.��..� DEPARTMENTAL GRANT APPEALS BOARD
Department ofHealth and Human Services
SUBJECT: Utah Department of Social Services
Docket No. 87�1
Decision No. 892
DATE: August 28, 1987
�
The Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) disallowed $18,862which
the
Utah Department of Social Services (Utah) claimed underTitle IV�D of
the
Social Security Act (Child Support andEstablishment of Paternity)
for the
quarter which ended December31, 1983. The disallowance was
based on
OCSE's finding that thisamount represented the federal share of
interest
earned onundistributed child support collections.
This case followed an earlier Board decision involving a Utahappeal
in
which we held that OCSE was authorized to treat thiskind of interest
as
income for which states are accountable. Decision No. 750 ("�Utah
I�"),
pp. 1�7. ## While we upheld OCSE inprinciple, we found that there
were
reasons to question theamount of the disallowance, and we remanded
the
case to OCSE toprovide Utah with an opportunity to show that the
actual
amountof interest earned was less than OCSE had said.
After
furtherreview, OCSE reduced the disallowance from the original
$42,793to
the $18,862 involved here. Utah, however, continued todispute
the
amount of the disallowance, and returned to theBoard. Utah proposed
an
alternative methodology which would setthe disallowance amount at
less
than half OCSE's figure. Although the amount in issue here is
not
substantial, there arepotential disallowances for other quarters
which
could beaffected by resolution of this dispute.
� �
In subsequent decisions concerning appeals from two
otherstates,
we confirmed OCSE's right to the federal share of
suchinterest,
after considering further argument on the matter.
�See�Indiana
Department of Public Welfare, Decision No. 859, April
13,1987;
New York State Department of Social Services, Decision
No.794,
September 30, 1986. Nothing in this decision should
beviewed as
modifying our conclusions in those cases.
The sole issue in this case concerns the calculation of
thedisallowance
amount for the quarter in question. After
carefullyco#sidering the
evidence and argument presented in this case andthe
earlier case, we
have concluded that the amount of interestcalculated by OCSE
is
unreasonable. As discussed below, it isclear that some amount
of
interest should be disallowed, and thatOCSE should establish
a
reasonable figure; one approach would be�j
�Background: the calculation issue in the earli#r case�.
In �Utah I�, OCSE had computed the amount of the interest by
usingdata
from a quarterly report regularly submitted by Utahprimaril# to
show
expenditures under Title IV�A (Aid to Familieswith Dependent Children
or
AFDC). This AFDC expenditure reportalso was the way Utah showed
a
reduction in state IV�Aexpenditures by the net federal share of
IV�D
supportcollections. OCSE established the amounts Utah
reported
asdeposits of child support collections (not in dispute),
andcomputed
the interest on those deposits, with certain
undisputedadjustments, from
the date of deposit until the date that
OCSE�received the report�. Utah
alleged that most of the collectedfunds
were already distributed (and
thus no longer earninginterest) by the time
OCSE received the report.
We found thatsome amount of interest was earned on
child support
collectionsdeposited in Utah's treasury, although precisely how
much
wasunclear. Decision No. 750, pp. 7�8. While we recognized
thatUtah
helped creat# the difficulty in calculating interest by itspractice
of
commingling support collections with other funds, wealso found
OCSE's
use of the report receipt date questionableenough to justify giving
Utah
an opportunity to rebut HCFA'scomputation by producing evidence to
prove
it actually had earnedless interest. Thus, we remanded the
case.
The parties now have returned to the Board with
substantiallymodified
approaches and more sophisticated analyses of
thecalculation issue
(their efforts in the earlier case focusedpredominantly
on the
substantive issue of whether interest had tobe repaid).
�OCSE's revised policy and disallowance�.
In a June, 1986 memorandum, while this case was remanded, OCSEchanged
its
approach to interest calculation. The
memorandum ("PIQ�86�1"), issued by OCSE's Deputy Director
toOCSE's
Regional Representative in New York (with copies sent toall
other
regions) appears prospectively to require a state toreport
�actual�
interest and to ". . . distinguish interest earnedon IV�D
collections
from interest earned on other funds." Utah'sAppeal File, Doc.
1. The
memorandum further stated that ". . .where interest was not
reported for
periods prior to the date ofthis memorandum, interest �may�
be
calculated from the date thecollection is deposited . . . to the end
of
the quarter for whichthe collection is reported. . . ." �Id�.
