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Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT: 

Thursday, January 18, 2007: 

Passenger Rail Security: 

Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security 
Efforts: 

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director Homeland Security and 
Justice Issues: 

GAO-07-225T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-225T, a testimony before the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The July 2005 London subway bombings and July 2006 rail attacks in 
Mumbai, India dramatically revealed the vulnerability of passenger rail 
and other surface transportation systems worldwide to terrorist attack 
and demonstrated the need for increased focus on the security of these 
systems. 

This testimony, which is based primarily on GAO’s September 2005 report 
on passenger rail security (GAO-05-851) and selected program updates 
obtained in January 2007 provides information on (1) how the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed the risks posed by terrorism to 
the U.S. passenger rail system; (2) actions TSA and other federal 
agencies have taken to enhance the security of U.S. rail systems; and 
(3) rail security practices implemented by domestic and selected 
foreign passenger rail operators. 

What GAO Found: 

The DHS Office of Grants and Training has conducted risk assessments of 
passenger rail systems to identify and protect rail assets that are 
vulnerable to attack, such as stations and bridges. TSA has also begun 
to conduct risk assessments of passenger rail assets. While TSA has 
begun to establish a methodology for analyzing and characterizing 
risks, as of January 2007, the agency has not completed a comprehensive 
risk assessment of the U.S. passenger rail system. Until TSA does so, 
the agency may be limited in its ability to prioritize passenger rail 
assets and help guide security investments. DHS has also begun 
developing a framework to help agencies and the private sector develop 
a consistent approach for analyzing and comparing risks among and 
across different transportation sectors. However, until this framework 
is finalized, it may not be possible to compare risks across different 
sectors, prioritize them, and allocate resources accordingly. 

After September 11, 2001, the Department of Transportation initiated a 
number of efforts to improve passenger rail security. After its 
creation, TSA also took a number of actions, including issuing rail 
security directives, testing rail security technologies, developing 
training tools for rail workers, and issuing a proposed rule in 
December 2006 regarding passenger and freight rail security, among 
other efforts. However, federal and rail industry stakeholders have 
questioned the extent to which TSA’s directives were based on industry 
best practices and expressed confusion about how TSA would monitor 
compliance with the directives. DHS and DOT also signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) that delineated the two departments’ respective 
roles and responsibilities for promoting the safe, secure, and 
efficient movement of people and goods throughout the transportation 
system. TSA has recently completed specific agreements with the Federal 
Transit Administration (FTA) and the Federal Railroad Administration 
(FRA) to further delineate security-related roles and responsibilities 
for passenger rail. 

U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators GAO visited have also taken 
actions to secure their rail systems. Most had implemented customer 
security awareness programs, increased security personnel, increased 
the use of canines to detect explosives, and enhanced employee training 
programs. GAO also observed security practices among foreign passenger 
rail systems that are not currently used by U.S. rail operators or by 
the U.S. government, which could be considered for use in the U.S. For 
example, some foreign rail operators randomly screen passengers or use 
covert testing to help keep employees alert to security threats. While 
introducing these security practices in the U.S may pose political, 
legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges, they warrant further 
examination. TSA has reported taking steps to identify foreign best 
practices for rail security. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO’s September 2005 report recommended, that the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) complete its methodology for conducting 
risk assessments, and develop rail security standards that reflect 
industry best practices. GAO also recommended that DHS determine the 
feasibility of implementing certain security practices used by foreign 
rail operators. DHS, DOT, and Amtrak generally agreed with the report’s 
recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-225T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above.
For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or 
berrickc@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing on federal 
efforts to secure rail and surface transportation systems. Since 
September 11, 2001, TSA has focused much of its efforts and resources 
on meeting legislative mandates to strengthen commercial aviation 
security. However, TSA has recently placed additional focus on securing 
surface modes of transportation, particularly in the area of passenger 
rail security. Surface transportation, which includes passenger and 
freight rail, mass transit, highways, and pipelines, are inherently 
open and difficult to secure. One of the critical challenges facing 
these federal agencies, and rail system operators they oversee or 
support, is finding ways to protect rail systems from potential 
terrorist attacks without compromising the accessibility and efficiency 
of rail travel. The Madrid commuter rail attacks in March 2004, London 
rail bombings in July 2005, and Mumbai, India train bombings just last 
year, highlight the vulnerabilities of passenger rail and other surface 
transportation systems and made clear that even when security 
precautions are put into place, these systems remain vulnerable to 
attack. While securing surface transportation systems is a daunting 
task--a shared responsibility requiring coordinated action on the part 
of federal, state, and local governments and the private sector--it is 
important nonetheless to take the necessary steps to identify and 
mitigate risks to these systems. 

As we have reported previously, the sheer number of stakeholders 
involved in securing surface transportation modes, including passenger 
rail, can sometimes lead to communication challenges, duplication of 
effort, and confusion about roles and responsibilities. Regarding 
passenger rail security, key Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
stakeholders with critical roles include the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), which is responsible for securing all modes of 
transportation, and the Office for Grants and Training (OGT), which 
provides grant funds to rail operators and conducts risk assessments 
for passenger rail agencies. Within the Department of Transportation 
(DOT), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad 
Administration (FRA) have responsibilities for passenger and freight 
rail safety and security. In addition, public and private passenger 
rail operators also share responsibility for securing their systems. 

At the federal level, another significant challenge related to securing 
passenger rail systems involves allocating resources based on risk. 
Within and among all modes of transportation, there is competition for 
resources, as federal, state, and local agencies and transportation 
operators seek to identify and invest in appropriate security measures 
to safeguard these systems while also investing in other capital and 
operational improvements. Moreover, given competing priorities and 
limited homeland security resources, difficult policy decisions have to 
be made by Congress and the executive branch to prioritize security 
efforts and direct resources to areas of greatest risk within and among 
transportation modes and across other nationally critical sectors. 

In this regard, to help federal decision makers determine how to best 
allocate limited resources, we have advocated, the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) has 
recommended, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004 provides that a risk management approach be employed to guide 
decision making related to homeland security resources. A risk 
management approach entails a continuous process of managing risks 
through a series of actions, including setting strategic goals and 
objectives, assessing and quantifying risks, evaluating alternative 
security measures, selecting which measures to undertake, and 
implementing and monitoring those measures. 

