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NON-STOCKPILE CHEMICAL MATERIEL PROJECT CORE GROUP THE KEYSTONE CENTER FINAL REPORT



THE KEYSTONE CENTER STAFF

On behalf of The Keystone Center and its staff, we thank you for the opportunity to serve you the past eight years.

Ed Moreno, Associate,
NSCMP Project Manager

Peter Adler, President,
The Keystone Center

The Keystone Center Headquarters
1628 Sts. John Road
Keystone, CO 80435
Phone: 970-513-5800
Fax: 970-262-0152

Denver Office
1600 Broadway
Suite 1920
Denver, CO 80202
Phone: 303-468-8860
Fax: 303-468-8866

Washington, DC Office
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Suite 509
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: 202-452-1590
Fax: 202-452-1138

www.keystone.org



The Keystone Center staff and subcontractors who participated on this project included:

Heather Bergman
Janesse Brewer
Kristi Parker Celico
Stephanie Cheval
Sid Cullipher
Shelby Hagenauer
Mary Davis Hamlin
John Huyler
Ed Moreno
Greg Sobel
Doug Thompson
Rebecca Turner
Sue Wilcox

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Louise Dyson
Bill Brankowitz
Elizabeth Crowe
Stephanie Cheval
Colonel Ned Libby (retired)
Wayne Jennings

NSCMP CORE GROUP

Core Group Members as of July 2007

Jim Austreng, State Unexploded Ordnance Coordinator, Department of Toxic Substances Control, Office of Military Facilities

Doris Bradshaw, Defense Depot Memphis Tennessee Concerned Citizens Committee (DDMTCCC)

Barbara Burgess, Senior Program Analyst, Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical Demilitarization and Threat Reduction, CD & TR)

Elizabeth Crowe, Chemical Weapons Working Group; Non-Stockpile CW (Chemical Weapons) Citizens Coalition

Janet Daniels, Citizen

Karen Jolley Drewen, Public Affairs Specialist, U.S. Army Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project

J.C. King, Special Assistant for Munitions, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Environment, Safety and Occupational Health

Jeff Edson, Unit Leader, Federal Facilities Remediation and Restoration, Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment

Laurence Gottschalk, Project Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel
Chemical Materials Agency

Patrick Lynch, Civil/Chemical Engineer, Clearwater Revival Company

Tim McNamara, Director, Safety, Health, & Environment, U.S. Army Garrison

Kenneth A. Shuster, Engineer, U.S. EPA

Chuck Twing, Chemical Warfare Recovery Team Chief, Department of the Army, Army Corps of Engineers

Enrique Valdivia, Member, Smart Growth Coalition of San Antonio. Managing Attorney for Texas Rural Legal Aid

Jane Williams, Sierra Club; California Communities Against Toxics

Past Core Group Members

William Brankowitz, Deputy Project Manager, NSCMP

Louise Dyson, Public Outreach and Information Officer

Jim Dries, Special Assistant, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Environment, Safety and Occupational Health, Department of the Army

Denzel Fisher, Assistant for Special Programs, Environment, Safety and Occupational Health, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army

LTC James P. Fletcher, Product Manager, NSCMP

William (Bud) Harper, Director, Arkansas Department of Emergency Management and Homeland Security Director, State of Arkansas

Hugh Hazen, Environmental Engineer, U.S. EPA

Steve Heare, Director, Permits and State Program Division, Office of Solid Waste, U.S. EPA

Col. Ned Libby, Project Manager, NSCMP

LTC Christopher Ross, Product Manager, NSCMP

Patrick Wakefield, Director for Treaties and Chemical Demilitarization (Chemical and Biological Defense), Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

SUPPORT

Ed Doyle

Jeff Harris

Jason Huffine

And, **Darryl Palmer**, **Charles Comaty**, **Marjorie Roberts**, **Anne Marie Rhodes**, and administrative and contract staff.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary.....	page 7
Chapter 1.0: Introduction.....	page 8
Chapter 2.0: Background and Origins of the NSCMP Core Group.....	page 9
2.1 NSCMP and the Public Involvement Challenge.....	page 9
2.2 Designing the Core Group.....	page 10
Chapter 3.0: The Early Years—Trust Building and Information Exchange.....	page 12
Chapter 4.0: The Middle Years—Focus on Technology Development, Communication with the Public and Problem-Solving.....	page 13
4.1 Technology Development.....	page 13
4.2 Guidebook.....	page 13
4.3 Problem-Solving—the Rocky Mountain Arsenal Experience.....	page 14
4.4 Approaches to Regulatory Permitting.....	page 14
4.5 Community Issues.....	page 14
Chapter 5.0: The Later Years—Mission Accomplished.....	page 15
Chapter 6.0: Conclusion.....	page 16
Chapter 7.0: The Keystone Center Observations.....	page 17
7.1: Leadership.....	page 17
7.2: Official and Unofficial Observers.....	page 17
7.3: The Importance of Networks.....	page 17
7.4: Collaboration is Appropriate In Many Situations, But Not All.....	page 18
7.5: Recommendation.....	page 18
Testimonials.....	page 19
APPENDICES	
Appendix A: Core Group Fact Sheet.....	page 23
Appendix B: Core Group Protocols.....	page 25
Appendix C: List of Acronyms.....	page 31

Executive Summary

This report summarizes the decade of collaboration among representatives of environmental community groups, the U.S. Army and state and local environmental regulators during the life of the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project (NSCMP) Core Group. The Core Group was convened by the Army to gain input on the identification, development and implementation of technologies to address non-stockpile chemical warfare materiel (CWM). This diverse group included citizens involved in active community groups; environmental regulators from different EPA regions and states; and Department of Defense and Department of Army officials. Advised by the Core Group through process management and logistics support by The Keystone Center, NSCMP achieved its mission on time and under budget in support of the international chemical weapons convention.



