Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DAB No. 643 (1985)

GAB Decision 643

April 19, 1985

Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services;
Ballard, Judith A.; Teitz, Alexander G. Settle, Norval D. (John)
Docket No. 84-158


The Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
(Florida, State) appealed a determination by the Office of Human
Development Services (OHDS, Agency) that the State was ineligible for
fiscal year 1983 funds under section 427 of Title IV-B of the Social
Security Act (Act). That section provides that a state may receive
additional funds for child welfare services, beyond the amount available
to each state under section 420 of the Act, if the state meets certain
requirements for the protection of children in foster care. /1/

The Agency evaluated the states' compliance with section 427 on two
levels. First, the Agency determined whether a state had established
policies or procedures for implementing the requirements of the Act.
Second, the Agency reviewed a sample of case records to determine
whether these policies or procedures were operational. If a state
failed to establish a requirement as a matter of policy, or a state did
not comply with the applicable requirements in a certain percentage of
the cases as determined through a case sample, the Agency required the
return of the section 427 funds. Under criteria established by the
Agency, the State had to comply with the applicable requirements in 80
percent of the cases in order to be eligible for funding for fiscal year
1983. The Agency initially approved the State's written request for
additional funds based on a written certification by the State that it
met the requirements of section 427. However, following a review
conducted in February 1984 to validate the State's self-certification,
the Agency advised the State that it was ineligible for fiscal year 1983
funds since it failed(2) to comply with the Act in at least 80 percent
of the cases sampled. Specifically, the Agency found that periodic
reviews and dispositional hearings, two of the safeguards specified in
the Act, were either not held or not timely in more than 20 percent of
the cases. In six of the cases the Agency also found other procedural
violations. Appendix D. For the reasons discussed below, we sustain
the Agency's determination that the State failed to meet the
requirements of section 427 in fiscal year 1983.

Section 427 Requirements As one of the conditions for the receipt of
additional child welfare funds, section 427(a)(2)(B) requires that a
state have implemented and be operating to the satisfaction of the
Secretary --

A case review system (as defined in section 475(5) for each child
receiving foster care under the supervision of the State. . . . Section
475(5) provides that --

(5) The term "case review system" means a procedure for assuring that
--

(A) each child has a case plan designed to achieve placement in the
least restrictive (most family like) setting available and in close
proximity to the parent's home, consistent with the best interest and
special needs of the child,

(B) the status of each child is reviewed periodically but no less
frequently than once every six months by either a court or by
administrative review (as defined in paragraph (6)) in order to
determine the continuing necessity for the appropriateness of the
placement, the extent of compliance with the case plan, and the extent
of progress which has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the
causes necessitating placement in foster care, and to project a likely
date by which the child may be returned to the home or placed for
adoption or legal guardianship, and

(C) with respect to each such child, procedural safeguards will be
applied, among other things, to assure each child in foster care under
the supervision of the State of a dispositional hearing to be held, in a
family or juvenile court or another court (including a tribal court) of
competent jurisdiction, or by an administrative body appointed or
Approved by the court, no later than eighteen months after the original
placement (and periodically thereafter during the continuation of foster
care), which hearing shall(3) determine the future status of the child
(including, but not limited to, whether the child should be returned to
the parent, should be continued in foster care for a specified period,
should be placed for adoption, or should (because of the child's special
needs or circumstances) be continued in foster care on a permanent or
long-term basis); and procedural safeguards shall also be applied with
respect to parental rights pertaining to the removal of the child from
the home of his parents, to a change in the child's placement, and to
any determination affecting visitation privileges of parents. Section
475(6) defines "administrative review" as a "review open to the
participation of the parents of the child . . . ."

