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South Africa: The National Peace Accord and the International Community

Highlights of an International Seminar

Most observers expect a considerable increase in already high levels of political violence in South Africa as the country approaches its first post-apartheid election, now slated for April 27, 1994. Containing political violence and limiting loss of life during this critical period of South Africa's transition to democracy will be a major challenge to the country and the international community. The National Peace Accord (NPA), a wide-ranging agreement reached in September 1991 and signed by a broad group of political parties and organizations, will be an important vehicle for minimizing violence during the turbulent period ahead. So too will be the presence of the international community, building upon the experiences of the United Nations (UN), Organization of African Unity (OAU), and other observer missions presently deployed in South Africa.

The United States Institute of Peace brought together in late July, 1993, NPA officials, UN and OAU officials, political party representatives, and representatives of conflict resolution non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for a public workshop to assess ways in which the international community can reinforce the work of the Peace Accord structures. (A list of regional and international organization participants appears on the following page.)

How to Strengthen the National Peace Accord:

- **Reinforce the local peace committees, the grassroots-level structures of the Peace Accord, to enhance community "ownership" of the peace process.**

- **Involve more women, persons of color, youth, church leaders, and civil society groups in the Peace Accord structures.**

- **Work toward greater civilian supervision of the police and security forces and better training for community-oriented policing techniques.**

- **Encourage parties not involved in the Peace Accord to sign the agreement and participate in its structures.**

How to Minimize Violence During the Election Campaign:

- A broad-based South African "peacekeeping corps" should be created to assist in providing evenhanded security during the election campaign and voting. Senior UN military officers could serve as advisors to the corps.

- The Peace Accord structures should be used to ensure that all areas of South Africa are open to campaigning by all political parties.

- The existing domestic capabilities for monitoring and preventing violence at campaign-related rallies and marches should be expanded.

How the International Community Can Help:

- International monitors should closely coordinate their activities with the peace committees, especially local peace committees, in order to remain sensitive to local conditions and needs.

- The security forces, especially the South African Defense Force and the South African police, should be closely monitored by international observers.

- The United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa (UNOMSA) should be significantly increased in numbers, and its mandate changed to include election monitoring and verification, if requested by the soon-to-be constituted Independent Electoral Commission.

- The United Nations, in cooperation with the Independent Electoral Commission, should coordinate and supervise its international monitors, including those of other international organizations and NGOs.

- The United Nations should have ample time—at least six months—for careful preparation and planning regarding the composition, coordination, and deployment of international monitors and other election monitoring activities.

- In the post–election period, the international community should play a continuing role in supporting the overall process of democratization.

Regional and International Organization Participants:
- Peter Gastrow, member, National Peace Secretariat
- Antonie Gildenhuys, chairman, National Peace Secretariat
- James O.C. Jonah, undersecretary-general for political affairs, United Nations
- Legwaila J. Legwaila, OAU special representative to South Africa
- Teboho Mafole, chief UN representative of the African National Congress
- Walter McLean, member, House of Commons, Canada
- Stanley Mogoba, vice-chairman, National Peace Committee
- Errol De Montille, minister, Embassy of South Africa to the United States
- Vuyi Nxasana, process observer, Natal/KwaZulu Regional Peace Committee
- Sem Pheko, chief UN representative of the Pan-Africanist Congress
- Gavin Woods, director, Inkatha Institute for South Africa

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The Context

Since early 1990, political leaders have been engaged in negotiation on the nature of post-apartheid South Africa. If current timetables are realized, this process will culminate in a transitional executive by late 1993, the election of a constitution-making body and interim government in early 1994, and a new constitution within the next several years. One acute problem of the transition from apartheid to democracy has been that rates of political violence increased substantially *after* the start of negotiations. Political violence has contributed to deadlocks and delays in the talks several times over the last three years, and some 16,000 have died in the strife since the mid-1980s.

In response to the endemic violence, the major negotiating protagonists—including the government and ruling National Party (NP), the African National Congress (ANC), and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)—concluded the thirty-three page National Peace Accord (NPA) in September 1991. The NPA structures—particularly the network of eleven regional and some 100 local peace committees—will be critical to containing violence during the election campaign and on voting day.