The disposal of chemical weapons was divided into two major components: stockpiled chemical weapons located in nine known and protected sites across the United States and at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific Ocean; and non-stockpile chemical materiel, comprising production facilities, component chemicals and munitions and training items located at numerous sites in at least 38 states. In many cases, non-stockpile items were discovered when a military installation began excavation for a construction project and uncovered a discarded chemical-filled munition. As a result, while NSCMP leadership understood the importance of engaging the public and other stakeholders, the Army did not know precisely where or when it would have to respond to destroy the items, or how to communicate with communities located in those areas. In some cases, NSCMP had little to no prior relationship with a newly identified stakeholder community.

Keystone often is asked to lend expertise on the design of stakeholder involvement strategies for government agencies. This is particularly true for issues of high concern that are likely to be controversial. With Keystone guidance on stakeholder involvement design and implementation, NSCMP developed and engaged the Core Group effectively. The group created ground rules and protocols and procedures for information exchange and discussed issues of concern to NSCMP and the other stakeholders represented on the Core Group. Of particular interest is how Core Group members, in their roles as U.S. military officials, community activists, and environmental regulators, responded to the discovery of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal GB (sarin) bomblets. This case is detailed in the following report, and is demonstrative of how this unique collaboration among stakeholder groups can produce safe, effective, and publicly acceptable outcomes for a community.


This report details lessons learned from the NSCMP Core Group effort. These include:

- ◆ Individual and institutional leadership is critical to the success of the group dialogue process.
- ◆ Independent, external institutions – technical observers, the general public, and facilitators – are valuable in helping an advisory group develop stability, expertise and compassion.
- ◆ Careful selection of participants is vital. It proved extremely advantageous that Core Group members were formal and informal leaders within their communities who also worked through extensive national networks and professional associations.
- ◆ While collaboration is not appropriate in all issues, the experience of the NSCMP Core Group illustrates that many elements can be addressed by enlisting the knowledge, wisdom and interest of a varied group of stakeholders.

Chapter 1.0: Introduction

This is a case study report about the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project (NSCMP) Core Group, an advisory group convened by The Keystone Center and supported by the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project, a program of the U.S. Army Chemical

Materials Agency (CMA). The case study seeks to outline some important outcomes of the Core Group and its contributions in helping NSCMP meet its mission in a timely and cost-effective manner.



Chapter 2.0: Background and Origins of the NSCMP Public Involvement

Public interest in the destruction of the nation's chemical weapons had been growing for a decade before Congress directed the U.S. military in 1985 to begin planning for the destruction of the chemical weapons stockpile. This interest expanded in 1991 with Congressional focus on additional chemical warfare material that was to be controlled under the new Chemical Weapons Convention that was then being negotiated. This included not only the stockpile, but also the related manufacturing infrastructure, recovered chemical weapons and other legacy items which became collectively known as non-stockpile materiel. This report is limited to discussion of the non-stockpile materiel.

"When we started a formal dialogue process, many NSCMP officials believed that community members had ulterior motives, and questioned whether anything 'real' could be accomplished through our discussion and debate. On the flip side, although community members set a higher bar for technology performance and transparency, our past experiences dealing with government and military agencies kept expectations low."

~Elizabeth Crowe, CWWG.

proposals to incinerate the wastes. Community representatives were concerned that the decision would be made in the expected style of the Army: "decide, announce, defend." Stakeholders also worried about

the risks of burning chemical weapons, treating the resulting waste streams, and what might happen in the event of a catastrophe; and moreover that the activities may occur without their knowledge or input. This led to the creation of the Non-Stockpile Chemical Weapons Citizens Coalition, which describes itself as a grassroots network of concerned citizens living near known and suspected non-stockpile sites in the United States. The NSWCC advocated for the use of safe,

The Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project was established in 1992 to identify and develop technologies to deal with non-stockpile materiel. The non-stockpile materiel included binary chemical weapons, former production facilities and assembly lines, miscellaneous chemical warfare materiel such as unfilled munitions and storage containers, and recovered chemical warfare materiel. Recovered chemical warfare materiel also included field training kits used at bases throughout the country between 1928 and 1969, known as Chemical Agent Identification Sets or "CAIS."

Some community stakeholders were particularly concerned with

non-incineration technologies for the disposal of non-stockpile materiel and its residual wastes, as well as promoting citizen involvement in choosing the disposal technologies.

2.1 NSCMP and the Public Involvement Challenge

The nature of non-stockpile materiel is that it is not in a designated weapons stockpile. Whereas the locations of chemical weapons production facilities, binary chemical weapons and unfilled munitions and devices were known, much of the non-stockpile materiel was in the form of unspent munitions, cylinders, and test kits that had been left in storage or



Chemical Agent Identification Sets

buried as part of the prior treatment and disposal processes at current and former military bases in many locations nationwide. Non-stockpile materiel was



believed to exist in a variety of configurations in hundreds of sites in more than 38 states.

NSCMP did not necessarily

CAIS recovery

know where the next phone call might come from—seeking help to isolate and treat chemical filled munitions. The chemical-filled munitions, often not tracked or inventoried, have been found in various locations, including the exclusive Embassy Row area of Washington, D.C., a rural Alabama farm that was once a mortar range, and on bases in the remote Aleutian Islands of Alaska. The most ubiquitous chemical items were the CAIS training kits used by soldiers to learn how to detect and decontaminate chemical weapons that might be used against them. After training, the kits were usually buried at the base training location, and often not located except by accident or by the initiation of a construction project.