My testimony today focuses on the progress federal agencies and 
domestic passenger rail operators have made in setting and implementing 
security priorities in the wake of September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks, and the security practices implemented by foreign passenger 
rail operators. In particular, my testimony highlights three key areas: 
(1) the actions that DHS and its component agencies have taken to 
assess the risks posed by terrorism to the U.S. passenger rail system; 
(2) the actions that TSA and other federal agencies have taken to 
enhance the security of the U.S. passenger rail system; and (3) the 
security practices that domestic and selected foreign passenger rail 
operators have implemented to mitigate risks and enhance security. My 
comments today are based on GAO's September 2005 report addressing the 
security of the U.S. passenger rail system and selected updates on this 
program obtained in January 2007.[Footnote 1] This report was based on 
work at DHS, DOT and Amtrak, as well as work that included 32 passenger 
rail operators in the U.S., and 13 passenger rail operators in 7 
European and Asian countries. We conducted our work in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We have been requested by the Chairman of the House Homeland Security 
Committee to conduct a follow-on review of passenger rail security, 
which we expect to initiate in the near future. In addition, we have 
been requested to assess the security of other surface modes of 
transportation--including freight rail, commercial vehicles and highway 
infrastructure--which we have underway or will initiate later this 
year. 

In Summary: 

* The DHS Office of Grants and Training has developed and conducted 
risk assessments of passenger rail systems to identify and protect rail 
assets that are vulnerable to attack, such as stations and bridges. TSA 
has also begun to conduct risk assessments, including a threat 
assessment of mass transit and passenger rail and assessments of 
individual critical rail assets. While TSA has begun to establish a 
methodology for determining how to analyze and characterize the risks 
identified, the agency has not completed a comprehensive risk 
assessment of the U.S. passenger rail system. Until TSA completes this 
effort, the agency may be limited in its ability to prioritize 
passenger rail assets and help guide security investment decisions 
about protecting them. At the department level, DHS has begun 
developing, but has not yet completed a framework to help federal 
agencies and the private sector develop a consistent approach for 
analyzing and comparing risks to transportation and other critical 
sectors. Until this framework is finalized and shared with 
stakeholders, it may not be possible to compare risks across different 
sectors, prioritize them, and allocate resources accordingly. 

* Before and after September 11, 2001, FTA and FRA undertook a number 
of initiatives to enhance passenger rail security, including conducting 
security readiness assessments, providing grants for emergency response 
drills and training, and developing security awareness programs for 
rail passengers and employees. In March 2004, after terrorist attacks 
on the rail system in Madrid, TSA issued security directives for 
passenger rail and mass transit. These directives were intended to 
establish standard protective measures for all passenger rail 
operators, including Amtrak. However, federal and rail industry 
stakeholders have questioned the extent that these directives were 
based on industry best practices and expressed confusion about how TSA 
would monitor compliance with the directives. In the 15 months since 
the completion of our work on passenger rail security, TSA has reported 
taking additional actions strengthen the security of the passenger rail 
system. For example, TSA has tested rail security technologies, 
developed training tools for rail workers, and issued a proposed rule 
in December 2006 regarding passenger and freight rail security, among 
other efforts. TSA has also taken steps to better coordinate with DOT 
regarding rail security roles and responsibilities. The memorandum of 
understanding between DHS and DOT has been recently updated to include 
specific agreements between TSA and FTA and FRA to delineate security- 
related roles and responsibilities, among other things, for passenger 
rail and mass transit. 

* Domestic and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted during our 
prior work on passenger rail security had taken a range of actions to 
secure their systems. Most had implemented customer awareness programs 
to encourage passengers to remain vigilant and report suspicious 
activities, increased the number and visibility of security personnel, 
increased the use of canine teams to detect explosives, enhanced 
employee training programs, upgraded security technology, tightened 
access controls, and made rail system design improvements to enhance 
security. We also observed security practices among certain foreign 
passenger rail systems or their governments that are not currently used 
by the domestic rail operators we contacted, or by the U.S. government, 
which could be considered for use in the U.S. For example, some foreign 
rail operators randomly screen passengers or utilize covert testing to 
help keep employees alert to security threats, and some foreign 
governments maintain centralized clearinghouses on rail security 
technologies and best practices. While introducing any of these 
security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal, 
fiscal, and cultural challenges, they nevertheless warrant further 
examination. Since our report on passenger rail security was issued, 
TSA has reported taking steps to coordinate with foreign passenger rail 
operators and governments to identify security best practices. 

In our September 2005 report on passenger rail security, we 
recommended, among other things, that TSA establish a plan with 
timelines for completing its methodology for conducting risk 
assessments and develop security standards that reflect industry best 
practices and can be measured and enforced. These actions should help 
ensure that the federal government has the information it needs to 
prioritize passenger rail assets based on risk, and evaluate, select, 
and implement measures to help the passenger rail operators protect 
their systems against terrorism. In addition, we recommended that the 
Secretary of DHS, in collaboration with DOT and the passenger rail 
industry, determine the feasibility, in a risk management context, of 
implementing certain security practices used by foreign rail operators. 
DHS, DOT, and Amtrak generally agreed with the report's 
recommendations. As of January 2007, DHS had not provided a formal 
response indicating if or how it has implemented these recommendations. 

Background: 

Overview of the Passenger Rail System: 

Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and 22 
states use some form of rail transit (commuter, heavy, or light 
rail).[Footnote 2] Commuter rail systems typically operate on railroad 
tracks and provide regional service between a central city and adjacent 
suburbs. Commuter rail systems are traditionally associated with older 
industrial cities, such as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. 
Heavy rail systems--subway systems like New York City's transit system 
and Washington, D.C.'s Metro--typically operate on fixed rail lines 
within a metropolitan area and have the capacity for a heavy volume of 
traffic. Amtrak operates the nation's primary intercity passenger rail 
service over a 22,000-mile network, primarily over freight railroad 
tracks. Amtrak serves more than 500 stations (240 of which are staffed) 
in 46 states and the District of Columbia, and it carried more than 25 
million passengers during FY 2005. 

Passenger Rail Systems Are Inherently Vulnerable to Terrorist Attacks: 

According to passenger rail officials and passenger rail experts, 
certain characteristics of domestic and foreign passenger rail systems 
make them inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks and therefore 
difficult to secure. By design, passenger rail systems are open, have 
multiple access points, are hubs serving multiple carriers, and, in 
some cases, have no barriers so that they can move large numbers of 
people quickly. In contrast, the U.S. commercial aviation system is 
housed in closed and controlled locations with few entry points. The 
openness of passenger rail systems can leave them vulnerable because 
operator personnel cannot completely monitor or control who enters or 
leaves the systems. In addition, other characteristics of some 
passenger rail systems--high ridership, expensive infrastructure, 
economic importance, and location (large metropolitan areas or tourist 
destinations)--also make them attractive targets for terrorists because 
of the potential for mass casualties and economic damage and 
disruption. Moreover, some of these same characteristics make passenger 
rail systems difficult to secure. For example, the numbers of riders 
that pass through a subway system--especially during peak hours--may 
make the sustained use of some security measures, such as metal 
detectors, difficult because they could result in long lines that could 
disrupt scheduled service. In addition, multiple access points along 
extended routes could make the cost of securing each location 
prohibitive. Balancing the potential economic impacts of security 
enhancements with the benefits of such measures is a difficult 
challenge. 

