UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE  $1200\ 17^{\text{TH}}$  STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20036-3011

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WEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 2005 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM

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IN NEED OF REPAIR:
REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS

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## **SPEAKERS:**

EDWIN FEULNER, The Heritage Foundation Member, Task Force on the United Nations

RODERICK M. HILLS, Center for Strategic and International Studies Member, Task Force on the United Nations

ANN FLORINI, The Brookings Institution Lead Expert, Task Force on the United Nations

RICHARD THORNBURGH, Former UN Under-Secretary-General

CHRISTOPHER BANCROFT BURNHAM, UN Under-Secretary-General for Management

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#### P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

10:00 a.m.

AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Well, good morning, everyone, and welcome very much to the United States Institute of Peace. For this program, which is the third in a series following the issuance on June 15 of the report of the Task Force on the United Nations. And I can tell by the turn out and the many people here whom I know that we will have a very good session today.

Let me just note at the outset, so I don't forget to say it later on, when we get into the discussion period for your questions and comments, if you would kindly come up to the microphone to pose your question, so that we can capture it on tape and we are being filmed by the media today.

To get us going, I would like to turn to Richard Solomon, who is President of the United States Institute of Peace, who was in at the inception of our big effort on this together with all the colleagues who have represented here today. Dick?

AMBASSADOR SOLOMON: Thanks very much and you have just heard from Gary Matthews, who played a critical role in our efforts to support this Task Force. Let me begin by giving a few remarks that will put this effort in some context.

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This country, indeed, the global community the challenge of adapting institutions faces policies for dealing with a totally changed world, and I think we are all aware of the efforts to take Cold War institutions, whether it was our defense establishment or our intelligence community, other institutions of and adapt them world in Government to а which fortunately we're not faced with major powers at each other's throats, but rather the danger of catastrophic terrorism, the problem of failed states out of strong states running rampant, problems of restructuring the global community, all the things that we read about dayto-day in our headlines and we and others are trying to come to some new terms with.

One of the key issues is how we, the United States, relates to the global community. And there is no more institution reflecting that community, of course, then the United Nations and this Task Force reflects that challenge. The United States Institute of Peace, as you know, is supported by Congress and our oversight and appropriating Chairman is Congressman Frank Wolf. And Frank Wolf has been extremely concerned with the inability of the United Nations over the past several years to deal with the genocide in the Sudan and Darfur as well as other evident failures that again have

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been in the news.

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The Oil For Food scandal, the indiscipline of the United Nations troops in the Congo and other issues of management transparency and accountability that was in that context that Congressman Wolf levied a charge on the Institute of Peace as part of the omnibus legislation last fall to convene and support the work of a Bipartisan Task Force to look at issues of the United Nations reform and to come up with a series of actionable proposals for reforming that institution to meet the challenges that I have briefly commented on.

We were extremely fortunate to have former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell agree to co-chair this And Congressman Wolf directed us to create a effort. mechanism that would draw on the expertise of six of the leading public policy institutions in our country, not Washington, although they just here in are all represented here, to provide the intellectual support for this effort: The American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Center for Strategic International Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings and the Hoover Institution.

And today, as Gary mentioned, you will be hearing a report from and have an opportunity to

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interact with one of the key task groups that were part of this effort, that is the effort to assess the management challenges of making the United Nations more effective in a managerial sense. And we are very pleased to have with us two members of the Task Force who had particular responsibility for this issue, Ed Feulner, who was President of the Heritage Foundation, and Rod Hills, former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and now with the firm of Hills and Stern.

And also with us is Ann Florini, who is the Leading Expert from Brookings on looking at this issue. And I know you will hear a very rich presentation and I have no doubt that we're going to hear a very lively set of exchanges to follow. Let me also mention that we are very fortunate to have with us Christopher Burnham, who was recently appointed the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Management Issues.

He was formerly the Chief Financial Officer and Assistant Secretary of State for Resource Management in the State Department. And he will be in his new role dealing with the challenges of trying to work with the Institution, the United Nations and with us and with others, to bring about a reform process.

So with that, Ed, I would invite you to

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lead off our presentation and discussion, and again, thank you all for coming this morning.

AMBASSADOR FEULNER: Can I speak from here?

AMBASSADOR SOLOMON: As you wish. Let me just finally say that the report we have some outside, we're getting on a rush basis the final, final full color, technicolor version of the report and by the time our session ends, you should be able to pick up a copy outside the door. Thank you. Ed, please.

AMBASSADOR FEULNER: Thank you very much Ambassador Solomon, and I want to thank you, Ambassador Matthews and all of your colleagues at the U.S. Institute of Peace for the extraordinary job you did in terms of taking these diverse individuals with varying political views across the American political spectrum pulling us together and forcing us to focus on the specific aspects of our broad charge from Congressman Wolf and his colleagues in both the House and Senate on the broad theme as our title indicates, American Interests and United Nations Reform.

I particularly acknowledge the leadership really of my colleague on Task Group No. 4, Rod Hills, who introduced me to the esoterica of Forensic Accounting and various other aspects of our detailed work as in our Task Group we attempted to deal with

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questions regarding, as he rather ineloquently describes it, the plumbing of the United Nations. I'm not talking about the plumbing of the physical facility. I will talk about that momentarily, but I'm talking about how the place works. And Rod, in fact, did teach me a great deal about the kinds of questions to ask and the answers to look for.

I am not a United Nations policy expert, like several of my colleagues who are here, Brett Schaefer and Nile Gardiner, particularly, on whose assistance I relied, but I have had exposure for more than two decades to the United Nations system. I was an American public member to a special session of the United Nations in 1983. Later in the 1980s I worked with then Secretary George Schultz on the United States and its role in UNESCO. And, of course, this year, I took it on myself to be one of the two Heritage designees to this Task Force.

So let me speak from my personal viewpoint on the work of the Task Force and where we are. The bottom line in terms of the management structure, in terms of the findings that we came up with, I think it is fair to say the United Nations is a mess. Our focus making the system more accountable, more transparent, more efficient and effective again from the perspective

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of the United States' interests, we found deficiencies in virtually every area of the United Nations that we looked at.

I appreciate the remarks by Under-Secretary Burnham in yesterday's <u>Financial Times</u> about how seriously he is going to be taking the need for real reform in the United Nations as he assumes his new duties there. In terms of specific problems, when we began our work at the United Nations early this year, my colleague, Mr. Hills, constantly reminded me and other involved in the work of our Task Group that when we were talking about problems like Oil For Food or Peacekeeping Operations in the Congo, we were talking about alleged incidents.

I think in the last six weeks or six months rather we can pretty well drop the adjective alleged. The corruption from top to bottom inside the United Nations system is from our perspective staggering in terms of the size of it, in terms, frankly, of the depth of it. It is a lack of integrity that unfortunately is endemic at far too many levels and in far too many areas. Down to small things, whether it has to do with how someone whom we had repeated and frequent contact with.

Mark Mallick Brown, how he can be paying

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\$10,000 a month rent on his personal house to George Soros, that on a salary of \$125,000 a year intrigues me at least. It was not part of our report, but it was of more than passing interest from recent press reports.

It goes to big questions like inflated rates of rebuilding the building itself, which will be the subject of a United States Senate hearing tomorrow when Donald Trump among others will be testifying on what the real cost of that should be. Should it be \$500 million or should it be \$1.2 billion? A not insignificant difference in terms of two estimates of what it might be. And as I say, that will be examined before the U.S. Senate tomorrow.

The lack of integrity, I'm afraid, is in evidence in terms of the culture of the United Nations, in terms of abusive travel and education vouchers, inflated expense reports, in terms of an internal justice system that was described to us by one senior United Nations official as being "royally screwed up with unqualified tribunal judges," reports of expected kick backs from lawyers representing dismissed or reassigned employees, etcetera, gross insufficient transparency and accountability throughout the system, in adequate management systems with no official managing the daily operations of the United Nations.

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With there being no requirement on a perspective Secretary General candidate to have had any experience in terms of management, the Under-Secretary Burnham's suggestion in yesterday's newspaper is one that we certainly applaud in terms of making the Secretary General the CEO type person with a deputy as a chief operating officer, so that real responsibility for the operations of the system can be assigned.