In July 1992, Cyrus Vance, the UN secretary-general's special representative, was sent to South Africa following an escalation of violence in June and a Security Council meeting in July. Following the Vance trip, the UN Observer Mission to South Africa (UNOMSA) was deployed to monitor political violence and work cooperatively with the indigenous conflict resolution structures of the NPA. In addition, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the British Commonwealth, and the European Community were requested to send observers, and these organizations now have deployed observer missions. The UN now has some sixty personnel on the ground, the OAU thirteen, the Commonwealth nine, and the European Community thirteen.

The international observer missions in South Africa and their linkages with an indigenous conflict resolution structure such as the NPA constitute a unique set of relationships and are the first instance of the United Nations and other international organizations working directly with a broad-based local effort to reduce conflict.

Constitutional negotiators have now set a tentative election date of April 27, 1994. The role of the international community will in all likelihood expand as the election campaign begins in earnest and especially as voting day nears. Most parties have called for an increased presence by the international community over and above the some 100 observers now deployed. Thus, UNOMSA's mandate may be amended to include election monitoring and, perhaps, verification. The UNOMSA precedent of working through the NPA structures indicates that other international election monitors, including international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), may also seek an adjunctive relationship with these structures.

Most political parties in South Africa have called for an increased international presence over and above the observers currently deployed during the election campaign and on election day. The international community, working with the NPA structures, can help mitigate violence during a heated election campaign. Thus, the linkages between

pollwatching and peacemaking will be very important in achieving a legitimate outcome to the elections and in minimizing political violence.

The United States Institute of Peace brought together NPA officials, UN and OAU officials, political party representatives, and representatives of conflict resolution non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for a public workshop in late July 1993 to discuss the linkages between the international community and the Peace Accord structures. This special report summarizes the discussion and findings from the workshop. The following recommendations are a rapporteur's summary of the recommendations made by some participants.

Political Violence in South Africa

Workshop participants generally agreed that while the sources of the political violence that has plagued South Africa's transition since 1990 are many and complex, two structural factors lie at the heart of the strife:

- **South Africa does not yet enjoy a government that is widely regarded as legitimate, and thus the police and other security forces—which were used to enforce apartheid policies over the years—are not perceived as impartial or evenhanded in many of the affected communities.**

- **Endemic poverty grips many affected communities, with very high rates of urban unemployment and desperate living conditions. (South Africa is enduring a decade-long recession, and unemployment in some townships is more than fifty percent).**

In addition to these longer term conditions, participants identified more proximate causes of violence. These included the "third force," i.e., those who use covert destabilization techniques to oppose a new post-apartheid order (some allege that the "third force" emanates from within the security forces); factional struggles between followers of the ANC and the IFP that are most acute in the urban townships around Johannesburg and in the rural areas of the Natal province; and a youth crisis, defined by Bishop M. Stanley Mogoba as a generation of "young people who have no future and are unemployed and unemployable." Others stressed the problems of criminal opportunism, such as gangsterism, and the difficulty of distinguishing between criminal and political violence. All participants generally agreed that, whatever its initial spark, violence often results in revenge attacks and counterattacks; the problem is thus self-perpetuating and creates a cycle of violence.

Finally, political violence at this stage in South Africa's democratization process is especially detrimental as it tends to undermine mutual tolerance just at the time when South Africa is attempting to discover and inculcate democratic values.

The National Peace Accord

The National Peace Accord, signed by twenty-seven political parties, organizations, and governments, is unusual in its depth and scope. In addition to a preamble that relates the Peace Accord to the overall process of democratization (the document contains, for example, a set of principles of democracy and human rights) and guidelines for socio-

economic development, it establishes rules and institutions to deal with political violence. The principle elements of the Peace Accord are:

Code of Conduct: Political Parties and Organizations. Signatories agree to conduct themselves in accordance with principles of "democratic tolerance," including maintaining channels of communication among themselves and with law enforcement authorities, desisting from threatening or intimidating one another's followers, refraining from vilification or inciting violence, and cooperating with law enforcement authorities when organizing rallies or demonstrations.

Code of Conduct: South African Police. The Peace Accord sets out wide-ranging principles and specific requirements of conduct for the South African police, such as provisions for political neutrality, nondiscrimination, and minimum use of force. It offers a detailed set of methods of response and investigation, as well as guidelines for police liaison with the institutions established by the Peace Accord. Additional provisions are measures for adjudication of complaints against the police, covert operations, dangerous weapons, "self-defense units," and a long and detailed oath to be taken by police force members.

The Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence. A standing commission was constituted for three years to investigate the underlying causes of violence, specific incidents, and steps required to prevent further violence. The "independent and nonpartisan" commission is chaired by widely respected Appeals Court Judge Richard Goldstone. The Commission includes members implicitly nominated by the major political parties, especially the ANC and IFP, and is thus seen as much more representative than previous judicial commissions.

The National Peace Committee (NPC). Each signatory to the Peace Accord appoints one representative and one alternate to the NPC, the task of which is to oversee implementation of the agreement and ensure compliance. All decisions of the NPC "shall be by consensus." If the NPC cannot reach consensus on disputes arising from alleged violations of the Peace Accord, it is empowered to convene a meeting of all signatories. The NPC is chaired by businessman John Hall, one of the original business mediators who midwifed the agreement.

The National Peace Secretariat. A permanent, full-time Secretariat establishes and administers regional and local peace committees (RPCs and LPCs). The Secretariat consists of seven persons chosen by the major political parties, one representative from the legal profession, and one from the government's Department of Justice. Representatives of relevant political organizations, churches, businesses, trade unions, the police, and security forces serve on the peace committees to resolve disputes at the grassroots level. Each committee reports to the Secretariat.

Compliance Provisions. The Peace Accord includes arbitration mechanisms to adjudicate allegations of noncompliance. Disputes are to be resolved, if possible, at the "grassroots level through the participation of the parties themselves by using the tried methods of mediation, arbitration, and adjudication." Disputes concerning the code of conduct for political parties are to be handled by the NPC. If the NPC cannot resolve the dispute, the matter is to be referred to an arbitrator who is empowered to convene compliance hearings and to make a ruling. The arbitrator can order the offending organization to take specific action to prevent further breaches of the code. Currently, there are no ongoing, accepted adjudication procedures satisfactory to all signatories.

Implementation of the Peace Accord

Paradoxically, in the period following the signing of the Peace Accord, rates of political violence in South Africa generally *increased*. In 1992, fatality rates from political violence outstripped those of 1991 (though 1990 had seen higher rates). According to press reports, 3,499 people lost their lives in political violence in 1992, up from the 2,365 politically motivated deaths in 1991 and approaching the 3,750 reported in 1990. Not only did the number of deaths from political violence increase, but two internationally publicized incidents in 1992—the June massacre of forty–six township residents at Boipatong and the September shooting of twenty–eight unarmed ANC marchers in the Ciskei "homeland"—underscored the Peace Accord's apparent failure to resolve the thorny problem of political violence. Although there was a marked decrease in political killings in the first three months of 1993, the violence erupted again in April following the assassination of popular South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani and continued to rise throughout the remainder of the first half of the year. By the end of July, 1,963 had died in political violence according to the Johannesburg-based Human Rights Commission.

Thus, much of the workshop discussion surrounding implementation of the Peace Accord focused on its shortcomings as opposed to its successes. Indeed, as National Peace Secretariat Chairman Antonie Gildenhuys noted, "Our successes, to the extent that we have had successes, are all nonevents, namely, that violence does not occur." Some pointed to the likelihood that deaths resulting from protests following the Hani assassination would have been much higher had it not been for the concerted efforts of hundreds of Peace Accord monitors working tirelessly with international observers to control crowds of mourners.

The grassroots-based conflict resolution structures of the NPA—the peace committees that function under the National Peace Secretariat—are generally operating as envisaged. As of mid-1993, the full complement of eleven regional committees had been established and operative, together with some 100 LPCs; many more LPCs were in the process of being created.

The RPCs and LPCs are in many ways the heart of the Peace Accord. Committees have dealt with a variety of issues, including joint planning and monitoring of political rallies and marches in volatile areas, relations between residents of worker hostels and township residents, commercial and industrial disputes (e.g., rent or services boycotts), rivalries over political turf, violence in workplace settings, gang rivalry, and localized conflict such as the "taxi wars" in which competing taxi associations vie for a limited pool of riders. Committee work was considerably bolstered with the hiring of full-time staff in each of the regions and the establishment of regional offices; in addition, some 250 part-time volunteers help with monitoring. Although funded from the government purse, the National Peace Secretariat has gained a measure of budget autonomy and has an annual operating budget of R 41 million (nearly $12 million).