Background Florida's first year in the program was fiscal year (FY)
1982 (October 1, 1981 -- September 30, 1982). The Agency audited the
State's compliance that fiscal year in July 1983 and found 73.3 percent
of the cases acceptable, which made the State conditionally eligible for
the additional funds under section 427 for FY 1982. Appendix C. In the
letter announcing the results of the July 1983 audit, OHDS also reminded
Florida that the State would have to attain a level of at least 80
percent acceptable cases in FY 1983 to be eligible for the section 427
funds in FY 1983. Id. The Agency found 31 cases unacceptable in the
first 89 cases it reviewed for FY 1983. Appendix D. This finding was
the basis for the Agency's determination of noncompliance. The Agency
continued to review all 150 cases in the review sample, ultimately
finding 57 cases unacceptable. /2/ The State conceded during this appeal
that 26 cases were(4) unacceptable. /3/ The State did not dispute that
80 percent of its cases had to be acceptable. /4/


Analysis 1. Florida did not meet the statutory standard for periodic
reviews and dispositional hearings nor did it qualify for the exceptions
allowed by the Secretary. As set out above, section 475(5) of the Act
requires periodic reviews every six months and dispositional hearings no
later than 18 months after the original placement, and periodically
thereafter. /5/ In 26 of the 27 disputed cases, either(5) periodic
reviews were not held every six months or dispositional hearings were
not held within 18 months after the original placement and periodically
thereafter as required. /6/ See Table of Disputed Cases (Table) appended
to this Decision. Thus the State did not meet the statutory standard in
these cases and was not entitled to the section 427 funds. /7/

The State argued that because the statute required periodic reviews not
less often than every six months, it assumed that it could correct those
cases found out of compliance in the audit of FY 1982 (and be in
compliance for FY 1983) if it conducted the required dispositional
hearings and periodic reviews in those cases in the first six months
(plus 30 days) of FY 1983. /8/ The State pointed to PI-82-06, an Agency
Staff Instruction, which provided that cases rejected during the initial
fiscal year of program operation for lack of a periodic review or a
dispositional hearing could be found acceptable in the following fiscal
year if the missing action were completed within the first quarter of
the following fiscal year. Attachment D to PI-82-06, p. 5 (Appendix B).

The State contended that PI-82-06 was an agency statement of general
applicability designed to interpret law and implement policy and, as
such, was a rule, within the meaning of the(6) Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. The APA provides:

Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of
the terms thereof, a person may not in any manner be required to resort
to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in
the Federal Register and not so published. 5 U.S.C. 552. Florida
alleged, and OHDS did not dispute, that the State did not become aware
of PI-82-06 until November 24, 1982, only 38 days before the end of the
first quarter of FY 1983. If Florida's rule of correcting FY 1982 errors
during the first six months of FY 1983 were applied to the 27 disputed
cases, at most six (nos. 16, 38, 63, 67, 81, 99) might be found
acceptable. One of these (no. 67) had another procedural deficiency.
/9/ Of the remaining 23 cases, 16 were not cases found deficient in FY
1982 (nos. 1, 6, 9, 18, 25, 30, 56, 88, 97, 109, 111, 115, 119, 129,
138, 140); three were cases in which the required hearings were held
out of time subsequent to March 31, 1983 (nos. 15, 31, 80); and in one
other, no. 141, the periodic review was never held. /10/


Thus, even if the rule were as Florida argued, the Agency would prevail
because Florida still would not have achieved the required 80 percent
compliance. We conclude that the periodic reviews in the group of six
cases listed above were not timely. The Board has held previously that
there is no ambiguity in the statutory requirements for periodic reviews
and dispositional hearings. Arkansas Department of Human Services,
Decision No. 553, July 16, 1984, p. 12. The State relied, mistakenly we
think, on a December 1983 letter in which the Assistant Secretary for
Human Development, HHS, stated that ACYF had agreed to "base the
compliance reviews on "reasonable State interpretations of the statute"
and that the statute was "not sufficiently clear in all its aspects."
Arkansas decision, supra; Vermont Department of Social and
Rehabilitation (7) Services, Decision No. 546, June 27, 1984, p. 7.
/11/ As the Board noted in another section 427 case, Virginia Department
of Social Services, Decision No. 596, November 21, 1984, at p. 9:

(W)e do not think this precludes the Agency from enforcing the
statutory provisions where they are clear or rejecting a state's
interpretation which is unreasonable in light of the statutory purposes.