One of our indicative problems with the UN system came up early on when we asked for something that presumably would be available from any major corporation, any major NGO, labor union or whatever and that is an organization chart. To the best of my knowledge, Ann, we're still awaiting an organization chart. We were able to find one that was, I think, some 16 or 17 years-old, but beyond that there was not a detailed organization chart available from the United Nations organization.

We are faced with an organization where the General Assembly through the 5<sup>th</sup> Committee micromanages the budget, personnel, etcetera, where personnel practices when asked about employees with proper skills, attitudes, etcetera or whose role was clearly defined, we heard estimates ranging from 10 to 20 percent and as high as one-third in one department of individuals who

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were superfluous to the tasks at hand.

We have heard reports of dismal moral of managers having no ability to fire or move employees across departments of a process that takes several years to remove employees for gross incompetence. In effective programs seem to be ripe within the UN structure and unfortunately many managers and a number of member states seem to have little interest in making results based budgeting work. Bad programs live forever and drain resources from newer, more vital, more effective ones.

Unfortunately, under the current system, there is no way to evaluate whether or not program goals are being met and many programs, for that matter, have no measurable goals in any effect. And we are frustrated by the notion that somehow when management by objective is put in place, seemed to be happening some years ago, that the objective seemed to produce yet another report and to produce that report on time that that then measures the effectiveness of that particular program.

You all are aware of the level of the U.S. payments in terms of both the assessed payments, as well as peacekeeping operations, what the ratio is from the United States to other member states, of what happens

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with the United States, and again I remind you that our task in the Task Force, as assigned by the Congress, was to examine not merely the United Nations operations, but American interests at the United Nations and how they could better be served by a more efficient, effective United Nations organization.

Of interest to us was the fact that in the General Assembly only 42 countries on average voted with the United States, more than they voted against the United States. We have a table that indicates who votes which way, how often, etcetera, and it is rather depressing to find out that the largest single contributor in terms of both assessed and voluntary contributions has that little support.

We, of course, noted throughout the report the anti-semitism that is ripe within the United Nations system, the discrimination against one particular member state at the United Nations system and its inability to, in effect, be treated as a full member of the United Nations. Our Task Force made a series of specific recommendations. I will leave it to Rod Hills to go into these in detail.

We called for weighted voting on budgetary matters. We asked for an implementing of a "sunset clause" for all programs, both new and old, where, in

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effect, programs would be ranked, not necessarily to be eliminated, but to be ranked in order to decide how funds allocated to lower priority programs could be reallocated to those that were considered by top management to be higher. We asked for an enforcement and a bolster into the 5.6 Rule.

of We called for the creation an Independent Oversight Board to investigate, to address misconduct and internal corruption. We stronger standard Code of Ethics for UN employees, a strengthening of the role of true democracy inside the United Nations system. Again, we called for fair treatment of Israel and the elimination of all antisemitic programs that are specifically mentioned and that receive specific funding, including specific funding from assessed members dues.

I personally believe in using financial leverage to ensure that reforms are real and that they happen in a timely fashion. Frankly, I believe that history has shown little progress on UN reform when there is not that kind of financial pressure that is able to be applied and that when it has been applied we have, in fact, seen some positive results, whether it was a consensus based budgeting from the 1985 Nancy Kassebaum, Gerald Solomon Amendment, the creation of

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OIOS in 1994, the Helms-Biden legislation to make a payment of arrears contingent on continuing reform, etcetera.

We have, in fact, seen it work. I think it can work again in the future. I'll leave my comments on pending legislation until later, and, at this time, thank you all for your attention. Rod?

AMBASSADOR HILLS: There is some good news. We found, I think, almost without exception a sense of the need for reform in the large number of people with whom we spoke. I think that was by far the most encouraging part of our effort. If you have seen the whole report and read our Chapter 3, you realize that we use the term plumbing appropriately. And you also see that ours is by far the most boring part of the report. It is a simple recitation of Business 101, I suppose.

The two things that are most graphic in trying to understand what's wrong and trying to understand how to deal with it is the lack of accountability and the lack of management skills and the lack of management authority. And so almost everything that is in that part of our report dealing with reform changes to focus on the need for accountability and the need for skills and the authority of management, the skills and the authority of management.

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Ed mentioned briefly the Independent In a sense, Newt Gingrich quietly Oversight Board. accused me of trying to bring the Sarbanes-Oxley Bill to the United Nations and to some extent that's what we did do. The Independent Oversight Board is, judgment, comparable to the Independent Audit Committee that has come into its own in the United States governance of the United States Publicly Traded We believe that that Board should have Corporation. complete authority over the budget and the assignments of what is now called the OIOS.

Let me repeat or let me point out that the accountability today in the United Nations consists of three organizations. One is the Board of External Auditors, consisting of the Auditor General from the countries of the Philippines, France and South Africa. They each serve for six years, rotation every two years. And to the best we can see, it works pretty well. They are competent people and they do their job. They don't have quite the budget they would like to have. They don't have quite the authority they would like to have, but it's working.

The OIOS that Ed referred to was created in 1994 and it is a true independent internal audit, I should say it is a true internal audit function. And

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there are some people that have tried to do a good job.

I think there are 191 people in it. I may have that
number wrong, but roughly at least a third of them are
thought not to be competent for the job. Some people
would say up to half. They do not have complete
authority.

They do not have an adequate budget. They have to ask for their budget in competition with all other aspects of the United Nations. They have the technical capacity to ask separately of the General Assembly, but as a practical matter, they are fighting for money with the Secretariat.

There is something called the Joint Investigative Unit, JIU, which has some theoretical authority, but no staff and no budget to speak of. The need for the OIOS to have a budget to go where they need to go, to bring what researchers they need to bring, is not only important, it is the only way you can be certain that there is an effort to deal with corruption, mismanagement and general accountability.

For example, during our interviews, it was quite clear the Secretary General has from time to time instituted some reforms, and for example, results based budgeting. And so everybody does, theoretically, have to have on their budget proposal some results that are

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articulated. But there is no accountability to it.

Nobody says well, you haven't really articulated any results that can be defined and nobody goes out afterwards to find out whether or not the results that were budgeted for were achieved.

How do you create something as independent, something as sufficient independence to deal with so complex an organization? Our proposal, which came out of an extended discussion with the Board of External Auditors, was to have a board of say seven people, consistent with at least three Auditors General from three different countries. Because the Auditor General or Controller General, if you will, of a country is probably the most likely to be independent of his own nation, of any other public official, and the three of them will have the same kind of capacity, the same kind of background as the Auditor General on the Board of External Auditors.

There is an international auditing standard which requires an internal control capacity in order to give an external audit. And there is an international audit standard which says you can't have effective internal controls unless you have independent oversight. And so the Board of External Auditors is something of a convert already to our proposal in the notion that they

think they need to have some independent oversight capacity, not only for the internal audit, but for themselves.

And our notion is that this body would set the budget, authorize the assignments of the OIOS, would, of course, have to go to the General Assembly, but they would go to the General Assembly, not through the Secretary General, but directly, recognizing that if they didn't feel that they had the capacity or the budget they needed, then that would threaten the capacity of the United Nations to get a clean external audit.

The head of the OIOS would, in our judgment, be selected by the IOB, but only with the approval of the Secretary General and, obviously, the day-to-day administrative responsibilities could include work for the Secretary General. Hopefully, the Secretary General would take advantage of the OIOS to track the accountability of the things he wants to accomplish.

We had a large discussion about transparency and the question of whether or not the reports of the internal audit would be available to all members of the General Assembly. This, as you know, is a problem in our Government, in almost every government.

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We have fully subscribed the notion of transparency.
We have also recognized that there are some matters that
you need to be careful of.

And so that if you have a vigorous and effective internal audit, you may often have information, rumors and otherwise and material that you don't easily want to be broadcast throughout the world. And so we suggested that the United Nations should be subject to the same kind of transparency requirements, Freedom of Information Act you might say, that we have in the United States.

Turning to management. Ed has already pointed out that the need for an effective chief executive officer, chief operating officer is terrible germane. It happens that you have to apparently amend the United Nations Charter to change the name of the Secretary General to be Chief Executive Officer. And so we have surreptitiously tried to achieve the same result by saying the United Nations must have a chief operating officer. And the Secretary General must have the capacity to fire all the direct reports at will without or without cause.