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Recommendations for Improving the Peace Accord

Recommendations during the workshop on implementation of the NPA include the following:

- **Reinforce the local peace committees, the grassroots-level structures of the Peace Accord, to enhance community "ownership" of the peace process.**

The Peace Accord is a generally a good document, but it was negotiated by political leaders and some say it does not have sufficient links to the grassroots. Thus, there is a need to strengthen the grassroots base of the Peace Accord structures as a means of local-level empowerment and community "ownership" of the peace process. Vuyi Nxasana, of the Vuleka Trust, summed up the feeling at the grassroots, saying that the NPA's conflict resolution efforts don't yet truly "touch the people." She added,

> People need to feel that they can own the Peace Accord. That they can actually breath it, eat it, talk it. At the present moment, there is no such ownership by the people. People know about it. They hear about it. They hear a song over the radio. They see an emblem . . . [But] they haven't really experienced the Peace Accord.

There is an urgent need to introduce the NPA principles into communities in a manner sensitive to local conditions and, most importantly, in terms of the methods traditionally employed in these communities to handle conflict. Traditional, indigenous (and, in fact, democratic) ways of handling community conflict already exist, according to Nxasana, and these approaches need to be integrated into the NPA's conflict resolution efforts. An example offered was the important role played by the *amakozi*, or traditional leaders, in dealing with disputes among members of their community. The NPA structures, focused on the participation of political party representatives, do not adequately accommodate other methods of conflict resolution.

One way to meld these approaches into the NPA's efforts is through wider participation. The leadership-oriented structures of the NPA are "limited in their ability to project the values and the procedures for a wider constituency," Nxasana said. "I think the more we can include other people in the peace structures, the better it will be received by people." A greater role for local NGO development organizations, community groups, and community and traditional leaders is needed, as is greater emphasis on community education to "shift the mind-set from adversarialism to cooperation . . . to understand the need for tolerance."

This point was seconded by Gavin Woods, director of the Inkatha Institute for South Africa, who criticized the central role played by businessmen, politicians, and the legal fraternity, noting that "the sociological dimensions of violence and of the human side of this [problem] is totally ignored by this approach." While Woods appreciated the sacrifices of those involved with the Peace Accord, he argued—as did many others at the workshop—that a critical reexamination of some of the basic approaches of the NPA is needed in order to make it and conflict resolution efforts more effective.

In addition to making the local peace structures more indigenous, participants pointed to the need for reinvigorated efforts to explain the NPA at the local level and in the vernacular of the affected communities. One important concern, for example, is that

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after nearly three years the agreement itself is only available in English and has not been distributed in Xhosa, Zulu, Afrikaans, Sotho, and other widely used languages. The NPA reads like a legal document, as in some ways it must, but it is important that the principles it contains are appropriately communicated to the people in languages and in terms they can understand and embrace.

- **Involve more women, persons of color, youth, church leaders, and civil society groups in the Peace Accord structures.**

Many of those engaged in the NPA structures recognize that much more must be done to make the structures better reflect the racial, ethnic, and gender characteristics of the affected communities and South African society as a whole. Participants agreed that the Peace Accord structures are too white and male dominated. Vuyi Nxasana noted, "Black women in particular have suffered triple discrimination as workers, women and black people . . . We have found it anomalous that they have been, to a large extent, excluded from the National Peace Accord."

An amendment to the NPA is pending that would allow greater representation of civil society groups, such as NGOs, community-based groups and associations, and interest groups such as trade unions. The amendment seeks to broaden and deepen the base of participation in the NPA structures, particularly for historically disadvantaged groups. Further, NGOs engaged in conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and education, and socio-economic development already have been involved extensively in NPA activities. Expanding and formalizing their role is high on the agenda of Peace Accord officials, and the workshop participants were in general highly sympathetic to the call for more diverse participation.

- **Work toward greater civilian supervision of the police and security forces and better training for community-oriented policing techniques.**

Many participants acknowledged that the South African police need better training in community relations and community policing. The police are not seen as impartial, and are generally not viewed as capable of controlling violence in an evenhanded fashion. Although few participants suggested that the current police force should be disbanded, many noted the need for substantial re-training and the cultivation of an officer corps more sensitive to community problems and needs.

- **Encourage parties not involved in the Peace Accord to sign the agreement and participate in its structures.**

Bishop Mogoba called for an urgent high-level meeting of the NPA signatories to reaffirm their commitment to the terms of the Peace Accord prior to the election campaign. This meeting would also serve as an opportunity for those who have not signed to do so in a highly public way.