Multiple Stakeholders Share Responsibility for Securing Passenger Rail 
Systems: 

Securing the nation's passenger rail systems is a shared responsibility 
requiring coordinated action on the part of federal, state, and local 
governments; the private sector; and rail passengers who ride these 
systems. Since the September 11th attacks, the role of federal 
government agencies in securing the nation's transportation systems, 
including passenger rail, have continued to evolve. Prior to September 
11th, FTA and FRA, within DOT, were the primary federal entities 
involved in passenger rail security matters. In response to the attacks 
of September 11th, Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act (ATSA), which created TSA within DOT and defined its 
primary responsibility as ensuring the security of all modes of 
transportation, though its provisions focus primarily on aviation 
security.[Footnote 3] The act also gave TSA regulatory authority for 
security over all transportation modes, though its provisions focus 
primarily aviation security. With the passage of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, TSA was transferred, along with over 20 other agencies, to 
the Department of Homeland Security.[Footnote 4] 

Within DHS, the Office of Grants and Training (OGT), formerly the 
Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), has become the federal source 
for security funding of passenger rail systems.[Footnote 5] OGT is the 
principal component of DHS responsible for preparing the United States 
for acts of terrorism and has primary responsibility within the 
executive branch for assisting and supporting DHS, in coordination with 
other directorates and entities outside of the department, in 
conducting risk analysis and risk management activities of state and 
local governments. In carrying out its mission, OGT provides training, 
funds for the purchase of equipment, support for the planning and 
execution of exercises, technical assistance, and other support to 
assist states, local jurisdictions, and the private sector to prevent, 
prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism. OGT created and is 
administering two grant programs focused specifically on transportation 
security, the Transit Security Grant Program and the Intercity 
Passenger Rail Security Grant Program. These programs provide financial 
assistance to address security preparedness and enhancements for 
passenger rail and transit systems. During fiscal year 2006, OGT 
provided $110 million to passenger rail transit agencies through the 
Transit Security Grant Program and about $7 million to Amtrak through 
the Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program. 

While TSA is the lead federal agency for ensuring the security of all 
transportation modes, FTA conducts safety and security activities, 
including training, research, technical assistance, and demonstration 
projects. In addition, FTA promotes safety and security through its 
grant-making authority. FRA has regulatory authority for rail safety 
over commuter rail operators and Amtrak, and employs over 400 rail 
inspectors that periodically monitor the implementation of safety and 
security plans at these systems.[Footnote 6] 

State and local governments, passenger rail operators, and private 
industry are also important stakeholders in the nation's rail security 
efforts. State and local governments may own or operate a significant 
portion of the passenger rail system. Passenger rail operators, which 
can be public or private entities, are responsible for administering 
and managing passenger rail activities and services. Passenger rail 
operators can directly operate the service provided or contract for all 
or part of the total service. Although all levels of government are 
involved in passenger rail security, the primary responsibility for 
securing passenger rail systems rests with passenger rail operators. 

Assessing and Managing Risks to Rail Infrastructure Using a Risk 
Management Approach: 

Risk management is a tool for informing policy makers' decisions about 
assessing risks, allocating resources, and taking actions under 
conditions of uncertainty. In recent years, the President, through 
Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs), and Congress, 
through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 
provided for federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities 
to apply risk-based principles to inform their decision making 
regarding allocating limited resources and prioritizing security 
activities. The 9/11 Commission recommended that the U.S. government 
should identify and evaluate the transportation assets that need to be 
protected, set risk-based priorities for defending them, select the 
most practical and cost-effective ways of doing so, and then develop a 
plan, budget, and funding to implement the effort.[Footnote 7] In 
addition, DHS issued the National Strategy for Transportation Security 
in 2005 that describes the policies the DHS will apply when managing 
risks to the security of the U.S. transportation system.[Footnote 8] We 
have previously reported that a risk management approach can help to 
prioritize and focus the programs designed to combat terrorism. Risk 
management, as applied in the homeland security context, can help 
federal decision-makers determine where and how to invest limited 
resources within and among the various modes of transportation. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also directed the department's 
Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection to 
use risk management principles in coordinating the nation's critical 
infrastructure protection efforts.[Footnote 9] This includes 
integrating relevant information, analysis, and vulnerability 
assessments to identify priorities for protective and support measures 
by the department, other federal agencies, state and local government 
agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 and the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 further define and establish 
critical infrastructure protection responsibilities for DHS and those 
federal agencies given responsibility for particular industry sectors, 
such as transportation. In June 2006, DHS issued the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), which named TSA as the primary 
federal agency responsible for coordinating critical infrastructure 
protection efforts within the transportation sector.[Footnote 10] The 
NIPP requires federal agencies to work with the private sector to 
develop plans that, among other things, identify and prioritize 
critical assets for their respective sectors. As such, the NIPP 
requires TSA to conduct and facilitate risk assessments in order to 
identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical 
transportation systems infrastructure, as well as develop risk based 
priorities for the transportation sector. 

To provide guidance to agency decision makers, we have created a risk 
management framework, which is intended to be a starting point for 
applying risk based principles. Our risk management framework entails a 
continuous process of managing risk through a series of actions, 
including setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, 
evaluating alternatives, selecting initiatives to undertake, and 
implementing and monitoring those initiatives. DHS's National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan describes a risk management process that 
closely mirrors our risk management framework. 

Setting strategic goals, objectives, and constraints is a key first 
step in applying risk management principles and helps to ensure that 
management decisions are focused on achieving a purpose. These 
decisions should take place in the context of an agency's strategic 
plan that includes goals and objectives that are clear and concise. 
These goals and objectives should identify resource issues and external 
factors to achieving the goals. Further, the goals and objectives of an 
agency should link to a department's overall strategic plan. The 
ability to achieve strategic goals depends, in part, on how well an 
agency manages risk. The agency's strategic plan should address risk 
related issues that are central to the agency's overall mission. 

Risk assessment, an important element of a risk based approach, helps 
decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that 
countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate 
the effects of the risks. Risk assessment is a qualitative and/or 
quantitative determination of the likelihood of an adverse event 
occurring and the severity, or impact, of its consequences. Risk 
assessment in a homeland security application often involves assessing 
three key elements--threat, vulnerability, and criticality or 
consequence. A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential 
threats on the basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and 
past activities. A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that 
may be exploited by identified threats and suggests options to address 
those weaknesses. A criticality or consequence assessment evaluates and 
prioritizes assets and functions in terms of specific criteria, such as 
their importance to public safety and the economy, as a basis for 
identifying which structures or processes are relatively more important 
to protect from attack. Information from these three assessments 
contributes to an overall risk assessment that characterizes risks on a 
scale such as high, medium, or low and provides input for evaluating 
alternatives and management prioritization of security initiatives. The 
risk assessment element in the overall risk management cycle may be the 
largest change from standard management steps and can be important to 
informing the remaining steps of the cycle. 