(emphasis
added). OCSEsaid it basically applied the methodology in
PIQ�86�1
toestablish the amount of the reduced disallowance (OCSE's Brief,p.
3),
but, as discussed below# there is more #o its method thanthat.
�j
A. �Context�.
We are dealing with a factual determination colored by context. While
not
decisive �per� �se�, the following two elements provide animportant
backdrop
for the discussion which follows thereafter:
1.� .�As we have indicated before, OCSE policy on
calculationof
interest has been murky, and appears to have beenmade an
enforcement
priority only relatively recently. �Utah I�, pp. 9�11; �New
York�, p.
13. Also, the Statepresented unrebutted testimony to the
effect
thatdespite many federal audits over past years, andprobably
awareness
on the part of federal authoritiesthat Utah's funds were
commingled, no
questions wereraised about interest earnings until recently.
Transcript
of hearing held June 3, 1987 (TR), pp. 23�25. In June, 1986,
in
PIQ�86�1, OCSE substantiallychanged its policy on interest
calculation
and yet, asthis dispute indicates, issues remain. None of
thismitigates
Utah's obligation in principle to account forinterest earned on
Title
IV�D funds, but this contextcannot, in fairness, be ignored in
assessing
thereasonableness of Utah's methods of achieving�.J�
� .��..�compliance with OCSE requirements and with the
burdenwe
articulated in �Utah I�. ##�.J�
2. We reaffirm our earlier conclusions that � �
� .��..�"AFDC and Title IV�D are quite separate programs, interms of
their
federal oversight, their operation, andtheir appropriations
structure.
. . . nothing in thelaw . . . authorizes OCSE to ignore the
requirements
inTitle IV�D because of a cash flow problem in Title IV�A.
. . ." �Utah I�,
p. 5.�.J�
� .�Although we stand by that analysis, it is nevertheless truethat
Titles
IV�A and IV�D are unusually interconnectedprograms in.ways
obvious enough
that we need not detail themhere. �See�, �e.g.�, �Utah
I�, pp. 3�5;
�New York�, pp. 8�12. While Titles IV�A and IV�D are
separate, they are
not sounrelated that evidence about Title IV�A must
be completelyignored in
calculating IV�D distributions. In part,
thedisallowance depends on
OCSE's insistence that it would notconsider a
Title IV�A warrant as evidence
of cessation ofinterest simply ". . .
because it is a 4�A warrant, not a 4�D
warrant." TR, p. 88. When
examining the reasonableness ofUtah's methods
of achieving compliance
with OCSErequirements and the burden set out in �Utah
I�,
theinterrelationships of Titles IV�A and IV�D are a
backgroundfactor
that cannot fairly be dismissed, notwithstanding thatthe
obligation in
principle to repay interest on IV�D�j
� �
The record indicates that as of July 1, 1986, OCSE and
Utahhad
agreed on a change in Utah's accounting system
whicheffectively
calculates and transfers the federal share of
IV�Dfunds daily
and eliminates interest altogether. Utah's Brief,
p.3; OCSE's
Brief, p. 8; TR, pp. 20�22.
b. �Reasonableness of OCSE's approach�.
In �Utah I�, we recognized OCSE's need for an
administra�tivelyexpedient
way of calculating IV�D interest in instances
where astate had failed to
do a good job. OCSE originally
calculatedinterest from the date of
deposit of collections (an
undisputedstarting point) to a "date of
distribution" which was the datethe
federal office received the
quarterly report. �Utah I�, p. 8. We found
that this practice was
questionable. �Id�., pp. 9�11. Inresponse,
OCSE revised its
calculation of the disallowance in twosignificant
ways: by changing the
date through which interestwas deemed to be
earned to the end of the
quarter, and by using azero balance as an opening
figure for
calculations for thequarter.
For the following reasons, we conclude that these actions do
notmake
OCSE's disallowance approach less question�able, and, infact,
may
unintentionally have made OCSE's methodology appearmore arbitrary
than
before.