In 1997, after some initial discussions with community organizations, the NSCMP Project Manager decided to engage community representatives in a dialogue. The NSCMP Public Affairs Officer (PAO) had participated in earlier community meetings around the country; setting up information repositories; and learning about the concerns of people in known non-stockpile sites. The PAO and the new NSCMP project manager were convinced that a new approach to the cleanup dialogue was necessary.

NSCMP leadership approached The Keystone Center to help with the design and facilitation of a stakeholder group. Keystone interviewed numerous

stakeholders regarding their views on the destruction of non-stockpile chemical materiel and how a stakeholder process might be designed. Interviewees included other officials of the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense, environmental regulators, and community representatives.

Paramount to the design of an advisory group was determining participants' roles and responsibilities, essential issues to be addressed, and decision-making protocols. Central to the formation of a stakeholder group was determining how this group could assist NSCMP in completing its mission in a manner acceptable to a diverse set of stakeholders.



Recovered Chemical Materiel

2.2 Designing the Core Group

The design of a stakeholder involvement process was challenging because NSCMP did not necessarily know where the next chemical munitions would be found. That situation meant that NSCMP did not know which community would be affected or interested, and identifying individuals who should be included in the dialogue would be challenging.

Based on information gathered through interviews, Keystone recommended that a group be formed that would be diverse, and would allow for open and regular interaction with NSCMP about the issues core to its mission. Draft ground rules, protocols, and a list of discussion topics were developed and finalized with the stakeholder group. Keystone, charged with identifying and selecting the group's members, convened this group, and provided the logistical support for members' participation in meetings.

At the first meeting in 1999, the group, designated as the NSCMP Core Group, included as members:

- ◆ the NSCMP Project Manager and PAO, to provide the perspective from the Army;
- ◆ state regulators with particular interest and experience in non-stockpile and other munitions issues, to provide the perspective from the states;
- ◆ Environmental Protection Agency representatives familiar with NSCMP issues, to provide the perspective from federal regulators;
- ◆ Community members and environmentalists, especially those near possible non-stockpile sites, to provide the perspective from the public and environmental groups; and
- ◆ Other Army and Department of Defense (DoD) agencies such as the Army Corps of Engineers and installation representatives, to provide the perspective of the organizations that would perform environmental remediation, including recovery of chemical warfare materiel.

In addition to environmental regulators and representatives with local environmental and environmental justice concerns, some of the community members brought substantial technical expertise to the Core Group. Other members, chosen for their expertise in the application of federal environmental laws, had direct experience in environmental remediation. As a result, the dialogue focused on developing the attributes of acceptable technologies. NSCMP and the Core Group maintained regular communication with groups and individuals in communities where former chemical weapons production facilities existed.



Mission Area 2: Former Chemical Weapons Production Facilities

Chapter 3.0: The Early Years— Trust Building and Information Exchange

The initial meetings of the Core Group focused on the development of group protocols, communication, and information exchange methods among the members. These practical activities grounded the members as a group, and became important touchstones for the life of the program.

Although frustrations were present and sometimes acknowledged, there was a growing understanding that the members had a common goal: To achieve destruction of the chemical weapons materiel in a way that did not compromise the environment. (Please see Appendix B for Core Group Protocols.)

At first, as the agency and participants began a regular dialogue, communication between NSCMP, community representatives and regulator members was unsatisfactory to some members. To alleviate this, the Core Group established an Information Exchange Team. The team was tasked with creating a procedure for how information would be exchanged in a timely, effective and responsive manner. Rules were established governing the

timeframes in which information requests and responses were due, and an evaluation of the nature and complexity of the request, determined the expected response date, and personnel involved in a request and response.

“The group all wanted frank and open communication. The group wanted timely facts and shared details of operations. The group wanted to participate in the decision-making process, and be sure that other affected groups also got the chance to participate. When participation and communication opened up, trust came with it.”

*~Bill Brankowitz, former Deputy
Project Manager, NSCMP*

Over time, the discussion led to norms on the timing and format of information provided to the Core Group, and opened the door to the NSCMP staff requesting specific input from the Core Group on matters of interest. By the end of 2000, Core Group members were expressing their satisfaction with the system that had been developed. Eventually the Core Group’s open discussion at regularly scheduled meetings was the most important element of its work.

The more formal structure provided consistency in the discussions, including methods to track assignments and to avoid distractions from outside the non-stockpile mission, and to give participants confidence and comfort with the process and issues.

Chapter 4.0: The Middle Years—Focus on Technology Development, Communication with the Public and Problem-Solving

The Core Group took on multiple roles in the non-stockpile mission, made possible through the Core Group's mixture of NSCMP, Army and DOD operational and management representatives, state, regional and national regulators and community experts and activists. As an acquisition agency, the search for non-incineration technologies was critical to NSCMP's mission, and the Core Group's primary focus. As an advisory body, the Core Group worked to communicate its objectives and the NSCMP mission to its constituencies throughout the country. With its technical and regulatory expertise, it was able to serve as a sounding board for NSCMP's dynamic mission. (Please see appendix A for NSCMP Fact Sheet)

4.1 Technology Development.

In coordination with requests from the Core Group by 2000, NSCMP had taken up research to test and develop transportable, non-incineration technologies. These technologies would effectively destroy chemical agent training items, chemical-filled bombs, cylinders, and artillery and mortar rounds as well as contaminated components of former production facilities. These technologies were also adaptable to work at the site of the problem with a minimum of setup, site impact and tear down. These technologies included the Rapid Response System (RRS), the Munitions Management Device (MMD) and the emerging technology that became the Explosive Destruction System (EDS). A wide variety of techniques and experimental technologies were examined and presented to the Core Group. Technologies that gained the confidence of the Army and the Core Group eventually were deployed.

