July 1998 | Special Report No. 35
Kosovo: Escaping the Cul-de-Sac
Lauren Van Metre, Albert Cevallos and Kristine Herrmann
Key Assumptions
Working group participants at the June meeting based their discussion and recommendations on certain assumptions regarding the nature of the current crisis. These assumptions, which are described in greater detail in two earlier United States Institute of Peace Special Reports-The Kosovo Dialogue: Too Little, Too Late and Serbia: Democratic Alternatives, are as follows:
- The international community's response to the crisis indicates that it is significantly behind the pace of events in Kosovo and that any future intervention must take into account new conditions that will affect future negotiations.
- The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which has emerged as a significant force in Kosovo and which dominates the political landscape. As of the June 15 meeting, it was apparent that the U.S. response did not account for new power dynamics in the region. Recent efforts to engage the KLA, according to working group participants, are key to the resolution of the conflict: Until the KLA supports implementation, any negotiated settlement will not stand.
- Widespread fighting between Serb police and military and the KLA, which places Kosovo on the brink if not in the initial phase of war. The working group agreed that stopping the violence and containing the conflict are the immediate priorities. Without an immediate ceasefire and separation of forces, prospects for a negotiated settlement diminish.
- Participants believed that neither the KLA nor Milosevic have an interest in a negotiated settlement because it would not further their respective political goals.
- For Milosevic, a negotiated settlement may jeopardize his political position in Serbia. Continued fighting strengthens him politically inside Serbia and may achieve a fait accompli in Kosovo before Western powers or the KLA can respond, enabling Serbia to impose a unilateral (non-negotiated) settlement.
- Milosevic is the problem in Kosovo and bears responsibility for the current crisis. Because his political career is associated with stripping Kosovo of its autonomy, he will not be part of a solution that restores real self-government to the province. Offering Milosevic "carrots" such as partial or even full relief from sanctions simply consolidates his hold on power in Serbia, enhances his ability to continue the slow burn in Kosovo, and convinces him that he is still able to manipulate Western leaders to his advantage.
- The KLA, on the other hand, understands that the West will continue to press for autonomy for Kosovo. Through military action and territorial gain, the KLA may be able to obtain de facto independence, forcing Serbia to relinquish its claim to the region.
- Participants did, however, note the significant difference between the international community's response to Kosovo and its actions in the early 1990s at the time of the first Yugoslav crisis. The Contact Group has clearly indicated that Kosovo is an international issue and not an internal Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) problem. By adopting such a position, the Contact Group has established the international community's obligation to seek a solution to the crisis. While the United States and Europe are far from united in their response to Kosovo, there is no doubt that, unlike the initial days of the Bosnia crisis, they are determined to remain engaged and see a clear mandate for their involvement.
- Despite this commitment, most participants felt that, unless the international community understood the points described above, it would be unable to respond effectively. Significantly lacking is the recognition that Balkan regional stability depends ultimately on Serbia's democratic transition. Without that recognition and the requisite action, the situation in Kosovo will reoccur in other flashpoints in the FRY, such as Vojvodina, Sandzak, and Montenegro. Furthermore, agreement by the Kosovars to some form of autonomy in Serbia or Yugoslavia is more likely if their rights are guaranteed within a democratic framework.
- Finally, participants noted that Serb oppression and Kosovo's self-imposed isolation from political life in the FRY have left the Albanians fragmented and disorganized. The political parties and the KLA are seemingly unable to organize a joint political strategy with which to negotiate with the Serbs. Most informal political contacts between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians have been severed, leaving both sides with little understanding of the other's interests. While this situation will greatly frustrate Western attempts to mediate a negotiated settlement, the Albanians must be tutored and assisted so that they are able to negotiate effectively with Milosevic. This process will strengthen the position of Albanian political leaders and establish the framework for a post-crisis leadership group. More confident in their ability to negotiate effectively with the Milosevic regime, the Kosovars may accept authentic autonomous status within the FRY.
- At the same time, Milosevic must understand the serious consequences of unleashing another war in the former Yugoslavia. Current actions in Kosovo will not improve but rather hurt Yugoslavia's already poor economic situation and reinforce its political isolation. Unlike in Bosnia, where Serbia fought indirectly through Bosnian Serb proxies, Belgrade will be held directly responsible for the actions of the Yugoslav Army and Serbian internal police.