Implementation of the NPA generally has focused on short-term crisis management and prevention—"ambulance work," as some describe it—and has not led to significant engagement in socio-economic development initiatives as a longer-term avenue to peace as mandated in Chapter 5 of the Peace Accord.

Some RPCs and LPCs have established subcommittees to help facilitate socio-economic development, but these efforts are still in their infancy. Development initiatives should be vigorously pursued by international governmental organizations (for example, the United Nations Development Program) and NGOs, according to Vuyi Nxasana. And although mandated by the Peace Accord itself, these functions cannot be undertaken by structures such as LPCs because they do not command sufficient resources or other capacities to undertake large-scale development work. LPCs, however, can indeed provide sorely needed lines of communication between international and domestic NGOs and the affected communities in order to assess the latter's socio-economic development needs and concerns. This communications bridge-building capacity has not been sufficiently cultivated and should be strengthened, she said.

Notwithstanding the myriad of criticisms leveled against the Peace Accord, very few in South Africa call for its complete abrogation or the dissolution of its structures. Although a South African Council of Churches resolution adopted in July 1993 was highly critical of the NPA, the criticism was intended to buttress the agreement, not destroy it. Some participants suggested that if the NPA and its structures did not exist, they would need to be invented.

The NPA structures, despite their flaws, play an important conflict resolution role in this historically divided society. For example, Bishop Mogoba, in his capacity as vice-chairman of the National Peace Committee, helped organize a June 1993 summit between the ANC's Nelson Mandela and the IFP's Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, their first face-to-face dialogue in over two years.

In many situations, the LPCs have helped defuse tense situations and prevent widespread violence. Further, the cooperative relationships being built among those who participate in the committees are important in both the short and the long term in South Africa. National Peace Secretariat Chairman Gildenhuys noted that the structures "have provided a vehicle through which the parties could come together and could speak to each other . . . I think that is possibly the most important role of the Peace Accord."

The Peace Accord and International Observers

International observer missions have clearly bolstered the effectiveness of the NPA. The mandate of the international observer missions—especially UNOMSA —is, as suggested earlier, unusual in the history of the United Nations. The UN Security Council, when it debated the question of violence in South Africa in mid-1992, stated in Resolution 772:

> authorized the secretary-general to deploy, as a matter of urgency, United Nations observers in South Africa, in such a manner and in such numbers as he determines necessary to address effectively the areas of concern noted in his report [regarding violence], in coordination with the structures under the National Peace Accord;

> invited the secretary-general to assist in the strengthening of the structures set up under the National Peace Accord in consultation with the relevant parties;

invited international organizations such as the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth, and the European Community to consider deploying their own observers in South Africa in coordination with the United Nations and the structures set up under the Peace Accord.

UNOMSA personnel were deployed beginning in August 1992; at present some sixty observers are in the country. According to the NPS, the UN observers are spread over the entire country, but the majority are active in the troubled Johannesburg/Pretoria metropolis and in Natal.

In response to the Security Council's invitation, the OAU has deployed thirteen observers to South Africa; the European Community has deployed fifteen; and the British Commonwealth has sent nine. International monitors observe many of the peace committee meetings, monitor political rallies and meetings (along with NPA monitoring groups), and hold weekly meetings with the NPS staff. The close working relationship that exists among the international observer missions is indicative of the cooperative approach between the United Nations and other international organizations that will be necessary for an enhanced, coordinated, and effective international community role in the ensuing months.

The observers have worked closely with a broad spectrum of South African political leaders, including the government, judicial authorities, security forces, and the staff of the NPA structures. There are weekly meetings between the NPS and the leaders of the four international observation teams and nearly daily contact between them and political parties and organizations. The heads of observer missions have been especially deft at making valuable, sometimes public, recommendations about strengthening efforts to combat violence without offending any of the major parties or organizations. During the workshop, OAU Special Representative Legwaila J. Legwaila recounted the international observers' effort to persuade Bophuthatswana homeland leader Lucas Mangope to open up the territory under his control to activities by all political parties.

Although the observers have been most effective in monitoring political marches and rallies—often interposing themselves, along with South African peace monitors, between armed opposing groups—they have, at times, engaged in mediation efforts. This is especially true of the OAU and Commonwealth delegations, who have more liberally interpreted the mandate set out in UN Security Council Resolution 772. The Commonwealth team, particularly, has received accolades for its efforts in Natal.