Without that capacity, you don't have the capacity to manage. Whether or not the General Assembly has to pass a resolution to create a chief operating

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officer or whether or not the Secretary General and the Chief Administrative Officer or the Chief Management Officer can say okay, I'm the Chief Operating Officer and go about telling people what to do is a question probably more of diplomacy than of law.

As Ed said, it was our judgment that the General Assembly should insist that the new Secretary General have some real management skills and that those management skills would be used to appraise the capacity of the people that report to him.

The budget and programming. Ed has talked about the 5<sup>th</sup> Committee. Every country, 191, puts a person on the committee, not normally a person of real economic capacity or budget capacity, and so the budget is, basically, in morass. The Rule 5.6, which Ed referred to, requires that the Secretariat require a definition of what are the lowest activities, rating all the activities, of the given department and to enforce that.

We suggested that anybody who did not follow 5.6, did not rate the programs with respect to importance, would automatically lose 15 percent of the budget. It does not mean that we thought, as Ed said, that we wanted 15 percent of the budget to be arbitrarily cut, but we thought that a rule as clear as

that should be clearly dealt with and should be followed.

The sunsetting proposals, as Ed said, we propose that they be managed, that every proposal have an automatic deadline. If it's not renewed, it dies. And again, you would need something like the OIOS to see whether the sunsetting proposals were provided for.

The consensus budgeting process came about, as Ed said, in the middle '90s and the problem, of course, is that there are 191 nations. 121 of them produce less than 1 percent of the total budget.

Whereas, Mexico alone produces 2 percent of the budget.

So you have 121 nations that have nothing at stake and you have about 10 nations that have 78 percent of the budget. And that means that anything that -- lets say United Nations wise, the United States wants to do something, 121 nations may automatically be against it.

So the idea of a consensus said okay, it's kind of a veto power. And it works in the sense of restraining the budget, but it doesn't really help very much when you want to accomplish something. In other words, if you have some good idea, how do you get a good idea passed? And how do you break this stranglehold where everybody has a veto power and nobody really has the capacity to do something.

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Now, we didn't have any dramatic ideas. We have said that we thought that the nations that pay more should find a way to exercise more authority over the budget without disenfranchising the capacity of the other nations. You certainly do not want to tell 121 nations they have no say over the budget. But that's a problem of both diplomacy and probably the changes of the authority.

Personnel. There simply is nothing at all that you would recognize as a modern personnel policy program or capacity. The Personnel Department itself, the people we talked to, they would acknowledge that 30 percent of the people there did not have the capacity to do the work or they weren't needed for the job that they were in.

Managers are not evaluated. Promotions are not easy. If you are trying to build a department and you have an opening, you can't put somebody in that opening from your department, it's the whole Secretariat can bid for that job. So there's no way to create that kind of management authority that we all see so common in the rest of the world. You can have a department with too many people in it and those people can't be moved to a department with nobody in it. It's a total chaos in trying to run an organization when you have

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rules so foolish.

The selection of people. We have long recognized that it is important to have geographical diversity, but the United Nations Charter says you want skill in United Nations and geographical diversity. It is our observation that the geographical diversity has taken preference over skill. And so how to put skill back into that equation with real meaning is important.

There has been some notion of reform. The Secretary General has suggested that there needs to be and the General Assembly seems to be going along with the notion there seems to be some capacity. It's very simple. You need judges to judge. You do not have competent people judging the Internal Justice System and it could take five years for the most simple management decision in terms of personnel.

In criminal cases, we felt strongly that immunity should be automatically waived unless the Chief Legal Officer of the United Nations can demonstrate and certify that an employee of the United Nations would be subject to a serious problem of fair and legal treatment.

The United Nations needs to develop a program for protecting whistle-blowers. They don't have

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such a thing today.

The management of the operation. The budget of the peacekeeping operation of the United Nations is, I think, three times the budget of the United Nations itself. The Procurement Office of the United Nations is, obviously, equipped to buy pencils and papers, whether or not it is equipped to buy weaponry is another thing. The fact is the peacekeeping has worked pretty well.

They have kind of jury built it and so that you could say that they understand that they shouldn't use the basic body delineations, but our proposal is that peacekeeping have its own set of regulations and its own staff. And that there are other operations in the United Nations that subsist largely on voluntary contributions and we suggest that maybe the best way to do that, and we ask that it seriously be considered, is that those operations be moved and entirely voluntarily and our comparison was to the United States UNDP, which works pretty well.

Under the same general rules, their personnel system works better. Their internal audit works a little better. And so our notion is that substantial matters could be worked out better if you had many operations moved out of the Secretariat, still,

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of course, subject to the overall authority of the Secretary General, but with its own staff, its own budget and its own culture.

The question of how you deal with the General Assembly is by far perhaps the most important. How to create effective committees, how to create an effective 5<sup>th</sup> Committee, how to create a real budget process. We have pointed out the problems and we have pointed out the need to do it. I confess that we did not come through with a remarkable argument, other than the fact that we surely think it needs to be done.

The question of how you get it done. There are those that thought that we should again withhold the budget. We decided not as a group, as a whole to deal with that. My own view is that Teddy Roosevelt had it about right, to speak softly. Everybody knows we have the "big stick" some place. We do believe that this is the time for diplomacy. We do believe that there is a willingness, certainly in the Secretariat itself, and we sense, at least anecdotally, that there is a sense in members of the General Assembly to bring about the kinds of reform that we have.

I must say that working with Ed has been a great delight. We came at this from different backgrounds. My United Nations experience was nothing

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compared to his, but I did have a lot of experience working with companies that didn't work. And so I guess that's why I was chosen for the job. Well, thank you.

AMBASSADOR SOLOMON: Well, before you go, just let me say I was remiss in not introducing one of our other experts. We did draw on this Task Force effort on a broad range of people with real expertise and former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, former Governor of Pennsylvania, also a former Under-Secretary of the UN for Management was one of those people who brought a lot of wisdom and experience to this effort and we're delighted that he is here this morning to be with us. So my apologies, Richard, for not highlighting your presence here earlier.

AMBASSADOR HILLS: And I'm going to just observe before I turn to Governor Thornburgh that, you know, just based on being Governor of the State of Pennsylvania, which is not a small State, and Attorney General of the United States, you would have something to say about management and accountability. But it's a particularly appropriate thing that you are -- than going on to be Under-Secretary-General of the UN for Management Issues, one of your less predecessors, perhaps, you know, gives this such continuity.

And I want to specifically mention the very

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good report you did in, I guess, 1993, report to the Secretary General on flagging many of the very issues which we are identified in the report today. Senator Thornburgh?

SENATOR THORNBURGH: Thank you. The first two management jobs you mentioned were a piece of cake compared to the challenges at the United Nations. I want to commend all who participated in the preparation of this report. It lays out in understandable terms. Is this mike not working? Somebody is --

AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Just pull it closer.

SENATOR THORNBURGH: Very seldom do I get admonished to speak louder. The report sets out in understandable terms precisely what the problems are that face both the UN and the United States. It's difficult to do that sometimes. Management is kind of a sleeper issue in both senses of the word. It's not often on people's screens when they look at issues, particularly internationally.

And quite frankly, it puts a lot of people to sleep. They don't want to hear about management issues when there is a lot of discussion about things such as peacekeeping, diplomatic initiatives and political roles at the UN. So I particularly commend the Institute of Peace and Ambassadors Feulner and Rod

Hills and others who participated in this effort.

Let me just offer a few comments. The the easiest, the notion that the Deputy first is Secretary General should, in fact, the be Operating Officer is as old as the hills and has been regularly dishonored by those who are in charge of policy at the UN. You simply can't run an organization worldwide in its reach and complex in its nature like the UN is without having a chief operating officer. Somebody who on a day-to-day basis is responsible for and oversees all of its operations. That's an easy one.

Similarly, the evaluation recommendations with regard to budget really recommend themselves. They resonate closely with the observations we made in our 1993 report. When I served at the UN, that report incidentally was aided by the pro bono services of MacKenzie and Company to look at some of these management problems. There is no effective evaluation and oversight of expenditures of the type that those of us who serve in the U.S. Government are used to here.

