FACE-87-16: 31 Year-old Fire Chief Electrocuted in North Carolina
Introduction:
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), Division of Safety Research (DSR) is currently
conducting the Fatal Accident Circumstances and Epidemiology
(FACE) Project, which is focusing primarily upon selected
electrical-related and confined space-related fatalities. The
purpose of the FACE program is to identify and rank factors that
influence the risk of fatal injuries for selected employees.
On November 15, 1986, the chief of a volunteer fire department
was electrocuted while attempting to extricate an injured person
from a vehicle involved in an accident. He was holding a winch
cable which contacted downed, energized power lines.
Contacts/Activities:
Officials of the Occupational Safety and Health Program for the
State of North Carolina notified DSR concerning this fatality and
requested technical assistance. This case has been included in
the FACE Project. Two research industrial hygienists from DSR met
with the fire chief, interviewed comparison workers and a
surrogate for the victim, conducted a site visit, and
photographed the accident site.
Background/Overview of Employer's Safety Program:
The employer is a volunteer fire department with a staff of two
full-time paid, two part-time paid, and 40 volunteer fireman.
Although the victim was on volunteer status for this fire
department, he was also a full-time paid fireman for the nearby
city fire department.
The volunteer fire department does not have a written safety
program; however, a fire department handbook which is given to
all department personnel does outline required personal
protective equipment for firemen responding to an emergency. New
department members serve a six month probationary period during
which time they must complete a 52-hour fireman training course.
In addition, the department presents three-hours of training each
week that department members are encouraged to attend. A major
part of the training involves emergency response drills, the
proper used of personal protective equipment, rescue techniques,
and on-the-job employee safety. The fire chief was responsible
for the management of this on-going training program.
Synopsis of Events:
On November 15, 1986, at 7:20 p.m. the chief of a volunteer fire
department (the victim) and several other fireman responded to a
power line transformer fire. At 7:22 p.m. while still at the site
of the transformer fire, the fire department received another
emergency call concerning an automobile accident. A vehicle has
gone off the road and struck a utility pole carrying a 7200 volt,
three-phase power line. The force of the collision broke the pole
off at ground level which caused one conductor to fall to the
ground and two other conductors to sag until they were
approximately three to five feet above the ground. An injured
passenger remained pinned inside the vehicle. The ground was wet
as it had rained previously that day. The chief of the fire
department (who was on volunteer status) and another volunteer
fireman arrived at the accident site. They were joined by the
engine company and rescue unit from the fire department and an
ambulance; a total of eight fire department and rescue personnel.
All fire department personnel except the fire chief, who had
assumed the role of fire ground commander, and two other firemen
were wearing turnout gear which included leather gloves and
rubber boots.
The vehicle involved in the accident was on its side
approximately two feet from the downed conductors. The conductors
were between the overturned vehicle and the road where the rescue
vehicle was parked. Fire department personnel were warned that
the power lines were down and to be careful. A power company
employee was notified of the transformer fire and was enroute to
de-energize the power line. In an effort to stabilize the
accident vehicle and prevent it from turning over, a steel cable
attached to a winch mounted on the rescue vehicle was extended to
a length of 47 feet, pass between the conductor on the ground and
the sagging conductors, and was attached to the luggage rack of
the accident vehicle. The fire chief, six firemen, an emergency
medical technician (EMT) employed by the ambulance company, and a
bystander were all holding on to the steel cable. Five firemen
let go of the cable after having been told to "stand
back." The luggage rack then pulled loose and the rack and
cable contacted the energized lines. The fire chief and the
bystander were both electrocuted. It is estimated that the fire
chief was in contact with the electrified steel cable for
approximately 30 to 45 seconds. One fireman who was not wearing
turnout gear and the ambulance company EMT did not let go of the
cable before it became energized. They were injured, receiving
severe electrical burns. Those firemen not holding the cable when
it became energized felt a slight electrical shock from the
ground.
The firemen were all EMT qualified and responded immediately. The
fire chief, the bystander, and the injured fireman and ambulance
company EMT were freed from the electrical steel cable with the
use of a fiberglass pole. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was
initiated within seconds and the injured fireman was revived
after experiencing full cardiac arrest. Resuscitation efforts
failed to revive the fire chief who was rushed to a nearby
hospital where he was pronounced dead by the attending physician.
Cause of Death:
The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was due
to electrocution.
Recommendations/Discussion:
Recommendation #1: Electrical sources that pose an
imminent danger to rescue personnel should be de-energized prior
to any initial rescue attempt.
Discussion: Attempting to extricate an injured person from
a vehicle amid an electrical hazard of this magnitude only
further endangered rescue personnel and the person originally
involved in the automobile accident.
Recommendation #2: Fire department standard operating
procedures should require the wearing of personal protective
equipment for all fire department rescue personnel responding to
the scene of an emergency.
Discussion: Standard operating procedures in the fire
department handbook address "wearing protective gear on the
fire scene" and states that "All firemen riding a fire
apparatus shall wear protective gear when responding to an
emergency..." The requirement should be expanded to include
the mandatory wearing of personal protective equipment such as
helmets, gloves, rubber boots, etc. of all rescue
personnel including the fire ground commander when responding to any
emergency.
Recommendation #3: Only authorized rescue personnel should
assist in rescue procedures.
Discussion: Unauthorized persons such as bystanders and
passers by should be restricted from entering into the immediate
accident area where trained rescue and emergency personnel are
present, and under no circumstances should unauthorized persons
be allowed to participate in rescue operations where imminent
dangers exist. Such well-intended volunteer help is often poorly,
if not totally, untrained in rescue techniques. The presence of
bystanders often hinders the efficiency of trained rescue
personnel and poses an unnecessary hazard to rescuers and to the
bystanders themselves.
Recommendation #4: Firemen should be trained in
recognition and appreciation of hazards, preventive measures for
personal safety during rescue operations, and safe rescue
techniques.
Discussion: Although firemen are trained in various
firefighting techniques, it would appear additional training is
needed in hazard recognition, particularly electrical hazards.
This training should include recognition, awareness, safe rescue
procedures, and an appreciation of electrical hazards, along with
necessary preventive measures to avoid future accidents of this
nature. Rescue personnel assumed an extreme and unnecessary risk
by threading a steel cable between downed, energized power lines
and attaching the cable to the luggage rack in order to stabilize
the accident vehicle. The very idea was ill-conceived. Its
realization posed an imminent danger with fatal results. Another
method to prevent the vehicle from overturning should have been
considered under these circumstances and future training of
emergency service personnel should address the utilization of
safer rescue techniques.
Recommendation #5: Personnel assigned responsibility to
coordinate activities at an accident site (i.e. fire ground
commander) should not become involved in the rescue effort, if an
adequate number of personnel are available.
Discussion: It would appear that a sufficient number of
personnel were available at the accident site to preclude the
need for the fire chief to be involved in the
"hands-on" rescue. His involvement in the rescue may
have diminished his ability to recognize the seriousness of the
hazard and to take corrective action.
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