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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

August 2005: 

Immigration Enforcement: 

Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement 
Efforts: 

GAO-05-813: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-813, a report to congressional requesters: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets 
attracting illegal immigrants to the United States. Immigration experts 
state that strategies to deter illegal immigration require both a 
reliable employment eligibility verification process and a worksite 
enforcement capacity to ensure that employers comply with immigration-
related employment laws. This report examines (1) the current 
employment verification (Form I-9) process and challenges, if any, 
facing verification; and (2) the priorities and resources of U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) worksite enforcement 
program and any challenges in implementing the program.  

What GAO Found: 

The current employment verification process is based on employers’ 
review of documents presented by new employees to prove their identity 
and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employers certify that they have 
reviewed employees’ documents and that the documents appear genuine and 
relate to the individual presenting them. However, various studies have 
shown that document fraud (use of counterfeit documents) and identity 
fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or information belonging to 
others) have made it difficult for employers who want to comply with 
the employment verification process to hire only authorized workers and 
easier for unscrupulous employers to knowingly hire unauthorized 
workers. The large number and variety of documents acceptable for 
proving work eligibility have also hindered verification efforts. In 
1997, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part 
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), issued an interim rule on 
a reduction in the number of acceptable work eligibility documents and, 
in 1998, proposed a further reduction, but this proposal has not yet 
been finalized. DHS is currently reviewing the list of acceptable work 
eligibility documents, but has not established a target time frame for 
completing this review. The Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program 
through which participating employers electronically verify employees’ 
work eligibility, has potential to help enhance the verification 
process and substantially reduce document fraud. Yet, current 
weaknesses in the program, such as the inability of the program to 
detect identity fraud, DHS delays in entering data into its databases, 
and some employer noncompliance with pilot program requirements could, 
if not addressed, have a significant impact on the program’s success. 
Furthermore, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officials stated 
that the current Basic Pilot Program may not be able to complete timely 
verifications if the number of employers using the program 
significantly increased. 

Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs 
that compete for resources and, under the former INS and now under ICE, 
worksite enforcement has been a relatively low priority. Consistent 
with DHS’s mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS 
and then ICE focused worksite enforcement resources mainly on removing 
unauthorized workers from critical infrastructure sites to help address 
those sites’ vulnerabilities. Since fiscal year 1999, the numbers of 
employer notices of intent to fine and administrative worksite arrests 
have generally declined, according to ICE, due to various factors such 
as document fraud, which makes it difficult to prove employer 
violations. ICE has not yet developed outcome goals and measures for 
its worksite enforcement program, which, given limited resources and 
competing priorities for those resources, may hinder ICE’s efforts to 
determine resources needed for the program. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security set a target 
time frame for completing the department’s review of the Form I-9 
process and issuing final regulations on the process, assess the 
feasibility and costs of addressing the Basic Pilot Program’s current 
weaknesses, and establish additional output goals and measures and set 
a target time frame for developing outcome goals and measures for the 
worksite enforcement program. In written comments on a draft of this 
report, DHS agreed with our recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-813. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Richard M. Stana at (202) 
512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Various Weaknesses Have Undermined the Employment Verification Process, 
but the Basic Pilot Program Shows Potential to Enhance the Process: 

Competing Priorities and Lack of Outcome Goals and Measures May Hinder 
Worksite Enforcement Efforts: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Employment Eligibility Verification Form (Form I-9): 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Information on the Electronic Form I-9: 

Appendix IV: Data on Employer Participation in and Use of the Basic 
Pilot Program: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Basic Pilot Program Verification Process: 

Figure 2: Number of Queries Authorized by DHS through the Automated 
Check and the Immigration Status Verifier Check: 

Figure 3: Investigative Agent Work-years Spent on Worksite Enforcement 
Efforts and Agent Work-years Spent on Other Investigative Areas for 
Each Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2003: 

Figure 4: Number of Notices of Intent to Fine Issued to Employers for 
Each Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2004: 

Figure 5: Number of Worksite Enforcement Arrests for Each Fiscal Year 
from 1999 through 2003: 

Figure 6: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries Run by Participating 
Employers for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004: 