Sunset provisions speak to themselves. They are an occasion for an evaluation and oversight and for weeding out programs that simply don't work. There is too much micromanagement at the UN, as favorite programs and individuals are protected from the normal

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scrutiny that you would expect when looking at programs from the point of view evaluating. And as Rod Hills pointed out, Rule 5.6 is an excellent way to carry out some prioritization, but is honored more in the breach than in the observance.

When you come to personnel, the existence of "dead wood" in the UN is a given. I'm always reminded of the remark that Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who served when I was there, was alleged to have made in response to a reporter's question, the reporter asked "How many people in Geneva work?" And he responded "about half." And that by some estimates is a very generous evaluation.

The movement from preponderance of permanent contracts to fixed contracts is a laudable change and one that is reinforced by this study and the change in the judicial system that would professionalize particularly the Administrative Tribunal, which is the ultimate authority on disciplinary actions and the like, could only be fruitful.

I was intrigued by the recommendation of a greater use of secondments in staffing key positions within the UN. Often times, the skill sets that are available from the resources within the UN are not matched with the needs of the organization and the

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ability to use secondments of people who have those skills would be a big step forward.

The probably most exciting change recommended by this group and one that, I think, will probably cause some great scrutiny, because it is new and different, is the recommendation for an Independent Oversight Board equivalent Corporate to a Audit Committee upon which so much attention has been focused recently in the U.S. due to problems with corporate governance.

Such a board, it seems to me, is terribly important when it comes to setting policy for audit oversight and investigations. I have, as I expressed to the co-chairs, some concern that an independent IOB may subsume the current Office of Internal Oversight Services within its organizational setup to the extent that OIOS is by appearances downgraded in its importance and lessened in its capability.

I have a great concern about the need for an independent proactive investigative capability, which differs quite a bit from the audit role. The two compliment one another in the best of all worlds and there is a cross relationship between those who are involved in investigating specific allegations or fraud and those who are engaged in the audit process, which is

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more often after the fact.

I look more upon the Inspector General model used in our Government, which empowers with kind of a roving mandate individuals who have that function. I think it is important, in particular, to retain the straight line relationship that OIOS has with the Secretary General. One, it is just a matter of making sure that that office is invested with the appropriate credibility and clout that it is a high profile office, not buried two or three layers down under the Secretary-General.

In the final analysis, I mean, I don't think these are more or less icing on the cake, from my point of view, and I think they can be worked out. But in the final analysis, the most important thing with regard to the integrity of the organizations' operations is going to be the backing of top leadership. You must have a Secretary General who is visibly and vociferously committed to the integrity of the operation and supporting those mechanisms that have been created to ensure that integrity.

Similarly, you have to provide the head of OIOS with the pay and status that indicates that he or she is a serious player when it comes to policing the activities of staff, management and contractors with

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regard to activities that are within the rules. Here, I think, the most recent infamous lack of oversight over the Oil For Food Program for Iraq offers a splendid opportunity. It is these times of crisis that bring forth opportunities to make constructive change in a very dramatic manner and it seems to me that's something that shouldn't be overlooked here.

There has to be a perception in addition to a fact that this is a serious effort and that applies the application of sanctions only to wrongdoing, fraud, corruption is uncovered, but the creation of deterrent capability through a the perception that this is a serious effort. recent experience in this regard was at the World Bank where the use of something equivalent to an Independent Oversight Board was attempted and what ultimately was adopted was an independent equivalent of the Office of Internal Oversight Services.

And it's more, I think, than a question of who does OIOS report to, whether they report to the Secretary General or to the Independent Oversight Board. It's a matter of giving OIOS a featured role in efforts to ensure integrity.

One particular matter that I want to make a strong plea for, that's included in the recommendations

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of this report, is the maximization of the requirement for disclosure of income and assets by persons. In my experience over 25 years of involvement in anti-corruption and prosecution efforts, one of the best ways to ferret out those who are maybe using their office for personal gain is to require the periodic disclosure, probably on an annual basis of income and assets, because they provide a jumping off point for examining any allegations that are made with regard to a wrongdoing.

the Finally, Ι think, path that is recommended in this report is an excellent one and one that I think should command our attention. understand it, that is to have the Administration and the Congress agree upon an agenda that the United States can support, one that there is no internal bickering between those two entities about what the path is and then sell that in the United Nations through diplomatic efforts, possibly through, as a last resort, some kind of economic pressure.

But I have always felt that one of the reasons that reform founders, when it is framed by the United States, is that we don't have our act together and that we hear different voices from the Congress than we do from the Administration. And I would set as a

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very high priority for these management changes, in particular, to have a consensus reached between the various players in the U.S. Government before we begin to mount a frontal assault on these, seemingly, intractable problems at the UN.

Thank you for giving me the chance to review the report and to participate in this process.

And once again, I commend you for your efforts.

AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Thank you, Governor. I'll turn now to Ann Florini, just to say a word here. Ann is a senior fellow at Brookings Institution and, of course, as one of the experts, she was the coordinating expert and had a great deal to do with the drafting and writing and as serving also myself as the editor of the overall report, the crispness and clarity of this particular section report has always been very striking. And, Ann, I turn to you to plug in any details or other observations based on your very close association with this over those months.

MS. FLORINI: Actually, Gary, what I would like to do is change the subject very slightly away from the report to the impact that it is having in New York and talk a bit about what is happening in New York in response not only to the recommendations of the Task Force put forward, but to the quite intensive pressure

and scrutiny that the United Nations has been under from many sources for quite a while.

If you look at our recommendations, I think you need to divide them into two categories. The first category are recommendations that are really aimed at the member states. Things that only the member states of the United Nations can do. The second category is reforms that the Secretary General can carry out under his own authority. So with that division in mind, there is a great deal of negotiation going on now among the member states in the General Assembly about many of these issues.

And I want to just run through where it seems there is a consensus that may be forming in New York in favor of some of the recommendations that we have put forward. On the Independent Oversight Board, which I personally think is the most important recommendation we made, there seems to be quite a bit of receptivity to the idea. They may not call it exactly an Independent Oversight Board, but there seems to be quite a strong understanding that something like this is needed and that it needs to have real authority.

Likewise, there seems to be increasing acceptance of the idea that the Secretary General has to be empowered to move people around. It has been

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ludicrous that up to this point he could not take a person from one department and put them in another department depending on the changing needs of the institution. And the ridiculousness of that policy is beginning to be recognized.

On the Administrative Justice System, the internal justice system that Rod mentioned, which really has been a travesty, the General Assembly adopted regulations, I think it was in April, setting forward criteria for the first time for the judges who serve in that system. How they are going to implement those criteria to make sure that people actually meet them is another question, but there is at least a recognition for the first time that there have to be criteria of some kind.

There is general acceptance of the idea that mandates that are more than five years old at least need to be reviewed. I haven't heard a great deal of acceptance of the idea that every new program ought to have a sunset clause, which I think is unfortunate, but at least the idea that things that have been around for a long time need to put forward some evidence that they should continue to exist. There is certainly going to be a request made to the Secretary General that he put forward proposals for overhaul of the budgetary and

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human resources systems, again not a whole lot of detail.

So in general there is receptivity to some of the more important recommendations that we put forward. There will be a document coming out sometime in the next week, which is called the "Outcome Document" spearheaded by the current President of the General Assembly, Ambassador Ping, which will touch on many of these issues and I think it will be very much worth looking at that document carefully to see to what degree there appears to be consensus among the UN's member states that there are ideas that are going to be adopted at the next General Assembly.

There are some where there are greater concerns like the proposal for a chief operating officer, and there the objection is an entirely political one. Who is going to be this chief operating officer? Is it going to be an American and is this actually an American plot to get an American running the United Nations? Not necessarily the response we were hoping for.

In terms of the steps that the Secretary General can make on his own authority, I think there we have gotten farther, understandably because he can just go ahead and do things as opposed to waiting for votes

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of the General Assembly.

One of the biggest concerns that Congress has had, and I think rightly so, is on Whistle-Blower Protection Policy. There has not been a very good one and it has not been trusted by the staff. For the last several months, the United Nations has been undergoing an extensive period of staff consultation on a new Whistle-Blower Policy. They have done one round. They are about to do another round. The pro-reform forces that I have talked to within the United Nations seem fairly happy with the way this one is going, something that, again, we need to look at closely over the next couple of months.

