coordination Center
ARVN	Army of Republic of Vietnam	DKZ	Recoilless Rifle
AS	Air Speed	DOC	Date of Capture
ASA	Army Security Agency	DOI	Date of Information
ASAP	As Soon As Possible	DS	Direct Support
ASCC	Air Support Coordination Center	DTA	Division Tactical Area
ASHC	Assault Support Helicopter Company	DTOC	Division Tactical Operations Center
ATC	Air Traffic Control	DZ	Drop Zone (parachute)
AVN	Aviation		
CA	Civil Affairs/Combat Assault		
CAB	Combat Aviation Battalion		
CACG	Combined Action Group		
CACO	Combined Action Company		
CAP	Combined Action Platoon		
CAS	Close Air Support (AF)		
CASDO	Close Air Support Duty Officer		
CASE	Combat Airlift Support Element		
CAT	Combined Action Team		
C&C	Command and Control		
CERE	Chemical, Biological, Radiological Element		

EEL	Essential Elements of Information	LRM	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
ENGINE	Engineer Element	LZ	Landing Zone
ETA	Estimated Time of Arrival	MACC	Marshalling Area Control Officer
FAC	Forward Air Controller (AF)	MAG	Manifesting and Outloading Group
FCC	Flight Coordination Center	MAT	Secret (Vietnamese)
FCL	Fire Coordination Line	MEDCAL	Medical Civic Action Program
FPAR	Folding Fin Aerial Rocket	MF	Main Force
FPV	Field Force Vietnam	MIBATS	Military Intelligence Battalion
FNU	First Name Unknown	MID	Military Intelligence Detachment
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order	MR	Military Region (+Numerical Designation)
FSA	Forward Support Area	MSS	Military Security Service
FSCC	Fire Support Coordination Center	NFL	No Fire Line
FSCORD	Fire Support Coordinator	NFLSVN	National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
FSE	Fire Support Element	NFZ	No Fire Zone
FW	Fixed Wing	NIC	National Interrogation Center
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Force	NLM	New Life Hamlet
GRREG	Graves Registration	NLT	No Later Than
GS	General Support	OPCON	Operational Control
HBL	Helicopter	OBJ	Objective
H & I	Harrassing and Interdiction	OPN (O)	Operations (Officer)
IAC	In accordance With	OPORD	Operations Order
IC	Innocent Civilians	PERINTREP	Periodic Intelligence Report
II	Imagery Interpretation	PF	Pathfinder/Popular Forces
IIR	Intelligence Information Report	PIC	Provincial Interrogation Center
INTG	Interrogation	PO	Political Officer
INTSUM	Intelligence Summary	POC	Place of Capture
IOD	Intelligence Operations Division J2	PRP	Pickup Zone Release Point
IPIR	Immediate Photo Intelligence Report	PRU	Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
IW	Individual Weapon	PSYOPs	Psychological Operations
JGS	Joint General Staff	PZ	Pickup Zone
JUSPAC	Joint US Public Affairs Office	RAG	River Assault Group
K-44	7.62mm M1944 Rifle (Chicom or USSR Model)	RAOP	Rigging Area Operations Center
KCS	Kit Carson Scout	RCA	Riot Control Agent
KIN	Confidential (Vietnamese)	RD	Revolutionary Development
LBN	Letter Box Number		
LF	Local Force		
LLDB	Vietnamese Special Forces		
LNO	Liaison Officer		
LCC	Line of Communication		
LOH	Light Observation Helicopter		
LCLX	Low Level Extraction		
LRP	Landing Zone Release Point		

KDC	Revolutionary Development Cadre	VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
RF	Regional Forces	VNN	Vietnamese Navy
RP	Release Point	VR	Visual Reconnaissance
RR	Radio Relay		
RTFL	Rough Terrain Fork Lift		
RTT	Radio Teletype		
RVN	Republic of Vietnam		
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces		
RW	Rotary Wing		
SICR	Special Intelligence Collection Requirement		
SIA	Sector Intelligence Advisor		
SKS	7.62mm Soviet Semi Automatic Carbine		
SITREP	Situation Report		
SLAR	Side-Looking Airborne Radar		
SOG	Studies and Observation Group		
SONG	River (Vietnamese)		
SPAR	Special Agent Report		
SUPIIR	Supplementary Photo Imagery Interpretation Report		
TAC	Tactical Air Command		
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center		
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party		
TALO	Tactical Airlift Liaison Officer		
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility		
TASE	Tactical Air Support Element		
TCC	Traffic Control Center		
TCP	Traffic Control Post		
TINH	Province (Vietnamese)		
TOC	Tactical Operations Center		
TOI-PAT	Top Secret (Vietnamese)		
TOT	Time on Target		
TZ	Tactical Zone		
U/I	Unidentified		
USAID	U. S. Agency for International Development		
USARV	US Army Vietnam		
USMACV (MACV)	U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam		
VC	Viet Cong		
VCC	Viet Cong Captive		
VMC	Viet Montangnard Cong		
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force		

DEFINITIONS

1. Air Alert -- Aircraft on station in the air over a designated area or point.
2. Air Control Point (ACP) -- A geographic location along a flight route used for control of movement of air elements.
3. Aircraft Commander (AC) -- An aviator appointed on competent orders as aircraft commander. He is responsible for the actions of his aircraft and crew and all matters pertaining to successful mission accomplishment.
4. Airmobile Combat Assault (CA) -- The lift of troops into an LZ in which the enemy has the capability of offering resistance during approach, landing and/or departure.
5. Airmobile Extraction -- The lifting of combat troops by helicopters from terrain in which the enemy has the capability to resist. Resistance can be expected to increase as each lift is made and the friendly force's perimeter becomes smaller.
6. Airmobile Raid -- A combat assault for the purpose of quickly seizing and/or destroying limited objectives and killing or capturing the enemy, followed by an extraction. A short duration airmobile operation.
7. Airmobile Task Force (AMTF) -- The air lift and ground maneuver elements required to conduct an airmobile operation.
8. Airmobile Task Force Commander -- The commander who exercises control of all elements of an AMTF; usually the ground force commander.
9. Airmobility -- Tactical mobility afforded a ground maneuver force by helicopters; the capability of a ground force to tactically deploy through the air; implies tactical integrity in loading.
10. Air Movement -- Movement of troops, supplies and/or equipment by air from one location to another; implies administrative loading.
11. Allowable Cargo Load (ACL) -- The total weight and/or number of troops that can be lifted under existing conditions by one aircraft in one load.
12. Area of Operations (AO) -- The area of combat operations assigned to a combat unit. The area of operations may or may not be in a TZ and be within or outside of a TAOR.
13. Army Aviation Element (AAE) -- A liaison element from the supporting Army Aviation element to be the supported unit for coordination and planning of aviation operations.
14. Armed Helicopter (Gunship) -- A helicopter equipped with an attached weapons system which is fired by the pilot or co-pilot.

15. Armed Escort. Accompanying armed helicopter used for escorting helicopters, ground convoys, or protection of personnel and equipment of damaged aircraft.

16. Attachment -- Units are bound temporarily to a command other than their assigned command. When a unit is attached to another unit, the gaining command assumes command of the attached unit. This includes full responsibility for supply, administration, training and operations.

17. Call Forward Area (CFA) -- An area in which vehicles, personnel and equipment are initially assembled for dispatch.

18. Central Office, SVN (COSVN) -- The highest VC military HQ in SVN. It has overall responsibility for VC military operations in RVN and exercises direct control over certain VC units. The NFLSVN is a political front for COSVN.

19. Chieu Hoi Program -- The "open arms" program of the RVN that permits VC and VC affiliates to return to GVN control of their free will under full amnesty and a promise of retraining.

20. Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) -- Indigenous personnel recruited, trained and equipped by Vietnamese Special Forces with help, advice and equipment furnished by US Special Forces.

21. Civilian Political Geographical Organization. Civilian political organization geographically parallels the military organization. The Chief of each division, from corps through district, is normally military and his deputy civilian. Civilian and military equivalent organizations are as follows:

<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Rank of US Advisor</u>
CTZ	Corp area	RVNAF Gen Off	Colonel
Sector	Province	Col or LTC	LTC
Sub Sector	District	MAJ or CPT	Major
None	Village	Civilian	None
None	Hamlet	Civilian	None

22. Close Air Support (CAS) -- Any tactical air mission within close proximity (less than 5,000 meters) of friendly troops. All CAS missions must be directed by a FAC. CAS falls into two categories, preplanned missions and immediate missions.

a. Preplanned Requests. Used when the ground forces have sufficient time to plan tactical air in support of a future operation. Missions such as air cover for heliborne assaults, column cover for motor convoys, landing zone preparations and suppressive fires are preplanned requirements.

b. Immediate Requests: Requests for immediate air support are designed

to meet specific requirements which arise during the course of battle which cannot be planned in advance.

23. Combat Airlift Support Element (CASE) -- A USAF troop carrier organization established on an airfield to provide movement control and unit ground support during training or combat operations. It normally includes an operational function, a liaison function for the supported ground/air force unit, and an aerial port operations function. The CASE informs the DACG as to the availability of airfield location, departure time, and flight formation of all aircraft supporting the ground force.

24. Combat Control Team (CCT) -- A team of USAF personnel; organized, trained, and equipped to establish and operate navigational or terminal guidance aids, communications, and aircraft control facilities within the objective area.

25. Command and Control Aircraft (C & C) -- An airborne command platform utilized by the AMTF and mission commander to monitor and control airmobile operations.

26. Company Lift -- A unit of lift helicopters, capable of lifting the assault elements of a rifle company in one lift.

27. Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) -- The major military subdivisions of RVN. There are four CTZs numbered I, II, III, and IV from north to south, plus two independent military areas, the cities of Saigon and Dalat. Each CTZ is further subdivided into military sectors which are in turn subdivided into sub-sectors.

28. Detainee -- An individual who, through his behavior in a particular situation, provokes suspicion that he is a VC or in active support of the VC.

29. Direct Support (DS) -- A mission or task requiring one unit, under command of its parent unit, to support another specific unit. The supporting unit is authorized and required to answer directly the supported units requirements for support.

30. Dust Off -- The code name by which medical evacuation helicopters are identified.

31. Eagle Flight -- Heliborne infantry troops on air alert to perform immediate reaction missions for a ground commander.

32. Escort Aircraft. An aircraft which accompanies another for the purpose of providing weapons support and/or pickup of crew and passengers in the event the escorted aircraft is forced down.

33. Fire Fly Ship -- A helicopter equipped with searchlights to illuminate

targets, PZs and/or LZs.

34. Flight -- Two or more aircraft with a common mission under the command of a designated flight leader.

35. General Support (GS) -- A mission or task requiring one unit, under command of its parent headquarters, to support more than one specific unit. The supporting unit is authorized and required to answer requests for support according to priorities assigned by higher headquarters.

36. Ground Control -- A control element located in a PZ/LZ to transmit changes in the tactical plan or mission and to coordinate the orderly flow of air traffic in and about the PZ/LZ.

37. Hamlet or Civil Guards -- Para-military personnel recruited at village and hamlet level who receive rudimentary military training and who assist in the defense of their hamlet or village against VC attacks. Normally are armed with small arms and grenades only, are without uniforms and perform normal civilian function when not on guard.

38. Heavy Fire Team -- Three armed helicopters operating as a tactical element.

39. Interdiction -- Missions conducted against enemy targets which in time will reduce his combat capabilities. Examples of interdiction targets are supply depots, supply routes, bridges and training area facilities. Interdiction missions in RVN must be directed by a FAC and are usually preplanned.

40. Laager -- A hasty perimeter type defense for local security of equipment, aircraft, and vehicles on the ground, established by crews in conjunction with friendly troops in the area. Armed aircraft and vehicles are positioned where possible so that weapons systems may be employed in the defense.

41. Landing Zone (LZ) -- A designated area on the ground for landing helicopters to disembark troops, equipment, and cargo in support of an airmobile operation.

42. Lift Helicopter (Slick) -- A helicopter used for the purpose of lifting troops and/or cargo.

43. Light Fire Team -- Two armed helicopters operating as a tactical element.

44. Military Regions -- The six VC military and political sub divisions of the RVN. These sub divisions are equivalent in organizational importance to RVN CTZs.

45. National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) -- an organization of the communist political elements opposing the GVN.

46. Operational Control (OPCON) -- Units are placed under a commander for assignment of tasks and authoritative direction to accomplish the mission. OPCON does not include responsibility or authority for administration, logistics, discipline, internal organization or training.
47. Pickup Zone (PZ) -- A tactical landing site utilized to pickup troops and/or cargo.
48. Popular Force (PF) -- A military (para-military) force organized into platoon-size elements, equipped and trained similar to RF units, normally employed exclusively in a district (sub-sector).
49. Pre-Strike -- Air Force, artillery or armed helicopter fire placed on an LZ and/or obj area prior to the arrival of the AMTF.
50. Ramp Alert -- Aircraft loads prepared and aircraft ready for take-off within 15 minutes.
51. Reaction Force -- Airmobile or ground reserve.
52. Regional Forces (RF) -- A military force organized normally into 132 man company size units, lightly armed, and designed for employment throughout a province (sector). They are not normally as well trained or equipped as RVNAF troops and are usually employed exclusively within a sector or sub-sector.
53. Release Point -- A geographic point, recognizable from the air and on the ground at which flight or ground elements arrive in proper formation and then proceed to designated areas under less centralized control.
54. Returnee -- An individual who renounces support of the NFLSVN and who voluntarily surrenders to GVN control under the "Chieu Hoi" program.
55. Revolutionary Development Cadre (RDC) -- Specially organized, trained and equipped units of squad and platoon size which conduct special intelligence and psychological warfare operations. Normally controlled at sector/province level.
56. River Assault Group (RAG) -- Vietnamese Navy units, employed primarily in the Delta area (IVCTZ). USN advised.
57. Sortie -- One take-off and landing by one aircraft in performance of a mission.
58. Stage Field -- a pre-determined area where personnel assemble prior to conducting an operation.
59. Starlight Mission -- A mission flown with the lead helicopter utilizing a starlight scope to spot enemy movement. Usually escorted by a helicopter

fire team. Lead helicopter marks the target and the gun helicopters destroy by fire.

60. Strip Alert -- Aircraft loaded and ready for take-off within five minutes.

61. Suppressive Fire (Airmobile) -- Fires by troop carriers or gun helicopters during the landing phase of a combat assault.

62. Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) -- The area assigned to a specific unit for which that unit is responsible. Normally adjacent to the assigned unit's base area. After coordination with appropriate RVNAF and RVN province officials, comdrs concerned may conduct operations within this area without further coordination with IPFV. The TAOR is normally divided into three zones.

1. Zone 1. A perimeter-type defense to provide close-in security for the base area against sabotage, infiltration and direct attack.

2. Zone 2. An outposted and patrolled zone of such depth as to reduce to a minimum the threat of 81mm mortar attacks within zone 1.

3. Zone 3. An outer zone (extended TAOR) preferably extending out to light artillery range and covering the most likely areas of assembly and avenues of approach for enemy forces.

63. Tactical Zone (TZ) -- The area contiguous to an assigned TAOR which includes known or suspected VC bases and concentration areas regarded as a potential threat to installations within the TAOR. A TZ is an area not wholly under GVN control, although village or hamlet "islands" of control may exist within it.

64. Viet Cong (VC) -- An individual of either SVN or NVN origin who actively supports the activities and programs of the NFLSVN and/or COSVN through active participation in or support of armed attacks, other forms of terror or intimidation, subversion, sabotage, and/or espionage directed against nationals, facilities, installations or military forces of the RVN/US/FWMAF.

f. Neuropsychiatric (NP) Casualties:

(1) Will be treated at the lowest possible medical echelon and returned to duty as soon as their condition permits.

(2) Will not be air evacuated without proper sedation, restraint, and/or attendants.

5. PROCESSING DECEASED PERSONNEL:

a. Is a quartermaster responsibility (Graves Registration).

b. Will be evacuated by any means available, to include medical evacuation vehicles if necessary.

c. Dead on arrival (DOA) and Dead of Wounds (DOW) at Battalion Aid Stations, will be transported to Graves Registration by the parent unit.

6. MANAGEMENT OF WOUNDED PW's.

a. PW's will remain in medical channels until their physical condition permits transfer. Transfer of wounded PW's will be coordinated with the Bde S-2.

b. Medical personnel will not be used to guard PW's. Unit Commanders will furnish guards for organic aid stations. The PM furnishes guards for the Brigade Clearing Station.

7. MEDICAL SUPPLY:

a. All units will deploy with a 15 day mission load (Bde Reg TBA).

b. Medical resupply will be on an as required basis, informal during combat operations, by formal requisition while in base camp.

c. Property exchange will be utilized at all levels. (i.e. stretcher for stretcher).

d. Medical maintenance support (second echelon) will be furnished by the medical company in support.

8. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE AND FIELD SANITATION: See Bde Reg 40-17.

9. MEDICAL RECORDS AND REPORTS:

a. Health records will be stored and maintained in the field by Battalion Base Camp Dispensaries.

b. Dental records will be stored and maintained in the Brigade Clearing Dental Facility.

c. Personal effects not evacuated with remains will be delivered to the unit's maintenance and holding area at the Brigade's Base Camp Area.

d. The team leader of the unit's maintenance and holding team will collect and inventory the deceased's personal effects on DD Form 1076. After inventory, he will package the personal effects for mailing and deliver them with two copies of DD Form 1076 to the Personnel Actions Branch, AG Section for further disposition.

6. REMAINS OF ENEMY PERSONNEL

Paragraph 13c, USARV Regulation 638-30, dated 7 May 1966, limits the number of enemy dead (up to 20) that will be turned over to ARVN Graves Registration Units. Groups of more than 20 will be turned over to the local province chief or his designated representative for appropriate burial. Enemy remains will be processed expeditiously.

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

1. REFERENCES:

- a. FM 30-5.
- b. FM 31-22.
- c. FM 31-32.
- d. FM 101-5.
- e. MACV Directive 20-5.
- f. MACV Directive 190-3.
- g. MACV Directive 381-11.
- h. MACV Directive 381-22.
- i. AMERICAL DIV Tactical SOP.

2. PURPOSE: To establish procedures and guidance for all elements of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade on intelligence matters, and to place proper emphasis on Brigade counterinsurgency activities.

3. MISSION: To provide the Commander accurate, timely and useful information concerning the enemy, terrain and weather, and at the same time deny the enemy access to similar information concerning friendly forces.

4. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

a. Electrically transmitted intelligence reports, correspondence and messages are identified by inserting the word "SPHINX" between the security classification and the message cite number.

b. Body count procedures.

(1) The number of confirmed enemy to have been killed in action is determined by body count. Body count is not synonymous with body recovery, but is a realistic appraisal of circumstances that leave no doubt that a certain number of the enemy has been killed.

(2) Probable kills are based on the enemy being in a specific area and the evidence indicates that a number were killed although no bodies were recovered.

5. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. Section 1
6. CAPTURED MATERIAL. Section 2
7. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS. Section 3
8. DETAINEES. Section 4
9. GROUND RECONNAISSANCE. Section 5
10. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. Section 6
11. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE. Section 7
12. COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE. Section 8
13. MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS. Section 9
14. WEATHER. Section 10
15. REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. Chapter VII, Section 2

SECTION 1

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

1. GENERAL: This section standardizes the counterintelligence measures to be followed by all elements of the 11th Lt Inf Bn.

2. SECURITY:

a. Passwords will be established on a 24 hour basis effective 1200 hours daily. Passwords and alternates will be classified "CONFIDENTIAL" and will not be disseminated in writing forward of battalion CP's. Any suspected compromise will be reported by immediate message to the Bdo S2.

b. A suspected compromise of an SOI item will be reported immediately to S2, info Bdo Sig Off.

c. Brigade plans and operations orders will not be taken forward of battalion CP's.

d. All battalions and separate companies will submit to the S2 a BTOC access roster indicating individual security clearances. The Brigade Provost Marshal is responsible for providing a guard at the entrance to the BTOC complex during the hours of darkness. MP's on guard will require identification from all personnel whom they do not recognize. A SECRET clearance is required for access to the BTOC. Units will notify the S2 as far in advance as possible when access is required by personnel not on current roster. Units establishing war rooms or areas where classified information is maintained and discussed will establish adequate security measures.

e. Dispersion, concealment, and camouflage of vehicles and installations in the field will be emphasized through daily inspections by commanders. Track discipline within CP areas will be maintained by marking permissible paths and establishing roving guards. Units not possessing organic aircraft may request through Brigade S2 Air an aerial inspection of their unit area to determine adequacy of camouflage and light discipline.

f. All personal items, including mail, photos, non-issue equipment, and similar items, will normally be left in base camp when units depart on operations. Individual documentation carried on operations will ordinarily be limited to DD Form 2A, "Identification Card", and "Nine Rules" for MACV personnel. Units receiving personal mail in the field will insure its destruction after reading it or will return it to base camp.

g. The keeping of personal diaries is discouraged. In no case will military activities be mentioned.

h. Units will check evacuated installations, bivouac, and assembly areas to insure no classified or identifying material is abandoned.

i. All casualties that are evacuated from a unit location will be inspected to insure that no sensitive items such as SMI's, ect, are evacuated with them.

3. MISCELLANEOUS:

a. Any foreign nationals discovered on base without documentation or unaccompanied by supervisory personnel will be apprehended, reported to the S2, and delivered to the POW Cage. Suspected enemy agents will be reported to the S2.

b. Any person appearing at entrances to brigade base camp or approaching members of the brigade outside the base who presents a bilingual leaflet and all other personnel offering information will be detained as near the point of contact as feasible and reported to the S2 for disposition.

c. Recovered US or Allied Military personnel claiming to have escaped from the enemy or evaded capture behind enemy lines will be reported immediately to the S2.

d. All civilians in position of influence within the brigade area will be reported to the S2.

e. The MI Det will conduct periodic unannounced security inspections at least once every 30 days. These inspections will include locations where troops socialize during off duty time. A written report (including a negative report) will be submitted within twelve hours after completion of the inspection to Bde S2.

f. Censorship will be instituted only on order of higher headquarters.

SECTION 2

CAPTURED MATERIAL

1. CAPTURED MATERIAL: Includes all weapons, munitions, food stuffs, medicines, clothing and other equipment taken from the enemy, his base, his caches or material policed from the battlefield.

2. EVACUATION:

a. Captured enemy material having intelligence value is evacuated through intelligence channels to the Bde S2.

b. Captured material will not be destroyed without prior approval of this headquarters through Bde S2.

c. Captured material will be evacuated to the 52MID collection point unless otherwise specified by the Bde S2. Bulk items such as rice and clothing will be evacuated through logistical channels, with notification to the Bde S2 and S5, consideration is given to using certain confiscated items as incentive items to be presented to local nationals who contribute to the accomplishment of the Bde mission.

d. Evacuated material will be tagged/identified with standard tags. The following information will be provided:

- (1) Date, time and location of capture.
- (2) Type and quantity of equipment.
- (3) Origin or source, if known.
- (4) Brief description.
- (5) Capturing unit designation.

e. Ammunition and other items suspected of being dangerous will not be moved unless considered essential for intelligence purposes. The brigade ammunition officer will be contacted if evacuation is necessary.

f. In the event of imminent recapture, or when destruction is authorized, captured material will be destroyed using method prescribed for US material of similar type. Care will be taken to preclude further use by enemy forces.

g. Technical documents relating to the capture of equipment will be evacuated with the equipment.

h. Capturing unit will inspect and render safe all captured material.

prior to evacuation. Technical assistance will be provided upon request through the Ede S2.

i. Technical intelligence support will be requested through intelligence channels when enemy material of a new type or which may indicate new tactics or procedures or items suspected of being dangerous are found.

3. REPORTS:

a. The capture of material is reported to Ede S2 by spot report. The report includes a complete description of the material, the country or origin, and the WHO-WHERE-WHEN-HOW of the capture.

b. Report new or unusual enemy equipment, armament or CB agents and forward immediately to Ede S2 with complete description. Captured or downed enemy aircraft will be reported immediately to the Ede S2 and will be guarded by recovering unit.

4. TROPHIES:

a. The Ede S2 is delegated the authority to certify captured weapons as war trophies.

b. Weapons classified as war trophies include WWII German and French rifles and pistols, certain Communist Block Bolt Action Carbines, US Caliber .30 M1903 Series, US Rifle Caliber .30 M1917, and British Enfield Caliber .30 M1917. Weapons not classified as war trophies include all weapons capable of automatic fire, Communist Block semi-automatic carbines, AK 7.62 Soviet attack rifles, SKS Carbines, and US weapons not specifically authorized as war trophies above.

c. Material classified as legitimate war trophies may be returned to capturing individual after the item has undergone intelligence screening. If it is to be returned, so state on the evacuation tag attached to the item. Include name, grade, service number, and unit of the individual.

Tab:

A - Captured Material/Weapon Data Tag

Tab A (Captured Material/Weapon Data Tag) to Section 2 (Captured Material) to Chapter 4 (Combat Intelligence) to 11th Infantry Brigade (Light) SOP

CAPTURED MATERIAL/WEAPON DATA TAG		TAG NO
1. DATE OF CAPTURE: _____	TAG NO _____	
2. INDIVIDUAL EFFECTING CAPTURE: _____	Name, Last	
_____	(First) (MI) (Rank) (Ser. No)	
_____	(Organization)	
3. DESCRIPTION OF MATERIEL/WEAPONS (to include cal., type & SN): _____		

4. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE	
a. Where captured (i.e., coordinates & nearest town): _____	
b. Brief Narrative of how captured: _____	

5. I do (not) desire to retain captured materiel/weapon in accordance with (Div Reg's).	
_____	(Signature)

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SECTION 3

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS: This section outlines the proper methods for processing enemy documents. These instructions are applicable to all captured documents, except those found on PW's.

1. Documents will be tagged with USARV Form 364. Location of capture date and time of capture are most important. Documents should not be defaced.
2. Documents will be evacuated through intelligence channels to the Bde S2 as expeditiously as possible. At this point, the documents will be scanned at great length to determine whether information of a tactical nature is contained in the documents.
3. United States and Allied documents that have fallen into enemy hands and have been recaptured will be handled and processed as captured enemy documents.
4. Documents found with and pertaining to captured equipment will be tagged and evacuated with the equipment.
5. Cryptographic material and documents containing information on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons will be delivered immediately to the Bde S2.

SECTION 4

DETAINEES

1. PURPOSE: To prescribe policies, responsibilities, and procedures for the handling, processing, exploitation and reporting of all persons detained by Bde.

2. RESPONSIBILITY: Staff responsibility for handling, processing, and disposition is vested in the Provost Marshal. The Provost Marshal operates the Bde PW collecting point.

3. DEFINITIONS:

a. All persons captured by US Forces as enemy or suspected enemy shall be referred to as a "detainee" until his status is determined by a brigade interrogator, as one of the categories described below:

(1) Prisoner of War (PW).

(a) Any captive of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces (NVA) or Viet Cong Main Force (VCMF) whether captured in combat or not.

(b) Any person captured while actually engaged in combat or in a belligerent act (other than espionage, sabotage, or terrorism) against the Government of Vietnam (GVN), US Forces, or other Free-World Military Armed Forces (FWMAF).

(2) Civil Defendants. Those persons having committed or suspected of having committed acts of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or even criminal acts. Persons of this category are not entitled to Prisoner of War status provided by the Geneva Convention relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War.

(3) Returnees. A person voluntarily returning to the control of GVN after having actively supported the Viet Cong in political or military activities. NVA personnel are accepted as returnees.

(4) Doubtful Cases. Persons suspected of or known to have committed a belligerent act (other than espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or criminal) and whose entitlement to PW status is in question. Doubtful cases must be resolved by a tribunal in accordance with Article 5 of the Geneva Convention (GPW) as implemented by MACV Directive 20-5.

b. Other Categories.

(1) A person known to be an innocent civilian at the time of capture does not fall within the "detainee" category above and does not require handling as such. (para 4c, below).

(2) A refugee is person other than that described in para 2a, above, who has fled or has been forced from his abode to escape military or political persecution.

4. PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING AND PROCESSING DETAINEES:

a. Capturing unit.

(1) Must search, segregate, silence, safeguard, and speedily evacuate detainees to the Bde collection point.

(2) Tag detainee with MACV Form 240 or USAV Form 36, "Captive Card". It is mandatory that the following minimum information be entered: date, time, place, circumstances of capture and capturing unit.

(3) Interrogate for immediate tactical value.

(4) All documents, monies, weapons, and other impediments must be tagged with description and related to the detainee. Items must be forwarded with detainee. Those items desired and authorized as war souvenirs should be marked for return with identity of requestor. Souvenirs are not authorized to be retained prior to processing by brigade interrogators.

(5) Evacuate detainees in accordance with MACV directives 20-5 and 19C-3.

(6) Seriously wounded detainees are to be evacuated through medical channels to Bde Clearing. Expeditiously inform Bde S2 of ETA to Bde Clearing. Bde Clearing will complete a duplicate Captive Tag if detainee must be evacuated out of Bde control.

(7) Bde interrogators will interrogate, categorize, and process detainees in accordance with MACV directives cited in para 4a(5) above.

a. PW's will be sent through Provost Marshal channels to the ARVN Combat Captive Camp.

b. Civil Defendants will be processed through Provost Marshal channels to Sector for disposition. Bde SJA must concur in the interrogator's determination of Civil Defendants. In cases where the SJA and Bde interrogator disagree in the category of a detainee, a tribunal established and conducted in accordance with MACV Directive 20-5 will resolve the case.

c. Innocent civilians are released through S5 channels for return to their homes.

SECTION 1
OPERATION ORDERS

1. ORDERS:

a. Written operations, movement and/or administrative orders will be published prior to execution when time permits. Administrative orders published when method of logistical support changes.

b. Only authorized abbreviations, which are commonly known, will be used. Operations plans and orders circulated for internalized use should not contain abbreviations except for those commonly used internationally.

c. Positive expressions will be used throughout all orders.

d. Operations, movement and/or admin orders will be numbered consecutively during the period of a calendar year.

e. Distribution.

(1) Classified orders distributed on need to know basis plus 2 copies to next higher headquarters.

(2) Copy No.

(a) 1 - Records

(b) 2 - File/Reference

(c) 3 - TOC

(d) 4 and above - Distribution.

f. Annex Designation. Lettered annexes not used will be so designated.

<u>Annex</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>
A	Task Organization	S3
B	Intelligence	S3
C	Op. Overlay	S2
D	Fire Support Plan	S3 (FSCOORD)
E	Admin	S4
F	Movement Plan	S4
G	Army Aviation	S3 (Avn Off)
H	Chemical	S3 (Chem Off)
I	Engineer/Barrier Plan	S3 (Eng Off)
J	Psywar Op Plan	S3 (Psy Ops Off)
K	Civil Affairs	S3 (Civil Affairs Off)

<u>Annex</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Responsibility</u>
L	Signal	S3 (Signal Off)
M-Y	Assigned as required by	S3
Z	Distribution when too lengthy for end of order	S3

2. STANDING COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: (May be used as an operations checklist)

- a. Coordination between commanders is directed.
- b. Boundaries are FCLs.
- c. No aerial recon of objective area except on approval of G3 or XO.
- d. Weather decision for airmobile assault made by aviation mission comdr and ground force comdr at H minus 2 hours. Subsequent decisions made hourly.
- e. If unable to secure primary LZs, conduct airmobile assault on alternate LZs after artillery and Tac Air preparatory fire.
- f. Changes to scheduled fires during airmobile assault approved only by FSCCORD.
- g. Select and report pickup zones, LZs and alternate LZs.
- h. Medivac aircraft air hover during En-sized airmobile assaults.
- i. Priority of positions to artillery units.
- j. Once contact is established, maintain contact and plan pursuit.
- k. Deliberate, methodical and thorough search of secondary and tertiary trails, paths and stream beds to detect caches, base camps, etc.
- l. Max use of Tac Air and artillery, with emphasis on use against strongly entrenched positions, regardless of size of enemy force.
- m. Plan on use of Riot Control Agents (RCA). Protective masks carried at discretion of unit comdr unless specified.
- n. Plan for maximum use of Night Observation Devices and Claymore mines during night operations. Special emphasis on security of Night Observation Devices.
- o. Vehicular traffic prohibited on roads not physically secured by US troops and until cleared by TOC.
- p. En trains will not move without prior approval of this HQ.
- q. Evacuate captured items promptly to this HQ.

(d) Doubtful cases must be resolved by a tribunal established and conducted as mentioned above.

b. The Provost Marshal is responsible for the preparation and submission to the MACV Provost Marshal, MACV Form 343, "Detainee Report." The Bde Interrogation Section will assist in preparation of this form.

c. Returnees will be evacuated to division and will be accorded favored treatment under the Chieu Hoi Program. Returnees will be processed and turned over to GVN Civil Authorities at the nearest Chieu Hoi Center as rapidly as is consistent with the tactical situation.

5. REPORTS:

a. Spot Reports. Interrogation personnel at any interrogation echelon will initiate a spot report concerning any information gained of immediate tactical exploitable value. Report will contain as a minimum the following:

- (1) Source and status of source.
- (2) DTG of interrogation.
- (3) DTG of information.
- (4) Information (who, what, where, when, how).

b. Interrogation Reports.

(1) Interrogation personnel at any interrogation echelon below Brigade will prepare three(3) copies of an interrogation report on each PW, Civil Defendant, & Returnee interrogated. One(1) copy will be forwarded with individual when evacuated. One(1) copy will be given to support S2, one (1) copy will be forwarded to 52d MID, Interrogation Section.

(2) Interrogation personnel at Brigade will prepare interrogation reports on all PW's, Returnees, knowledgeable Civil Defendants, and Innocent Civilians interrogated in sufficient copies to meet existing requirements.

c. Weekly Captive Status Report. Brigade Interrogation Section will prepare weekly reports for the Bde S2 accounting for all PW's, Civil Defendants, Innocent Civilians, and Returnees detained by Brigade units during the reporting period 0001 Sunday to 2400 Saturday.

- r. Steel helmets will be worn during combat operations.
- s. Personnel will sleep below natural level of the ground, or below parapet level, as a passive measure against grenade and mortar attacks.
- t. Each squad-size element carry VS-17 Panel for identification of friendly elements.
- u. Recognition signal, friendly units. (Specify signal in effect).
- v. Minimize all radio traffic from H-1 until lifted by this HQ (airmobile cp).
- w. Vary routes, timing and size of patrols and periodically change CP locations to avoid set patterns which the enemy can exploit. At night and during periods of reduced visibility, aggressive patrols, listening posts, trip flares, starlight devices, and stand-to will be employed to prevent sudden massive enemy attacks.
- x. Company and larger units will not operate outside the range of 105mm or 155mm arty support.
- y. No operations against PW camps unless cleared by this HQ.
- *z. Upon completion of interrogation for tactical intelligence, PWs will be evacuated to ARVN II Corps captive camp in accordance with MACV Dir 140-3 and I FFORCE V msg AVFA-PM B1906, dtd 041137Z Oct 66.
- aa. No destruction of Vietnamese property unless absolutely essential to accomplishment of the mission.
- bb. Obtain and maintain contact with ARVN, RF-PF and CIDG units in zone.
- cc. Be especially alert for mid-afternoon and early evening surprise attacks by VC-NVA.
- dd. Vehicles will be sandbagged to reduce personnel injuries from enemy mines.
- ee. Report CP and unit locations without delay.
- ff. Submit implementing plan-order within 24 hours following receipt of Bde plan-order.
- gg. Destruction of elephants restricted to those carrying enemy material in known VC controlled areas and/or accompanied by recognizable VC.

* In country verification required.

ii. Counterintelligence plan. Reference annex/appendix or list points of plan.

jj. Time attachments effective, if different from order DTG.

kk. Reference to annexes not previously referenced.

3. OPERATION PLANS:

a. Operations plans are for planning upon receipt and execution on order.

b. H-hour, D-Day, to be announced.

c. Operation plans will be numbered consecutively during the calendar year and assigned a code name.

d. Operation plans will be prepared for all contingency missions.

Officer.

(4) Appendix 4. Naval Gunfire Plan prepared by the Naval Gunfire Liaison Team.

e. At each level of command the fire plans of subordinate units are integrated and coordinated with the fire plan of the major unit. Fire support plans will be forwarded to the next higher echelon of command without delay. Forwarding of requests for planned fire support will not be delayed awaiting completion of the entire support plan.

f. At company level the fire support plan will normally consist of a target list prepared by the artillery forward observer in coordination with the heavy mortar platoon forward observer and the company comdr. The artillery forward observer forwards this list by the most expeditious means to the artillery battalion liaison officer with the Infantry battalion.

4. ARTILLERY SUPPORT:

a. Direct Support Artillery. The 6th Bn, 11th Arty will normally be in direct support (DS) of the brigade. This battalion provides a forward observer (FO) section to each rifle company and a liaison section to the brigade HQ and each infantry battalion HQ.

b. Fire Requests. Fire requests will normally be addressed to the DS or attached artillery battalion FDC on artillery FDC nets by the artillery FO or liaison section. Fire requests may be originated by any element of the supported unit and transmitted to the artillery FDC by any available means.

c. Quick Fire Channel. A "Quick Fire Channel" will be maintained between the artillery FDC and associated infantry heavy mortar platoon fire direction centers on artillery battalion FDC nets whenever possible.

d. Reinforcing Artillery. The fires of reinforcing artillery are obtained through the DS artillery battalion FDC.

e. Close-in-Fire Procedure. Close-in fire is defined as any indirect fire intended to impact within 600 meters of friendly troops. Such fire should not be employed unless the threat presented by the target justifies the risk involved. When close-in fire is requested, the fire request will include the words, CLOSE-IN FIRE/CLOSE-IN FIRE, following the nature of target. It is incumbent upon comdrs of forces employing close-in fire to insure that troops take necessary protective measures to minimize the possibility of sustaining casualties from such fire. As a minimum, troops should be in the prone position when cover is not available. When close-in fire is to be adjusted within 200 meters of friendly troops, all pieces to be fired in effect will also fire in adjustment.