The National Academies of Science, which had appointed a National Research Council (NRC) review committee for the non-stockpile program, regularly identified and commented on the importance of the alternative technologies from around the world. They deemed public and regulatory involvement as essential to avoid delays in fulfilling the treaty requirements by helping “determine trade-offs in technology selection, siting, and technology deployment and implementation.”¹

4.2 Guidebook.

The Core Group agreed that it would be helpful and useful to distribute a resource guide for “new” sites. This guide would help to explain to interested individuals (military site commanders, leaders and activists in affected communities, or state and local regulators) the risks and options if they suspected or knew about non-stockpile materiel at a particular site. By consensus, the Core Group developed and published the Guide to Non-Stockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel, a reader-friendly document designed to orient readers to the issues and options regarding the safe destruction of non-stockpile materials. The initial guidebook was completed in December 2003 and was revised in October 2005. To date, the Guidebook is one of the few known documents co-authored and published by citizens, regulators, and the military. An electronic version of the guidebook is available at www.keystone.org.

¹According to a 2001 NRC presentation to the Core Group.

4.3 Problem-Solving—the Rocky Mountain Arsenal Experience.

In 2000 and 2001 at Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Colorado, several bomblets containing the nerve agent GB, also known as sarin, were discovered during excavation of some refuse piles. By coincidence, the initial calls alerting NSCMP of the discoveries came during a NSCMP Core Group meeting. Denver-area residents were alarmed by the discoveries and feared that the initial proposed response by the Army would include incineration or open detonation. Under the premise that the items were too dangerous to move, a variety of enclosed options were considered. Those included open detonation, an untested controlled detonation chamber developed by a contractor for the Army Corps of Engineers, and NSCMP's Explosive Destruction System (EDS), which was in final-stage testing in England and ready for deployment.



M139 Bomblet

Core Group members used their knowledge about NSCMP, and especially their knowledge of the EDS, to communicate with community groups and regulators. Core Group members worked within their networks to talk about NSCMP's prospective technologies, NSCMP's involvement in the destruction of chemical munitions, potential risks to human health and the environment, and other issues of concern.

In 2001, NSCMP teams successfully treated the 10 GB bomblets using the EDS technology. All considered this case to be a success, greatly aided by the independent actions of Core Group members. A Colorado U.S. Senator who was present for the disposal of the first bomblet had high praise for the cooperation he saw at Rocky Mountain Arsenal.

4.4 Approaches to Regulatory Permitting.

The Core Group continuously worked on permitting issues, and finding appropriate and timely approaches to states in which non-stockpile activities were under way or being contemplated. Through their associations and networks of regulatory officials, the regulator members of the Core Group were able to provide NSCMP with the latest thinking and regulatory trends among the states. The state regulator community, through representatives on the Core Group, contributed to deployment standards and procedures that satisfied most states' requirements. In concert, the regulator, NSCMP and community members provided support and ideas on how to propose and manage clean-up operations.

Core Group members recognized the variability among the states with respect to regulations and procedures applied to recovered chemical warfare materiel found in their jurisdictions. The question was whether NSCMP could establish a uniform procedure or format for its response to discovered chemical materiel. While there was no consensus on proceeding toward that type of unified template or system, members acknowledged that regular interaction among NSCMP, the Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials (ASTSWMO), Interstate Technology and Regulatory Council (ITRC) and individual states, was helpful to both the state regulator community and NSCMP.

4.5 Community Issues

Another meaningful element of the dialogue occurred during Core Group meetings, where representatives of community or tribal groups were invited to attend and make presentations, often if they had experience with non-stockpile or other military-related issues. Discussion of environmental justice issues sensitized the Core Group to the interests of communities that bear a disproportional amount of risk from government or industry actions.

Chapter 5.0: The Latter Years— Mission Accomplished

The Core Group's Technology Subcommittee reviewed and supported one of the latest breakthrough decisions by NSCMP, the use of a simplified heating system to remove remnants of nerve agent VX from large storage tanks at the former VX Production Facility at Newport Chemical Depot, IN. The selection of the thermal method eliminated large volumes of liquid waste, which enabled NSCMP to finish its mission responsibilities in late 2006, four months ahead of the deadline set by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

By 2005, most of the components of NSCMP's mission-related activities were well under way in sites across the nation, and some had already been completed. For future chemical warfare materiel disposal projects that did not fall under NSCMP's

initial mission, a protocol for prioritizing known sites had been developed. The extent of public involvement in those activities has not been determined but certainly will play a role in the future. Some Core

"I'm proud to say the Core Group completed its mission. This was a very effective way to get input from diverse sources as we developed the non-stockpile program, from the methodologies and technologies, to equipment development. The real-time feedback from the group enabled them to provide input early in the process, so we could act on their ideas in the equipment design. The end result was safe, effective equipment that meets the needs of the Army, the regulators and the community."

~Laurence Gottschalk, Project Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel, U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency

Group members have expressed concerns that those elements of the nation's chemical cleanup activities have yet to be undertaken and that with the completion of NSCMP's core mission, the cleanup may continue without sufficient public involvement. Chemical munitions are believed to exist at formerly used defense sites that have been converted into private property, at bases recently closed or slated for closure by the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process and at active bases where materiel is known or as-yet undiscovered.

Chapter 6.0: Conclusion

Within the chemical demilitarization arena, NSCMP achieved a high level of operational success, environmental protection and general public acceptance. According to a finding from the National Research Council's Non-Stockpile committee, public involvement was a key factor.