DHS Has Taken Steps to Assess Risk to Passenger Rail Systems, but 
Additional Work Is Needed to Guide Security Investments: 

DHS component agencies have taken a variety of steps to assess the risk 
posed by terrorism to U.S. passenger rail systems. The DHS OGT 
developed and implemented a risk assessment methodology intended to 
help passenger rail operators better respond to terrorist attacks and 
prioritize security measures. Passenger rail operators must have 
completed a risk assessment to be eligible for financial assistance 
through the fiscal year 2007 OGT Transit Security Grant Program, which 
includes funding for passenger rail. To receive grant funding, rail 
operators are also required to have a security and emergency 
preparedness plan that identifies how the operator intends to respond 
to security gaps identified by risk assessments. As of January 2007, 
OGT had completed or planned to conduct risk assessments of most 
passenger rail operators. According to rail operators, OGT's risk 
assessment process enabled them to prioritize investments based on risk 
and are allowing them to target and allocate resources toward security 
measures that will have the greatest impact on reducing risk across 
their system. 

TSA has also begun to assess risks to the passenger rail system. TSA 
had completed an overall threat assessment for both mass transit and 
passenger and freight rail modes. TSA also conducted criticality 
assessments of nearly 700 passenger rail stations and had begun 
conducting assessments for other passenger rail assets such as bridges 
and tunnels. TSA plans to rely on asset criticality rankings to 
prioritize which assets it will focus on in conducting vulnerability 
assessments to determine which passenger rail assets are vulnerable to 
attack. For assets that are deemed to be less critical, TSA has 
developed a software tool that it has made available to passenger rail 
and other transportation operators for them to use on a voluntary basis 
to assess the vulnerability of their assets. Until all three 
assessments of passenger rail systems--threat, criticality, and 
vulnerability--have been completed, and until TSA determines how to use 
the results of these assessments to analyze and characterize the level 
of risk (high, medium, or low), it will be difficult to prioritize 
passenger rail assets and guide investment decisions about protecting 
them. Finalizing a methodology for assessing risk to passenger rail and 
other transportation assets and conducting risk assessments are also 
key steps used in producing the Transportation Sector Specific Plan 
(TSSP) required by HSPD-7.[Footnote 11] According to TSA, the TSSP and 
supporting plans for each mode of transportation have been completed 
and are currently being reviewed by DHS and the White House Homeland 
Security Council. As of January 2007, TSA had not completed a 
comprehensive risk assessment of the passenger rail system. 

As TSA, OGT, and other federal agencies, including DOT, move forward 
with risk assessment activities, DHS is developing a framework intended 
to help these agencies work with their stakeholders to assess risk. 
This framework is intended to help the private sector and state and 
local governments develop a consistent approach to analyzing risk and 
vulnerability across infrastructure types and across entire economic 
sectors, develop consistent terminology, and foster consistent results. 
The framework is also intended to enable a federal-level assessment of 
risk in general, and comparisons among risks, for purposes of resource 
allocation and response planning. DHS has informed TSA that this 
framework will provide overarching guidance to sector-specific agencies 
on how various risk assessment methodologies may be used to analyze, 
normalize, and prioritize risk within and among sectors. Because 
neither this element nor the framework as a whole has been finalized or 
provided to TSA or other sector-specific agencies, it is not clear what 
impact, if any, DHS's framework may have on ongoing risk assessments 
conducted by, and the methodologies used by, TSA, OGT, and others, and 
whether or how DHS will be able to use these results to compare risks 
and prioritize homeland security investments among sectors. Until DHS 
finalizes this framework, and until TSA completes its risk assessment 
methodology, it will not be possible to determine whether different 
methodologies used by TSA and OGT for conducting threat, criticality, 
and vulnerability assessments generate disparate qualitative and 
quantitative results or how they can best be compared and analyzed. In 
addition, coordinated risk assessments will help TSA and others avoid 
duplicative efforts and determine whether other agencies' risk 
assessment methodologies, and the data generated by these 
methodologies, can be leveraged to complete assessments required for 
the transportation sector. 

Multiple Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Enhance Passenger Rail 
Security: 

In addition to the ongoing initiatives to enhance passenger rail 
security conducted by the FTA and FRA before and after September 11, 
2001, TSA issued security directives to passenger rail operators after 
the March 2004 terrorist attacks on the rail system in Madrid. However, 
federal and rail industry stakeholders have questioned the extent that 
these directives were based on industry best practices and expressed 
confusion about how TSA would monitor compliance with the directives. 
Since the completion of our work on passenger rail security, TSA has 
reported taking additional actions to strengthen the security of the 
passenger rail system. For example, TSA has tested rail security 
technologies, developed training tools for rail workers, and issued a 
proposed rule in December 2006 regarding passenger and freight rail 
security, among other efforts. TSA has also taken steps to better 
coordinate with DOT regarding rail security roles and responsibilities. 
The memorandum of understanding between DHS and DOT had been recently 
updated to include specific agreements between TSA and FTA and FRA to 
delineate security-related roles and responsibilities, among other 
things, for passenger rail and mass transit. 

DOT Agencies Led Initial Efforts to Enhance Passenger Rail Security: 

Prior to the creation of TSA in November 2001, FTA and FRA, within DOT, 
were primarily responsible for the security of passenger rail systems. 
These agencies undertook a number of initiatives to enhance the 
security of passenger rail systems after the September 11th attacks 
that are still in place today. Specifically, FTA launched a transit 
security initiative in 2002 that included security readiness 
assessments, technical assistance, grants for emergency response 
drills, and training. FTA instituted the Transit Watch campaign in 
2003--a nationwide safety and security awareness program designed to 
encourage the participation of transit passengers and employees in 
maintaining a safe transit environment. The program provides 
information and instructions to transit passengers and employees so 
that they know what to do and whom to contact in the event of an 
emergency in a transit setting. FTA planned to continue this 
initiative, in partnership with TSA and OGT, and offer additional 
security awareness materials that address unattended bags and emergency 
evacuation procedures for transit agencies. In addition, FTA has issued 
guidance, such as its Top 20 Security Program Action Items for Transit 
Agencies, which recommends measures for passenger rail operators to 
implement into their security programs to improve both security and 
emergency preparedness. FTA has also used research and development 
funds to develop guidance for security design strategies to reduce the 
vulnerability of transit systems to acts of terrorism. In November 
2004, FTA provided rail operators with security considerations for 
transportation infrastructure. This guidance provides recommendations 
intended to help operators deter and minimize attacks against their 
facilities, riders, and employees by incorporating security features 
into the design of rail infrastructure. 