5. FREE-FIRE AREAS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT*:

a. In areas exclusive of villages and hamlets, observed artillery fi

and naval gunfire may be directed against NVA/VC forces in contact in accordance with normal procedures. However, unobserved fire will be directed only at targets or target areas declared hostile by GVN, Bde FSCC and/or Bn Arty LNO. It is the responsibility of the brigade FSCC and/or Bn Arty LNOs to obtain clearance on the requested target or target areas from the GVN US Sector Advisor prior to declaring it hostile.

b. Missions against known or suspected NVA/VC targets in hamlets and villages occupied by non-combatants will be conducted as follows

(1) All fire missions on hamlets or villages will be controlled by an airborne or ground observer (FO) and will be executed only after the target has been declared hostile by GVN, Bde FSCC, and/or Bn Arty LNO.

(2) Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked by gunfire without prior warning (by leaflets and/or speaker systems or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them.

(3) Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area, and if, in the judgement of the ground commander (Bn or higher), his mission would be jeopardized by such warnings.

c. All missions fired on targets or target areas that are in the coastal waters of RVN must be cleared by the Bde FSCC (clearance from GVN Sector US Advisor required).

d. Free-fire areas are coordinated with the sector/sub sector US advisor and his VN counterpart, the province/district chief. The province/district chief will establish the restrictions on firing into these areas.

e. Temporary free-fire areas may be negotiated for a specific operation effective for the period of the operation, and are normally more restrictive.

6. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT.

a. Requests for Naval gunfire support will be directed to the Bde FSCC.

b. In the II CTZ requests for NGF will be forwarded to the Artillery Section, I FFV, or to II Corps TOC, CONDOR 4129.*

c. Outside the II CTZ, liaison must be made with the nearest MACV HQ to obtain request procedures and location of NGFLO.

d. The following information is required when requesting NGF:

(1) Type of operation.

SECTION 6
AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

1. GENERAL:

a. This Section prescribes the responsibilities and techniques to be followed in the planning, coordination, control, and execution of airmobile operations.

b. This mission and ground commander's concept of operations and scheme of maneuver are the basic factors in determining the pattern of the operation and the support forces to be employed.

c. The airmobile force is organized into flights and elements. The tactical integrity of the squad, platoon, and company is maintained whenever possible.

d. The major ground force commander of the airmobile force is responsible for the entire operation.

e. The air mission commander is responsible to the ground force commander for the techniques of accomplishment of the air movement phase of the operations.

2. PLANNING:

a. Normal planning for airmobile operations is the responsibility of the next higher headquarters to the airlifted force. The plan of maneuver will be coordinated with the headquarters of higher, lower, and adjacent units.

b. Detailed planning for airmobile operations is essential. The backward planning sequence should be utilized.

(1) Sequence:

(a) Ground tactical plan.

(b) Landing plan.

(c) Air movement plan (Coord with fire support plan).

(d) Loading plan.

(2) Upon receipt of airmobile mission or warning order.

(a) The ground force commanders will:

1. Submit to the Aviation Officer:

a. Number and locations of pick up areas.

b. Number of troops, crew-served weapons (81mm mortar and up) and pallets of cargo at each pick up area.

planned.

- c. Pick up sequence desired.
- d. Number and locations of LZs tentatively

- e. Expected time of pick up.

2. Initiate ground maneuver planning; fire support planning; issue warning order to subordinate units; and make support requests to Brigade staff/supporting agencies.

3. Establish time and place for a joint planning conference and inform S3 and Aviation Officer.

(b) The Aviation Officer will:

- 1. Alert supporting aviation unit, giving information received from ground unit.

- 2. Arrange for the aviation unit commander or his designated representative to be present at planning conference.

(c) The aviation unit will:

- 1. Move to an alert posture dictated by the situation.

- 2. Have unit LNO at brigade to receive a briefing on enemy and friendly situation, procure maps and keep the unit posted as the situation develops.

(3) A planning conference will be held, normally at the CP of the ground unit commander.

(a) Personnel to attend.

- 1. Ground unit commander and selected staff.

- 2. Aviation unit commander and selected staff.

- 3. Artillery LNO/FSCoord of ground unit.

- 4. ALO/FAC with ground unit.

- 5. NGF officer (if appropriate).

(b) Procedure.

- 1. Ground unit commander presents ground tactical plans, fire support plan, and desired landing and loading plans.

2. Aviation unit commander states number of aircraft available, 1st capability, and recommends flight routes and any changes he believes appropriate in pick up-areas or LZs.

3. The planning group listed in 3c (a) above will conduct an aerial reconnaissance with the principals in one aircraft. The reconnaissance will permit the commanders and staff to make final determination on:

a. Identification of objective.

b. Ground maneuver plan.

LZs.
c. Identification of pick up areas, LZs and alternate

d. Flight routes.

e. Fire support plan, to include;

(1) Location of artillery/mortar firing positions
and targets.

(2) Timing of fires.

(3) Directions of attack by USAF aircraft and
armed helicopters.

(4) Targets for NGF and locating of firing ships.

4. A final coordination meeting will be held upon loading. The ground unit commander will subsequently issue an oral or written OPOD or FRAGORD. Coordination is continuous until completion.

5. Weather, the enemy situation, and aircraft availability may force changes in the routes flown, loading zones, fire support plans and aircraft loading plans. Alternate plans must be made to minimize the effect of these changes.

(4) Special considerations.

(a) Time:

1. When the lack of time will not permit the full planning sequence outlined above, the ground unit commander will notify all personnel concerned by the most expeditious means of the essential elements of the plan. As a minimum, aircraft flight leader will be briefed and given time to brief his pilots.

2. All times coordinated are critical.

3. Weather delays should be planned.

(b) Evasion and escape. Personnel participating in the operation must be briefed on actions to be taken if aircraft goes down at other than intended LZ.

(c) Counterintelligence.

1. Conduct planning in a secure area.
2. Conduct minimum reconnaissance essential to planning.
3. Disseminate orders at latest time feasible and on need to know basis.
4. Prohibit marked maps, OPORDs, overlays and sketches in assault echelon.

(d) Fire Support planning.

1. Preparatory fires on and around LZ should be intense and of short duration. Napalm and other incendiary ordnance may be used on and near the LZ just prior to landing, when required against appropriate targets, provided that the airmobile force commander has considered the possible undesirable fires and reduced visability.

2. To gain surprise, infiltrate, when possible, special reconnaissance/combat patrols into the area 24-48 hrs in advance to secure LZs and preclude requirement for mortar/artillery preparation and/or air strikes.

3. Gunships may be used immediately after the preparatory fires to recon approach routes to the LZ; screen and block enemy movement, and provide limited air call fire support for the ground force elements. Close coord is essential and friendly positions must be positively identified.

c. Load planning factors will vary with weather, altitude and condition of aircraft. (Section 16)

d. Execution. Inverse of Planning sequence.

(1) Loading.

(a) Arrange loads in pick up area so that aircraft approach into wind.

(b) One man in charge of loading area. He should be clearly identified by distinctive marking easily recognized by air crews and ground personnel.

(c) Loads will be positioned in accordance with published or announced load plan and spaced 40-60 meters apart, adjacent to, but not on touchdown point.

(d) Chalk leaders stand; other chalk members lie down or crouch as aircraft approach. Chalk leader identifies his aircraft in formations, raised his rifle horizontally overhead and directs aircraft in.

(e) Personnel in following chalks assist in loading bulk equip and supplies (mortars, ammo, etc). Care must be taken not to damage aircraft when loading heavy equipment.

(f) Cargo to be externally transported will be prepared for hook-up with experienced guide to direct aircraft. The following method is helpful in delivering supplies and equipment, following initial assault when preplanned.

1. Have loads identified by colored panel or smoke.
2. Direct aircraft to load by color designation.
3. Have aircraft deliver load to same color smoke

on LZ.

(g) Safety measures emphasized.

1. Approach aircraft from front or directly from side; avoid tail rotor.
2. Approach aircraft from downhill side if on a slope.
3. Outside personnel, as a minimum, strap in.
4. Cargo secured in aircraft by lashing/blocking.

(h) The following times with UH-1D aircraft should be normal.

1. Troops only: 10 Seconds
2. Troops and cargo: 60 Seconds

(2) In-flight.

(a) Personnel follow orders of aircraft commander.

(b) Aircraft commander follows prescribed flight route and altitude. Notifies flight leader/ground unit commander/artillery if he must deviate to an alternate flight route.

(c) The ground unit commanders will make the decision to change to an alternate LZ and inform the airlift commander and fire support elements.

(3) Landing.

(a) LZ control/security party (on ground or in first lift) keep flight leader advised of enemy activity.

(b) Personnel unload rapidly after aircraft touches down and clear LZ.

(c) All available personnel assist in off-loading bulk cargo.

(d) Night Landings.

1. When possible, pathfinder personnel with emergency airfield lighting set, used as follows: Five light "T" for lead aircraft and a single light for each remaining aircraft.

2. Flashlights may be used. Place red filtered light 20 meters from edge at four points defining landing area. Direct lead aircraft with two flashlights, using hand and arm signals.

3. Single flashlight may be used. Blink light to permit identification, point light to spot where aircraft is to land as aircraft approaches.

4. Small fires in sand and gas filled flare cans can be used to mark LZ in an emergency.

5. Experienced personnel on radio directing aircraft is essential.

2 Tabs:

A - Type Loads

B - Sequential Operation Order

Tab A (Type Loads) to Section 6 (Airmobile Operations) to Chapter 7
Operations) to 11th Infantry Brigade (Light) SOP.

TYPE LOADS

The following type loads are some examples of loads which can be carried on the various types of Army aircraft under normal conditions in Vietnam. Weight limitations will vary from one mission to another as atmospheric conditions change. Reducing fuel loads on the aircraft will also increase carrying capabilities. Other variables such as the size and shape of PZs and LZs will affect allowable cargo loads (ACL). The following examples are only a guide. The aviation LNO can provide exact ACLs for a given mission.

UH-1B

ACL 1000 (2+00 HRS Fuel)

Type	Cargo	Weight	Total
1.	4 personnel	960	960
2.	Bulk Cargo	1000	1000
3.	1 ea Mule (Sling)	900	900
4.	1 ea. 1/4 ton TLR (Sling) Cargo	565 400	965

UH-1D

ACL 1200 (2+30 HRS Fuel)

Type	Cargo	Weight	Total
1.	5 personnel	1200	1200
2.	Bulk Cargo	1200	1200
3.	1 ea Mule (Sling) Cargo	900 300	1200
4.	1 ea 1/4 ton TLR (Sling) Cargo	565 500	1065

ACL 2100 (1+00 HRS Fuel)

5.	8 personnel	1920	1920
6.	1 ea Mule (Sling) Cargo	900 600	
	2 personnel	580	2080
7.	1 ea 1/4 ton TLR (Sling) Cargo	565 500	
	4 personnel	960	2025
8.	1 ea 1/4 ton TLR (Sling) Cargo	1340 750	2090

CH-47

ACL 8000 LBS (1+50 HRS Fuel)

Type	Cargo	Weight	Total
1.	33 personnel	7920	7920
2.	20 personnel	4800	
	1 ea A22 Container (Sling Load)	3000	7800
3.	14 personnel	3360	
	1 mule (loaded)	2000	
	3 ea 81 mm mortars	282	
	150 rds Ammo (Sling) Load)	2250	7892
4.	10 personnel	2400	
	1 1/4 T trk w/1/4 T tlr Cargo (Sling)	3500 2000	7900
5.	7 personnel	1680	
	1 M102 HOW w/sect equipt	3350	7790
	60 rds ammo	2760	
6.	6 personnel	1440	
	1 ea 1/4 T trk w/w Cargo	5917 600	7957
7.	3 personnel	720	
	8 ea mules in 4 stacks	7200	7920
8.	4 personnel	960	
	2 ea 1/4 T Front Line Ambulances	7000	7960
9.	7 personnel	1680	
	1 ea 1 1/2 T cargo Tlr #tlr max height 74 in. Cargo (Internal or Sling)	5400 8000	7080 8000

U-1A

ACL 1920 (2+00 HRS Fuel)

Type	Cargo	Weight	Total
1.	8 personnel	1920	1920
2.	Cargo	1920	1920
3.	4 personnel	960	
	Cargo	960	1920

Tab B(Sequential Operation Order) to Section 6 (Airmobile Operations) to Charter V (Combat Operations) to 11th Infantry Brigade (Light) SOP

SEQUENTIAL OPERATION ORDER

(The Sequential Operation Order can be used to simplify the issuance of necessary orders for an airmobile operation. It also simplifies the annotating of changes after the order has been published).

Sample:

ITEM	TIME	ACTION	OTHER INFORMATION
1	0730-1000	162d w/attach conducts amlt asst w/1/2 Inf from QUAN LOI to LZ RED (XT645689); 25 sorties 2 lifts.	(1) Flt #1, 1st plat 162d 5 UH-1D; Flt #2, 2d plat 162d 5 UH-1D; Flt #3, 173d 5 UH-1D. 1 LFT Copperheads, 1 LFT Crossbows.
2	0730	Station time QL; line up NW side RW; final briefing. Contact QL Twr 5 Min out for landin instr.	(2) Chalk plates & Nr. Flt #1 Yellow 1-5 Flt #2 White 1-5 Flt #3 Green 1-5
3	0745	Copperheads & Crossbows dep for LZ RED. Gunships prep 3 min prior to arrival of slicks; Copperheads mark LZ w/yellow smoke.	(3) Copperheads E; Crossbows W side or LZ. No prep fires by arty or TAC air.
4	0748	Flt #1, #2, #3 dep QL for LZ RED.	(4) En route & landing formation Heavy Right; Flt route as briefed; 30 sec sep between flts; 1500'/80k. Normal rules of engagement enroute.
5	0800	Flt #1 ARR LZ RED. Followed by Flt #2, #3.	(5) Landing AZ 030; suppressive fire by door gunners Flt #1 only. Use only outboard guns. All flts rpt arr & dep LZ to C&C.
6	0813	Flt #1 & #2 ARR QL; P/U 2d lift; dep immed for LZ RED. Flt #3 refuel and standby QL.	(6) POL avail QL. Rearm at HON QUAN. Aid sta loc QL. Dust Off avail on call.
7	0826	Flt #1 & #2 ARR LZ RED: return QL, refuel & standby. Copperhead & Crossbows return to QL on order C&C; standby QL	(7) AMTF Cmdr: CO, 1/2 Inf (Dasher 6) Mission Cmdr: CO, 162d (Vulture 6) Alt Mission Cmdr: Vulture Lead.
8	1000	All flts released to parent unit control.	(8) Prim UHF: 248.6 Alt: 360.4 Prim FM: 66.30 Alt: 60.2 Gunships VHF: 122.5 QL TWR: 47.3 Dust Off: 45.7

SECTION 7
ARMED HELICOPTER SUPPORT

1. **GENERAL:** This section provides guidance and establishes responsibilities for employing armed helicopters in support of ground operations. Para 1-110 provides general information on armed helicopter employment.

2. **ARMAMENT:** All UH-1 gun helicopters are armed with one or more of the following systems:

- a. M3: 2.75" Rocket Launcher, 48 tube.
- b. M5: 40mm M75 Grenade Launcher, nose mounted.
- c. M6: Quad 7.62mm M60C Machine Gun.
- d. M16: Quad 7.62mm M60C Machine Gun: 2.75", Rocket Launcher, 14 tube.
- e. XM21: Dual 7.62mm high rate mini-gun: 2.75", Rocket Launcher, 14 tube.
- f. Other combinations are possible, I.E. M3/M5, M5/M6.

3. **EMPLOYMENT:**

a. The basic organizational element is the platoon, consisting of 5 UH-1 helicopters. Each platoon consists of two light fire teams of two helicopters each. The fifth helicopter is flown by the platoon leader.

b. Normally the aircraft will not be operated singly, but in teams of not less than two aircraft. When the platoon leader augments the fires of light fire team it becomes a heavy fire team.

4. **RESPONSIBILITIES:**

a. Ground unit commander.

(1) The supported unit commander will provide the fire team leader with friendly troop locations by marking center of mass with smoke, panels, distinguishable land marks, or other suitable device.

(2) Coordinate with other supporting fires to enable simultaneous employment of all fires.

(3) The target must be positively identified and recognized prior to attack.

b. Aviation Platoon Leader.

(1) The platoon leader must thoroughly understand the current ground situation, and insure that his crew(s) are completely aware of friendly troop disposition and location.

(2) Plan attack so as not to restrict the ground commanders' use of other support fires.

(5) Obtain information of artillery targets and target lines through air control net from zone control station of the control zone in which operating.

(4) Keep ground commander abreast of status of fuel and ordnance during the attack.

5. OPERATIONS:

a. The armed helicopter in a ground support role is a means of extending the firepower available to the ground commander.

b. To achieve the best results in the employment of armed helicopters ground commanders should make maximum use of preplanned missions.

(1) Preplanned missions.

(a) The fire team leader/aircraft commander should be briefed on:

- 1 The ground tactical plan
- 2 Restrictions for ground movement
- 3 Supporting fires
- 4 Frequencies and callsigns
- 5 Identification and prearranged signals
- 6 Flight route
- 7 Target area
- 8 Alternate plans

(b) Point target firing is normally used. Area fires are too inaccurate for use in close support of friendly elements.

(2) Immediate mission.

(a) Minimum information required for an immediate mission must include:

- (1) Supported unit location

(2) Callsign and frequency

(3) Troop dispositions

(4) Other supporting fires

(b) Ground unit commander must conduct briefing by radio when aircraft arrive over area.

6. REARMING AND REFUELING:

a. Rearming and refueling will be accomplished at base camp for operations in the brigade TOC.

b. Planning for utilization of gunships must allow a minimum of thirty minutes to rearm and refuel (varies with distance from base camp).

c. When operating within 10-15 miles of base camp the aircraft will normally be in a reaction role on ground standby.

7. Requests for Gunships.

a. Preplanned gunship missions submitted to Aviation Officer by 1600 hours daily.

b. Immediate requests will be sent by radio or landline to brigade TOC for processing.

SECTION 10
CIVIL AFFAIRS AND CIVIC ACTION

1. REFERENCES: FM 11-10 Civil Affairs Operations Map 62.

2. GENERAL:

a. This Annex provides guidance for Civil Affairs (CA) planning and operations within the 11th Inf Bde.

b. Unit emphasis will be placed on CA problems and Civic Action directly contributing to the accomplishment of the assigned military mission.

c. The primary aim of all CA programs is to enhance Revolutionary Development (RD).

3. RELATIONSHIPS:

CA operations will be coordinated with American military and civilian advisor, their counterparts, and province, village and hamlet officials at the appropriate level.

4. PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS:

a. Liaison will be established at each echelon of command by unit commanders, and/or staff sections with the US civilian or foreign military/civilian counterparts for the purpose of exchanging information, requests, complaints and effecting coordination.

b. Command Responsibility:

Responsibility and authority for the conduct of CA operations is vested in the senior military commander, who, guided by directives from higher authorities, national policy, international law, and applicable agreements conducts CA operations as ordered or as he deems necessary to assist in accomplishing the mission. Maximum emphasis is placed on integrated plans coordinated between US and GVN authorities.

c. Civil Affairs Plans and Orders: Commanders at all levels will include Civil Affairs guidance to insure accomplishment of the assigned Civil Affairs Mission. Civil Affairs area of operations will include both the Brigade tactical and administrative area of operations.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. Civil Affairs is a command responsibility.

b. During tactical operations the 11th Inf Bde will execute those Civil Affairs operations necessary to:

(1) Support the combat effort and accomplish the assigned military mission.

(2) Perform Civic Action in areas of tactical responsibility. Tab A to Section 10 to Chapter V.

6. CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS:

a. Requests for CA assistance will be submitted to the S5.

b. Functions:

(1) Government Affairs: All CA operations will be coordinated with the local government officials.

(2) Labor DIC will ensure effective utilization of NON-US labor. Units will requisition laborers by number from DIC.

(3) When tactical requirements dictate entry into a new area of operations initial contact will be accomplished with the government officials. Tab B to Section 10 to Chapter V.

(4) Medical: Tab C to Section 10 to Chapter V.

(a) Units will assist in the prevention of disease to the extent necessary to protect US troops. Contagious diseases will be reported to the Brigade Surgeon immediately.

(b) Civilian casualties will be evacuated through the military evacuation system.

(c) Dead civilians will not be buried by military personnel, except when sanitary conditions dictate. Civilian dead will normally be evacuated to the nearest village, GVN official, district or province.

(d) Non-combatant sick, wounded, or injured will be treated within security and resource capabilities after needs of US troops have been met.

(5) Public Safety: Units will assist local GVN officials in maintaining or restoring order and safety as necessary to insure success of the military mission.

(6) Arts, Monuments and Archives.

(a) National monuments, repositories or archives, and fine arts will not be used for military purposes.

(b) Protective measures will be executed at each echelon of command to protect and prevent looting of fine arts, treasures, and archives.

(7) Religious Affairs:

(a) Insure that proper consideration and deference given by forces to religious shrines, buildings and symbols.

(b) Reduce the possibility of actions by our forces which would be offensive or contrary to religious customs and practices of the area.

(8) Economic Matters:

(a) Unnecessary damage, use, removal or destruction of economic resources, facilities, and public utilities will be prevented by commanders.

(b) Units will impound and dispose of property belonging to Viet Cong as provided for in appropriate Pde directives. All captured rice and salt will be evacuated to the Bde Civil Affairs Officer if the tactical situation permits. When evacuation is impossible a sample will be taken from each cache. The sample, along with one of each different type of rice bag in the cache will be turned over to the Bde Civil Affairs Officer. In all instances quantities of captured food stuffs will be reported to the Civil Affairs Officer in daily reports. Units desiring to retain captured food stuffs for use in Civic Action projects will request permission from the Brigade Civil Affairs Officer.

(c) Each unit will maintain a stock of rice bags (available from Civil Affairs Officer) and insure they are available on tactical operations to collect captured rice.

(9) Natural Resources: Programs and projects to develop and conserve natural resources or contribute to the physical relief of the civil population will be encouraged and assisted.

(10) Price Control: Bde Civil Affairs Officer will make coordination with local officials, establish price controls and supervise the program to insure compliance.

c. General Policies:

(1) Maximum effort will be made to minimize non-combatant battle casualties during tactical operations.

(2) Troops will be informed of importance of minimizing civilian casualties and destruction of property, including livestock.

(3) Destruction of dwellings and livestock as a denial measure is the responsibility of GVN authorities, or ARVN military units unless specifically authorized by this headquarters.

(4) Distribution of emergency rations for CA purposes is authorized only to relieve undue suffering.

(5) Light engineer work will be planned and executed within the capabilities of the tactical units to assist the civil populace in the repair of damaged structures.

(6) Security berms constructed in the area of operations will be leveled to the extent time and tactical situation permits at the completion of their use. This is done to facilitate replanting of those portions of land.

(7) Tracked or wheeled vehicles will not be driven over planted rice, pineapple, or manioc fields except as a tactical necessity.

(8) Units will appoint claims officers on orders and insure that sufficient stocks of claim forms are on hand at all times.

7. CIVIL CONTROL:

a. Effective control of the movement of the population is of the utmost importance during tactical operations. Disorganized masses impair the maneuverability of military units, endanger security, and threaten the health of the command. Control is also necessary to minimize casualties to non-combatants and to reduce incidents which may be exploited by the enemy.

b. Policy:

(1) US commanders are normally not responsible for the control of civilians during operations. This responsibility is normally retained and discharged by Province or RVNAF Forces. When GVN agencies are unable to discharge this function due to lack of security or resources the US commander is required to implement Civil Control.

(2) Unless a civilian evacuation is preplanned and coordinated with the proper GVN authorities, units will not forcefully evacuate civilians from their homes except in emergencies which require their evacuation for their own safety, or to provide tactical security. Units are authorized to conduct emergency temporary relocation with notification to this headquarters as soon as possible explaining the circumstances. When relocation is necessary, national police should be utilized to the maximum to accomplish the screening and control of civilians. Civilians may be temporarily relocated to a Brigade collecting point or points outside the immediate combat area and returned to their homes as soon as the tactical situation permits.

c. Handling of Villagers:

(1) Villagers will be screened to determine their true status (i.e., village resident, suspect VC or confirmed VC). Supporting National Police will accomplish this screening.

(2) Disposition of villagers will be as follows:

(a) Permitted to return to their place of residence after appropriate identification.

(b) Those found without or improper identification will be detained and placed in custody of ARVN officials after intelligence exploration is satisfied.

(c) Commanders are enjoined to insure that the rights of all bonafide village residents are protected.

d. Refugee Control:

(1) Brigade will establish a refugee control point for handling refugees generated during the conduct of tactical operations.

(2) At a minimum, the Refugee Control point should be operated by:

(a) S5 representative

(b) Army medical service representative

(c) Intelligence representative

(d) National police representative

(e) Qualified interpreters as needed.

(3) Coordination will be made with appropriate GVN officials for the disposition of refugees in the province.

3 Tabs

A - Civic Action

B - Civil Affairs Entry Checklist

C - Medical Civic Action Program

Tab A (Civic Action) to Section 10 (Civil Affairs And Civic Action)
to Chapter V (Operations) to 11th Inf Bde (Light) SOP.

1. PURPOSE: This Inclosure establishes guidance to be followed by all units of the 11th Inf Bde in conducting Civic Action Programs.

2. GENERAL:

a. Military Civic Action may be defined as participation in or support of, economic and sociological programs useful to the local population. Aims concurrent with this definition include, but are not limited to:

(1) Improving living conditions of the local populace.

(2) Support of GVN officials (Province, district, village and hamlet chief, and their staffs and National Police).

b. The Brigade's Civic Action program supports the Revolutionary Development Program by construction and repair projects, and in establishment of public services. In this part of the program assisting the provincial Government with their programs and projects is an essential characteristic of military Civic Action.

c. Brigade units will include RF/PF support in their Civic Action Programs. The support rendered to these units will include supply of barrier material, commodity support, MEDCAP, and improvement of outpost and dependent areas.

3. EXECUTION:

a. Military Civic Action Programs will be conducted in coordination with local government officials and advisors. Unit programs should be within the limits of resources available to include labor, materials and funds. The distribution of relief commodities by US forces is accomplished through the GVN officials when possible. Military Civic Action while on operations emphasizes medical care and relief for non-combatant.

b. Civic Action projects will be classified into three categories.

(1) Clearing: Civic Action projects during tactical operations should be of short duration and have an immediate impact on the local populace. Examples are:

(a) MEDCAP

(b) Civil relief supplies distribution

(c) Gifts

(d) Minor repairs to roads, bridges and public facilities

(2) Securing: Once the area is declared clear, units can participate in more sophisticated civic action projects to fit the needs of the

local inhabitants, providing these projects have the approval of the province, district and village or hamlet chief, and that they are coordinated with the MACV/Provincial representatives in the area. Examples of this type project:

- (a) Agricultural and Natural Resources improvement
- (b) Major Road repairs
- (c) Building of dispensaries and classrooms
- (d) English classes
- (e) MEDCAPS

(3) Development: Once the area is secured and the population is supporting the objectives of the National Government, long range construction projects will be put into effect by the local GVN officials and Province office of Civilian Operations. Units working with GVN officials should promote good relations between US Forces, GVN officials and the civilian population. During development, units will assist the overall development plan with technical advice, equipment, and power.

c. Coordination.

(1) Units assigned civic action responsibility will establish liaison with the MACV advisors at Province/sector and district/subsector.

(2) Direct coordination with village and hamlet officials is encouraged provided planned Civic Action projects are approved by the local district official.

(3) Units, the government, or private agencies should not be relied upon to furnish all the equipment, supplies, and labor. The people themselves must be encouraged to participate.

(4) Local people will be encouraged to originate projects.

(5) Credit for results should be attributed to both local military and the civil administrations.

4. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION SUPPLIES:

a. Requests for assistance in material/or money will be made to this headquarters, ATTN: S5

b. Captured Supplies

Maximum use will be made of captured supplies in supporting the Military Civic Action Program.

c. Provincial office of Civilian Operations

(1) When units operate outside of Bde TAOR, direct coordination is authorized with the provincial office of Civilian Operations to obtain supplies.

d. CARE: Units should include CARE items in their monthly planning reports to insure an adequate supply is on hand at the Bde S5 warehouse.

5. REPORTS:

a. All construction projects and major CA projects will be photographed and three copies of each picture forwarded to S5 with the monthly CA report. The following information will be attached.

- (1) Location
- (2) Starting date
- (3) Completion date
- (4) Labor Source
- (5) Project description to include identification of individuals.

c. Provincial office of Civilian Operations

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- (3) Completion date
- (4) Labor Source
- (5) Project description to include identification of individuals.

SECTION 13
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

1. REFERENCES:

- a. FM 33-1, Psychological Operations - US Army Doctrine, May 1965.
- b. FM 33-5, Psychological Operations October 1966.
- c. USMACV Dir 515-1, Psychological Operations---Psychological Warfare, 26 April 1966.
- d. USMACV Letter, Subject: National Psychological Operations Plan, 4 March 1966.
- e. JUSPAO Pamphlet, Chief Hoi Guidance, 10 Oct 66.
- f. JUSPAO General Briefing Book, (revised) March 1967.

2. GENERAL:

g. This annex provides guidance for planning and implementing Psychological Operations (PSYOP) within the Brigade.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES AND ORGANIZATION:

PSYOP_a is a command responsibility at all levels. Commanders will plan and incorporate PSYOP_a into all tactical operations and activities involving contact with the local populace. Civil Affairs Officer is responsible for coordinating PSYOP activities within the Brigade.

4. OPERATIONS:

a. In accordance with the guidance contained in the US Mission Council approved National PSYOP Plan, all PSYOP activities within the Brigade will be directed at achieving these objectives:

- (1) Convince all audiences that GVN victory is inevitable with the support of the US and FMAP.
- (2) Persuade all audiences that the fastest way to end the War and achieve peace and security is to support Free Vietnam and oppose the Viet Cong.
- (3) Convince all audiences that US Presence in Vietnam is to help the RVN and is temporary in nature.
- (4) Convince the Viet Cong that returnees will be sincerely welcomed

b. Propaganda themes used in PSYOPs within the Brigade will support the above objectives. All propaganda disseminated will use clear and simple approaches to insure understanding by the target audience. Maximum effort will be made to insure that the subject matter appeals to the targets inner emotions, and maximum use of simple illustrations on leaflets will be utilized to insure at least partial understanding by that portion of the target audience who is illiterate. Primary target audiences will be:

- (1) The local populace, particularly those subject to Viet Cong control.
- (2) The Viet Cong, to include Main Force, local force, and particularly the village guerrilla.
- (3) NVA units in the Brigade TAOR.

c. PSYOPs within an operational area will integrate all US and GVN capabilities, both military and civilian. To insure maximum effectiveness, plans will be coordinated with the MACV sector and subsector advisory authorities and their counterparts before implementation.

d. Major subordinate unit PSYOP plans will provide for the employment of all available and practicable PSYOP techniques during all phases of each operation. Commanders at all levels will insure the timely exploitation of PSYOP opportunities that become apparent during an operation.

5. PROPAGANDA MEDIA SUPPORT:

a. Stocks of the most commonly used leaflets are maintained on hand at this Headquarters by the Civil Affairs Officer. These are used for immediate response to requests for leaflet support and for preplanned leaflet operations. Leaflets which are not in stock and special leaflets desired by subordinate commands may be ordered through the Civil Affairs Officer upon his approval. Delivery time for leaflets ordered through the Civil Affairs Officer will vary depending on the press load of the PSYOPs company furnishing printing support to the Brigade.

b. Newspapers and magazines published by JUSPAO and OCO are automatically issued to the Brigade. Requests for additional copies or reprints of particular articles will be coordinated through the Civil Affairs Officer.

c. Posters, banners and signs may be ordered from OCO through the Civil Affairs Officer.

d. Taped PSYOP broadcasts for loudspeaker missions will be provided by the PSYOPs company supporting the Brigade. Tapes of commonly used standard messages are maintained by 83 PSYOP Americal Division. These

are immediately available upon request. Other standard tapes may be requested through the Civil Affairs Office who is also capable of producing special tapes of simple texts. Special tapes with advanced text are available from the PSYOP's company furnishing audio support to the Brigade.*

6. PROPAGANDA DISSEMINATION SUPPORT:

a. Aerial leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts are available to the Brigade through the PSYOP's company tasked to support the Brigade. Civil Affairs Officer is capable of providing aerial leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts within 1 hour when aircraft are available.

b. Civil Affairs Officer can provide vehicle mounted or hand held loudspeaker support on call.

c. The PSYOP company tasked to support the Brigade will provide mobile PSYOP teams for special operations upon request. The teams capability includes loudspeaker support, the production of simple taped messages, and a limited leaflet dissemination capability. Requests for these teams should reach the Civil Affairs Officer two weeks prior to the operations.

7. REPORTS:

a. Changes in enemy vulnerabilities capable of immediate or long term exploitation, significant changes in enemy PSYOP activities, incidents of enemy terrorism against the civilian population, and indicators of responses to the Brigade PSYOP effort by any target audience will be reported to the Civil Affairs Officer without delay.

b. One copy of all PSYOP Plans will be forwarded to the Civil Affairs Officer by each unit.

c. Commanders will include in their combat operations after action reports comments on PSYOPs, to include a summary of the PSYOP activities conducted, estimated effectiveness, recommendations and lessons learned.

* Verification required in-country.

SECTION 2
S2 REPORTS

1. GENERAL.

This section prescribes the intelligence reporting procedures to be followed by all elements of the 11th Lt Inf Bde.

2. REPORTS.

a. Spot Report.

(1) Purpose: The spot report will be utilized to report to Bde S2 all information of immediate intelligence value. This report will be used for reporting the following which is not all inclusive, and is only a guide for the type of information to be transmitted;

- (a) Approach of enemy armor.
- (b) Attack by aircraft, ships or airborne troops.
- (c) Initial enemy contact or artillery fire.
- (d) Change in enemy disposition or counter attack indications.
- (e) Change in enemy barriers, fortifications and mine fields.

NOTE DA Form 1355 will be utilized to follow up in more details after initial report has been submitted.

(2) Format of Spot Report: The format will be as outlined in Tab B to section 3 to chapter VII.

(3) Transmission. The spot report will be transmitted by radio and/or telephone (commensurate with security considerations). When utilizing this form, sender identify the report as intelligence spot report.

b. Follow-up Report. Follow-up reporting of information will be continuing and will be rendered as additional information is obtained. Where applicable, these reports will include sketches and photographs whenever possible.

c. Intelligence After Action Reports. Intelligence After Action Reports will be submitted to Bde S2 MLT seven (7) days following the completion of a battalion/separate company size operation or when otherwise directed by this headquarters. After Action Reports will contain as a minimum:

(1) Weather and Terrain. Information concerning terrain and weather conditions in AO operations; effects of terrain and weather on troops and

equipment and evaluation of area for future operations.

(2) Preliminary Intelligence. The information received by the unit concerning the enemy situation in AO prior to the operation.

(3) Development of Intelligence Chronological progression of significant incidents that increased the intelligence of the area of operations.

(4) Conclusions. Results of the operation on the enemy.

(5) Enemy losses. Losses inflicted by the unit on the enemy during the operation.

d. Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) prepared as of 0600 and 1800 hours daily, submitted NLT 0700 and 1900 hours daily. (For format of INTSUM see Tab A this section).

Tab A - INTSUM Format

(2) Preliminary Intelligence. The information received by the unit concerning the enemy situation in AO prior to the operation.

(3) Development of Intelligence Chronological progression of significant incidents that increased the intelligence base of the area of operations.

(4) Conclusions. Results of the operation on the enemy.

(5) Enemy losses. Losses inflicted by the unit or the enemy during the operation.

d. Other Bde S2 reports required by higher headquarters will be prepared in consonance with pertinent regulations, directives and circulars.

TAB A to Section 2 to Chapter VII, Reports

1. Issuing Unit (Always included).
2. Time and date of issue (Always included).
3. Summary of enemy activity during the period.
 - a. Ground activity
 - b. Trace of forward elements
 - c. Potential nuclear targets
 - d. Air activity
 - e. Nuclear activity
 - f. Other (new tactics, CI, guerrilla activity etc.)
4. Personnel and equipment losses.
 - a. Personnel (KIA etc)
 - b. Prisoners of War
 - c. Equipment destroyed or captured
5. New obstacles or barriers.
6. Administrative activities.
7. New identifications.
 - a. Units
 - b. Personalities
8. Enemy movements.
9. Estimated number and type of vehicles.
10. Weather and terrain conditions.
11. Capabilities and vulnerabilities (Always included).
12. Conclusions (Always included).

NOTE: Submit and complete only paragraphs applicable.

SECTION 3
S3 REPORTS

<u>REPORT</u>	<u>SUBMITTING UNIT</u>	<u>TIME SUBMITTED</u>	<u>HOW SENT</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. OP SITREP	All Units	As of 1800 by 1900 daily	Msgr/RTT		
2. SPOT REPORT	All Units	As required	Msgr/RTT Radio/Tel		Submitted upon significant activity friendly or enemy to include contact or loss of contact. Page
3. Routine SITREP	All Units	Hourly during contact. Other; 2 hr periods on the even hour	Msgr/RTT Radio/Tel	Page	
4. Troop Disposition	All Units	Immediate	Msgr/RTT Radio/Tel		Overlay or points of origin, submit upon seizure of obj or closure in new area
5. Change in CP & Helipad Loc	All Units	Immediate	Msgr/RTT		Include time of opening and coord; loc of alt CP
6. Employment of Reserve	All Units	Immediate	Msgr/RTT Radio/Tel		
7. Loss of Contact with Adjacent Units	All Units	Immediate	Msgr/RTT Radio/Tel		
8. Time SP, RP, PL, LD or Obj is Reached	All Units	Immediate	Msgr/RTT Radio		
9. Airhead Strength	All Units	As Indicated in Remarks	Msgr/RTT Radio/Tel		Rpt time of 50%, 70% and 90% assembled.