“As demonstrated in the literature and by the Army's own experience in the chemical stockpile program, public involvement is key to the timely achievement of the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Product's (NSCMP's) mission (NRC, 1994, 1996a, 1996b, 2000a, 2001a). The previous reports noted that the public should be thought of not as monolithic but as different “publics”— that is, stakeholders whose interests, level of awareness and information, and desired level of involvement vary.”

“Facilitating their input to a policy or technology and their understanding and ultimate acceptance of it involves identifying interested or affected stakeholders, providing open and timely information, discussing and clarifying the issues of concern, putting in place mechanisms to facilitate their engagement, and establishing procedures to evaluate the recommendations of these publics and to give them feedback on how and why their input was or was not used. (NRC reports, 1996a, 1996c, 1999b, 2001a).”

Chapter 7.0: The Keystone Center Observations

The Keystone Center believes that a number of aspects of the Core Group experience were important to the success of the group and the NSCMP mission overall: key leadership, the role of designated observers, and the value of extended networks in the regulatory and community sectors.

7.1 Leadership.

The importance of leadership to the success of the Core Group cannot be overstated. The Core Group succeeded in its mission because of the dedication and work of individuals who championed the importance of the dialogue. The U.S. Army, environmental regulators, and community participants demonstrated exemplary leadership.

7.2 Official and Unofficial Observers.

The NRC of the National Academies assigned a committee for non-stockpile activities, to review specific issues related to non-stockpile, and publish reports and findings. NRC Committee members regularly attended NSCMP Core Group meetings and

provided helpful reflections in their reports, including the importance of public involvement of this type. Moreover, meetings were open to the public and often representatives of community groups and political leaders were invited to attend and make presentations to the Core Group.

7.3 The Importance of Networks.

The performance of the Core Group over time demonstrated that a carefully selected group of people could work effectively in a context of national and international policy, while also effectively and appropriately using their professional and grassroots networks to advance the agency's mission. This was important because the expertise that arose from the community and regulatory networks added credibility to the technology and permitting discussions within the Core Group. At the same time, when suspected chemical munitions were discovered, Core Group members helped pave the way for NSCMP operations to occur in communities that had concerns about discovered munitions or proposed destruction methods.



3 oz. HD Mustard Bottle

7.4 Collaboration is appropriate in many situations, but not all.

Many government agency leaders may be concerned that involving the public in their technology development and decision-making processes might weaken their authority or force them to agree to compromises that they would consider inappropriate. The test of a collaborative effort is whether more progress toward the mission goals was achieved because of the dialogue, than if the parties had embarked on their own paths. It is reasonable to contend that the NSCMP Core Group fits this criterion of success. Keystone's experience is that collaboration is appropriate under many, but not all conditions, and that every prospective collaborative initiative should begin with a careful evaluation and assessment, as in this case.

7.5 Recommendation.

Keystone's experience demonstrates that agencies can benefit by going beyond standard public information in complex environmental cases with significant safety and health risks and high public interest and concern.



Explosive Destruction System



MMAS Phase 2

Testimonials

Participants are the best source of testimonials: the following are reflections and commentaries from Core group members.

Bill Brankowitz, former Deputy Project Manager, NSCMP

I was not a charter member of the Core Group. However, I remember the first meeting that I was involved in was in the spring of 2000 at Keystone, in Colorado. I remember riding up to that meeting in the rental car from the airport with LTC Chris Ross and Louise Dyson. We discussed how we had gotten to where we were, in conflict with many groups, and how we could reduce the conflict.

The one thing that struck me at that meeting, and continues to resonate with me today, is that everyone in the Core Group shared the same goal. That goal was the destruction of non-stockpile chemical materiel. All we had to agree on were the details!

Over the next six years, now seven or eight for many of you, I think we found a way. The lessons I took away from the Core Group were very basic. The group all wanted frank and open communication. The group wanted timely facts and shared details of operations. The group wanted to participate in the decision making process, and be sure that other affected groups also got the chance to participate. I think the success of this group was that we had the right people, at the right time, to make these “simple” things happen. When participation and communication opened up, trust came with it. That is no small thing.

Some examples of success I remember are goal oriented, and since I’m an Army person, that is mainly the way I think. These would include the first use of the Explosive Destruction System at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, the choice of a technology for the binary waste destruction and the current success the Wet Air Oxidation System is enjoying, and the destruction of the large agent storage tanks at Newport by the use of the band heating equipment. This last event opened the way for the recent successful completion of the CWC 100 percent destruction milestone for Former Production Facilities. This was a major accomplishment, and a success for the country.

I think some other examples of success were just as important, and perhaps less noticed. For instance, in later meetings I noticed that if we forgot to formally raise our “speaking cards” and spoke out of turn, there was more give and take, and more of a willingness to let this slide if it was not abused. That would have been unthinkable in 2000, when such trust was missing from our meetings.

I remember that at one time we would dread these meetings and the preparation they required. But Colonel Libby was right...with polite conversation, communication and some compromise, things got a lot better. I'd like to think they got a lot better for everyone represented in the group, and that we all gained something from the experience. I believe that we did...and that the whole country did!

After all this time, we are at the logical end of many of Non-Stockpile's original goals. The Former Production Facilities are gone, the binary chemicals are gone, and many recovered munitions are gone as well. Recoveries still happen, but there is a network in place, both official and unofficial, to help everyone when these unwanted events happen.

Ned Libby came to visit me about the time I retired in 2006, and we talked about our careers and decisions...some of the good things that had happened, and some of the bad. Ned had pushed hard for some of the more reluctant folks in the Army to allow the Core Group to become a reality. I remember looking over and saying to him, "You know, you were right about the Core Group...that was a great idea." He just smiled...he knew that!