FRA has also taken a number of actions to enhance passenger rail 
security since September 11, 2001. For example, it has assisted 
commuter railroads in developing security plans, reviewed Amtrak's 
security plans, and helped fund FTA security readiness assessments for 
commuter railroads. In the wake of the Madrid terrorist bombings in 
March 2004, nearly 200 FRA inspectors, in cooperation with DHS, 
conducted inspections of each of the 18 commuter railroads and Amtrak 
to determine what additional security measures had been put into place 
to prevent a similar occurrence in the United States. FRA also 
conducted research and development projects related to passenger rail 
security. These projects included rail infrastructure security and 
trespasser monitoring systems and passenger screening and manifest 
projects, including explosives detection. Although FTA and FRA now play 
a supporting role in transportation security matters since the creation 
of TSA, they remain important partners in the federal government's 
efforts to strengthen rail security, given their role in funding and 
regulating the safety of passenger rail systems. Moreover, as TSA moves 
ahead with its passenger rail security initiatives, FTA and FRA are 
continuing their passenger rail security efforts. 

TSA Issued Rail Security Directives, but Faces Challenges Related to 
Compliance and Enforcement: 

In May 2004, TSA issued security directives to the passenger rail 
industry to establish standard security measures for all passenger rail 
operators, including Amtrak.[Footnote 12] However, as we previously 
reported, it was unclear how TSA developed the requirements in the 
directives, how TSA planned to monitor and ensure compliance, how rail 
operators were to implement the measures, and which entities were 
responsible for their implementation. According to TSA, the directives 
were based upon FTA and American Public Transportation Association best 
practices for rail security. Specifically, TSA stated that it consulted 
a list of the top 20 actions FTA identified that rail operators can 
take to strengthen security. While some of the directives correlate to 
information contained in the FTA guidance, the source for many of the 
directives is unclear. Amtrak and FRA officials also raised concerns 
about some of the directives. For example, FRA officials stated that 
current FRA safety regulations requiring engineer compartment doors be 
kept unlocked to facilitate emergency escapes[Footnote 13] conflicts 
with the TSA security directive requirement that doors equipped with 
locking mechanisms be kept locked. Other passenger rail operators we 
spoke to during our review stated that TSA did not adequately consult 
with the rail industry prior to developing and issuing these 
directives. 

With respect to how the directives were to be enforced, rail operators 
were required to allow TSA and DHS to perform inspections, evaluations, 
or tests based on execution of the directives at any time or location. 
TSA officials stated the agency has hired 100 surface transportation 
inspectors, whose stated mission is to, among other duties, monitor and 
enforce compliance with TSA's rail security directives. However, some 
passenger rail operators have expressed confusion and concern about the 
role of TSA's inspectors and the potential that TSA inspections could 
be duplicative of other federal and state rail inspections. TSA rail 
inspector staff stated that they were committed to avoiding duplication 
in the program and communicating their respective roles to rail agency 
officials. According to TSA, since the initial deployment of surface 
inspectors, these inspectors have developed relationships with security 
officials in passenger rail and transit systems, coordinated access to 
operations centers, participated in emergency exercises, and provided 
assistance in enhancing security. We will continue to assess TSA's 
enforcement of rail security directives during our follow-on review of 
passenger rail security. 

TSA Has Taken Other Actions to Strengthen the Security of the Passenger 
Rail System and Coordinate Its Efforts with Other Federal Agencies: 

In January 2007, TSA provide us an update on additional actions they 
had taken to strengthen passenger rail security. We have not verified 
or evaluated these actions. These actions include: 

National explosive canine detection teams: Since late 2005, TSA 
reported that it has trained and deployed 53 canine teams to 13 mass 
transit systems to help detect explosives in the passenger rail system 
and serve as a deterrent to potential terrorists. 

Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response Teams: This program is 
intended to provide teams of law enforcement, canines, and inspection 
personnel to mass transit and passenger rail systems to deter and 
detect potential terrorist actions. Since the program's inception in 
December 2005, TSA reported conducting more than 25 exercises at mass 
transit and passenger rail systems throughout the nation. 

Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Security Information Sharing Network: 
According to TSA, the agency initiated this program in August 2005 to 
develop information sharing and dissemination processes regarding 
passenger rail and mass transit security across the federal government, 
state and local governments, and rail operators. 

National Transit Resource Center: TSA officials stated that they are 
working with FTA and DHS OGT to develop this center, which will provide 
transit agencies nationwide with pertinent information related to 
transit security, including recent suspicious activities, promising 
security practices, new security technologies, and other information. 

National Security Awareness Training Program for Railroad Employees: 
TSA officials stated that the agency has contracted to develop and 
distribute computer based training for passenger rail, rail transit, 
and freight rail employees. The training will include information on 
identifying security threats, observing and reporting suspicious 
activities and objects, mitigating security incidents, and other 
related information. According to TSA, the training will be distributed 
to all passenger and freight rail systems. 

Transit Terrorist Tool and Tactics: This training course is funded 
through the Transit Security Grant Program and teaches transit 
employees how to prevent and respond to a chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, or explosive attack. According to TSA, this 
course was offered for the first time during the fall of 2006. 

National Tunnel Security Initiative: This DHS and DOT initiative aims 
to identify and assess risks to underwater tunnels, prioritize security 
funding to the most critical areas, and develop technologies to better 
secure underwater tunnels. According to TSA, this initiative has 
identified a list of 29 critical underwater rail transit tunnels. 

TSA has also sought to enhance passenger rail security by conducting 
research on technologies related to screening passengers and checked 
baggage in the passenger rail environment. TSA conducted a Transit and 
Rail Inspection Pilot. The pilot was a $1.5 million effort to test the 
feasibility of using existing and emerging technologies to screen 
passengers, carry-on items, checked baggage, cargo, and parcels for 
explosives. TSA officials told us that based upon preliminary analyses, 
the screening technologies and processes tested would be very difficult 
to implement on heavily used passenger rail systems because these 
systems carry high volumes of passengers and have multiple points of 
entry. However, TSA officials added that the screening processes used 
in the pilot may be useful on certain long-distance intercity train 
routes, which make fewer stops. Further, TSA officials stated that 
screening could be used either randomly or for all passengers during 
certain high-risk events or in areas where a particular terrorist 
threat is known to exist. For example, screening technology similar to 
that used in the pilot was used by TSA to screen certain passengers and 
belongings in Boston and New York rail stations during the 2004 
Democratic and Republican national conventions. According to TSA, the 
agency is also researching and developing other passenger rail security 
technologies, including closed circuit television systems that can 
detect suspicious behavior, mobile passenger screening checkpoints to 
be used at rail stations, bomb resistant trash cans, and explosive 
detection equipment for use in the rail environment. 

More recently, in December 2006, TSA issued a proposed rule regarding 
passenger and freight rail security requirements. TSA's proposed rule 
would require that passenger and freight rail operators, certain 
facilities that ship or receive hazardous materials by rail, and rail 
transit systems take the following actions: 

* Designate a rail security coordinator to be available to TSA on a 24 
hour, seven day a week basis to serve as the primary contact for the 
receipt of intelligence and other security related information. 