Here the State has not provided any basis for its interpretation, nor do
we find any. That the Agency chose to give the states a certain grace
period in measuring compliance does not alter the statutory
requirements, nor(8) does it give a state permission to allow itself a
greater grace period. See Arkansas, p. 6 and see also Virginia
Department of Social Services, Decision No. 626, pp. 8-9. We do not
decide whether PI-82-06 was a rule subject to the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act. The cases covered by this part of our
decision (nos. 63, 67, 81) were in violation of statutory requirements.
It is not significant that they were also in violation of the grace
period in PI-82-06. See, Ohio Department of Public Welfare, Decision
No. 472, October 31, 1983, at p. 6. The three cases discussed in the
preceding paragraph, when added to the 16 in which there were no FY 1982
errors to correct (and thus were not entitled to the benefit of either
the Agency's or the State's grace periods), the six which were untimely
even under the State's grace period (i.e., by March 31, 1983), and the
one in which the periodic review was not held, would bring the total
number of noncomplying cases to 45, and the State's compliance level for
FY 1983 to 68 percent. See n. 4, supra. As noted previously, the
required level is 80 percent and thus if this were the only issue the
State would not be entitled to the section 427 funds. 2. The Agency
acted reasonably within its discretion in limiting the universe of cases
sampled to those of children who had been in the foster care system six
months or more. The State contended that the sample of 150 cases was
invalid because the Agency excluded cases which had been terminated in
less than six months after a dispositional hearing by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The State noted that, in the Arkansas and
Wyoming decisions, the Board had upheld the validity of samples which
excluded short-term cases, but Florida urged the distinction here that a
case in which the State had conducted a dispositional hearing within the
six months could not reasonably be excluded even though short-term.
Initial Br., pp. 9-11; Reply Br., pp. 5-6. /12/

The Agency argued that the section 427 incentive payments were added to
the already existing foster care program because of a concern about
children whose status was not resolved quickly getting lost in the
system. Agency Brief,(9) pp. 11-13. The Agency contended that, given
the need to pinpoint limited resources, it acted within its discretion
in selecting a universe which did not include cases which were not the
focus of Congressional attention at the time section 427 was enacted.
The Agency cited the legislative history of section 427 set out in Lynch
v. King, 550 F. Supp. 325, 338-341 (D. Mass. 1982). April 3, 1985
Telephone Conference. We conclude that the decision of the Agency to
limit the universe to cases which had been in the foster care system for
at least six months was consistent with the statutory purpose. As
indicated in the summaries of the legislative history of section 427 in
Lynch, and in the July 15, 1982 Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (47
Fed. Reg. 30932), and the May 23, 1983 Final Rule (48 Fed. Reg. 23104)
on regulations to implement section 427, that legislation was designed
to help children in foster care who were "stranded" or "adrift" in the
system. Among other things, the amended statute required states to
conduct an inventory of children who had been in foster care for over
six months. Thus, it was not unreasonable for the Agency to sample from
a universe of such cases and the sample thereby obtained was valid. 3.
Florida was required to hold dispositional hearings at least every six
months for children under 13. As noted previously, the Act requires a
dispositional hearing within 18 months of the original placement and
periodically thereafter. Florida contended that under State law the
follow-up hearings were required only every 12 months. The Agency
argued that State law required follow-up hearings every six months for
children under 13. In five of the 27 disputed cases the children are
under 13. /13/

The State relied on section 409.168(3)(f)2 of the Florida Statutes,
which states in pertinent part:

In each case in which a child has been . . . placed in foster care,
the clerk of the court shall schedule a review hearing . . . at least
annually . . . The Agency cited section 409.168(3)(c) of the Florida
Statutes, which provides:

The agreement shall be limited to as short a period as possible for
accomplishment of its provisions. The agreement shall expire no later
than the date of the(10) second annual judicial review. If, at that
time, the child is not returned to the physical custody of his natural
parents, the social service agency shall initiate permanent commitment
proceedings pursuant to s. 39.41 unless, at the time of the judicial
review, the court finds by clear and convincing proof that the situation
of the child is so extraordinary that the agreement should be extended.
In determining whether an agreement should be extended, the court shall
consider information provided by the social service agency, the natural
parent or parents, and the foster parents and any other information
requested by the court. No agreement extended by the court after the
second annual review may be for a period longer than 6 months, at which
time the court shall again review the child's status. If the child is
13 years of age or older, the court may extend the agreement for 12
months, at which time the court shall again review the child's status.
The agreement referred to is a "performance agreement," which is
supposed to cover all aspects of a child's placement in a foster home
and efforts to return the child to the parental home. Florida argued
that the six month requirement for children under 13 did not involve the
child's placement and thus was not a requirement for a dispositional
hearing. In response, the Agency appended sections of the Florida
Administrative Manual and Administrative Code which require a judicial
review every six months for children under 13. As part of that review,
the State must submit a statement of the recommended disposition
alternative, either continuing the child in foster care or returning the
child to a parent, guardian, or relative. We conclude that Florida was
bound to hold dispositional hearings every six months for children under
13. Oridinarily we accord a state deference with respect to the
interpretation of its own laws, but here the State's suggested
interpretation is at variance with the review requirement in section
409.168(3)(a) as defined in the State's Administrative Manual and its
Code. The specific reference to the under-13 age group and the nature
of the review hearing to be accorded them is more persuasive evidence of
the State law requirements than the very general reference to an annual
judicial review in section 409.168(3)(f)2. 4. The State was not required
to conduct periodic reviews in a closed case, even though foster care
payments may have continued in error. The Agency contended Case no. 141
was not acceptable because the periodic review due July 20, 1983 (with
the grace period credited) was not held. The State submitted
documentation(11) indicating that the case was closed June 30, 1983
because the subject was 20 years old and out of school. The Agency did
not dispute this but contended that the determinative date was the date
foster care payments stopped and the State had not documented that date.
We conclude that the periodic review requirement ended with the closing
of the case on June 30, 1983 and this case was acceptable. The relevant
question under section 427 is not whether foster care payments are being
made, but whether the child is "receiving foster care under the
supervision of the State . . ." If the State did not stop foster care
payments as of that date, it may be subject to a disallowance, but it
has met the section 427 requirements. 5. The State did not document
that the periodic review was open to the surviving parent in Case no. 6.
The Agency rated Case no. 6 unacceptable because the dispositional
hearing was not timely held and because the periodic review was an
administrative review and was not open to the father, the surviving
parent. Appendix F. /14/ The Agency pointed to the Florida
Administrative Code, which requires that written notice of an
administrative review be provided to the parents. Appendix M. The State
argued that the father's whereabouts were unknown, and that there was no
evidence that the administrative review was not open to the father.


The Act requires that the status of each child receiving foster care
under the supervision of the State must be reviewed periodically in an
administrative or judicial proceeding open to the parents of the child.
Sections 427(a)(2)(B), 475(5)(B), and 475(6) of the Act. The Florida
Statutes defines a "child" as an unmarried person under 18 years of age,
but the Florida Administrative Code makes subject to administrative
review the cases of "children who remain in foster care beyond their
18th birthday" and requires that the administrative review conference be
open to the participation of the parents. Appendix I, section
409.168(2)(a); Appendix M, section (3)(c) and (2). We conclude that the
federal and State laws read together required Florida to conduct
periodic reviews for children over 18 who remained in foster care under
the State's supervision -- which the State did in Case no. 67 -- and to
make(13) those proceedings open to the parents. Absent any evidence that
Florida in fact interpreted section 427 as not applying to this
situation, we think that the State considered this person to be a
"child" for section 427 purposes (even if not for other purposes) and
simply failed to make the review open to the parents. The State did not
provide that procedural safeguard here and Case no. 67 was not
acceptable.

Conclusion For the reasons stated above, we find that the State did
not comply with the requirement that it implement and operate to the
satisfaction of the Secretary a case review system for children in
foster care, as defined in section 475(5) of the Social Security Act.
Accordingly, we sustain the Agency's determination that the State was
ineligible for the $1,945,721 available under section 427 of the Act for
fiscal year 1983.(14)$TTable of Disputed Cases Following is a list of
the 27 cases which the parties disputed:

Last Review Reason for
or Date of 1 Sample #
Rejection Placement Due Date 1 Periodic
6/8/82 1/8/83 Dispositional 6/8/82 7/8/83
Other violations 6 Dispositional
1/29/82 3/1/83 Other violations 9 Dispositional
9/17/82 4/17/83 2 no later than 15(78) Periodic
2/26/82 12/31/82 no later than 16 Periodic
2/22/82 12/31/82 18 Periodic 7/2/82
2/2/83 Dispositional 7/2/82 1/2/83 25
Periodic 6/14/82 1/14/83 30 Periodic
5/5/82 12/5/82 no later than 31(52) Periodic
1/22/82 12/31/82 no later than Dispositional 6/13/77
12/31/82 no later than 38 Periodic
8/31/81 12/31/82 no later than Dispositional 8/31/81
12/31/82 no later than 51 Periodic
12/4/81 12/31/82 Dispositional 12/4/81
7/4/83 56 Periodic 4/28/82
11/28/82 63 Periodic 8/25/82 3/25/83
no later than 67
Periodic 9/9/81 12/31/82 Other violations 80
Periodic 12/9/82 7/9/83 no later than 81
Periodic 5/18/72 12/31/82 no later than
Dispositional 312/31/82 88
Periodic 6/25/82 12/25/82 Dispositional
6/25/82 12/25/82 97 Periodic
5/13/82 12/13/82 99 Periodic 2/22/82
8/22/82 Dispositional 2/22/82 3/22/83 109
Periodic 5/24/82 12/24/82 111 Periodic
7/1/82 2/1/83 115 Periodic 4/1/82
11/1/82 119 Periodic 6/8/82 1/8/83
Dispositional 6/8/82 1/8/83 129
Periodic 3/2/82 10/21/82 138 Periodic
3/1/82 10/1/82 140 Dispositional 10/27/82
5/27/83 141 Periodic 12/20/82 7/20/83

F

n1 The due date is the date derived from PI-82-06 and includes the
one month grace period. (Appendix B, Attachment D).

n2 The cases with due dates listed as "no later than 12-31-82" were
actually due prior to October 1, 1982, but the Agency gave the State a
grace period until 12-31-82 to correct prior errors.