The reason it worked was all of you. You should be proud of that! My best regards for the future, no matter where it takes you.

Elizabeth Crowe, *Chemical Weapons Working Group; Non-Stockpile CW (Chemical Weapons) Citizens Coalition*

I am proud of many of the Core Group's accomplishments. Through the Core Group, we diverted a significant amount of hazardous waste from incineration to safer disposal technology, thus preventing toxics from being released in an uncontrolled manner into the environment, and easing the burden on citizens living near hazardous waste incinerators. We were able to transform suspicion into transparency through regular flow of information and opportunities for open dialogue. We took pro-active steps to involve citizens affected by the threat of non-stockpile materiel in our discussions, and developed clear outreach materials.

But to me, the underpinning of these points, and the deep value of the Core Group was that we learned how to develop trust. When we started a formal dialogue process, many NSCMP officials believed that community members had ulterior motives, and questioned whether anything "real" could be accomplished through our discussion and debate.

On the flip side, though community members set a higher bar for technology performance and transparency, our past experiences dealing with government and military agencies kept expectations low.

As time went on and trust slowly developed, both parties agreed that the effort was worthwhile; that it was possible to agree on broad goals and implement specific ideas for the benefit of everyone involved; that we could take constructive criticism on an agency level and personally; and that building respect and trust for each other as individuals was critical to our success. These are the building blocks of success, and it is my hope that the Core Group's lessons may be learned by many others within and beyond the chemical demilitarization program.

Jim Austreng, *State Unexploded Ordnance Coordinator, Department of Toxic Substances Control, Office of Military Facilities*

Through the years the polarization was reduced and a true spirit of cooperation evolved. Having the regulatory team on the Core Group helped facilitate that. I think the having the regulatory component helped bridge the gap between the DoD and the stakeholders.

Initially there was distrust that had build up from misunderstanding, lack of understanding or possibly just from a lack of information. Having a Core Group created a forum that provided insight for each entity and helped gain an understanding even when participants didn't share the same perspective.

While I participated as a regulator, I believe it was well understood that I was not representing every regulator. But like others who represented organizations or other stakeholders, the discussions gave insight to NSCMP on what they may face as they went into these communities.

Initially, I did feel it was a risk for DoD to take some of its money and fund this effort. But looking back, I think all would agree it was a wonderful investment, and that the return on investment is many fold. I suppose I summarize it as: Early on, information flow was only a trickle. There were some strong conversations and some hesitations. There was not one moment in time, but a series of commitments that DoD made to provide information and it had a snowball effect. After a couple of years the information flow started to be a little bit more free-flowing. That evolved into the growth of the trust factor.

The relationship between trust and accomplishments is huge. It is attributed to the individuals' commitment to the Core Group process. All of the Core Group members were there with a passion to see success.

Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project (NSCMP) CORE GROUP FACT SHEET

MISSION:

The mission of the Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project is to dispose of recovered chemical warfare materiel in a safe and effective manner. In order to do so, the NSCMP emphasizes the importance of engaging a spectrum of individuals and organizations that are involved in and potentially affected by the disposal of chemical materiel.

NSCMP asked The Keystone Center, a non-profit organization that works as a third-party neutral facilitator, to develop a public involvement mechanism that brings together various individuals who can share their perspectives with the NSCMP as it moves toward disposal of chemical materiel now located at non-stockpile sites. This effort is called the NSCMP Core Group.

CORE GROUP OBJECTIVES

The Core Group's objectives are to:

- 1) Support development of safe, environmentally sound, cost-effective, and publicly acceptable NSCMP disposal technologies, policies, and practices;
- 2) Promote cooperative working relationships among citizens, regulators, NSCMP, and other related Department of Defense Offices; and
- 3) Exchange information and opinions about areas of high concern to NSCMP and other stakeholders within the scope of NSCMP responsibilities.

The Core Group does not have the authority to make decisions for NSCMP. Rather, the Core Group provides input, exchanges information and views and undertakes initiatives to promote cooperative working relationships among stakeholders.

For More Information about the NSCMP Core Group in particular contact The Keystone Center:

Ed Moreno
The Keystone Center
Santa Fe, NM 87508
Phone: 505-466-2006
Fax: 505-466-3432
emoreno@keystone.org



For information regarding the Core Group or other NSCMP activities, please contact:

**NSCMP Public Outreach and Information Officer,
U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency**

Karen Jolley Drewen
Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project
5183 Blackhawk Rd.
AMSCM-SSP
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5424
Phone: 410-436-3445
karen.j.drewen@us.army.mil

CORE GROUP MEETINGS ARE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC

Core Group meetings are held two to four times each year at different locations around the country. The meetings are open to the public. Opportunities for members of the public to address the Core Group are provided at designated times during Core Group meetings.

Core Group Subcommittees

Subcommittees are formed by the Core Group from time to time, to address specific issues.

Subcommittees report to the Core Group and may include individuals who are not on the Core Group.

PARTICIPATION IN THE CORE GROUP

Core Group Membership

Core Group members are selected by The Keystone Center.

In order to provide a balanced perspective, the following types of interests are represented on the Core Group:

- The Project Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project and other NSCMP staff;
- State regulators with a particular interest in NSCMP issues;
- Environmental Protection Agency representatives concerned with NSCMP issues;
- Community and environmental activists concerned with non-stockpile chemical materiel issues, particularly those who live near a non-stockpile site; and
- Other Department of Defense programs such as the Corps of Engineers and installation personnel.