On appointments, senior appointments, the appointments process up until very recently has been a very closed, opaque, highly politicized one and that, I think, truly has changed and there has been demonstrable change in that. The appointment for the new head of UNDP, Kemal Dervis from Turkey, was done in a very open and transparent process. Similarly, the process for the selection of the new head of OIOS, the new High Commissioner for Refugees.

The appointments by and large seem to be ending up in quite good people, and I think there the Secretary General has made some progress. Similarly, of

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course, the appointment of Mr. Burnham, who is going to be having to deal with all of these issues from now on.

On one other matter I didn't mention having to do with the member states, on OIOS there definitely at least strong lip service being given to the idea that OIOS needs much more in the way of The General Assembly resources that it had. approved a number of new investigative positions. The General Assembly does not appoint people, but it does have to authorize all of the slots for all of the departments, and they have now authorized, I think, it's 19 new ones for OIOS and provided something more in the way of resources, particularly focused on peacekeeping monitoring.

major One of the weaknesses that identified in our report was that there was no automatic follow-up process for recommendations no matter where they came from. There are the three audit bodies that the previous speakers referred to, the OIOS, the Board of Auditors and the Joint Inspection Unit. There was no which their recommendations process by were automatically followed up on.

The Secretary General has now set up a new oversight body whose job it is to take all those recommendations and make sure something happens with

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them. One would think that would have been a fairly obvious step sometime ago, but at least it now appears to be happening.

So if you put all of this together, I would say that in the more than two decades I have been watching the United Nations, there is more happening now and more of a broad consensus on the need for reform in this area than there has ever been before. This does not mean it's a done deal.

With the exception of the specific steps that the Secretary General has undertaken that I mentioned, much of this is still in the negotiating phase. I think it's a much more ripe time for negotiation now than it has ever been before. I think there is a real chance that the United States will get most of what it really needs to get out of this reform process, but it is not a done deal. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Thanks, Ann. Those remarks are a very good segueway into inviting Under-Secretary Burnham to make some comments, because nothing could be more appropriate, and we were chatting a little bit just as you arrived, all the more from someone like yourself who has gone from several years of managing, or if I may even say so, trying to manage the Department of State and going directly to managing or trying to manage

the United Nations. I mean, this is a perspective, but it's a pleasure. If I may, I invite you at this point to make some comments.

UNDER-SECRETARY BURNHAM: Well, thank you very much for inviting me to do so and to the Members of the Panel and the effort you made in this work. It's an absolutely spectacular document, one that continues to reverberate throughout the halls of the United Nations in New York and one that is being taken deeply seriously by the Secretary General and all the senior management of the United Nations, and I think it's an important stake in the ground for exactly what needs to be done to the United Nations to help move it forward.

I don't want to be long. I'm reminded of the story of Henry Ford and Thomas Edison. Henry Ford pointed to a fish on the wall and said Tom, why do you think that fish is there? And he said I don't know, he said, because he opened his mouth at the wrong time.

With that, let me be brief. I think that the internal controls, as defined by Sarbanes-Oxley and with the words, Ed, that you have mentioned here today, that Sarbanes-Oxley application for the American corporate world and through OMB Circular A-123 for the Federal Government are absolutely essential and applicable to the United Nations. So clearly, the same

vision of Sarbanes-Oxley and the attestation to internal controls must be included here.

There is something, which we haven't talked about and in these discussions we don't, but yet it was something that General Colin Powell was deeply focused on when he was Secretary of State, and that was the enterprise architecture of the Department of State, and it's true for any qlobal organization and it's absolutely true for the UN. Wе have to have an enterprise application.

Transparency and accountability can only come when you have the systems that support that, an accounting system, accounting standards, the ability to aggregate information, a knowledge management system, the breaking down of stovepipes between individual entities that are out there, purchasing software and developing different personnel management systems and whatnot independent of the whole, which is, by the way, expensive and it doesn't coordinate across the various organizations of the UN. So the words enterprise architecture also need to be included here.

I feel like we have the rubrics, accountability, transparency and ethics, and when we talk about ethics we don't talk enough about training.

There currently does not exist at the United Nations a

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universal ethics training program. Yet, certainly there is within the Federal Government.

I will take note that recently the Chairman of Goldman Sachs ordered all his managing directors to undergo an ethics training program. And as both the corporate, the philanthropic and the non-governmental or the multilateral world moves forward, we need to embrace the notion that we should have annual ethics training, annual ethics certification and, by the way, an independent Office of Ethics at the United Nations that reports directly to the Secretary General and perhaps directly to the General Assembly, very similar to the independent Office of Government Ethics that we have here in Washington, D.C.

I will note just that making we are progress and, Ann, you were very kind and generous to note that on both the Whistle-Blower protection issues, on the empowerment and independence and increased resources for OIOS, financial disclosure also moving forward where we are really adopting the best practices from a number of member states. Ultimately, I believe that will conclude with а financial disclosure requirement stronger than that, which we have within the Federal Government for members of the Administration.

An Independent Advisory Board or an

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Independent Audit Advisory Board of some kind is moving forward. I know I have had a number of discussions about this with the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary General, and that has certainly been embraced at the very top.

Ed mentioned the Capital Master Plan.

Because I happen to be briefing Capitol Hill on it tomorrow, I just want to mention that this is a \$1.2 or \$1.3 billion renovation of the United Nations' campus, 17 acres, 2.6 million square feet up in New York and, of course, it's essential that we do this. It's a marvelous retro 1950s building and architecture and furniture and, when you walk in there, it's a walk back in time to see this and it's absolutely charming.

That said, right below that lies, including the radiator just a few feet from my desk, dripping asbestos that is caking the walls, no sprinkler systems, no effort at all or ability to meet the Fire Code, the Building Code, Safety Codes. Any modern security that we would assume for federal buildings down here we lack up there, so it's essential.

That said, it's an expensive project, and so we are doing what I think any responsible organization would do, which is that we're bringing aboard, and the Secretary General announced yesterday,

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the hiring of a new Assistant Secretary General for the Capital Master Plan, a gentleman by the name of Fritz Reuter.

Fritz most recently managed the over \$1 billion new construction and renovation of Cornell Medical, the Columbia Presbyterian construction over the FTR Drive. He has had experience around the world, other experience with major projects in New York, came highly recommended by many individuals within New York, including the UN Association and the former head of the Metropolitan Museum who has also worked with Fritz Reuter in the past.

So we're going to be bringing in an expert with huge experience within the City of New York to come and oversee this project. It doesn't mean that I, as the Under-Secretary-General, won't continue to have day-to-day involvement in this and will continue to work to make comps.

And as an investment banker by training, of course, the best way to figure out whether or not we're getting value here is to try and figure out on an apples-to-apples basis what other projects have cost, what's the best practice from those other projects and what is the per square foot cost on these things.

For right now, we have had four reviews in

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the last four years. For right now, it appears that we are on track. It does not, however, mean that we're not going to continue to ask the right questions about this project, continue to be protective of the global taxpayer that is paying for this project and, finally, continue to manage by what I call "quis custodiet ipso custodes," who is guarding the guards, management by guarding by the guards, by always asking the questions whether or not we're getting fair and good value for this effort.

On the oversight of the recommendations of both the Board of Auditors as well as OIOS, it is essential that we bring in a mechanism to review these, and the Deputy Secretary General has tasked me with coming up with the methodology for that.

The State Department, we called it the Management Control Steering Committee, which I chaired, made up of Assistant Secretaries and the IG, it came together and required a work plan any time we had a reportable condition or a material weakness on our financial statements or in our internal controls, and to oversee the efforts to either reduce those reportable conditions and eliminate them entirely or to prevent the potential for a reportable condition from happening.

And clearly, that model is going to move

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forward. What the appropriate residence of that model is or who should chair that, I'm not completely sure whether or not it should be the Deputy Secretary General or someone from the outside, but we're coming up with advice on that.

And then finally, on the management performance review, which was also mentioned here this morning for senior managers, this is also something that the Deputy Secretary General has tasked the Department of Management with, and we are coming up with recommendations on this as well.