Thus, international observers, by their very presence, have had the effect of moderating behavior in many volatile situations and have already fulfilled their preventive diplomacy mission to a certain extent. Because their numbers are limited, however, they have not been able to monitor all situations of potential or actual political violence nor reduce the overall increase in rates of fatalities.

Conclusions about the UN's role in South Africa's transition are premature, but thus far it has been viewed generally as constructive. Although the United Nations has long had an adversarial relationship with the South African government, attitudes have changed and there is considerable acceptance of the UN's role in reducing violence and, ultimately, in working to ensure a free and fair election. The United Nations is now widely perceived by many South Africans as enjoying integrity and credibility. The

United Nations is thus well-placed to play an important and constructive role during the next, perhaps crucial, step in the transition.

The Peace Accord and the Election

Progress in easing tensions in affected communities during the ensuing election period is directly related to progress in talks on the process and substance of forging a new, post-apartheid constitution. This easing of tension is important because, as National Peace Secretariat member Peter Gastrow suggested, "tensions in the negotiation process . . . also [introduce] tensions amongst different political groupings on the ground. The prospects, therefore, of a peaceful or relatively peaceful election, in my view, dwindle . . . as long as this conflict is not resolved." Resolution of outstanding points of disagreement at the democratization talks being held in the World Trade Center at Kempton Park (near Johannesburg) may contribute to easing fears and insecurity about the potential for political exclusion in a post-apartheid order. One participant noted that "the possibilities of parties seeing winners and losers coming out of this election makes a lot of people very anxious."

Progress in constitutional talks is also relevant in two other respects: the *timing* of international involvement, and its *nature and extent*. Virtually all parties have called for an increased role for the international community during the election campaign and on election day, implicitly recognizing the linkages between poll-watching and peacemaking. Before firm decisions can be made about the international community's role during the election campaign and on election day, the Transitional Executive Council must be implemented. The multiparty Council will oversee the government until a post-election interim government of national unity is formed while the new constitution is being finalized.

It is a significant fact that a separate Independent Electoral Commission, which will be constituted soon, will have wide-ranging powers over many aspects of the election campaign and voting: voter education, media access, campaigning and constituency mobilization, political party codes of conduct, the number and location of polling booths, monitoring, ballot structure, vote-counting and verification, and so on. The Independent Electoral Commission will also have a role, along with the Peace Accord structures, in ensuring that violence and intimidation do not lower turnout, jeopardize voter confidence and the secrecy of the ballot, or otherwise endanger the legitimacy of the outcome. The primary task of the Independent Electoral Commission will be to ensure that the election process is handled in a neutral and impartial manner—to "level the playing field" for all parties that participate and to ensure free and fair balloting.

It will in all likelihood fall to the Transitional Executive Council and the Independent Electoral Commission to officially invite the international community to participate in election monitoring and to provide additional governmental and nongovernmental assistance—i.e., requesting the United Nations to change UNOMSA's mandate and increase its size. Once that occurs, the Independent Electoral Commission will be responsible for coordination with the United Nations and other organizations of international monitors, determining their size, deployment, and specific tasks. It will also oversee the relationships among international monitors and domestic monitoring groups.

Although the NPA structures will not likely be directly involved in monitoring the election, the established infrastructure will provide vital conduits to local communities and will help identify areas where the legitimacy of the balloting may be questioned because of political violence or intimidation. Participants in the NPA infrastructure know where the problems lie and are in regular contact with political leaders and international observer missions. Election experts suggest that perceptions of likely violence are just as significant as actual violence in keeping voters from the polls and lowering turnout rates. Andrew Reynolds, an elections specialist at the University of California-San Diego and a participant at the workshop, argues that even if only ten percent of the South African electorate does not vote out of concern about violence, a million voters will be effectively disenfranchised. Further, participants acknowledged that leveling the playing field requires much more than eliminating violence and intimidation; it also includes voter education, equal access to the media, and fair balloting procedures.