Figure 7: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries that Resulted in 
Employment Authorizations for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004: 

Abbreviations: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

IIRIRA: Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act: 

INS: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service: 

IRCA: Immigration Reform and Control Act: 

SSA: Social Security Administration: 

USCIS: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

August 31, 2005: 

The Honorable Jim Sensenbrenner, Jr.: 
Chairman: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John N. Hostettler: 
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
House of Representatives: 

According to the final report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration 
Reform, immigration contributes to the U.S. national economy by helping 
to keep viable segments of certain labor-intensive industries, expand 
foreign trade, provide valuable language and cultural expertise to U.S. 
companies, and contribute to the economic revitalization of some 
communities.[Footnote 1] Yet, the commission also noted that 
immigration, particularly illegal immigration, has adverse 
consequences, such as helping to depress wages for low-skilled workers 
and creating net fiscal costs for state and local governments. Aliens, 
including temporary foreign workers, legally enter and reside in the 
United States through a variety of channels, such as immigration and 
work visa programs, but aliens also illegally enter or overstay visas 
and reside in the United States. The former U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) estimated that about 7 million 
unauthorized aliens resided in the United States by January 2000, and 
other organizations estimated that the unauthorized alien population 
was about 10 million in 2004.[Footnote 2]

The opportunity for employment is one of the most important magnets 
attracting illegal aliens to the United States. To help reduce the 
attraction of this magnet, in 1986 Congress passed the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (IRCA),[Footnote 3] which made it illegal for 
individuals and entities to knowingly hire, continue to employ, or 
recruit or refer for a fee unauthorized workers. The act established a 
two-pronged approach for helping to limit the employment of 
unauthorized workers: (1) an employment verification process through 
which employers verify newly hired employees' work eligibility and (2) 
a sanctions program for fining employers who do not comply with the 
act. Under the employment verification process, employees and employers 
must complete the Employment Eligibility Verification Form (Form I-9) 
to certify that the employees are authorized to work in the United 
States.[Footnote 4] Those employers who do not follow the verification 
process can be sanctioned for knowingly hiring, continuing to employ, 
or recruiting or referring for a fee unauthorized workers or for 
improperly completing Forms I-9. Efforts to enforce these sanctions are 
referred to as worksite enforcement. 

In the nearly 20 years since the passage of IRCA, the employment 
eligibility verification process and worksite enforcement program have 
remained largely unchanged. Following the passage of the act, the U.S. 
Commission on Immigration Reform and various immigration experts 
concluded that deterring illegal immigration requires, among other 
things, strategies that focus on disrupting the ability of illegal 
aliens to gain employment through a more reliable employment 
eligibility verification process and a more robust worksite enforcement 
capacity. In particular, the commission report and other studies have 
found that the single most important step that could be taken to reduce 
unlawful migration is the development of a more effective system for 
verifying work authorization. Yet in the 8 years since the commission's 
final report, few substantial enhancements have been applied to the 
employment verification process, and the approach continues to rely on 
the Form I-9, a procedure of which the commission was roundly critical 
because of its vulnerability to fraud and potential to cause 
discrimination. Moreover, in previous work, we reported that employers 
of unauthorized aliens faced little likelihood that INS would 
investigate, fine, or criminally prosecute them, a circumstance that 
provides little disincentive for employers who want to circumvent the 
law.[Footnote 5]

You asked us to review the federal government's policies and programs 
aimed at enforcing immigration laws in the workplace. This report 
addresses the following questions: (1) How does the current employment 
verification process function and what are the challenges facing 
verification? (2) What are the priorities and resources of U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) worksite enforcement 
program and what challenges, if any, has the agency faced in 
implementing the program?