* Immediately report incidents, potential threats, and security 
concerns to TSA. 

* Allow TSA and DHS officials to enter and conduct inspections, test, 
and perform other duties within their rail systems. 

* Provide TSA, upon request, with the location and shipping information 
of rail cars that contain a specific category and quantity of hazardous 
materials within one hour of receiving the request from TSA. 

* Provide for a secure chain of custody and control of rail cars 
containing a specified quantity and type of hazardous material. 

Public comments on the proposed rule are due in February 2007. TSA 
plans to review these comments and issue a final rule in the future. 

With multiple DHS and DOT stakeholders involved in securing the U.S. 
passenger rail system, the need to improve coordination between the two 
agencies has been a consistent theme in our prior work in this area. In 
response to a previous recommendation we made,[Footnote 14] DHS and DOT 
signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to develop procedures by 
which the two departments could improve their cooperation and 
coordination for promoting the safe, secure, and efficient movement of 
people and goods throughout the transportation system. The MOU defines 
broad areas of responsibility for each department. For example, it 
states that DHS, in consultation with DOT and affected stakeholders, 
will identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical 
infrastructure. The MOU between DHS and DOT represents an overall 
framework for cooperation that is to be supplemented by additional 
signed agreements, or annexes, between the departments. These annexes 
are to delineate the specific security related roles, responsibilities, 
resources, and commitments for mass transit, rail, research and 
development, and other matters. TSA signed annexes to the MOU with FRA 
and FTA describing the roles and responsibilities of each agency 
regarding passenger rail security. These annexes also describe how TSA 
and these DOT agencies will coordinate security related efforts, avoid 
duplicating these efforts, and improve coordination and communication 
with industry stakeholders. 

U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Have Taken Similar Actions to Secure 
Rail Systems, and Opportunities for Additional Domestic Security 
Actions May Exist: 

U.S. passenger rail operators have taken numerous actions to secure 
their rail systems since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
in the United States, and the March 11, 2004, attacks in Madrid. These 
actions included both improvements to system operations and capital 
enhancements to a system's facilities, such as tracks, buildings, and 
train cars. All of the U.S. passenger rail operators we contacted have 
implemented some types of security measures--such as increased numbers 
and visibility of security personnel and customer awareness programs-- 
that were generally consistent with those we observed in select 
countries in Europe and Asia. We also identified three rail security 
practices--covert testing, random screening of passengers and their 
baggage, and centralized research and testing--utilized by foreign 
operators or their governments that were not utilized by domestic rail 
operators or the U.S. government at the time of our review. 

U.S. and Foreign Rail Operators Employ Similar Security Practices: 

Both U.S. and foreign passenger rail operators we contacted have 
implemented similar improvements to enhance the security of their 
systems. A summary of these efforts follows. 

Customer awareness: Customer awareness programs we observed used 
signage and announcements to encourage riders to alert train staff if 
they observed suspicious packages, persons, or behavior. Of the 32 
domestic rail operators we interviewed, 30 had implemented a customer 
awareness program or made enhancements to an existing program. Foreign 
rail operators we visited also attempted to enhance customer awareness. 
For example, 11 of the 13 operators we interviewed had implemented a 
customer awareness program. 

Increased number and visibility of security personnel: Of the 32 U.S. 
rail operators we interviewed, 23 had increased the number of security 
personnel they utilized since September 11th, to provide security 
throughout their system or had taken steps to increase the visibility 
of their security personnel. Several U.S. and foreign rail operators we 
spoke with had instituted policies such as requiring their security 
staff, in brightly colored vests, to patrol trains or stations more 
frequently, so they are more visible to customers and potential 
terrorists or criminals. These policies make it easier for customers to 
contact security personnel in the event of an emergency, or if they 
have spotted a suspicious item or person. At foreign sites we visited, 
10 of the 13 operators had increased the number of their security 
officers throughout their systems in recent years because of the 
perceived increase in risk of a terrorist attack. 

Increased use of canine teams: Of the 32 U.S. passenger rail operators 
we contacted, 21 were suing canines to patrol their facilities or 
trains. Often, these units are used to detect the presence of 
explosives, and may be called in when a suspicious package is detected. 
In foreign countries we visited, passenger rail operators' use of 
canines varied. In some Asian countries, canines were not culturally 
accepted by the public and thus were not used for rail security 
purposes. As in the United States, and in contrast to Asia, most 
European passenger rail operators used canines for explosive detection 
or as deterrents. 

Employee training: All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we 
interviewed had provided some type of security training to their staff, 
either through in-house personnel or an external provider. In many 
cases, this training consisted of ways to identify suspicious items and 
persons and how to respond to events once they occur. For example, the 
London Underground and the British Transport Police developed the "HOT" 
method for its employees to use to identify suspicious items in the 
rail system. In the HOT method, employees are trained to look for 
packages or items that are Hidden, Obviously suspicious, and not 
Typical of the environment. 

Passenger and baggage screening practices: Some domestic and foreign 
rail operators have trained employees to recognize suspicious behavior 
as a means of screening passengers. Eight U.S. passenger rail operators 
we contacted were utilizing some form of behavioral screening. Abroad, 
we found that 4 of 13 operators we interviewed had implemented forms of 
behavioral screening. All of the domestic and foreign rail operators we 
contacted have ruled out an airport-style screening system for daily 
use in heavy traffic, where each passenger and the passenger's baggage 
are screened by a magnetometer or X-ray machine, based on cost, 
staffing, and customer convenience factors, among other reasons. 

Upgrading technology: Many rail operators we interviewed had embarked 
on programs designed to upgrade their existing security technology. For 
example, we found that 29 of the 32 U.S. operators had implemented a 
form of closed circuit television (CCTV) to monitor their stations, 
yards, or trains. While these cameras cannot be monitored closely at 
all times, because of the large number of staff that would be required, 
many rail operators felt that the cameras acted as a deterrent, 
assisted security personnel in determining how to respond to incidents 
that had already occurred, and could be monitored if an operator had 
received information that an incident may occur at a certain time or 
place in their system. Abroad, all 13 of the foreign rail operators we 
visited had CCTV systems in place. In addition, 18 of the 32 U.S. rail 
operators we interviewed had installed new emergency phones or enhanced 
the visibility of the intercom systems they already had. As in the 
United States, a few foreign operators had implemented chemical or 
biological detection devices at these rail stations, but their use was 
not widespread. Two of the 13 foreign operators we interviewed had 
implemented these sensors, and both were doing so on an experimental 
basis. In addition, police officers from the British Transport Police-
-responsible for policing the rail system in the United Kingdom--were 
equipped with pagers to detect chemical, biological, or radiological 
elements in the air, allowing them to respond quickly in case of a 
terrorist attack using one of these methods. 