<u>REPORT</u>	<u>SUBMITTING UNIT</u>	<u>TIME SUBMITTED</u>	<u>HOW SENT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
10. Ambush	All Units	Immediate	Msgr/RTT Radio/Tel	All ambushes initiated by VC against a friendly force, regardless of size will be rpt by the most expeditious means to the TOC in the format prescribed. Items marked by * comprise tel or radio rpt. A complete follow-up rpt will be submitted to arrive within 48 hrs after occurrence - Page 2
11. After Action	All Units	Within 72 hrs after operation.	Msgr	Page
12. Deviation from Bde Order	All Units	Immediate	Msgr/RTT Radio/Tel	Thorough description of Deviation. Code when trans elec.
13. Booby Trap	All Units	Within 12 hrs after detection	Radio/Tel Msgr	Page
14. Shell Mort Rep	All Units	Immediate	Msgr/RTT Radio/Tel	Page
15. Minefield	All Units	As required	Msgr	Page 2. Request location, size, and extent of enemy minefield ASAP. Follow-up with written report.

00
00
03

*16. Artillery SITREP. Submitted to I FFV not later than 24 hours following the close of each report period. Submit to brigade in accordance with OP SITREP schedule by DS artillery unit. Page

17. ENGINEER SITREP. Road damage and repair will be reported ASAP. Reports will include description of damage and bypass conditions. When a bridge or road section has been repaired, this information will also be reported to this HQ to include the new vehicular classification of the repaired bridge or road. Submitted by organic and attached Engineer units as of 1200 hours each Saturday. Page

*Confirmed after arrival in-country.

10 Tabs:

- A - Operations Sitrep
- B - Spot Report
- C - Routine Sitrep
- D - Ambush Report
- E - After Action Report
- F - Booby Trap Report
- G - Shelrep, Mortrep, Bombrep
- H - Minefields Reports
- I - Artillery Sitrep
- J - Engineer Sitrep

Tab A (Operations Sitrep) to Section 3 (S3 Reports) to Chapter VII (Reports)
to 11th Infantry Brigade (Light) SOP

OPERATIONS SITREP

1. OPERATIONS SUMMARY.

a. This paragraph will be a clear concise summary of the day's activities in chronological sequence. As a minimum the following information included when applicable.

(1) Battalion/company area of operations.

(2) Significant enemy contacts and friendly action; time of initial contact, duration of the engagement and time contact was broken, location by 6 digit coordinate and friendly/enemy personnel and equipment losses.

(3) Location and disposition of significant enemy supply and equipment caches.

(4) Joint US-ARVN/GVN operations. Include ARVN unit designations.

(5) Overnight positions and closing times.

(6) The narrative will clearly distinguish between the activities that occurred between 1801 and 2400 hours the previous day, and the activities between 0001 and 1800 hours the day of the report.

b. Plans Summary. This paragraph will include activities planned for the next 24 hour period. Operations forecasts will include, as a minimum, the unit, type of operation and location (ctr of mass).

c. Major Unit Operations. Use one subparagraph for each major operation (Co or larger).

2. OWN SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD. A statement of the situation as it existed at the end of the period to include any special conditions that should be brought to the attention of higher HQ, the location of major troop units, and pertinent activities of each. As much of the detail as possible is indicated graphically on a situation overlay.

3. INFORMATION OF ADJACENT UNITS AND SUPPORTING TROOPS. Any information relative to activities of adjacent and supporting units during the period which are of importance to the operations of the command to include operations of air, naval and ground units and support rendered.

4. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS. A statement of the results of operations conducted by the command as a whole and by major subordinate combat units as appropriate to include any specific results that would have an effect on the assignment of future missions to the command. Any details of successes or failures of interest to the next higher command will be included.

5. MISCELLANEOUS. Details not appropriate to above paragraphs, such as weather, road conditions of importance, and any other factors which have

had a bearing on operations of the command.

6. ADMINISTRATION. General statement of the administrative situation, if other than normal, as it directly affects the tactical situation.

Tab B (Spot Report) to Section 3 (S3 Reports) to Chapter VII (Reports)
to 11th Infantry Brigade (Light) SOP

SPOT REPORT

*Alpha: (date/time of action, incident, activity): _____

*Bravo: (Activity): _____

B1 Element involved: _____

B2 type action, activity, etc: _____

B3 Location: _____

Charlie: (Enemy)

C1 Type enemy (Regular, guerrilla, armor, VC, NVA, etc): _____

C2 KIA: (Actual body count): _____

C3 KIA: (Est): _____

C4 POW: _____

C5 Equipment Losses: _____

C6 Direction of Movement: _____

Delta: (Friendly Forces in numerical code): _____

D1 KIA: _____

D2 WIA: _____

D3 MIA: _____

D4 POW: _____

D5 Equipment: _____

Echo: Remarks: _____

*Foxtrot: (use): F1 (More to follow) F2 (Nothing follows)

*Must be included in every report

Tab C (Routine Sitrep) to Section 3 (S3 Reports) to Chapter VII (Reports) .
to 11th Infantry Brigade (Light) SOP

ROUTINE SITREP

This report submitted every 2 hours on the even hour. Submit every hour when in contact.

ALPHA -- Who is reporting

BRAVO -- Enemy situation

CHARLIE -- Location of forward combat elements

DELTA -- Helipad location

ECHO -- Other circumstances concerning operations of interest to this HQ.

Tab E (After Action Report) to Section 3 (S3 Reports) to Chapter VII (Reports)
to 11th Infantry Brigade (Light) SOP

AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. MISSION. A complete statement of unit mission(s).
2. TASK ORGANIZATION. List all forces available for the operation which were used in carrying out the mission. Show original organization and all changes during the course of the operation.
3. OPERATIONAL SUMMARY. This paragraph will outline events chronologically for the entire operation from start to finish. Narrative should be specific as to major and subordinate unit identifications, type action undertaken, enemy reaction, time of occurrence (DTG), use of supporting fires and locations.
4. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. This paragraph provides a brief summary of the enemy's major combat activities to include marked changes in morale, strength, tactics, combat efficiency and equipment. Data which are lengthy or can conveniently be shown graphically are represented in appropriate annexes.
5. ACTIVITIES STATISTICS.
 - a. Personnel. KIA WIA MIA VCC

 Friendly

 Enemy
 - b. Equipment Losses. Quantity Type

 Friendly

 Enemy
 - c. Weapons Losses. Quantity Type

 Friendly

 Enemy
 - d. Other Losses.

 Friendly

 Enemy
6. COMBAT EFFICIENCY. A statement of the combat efficiency of the command to include any pertinent changes during the period. Consideration as appropriate, will be given to morale, strength, status of training, status of health, status of supplies and equipment.
7. Civic Action. A statement of civic action undertaken and accomplished during the operation. Include attitude of population toward American units.

Outline recommendations for civic actions to be accomplished in the future within the area. List all actions which may have tended to alienate the population in respect to the WS/GVN effort.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. GENERAL.

This document constitutes guidance to combat unit commanders in the tactical employment of their units. The many topics which follow are placed in 11 general groups: Tactical Guidance, Viet Cong Tactics, Infantry Operations, Artillery Operations, Signal Communication, Weapons, Medical Service, Army Aviation and Airmobile Operations, Logistics, Civil Affairs/Civic Action and Personnel. The lessons presented here represent the experiences of a very few units within a limited geographical area. For these reasons the Lesson Learned may not be applicable to the brigade AO, but they do offer valuable guidance and a frame of reference for operations in a counterinsurgency environment.

2. TACTICAL GUIDANCE.

a. Individual and small unit training must be constantly emphasized by commanders. Teamwork must be stressed to the point that tactical execution is accomplished with the same precision as dismounted drill; that delivery of effective fire is as automatic as rifle drill; and that supply to the tactical unit is as responsive in battle as it is in garrison.

b. In the absence of strong command influence, exercised through a strong chain of command, soldiers will become complacent and grow lax. In counterinsurgency warfare one can never relax. One alert soldier can save a battalion. Training must instill in our men an understanding of the need for alertness. To have alert soldiers we must have alert leaders who never relax and who check, check, check

c. Too many leaders are either blind to common errors or lack the force, drive or energy to see that they are corrected. These errors must be corrected with precision and accuracy. Every opportunity for training must be used. Each combat mission is a training mission, as well as a patrol, an attack or an assault. When possible, leaders correct mistakes noted during battle, and in all cases at the first respite following the battle, to prevent recurrences. Take maximum advantage of reserve, marshalling and stand-down periods. During these periods of training, the leader must develop the attitude that "the more sweat on the training field, the less blood on the battlefield." The habits developed in training, good or bad, are the same habits which will be used in combat. Good habits and proper response must be so well drilled into our troops that under the stress of battle they will instinctively and immediately do the right thing.

d. The basic difference between a proficient, crack unit and one that is mediocre, is the attention paid to the details and fundamentals of marksmanship, fire and maneuver, camouflage and concealment, communications, maintenance, administration, and all the other arts and skills of warfare that contribute to success in combat. The leader must constantly check to see that these fundamentals are followed. All commanders

will devote their personal attention to training at every available opportunity. Emphasis will be at the squad, section, platoon level. Experience and lessons learned must be pushed down by, brigade, battalion, company, troop and battery commanders through an imaginative, continuous, aggressive training program. Nothing will be taken for granted.

e. Listed below are some techniques to be employed during training and tactical operations:

(1) No rifle company in the 11th Brigade will advance either in open or close terrain with three platoons on line. Commanders at company and battalion level will always have a reserve element in hand, under control, and prepared for immediate commitment.

(2) Troops must anticipate that meeting engagements with the VC will involve a heavy volume of initial VC fire. At this time, commanders and troops will not be able to walk freely along the battle front. However, they will not regard themselves as "pinned down" but rather will accept this condition as the normal and natural initiation of close infantry combat. Forward elements closely engaged will automatically become a base of fire. Commanders at squad and platoon level will advance their men into the base of fire positions by crawling if necessary. A heavy volume of fire will be returned by all hands and at any time the VC fire either slackens or stops the base of fire will improve its position by moving forward even if forward movement is only a matter of 5 meters at a time and the mode of advance is by crawling. Under NO circumstances will forward elements in contact withdraw in order to bring artillery fire on the VC. The base of fire will stand fast and reinforce if necessary. Contact will be maintained if necessary throughout the night.

(3) Upon initial contact, company commanders will immediately commit their reserve platoons around one flank or the other and will immediately begin artillery and mortar fire to their front. In the jungle, this fire may be started some distance in front of the position and walked back toward the position until safety requires that it be brought no further. This artillery fire, even though it may be behind the forward VC elements in contact will be continued. It will prevent the VC from reinforcing, withdrawing or maneuvering. Commanders will retain control of their forward elements so that maximum fire power can be brought into the VC closer.

(4) During the first 5 or 10 minutes of a meeting engagement, the chances are the VC will have the advantage. He will initiate combat at a time and place of his choosing -- usually from prepared positions. After the first 5 to 10 minutes, the combat advantage will begin to shift rapidly in our favor as additional fire power is brought to bear. The maximum casualty producing weapons are light, medium and heavy artillery and air strikes. Commanders of companies and battalions, upon engagement,

will immediately analyze the situation on the map and by visual observation and will bring air strikes and artillery fire into all areas through which the VC may be withdrawing, reinforcing or maneuvering.

(5) Once the VC is engaged, all commanders will use initiative and imagination to commit all available forces and block all possible routes of withdrawal within their capabilities. Until such times as routes of withdrawal can be physically blocked, they will be blocked by interdiction. Encirclement will be maintained until the VC is eliminated. There will be no pulling back into a perimeter at night during such an action.

(6) Battalions will be assigned the mission of saturation patrolling in extensive areas. Progressively, units will learn to operate independently down to platoon level. Initially, platoon operations will be done in the daytime pulling back into company perimeters at night; and after a reasonably short period of experience in this mode, platoon will operate independently night and day. The safety of a rifle platoon operating independently depends on two things:

(a) Repeated movement, including movement after dark so that VC forces cannot conduct a planned attack but rather must conduct an open tactical maneuver. This is not their most effective method of operating and during such engagements they are extremely vulnerable to artillery and mortar fire. All platoon leaders and platoon sergeants will direct and adjust artillery fire during such operations.

(b) While operating independently, where contact is always imminent, platoon leaders will control and maneuver their elements so that at least a squad base of fire covers all advances across open terrain toward positions which may or may not be occupied by the VC.

(7) In temporary defensive positions, two-man emplacements will be constructed so that there is a berm to the front and firing positions on either side with about a 45 degree angle of cross fire. This will permit the regaining of fire superiority without exposing each soldier to direct fire from the front when an attack is initiated by the VC with a heavy volume of small arms and recoilless rifle fire.

(8) It will be a normal operating procedure in the 11th Brigade to position artillery batteries and single rifle companies in forward bases of fire. These positions will be moved with sufficient frequency so that they will normally not be susceptible to coordinated attacks by large forces. However, they will be subject frequently to probes and attacks of up to company size. These troops must be cautioned to expect and to handle this size engagement. Additionally, combat reconnaissance by platoon and company size elements will be normal. Rifle platoons are expected to be able to handle VC companies; companies to handle battalions; and battalions to handle regiments until reinforcements can be brought in.

f. The following procedures, or "tips", demand the immediate and continuing attention of all leaders.

(1) Clandestine Entry into the Battlefield: Move into the battlefield by foot rather than by helicopter, the noise and sight of which reduce the possibility of surprise. Enter the battlefield at night.

(2) Night Operations: Steal the night away from the guerrilla. Night airmobile assaults, ambushes, patrols, and movement must become routine.

(3) Stay Behind Forces: When a unit is extracted following an engagement, leave or insert a stay behind force on the battlefield.

(4) Reinforce Rather than Extract: When a stay behind force or a LRRP makes contact, plan to reinforce promptly rather than extract. For this employ an immediate reaction force (platoon) on air strip alert with helicopters on stand-by, or insert platoons in advance on the ground concurrently with the LRRP on stay behind unit.

(5) Reaction Force: Since the helicopter reveals the presence of US forces, command and control ships should not be the first helicopters in the areas in which a reaction force is to be committed. As long as there is excellent radio communications the first helicopter in the area should carry combat troops. Upon arrival at an LZ the reaction force should promptly move out to block enemy escape routes while final coordination is being made between the unit on the ground and the reaction force commander.

(6) Limited Helicopter Traffic: Provide stay behind forces, LRRP, and units entering battlefield clandestinely with a minimum of 3 to 5 days rations to obviate need for helicopter resupply which promptly telegraphs to the enemy the presence of our forces. Prior to contact with the enemy use helicopter for medevac or tactical emergencies only.

(7) Resupply Techniques: Unlike the VC guerrilla who lives off the land, we are limited in our clandestine operations by the bulk and weight of C rations which limit the number of days our troops can operate without resupply by helicopter. The following are suggested ways to solve this problem:

(a) Use LRRP rations when available or in combination with C rations.

(b) Use rice and powdered soups alternately with C rations or the LRRP ration.

(c) Store supplies and operate clandestinely from a base carrying only one day's supply on the soldier.

(d) Resupply by helicopter at night.

(e) Resupply during the day with the helicopter flying nap of the earth and supplies "kicked" out onto a DZ.

(8) Silence the Battlefield: Eliminate artillery H & I fires, long range artillery, and TAC Air strikes near friendly troops unless promptly exploited by ground forces.

(9) Dummy Positions: Construct and occupy obvious positions during daylight hours and then abandon them during the hours of darkness to move to ambush sites or to attack suspected enemy positions.

(10) Doubling Back: Move out from a position in the afternoon and after darkness falls, radically change direction of march to attack a pre-selected target before dawn.

(11) Use of Trails: "Beat the brush" rather than move along main trails. The enemy employs trail watchers along main trails where he can generally observe advancing troops. Search along secondary and tertiary trails used by game which offer the guerrilla excellent concealment as well as an escape route.

(12) Springing the Trap: When feasible, follow or observe a single or small party of enemy to locate larger forces or determine critical intelligence such as enemy positions, supply points, CPs, etc. Then maneuver forces to ensure closing the trap and killing or capturing the enemy force involved. Move on a wide front supported by reserves and firepower.

(13) Cordon and Search: Encircle a village at night as secretly as possible, then search at first light using PF, RF, or ARVN forces. Rehearse using same forces until this type operation can be accomplished effectively. Consider use of stay behind forces after the search.

(14) Improve Marksmanship: Marksmanship is extremely important in fighting guerrillas. Generally the enemy will offer only fleeting glimpses of himself while trying to escape the advancing US soldiers. Therefore, if a continuous and supervised marksmanship program is established each man firing 20-40 rounds daily except on clandestine operations the enemy casualty statistics will rise, enemy morale will be lower, and the enemy will be forced to engage US troops at maximum range. This will reduce the effectiveness of his fire and give us time to commit immediate reaction forces.

(15) Specialized Training: To be successful as guerrillas, soldiers must be instilled with patience and taught the fundamentals of camouflage, concealment, light and noise discipline, and to remain still for long periods of time. Too often a potentially effective ambush is prematurely disclosed by coughing, scratching, movement to revive oneself and other restless activities. Our troops camouflage religiously at night but seldom camouflage for day operations. Training should give added emphasis to proper conduct of the individual during ambush operations.

g. Once contact is made, react rapidly with all available fire power and reinforcements without further regard to deception, stealth, or surprise. Following the engagement with the enemy, revert to semi-guerrilla tactics until a subsequent contact is made.

h. If at every echelon, from squad to battalion, each commander applies the standard techniques of ground combat and utilizes the full firepower available to him, the operations of the 11th Brigade will be successful. If, on the other hand, commanders maneuver their troops and handle their firepower so that the full weight of the combined arms team is not or can not be brought to bear, then setbacks will be experienced and unnecessary casualties will be taken. Every commander is expected to do his job in a cool, professional manner at all times.