To address these objectives, we interviewed officials from the 
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) and ICE, and officials from the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) in headquarters and selected field 
locations. We obtained from them information on the Form I-9 process 
and the Basic Pilot Program, a voluntary program through which 
participating employers verify employees' work eligibility by 
electronically checking information on employees' Forms I-9 with 
information in SSA and DHS databases. We analyzed information from 
these agencies, as well as related laws and regulations, to determine 
how the current Form I-9 process functions, identify any challenges in 
the current Form I-9 process, and examine DHS plans to modify the 
process. We also interviewed representatives of 23 employers;[Footnote 
6] 12 employer, employee, and advocacy groups;[Footnote 7] and 6 
immigration experts[Footnote 8] to obtain their views on the Form I-9 
process and the Basic Pilot Program. We selected the employers to 
interview based on a mix of criteria, such as the number of employers' 
pilot program queries and geographic location. We selected the 
employer, employee, and advocacy groups to interview based on a mix of 
criteria, such as industry representation and range of views on 
immigration issues. In addition, we examined USCIS and SSA guidance, 
instructions, and agreements for the Basic Pilot Program and the 
results and methodology of an independent evaluation of the program 
completed by the Institute for Survey Research at Temple University and 
Westat in June 2002.[Footnote 9] We analyzed data on employer 
participation in and use of the Basic Pilot Program to determine how 
participation and use have changed since fiscal year 2000. We assessed 
the reliability of these data by reviewing them for accuracy and 
completeness, interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the 
data, and examining documentation on how the data are entered, 
categorized, and verified in the databases. We determined that the 
independent evaluation and these data were sufficiently reliable for 
the purposes of our review. 

To obtain information on the worksite enforcement program priorities 
and resources, we interviewed officials from ICE, the SSA Office of the 
Inspector General, the Department of Labor, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration- 
Related Unfair Unemployment Practices. We also interviewed officials 
from 12 of the 26 ICE Special Agent in Charge field offices[Footnote 
10] and 4 U.S. Attorney's Offices[Footnote 11] that were located in the 
same areas as 4 of the field offices we visited. We selected the 12 
field offices based on a mix of criteria, such as number of 
investigations conducted by field offices, number of investigators in 
each field office, and geographic location. We analyzed ICE 
headquarters and field office guidance, memos, and other documents on 
worksite enforcement to evaluate ICE's priorities for and management of 
worksite enforcement efforts. In addition, we analyzed ICE data on 
worksite enforcement and assessed the data reliability by reviewing 
data for accuracy and completeness, interviewing agency officials 
knowledgeable about the data, and examining documentation on how the 
data are entered, categorized, and verified in the databases. We 
determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 
of our review. For more detailed information on our scope and 
methodology, see appendix II. We conducted our work from September 2004 
through July 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

The employment verification process is primarily based on employers' 
review of their new employees' work eligibility documents, but various 
weaknesses, such as the process' vulnerability to fraud, have 
undermined this process. Employers certify on the Form I-9 that they 
have reviewed documents presented by their employees and that the 
documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting them. 
However, various studies have shown that document fraud (use of 
counterfeit documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid 
documents or information belonging to others) have made it difficult 
for employers who want to comply with the employment verification 
process to ensure that they hire only authorized workers and have made 
it easier for unscrupulous employers to knowingly hire unauthorized 
workers. The large number and variety of documents included in the list 
of acceptable documents for proving work eligibility have also 
undermined the process. We have previously reported on federal 
government efforts to reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility 
documents and make the remaining acceptable documents more secure. In 
1997, the former INS issued an interim rule on reductions in the number 
of acceptable work eligibility documents and, in 1998, proposed a 
further reduction. However, DHS has not yet finalized the proposal, and 
the 1997 interim rule remains in effect. Although department officials 
told us that the agency is currently assessing modifications to the 
list of acceptable work eligibility documents, the department has not 
established a target time frame for completing this assessment and 
issuing final regulations on the list of acceptable documents. In 
addition, the Basic Pilot Program has potential to enhance this process 
and help to significantly reduce document fraud. According to ICE 
officials, access to Basic Pilot Program information could help the 
agency better target its worksite enforcement efforts at those 
employers who do not follow program requirements. If the program is 
expanded, however, several current weaknesses in the program, including 
its inability to detect identity fraud, DHS delays in entering data 
into its databases that may lengthen the pilot program verification 
process, and some employer noncompliance with pilot program 
requirements intended to protect employees from discriminatory 
practices, could become more significant and adversely affect a greater 
number of employers and employees, if not addressed. Additionally, 
USCIS officials told us that the current Basic Pilot Program may not be 
able to complete timely verifications of work eligibility if the number 
of employers using the program were to significantly increase, 
primarily because of limited program funding and the growth in other 
verification programs. These officials said that USCIS is planning to 
fund an evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program to assess, among other 
things, the program's current costs, any improvements in DHS data 
accuracy, and employers' compliance with program requirements. Although 
the results of this evaluation should help provide information on the 
pilot program's weaknesses, without information on the feasibility and 
costs of addressing those weaknesses, USCIS and Congress cannot 
effectively assess possibilities for future implementation of the 
program, including increased program usage. 

Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs 
that compete for resources and, under the former INS and now under ICE, 
worksite enforcement has been a relatively low priority. Consistent 
with the DHS mission to combat terrorism, after September 11, 2001, INS 
and then ICE focused worksite enforcement resources mainly on 
identifying and removing unauthorized workers from critical 
infrastructure sites, such as airports and nuclear power plants, to 
help address vulnerabilities at those sites. We previously reported 
that if businesses at such sites were to be compromised by terrorists, 
this would pose a threat to domestic security.[Footnote 12] In fiscal 
year 1999, INS devoted about 9 percent of its agent investigative work- 
years to worksite enforcement, and in fiscal year 2003 ICE devoted 
about 4 percent, although ICE has proposed increasing resources for 
worksite enforcement. The number of notices of intent to fine issued to 
employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers or improperly 
completing Forms I-9 and the number of administrative worksite arrests 
have also generally declined. For example, the number of notices of 
intent to fine generally decreased from 417 in fiscal year 1999 to 3 in 
fiscal year 2004. ICE has attributed this decline to various factors 
including the widespread use of counterfeit documents that make it 
difficult for ICE agents to prove that employers knowingly hired 
unauthorized workers. In addition, INS and ICE have faced difficulties 
in setting and collecting fine amounts from employers and in detaining 
unauthorized workers arrested at worksites. According to ICE, pursuit 
of civil settlements with employers rather than administrative fines 
could help address some of the difficulties faced in the fines process, 
but it is too early to tell what effect, if any, use of civil 
settlements will have on worksite enforcement efforts. Furthermore, 
although ICE has identified two output measures for the worksite 
enforcement program, these measures address only two elements of the 
program. Without additional output goals and measures for the worksite 
enforcement program, ICE's ability to effectively determine resources 
needed for the program may be hindered, especially given ICE's limited 
resources and competing priorities for those resources. Although ICE is 
developing outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement 
program, until it finalizes these goals and measures, the agency may 
not be able to effectively evaluate the results of program efforts. 

To strengthen the current employment verification process, we are 
recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security set a specific 
time frame for completing the department's review of the Form I-9 
process, including an assessment of the possibility of reducing the 
number of acceptable work eligibility documents, and issuing final 
regulations on changes to the Form I-9 process and an updated Form I-9. 
To assist Congress and USCIS in assessing the possibility of increased 
or mandatory use of the Basic Pilot Program, we are recommending that 
the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS to 
include, in the planned evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, an 
assessment of the feasibility and costs of addressing the Basic Pilot 
Program's current weaknesses, including its inability to detect 
identity fraud, delays in entry of employment authorization information 
into databases, and employer noncompliance with program procedures, and 
resources that would be needed to support increased or mandatory use of 
the program. To help evaluate the results of worksite enforcement 
program efforts and determine resource levels needed for the program, 
we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the 
Assistant Secretary for ICE to establish additional output goals and 
measures for the worksite enforcement program, and set a target time 
frame for completing the assessment and development of outcome goals 
and measures for the program. In commenting on a draft of this report, 
DHS agreed with the recommendations. 

Background: 

IRCA provided for sanctions against employers who do not follow the 
employment verification (Form I-9) process. Employers who fail to 
properly complete, retain, or present for inspection a Form I-9 may 
face civil or administrative fines ranging from $110 to $1,100 for each 
employee for whom the form was not properly completed, retained, or 
presented.[Footnote 13] The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 limited employer liability for 
certain technical violations of Form I-9 paperwork 
requirements.[Footnote 14] According to the act, a person or entity is 
considered to have complied with the employment verification process if 
the person or entity made a good faith attempt to properly complete the 
Form I-9.[Footnote 15] Employers who knowingly hire or continue to 
employ unauthorized aliens may be fined from $275 to $11,000 for each 
employee, depending on whether the violation is a first or subsequent 
offense. Employers who engage in a pattern or practice of knowingly 
hiring or continuing to employ unauthorized aliens are subject to 
criminal penalties consisting of fines up to $3,000 per unauthorized 
employee and up to 6 months imprisonment for the entire pattern or 
practice. 