Access control: Tightening access control procedures at key facilities 
or rights-of-way is another way many rail operators have attempted to 
enhance security. A majority of domestic and selected foreign passenger 
rail operators had invested in enhanced systems to control unauthorized 
access at employee facilities and stations. Specifically, 23 of the 32 
U.S. operators had installed a form of access control at key facilities 
and stations. All 13 foreign operators had implemented some form of 
access control to their critical facilities or rights-of-way. 

Rail system design and configuration: In an effort to reduce 
vulnerabilities to terrorist attack and increase security, passenger 
rail operators in the United States and abroad have been, or are now 
beginning to, incorporate security features into the design of new and 
existing rail infrastructure, primarily rail stations. For example, of 
the 32 domestic rail operators we contacted, 22 of them had removed 
their conventional trash bins entirely, or replaced them with 
transparent or bomb-resistant trash bins, as TSA instructed in its May 
2004 security directives. Foreign rail operators had also taken steps 
to remove traditional trash bins from their systems. Of the 13 
operators we visited, 8 had either removed their trash bins entirely or 
replaced them with blast-resistant cans or transparent receptacles. 

Many foreign rail operators are also incorporating aspects of security 
into the design of their rail infrastructure. Of the 13 operators we 
visited, 11 had attempted to design new facilities with security in 
mind and had retrofitted older facilities to incorporate security- 
related modifications. For example, one foreign operator we visited was 
retrofitting its train cars with windows that passengers could open in 
the event of a chemical attack. In addition, the London Underground 
incorporates security into the design of all its new stations as well 
as when existing stations are modified. We observed several security 
features in the design of Underground stations, such as using vending 
machines that have no holes that someone could use to hide a bomb, and 
sloped tops to reduce the likelihood that a bomb can be placed on top 
of the machine. In addition, stations are designed to provide staff 
with clear lines of sight to all areas of the station, such as 
underneath benches or ticket machines, and station designers try to 
eliminate or restrict access to any recessed areas where a bomb could 
be hidden. 

Figure 1 shows a diagram of several security measures that we observed 
in passenger rail stations both in the United States and abroad. 

Figure 1: Composite of Selected Security Practices in the Passenger 
Rail Environment: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO and NOVA Development Corporation. 

[End of figure] 

Amtrak Faces Challenges Specific to Intercity Passenger Rail in 
Securing Its System: 

In our past work, we found that Amtrak faces security challenges unique 
to intercity passenger rail systems. First, Amtrak operates over 
thousands of miles, often far from large population centers. This makes 
its route system more difficult to patrol and monitor than one 
contained in a particular metropolitan region, and it causes delays in 
responding to incidents when they occur in remote areas. Also, outside 
the Northeast Corridor, Amtrak operates almost exclusively on tracks 
and in stations owned by freight rail companies. This means that Amtrak 
often cannot make security improvements to others' rights-of-way or 
station facilities and that it is reliant on the staff of other 
organizations to patrol their facilities and respond to incidents that 
may occur. Furthermore, with over 500 stations, only half of which are 
staffed, screening even a small portion of the passengers and baggage 
boarding Amtrak trains is difficult. Finally, Amtrak's financial 
condition has never been strong--Amtrak has been on the edge of 
bankruptcy several times. 

Amid the ongoing challenges of securing its coast-to-coast railway, 
Amtrak has taken some actions to enhance security throughout its 
intercity passenger rail system. For example, Amtrak initiated a 
passenger awareness campaign, began enforcing restrictions on carry-on 
luggage that limit passengers to two carry-on bags, not exceeding 50 
pounds; began requiring passengers to show identification after 
boarding trains; increased the number of canine units patrolling its 
system looking for explosives or narcotics; and assigned some of its 
police to ride trains in the Northeast Corridor. Also, Amtrak 
instituted a policy of randomly inspecting checked baggage on its 
trains. Lastly, Amtrak is making improvements to the emergency exits in 
certain tunnels to make evacuating trains in the tunnels easier in the 
event of a crash or terrorist attack. 

Three Foreign Rail Security Practices Are Not Currently Used in the 
United States: 

While many of the security practices we observed in foreign rail 
systems are similar to those U.S. passenger rail operators are 
implementing, we identified three foreign practices that were not 
currently in use among the U.S. passenger rail operators we contacted 
as of September 2005, nor were they performed by the U.S. government. 
These practices are as follows. 

Covert testing: Two of the 13 foreign rail systems we visited utilized 
covert testing to keep employees alert about their security 
responsibilities. Covert testing involves security staff staging 
unannounced events to test the response of railroad staff to incidents 
such as suspicious packages or setting off alarms. In one European 
system, this covert testing involves security staff placing suspicious 
items throughout their system to see how long it takes operating staff 
to respond to the item. Similarly, one Asian rail operator's security 
staff will break security seals on fire extinguishers and open alarmed 
emergency doors randomly to see how long it takes staff to respond. TSA 
conducts covert testing of passenger and baggage screening in aviation, 
but has not conducted such testing in the rail environment. 

Random screening: Of the 13 foreign operators we interviewed, 2 have 
some form of random screening of passengers and their baggage in place. 
Prior to the July 2005 London bombings, no passenger rail operators in 
the United States were practicing random passengers or baggage 
screening. However, during the Democratic National Convention in 2004, 
the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) instituted a 
system of random screening of passengers. 

National government clearinghouse on technologies and best practices: 
According to passenger rail operators in five countries we visited, 
their national governments had centralized the process for performing 
research and development of passenger rail security technologies and 
maintained a clearinghouse of technologies and security best practices 
for passenger rail operators. No U.S. federal agency has compiled or 
disseminated information on research and development and other best 
practices for U.S. rail operators. 

Implementing covert testing, random screening, or a government- 
sponsored clearinghouse for technologies and best practices in the U.S. 
could pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges because of 
the differences between the U.S. and these foreign nations. Many 
foreign nations have dealt with terrorist attacks on their public 
transportation systems for decades, compared with the United States, 
where rail has not been specifically targeted by terrorists. According 
to foreign rail operators, these experiences have resulted in greater 
acceptance of certain security practices, such as random searches, 
which the U.S. public may view as a violation of their civil liberties 
or which may discourage them from using public transportation. The 
impact of security measures on passengers is an important consideration 
for domestic rail operators, since most passengers could choose another 
means of transportation, such as a personal automobile. As such, 
security measures that limit accessibility, cause delays, increase 
fares, or otherwise cause inconvenience could push people away from 
rail and into their cars. In contrast, the citizens of the European and 
Asian countries we visited are more dependent on public transportation 
than most U.S. residents and therefore may be more willing to accept 
intrusive security measures. Nevertheless, in order to identify 
innovative security measures that could help further mitigate terrorism-
risks to rail assets--especially as part of a broader risk management 
approach discussed earlier--it is important to consider the feasibility 
and costs and benefits of implementing the three rail security 
practices we identified in foreign countries. Officials from DHS, DOT, 
passenger rail industry associations, and rail systems we interviewed 
told us that operators would benefit from such an evaluation. Since our 
report on passenger rail security was issued, TSA has reported taking 
steps to coordinate with foreign passenger rail operators and 
governments to identify security best practices. For example, TSA 
reported working with British rail security officials to identify best 
practices for detecting and handling suspicious packages in rail 
systems. 

