By David C. Gompert, Irving Lachow, and Justin Perkins
“The unstoppable spread of information networking and
know how gives rise to the need for a new edge – one that
utilizes but transcends networks – by developing people, teams,
and decisionmaking methods that convert information into better
choices and outcomes. We call this new edge ‘battle-wisdom.’”
– Battle-Wise
The United States is well on its way to integrating the use of
information networks into its warfighting doctrine. At the same
time, adversaries are leveraging networking technologies and concepts
to further their aims. Although many of these adversaries are technologically
inferior to U.S. firepower, their use of network-centric concepts
can potentially affect the costs of war. The mutation of Al Qaeda
after 9/11 and the ongoing insurgency in Iraq provide a glimpse
of what U.S. forces are likely to face in the future. As a result,
military operations are likely to grow even more complex, stressful,
ill-defined, and politically sensitive than they have been in the
past.
One result of this trend is that junior ranks of enlisted personnel
and officers are being given increasing levels of responsibility.
Decisions that were once made by colonels are being made by captains
and majors, and the consequences of those decisions can have a global
impact. At the same time, adversaries are using networks to make
the lives of U.S. soldiers even more difficult. How can U.S. forces
respond to these challenges? The answer is by improving the ability
of soldiers to make quick, accurate, and reliable decisions through
a combination of more timely reasoning and more reliable intuition
– the former to make use of networked information and the
latter to overcome the diminished utility of experience when faced
with novel and complex situations. The authors argue that current
and future operational environments call for the integration of
reasoning and intuition into “battle-wisdom.” Battle-wise
individual, teams and forces are able to create time-information
advantages by making swift but sound decisions in the heat and fog
of combat.
Few would disagree that having more battle-wise soldiers is a good
idea. The hard part is determining what needs to be done to create,
develop and retain battle-wise forces. The results of the analysis
fall into three broad categories: (a) improving the cognitive abilities
of individual war-fighters; (b) reforming command and control to
harness these abilities; and (c) enhancing the collective cognitive
power of teams.
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied
within are those of the contributors, and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the
Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.
Portions of this book may be quoted or reprinted without permission,
provided that a standard source credit line is included. NDU Press
would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews.
First printing, July 2006.
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