Thus, while the fighting in Kosovo is escalating, with both sides convinced of the necessity for further military activity, the Albanians and Serbs must be made to understand that a political settlement (rather than a military one) is ultimately in their best interest. This objective is as much a priority for the international community as achieving a ceasefire and containing the conflict.
Recommendations for the International Community
Recommendations for the Kosovars
- Assure the participating international community that Kosovo is willing to engage in negotiations that are open-ended and unconditional, seeking opportunities for engaging the Serbs. Insist firmly on the presence of an international mediator acceptable to both sides. Ensure that adequate preparations have been made for talks, including a unified Kosovar negotiating team that has carefully analyzed Kosovar Albanian interests.
- Request that additional international observers (first ICRC/ECMM/UNHCR and later OSCE) monitor the situation in Kosovo and are provided with adequate security guarantees by both Belgrade and the KLA. If OSCE observers are deployed, employ their expertise in establishing political and civil societies rooted in the rule of law, efficient local governments, etc.
- Begin systematic documentation of Serb violations of Albanian rights, the denial of which legitimates Albanian efforts to seek self-determination.
- Invite foreign journalists to work with an indigenous, independent, credible media team to report objectively on atrocities. Broadcast findings early and accurately through such media as the internet and the international press. Exchange information with international human rights and aid organizations on the ground to ensure accurate reporting to outside organizations and Western governments.
- Organize an indigenous nongovernmental organization to work with human rights organizations, refugees, and citizens to establish a database of those who have disappeared or are displaced. Publicly request that Serb authorities account for the missing.
- Hire a competent public relations firm and legal representative to discuss with international leaders the situation in Kosovo, the Kosovar perspective on events, and acceptable outcomes to the crisis from the Albanian point of view.
- Address the international perspective that regards an independent Kosovo as an unstable end state that is likely to foster Greater Albanian nationalistic movements in Albania and Macedonia.
- Acknowledge Western concerns regarding the formation of a Greater Albania.
- Suggest that a democratic Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia-states that would support political pluralism and open societies-are the best vehicles for protecting the rights of ethnic Albanians.
- Emphasize that Kosovo will not be a destabilizing factor in the region, but will have good relations with neighboring states.
- Express support for the territorial integrity of Albania and Macedonia and for the democratic transitions currently under way in those countries.
- Applaud leaders in Montenegro and Macedonia who support political systems that protect ethnic rights and who have worked to incorporate Albanian citizens and groups into civil and political systems.
- Denounce leaders who are using the current crisis to fuel nationalism and their own political objectives.
- Actively support the democratization of Serbia. No matter what status Kosovo achieves as a final outcome, Serbia must be democratic, if Kosovo is to exist securely and in peace.
- In any negotiated outcome to the current crisis, incorporate measures that will ensure Serbia's further democratic development: that is, more independent media outlets , autonomous universities, etc.
- Reach out to political forces in Montenegro and Serbia that are seeking a democratic transformation of the FRY.
- Encourage the international community to implement democratization programs in Serbia.
- Consider creative ideas for negotiating the status of Kosovo that allow Serbs to meet their needs while Kosovars meet theirs. These ideas should include sovereignty and protection for Serb historic sites, the rights of successor states, protection of human rights, avoiding an exodus of Serbs from Kosovo, and the conditions for the establishment of a professional police force.
- Seek to reassure Serbs in Kosovo that protection of human rights continues to be a priority of the Kosovar leadership. Find ways to integrate local Serbs, and to learn about and understand their concerns regarding any change in Kosovo's status.
- Consider arrangements for local Serbs that enhance their political status, provide substantial protection for minority status, including consideration of "Serb" municipalities in areas of Serb concentration; electoral laws which encourage the formation of minority parties and assure their representation in parliament; guarantees for the establishment of Serb language schools, newspapers, and television programs. Protecting and promoting Serb rights will legitimize Kosovo as a responsible, democratic entity; undermine local Serb loyalty to Belgrade (which is currently weak as Serbs in Kosovo are predominantly refugees from Bosnia); and encourage Serb communities to remain in Kosovo on the basis of extensive political and economic freedom.
- Establish an informal Serb/Albanian dialogue on a regular and continuing basis, apart from any official negotiations.