OCSE revised its policy in PIQ�86�1, issued June 10, 1986. Utah's
Appeal
File, Document 1. This memorandum stated inpertinent part:
� .�Total interest income earned on IV�D collections at theState or
local
level during each quarter must be reported online 3 of Form
OCSE�41 to reduce
IV�D expenditures for thequarter. This would require
States to be able
todistinguish interest earned on IV�D collections
frominterest earned on
other funds. In those instances whereinterest
was not reported for
periods prior to the date ofthis memorandum,
interest may be calculated from
the datethe collection is deposited in
an interest�bearing accountat the
State or local level to the end of the
quarter for�j
Our concern here is with the last sentence, which allegedly formsthe
basis
for OCSE's methodology. On its face, it is notnecessarily
unreasonable
for OCSE to assess interest to the endof the quarter when a
state does not or
cannot show it earnedless interest. However, in the
present case, Utah
�had� some suchevidence (discussed below), and the
record here contains
evidencethat OCSE personnel specifically refused to
examine
Utah'sdocumentation on the basis that PIQ�86�1 established
thedistribution
date. TR, pp. 76�7, 99. Thus, in this case,
the end�of�quarter distribution basis was used as a �per�
�se�determinant
of interest, just as formerly the date of receipt ofthe
expenditure report
was in �Utah I�. If the former policyrisked being
viewed as arbitrary,
then the new policy suffersvirtually the same risk;
there is little
difference in fiscalimpact, and no difference in
principle, between rigidly
using theend of the quarter and rigidly using
a point some days later. Also,
the policy explicitly says that the end
of the quarter"may" be used, which
implies some choice (and a
correspondingduty to exercise discretion), not a
rule of rigid
application. The policy in the first and second sentences
quoted
above��whichgives a state an opportunity to show actual
interest
earned��appears to frame the substantive policy which is
actually
(andlegitimately) the focus of the Agency's concern �� �i.e.�,
that
astate bear a burden of proving the amount of interest earned. �3�/
As stated, another factor in OCSE's reduction of the
originaldisallowance
was the use of a zero opening balance. In �Utah
I�,OCSE had used a
substantial balance of funds drawn from a
priorquarterly report as the
opening balance used as a starting pointfor
calculation of interest during
the quarter in question. �UtahI�, p. 8.
In the revised disallowance,
OCSE used zero as theopening balance, thus
calculating interest only on
thecollections during the quarter. TR, pp.
15, 80, 91�2.
Thisclearly was favorable to the State (as it reduced the
interestamount) and
apparently was done in good faith. ##
Nevertheless,we cannot ignore the
questions raised by this precipitous
changein calculation methodology.
It
�
�
## Since the policy in PIQ�86�1 for prior periods isd#scretionary, we
need
not consider whether a mandatory policycould be imposed
retroactively on the
states.
OCSE said that it took this approach because it
perceivedthat
the Board had a "concern" in �Utah I� about use of
the
openingbalance. TR, p. 83. However, our concern was a
more
generalizedone, and there is nothing in �Utah I� that
suggested
OCSE should dowhat it did here. Elsewhere, there
are
suggestions that the zeroopening balance was used as a
rough
justification for not lookingat Utah's documentation, and
that
it might represent an aspect of�j
adds to the appearance of confusion discussed under "context"above,
which
enhances the perception that OCSE was arbitrary. Furthermore, the
methodology
even arguably violates thestatutorily�based requirement that
Utah account
for, and OCSEcollect, the interest, since OCSE does not
deny that
themethodology consciously ignores interest on
carryovercollections. . TR,
pp. 80�1. (Even counsel for OCSE was
notunmindful of this. �Id�., and
pp. 91�2). Also, the approachpresents
an accounting anomaly: a
collection deposit on the lastday of the prior
quarter would be ascribed only
that one day'sinterest in that quarter,
even though it carried forward
throughthe following quarter, whereas a
collection made on the very nextday
(the first day of the following
quarter) would be ascribedinterest throughout
the quarter. TR, pp.
80�1.
In summary, despite OCSE's apparently good intentions,
OCSE'smethodology
�as applied in the facts of this case� appears to beeven
more arbitrary
than in the earlier case.
c. �Reasonableness of Utah's approach�.
In �Utah I�, we concluded that the State bore a burden ofaccounting
for
the interest, that the State's commingling offunds from various
state
and federal sources was a cause of thedispute, and that the
State's
approach at that time (whichbasically used principal amounts
of
undistributed IV�Dcollections remaining at the end of the quarter as
a
basis forcalculating interest) was too imprecise. For
reasons
alreadydescribed, we remanded to give Utah an opportunity
to
establish"through reasonable documentation the actual amount
of
interestearned." �Utah I�, p. 13.