3. ENEMY TACTICS:

a. The basic tactical code of the VC is: "When the enemy advances, withdraw; when he defends, harass; when he is tired, attack; when he withdraws, pursue." Emphasis is placed upon speed, security, surprise and deception. The VC exhibit great skill in making the most of their enemy's weaknesses.

b. Enemy operations are planned in detail and are based upon careful reconnaissance and collection of intelligence. Troops are prepared for a mission with detailed rehearsals, including the use of mockups, sand tables and similar terrain. Once a plan has been prepared and rehearsed, the VC seem reluctant to depart from it. A certain inflexibility is apparent in many VC operations, but on some occasions, VC forces have shown themselves to be capable of improvisation.

c. The VC are very cautious and attempt to determine in detail the size, disposition and direction of movement of their opponents before engaging them. They would rather let an opportunity slip by than act hastily without proper intelligence and preparation. For this reason, a meeting engagement, which usually does not provide a marked advantage to the VC, is avoided at all costs. However, should such an action take place, they are taught to "be the first to deploy troops to critical terrain, be the first to open fire, be the first to assault". The purpose of this aggressive action is to seize the initiative and to delay and disorganize the enemy by causing him to deploy rapidly under fire. During the resulting confusion the VC break contact and withdraw.

d. Local Viet Cong forces tend to operate near roads and villages where they may control the local populace and assist the regular units which cannot easily avoid detection. Main Force and NVA units normally move and establish bases in more remote areas, usually along natural lines of drift such as trails, streambeds, and valleys. They take maximum advantage of heavily vegetated terrain which provides them concealment from aerial observation. Only when pressed by our forces will they move deep into difficult terrain such as dense jungle or steep mountains.

e. The VC will normally make use of every opportunity to harrass, delay, and disorganize our forces by the use of snipers, mines, booby-traps, probing attack, etc. They will usually attempt to disengage and withdraw when faced with superior firepower, or when they no longer enjoy an advantage. In contrast, NVA units may defend tenaciously or vigorously press an attack even in the face of overwhelming US firepower. When heavily engaged by a US force, the enemy will frequently employ the "hugging technique" to stay in close proximity with friendly troops in an effort to make it difficult to employ mortar, artillery, and close tactical air support. They often disengage and withdraw only after suffering severe losses.

f. Offensive Tactics:

(1) An important VC offensive tactic is the raid. It may be conducted by units from squad to regimental size and is most often executed during the hours of darkness. Two basic types of VC raids have been noted. The surprise raid is the most common. Secrecy and speed are key considerations in this type of action since the VC raiding party may have less numerical strength than the defending force. The power raid is one in which the VC employ overwhelming strength and firepower in order to annihilate a defending unit. The time the raid begins may be a clue to its nature. Raids begun after 0200 hours are rarely power raids.

(2) The ambush is one of the most effective VC offensive tactics. Ambushes are normally established along roads, trails, streams, and other natural routes of movement. Patterns of friendly forces are studied in detail and then ambushes are established along regularly traveled routes. VC ambushes are usually short, violent actions followed by a rapid withdrawal. On occasions, the VC have observed friendly patrols departing their patrol bases and have established ambushes near the base area on the same route used by the patrol. This technique gives the VC the element of surprise and enables him to hit the friendly patrol as it nears its base area on the return route at a time when security is apt to be lax.

(3) The "lure and ambush" is a commonly used VC tactic. The basic principle is to draw the attention of friendly forces and lure them into prepared ambushes. Many variations of this tactic have been noted:

(a) The VC have attacked an outpost or vulnerable unit and then attempted to ambush relief forces at nearby landing zones or along principal avenues of approach.

(b) Withdrawing VC units have attempted to lead friendly forces into the ambushes of other VC units.

(c) Snipers have drawn the attention of friendly units and enticed them into ambushes.

(d) The VC have mortared friendly base camps and then

ambushed friendly forces in search of mortar positions.

(e) The VC have used some of the above methods to entice friendly units into heavily booby-trapped or mined areas.

(4) Harrassment is a basic tactic of VC guerrillas. Sniper activity and probes are used to demoralize, confuse and mislead friendly forces. Diversionary harrassing attacks have been used to draw friendly forces away from vulnerable VC installations. Local guerrilla forces are often used as delaying or harrassing elements to permit Main Forces or NVA units to withdraw from an area.

(5) The VC are experts at infiltration. They have infiltrated friendly positions during periods of reduced visibility and adverse weather and have often combined the infiltration with a feint or ruse. Frequently they have infiltrated friendly positions disguised as local civilians. Objectives of VC infiltration are sabotage, assassination, demoralization of friendly troops, collection of intelligence and disorganization of friendly units. Rapid deterioration of organized defenses and many accidental casualties have been caused by these infiltration tactics.

(6) The VC have been known to follow a friendly unit to a helicopter or truck pick-up point. They will allow the majority of the friendly force to depart the area thus providing the VC with the superior force; the VC will normally launch a violent attack just as the last elements are loading the vehicles or helicopters. Their mission is to destroy the troops and transport and withdraw before reinforcement can be effected.

5. Defensive Techniques:

(1) The VC avoid warfare because they cannot withstand friendly firepower. However, they may defend vulnerable units, bases, hospitals and installations for short periods of time.

(2) The VC prepared extensive defensive positions throughout their operational areas. If surprised by friendly forces, they will, if possible, withdraw to a previously prepared position and defend until they can break out during the hours of darkness. VC positions are characterized by defense in depth, mutual support, overhead cover, and maximum use of natural cover and concealment. Defenses are oriented along trails and other obvious avenues of approach. Booby-traps are often incorporated in the defense, particularly in VC base areas, and are often covered by automatic weapons fire.

(3) As a reaction to friendly airmobile operations, the VC have prepared positions at the edges of prominent landing zones in their operational areas. In some instances they have remained covered in a second line of fortifications several hundred yards from the landing zone while friendly artillery and TAC air were employed against the landing zone. When the preparation ended the VC moved forward to defend at the edge of the landing zone and then withdrew to the second line of trenches when necessary.

The VC will frequently allow the first lift of helicopters to land and the troops to disembark prior to triggering an ambush or launching an attack.

h. Withdrawal Techniques:

(1) The Viet Cong include a withdrawal plan with every offensive and defensive plan. As soon as the situation becomes unfavorable to their forces, they withdraw rapidly along preplanned, concealed escape routes. They often break down into small groups and withdraw along the same route they used in their approach.

(2) During the withdrawal, the VC make extensive use of rear guard personnel whose mission is to delay the pursuing friendly force until withdrawal of the VC main force is accomplished. Ambushes designed to slow friendly forces are also frequently employed.

(3) A typical withdrawal technique used by small VC forces in danger of an unfavorable, close range contact is to drop their packs and run. Friendly forces have been inclined to slow their pursuit in order to inspect the packs. On occasion the VC have employed booby-traps in the packs.

(4) The VC may also evade capture by hiding or by blending in with the local populace. Hiding places used by the VC are almost limitless, although underground locations are frequently used. Underground methods of hiding troops and equipment range from simple "spider holes" to elaborate, reinforced rooms. From the surface these underground installations are most difficult to detect. Critical points are entrances and exits, which are usually concealed in gardens, animal pens, under piles of straw or dung, in or under structures and in stream banks.

(5) Extensive and ingeniously constructed underground tunnel systems are one of the unique features of underground hiding places. Most are constructed in a manner to permit short term underground habitation. They are usually built in a zig-zag, multi-level form with ventilation holes at various intervals. This type of construction provides protection from grenades, indirect supporting fires and TAC air strikes. When cornered underground by friendly forces, the VC will often toss a grenade from one of these holes and attempt to escape through another exit during the resulting shock and smoke.

i. Booby-Traps and Mines:

(1) Booby-traps are favorite devices of the VC. Grenades, spike traps, poison arrows, unexploded ordnance (duds) and a variety of other means are employed to harass, slow down, confuse, and kill friendly forces. The forms of these weapons are limited only by the imagination of the designer.

(2) Booby-traps have most often been used along roads and trails, in moats and entrances to villages, in gaps in fences or thick bush, at fording sites, at bypasses to obstacles, in doorways and on abandoned bodies, weapons and equipment.

(3) Grenades are commonly used as booby-traps because they are lightweight, easy to carry and conceal, and are readily adaptable. They are frequently placed in trees or bushes along trails which friendly forces are expected to use; the most commonly used detonation device is the trip wire.

(4) Punji stakes and man traps are common types of booby-traps found throughout Vietnam. The punji stakes may be sharpened bamboo stakes or they may be barbed wood or metal stakes, dipped in poison or excrement, emplaced in wooden, concrete or metal blocks. The spike devices are placed in holes along routes of movement and are carefully camouflaged to prevent detection. They have been found in streams, rice paddies, tunnels, and other places. They are often employed as obstacles in conjunction with ambushes.

(5) The VC also employ crude but effective trip wire devices along trails and paths which release arrows, bamboo whips, and other swinging, barbed, club-type objects. Barbs are often dipped in poison or excrement to compound casualty effects.

(6) Anti-personnel (AP) and anti-tank (AT) mines are used extensively in VC operations. They may be of the crude homemade variety or similar to those in the US inventory. The VC have been known to mix AT and AP mines in their minefields. AT mines are employed along major routes to destroy friendly vehicles while AP mines are placed on critical terrain in the immediate area to inflict casualties on friendly personnel attempting to occupy the high ground or to secure vehicles disabled by the AT mine.

(7) AT mines are placed in hollowed-out places on bridges or in holes which have been dug in roads. In order to make the hole difficult to detect, the VC may scatter dirt across the road for several hundred meters or dig several dummy holes for deception or for mine deployment at a later date. Water buffalo dung has also been used to camouflage AT mine emplacements. Shoulders along roads are often mined and occasionally the VC will tunnel in from the shoulders to plant electrically controlled mines directly in the center of the road. This latter practice permits "selective targeting" of vehicular traffic. On some occasions the VC have buried wire leading to a road but have not emplaced a mine. When friendly troops failed to discover the wire, the VC then emplaced the mine and destroyed the next target of their casing.

j. Miscellaneous:

(1) The VC are very nonchalant in areas they believe are safe. They travel almost exclusively on trails and security is very lax. When they know friendly units have moved into an area they will shift from major trails to tertiary trails and stream beds.

(2) Although the VC are accustomed to moving along trails at night

and conducting well rehearsed night attacks or probes in familiar terrain, they are not experienced in night combat and are often surprised and confused when engaged unexpectedly by friendly forces at night.

(3) Typical signs of enemy presence are dead foliage, which may be camouflage for a trap, tied down brush, which may be a firing lane for a defensive or ambush position and villages which have been recently abandoned by women and children. Large herds of cattle and well tended crops in unpopulated areas may be an indication of enemy presence. The VC have attempted night infiltration of US units by intermingling with herds of cattle and moving them into friendly positions. Cattle do not move at night unless herded by someone, be alert!

(4) Enemy caches are usually placed at convenient locations in close proximity to secondary trails. Typical hiding places for VC equipment are rafters, thatched roofs, rice bins, hay stacks, dung-piles and wells.

(5) Local guerrillas prefer to live in villages with their families at night. Movement of guerrillas out of villages at dawn and into villages at dark is a pattern in many areas.

(6) The VC attempt to locate distinguishing features of friendly forces when engaged. They will fire most often upon personnel distinguished by radio antennas or back packs, insignia of rank, or automatic weapons with bipods. They will concentrate first upon anyone who appears to be giving commands.

(7) In preparation for an engagement, the VC will prestock the battle area and rally points with resupplies of ammunition, medical supplies and equipment.

(8) The VC often prepare covert mortar firing positions for use without a base plate. An angled (preaimed) cylindrical hole is dug at the mortar position. During the attack the VC move forward to the hole, emplace the mortar tube fire the desired number of rounds and then hide the tube at another location or withdraw with the tube.

(9) The VC often use a creeping pattern in support of ground attacks. In other words, the mortar rounds fall very closely in front of the advancing troops.

(10) The VC are experienced in breaching unobserved obstacles which have not been supplemented with detection devices.

(11) As an adjunct to their operations orders, the VC prepare elaborate plans to ensure the recovery of dead, wounded, weapons, ammunition, and equipment from the battlefield.

4. INFANTRY OPERATIONS

a. Occupation of Night Positions. Never occupy the same positions during the hours of darkness that are occupied during daylight hours. Night positions should be selected during daylight hours and occupied under cover of darkness; never occupy the exact same sites the nights consecutively. Good ambush patrols with Claymore mines in front of defensive positions are mandatory.

b. Use of the Buddy System. Many friendly casualties have been caused by punji stakes, snipers firing from trees, spider holes or by land mine tripping booby-traps. The use of two-man teams operating on the buddy system can greatly reduce the occurrence of such incidents. One man should watch primarily for punji stakes, booby-traps and snipers firing from holes nearby while his buddy searches the trees and the area further to the front for snipers. This same buddy system should apply on defense. Always have two men in each position, especially during hours of darkness.

c. Reaction to Snipers. Immediate reaction to sniper fire must be characterized by violence, a rapid return of heavy volume of fire and fast movement. The M-79 is excellent for use against likely targets in trees. In dense tree growths, grenadiers must realize that rounds do not aim if they hit branches immediately after being fired.

d. Effect of Casualties. The American soldier has a tendency of immediately going to the aid of a wounded soldier. VC snipers have capitalized on this and purposely wound a man to kill two or three others going to his aid. The immediate response should be that of laying down a heavy base of fire, both grazing and tree spray, in the direction of the sniper and pushing forward to establish a secure area for the wounded man. Personnel cannot stop fighting to aid the wounded. Aid men must come forward to police the battlefield.

e. Use of Anti-Sniper Teams. In operations which involve clearing and destruction of Viet Cong facilities (tunnels, foxholes, hooches), screening forces on the outside of the established perimeter keep the Viet Cong off balance and preclude possible sniper action against forces who are relatively stationary in the perimeter conducting clearing operations.

f. Use of APC. Armored personnel carriers can be used as ambulances and resupply vehicles if necessary. These track vehicles provide protection for wounded while expeditiously returning them to medical treatment. The APC is able to rapidly carry bulk items such as diesel and demolitions to the operational area.

g. Use of Tunnel Teams. Trained tunnel teams will increase the effectiveness of unit operations. Once trained, these personnel can systematically search the base camp area for suspected Viet Cong tunnels and explore and destroy those located. A minimum of three men are required per team—one above ground and two men inside the tunnel equipped with pistol, flashlight telephone and wire plus compass and bayonet.

h. Use of Claymores. Claymores can be used effectively in the offense in

the jungle, in and H and I role or to protect the perimeter in the defense and in breaking contact during the withdrawal or extraction phase of an operation. On ambushes, there is a tendency to detonate Claymores before the enemy has entered the maximum killing zone. Commanders must insure that using troops understand the maximum effective range of the Claymores.

i. Use of Flares. Units must not use flares too close to their own positions, thus exposing their own position more than the enemy's. Flares must be well to the front.

j. Equipment to be Carried.

(1) Squad leaders should carry extra insect repellent for their squad, foot powder, water purification tablets, one or two razors.

(2) Medics should carry malaria pills, extra bandages, extra tape to tag personal gear, and/or weapons of MIA, WIA.

(3) Squad bags to include trousers, shorts and socks for each man should be prepared for each operation in event required to be airlifted.

(4) Illumination grenades should be carried to mark helipads at night.

(5) Engineers must carry a maximum load of demolitions and power saws.

(6) Grappling hooks should be fabricated in each company for use in extracting caches and exploding booby-traps.

k. Command Groups. Command groups are readily identifiable by their collection of antennas. While there are a number of methods to camouflage these radios, the paramount requirement is to keep the number in the command group to a minimum and well dispersed. Command groups are primary targets for observed indirect fire and command detonated mines. FO teams should keep adequate distance from the commanders but should be close enough to provide immediate response. Newsmen, photographers, etc., accompanying the unit should not attach themselves to the command group and complicate the problem.

l. Use of Smoke to Mark Locations. Whenever a unit is marking a location with smoke they should require the homing element (FAC, Airborne Observer, Medical Evac, etc.) to identify the color of smoke. The Viet Cong will throw smoke to confuse the issue or lure an evacuation helicopter in ambush.

m. Accounting for Personnel. A fire team does not move if a man is missing, a squad doesn't move if a fire team is missing, a platoon doesn't move if a squad is missing, and company doesn't move if a platoon is missing. Platoon leaders absolutely responsible for the accountability of all personnel at all times.

n. Halting for the Night. When stopping at night, search out a minimum of 400 meters to the front to insure that the enemy is not observing the preparation of your defensive positions.

o. Ambush patrols. Patrols can and should use on-call marking rounds at predetermined points along their route to assist them. Ambush patrols should plot their ambush site as a concentration and fire upon it after returning to their lines.

p. Aircraft for Anti-Ambush Purposes. Maximum use of air observation by fixed and rotary wing aircraft should be made in conjunction with troop movements. These aircraft should carry trained forward observers who are capable of the dual role of detecting and marking possible ambush sites and of adjusting artillery fire on any resulting targets. Aerial observation should be retained for the entire movement. There are examples of successful Viet Cong ambushes occurring after the friendly commander had felt that his mission was accomplished and he had no further need for his aerial eyes. Armed rotary wing aircraft should be on station until all vehicles have completed the move.

q. Battlefield Police. Nothing that can be of value to the enemy should be left behind. Even a burned-out radio battery still has enough juice to detonate an explosive charge if properly set in series. The Viet Cong will police up everything.

5. ARTILLERY OPERATIONS

a. Briefing of Cannoneers. The men must be kept aware of the situation at all times. They must be well briefed on the general, special and current situations. Response has been much better when this is done. Cannoneers should be informed as to the nature of the target and the results of every mission.

b. Importance of Forward Observers Providing Information. Forward observers must send all available information to the FDC. General terms such as "VC in open" must be forgotten. Specifics, such as number (size) of enemy force, nature of activity, distance, are a must for the FDC.

c. Fire Control Techniques. No fire lines and fire coordination lines must be on firing charts and must be current. The artillery commander should be the only approving authority for fire coordination lines between battalions and may establish them regardless of maneuver boundaries.

d. Reporting of Results. Surveillance will often be negative. In order to determine full value of artillery fires, report not only confirmed results (which often will be few) but possible or probable results.

e. Fire Adjustment. For close-in firing, the first round in adjustment or an initial round in FFE missions must be white phosphorous (WP). This will insure that the fire is safe and will greatly reduce possible casualties if the maneuver element is disoriented. Be sure to apply corrections to the HE round when switching from WP. Forward observers must be prepared to adjust by sound as well as sight. During daylight hours, combined adjustments with the air OP bringing fire close to the ground observer for final adjustment will prove invaluable. "Creeping" has not been a dirty word in Vietnam. For close in fires, it is a must due to map inaccuracies and difficulties in locating oneself. Drops of less than 50 meters will sometimes be necessary.

f. Counter-Mortar Radar. Counter-mortar radar is very effective but limited equipment permits coverage of only a small sector to the brigade perimeter at any one time. Shellreps/mortreps are essential and reporting upon receipt of the first incoming round is of extreme importance. Thorough training in reporting is mandatory prior to arrival in-country.

g. Extra Fire Control Equipment. Extra fire control equipment such as aiming posts, bulbs and aiming post lights should be carried. Toggle switches for remote control of aiming post lights are very helpful.

h. Plastic Firing Charts. Plastic target grids and firing charts shrink and expand under the temperature and humidity conditions found in Vietnam, thus affecting their accuracy. Grid sheets should be kept covered when not in use.

i. Firing Charts. 6400 mil chart. Secure 25,000mm charts since smaller charts taped together produce some inaccuracy. Take cloth to cover the chart when not in use. Terrycloth or towels are ideal to cover the chart because when they are pulled back for a fire mission, the chart operators rest their sweaty arms on the towels thus protecting the chart. Do not try to remove the reflection indexes with each new adjusted deflection. Normally, registration is with all 7 charges and is done too frequently to move all deflection indexes. The deflection correction is applied from the stick by the computer on FFE missions.

j. Map Scales. The use of maps, scale 1:50,000 for posting the situation, friendly front lines, patrols, etc., is unacceptable as it is not sufficiently accurate to post these with grease pencil and adequately control artillery fire. The most successful system is for each INO to have 1:25,000 overlay which is then posted in colored pencil on a plastic firing chart.

k. Bottoming. Firing battery personnel must be continually alert for evidence of bottoming when firing in soft ground. When this condition is detected the howitzer should be moved and relaid immediately.

6. SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

- a. Importance of Radio Operators. The importance of radio operators monitoring their nets at all times cannot be emphasized enough. Instructions must be passed from the sender to the commander concerned and not the operator. On extended operations, a radio operator's alertness can be sustained by commanders having an extra RTO in the command group who can carry the radio when the operator tires.
- b. Jamming. The enemy exercises his jamming capability only during critical phases (i.e., air strikes, during artillery preparations, medical evacuation, etc.). Units must be alert to switch to the alternate frequency on order.
- c. Transmissions on Radio. When reporting incoming fire over the radio, commanders should disguise the accuracy of this fire as the Viet Cong at times appear to be monitoring unit frequencies and adjusting their fire based on friendly commanders reports.
- d. Communications Security. Correct radio procedures, use of approved code, and encoded map coordinates (except for enemy information) will prevent the Viet Cong from knowledge of the operation.
- e. Air/Ground Radio Communications. Until Brigade helicopters and other aircraft used in direct support of the Brigade are equipped with the new family of FM radios all airborne observers should use the AN/PRC-25 radio for air/ground communications.
- f. Changing AN/PRC-25 Batteries. There is a tendency to forget about changing the batteries in the AN/PRC-25. The extreme heat and lack of refrigeration for dry cell batteries reduces their life. Use first in-first out method of issue. AN/PRC-25 batteries often last longer than the 20 hour expectancy but new batteries should be put in radios just prior to operation.
- g. Remoting Radios. It is desirable to remote radios into the TOC and to centralize the radios on high ground under the control and direct supervision of qualified radio personnel. Such utilization simplifies maintenance, keeps untrained hands off the equipment and reduces the wear on associated secure voice equipment. Although weak batteries in remote sets have caused some units problems, periodic changing of batteries on a scheduled basis will eliminate this problem. Radios should be rack mounted and powered by 28 volt generators through vehicle batteries. Six radios can be effectively run off one set of batteries in this manner and the noise of the generator is removed from the TOC area.

h. Transmissions. Radio nets get strangled by inarticulate RTO's. Keep air open during helicopter assault. RTO's should listen to radio traffic and get a feel for what is going on before transmitting an administrative or nonessential type message. During heliborne operations a separate frequency should be allocated for control of helicopters.

i. Panels and Smoke. Use of Dust Offs" and marking lines for air support missions can result in a heavy demand for smoke grenades. Companies should carry one smoke grenade per man on operations, at least two panel sets, plus all the pyrotechnics listed in current SOI.

j. OH-23 as a Command and Control (C&C) Ship. The OH-23 is not considered a good command and control ship. It has only one radio channel available and use of PRC-25 as a supplement is not favorable since one cannot listen to the PRC-25 handset while wearing a flight helmet. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand anyone transmitting over the radio in the OH-23.

k. Telephone Poles. Don't count on readily obtaining good bamboo lance poles for overhead wire. Many units are using long engineer stakes welded together to get the wire off the ground. 2 x 4 "A" frames are also a good substitute and create less of a lightning problem.

l. Telephones. Telephones are at a premium due to the needs for perimeter, base camp and operations. Get all you can. ESB's, if you can find them, will be a great help. Also use of TA-1's and squad radios for perimeter communications will reduce the number of TA-312's required.

m. Packing of Radios. Obtain dessicant to pack with radios for overseas shipment. (This also applies for fire control equipment and boxed weapons).

B. WEAPONS

a. Taping M-16 Magazines Together. The practice of taping a second magazine to the magazine of the M-16 rifle (then turning the two over quickly and inserting the second for a rapid loading) often results in the second magazine being stuck in the ground. This gets the magazine dirty and causes malfunctions. Such practice should be avoided.

b. Machine Gun Ammunition. Keep a short belt of machine gun ammunition out and ready to fire--carry all other machine gun ammunition in cans to protect from corrosion and dirt.

c. Maintenance of Weapons. The high evening humidity in this area rusts weapons. Clear and reload weapons each night and each morning to prevent rounds sticking in chambers. Leaders must conduct weapons inspections daily.

d. Claymore. Attempt to secure Claymore mines to objects and remove only after approaching them on flanks and visually inspecting.

e. Hand Grenades. Grenades must be securely fastened to the harness to prevent loss. They should also be taped to prevent separation of grenade body and fuse.

f. Night Firing. Personnel should aim low at night to ensure hitting any enemy that may be crawling in.

g. Use of Claymore Mines. Following points are stressed in the use of Claymore mines:

(1) Avoid premature detonations prior to enemy entering the killing zone.

(2) Secure Claymore mines to fixed objects such as trees or stakes.

(3) Secure electrical wires to legs of the mine to prevent animals from tripping the wire and separating the fuze from the mine.

(4) Individuals physically receiving a Claymore should carry the hand generator in a pocket to avoid accidents. Recovery party should approach mine from the flanks making a careful visual inspection prior to movement of the Claymore.

(5) Employ Claymores so that they can be well-guarded and under constant observation by friendly troops.

h. M-79 Grenade Launcher. The most effective weapon in recent years for use by infantry units is the M-79, grenade launcher. The six M-79's organic to the rifle platoon deliver an explosive accurately up to 375 meters. This is especially valuable in the many situations peculiar to counter-guerrilla warfare. If you ever have a situation where the squad is understrength, make sure you fill the position of grenadier.

i. M-72 LAW. The M-72 is useful against lightly fortified positions. Heavy bunkers and entrenchments will, however, withstand the explosive projectile.

j. M-26, Fragmentation Hand Grenade. The new model of the hand grenade, the M-26, makes no snap and hissing noise as did its predecessor, the MK-11, which is also used in Vietnam. Use an explosive such as the grenade whenever possible in lieu of small arms fire. In the night ambush, for instance, the grenade is very effective since it has a large killing radius and does not compromise the friendly position.

9. MEDICAL SERVICE

a. Casualties to Medical Aidmen. Operation planning should include immediately replacing company aidmen who become casualties as this happens more frequently in guerrilla warfare than in conventional warfare.

b. Aerial Medical Evacuation. Aerial medical evacuation is responsible for saving more lives than any other evacuation means, however, there are multiple considerations in its use. The calling of "Dust Offs" restrict tactical operations by curtailing and sometimes completely stopping supporting indirect fires. The scheme of maneuver may have to be altered to secure LZ's for medical evacuation. These should be normally cleared areas to the rear

of the operational areas.

Dust off helicopters cannot take improvised stretchers if they are too long so be prepared to shift wounded to the stretchers that are on the evacuation helicopters.

c. Medical Evacuation in APC's. The use of armored personnel carriers in a medical evacuation role in areas subject to sniper fire and booby-traps has proven highly satisfactory. The optimum number of APC's that should be made available to a battalion for medic 1 evacuation is three. Medical evacuation is best handled utilizing attached APC's moving casualties from the front lines to the field litter ambulance under battalion control to a Forward Medical Evacuation Center from where they are evacuated to the battalion aid station. Guides should be available at the Forward Medical Evacuation Center to lead the APC to the company collecting point. Personnel manning this point should mark the point with smoke on order.

d. Evacuation of Dead. Preparations in the form of evacuation bags and a vehicle should be on hand in the vicinity of the Forward Medical Evacuation Center to evacuate KIA's as quickly as possible without utilizing field litter ambulances which may be needed for the wounded.

e. Assisting Casualties. Over attention to assisting casualties can sometimes detract from a unit's aggressiveness resulting in additional casualties from sniper fire and aggressive maneuver to adequately clear the area where the initial casualties were taken. There is a tendency for personnel to rush to the aid of wounded comrades during the assault. This reduces the volume of firepower being delivered on the enemy, provides additional targets for the enemy and results in greater number of friendly casualties.

f. The Individual Soldier:

(1) Preventive measures must be employed to avoid becoming a non-battle casualty.

(a) Dysentery and Diarrhea: Caused by contaminated food and water. None of the local untreated water in Vietnam is considered safe for drinking. To make the water potable always add two iodine or halazone purification tablets per canteen of water.

(b) Typhoid, Cholera, and Hepatitis: Caused by contaminated food and water. Avoid eating any local raw vegetation, fruits or milk products. Keep immunizations up to date at all times.

(c) Malaria: Caused by the bite of an infected mosquito. This disease may be fatal and the following precautions must be observed:

a. The daily and weekly anti-malaria pills must be taken faithfully.

b. Shirt sleeves must be rolled down during the hours of darkness and when operating in dense jungle.

c. Use insect repellent regularly and aerosol bombs freely when the tactical situation permits.

(d) Immersion Foot: Caused by constant exposure to wet boots and socks and can result in loss of feet and toes. To prevent immersion foot-dry your feet at every opportunity, massage feet, apply foot powder and put on dry socks. Always carry extra socks; if at all possible do not sleep in wet boots.

(e) Fungus: Common infection when operating in jungle terrain. The armpits, groin, feet and arms are most susceptible to infection. The best prevention is to keep the body dry and clean. Use of foot powder on susceptible areas is helpful.

(f) Heat Casualties: The body becomes acclimated to the heat of Vietnam after a period of 2-3 weeks. However, 8-10 canteens of water may be required for an individual while conducting combat operations during periods of intense heat. Food must be eaten regularly to maintain strength and salt intake. Additionally, salt tablets must be taken when perspiration is profuse, never take salt tablets without drinking water.

(2) Use of the Buddy System: Two of the most common causes of friendly casualties are booby-traps and snipers. The use of two man teams can reduce the recurrence of these incidents. One man should watch primarily for punji stakes and booby-traps while his buddy searches the area (to include trees) for snipers.

10. ARMY AVIATION AND AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

a. Trooper Ladder. During operations in heavily wooded and mountainous terrain the trooper ladder is used in operations ranging from fire team size to entire companies. The ladder is 36" wide series of aluminum rods arranged as a ladder and is 100 feet long. The ladder has been successfully used both at night and during the day time. Units should plan for the use of trooper ladders, and should, when practicable practice this means of deployment on the battlefield.

b. Positioning Troops Near the Operational Area. If the operational area is located a considerable distance from the staging area, troops should be repositioned to a forward intermediate staging area, which will alleviate lengthy turnaround time and, thereby, achieve mass more quickly in the objective area, reduce risk, and decrease time to accomplish the air movement. If the intermediate staging area selected is a prepared area, the repositioning should be accomplished by fixed-wing aircraft to conserve the more costly and critical helicopter.

c. Selection of Landing Zones. It is mandatory that the air mission commander (or his representative) and the airmobile force commander jointly reconnoiter the proposed sites, preferably in the same helicopter.

d. Distribution of Ground Tactical Plan. Overlays of the supported unit's T/O, objectives, and direction of movement must be provided to aviation units in time to incorporate the plan into aviation unit briefings.

e. Helicopter Troop Extraction. Coordination between the lift commanders and the ground elements must be accomplished early, preferably prior to beginning the operation and must include preparation of a detailed fire support plan. The loading zone security force must be positioned in close proximity to the landing zone, but far enough out to prevent small arms and direct fire weapons from firing on the elements involved in the lift. Pathfinders should be in position a minimum of one hour prior to extraction time, to accomplish necessary coordination with the ground commanders, assist in positioning troops, and assist in preparing the loading zone.

f. LZ Preparation Fires. When the area in and around an LZ is likely to burn, restrict the type ordnance to be used during preparation to that least likely to cause fire, i.e., fragmentation bombs, cannon, fire, HE with fuze VT, and the like.

g. Identification of LZ. In a multi-lift operation it is often difficult for subsequent elements, flights or companies to locate the exact position of the LZ because of pre-strike smoke and dust, or because of excessive time interval between aircraft flights. This problem can be eliminated if the lead ship in each element drops yellow smoke on the LZ, upon departure.

h. Preparatory and Supporting Fires, Automobile Assaults. Combat assaults must be well planned and coordinated with the Artillery INO and the Air Force INO to insure that sufficient fire support is available. For example, when a landing zone is to be prepared by fire, the air strike should be scheduled from H-30 to H-15; the artillery preparation should be H-15 to H-5; and between H-5 and H-hour, the armed helicopters should recon the LZ, mark the landing point, and place pathfinders on the LZ prior to arrival of the first troopships. When a combat assault is scheduled into an unprepared LZ, on-call fires by artillery and air must be preplanned. If armed helicopters find the LZ hot, the troopships will orbit out of the area while artillery or air saturates the LZ. The optimum altitude to fly in the operational area is 2500 feet. This places the aircraft above effective small arms fire but allows the observer to perform his mission.

i. Exiting Helicopters Used as Troop Carriers. Upon exiting the helicopter, troops should take three or four steps and immediately lift the ground until the helicopter departs. This avoids the possibility for their getting hit by the rear rotor blades, gives the leader time for orientation before he moves off the LZ, permits the helicopter to fire expressive fires, and clears the helicopter's takeoff route.

j. Heavily Loaded Troops. Heavily loaded troops should load last. This enables other troops in the helicopter to help load their gear. It also positions the heavier equipment near the door, facilitating rapid debarkation at the LZ.

k. Security Force for Downed Aircraft. It is desirable to form a small reserve unit to provide security for downed aircraft. This prevents tasking a unit in the vicinity which already has a tactical plan and mission to accomplish. A suitable solution is to keep a portion of the base security force on ground alert to provide security for downed aircraft.

11. LOGISTICS

a. Tactical Operations. For timely and adequate support of tactical operations, prior weapons density rate is needed to determine required "day-of-supply" for ammunition and to initiate action to insure adequate stocks are available. Weapon density information should be provided by tactical commanders at least 10 days prior to start of operations.

b. Ammunition Packing. All ammunition packing materials should be returned to an Ammunition Supply Point by the using unit, as containers and materials are required in the conduct of normal maintenance operations by ammunition units.

c. Storage of Sandbags. Burlap sandbags with oil based preservative are prone to spontaneous combustion if stored improperly. Store sandbags with adequate ventilation and practice proper fire protection.

d. Construction Planning. Prior to departure from CONUS, units should develop plans for semi-permanent locations upon arrival in-country. They should also augment this TAT RED equipment with certain hard to get items such as light fixtures, electric outlets, and plumbing fixtures as well as other items which they can improvise and improve their living conditions.

e. Protective Mask. Protective masks should be kept in waterproof bags until they are needed. If they are removed from these bags prior to an attack utilizing RCA, they must be kept out of the water to be of any value.

f. Driver Maintenance and Training. Driver training and proper lubrication of the clutch assembly (3/4 ton primarily) must be emphasized. When traveling in soft sand, drivers will use low gear. When descending steep hills, they will use the low range gear.

g. EM for Electronic Components. Electronic circuits and components are subject to rapid deterioration in the climatic conditions that prevail in Vietnam. Sealing these components in plastic bags, which are readily available through re-use or on the commercial market, will provide protection against the dust and moisture which are so common.

h. Scheduling of Organizational Maintenance. Due to the intensive daily requirement for vehicles, it may prove unsatisfactory to adequately perform scheduled maintenance of vehicles when due. It may be necessary to perform scheduled maintenance at night when maximum number of vehicles and drivers are available with only emergency or major repairs on deadlined vehicles in the daytime.

i. Universal Joints and Wheel Bearings. Current lubrication orders (LOs) call for lubrication every 3000 miles or once every six months. This interval is inadequate due to road conditions and rain. Vehicles should be lubricated as outlined in the appropriate LO each 1000 miles or every two months, whichever comes first.

j. Generator Failure. Continuous operations, extreme climatic conditions, and dust contribute to a high generator deadline rate. Generators should be converted to 3-phase output whenever possible. This results in smoother operation, lower internal heating, and a significant reduction in generator failure.

k. Vehicle Overload. The allowable 100% overload for combat vehicles should apply only when they are driven on hard, smooth-surfaced roads. When operating on secondary roads, cargo trucks, loaded above rated capacity, will sustain damage to the frame, springs, and steering linkage. Vehicles used to transport ammunition are of specific concern. Most types of ammunition will overload a vehicle before the volumetric capacity is reached.

12. CIVIL AFFAIRS/CIVIC ACTION

a. MEDCAP Supplies. Civilian personnel without bonafide illness often show up for MEDCAP treatment. Discretion must be used in issuing free MEDCAP supplies to healthy civilians who request treatment and thereby delay treatment of the bonafide sick.

b. Interpreters for MEDCAP Program. The necessity for adequate interpreter service at all MEDCAP programs is essential. The best of American aid is near worthless without the presence of skilled interpreters. Valuable medical time will be lost because of failure to have qualified interpreter personnel present.

c. Refugee Control. It is essential to establish Refugee Control Points near the tactical operational areas and to evacuate refugees to these collection points as soon as the tactical situation permits. Speedy evacuation releases the commander of the burden caused by the presence of civilians in the operational area, and reduces the chance of noncombatant casualties.

d. The MACV NINE Rules

(1) Remember we are guests here: We make no demands and seek no special treatment.

- (2) Join with the people, understand their life, use phrases from their language and honor their customs and laws.
- (3) Treat women with politeness and respect.
- (4) Make personal friends among the soldiers and civilian people.
- (5) Always give the Vietnamese the right of way.
- (6) Be alert to security and ready to assist with your military skill.
- (7) Don't attract attention by loud, rude or sexual behavior.
- (8) Avoid separating yourself from the people by a display of wealth or privilege.
- (9) Above all else you are members of the U.S. Military Forces on a difficult mission, responsible for all your official and personal actions. Reflect honor upon yourself and the United States of America.


13. PERSONNEL

a. Replacement Processing Centers Replacement facilities in combat zones are characterized by large numbers of unarmored troops billeted in combat areas. When these units are located near vital supply facilities or prime military targets (such as helicopter pads), disastrous results can occur in the event of an enemy attack on the prime target. Therefore, replacement type units and similar groups will be located a reasonable distance from petroleum storage, aircraft parking, large headquarters, and like locations.

b. DEKOS Humps The input of numerous units in a short period of time has caused unfavorable peaks in DEKOS. The brigade can be expected to transfer and receive 30%-35% of their deployable strength shortly after arriving in-country. This procedure causes minimum impact on the operational capability of old and new units and assists in reducing these peaks.


C O M P A T

EXTRACT



6TH

BATTALION



11TH ARTILLERY

EXHIBIT M-74

EXTRACTS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 6TH BATTALION, 11TH ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96557

18 November 1967


XIAT-OP

SUBJECT: Combat SOP

TO: See Distribution

1. The 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery Combat Standing Operating Procedure is published for the guidance of all concerned.
2. Recommendations for changes, additions or deletions should be made to this Headquarters, ATTN: S3. All changes will be posted and recorded on record of changes sheet, attached to Combat SOP.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



LOREN P. HOOVER
2Lt, Artillery
Adjutant

1 Incl
6/11 Arty Combat SOP

DISTRIBUTION:
See Annex P

HEADQUARTERS
6TH BATTALION 11TH ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96557

SOP for Combat

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SECTION I

GENERAL

1. REFERENCES AND RESCISSIONS

a. References:

(1) 11th Infantry Brigade Tactical SOP for Counterinsurgency Operation (Draft).