- Seek to understand the goals and objectives of the KLA and engage those elements that enjoy broad public support and are willing to consider negotiation and compromise.
- Include the KLA at the negotiating table as part of an umbrella team which includes various groups in Kosovar society. Pluralism is not a luxury but an essential ingredient for managing the conflict in a way that will reduce Albanian casualties and ensure a democratic outcome. Do not isolate the KLA as they represent a broad section of opinion and are instrumental to the implementation of any negotiated settlement.
- Develop with the KLA a democratic political strategy to accompany its military strategy. Try to unite political and military objectives in order to negotiate from a position of unity, and always remain open publicly to negotiations.
Recommendations for the Serbs
- Recognize that the regime in Belgrade has not represented the interests of Serb citizens and has denied their fundamental human and democratic rights. Seek a political system and leadership that is responsive to the people, guarantees economic prosperity, and ensures individual liberty for all citizens of the FRY.
- Work to reverse Serbia's isolated condition as a pariah state within the community of nations. Adopt programs and policies that guarantee basic democratic rights for all citizens of the FRY, encourage transparent and good relations with Balkan neighbors, and establish Serbia as a regional force for stability and economic cooperation and growth.
- Employ Serbia's substantial regional power in ways that benefit citizens of the FRY and the Balkans by increasing regional economic ties, providing stability to enhance economic growth and regional dynamism, and initiating regional integration with Europe.
- Seek ways to limit autocratic extragovernmental power by legislating substantial checks on the executive branch. In seeking ways to remove the current regime or limit its power, emphasize democratic, nonviolent, constitutional means.
- Reverse recent government attempts to centralize control over the media, universities, and the judiciary.
- Solicit international support for Serbia's transition to a democratic state, including funding for democracy programs, political party development, institution-building, and increasing the capacity and reach of existing nongovernmental, social, and independent media organizations.
- Cease all offensive operations and prohibit further atrocities by the police and military in Kosovo; such atrocities legitimize the position of the KLA at the expense of the more moderate Rugova faction and undermine any hope for a political (rather than a military) solution to the crisis-a solution that is in Serbia's best interest.
- Take advantage of renewed relations with the OSCE to learn about programs for democratization and social development. Request international observers who can also advise civil and political society on implementing a political transition that is as peaceful and smooth as possible.
- Seek advice from countries in the region that have undergone the transition from communism to democracy, and try to incorporate "lessons learned" into any transition strategy.
- Allow full access into Kosovo for humanitarian organizations to assist internally displaced persons, refugees, and others in urgent need of attention.
- Grant international monitors unconditional access in Kosovo as a first step in verifying the structure and organizational capacity of the KLA and allowing greater influence over KLA military activities.
- Understand that a negotiated settlement regarding the status of Kosovo is the best outcome for the FRY. Past attempts in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia to use force to maintain the integrity of the former Yugoslavia resulted in its further dismemberment. These efforts not only failed in their political objective, but resulted in substantial loss of life, Serbia's political and economic isolation from the international community, and economic hardship for the Serb people.
- Absolve the Serb people of responsibility for violence against citizens of the former Yugoslavia by condemning Milosevic's handling of the crisis in Kosovo. Organize protests and continue acts of nonparticipation in the crisis, such as the recent boycott of involvement in Kosovo by 100 Serb police. Encourage "responsible nationalism," which promotes pride in Serbia's culture and heritage without denigrating other nations or peoples.
About the Report
On June 15, 1998, the United States Institute of Peace hosted a second meeting of its Bosnia Working Group to discuss the unfolding crisis in Kosovo. Participants were asked to provide recommendations for how the negotiating process could achieve a viable and acceptable outcome for all parties to the conflict. In addition, members of the working group were asked to critique the international community's role in attempting to mediate, resolve, and simply contain the conflict. This report, prepared by Institute program officer Lauren Van Metre and research assistants Albert Cevallos and Kristine Herrmann, is a working document written to suggest core issues for resolution of the Kosovo crisis-issues that can be used as a basis for further thinking and discussion.
The authors are aware that steps for implementing the recommendations proposed in this report are not provided. These steps must be based on a coherent regional strategy. The purpose of this report, therefore, is to generate comments and responses and encourage reflection on a comprehensive strategy for the long-term stability of Kosovo and its Balkan neighbors.
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policies.
Of Related Interest
See our complete list of reports.
|