n3 The record does not show the date of the previous dispositional
hearing. Appendix F. The State contended the dispositional hearing was
due April 30, 1983.$E /1/ The amount in dispute, $1,945,721, consists
of: $631,672 of Title IV-B funds; $1,200,000 of Title IV-E
funds transferred to Title IV-B; and $114,049 of Title IV-E funds for
placements made pursuant to voluntary agreements. /2/ The State
contended, and the Agency did not dispute, that six of the 150 were
counted twice. Thus, the total sample was actually only 144. Initial
Br., p. 3. /3/ These are cases nos. 20, 22, 26, 35, 39, 53, 66, 68, 70,
71, 75, 78, 87, 90, 102, 105, 106, 116, 121, 122, 124, 127, 133, 139,
142 and 144. Initial Br., p. 4; Reply, p. 3; Supplemental Response,
p. 1. The Agency contended that Florida had conceded case no. 10, but
the State counted cases nos. 10 and 143 (same cases) among those in
dispute, referring to it "as well as 143/10 counted once only." Initial
Br., p. 5. The file does not indicate when the dispositional hearing
was due. Appendix F. Because of these ambiguities, we make no finding
on case no. 10 adverse to the State. /4/ According to the
State's figures, if 29 or more of the sample cases were unacceptable,
the State would not have the requisite 80 percent. Thus, using the
State's figures, if only three of the disputed cases were unacceptable,
the State was not entitled to the section 427 funds. Since the parties
discussed the dispute in these terms, we address all of the findings
which the State contested. We note, however, that the sampling method
used by the Agency reviewers was a sequential method, which employed a
decision table to determine the point at which there was sufficient
assurance that the State was noncomplying. See Attachment E to
PI-82-06, Appendix B. Using either this table or the State's percentage
calculation (which does not have the same statistical validity), the
number of cases we find unacceptable is sufficient to support the
finding of noncompliance. /5/ Neither the Act nor Agency
regulation spell out what is meant by "periodically thereafter." The
parties agreed that under State law it meant at least every 12 months.
The Agency contended, but the State disputed, that for children under
age 13, State law required a dispositional review every six months.
Agency Br. p. 3, n.2; State Reply Br. of January 18, 1985, p. 2;
Agency Reply Br. of February 27, 1985, pp. 10-11. Our analysis of this
issue, which involved only four of the 27 disputed cases (nos. 18, 88,
119, 140), is set out at pp. 9-10 of this Decision; for our purposes in
this part of the discussion, it is not necessary to decide whether the
dispositional review should have been held within six months or 12
months. /6/ In the other case, no. 141, the periodic review was
not held at all. /7/ See n. 5, supra. The State challenged the
validity of the sample on which this conclusion is based. For our
analysis of the sampling issue, see p. 8, infra. /8/ The "plus 30 days"
refers to an Agency Staff Instruction, dated June 3, 1982
(PI-82-06) which directed federal officials reviewing state compliance
with section 427 to consider periodic reviews and dispositional hearings
timely if completed on or before the same date in the month following
the due date. Appendix B, Attachment D, p. 4. The Instruction cautioned
that this policy applied only to compliance reviews and in no way
abrogated the statutory requirements. Id. /9/ This aspect of
no. 67 is discussed on pp. 11-12, infra. /10/ Case no. 141 is discussed
on p. 10, infra. /11/ The full text of the paragraphs in
the letter from which the statements were taken is as follows: As you
noted, officials of ACYF and the National Council of State Public
Welfare Administrators (NCSPWA) had been meeting to work out a process
for conducting compliance reviews in the absence of regulations. My
understanding is that these joint meetings were useful and the resulting
general consensus was that ACYF would base the compliance reviews on
reasonable State interpretations of the statute. However, in conducting
the reviews, we found that the statute was not sufficiently clear in all
its aspects. The statutory requirements are complex, detailed,
timespecific and scattered throughout both title IV-E and title IV-B of
the Act. In addition, there was often disagreement on what constituted
a reasonable interpretation. Given the complexities of this statute, it
became clear that it was not possible to conduct reviews without some
basic agreement on minimum requirements. Therefore, as you know, we are
developing an NPRM which pulls together in one place all the
requirements - the cross-references between the two laws and the
pertinent regulatory requirements. It also includes the criteria,
percentage levels and standards with which we believe a State must
comply to reasonably meet the statutory provisions. Neither the letter
nor these paragraphs from the letter were introduced into the record in
this case. As the letter is a matter of public record and was referred
to by the parties here, we take judicial notice of its contents. See 45
CFR 16.17 and 16.21. /12/ At a telephone conference on April 3,
1985, the Agency noted that some of the short-term cases in which
dispositional hearings had been held were cases in which a judge had
merely continued the initial hearing and thus were not true foster care
cases. The State agreed such cases also should not be included in the
universe. /13/ These are nos. 18, 31, 88, 119, and 140. In case
no. 31, the follow-up hearing was not held within 12 months of the
previous hearing, so that case is out of compliance even under the
State's interpretation. /14/ The Agency had determined that the
State had failed to provide six procedural safeguards in Case no. 6.
The State did not dispute ness of the dispositional hearing in Case no.
6, see pp. 10-11, supra. The report of the administrative review
conference held on January 20, 1983 states that the father's whereabouts
are unknown and that he did not maintain contact with the children's
counsellor. However, it also states that the father had been observed
"walking around town" and that the older children "occasionally" saw
him. Appendix F. The Agency considered this documentation inadequate
because it did not show that the State made any attempt to notify the
father. The Agency indicated its willingness to consider additional
documentation that the State had attempted to notify the father of the
scheduled reviews but the State provided none. We conclude that the
conference report was not sufficient to demonstrate that the State made
reasonable efforts to obtain(12) the father's address so that the
required notice might have been sent to him. While there is no evidence
that the administrative review was, in fact, closed to the father, the
requirement of openness, viewed in light of the purposes behind section
427 and the State's own notice requirement, must at a minimum mean that
reasonable efforts are made to notify a parent of the review. Thus, on
this record, we do not find case no. 6 acceptable. Should case no. 6
become crucial in determining whether the State was in compliance, we
presume that the Agency would afford the State the opportunity to submit
additional documentation that the review was open to the father. Of
course, our decision on the other issues makes further action
unnecessary at this time. 6. Parental participation in periodic reviews
is required for children over 18 who are still in foster care. The
Agency rated Case no. 67 not acceptable because the periodic review was
not open to participation by the parents. Appendix F. n15 Florida
contended that the parental participation requirement did not apply
because the child was over 18, the age of majority in Florida. The
Agency did not dispute that the child was over 18. /15/ The
Agency had determined that the State had failed to provide six
procedural safeguards in Case no. 67. The State did not dispute the
findings on the other five. To be acceptable, a case must score "yes"
or "not applicable" on 13 of the 18 procedural safeguards. Appendix B.

JUNE 06, 1985