If you would like to receive a list of Core Group members, or periodic updates about the activities of the NSCMP Core Group through the mailing list, please contact:

Core Group Members and Activities:

Stephanie Cheval
The Keystone Center
1628 Sts. John Road
Keystone, CO 80435
970-513-5837 or
800-842-7485 ext. 5837
Fax: 970-262-0152
scheval@keystone.org



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**PROTOCOLS
FOR
NON-STOCKPILE CHEMICAL MATERIEL PROGRAM
CORE GROUP**

Finalized on March 23, 2000

Revised October 19, 2000

Revised March 15, 2002

Revised April 15, 2002

15
16

Background

17 The Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program (NSCMP) was established in 1992. The
18 mission of the NSCMP is to provide centralized management and direction to the U.S.
19 Department of Defense (DoD) for disposal of non-stockpile chemical materiel in a safe
20 and cost-effective manner. Complex technical, environmental and community issues are
21 challenges facing the Program.

22
23 By law, the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (COE) is the agency responsible for the
24 recovery of non-stockpile chemical materiel at Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) and
25 the NSCMP shares responsibility with installation commanders for the effective disposal
26 of non-stockpile chemical materiel at active installations. As it seeks to accomplish its
27 mission, NSCMP recognizes that there are a number of parties involved with or affected
28 by the decisions made by the NSCMP regarding the disposal of non-stockpile chemical
29 materiel.

30
31 The Army, community and environmental advocates, and regulators are working with
32 The Keystone Center, a non-profit organization specializing in the facilitation and
33 mediation of national and international environmental policy issues, to address the cost-
34 effective, safe and environmentally sound disposal of non-stockpile chemical materiel.
35 Keystone has organized what is being called the "Core Group," a diverse group of
36 citizens, regulators, and Army personnel concerned with non-stockpile issues. These
37 Protocols set forth the Core Group's objectives, membership responsibilities, and
38 operating procedures.

39
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I. Core Group Objectives

- 43 A. Support the development of safe, environmentally sound, cost-effective, and
44 publicly acceptable NSCMP disposal technologies, policies and practices.
- 45
46 B. Promote cooperative working relationships among citizens, regulators,
47 NSCMP, and other related DOD organizations.

- 1
2 C. Exchange information and opinions about areas of high concern to NSCMP
3 and other stakeholders within the scope of NSCMP responsibilities.

4
5 The following steps summarize NSCMP's scope and involvement with
6 non-stockpile chemical materiel at suspected sites. NSCMP acts in a
7 technical advisory capacity for Steps 1-5, when requested. For Step 6,
8 NSCMP is the lead implementor. While NSCMP is open to advice re:
9 their advisory role in steps 1-5, they are particularly interested in the Core
10 Group focusing input on Step 6, in the area NSCMP has implementing
11 authority.

- 12
13 1) Develop a plan for recovery and assessment of suspected materiel.
14 2) Recover and assess materiel.
15 3) Based on the plan, decide to a) store the materiel on site; b) transport
16 materiel to a different site; or c) execute an emergency or time critical
17 destruction.
18 4) Once a strategy (store, transport, or destroy) has been decided on,
19 NSCMP aids the US Army Corps of Engineers or the installation to
20 get the proper approvals
21 5) Implement approved strategy
22 6) Develop appropriate technologies and treat and dispose of non-
23 stockpile materiel.

- 24
25 D. The Core Group will provide input to the NSCMP in a proactive manner
26 regarding the following issues. Other issues may be identified and agreed
27 upon by the Core Group.

- 28
29 1) The Core Group will assist NSCMP in identifying potential roadblocks
30 to non-incineration technologies for permitting and eventual treatment
31 and disposal using these technologies.
32
33 2) The Core Group will assist NSCMP in the development of a
34 strategy to reduce or eliminate incineration of non-stockpile
35 materiel for the future.

36
37 *Note One: NSCMP will make pertinent information regarding NSCMP*
38 *disposal technologies, policies, and practices available to the Core Group*
39 *in order to receive timely feedback and suggestions from the Core Group*
40 *on substantive issues such as the ones listed above.*

41
42 *Note Two: Programmatically, the NSCMP is willing to move away from*
43 *incineration for the treatment and disposal of non-stockpile materiel and*
44 *is evaluating other alternatives. The Core Group is supportive of this*
45 *programmatic direction. However, while technologies are still under*
46 *development, and given current treaty obligations, the Core Group*

1 *recognizes that incineration is an option for the treatment and disposal of*
 2 *non-stockpile materiel in the near-term, as defined by the current NSCMP*
 3 *schedule.*
 4

5 **II. Core Group Decision-Making**
 6

- 7 A. The Core Group does not have the authority to make decisions for NSCMP.
 8 Rather, the Core Group provides input, exchanges information and views and
 9 undertakes initiatives to promote cooperative working relationships among
 10 stakeholders.
 11
 12 B. The Core Group will strive for agreement among all members. Agreement is
 13 reached when, upon question by the facilitator, there is no dissent from any
 14 Core Group member regarding the proposal under discussion. Thus, no
 15 member can be outvoted. The Core Group will always seek agreement among
 16 members to the extent possible. When agreement is not possible differences
 17 will be noted.
 18
 19 C. Not attending will be considered equivalent to not dissenting.
 20
 21

22 **III. Core Group Meetings**
 23

- 24 A. There will be approximately four Core Group meetings per year in order to
 25 best provide timely input to NSCMP Meetings will be scheduled so that at
 26 least two of these three NSCMP managers will attend: Product Manager for
 27 NSCMP, Deputy Product Manager for NSCMP, and the Public Outreach and
 28 Information Officer for NSCMP. Of these meetings, two will be scheduled to
 29 include the Product Manager for NSCMP. The other meetings may not
 30 include the Product Manager; however, an NSCMP representative will be
 31 authorized to make commitments on behalf of the Product Manager.
 32
 33 B. Core Group members may request a caucus break as needed.
 34
 35 C. Meetings of the Core Group are open to the public.
 36
 37 D. Opportunities for other participants to address the Core Group will be
 38 provided at designated times during Core Group meetings.
 39
 40 E. While core group meeting discussions are generally limited to Core Group
 41 members, others with particular expertise may be invited by the Core Group
 42 to participate in specific agenda topic discussions from time to time.
 43
 44 F. Individuals who address the Core Group will be required to follow specified
 45 groundrules:
 46

- 1 1. Introduce self
- 2 2. Address the agenda topic
- 3 3. Stay within the designated time limit
- 4 4. No personal attacks.
- 5 5. To not attribute statements to Core Group members or attempt to speak
- 6 for the full Core Group.