Subsequently, OCSE personnel developed an "action plan" with aschedule
for
development of a methodology and met with Statepersonnel. One
element
of the plan called for OCSE to review"All relevant State fiscal
transactions"
and "The distributionprocessing [sic] of funds between
IV�D and IV�A
programs." Utah'sAppeal File, Document 2; Utah's Brief,
pp. 1�2; TR, pp.
74�7;OCSE's Brief, p. 3.
Utah in fact did develop a more sophisticated
methodology
whichsubstantially relied on tracking IV�A warrants (warrants
are
likechecks issued to assistance recipients
which they can cash anywhere). Utah explained the core conceptsof
its
approach as follows:
� .�Since IV�D collections were deposited directly into theState's
general
fund, from which warrants for assistancepayments were paid,
those collections
were immediatelyavailable upon deposit. That
availabil�ity was the
State's�j
� .�Since IV�A draws [�i.e.�, the State's drawdowns from
.itsfederal
letter of credit] were also deposited�.J� � .�in the general
fund, the
records of deposits andexpenditures from the fund do not alone
reveal
whether IV#Dfunds were d#stributed first, at the same time, or
after
theIV�A funds were distributed. Any of the three situationscould
be
assumed with some good reasons. However, it ismost reasonable to
assume
that funds from the two sourceswere distributed at the same time
for
purposes ofdetermining reasonable interest on IV�D
collections
awaitingdistribution.�.J�
� .�IV�D collections deposited in the general fund during onemonth
were
totally distributed for assistance paymentsduring the month after
they
were collected . . . [pursuantto] 45 CFR 302.51(b)(2). . . . Proof
that
the collectionswere actually distributed as indicated is found in
a
carefulanalysis of the records of deposits of IV�A draws, netdeposits
of
IV�D collections, and IV�A expenditures. See[Appeal File] documents
3
through 6. Utah's Brief, pp. 5�6;�see� �also� TR, pp. 104�5.�.J�
� .�Based on the foregoing, Utah said it made a reasonableassumption
that
IV�D collections were distributed each monthin proportion to the
IV�A AFDC
funds, and it devised aformula for calculating interest based
on this
principle ofproportionality. The record contains detail on the
steps
inthe calculation process. Utah's Brief, pp. 7�8,
anddocuments
cited. Utah represented the calculations asdefinitive and
based on
accurate, hard data. �See�, �e.g.�, TR,p. 111.�.J�
� .�OCSE then disregarded its "action plan" and refused toreview
Utah's
documentation. The State's witness testifiedthat a regional
OCSE
auditor said, essentially, "we havereceived the instruction
from
Rockville on how to distributeand I won't be looking at the
records."
TR,�.J�
p. 76. The instruction apparently was PIQ�86�1. �Id�. OCSE
didnot
dispute this.
OCSE essentially objected in principle to the State'smethodology, as
we
have discussed above and discuss furtherbelow. We note here,
however,
that nothing in the recordindicates that Utah did anything other
than
make a good faitheffort to develop an adequate methodology. Utah
did
develop anew and relatively sophisticated presentation in response
to
ourconcerns in �Utah I�, and the methodology, on its face, with
acaveat
noted below, appears to be a reasonable enough approach
tocalculating
the interest for the quarter in question that OCSEwas
unreasonable in
rejecting it out of hand.�j �Analysis of OCSE's
objections�.
a. �OCSE's arguments from prior Board decisions�.
OCSE made several overlapping arguments to the effect that Utahdid
not
meet tests for acceptable methodologies established bythe Board.
OCSE's
Brief, pp. 2�8; TR, p. 102.
OCSE said that in �Utah I� the Board rejected Utah's argument
thatIV�A
federal funding deficits essentially should offset
IV�Ddeposits. OCSE's
Brief, p. 5. Utah did briefly reassert
thisargument here. Utah's
Brief, p. 2. OCSE is correct that
wespecifically rejected this approach
in �Utah I� (�see� pp. 4�5, 7),and we
reaffirm that decision here.
However, as we have alreadyindicated, this does
not mean that all
evidence drawn from therelationship of Titles IV�A and IV�D
is
irrelevant to thequestion of whether Utah's revised methodology
was
unreasonablyrejected by OCSE.