Recommendations for Future Relationships

Recommendations offered by workshop participants with regard to the international community and the NPA structures in pollwatching and peacemaking are:

- **A broad-based South African "peacekeeping corps" should be created to assist in providing evenhanded security during the election campaign and voting. Senior UN military officers could serve as advisors to the corps.**

This important security issue was raised at the workshop by Bishop Mogoba who called for a joint peacekeeping force composed of members of the various organizations' military or paramilitary forces. This joint force—distinct from multiparty control of the police and the South African Defense Force—would patrol especially volatile areas and provide security during the election campaign and voting. The argument was advanced that such a force would be more widely representative and thus more acceptable and credible in these communities than the existing security forces and police. An important aspect of Mogoba's proposal is that the United Nations would be requested to provide assistance to the force by deploying senior military officers to advise or command it. The peacekeeping force is included in legislation that sets up the Transitional Executive Council passed by the South African parliament in mid-September 1993.

- **The Peace Accord structures should be used to ensure that all areas of South Africa are open to campaigning by all political parties.**

- **The existing domestic capabilities for monitoring and preventing violence at campaign-related rallies and marches should be expanded.**

- **International monitors should closely coordinate their activities with the peace committees, especially local peace committees (LPCs), in order to remain sensitive to local conditions and needs.**

- **The security forces, especially the South African Defense Force and the South African police, should be closely monitored by international observers.**

- **The United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa (UNOMSA) should be significantly increased in numbers and its mandate changed to include**

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election monitoring and verification, if requested by the soon-to-be constituted Independent Electoral Commission.

Participants in the workshop generally agreed that it will be critical to ensure a proper mandate for the international community's role in South Africa's upcoming election—namely continued and enhanced monitoring of the political violence and observations, and perhaps even certification, of the election result.

To carry out this mandate effectively, the international community must provide adequate resources and personnel. Most participants expect that, in coordination with the Independent Electoral Commission, the United Nations will be called upon to appropriately coordinate international governmental and nongovernmental monitors. The Commission will invite the international observers, but it will be up to the United Nations to designate and appoint them, and, in consultation with the Independent Electoral Commission, direct their activities.

- **The United Nations, in cooperation with the Independent Electoral Commission, should coordinate and supervise its international monitors, including those of other international organizations and NGOs.**

Unlike the transition in Namibia, however, as OAU Special Representative Legwaila J. Legwaila pointed out during the workshop, it will be up to the South Africans themselves to certify whether the election was free and fair.

- **The United Nations should have ample time—at least six months—for careful preparation and planning regarding the composition, coordination, and deployment of international monitors, and other election monitoring activities.**

This planning time will be especially important if the United Nations is requested by an Independent Electoral Commission to certify whether the election is free and fair. In this regard, the newly constituted United Nations Electoral Assistance Unit, which operates under the auspices of the undersecretary-general for political affairs, can assist the South Africans in many aspects of the election design and logistics.

- **In the post-election period, the international community should play a continuing role in supporting the overall process of democratization in South Africa.**

A single election does not make a democracy. Indeed, in South Africa's April 1994 election voters will select a constituent assembly to draft a new democratic constitution under which elections will continue to take place well into the post-apartheid future.

Conflict Resolution, Democracy-Building and the International Community

Few expect a single election to remove all of the causes of political violence, though it is widely expected that a legitimate post-apartheid state will be in a better position to address the causes of violence than the present government. One consideration, therefore, of the international community's role in the election will be how to use an extensive international intervention for the longer term benefit of democracy-building in South Africa. Assuming that there will be greatly expanded international involvement

in South Africa in the coming months, it is important now to consider how this unique infusion of international support for South Africa's upcoming election can best be used toward longer term efforts to create a prosperous post-apartheid democracy. One way this can be done is to employ the expertise and resources devoted to this single election to build, as Canadian Member of Parliament Walter McLean suggested, "an indigenous, free-standing South African election capacity." The same can be said about international involvement to help reduce political violence: An overriding principle of international intervention to reduce violence should be—as the current mandate envisions—efforts to strengthen the long-term conflict resolution capacities of the NPA.

If the international community's linkages with the NPA are successful in minimizing widespread election-related violence in South Africa, it may well be an important precedent for future international involvement in various, primarily internal, conflict situations. As the United Nations faces growing pressures on its limited capacities and resources, and as the international community searches for appropriate response mechanisms to the myriad of conflicts that have erupted in the post—Cold War world, the lessons learned from the South African experience will be very informative. As South Africa moves toward its first election after apartheid, an important hypothesis for the challenge of international involvement in the increasingly complex conflicts around the globe will be tested: Can a small, minimally intrusive, less-than-peacekeeping presence by the international community, working with and buttressing sufficiently strong indigenous conflict resolution institutions such as South Africa's National Peace Accord, manage tensions and promote more peaceful politics?

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