9 IV. Core Group Subcommittees

- 11 A. The Core Group may establish subcommittees.
- 12
- 13 B. Subcommittees will report to the Core Group.
- 14
- 15 C. Subcommittees may be short term or long term in duration.
- 16
- 17 D. **Membership on Subcommittees:**
- 18 **The Core Group may seek sub-committee members outside of the Core**
- 19 **Group's membership when their expertise is deemed useful and supports**
- 20 **the Core Group's mission. The Membership/Outreach Committee will**
- 21 **coordinate nominees for the Core Group's consideration.**
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

26 V. Core Group Membership

- 28 A. Members are Selected by Keystone.
- 29 *Note: While it is important to keep this group at a functional size, it may be*
- 30 *useful to make changes to the membership of the Core Group from time to*
- 31 *time in order to best address the key objectives outlined in this document, or*
- 32 *others identified by the Core Group.*
- 33
- 34 B. Members may suggest additional perspectives that might be helpful to the
- 35 Core Group in providing input.
- 36 *Note: Keystone will solicit input from the entire Core Group regarding*
- 37 *recommended perspectives to be considered for membership. Keystone, with*
- 38 *the help of Core Group members, would work to identify potential candidates*
- 39 *for such perspectives.*
- 40
- 41 C. Members may resign upon written notice to Keystone.
- 42
- 43 D. Keystone may remove a person from the Core Group if the member is no
- 44 longer involved in issues related to chemical demilitarization or if the member
- 45 is unable to fulfill membership responsibilities.
- 46

1 E. AD HOC Membership:

2 The Core Group may choose to add members from key areas or sites
 3 where significant and pertinent activities are occurring for a limited time
 4 period. In some cases, members may be also chosen because of their
 5 expertise. The time period will not exceed two years and will be
 6 determined, along with the nominee, by the Core Group based on
 7 recommendations from the Membership/Outreach Committee.
 8

9
 10 VI. Core Group Member Responsibilities

- 11 A. Offer solutions; don't just criticize.
 12
 13 B. Focus on issues; refrain from personal attacks.
 14
 15 C. Listen to and consider the views of others; don't interrupt.
 16
 17 D. Support the objectives of the Core Group.
 18
 19 E. Stay focused on the agenda.
 20
 21 F. Although many members are affiliated with organizations (e.g. regulatory
 22 agencies, citizen organizations, DoD programs) it is presumed that comments
 23 during Core Group meetings are not for attribution and should not be
 24 assumed to be an official organizational position.
 25
 26 G. Keep constituents, colleagues and managers informed about the work of
 27 the Core Group.
 28 *Note: It is recognized that while Core Group members are participating as*
 29 *individuals, they will work proactively within their respective communities*
 30 *and organizations to support the work of the Core Group. Members have an*
 31 *obligation to inform and solicit input regarding the Core Group, from the*
 32 *people with whom they work. Further, they have an obligation to accurately*
 33 *convey this information back to the Core Group.*
 34
 35 H. Attend all meetings
 36

37
 38
 39 VII. Core Group Meeting Summaries

- 40 A. The facilitators will prepare draft summaries.
 41
 42 B. Summaries will capture key issues, conclusions and agreed-upon next steps.
 43
 44

- 1 C. Summaries will not attribute statements to individuals, except where specific
2 commitments are made by individuals and for briefings and subsequent
3 discussions.
4
- 5 D. The Core Group will have the opportunity to correct the draft meeting
6 summary prior to finalization. Once final, the meeting summary will be
7 available to the public.
8
9

10 **VIII. Interacting With the Media**

- 11
- 12 A. Core Group members are free to speak about their own views and the views
13 of their organizations.
14
- 15 B. Core Group members will not attribute statements to others or attempt to
16 speak for the Core Group.
17
18
19
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21 **IX. Meeting Facilitation**

- 22
- 23 A. Keystone is responsible for helping to ensure that the process runs smoothly
24 by: facilitating meetings, encouraging adherence to the Protocols, developing
25 meeting agendas, preparing and distributing draft and final summaries, and
26 helping the parties resolve their differences and achieve closure on the issues.
27
- 28 B. Keystone will be available to consult confidentially with Core Group
29 members during and between meetings.
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Appendix C: ACRONYMS

ASTSWMO: Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials

BRAC: Base Realignment and Closure

CAIS: Chemical Agency Identification Sets

CMA: U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency

CW: Chemical Weapons

CWM: Chemical Warfare Materiel

CWWG: Chemical Weapons Working Group

DoD: Department of Defense

EDS: Explosive Destruction System

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency

GB: Sarin nerve agent

ITRC: Interstate Technology and Regulatory Council

MMD: Munitions Management Device

NRC: National Research Council

NSCMP: Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project

NSWCC: Non-Stockpile Chemical Weapons Citizen Coalition

PAO: Public Affairs Officer

RRS: Rapid Response System