OCSE also argued that Utah's new methodology was "only avariation" of
what
it had presented earlier, in the sense that"both �assume� a
relationship
between IV�D collections and IV�Aexpenditures without
actually demonstrating
its existence."OCSE's Brief, p. 6. As already
explained, Utah did
considerablymore than merely reiterate former
arguments, and OCSE's failureto
examine Utah's newly offered
documentation (as it originallyindicated it
would) undermines its
credibility concerning whatthe documentation actually
showed. The Board
did �not� reject allevidence derived from the
IV�A/IV�D relationship; we
rejected theidea of overturning a IV�D
disallowance based on shortfalls
infederal funding in IV�A. In �Utah
I�, our
�
"test" basically was no more than that the State had to"document,
rather
than speculate on" the amount of interest. p.12. OCSE
found far more
definition in our earlier decisions thanwe can when it argued
that
Utah's methodology does not "conformto any of those previously
approved
by the Board." OCSE's Brief,p. 7. OCSE described these
acceptable
methodologies as includingcomputations based on the four corners
of a
IV�A quarterlyreport; "effective crediting" through actual use of
funds
tolower needs for federal cash; and crediting in the
context
ofregulating letter of credit drawdowns. �Id�., p. 3. We
agree thatwe
likely would find these methods acceptable, although thedirect
relevance
of the third in this context is unclear. ## Inany event, what we
found
acceptable in particular facts.elsewhereestablishes no
negative
stricture on what we might findacceptable in the facts here.
Even OCSE
acknowledged that themethods it says we found acceptable do
not
"constitute anexhaustive list." OCSE's Brief, p. 8. �j
� �
This part of the argument apparently derives from
OCSE'sreading
of the Board's �Indiana� decision, which
involved
differentissues. �Indiana� involved a dispute over delay
in
crediting thefederal share of Medicaid and AFDC
collections
deposited in acommon pool which was 95% invested
in
interest�bearinginstruments or accounts. A principal focus
in
the case was onIndiana's alleged prefinancing of the
federal
share of programcosts, and the Board indicated that
calculation
of interestearned might be affected if Indiana
effectively
credited thefederal account with collections by
advancing
equivalent sums tocover program costs or otherwise
reduced
drawdowns of federalfunds. The Board found that Indiana
had
presented inadequateevidence of balances in accounts and
timing
of fund adjustments,collections and refunds. While
federal
auditors had madespecific determinations from State records
of
those facts, thatwas a factual determination specific to
the
evidence in that caseand directed at a different issue than
we
face here.
�
evidence before us at the time (including an incomplete record
onthe
details of issuance and redemption of warrants). Wetherefore
reject
OCSE's argument that the Board establishedvarious "tests" which
Utah
failed to pass; our concern simply wasto elicit evidence, if it
existed,
of the amount of interest in aparticular factual setting which
included
a questionable OCSEcalculation.
b. �Objections to Utah's methodology as an alternative�.
OCSE argued that Utah made an insufficient case for
substitutingits
methodology for OCSE's methodology, based on points
discussedbelow.
At the outset, it should be noted that the Board never
merelysubstitutes
its judgment for that of the HHS constituent agency,that we
give
deference to agency decision�making, and that wewould not find for
an
appellant merely because we judge itsposition to be as reasonable as
the
agency's. Generally, theremust be an affirmative showing that
the
agency's determination iswrong, not just that the appellant's
contrary
determination maybe equally valid; the appellant generally has
the
burden to showin the given factual context that the agency
determination
is�j
OCSE argued that Utah's methodology is inadequate because
it
is"hypothetical." OCSE's Brief, p. 9. Although this is
an
undulypejorative description of the State's effort, one might
agreethat
it is hypothetical in the sense that it does not actuallytrack
and
display each specific dollar of interest. If so, thenOCSE's
preferred
methodology is similarly hypothetical since itattributes interest
to
periods late in the quarter when theactual amount of interest is
unknown
and may be nonexistent. OCSE generally insisted that its approach
is
meticulouslyaccurate, but in the context of the IV�A/IV�D
relationship
it isdisingenuous to ignore the fact that some portion of IV�D
fundsis
distributed through AFDC warrants, and that substituting
theIV�D
collections for IV�A cash does
�
effectively distribute the funds to the IV�A program. Furthermore,
by
virtue of the relatively recent decision toeliminate an opening
balance,
OCSE's approach can becharacterized as hypothetical or "artificial."