And from my own perspective of the last four years and the methodology that was used to bring in strategic and performance planning within the Department of State, to link that to resources, to understand how much each one of our goals, of our performance indicators, our costing going forward to do dashboard reporting, to aggregating this information beneath a new a global accounting system, a dispersing system, it was a massive undertaking at the State Department under Secretary Powell and now, Secretary Rice, and something which will be a very large, if not massive, undertaking here at the United Nations.

Suffice it to say, however, that I think that we have great examples out there of member states

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that are doing this not just the Department of State.

Canada, New Zealand, others have also used the balance scorecard and other methodologies to rate programs and managers, and I think this will be our effort going forward.

So with that, thank you so much for inviting me to come and make comments and particular thanks to this Panel and to the work you have done in making the United Nations and helping to make the United Nations a more accountable and honorable place. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Thank you very much, Chris. Those were very timely and extremely important insights and, you know, what is really happening in the real world now as to concerning the real problems that were identified in the points made by our Panel.

We would like now to move into the remaining portion of the program with your questions and comments. And I would repeat, ask you, please, to come up to the microphone and kindly give your name and affiliation before you ask your question, and we will have no problem directing it, I think, to the appropriate Member of the Panel.

So with that, let me invite us to proceed. Who would like to be first? There is usually no

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reticence in these matters. Oh, my colleague, Don Hays, who also had more than a hand in management issues at the United Nations.

ambassador Hays: I had two years dealing with the 5<sup>th</sup> Committee, the General Assembly, the Security Council from '99 to 2001 as the Ambassador for UN Reform, and I would make two comments. One, I'm delighted that Ann says that there is a mood up there, but when you get it down to the 5<sup>th</sup> Committee, it's like taking something from the dining room to the garbage compactor. Somehow, there is no connection there. You kind of see the threads, but there is no follow through.

I would point to two things. One, the U.S. needs to be consistent and you have said this before but, I mean, consistent in terms of time, too. This is not a one year or two year project. It's a 10 year project to build a culture inside an organization and inside a membership of an organization.

Secondly, we need to put our own resources into the U.S. mission to ensure that continuity takes place. You can't do it with four overburdened people who are running from committee to committee. You need a massive program to create an alliance to educate member states who have never heard of these things and don't really have much concern.

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Management anywhere is a difficult sell. I spent a lot of time in management in the State Department and I told one of the secretaries the only place I saw change was in the child care center. In any event, at the UN you have got a lot of member states who don't share our culture of management. They don't share our goals and, in many cases, it's not their issue.

The last point I would say is that, by and large, the biggest hurdle that this will have to overcome is the member states, because whether you divide it up, as Ann did, between member states and Secretariat, it all comes back to the member states. Yes, it is true the Secretary can do certain things, but he does it as a hazard, because if he irritates a segment of the constituency, they will get him back later.

It's all very well that the Assembly has agreed to strengthen OIOS, but we will see the proof in the pudding when the budget is approved this year. There will be tradeoffs demanded by member states who really don't endorse this for their support for funding for OIOS, and that is why I agree with you completely. It should be taken out of the general budget and be a separate line item voted by the General Assembly and not through this budgetary system in there where you have

tradeoffs between oh, you want peacekeeping and you want a conference and you want somebody in OIOS and it's always a tradeoff. The last thing I would say is the personnel system, it's a mess. It's a mess by everybody's standards, by the people who work with them, by the people who select them, by the people who oversee them. And if we can do anything about that to make this a of international civil cadre servants that professional, that stand up to the highest standards, that have good education and training, we will do the world a good service. Thank you. PARTICIPANT: No questions? AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: As mentioned, Ι questions and comments. MS. FLORINI: Well, actually --AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Do have response? MS. FLORINI: Yes, if I could make a quick response to two of those points. One is for people who

MS. FLORINI: Yes, if I could make a quick response to two of those points. One is for people who haven't spent the last several months immersed in the United Nations, fortunate people. The 5<sup>th</sup> Committee that everybody keeps referring to is the Budget Committee at the United Nations, which is a huge part of the reason that the United Nations has not worked very

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well.

It tends to be represented by fairly low level personnel who do not have much expertise in budget and finance and administrative issues, and working around the 5<sup>th</sup> Committee is a huge part of the problem, that you have to work around the 5<sup>th</sup> Committee if you're going to get much in the way of successful reform.

There is a proposal for providing the President of the General Assembly with the authority to convene his own small group of ambassadors, not the second secretaries who staff the 5<sup>th</sup> Committee, not to replace the 5<sup>th</sup> Committee, but to provide an alternative channel for oversight of the Secretariat. If that were to bear fruit, I think it would help a great deal, because, frankly, anything that gets you around dealing with the 5<sup>th</sup> Committee is only a good thing.

The second comment on personnel. There is a tremendous amount of pro-reform force within the United Nations, particularly on personnel and particularly the lower level people who are intensely frustrated by the system that they are working in. There is a huge number of people who go to the United Nations, because they share the ideals, because they think they are going to go there and do good for the world, and then they run into this system that we have

been talking about where there is a great deal of not good things going on.

They have come together in something called the Low Level Panel for UN Reform, because they are generally fairly low level, and their focus is overwhelmingly on reform of the personnel system. So there are forces both within the United Nations, as well as forces from outside, who are all pushing in this very important direction.

#### AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Please.

DR. PI: My name is Dr. Pi (phonetic sp.) and I from Beijing Nations. I have interest in the United Nations as one of our major programs and, in fact, we're doing quite a few things in terms of gauging all these different proposals from you, from the Kofi Annan and from the Administration. We have started some polling activity also to get the consensus, full understanding.

I have a couple of questions and anybody is welcome to answer it. You defined the objective of this report was to assess the American interest, so I didn't see by reforming this rich American interest are we really promoting or helping. So I would like to get some clarification, and just one example could be is this going to help us get better, less, let's say, anger

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in the rest of the world and, as you know, all those issues?

The other thing is when you look corporate restructuring, and I am an entrepreneur, and like and GE when they become very big, very inefficient, they split and they form different, say, subsidiaries or different companies. Was there any discussion within this particular group regarding into splitting the UN three or four completely independent or maybe having four COOs rather than one COO?

Like, you know, when the rest of the world looks at you and there is a humanitarian component, there is a peacekeeping component and there is a war making component. So would it be better and was this subject talked about, splitting the UN into three or four different major areas? Thank you.

AMBASSADOR FEULNER: Let me try. Thank you very much, Dr. Pi, for you insightful question. say first that yes, the theme of the whole report was American interest in UN reform. Our colleagues on the other task groups when they spoke to subjects like terror, like weapons of mass destruction, like peacekeeping and other substantive processes, talked specifically about American concerns and American

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opportunities. I, for one, would hope that there would be a coming together in terms of the mechanical plumbing kind of reforms that we are talking about in our own specific Task Group.

Your second question, we did, in fact, discuss among ourselves very intensively the notion that, for example, the UN Development Program is a separate operational entity, as Mr. Hills pointed out, that seems to have a much better both management management record than structure and does the Secretariat. And we discussed among ourselves the possibility, for example, of peacekeeping being split off, peacekeeping with a budget now roughly twice, more or less, the size of the Secretariat, yet being under the Secretariat.

Would it make more sense for peacekeeping to be a separate operational entity within the UN, ala your analogy to General Electric or other major corporate structures, and that is certainly a way that might, in fact, be looked at at the UN. But I would yield to my colleague, Mr. Hills, who might have more thoughts on this.

AMBASSADOR HILLS: No, I think you have answered it perfectly.

MR. BALDWIN-BOTT: My name is Jeffrey

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Baldwin-Bott from GAO. I have sort of a two part question on the notion of an Independent Oversight Board. I know there's some concern among a number of the member states that over time, OIOS has become sort of less and less an internal management tool and more and more an external audit and that, of course, was exacerbated as audit reports were made available to member states.

Do you think that this move toward an IOB might help the member states that have this concern since there would be an outside board that would be overseeing some more of OIOS' work? And the second part of the question is do you have some idea on how you might think members of this Oversight Board would be chosen?