(2) FM 6-140 dated 14 June 1965.

b. Rescission. Tactical Standing Operating Procedures, 6th Battalion, 11th Artillery, dtd 31 August 1967, is rescinded.

2. PURPOSE: This SOP standardizes routine operational and administrative procedures within this battalion. It applies to organic and attached units unless otherwise stated.

SECTION II

PERSONNEL & ADMINISTRATION

1. GENERAL: This chapter prescribes the policies and procedures relating to personnel and administration. (USARV Regulation references in this SOP will be disseminated as received).

2. MAINTENANCE OF UNIT STRENGTH:

a. Strength:

(1) Current policy is to maintain maneuver batteries at 100% strength.

(2) Units are responsible for personnel accountability. This is continuous and immediate.

b. Reports:

(1) Personnel daily summary (EBF 44) See Appendix I & II to Annex A.

(a) Reports will be as of 1200 hours for previous 24 hour period to be submitted by batteries to arrive at Battalion S-1 as soon as possible but not later than 1400 hours daily.

(b) Reports may be submitted by message or wire. In any case, a follow up copy of EBF 44 must be submitted.

(2) Casualty Reports:

(a) Reporting of casualties within the Brigade is governed by AR 600-10 and USARV Regulation 600-1.

a. Definitions

(1) All persons captured by US Forces as enemy or suspected enemy shall be referred to as a "detainee" until his status is determined by a brigade interrogator, as one of the categories described below:

(2) Prisoner of War (PW)

(a) Any captive of the North Vietnamese Armed Force (NVA) or Viet Cong Main Force (VCMF) whether captured in combat or not.

(b) Any person captured while actually engaged in combat or in a belligerent act (other than espionage, sabotage, or terrorism) against the Government of Vietnam (GVN), US Forces, or other Free World Military Armed Forces (FWMAF).

(3) Civil Defendants. Those persons having committed or suspected of having committed acts of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or even criminal acts. Persons of this category are not entitled to Prisoner of War status provided by the Geneva Convention relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War.

(4) Returnees. A person voluntarily returning to the control of GVN after having actively supported the Viet Cong in political or military activities. NVA personnel are accepted as returnees.

(5) Doubtful Cases. Persons suspected of or known to have committed a belligerent act (other than espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or criminal) and whose entitlement to PW status is in question. Doubtful cases must be resolved by a tribunal in accordance with Article 5 of the Geneva Convention (GFW) as implemented by MACV Directive 20-5.

(6) Other Categories.

(a) A person known to be an innocent civilian at the time of capture does not fall within the "detainee" category above and does not require handling as such. (para 4c, below).

(b) A refugee is person other than that described in para 2a, above who has fled or has been forced from his abode to escape military or political persecution.

(7) PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING AND PROCESSING DETAINEES:

(c) Capturing unit.

(1). Must search, segregate, silence, safeguard, and speedily evacuate detainees to the Bde collection point.

(2). Tag detainee with MACV Form 340 or USAV Form 364 "Captive Card". It is mandatory that the following minimum information be entered: date, time, place, circumstances of capture and capturing unit.

(3). Interrogate for immediate tactical value.

(4). All documents, monies, weapons, and other impediments must be tagged with description and related to the detainee. Items must be forwarded with detainee. Those items desired and authorized as war souvenirs should be marked for return with identity of requestor. Souvenirs are not authorized to be retained prior to processing by brigade interrogators.

(5). Evacuate detainees in accordance with MACV directives 20-5 and 190-3.

(6). Seriously wounded detainees are to be evacuated through medical channels to Bde Clearing. Expeditiously inform Bde S-2 of ETA to Bde Clearing. BDE Clearing will complete a duplicate Captive Tag if detainee must be evacuated out of Bde control.

b. Processing

(1) Liaison officers will submit artillery H&I's to Battalion FDC NLT 1200 hours daily.

(2) Battalion FDC will consolidate all requests adding targets received from S-2 and the Brigade liaison officer and submit to FSCE NLT 1400 hours.

(3) H&I's will be distributed to the firing batteries at the discretion of the S-3.

(4) H&I's will be fired on a random schedule.

(5) H&I's will not be fired closer than 1000 meters to friendly troops or to known friendly personnel.

(6) Daylight H&I's may be requested at any time.

31. DEFENSIVE CONCENTRATIONS:

a. Defensive concentrations planned by each forward observer in coordination with supported company commanders.

b. Whenever possible, these fires will be adjusted during daylight hours.

32. TARGET DESIGNATION SYSTEM: (See Annex C)

33. FIRE REQUESTS:

(1) Sent to direct Support Battery for Processing. Upon receipt of a fire mission by a battery, the mission will be computed and the azimuth, range, deflection and quadrant will be sent to the Battalion FDC. The mission will not be fired until the Battalion give the battery a positive clearance to fire.

(2) When a fire mission received by a battery is in support of contact, the battery will concurrently commence firing and send the battalion fire direction center the data required by paragraph 20.a.(1). Above.

(3) Monitored and friendly ground clearance obtained by Battalion FDC.

(4) Battalion FDC notifies Brigade LNO who obtains RVN and air clearance.

b. Preplanned Fires

(1) Sent to Battalion liaison officer.

(2) Forwarded to Battalion FDC.

(3) Cleared and assigned to appropriate firing battery by S-3.

34. FIRE DIRECTION:

a. General: Technical fire direction is decentralized to battery level. Fire control and tactical fire direction is performed by Battalion FDC. Limited technical checks will be performed when proximity of location permits.

b. Definitions:

(1) Technical Fire Direction: Conversions of fire missions to appropriate firing data and fire commands.

(2) Tactical Fire Direction: Exercise of tactical command of one or more units in the selection of targets, designation of units to fire, and the allocation of ammunition for each mission.

(3) Primary check: An independent check of data and commands produced within an FDC.

(4) Secondary check: An independent check, always in addition to primary check, conducted by battalion FDC.

c. Firing Charts:

(1) Two (2) firing charts (1:25,000) will be maintained at each FDC. Charts will be constructed to permit 6400 mil coverage.

(2) An observed firing chart will be constructed in the absence of survey or suitable maps. When a map is available, an observed battle map will be used.

(3) Battalion and Battery FDC's will exchange information necessary to keep firing charts current and complete.

d. Operational Maps:

(1) FDC battle maps will show the following minimum information: no fire zone, free fire zone, nofire line, accurate friendly unit locations and maneuver unit operational areas.

(2) S-3 will maintain an operational map which will reflect free fire zoned, no fire zones, 11th Brigade TACR, Province boundaries with anti- artillery range, ARVN and pacified villages.

35. REGISTRATION:

a. Registrations will be conducted immediately upon occupying a new position and at subsequent times as deemed necessary by the FDC.

1. Battery(s) firing for an air observer will fire at the air observers command unless the AO requests "when ready").

m. Appropriate checks will be made at each battery to insure that the data computed and fired is correct.

n. FDO's must ask observers if "Adjust Fire" missions are close to friendly troops. If "Close", they must ask "How Close"? A two way channel exists over the radio to advise the observer and the FDC of unusual situations and difficulties which might produce safety hazards, i.e., friendly troops forward of the FO, on his flanks, jungle which hampers observation, etc.

o. All section chiefs will maintain a direct fire range card at their howitzers. Included on this range card will be the maximum safe QE (i.e. the QE which, if exceeded, will cause a round to clear the mask visible from the howitzer position).

p. Elbow sights will be boresighted each time the panoramic telescope is boresighted.

q. All howitzer sections will conduct, on a continuous basis, instruction on direct fire procedures. This instruction should include practical work with situations included in the drill that will require particular attention to safety techniques in setting the fuze for the beehive round and situations requiring the use of the beehive round, will also be given emphasis.

46. ACTIONS AFTER FIRING INCIDENTS.

a. When check fire is received by a battery, an officer will immediately inspect each howitzer firing to verify and record the data to include a physical count of the unused powder charges. In addition, the azimuth of fire will be measured and recorded. Simultaneously, the battery FDC will check the data computed in the FDC and determine the reason for the check fire.

b. After a check fire is received, it may be cancelled by the station (person) who initiated the command. However, the battery will not resume firing without accomplishing the checks discussed in paragraph above unless it is determined that the check fire is administrative in nature; i.e., Red Haze, termination of preparation, aircraft on the GT line etc.

c. When friendly troops are injured by artillery or mortar fire, a spot report will be transmitted to the battalion operations by the most expeditious means. Follow-up reports will be forwarded as additional information becomes available.

d. At the Brigade Commander's discretion, an officer will be appointed to investigate indirect firing incidents. While a shell report should be included as part of the spot/follow-up report, it is imperative that the shell crater(s) are not disturbed until the investigating officer arrives to make a crater analysis. When an incident results from a tree burst, care must be taken not to disturb the area in which the burst occurred.

46A. CIVIL AFFAIRS. (S-5)

a. The S-2 is assigned the additional duties of battalion civil affairs officer.

b. All civil affairs activities and projects will be coordinated with the brigade civil affairs officer (S-5)

c. Interpreters assigned to the battalion will be under the control of S-5.

Appendix I to Annex A (Recurring Reports) to Tactical SOP, 6th Bn, 11th Army

SECTION 1
SI REPORTS

<u>REPORTS</u>	<u>SUBMITTING UNIT</u>	<u>TIME SUBMITTED</u>	<u>HOW SENT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1. Personnel Daily Summary	All batteries	1200 daily	Batteries NLT 1400	See Appendix II Submit in three copies
2. Periodic Personnel Report	All batteries	1200 Sat	NLT 0660 Sun	See Appendix III Submit in three copies
3. Spot Strength Report	All batteries		ASAP upon receiving 10% or more casualties or upon key losses	
4. Morning Report (Feeder)	All Batteries	2400 daily	0600 following day	See Ar 335-60
5. Casualty Feeder Report	All batteries	ASAP	ASAP	See AR 660-66 Submit w th M/R
6. Witness Statement	All batteries	ASAP	ASAP	See AR 660-66 Submit with M/R
7. Straggler Report	All Batteries		NLT 2 hrs after Cmdr is aware of occurrence	
8. Reports of Crime & Serious Incident	All batteries			

PRISONER OF WAR

Date & Time of Capture _____

Place of Capture (Use 6-digit coord if possible) _____

Circumstances of Capture _____

Capturing Unit _____

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE

1. This Tag Will Be Accomplished By The Capturing Unit, At Which Point Each Prisoner Of War Will Be Tagged (Loop Cord Around Neck).
2. Prisoners Of War Will Be Warned Not To Mutilate, Destroy, Or Lose Their Tags.

NOTE: The above space reserved for translation of paragraphs 1 and 2 above
In the language of the POW

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REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
JCS/RVNAF
J3
Phone #30905
#505/TTH/P3/KH

SECRET DIRECTIVE

TO

- Commander, I Corps Tactical Zone
- Commander, II Corps Tactical Zone
- Commander, III Corps Tactical Zone
- Commander, IV Corps Tactical Zone

SUBJECT: Activity Guidelines for Corps Tactical Zones

1. In order to quickly restore the normal existence of the Army and the people, it is requested that all Corps Tactical Zone Commanders urgently apply the following activity guidelines.

a. In all cities and towns that have repelled the enemy, entrust the security mission to the Police, regional forces and operational units pulled back from destroy operations.

However, all cities - towns must increase intelligence activities to the maximum, reinforce defense systems, prepare weapons, ammunition, food, and take vigilant precautions to deal with the VC second attack wave.

b. In all cities and towns where the enemy has yet to be repelled, endeavors must be made to settle the situation quickly. In the meantime, halt all additional infiltration by the enemy.

c. Regularly review the security status of all provinces. Depending on the regional situation, prescribe green and red areas, discontinue or reduce the curfew hours, particularly in the province towns and cities, so that the people may return to their normal level of existence.

d. Let all tired operational units be alternated to obtain rest and recuperation, replacements and equipment.

e. Maintain control of villages and hamlets, especially hamlets which have just completed reconstruction. Move regular forces which have been supporting the RD program out of all towns at the earliest so that they may continue their mission of RD support.

f. In regard to areas which have received directives from Central level in the matters of arming civilian groups, as well as areas where the people have a strong anti-Communist spirit, actively assist in the task of equipping them and building their morale.

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g. Strive to quickly re-establish normal conditions in order to effectively and adequately assume the missions prescribed in the Joint Military Plan, AB-143.

h. In short, actively maintain the initiative on all fronts; especially since the major part of the main enemy forces have been put out of action: During the period from 300600/1/68 to 111600/02/68, the VC suffered the loss of 32,109 in battle, in addition to a large number, killed by air and artillery strikes, which cannot be counted; 6,306 have been captured and 8,617 weapons of various types have been seized. The enemy's ability to oppose us is gone, and this is an excellent opportunity for the RVNAF and Allied Forces to fully take the initiative, strengthen the RD support task, and maximize destroy operations against the remaining enemy main force units.

2. Also at this opportunity, Corps Tactical Zone Commanders are requested to distribute to all territorial level commanders and operational units concerned the following directives and experiences which have been applied in the Tran Hung Dao Campaign in Saigon and Gia Dinh:

a. Reduce Civilian Casualties.

One of the many important problems to which all levels of command must pay regular attention when operating in cities and towns is the matter of lowering the loss of life among civilians to the lowest level.

- Avoid the use of air and artillery.
- Avoid the use of armor support fire if it isn't necessary.
- Avoid erratic fire; when firing there must be a clear target.
- Be careful when using weapons in housing areas in order to avoid fires.
- Be courteous and polite with the people and behave properly toward women.
- Do not take the property of the people, no matter how small.

In short, from the command level to the individual soldier, every person must be determined to lower civilian casualties by every means. If not, then an additional burden will be created for the government in the problem of giving assistance. And in the meantime the people will be dissatisfied and will have no further confidence in the Government and the Army.

b. Combat Techniques in Towns.

(1) When informed of or discovering VC elements mingling in inhabited areas, operational units set up cordons and barricades at all intersections.

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(2) Have the soldiers disguise themselves, infiltrate in small groups, and position themselves at high points (rooftops, stories of buildings...) for ambushes at all contact points of allies. The mission of these disguised infiltrated groups is:

- Destroy lone Viet Cong.
- Uncover places of deployment and every movement of the enemy and inform the unit.
- Support the forces outside the area when they advance into it for a search.

The most important point of this technique is liaison and signals between the disguised group and the clearing unit. If possible, then the disguised group will be developed into a unit within a unit with the clearing unit so that the receipt of messages may be easier.

(3) After the disguised group has completed its infiltration and deployment use POLWAR Groups to call the VC to surrender. If the VC are stubborn, then call the people to temporarily leave the area (give a deadline for the completion of the evacuation). Afterwards, the clearing force advances into the area; divides into groups of three; advances from position to position, one group giving support to another and completely avoiding the middle of the street. All groups of three will be equipped as follows: 1 M79 grenade launcher, and 2 M16 rifles or 1 LAW rocket and 2 M16 rifles.

(4) At night, units must organize numerous small ambush groups in the area of responsibility. Apply area ambush techniques, meaning ambushes at all highways where the enemy might be able to escape or infiltrate into the area.

(5) In regard to the problem of support, avoid the use of artillery in heavily populated areas because it is not effective in destroying the enemy and only causes casualties to the civilian population. Avoid the use of M113 Armored Personnel Carriers to support infantry in towns. This type of APC can be easily destroyed by enemy B40 and B41 rocket fire. The most effective weapons to destroy the enemy while fighting in towns is the M79 grenade launcher, LAW rocket, 57mm recoilless rifle and individual weapons. In addition, reinforced by armor, the M41 tank only may be used. But tanks must be defended by infantry.

Especially as regards support by armed helicopters, do not use them in heavily populated areas. The Corps Tactical Zone Commander is the sole person who has the authority to determine the use of armed helicopters in the above circumstances and special surroundings. The Corps Tactical Zone Commander may delegate this authority only to DTA Commander.

(6) Therefore, be careful when using firepower in hut areas in order to avoid fires. Where there is a fire started by the VC in the area of our search, close off the area, screen the civilians leaving the area, defend the fighting personnel and continue the search and destruction of the enemy.

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(7) Special attention must be given to the search of enemy to discover VC elements taking shelter here, infiltrating or occupying the area.

(8) Pay particular attention to night activities; recon patrols and ambushes away from the stationing area and along the demarcation line, especially in areas bordering on the area of responsibility, to halt the enemy, and destroy scattered VC elements infiltrating into cities and towns.

c. Defend Valuable Warehouses and Other Important Agencies.

Defend at all costs every weapon, ammunition, food, and PCL storage area, radio stations, post offices, communications centers, telephone switchboards and power and water stations which are most essential to the everyday life of the populace:

- Increase ambush patrols to maintain distant security.
- Establish fire support plans, rescue plans in case of attack.
- Establish counterattack plans to be carried out by soldiers of the unit concerned. This is to be done in case the VC attack the defense system.
- If the enemy overruns weapons and equipment storage areas, these items must be destroyed immediately so that they will not fall into the hands of the enemy (sequences and methods of destruction have been given previously).

d. Political Warfare.

Arrange and coordinate the forces of all military and governmental agencies assembled for POLWAR, Civil Affairs and civilian indoctrination missions. The hub of activity is protecting the peace of the people, Chieu Hoi campaigns for VC cadre, military campaigns and assistance for refugees.

(1) POLWAR Activity Objectives: Buttress the confidence of the military - cadre - Governmental - and the people. Create resentment against the actions of the VC. Destroy the fighting spirit of the enemy.

(2) Civil Affairs Activity Objectives: Lessen the sufferings of the refugees and soldiers' dependents; maintain security, order and public health.

(3) Military Campaign Activity Objectives: Ensure that soldiers correctly execute their missions. Avoid damaging the property of the people. Eagerly fight to destroy the VC. Actively participate in the task of maintaining public order.

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3. It is requested that Corps Tactical Zone Commanders, depending on the regional situation, quickly prepare appropriate plans to execute the guidelines brought out in paragraph 1 of this directive. In the meantime, widely distribute all directives and operational experiences brought out in paragraph 2.

GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN
Chief of JGS/RVNAF

/Signed and Sealed/

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

MACJOIR

15 February 1968

CORDS/624

SUBJECT: Activity Guidelines for Corps Tactical Zones (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

RETAIN FOR
HISTORICAL PURPOSES

LL FROM TET VC OFFENSIVE
Re: Participation

1. (U) Attached translation of important JGS/RVNAF Directive #505/TM/P3/KH is of interest to US Commanders and Advisors. COMUSMACV desires that all tactical unit commanders down to battalion level and senior advisors to RVNAF units and GVN province and district chiefs be familiar with its contents.

2. (U) Division and Province Senior Advisors will check to determine if counterparts have received the directive. If they have not, advisors will report fact to Corps Senior Advisor who will urge his counterpart to make wide distribution.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Walter T. Kerwin, Jr.

WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

Attachment
a/s

DISTRIBUTION:

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