##
The realconcern should be whether Utah's methodology is reasonable
as
ameans of determining this interest with a substantial
degree
ofaccuracy. We note that HHS constituent agencies
frequently
usesampling and statistical analysis to estimate disallowances
whichare
not actual measurements but are, nonetheless, 90% to
95%reliable.
OCSE also made the separate argument that the artificiality
ofUtah's
approach was shown in Utah's acknowledgment that
itassumed.a
"proportionate dollar" distribution of IV�D funds atthe same time
as the
distribution of IV�A funds, rather thanbefore or after. OCSE's
Brief,
p. 10; TR, pp. 89�91. Ourobservations in the paragraph above are
also
applicable here inresponse. In addition, the State's
proportionality
approachappears reasonable as the State explained it (and as
a matter
ofcommon sense), and OCSE chose not to go into the details
of
thebackground documentation the State offered in support
of
itscalculations. At the hearing, OCSE argued that the complexity
ofthe
IV�A/IV�D funding relationship needed to be considered ingreater
detail,
and that one cannot accept the proportionatedollar approach "in
a
vacuum, which I believe they have." TR, p.91. OCSE suggested that
the
interaction between the timing ofIV�A draws on the letter of credit
(and
the fact that interestearned on the AFDC funds does not have to
be
accounted for) mightaffect the fairness of the proportionate
dollar
approach, and�j
� �
�6�/ OCSE's counsel said, "It's as artificial [as the State's],
butit's
certainly not unfavorable to the State." TR, p. 85.
�
concern about the IV�A/IV�D funding interrelationship
actuallyhighlights
the difficulty of OCSE's expedient but questionabledesire
to ignore
anything other than IV�D dollars �per� �se�; andsecond, to the
extent
OCSE arguably identified a valid questionabout the State's
methodology,
it is not sufficient in and ofitself to establish the
reasonableness of
the disallowance.
OCSE also argued that it was incorrect to use the date ofissuance of
a
warrant as opposed to the date of redemption of theissued
warrant.
OCSE's Brief, pp. 9�10. It is clear that inUtah, funds
continued to
earn interest after issuance of thewarrant until redeemed.
TR, pp. 65,
92�3. Utah maintained thatit was impossible to track
redemptions on a
warrant�by�warrantbasis. TR, p. 95. Utah
indicated #hat most warrants
were cashedquickly by recipients and that banks
also quickly sought
fundsfrom the State treasury; there was testimony that
the averagetime
from issuance to redemption might be only two days. TR,
pp.43�4. Utah
argued that the funds lost their character as IV�Dfunds
upon issuance of
the warrant and that elsewhere HHS hasused issuance dates as
an
expedient accounting device fordifferent purposes. Utah's Brief, p.
7;
TR, p. 93. We do notfind Utah's arguments persuasive because it
is
clear thatinterest was in fact earned until redemption and that
the
Stateis specifically accountable for interest under Title IV�D.
Although
perhaps not the only possible policy, it is notunreasonable for OCSE
to
take the position that interestcontinues to be earned on IV�D
funds
until the funds are actuallypaid out. However, it appears that
the
amount in issue is notsubstantial, and could be accommodated by
some
agreed uponadjustment. Thus, although Utah's methodology is flawed
in
thisrespect, the flaw appears minor and correctable.
�Conclusion�.
Based on the foregoing analysis, we have determined that OCSE's�j
�
adjustment to accommodate our determination that OCSE is
correctin
the.facts of this case concerning Utah's improper use of
theissuance
date; examples of adjustment methodologies��there may
beothers��which
seem reasonable include using the results of asample of
actual redeemed
warrants or using the average two�dayredemption period
suggested at the
hearing. ##
##dith #._Ballard_
�
�
�
� Alexander
G. T#itz .
� � ###
#�#
#./i
# #
.
# � Norval
D.
#John) Settle Presiding
Board
Member
� �
In �Utah I�, we indicated that it would be appropriate
touphold
the disallowance in the amount of $7,789 based on
Utah'sposition
that this was a more accurate amount than OCSE's.
�UtahI�, p.
8. Utah protested that its position was not an
admission,but
merely part of an argument related to the substantive
issue�j