This goes back, once again, to the political nature of appointments of this type, of employment of this type at the UN. There have been some concerns expressed that it would be difficult to choose these folks in a way that would be agreed upon and in a way that would make this Oversight Board effective.

AMBASSADOR HILLS: Let me respond first, if I may. I would like to incorporate, if I may give a reference, Dick Thornburgh's comments on the difficulty of creating the kind of oversight responsibility we

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want. As I see it, the creation of the Independent Oversight Board would greatly elevate the status of the OIOS. Of course, it would have the straight line responsibility to the Secretary General, but it would have that little independent twinge to it, so that he can say that it has someplace else to go for authority as well.

The difference between the internal audit and the Inspector General role that Dick also referred to is important, but there is no reason at all why both those functions cannot be in the OIOS. They don't have to be, but there is no reason why they can't be.

That is typical of an American corporation where the internal auditor is also responsible for investigations. And in that capacity, the OIOS should have responsibility to hire outside experts, if they need to, to use an outside auditing firm or outside law firm or outside detective agency, whatever. On the second issue, which was on the --

MR. BALDWIN-BOTT: How to choose the (inaudible).

AMBASSADOR HILLS: I'm sorry, yes, a terribly good point. The way to start, as we proposed it, was to find three other Directors General. That has worked for some time. They have been able to choose

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three Directors General and rotate them. And as I said earlier, a typical Controller General or Auditor General has more independence from his or her own government than most government officials. So that seemed to be a fertile field for candidates.

Now, how do you get the rest of them? My own idea would be the three of them could pick the others, and that you would probably have some general approval by the General Assembly, but the candidates could be retired or former heads of the Central Bank. They could be former heads of agencies that have had an impeccable record of independence and that it would operate that way.

Let me come back to the other point. The authority of the head of OIOS, I believe, will automatically be raised by the existence the Independent Oversight Board. The interesting experience in the United States is that the creation of Sarbanes-Oxley rules has caused the typical internal auditor to be elevated from a subservient position into one at least equal to the controller of the country and often to the chief financial officer. So you had an elevation of that authority just by the fact of the independence.

So I would certainly subscribe to the notion that the OIOS should not be subsumed and while I

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accept the fact that it may be difficult to find members, if you did use that formula, pick three Directors General, and let them fill out the members of the Audit Committee, I think that you would have a satisfactory operation.

There is the question of how much attention is going to be given by the Independent Oversight Board. It is true that in the United States the audit committees meet. Well, it used to be four times a year. Now it's more like six or seven times a year. But there's no reason why the nature for at least the initial period of the Independent Oversight Board couldn't have a permanent presence, a small staff if you will, in New York working with the permanent presence of the External Board of Auditors.

AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Please.

Carolina DR. CALLOWAY: Dr. Calloway (phonetic sp.) from the United Nations and I am with the Culture of Department with Peace Under-Secretary Chowdhury. I have a couple of questions regarding the personnel issues. Certainly, we never want to forget the overall spirit of the charter of the UN, that being the harmonization of nations and, while I certainly appreciate your expertise in the financial field, we have to remember the original mission of this

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When Ι heard you talk about the inadequacies of jobs and I certainly walk those halls frequently and that Ι have met against those inadequacies, but I also have to keep in mind that when you talk about putting qualified personnel in every single position that you possibly can, you are just, by the nature of international education, going to overload this organization with representation from developed nations and underdeveloped nations will be represented in those personnel posts.

Our department's position is that there should be a screening. And I am putting this out as a comment, an idea for you to consider. There should be a screening of qualified, honest candidates and then there being a training facility within the UN where there is a UN training program, so that we bring individuals from around the world and do not have a west-heavy operation of the United Nations. You have got to remember the same boy out in the bush may have studied his tail off, but if the facilities to learn were not there, he did not get the adequate representation at the UN.

And that's my comment to this, and I do certainly appreciate your expertise, but education is my field and I feel adamantly that there has to be more

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equality in the selection process once they receive their appointment to the UN. Why don't we have an institute within the UN for the purpose of training on ethics? That was a very fine comment and I certainly support that, but also for the training in the nuts and bolts, because it's pretty hard to learn about a computer when your village doesn't have electricity, but maybe an hour a month in some places where I have visited. Thank you.

SENATOR THORNBURGH: I think what you're talking about in part is a career development program.

DR. CALLOWAY: Exactly.

SENATOR THORNBURGH: Which has been notably lacking at the UN from the outset. I don't know if perhaps others can speak to the status today, but I know when I was there that was one of the recommendations that we urged most strongly, was to tend to that very shortcoming.

DR. CALLOWAY: Thank you.

AMBASSADOR HILLS: Let me just say the problem today at the United Nations is people are being hired purely on a geographical basis and not on capacity. And while I completely subscribe to the notion of career development, if you look at the way people come and stay at the United Nations today, they

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come from countries that have qualified people in them, but the people being selected are being selected so much on geographical diversity and not on skills that you can't ignore that part of this. Career development, fine, but right now the question of selection is seriously distorted.

DR. CALLOWAY: Yes, sir, but isn't that the spirit of the United Nations, a place of equal representation and to cooperate with each other?

AMBASSADOR HILLS: I don't know. I think the damn thing has to work first.

DR. CALLOWAY: In the spirit of the original charter?

AMBASSADOR HILLS: Yes. Diversity is wonderful and education is wonderful and progress is wonderful, but you got to make the United Nations work.

AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Well, just a quick postscript as one who headed or was deputy and often was acting head of the then largest UN peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. It was just incredible how little leeway I had to put people, the right people from whatever country and background, into the job that they could do. My hands were almost completely tied by the same system, which, of course, applies so much at UN headquarters and in the larger concentrations. But I

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think all that is basic stuff that really has to be addressed. Please.

MR. BIGBY: Thank you. My name is Brian Bigby (phonetic sp.). I am with the Embassy of Papua New Guinea. I would first like to start off by thanking our honorable Panel here, as well as Under-Secretary Burnham. Thank you for your time and all the time spent on the UN reform. My question kind of falls along the recent Hyde Act, a UN Reform Act coming out of the U.S. House of Representatives. It falls along with what Mr. Feulner said, as well as Ms. Florini and the "Outcome Document," I guess.

Applying the power of the purse. Do the United States apply the power of the purse, though it has precedent in '85, '94 and '95? Is that the right way to right now, I guess, jettison UN reforms, to get them underway by kind of saying, you know, if the Secretary of State does not see the reform that's happening, we're going to withdraw 50 percent of our dues to the UN? Is that conducive, productive, to try to get uniform off the ground and actually implementing it? Thank you.

AMBASSADOR FEULNER: The Hyde Bill as passed by the House of Representatives, of course, allows two years for the reforms to actually be put in

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place before any mandatory cutback in dues allocations would take place. The Coleman, Lugar Bill makes it discretionary at the direction of the Secretary of State to the President to either withhold or not withhold.

It seemed pretty clear to me at least speaking as an individual and, as Mr. Hills indicated, this was not a consensus view among the 12 members of the Task Force, but to me as an individual, having read the history of reform attempts over the last 20 years, that without the power of the purse, without a financial stick, if you will, the carrot of doing the right thing just wasn't occurring at the UN.

And I believe that the Hyde Bill is, in fact, a sensible way to go both by encouragement, you have got two years to make these substantial changes, not every single one that we're recommending in the Hyde Bill, according to their own legislation, but a certain percentage of them. If you don't, then this will kick in. But Rod might have a different perspective on that.

AMBASSADOR HILLS: I was waiting for Dick's comment.

SENATOR THORNBURGH: That kind of initiative, it seems to me, should always be a last resort. I have never felt it becomes us a global power to be in default of obligations that we have undertaken

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as members of the UN, and that's why I urge us to get our own agenda and order and try to use every diplomatic tool available to make that --

PARTICIPANT: It's impossible to hear you back here.

SENATOR THORNBURGH: That's probably the best news.

AMBASSADOR HILLS: Let me say I think we're dealing here with a question of diplomacy and behavioral science, and so the issue is what is best likely to be effective in the next period of time? I'm persuaded that there is enough interest in reform right now that we're best not issuing that threat.