Conclusions: 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the July 2005 London rail bombings made 
clear that even when a variety of security precautions are put into 
place, passenger rail systems that move high volumes of passengers 
daily remain vulnerable to attack. DHS components have taken steps to 
assess the risks to the passenger rail system. However, enhanced 
federal leadership is needed to help ensure that actions and 
investments designed to enhance security are properly focused and 
prioritized so that finite resources may be allocated appropriately to 
help protect all modes of transportation. Specifically, both DHS and 
TSA should take additional steps to help ensure that the risk 
management efforts under way clearly and effectively identify priority 
areas for security-related investments in rail and other transportation 
modes. TSA has not yet completed its methodology for determining how 
the results of threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments will 
be used to identify and prioritize risks to passenger rail and other 
transportation sectors. Until the overall risk to the entire 
transportation sector is identified, TSA will not be able to determine 
where and how to target limited resources to achieve the greatest 
security gains. Once risk assessments for the passenger rail industry 
have been completed, it will be critical to be able to compare 
assessment results across all transportation modes and make informed, 
risk-based investment trade-offs. It is important that DHS complete its 
framework to help ensure that risks to all sectors can be analyzed and 
compared in a consistent way. Until this framework is complete, it will 
be difficult for agencies to reconcile information from different 
sectors to allow for a meaningful comparison of risk. 

Apart from its efforts to identify risks, TSA has taken steps to 
enhance the security of the passenger rail system. The issuance of 
security directives in 2004 was a well-intentioned effort, but did not 
provide the industry with security standards based on industry best 
practices. It is also not clear how TSA will enforce these directives. 
Consequently, neither the federal government nor rail operators can be 
sure they are requiring and implementing security practices proven to 
help prevent or mitigate disasters. While foreign passenger rail 
operators face similar challenges to securing their systems and have 
generally implemented similar security practices as U.S. rail 
operators, there are some practices that are utilized abroad that U.S. 
rail operators or the federal government have not studied in terms of 
the feasibility, costs, and benefits. In our September 2005 report on 
passenger rail security, we recommended, among other things, that TSA 
establish a plan with timelines for completing its methodology for 
conducting risk assessments and develop security standards that reflect 
industry best practices and can be measured and enforced. These actions 
should help ensure that the federal government has the information it 
needs to prioritize passenger rail assets based on risk, and evaluate, 
select, and implement measures to help the passenger rail operators 
protect their systems against terrorism. In addition, we recommended 
that the Secretary of DHS, in collaboration with DOT and the passenger 
rail industry, determine the feasibility, in a risk management context, 
of implementing certain security practices used by foreign rail 
operators. DHS, DOT, and Amtrak generally agreed with the report's 
recommendations, but as of January 2007, they have not told us what 
specific actions they are taking to implement them. We will continue to 
assess DHS and DOT's efforts to secure the U.S. passenger rail system 
during follow-on work to be initiated later this year. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 
any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at 
this time. 

Contact Information: 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A. 
Berrick at (202) 512-3404. Individuals making key contributions to this 
testimony include John Hansen, Assistant Director, Chris Currie, and 
Tom Lombardi. 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products Released Since September 11, 2001: 

Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and Risk 
Can Help Guide Security Efforts. GAO-06-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 
29, 2006. 

Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to 
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-06-181T, Washington, D.C.: 
October 20, 2005. 

Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to 
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-05-851. Washington, D.C.: 
September 9 2005. 

Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize 
Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005. 

Rail Security: Some Actions Taken to Enhance Passenger and Freight Rail 
Security, but Significant Challenges Remain. GAO-04-598T. Washington, 
D.C.: March 23, 2004. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security 
Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security 
Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail 
Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed. GAO-03-435. Washington, D.C.: 
April 30, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-term 
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Mass Transit: Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address 
Security Challenges. GAO-03-263. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002. 

Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems. GAO-02-1075T. 
Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2002. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to 
Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-05-851 (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 9, 2005). 

[2] The American Public Transportation Association compiled this fiscal 
year 2003 ridership data from FTA's National Transit Database. These 
are the most current data available. Rail transit systems in the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are included in these statistics. 

[3] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

[4] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 

[5] OGT originated within the Department of Justice's Office of Justice 
Programs in 1998 as the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP). 
Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, ODP was transferred to 
DHS in March 2003. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 403(5), 116 Stat. at 2178 
(codified at 6 U.S.C. 203(5)). In March 2004, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security consolidated ODP with the Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination to form the Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP). SLGCP, which reports directly to 
the DHS Secretary, was created to provide a "one-stop shop" for the 
numerous federal preparedness initiatives applicable to state and local 
governments. Recently, SLGCP was incorporated under the Preparedness 
Directorate as OGT. 

[6] FRA administers and enforces federal laws and regulations that are 
designed to promote safety on railroads, such as track maintenance, 
inspection standards, equipment standards, and operating practices. FRA 
exercises jurisdiction over all areas of railroad safety pursuant to 49 
U.S.C. § 20103. 

[7] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, D.C.: 2004). The 
9/11 Commission was an independent, bipartisan commission created in 
late 2002, to prepare a complete account of the circumstances 
surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including 
preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks. The 
Commission was also mandated to provide recommendations designed to 
guard against future attacks. 

[8] The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, working jointly with the 
Secretary of Transportation, to develop, prepare, implement, and 
update, as needed a National Strategy for Transportation Security and 
transportation modal security plans. Pub. L. No. 108-458, §4001, 118 
Stat. 3638, 3710-12 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 114(t)). 

[9] In 2006, DHS reorganized their Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection division. The functions of the Directorate of 
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection were moved to the 
Office of Intelligence Analysis and Office of Infrastructure 
Protection. 

[10] HSPD-7 directed the Departments of Transportation and Homeland 
Security to collaborate on all matters relating to transportation 
security and transportation infrastructure protection. In 2003, DHS 
designated TSA as the lead agency for addressing HSPD-7 as it relates 
to securing the nation's transportation sector. 

[11] HSPD-7 defines critical infrastructure protection responsibilities 
for DHS, sector-specific agencies (those federal agencies given 
responsibility for transportation, energy, telecommunications, and so 
forth), and other departments and agencies. The Directive instructs 
federal departments and agencies to identify, prioritize, and 
coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure to prevent, deter, 
and mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks. 

[12] TSA issues security related regulations and directives pursuant to 
its 49 U.S.C. § 114(1) rulemaking authority. 

[13] See 49 C.F.R. § 238.235. 

[14] Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address 
Security Challenges, GAO-03-843 (Washington, D.C.: June 2003). 

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