I'm a little bothered by the fact that we have signed a treaty, which obliges us to pay this money and I don't lightly like to see the United States say boldly that it's going to abandon this treaty. I think Ann Florini may have the course of action we need the most, a firm, united, a firm stand, consistent over a period of time with resources sufficient to the task put at the United Nations is the way to accomplish this.

We have never tried that, quite frankly, a unified approach by the White House and by the Congress, qualified people of enough nature, enough people, put in there at the United Nations to focus on this and enough

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time given by the Secretary of State and others in Government, diplomacy around the world to firmly make it clear this is the position the United States wants.

Again, Teddy Roosevelt I think had it right. I don't think anybody doubts the fact that this country will, if it needs to, withhold the dues, but right now I would like the firm diplomacy rather than the threat.

## AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Ann?

MS. FLORINI: I read the history of this a little differently, I think, than Ed does. Well, first, one point on the Hyde Bill. The way the Hyde Bill reads, there are some of the reforms that the United Nations does not need to undertake without risking withholding, but the very large majority of them do have to be enacted within two years or we cut our dues by 50 percent. And obviously, the Bush Administration has raised concerns of what this does to its negotiating flexibility, and here I think there's a good lesson from history.

The first time we did withholding on a management issue was in the mid 1980s with the Kassebaum Amendment where we said that if we do not get weighted voting, we're going to withhold payment of part of our dues. Well, we didn't get weighted voting on budget

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What we got was a consensus-based process of decision making, which was rather different from what we said we initially wanted, but it served our purposes well enough. And I think the concern is that given the level of detail that there is in the Hyde legislation, that there is very little room for that kind of more creative solution without risking the threat of cutting off half of our dues.

There's also the political issue of the threats of withholding and the arrears that we accumulated in the 1990s and all that left a very, very bitter taste in New York in a way that I think was probably overall counterproductive to U.S. interests, and there's a very big concern that if we do the same thing again, we are going to be less likely rather than more likely to get the reforms that we need.

thing that Ι think tends be forgotten in Washington now is that throughout the '50s and '60s and '70s, there were other nations in arrears withholding their dues, particularly the Soviet Union, and the United States took a very strongly principled position that this was simply illegal. It was not allowed, that withholding payment of assessed contributions under the UN Charter was not something

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that any member in good standing of the international community could do.

We have obviously taken a very different position in the last couple of decades, and I think it's questionable whether that serves our own interests.

AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Please.

MS. MULLEN: My name is Mary Mullen and I worked with the Bosnia Support Committee. I would like to know if you could discuss a little bit about the Human Rights Commission, what it was set up for, what was expected of it, what you feel it didn't do or what you feel it should do now?

AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: I would just note, not that our Panelists wouldn't, they will certainly have views on that. We had an earlier program which addressed specifically the human rights genocide issues, responsibility to protect, that particular issue, and, of course, in the report it clearly calls for the abolition of the present Human Rights Commission because of the manifest problems that it represents, not least in terms of membership by states, by governments, which are themselves gross violators of human rights, and it calls for the returning instead to a Human Rights Council. But I'm sure some of my colleagues here will have thoughts, because that's part of the overall

report.

MS. CALAVIA: I'm Dawn Calavia (phonetic sp.) with the United Nations and one of the low level panel types. You write in your report, and I want to thank you very much for the time and energy that you put in. I know it's not an easy subject. I would also like to commend this Panel for your three circles that you set up to try to explain the structure of the United Nations, which I think is very helpful and I have since used it with visiting students who come to the UN.

You mentioned the reforms that were done at UNDP. I would point out they were also done at UNHRC, at the World Food Program and at UNICEF, which are all voluntarily funded agencies, which have their own boards and which have more — their executive directors or high commissioners have more authority to operate than does the Secretary General, as your report points out.

I would also point out that one of the problems that we have labored with at the United Nations is zero real growth or zero non-real growth in our budget over the last 10 years. That's something that Ambassador Hays worked on when he was there, and also changes that have happened in the funding patterns at the United States since Ambassador Thornburgh, excuse me, Justice Thornburgh was at the United Nations where

he correctly pushed for more voluntary funding of programs.

So we now have the United Nations' budget for 2005/2006, which is going to be about \$3.2 billion on a biennial basis and the voluntary or the extrabudgetary is going to be \$5.5 billion. So the trend is already in that direction very strongly the last 12 years.

And one of the issues that I noted in the past that Senator Gregg has been active on was trying to get rid of the stockmen holdover, which has the United States paying its dues out of the next fiscal year, and I noted there is nothing in your report that speaks to that. I didn't know if you had a chance to look at that and the impact that that has. And similarly, on peacekeeping, where sometimes the payments have been quite late, given the way the appropriations process works. Thank you. But again, thank you for your report. It's excellent.

AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: A very specific question.

AMBASSADOR HILLS: Well, we didn't address the question of payment of dues. It's an important question, but it's not one we addressed.

SENATOR THORNBURGH: Those are more

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characteristics of the U.S. budgetary process than the UN budgetary process.

MS. CALAVIA: Right. But you were looking at US interests.

SENATOR THORNBURGH: Yes.

MS. CALAVIA: So I thought specially since the Senate has twice said that that should be done.

issue that I probably ignored and that is the ability of the OIOS to audit activities of the United Nations that are not part of the Secretariat. And our strong report, of course that was an Oil For Food Program, our strong recommendation was that wherever United Nations personnel are involved, the process of the Independent Oversight Board or the independent internal auditor should have co-extensive authority.

Right now, the OIOS essentially has go in and say you guys may be corrupt now and I'll investigate you and I need some money from it for you and it doesn't come very quickly. And so our view is that if the money isn't there, the United Nations personnel shouldn't do it.

AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Do we have any more comments or questions? Please. Yes?

MR. HASI: My name is Taka Hasi (phonetic

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sp.), a correspondent of GG Press Japanese News Agency. You know Group of Four, Germany, Japan, Brazil, India, and African unions, which is 53 countries, are now making efforts to enlarge Security Council. They argue the enlargement of Security Council is helpful for United Nations reform.

Do you think that their efforts will be successful or not?

AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Thank you.

AMBASSADOR HILLS: Well, I told you our report was boring. We didn't deal with that issue.

MS. FLORINI: Actually, I think just one comment on the Security Council expansion, which is that many of us who are concerned about all of the other reforms that the United Nations need are very concerned that the fight over the expansion of the Security Council is dominating the agenda to such an extent that everything else that is much more readily achievable and much less politically difficult by comparison is going to be overshadowed, and I think that would be extraordinarily unfortunate for the Group of Four and for every other member state of the United Nations.

AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Yes. The report does not take a specific position on enlargement of the Security Council, but it did note, stress, that any such

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enlargement should enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations and in no way detract from it. There is a declarative sentence, paragraph, in the report.

Please.

MR. FOX: I'm John Fox, retired from the State Department, from the UN. I'm just wondering maybe if Mr. Hills in particular, would the IOB -- how would the IOB relate to the oversight services for the second ring, UNDP, UNICEF, that sort of thing, and would you merge their oversight services with OIOS? Thank you.

AMBASSADOR HILLS: John, as I said a minute ago, our primary notion was that the authority of the OIOS should extend to any place where United Nations personnel are involved. Whether or not the OIOS would be -- but whether you would have separate OIOS' in these very places is a different issue, I mean, because UNDP has a reasonably effective internal audit. It doesn't have the protection of an Independent Oversight Board. So we would extend the protection, but leave open the question of whether or not you would want to have separate internal groups.

The question of the audit is to say that you have a Board of External Auditors that have broad auditing responsibility, and we would make the IOB at least co-extensive with the authority of the Board of

External Auditors.

AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS: Let me mention to all of you that you will find outside copies of the final, final report. The intellectual and creative ferment and work that went into this report, of course, needed to be followed by the practical necessity of the final printed version. We have just even this morning received this, so you will find out on the tables the final copies, and I urge you to take this and it has even the use of color, red to offset some of the main points.

But if there are no further questions, I would like to thank everyone, our Panelists certainly the presence here of Under-Secretary-General Burnham and all of you who played such a -- made such and questions, gave good comments such good us questions, and I urge you to continue to follow and, indeed, act on behalf of the recommendations that the report makes throughout. Thank you very much.

(Applause)

(Whereupon, the meeting was concluded at 12:00 p.m.)

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