ICE is primarily responsible for enforcing the employer sanction 
provisions of IRCA as well as many other immigration-related laws. ICE 
has approximately 5,000 investigative agents in 26 Office of 
Investigations field offices that are headed by special agents in 
charge. ICE's Worksite Enforcement/Critical Infrastructure Unit 
oversees programs to protect U.S. critical infrastructure, including 
military, economic, industrial, and transportation infrastructure, and 
manages the agency's worksite enforcement efforts. Prior to the 
creation of ICE in March 2003, INS enforced IRCA and other immigration- 
related laws. 

Basic Pilot Program Employment Verification Process: 

IIRIRA required INS to operate three voluntary pilot programs to test 
electronic means for employers to verify an employee's eligibility to 
work: the Basic Pilot Program, the Citizen Attestation Verification 
Pilot Program, and the Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program. The 
three pilot programs were to test whether pilot verification procedures 
could improve the existing Form I-9 process by reducing (1) document 
fraud and false claims of U.S. citizenship, (2) discrimination against 
employees, (3) violations of civil liberties and privacy, and (4) the 
burden on employers to verify employees' work eligibility. IIRIRA 
established the three pilot programs to be in effect for 4 years, but 
Congress extended authorization for the pilots for an additional 2 
years in 2002 and for another 5 years in 2003.[Footnote 16] Congress 
also mandated DHS to expand the Basic Pilot Program to employers in all 
50 states by December 2004, which DHS did.[Footnote 17] DHS terminated 
the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot Program and the Machine- 
Readable Document Pilot Program in 2003 because of technical 
difficulties and unintended consequences, such as increased fraud and 
discrimination, identified in evaluations of the programs.[Footnote 18]

The Basic Pilot Program is a part of USCIS's Systematic Alien 
Verification for Entitlements Program, which provides a variety of 
verification services for federal, state, and local government 
agencies. USCIS estimates that there are more than 150,000 federal, 
state, and local agency users that verify immigration status through 
the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program. In fiscal 
year 2004, about 2,300 employers actively used the Basic Pilot Program 
within the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program. 

The Basic Pilot Program provides participating employers with an 
electronic method to verify their employees' work eligibility. 
Employers may participate voluntarily in the Basic Pilot Program but 
are still required to complete Forms I-9 for all newly hired employees 
in accordance with IRCA. After completing the forms, these employers 
query the pilot program's automated system by entering employee 
information provided on the forms, such as name and Social Security 
number, into the pilot Web site within 3 days of the employees' hire 
date. The pilot program then electronically matches that information 
against information in SSA and, if necessary, DHS databases to 
determine whether the employee is eligible to work, as shown in figure 
1. The Basic Pilot Program electronically notifies employers whether 
their employees' work authorization was confirmed. Those queries that 
the DHS automated check cannot confirm the pilot refers to USCIS staff, 
called immigration status verifiers, who check employee information 
against information in other DHS databases. 

Figure 1: Basic Pilot Program Verification Process: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

In cases when the pilot system cannot confirm an employee's work 
authorization status either through the automatic check or the check by 
an immigration status verifier, the system issues the employer a 
tentative nonconfirmation of the employee's work authorization status. 
In this case, the employers must notify the affected employees of the 
finding, and the employees have the right to contest their tentative 
nonconfirmations within 8 working days by contacting SSA or USCIS to 
resolve any inaccuracies in their records.[Footnote 19] During this 
time, employers may not take any adverse actions against those 
employees, such as limiting their work assignments or pay. When 
employees do not contest their tentative nonconfirmations within the 
allotted time, the Basic Pilot Program issues a final nonconfirmation 
for the employees. Employers are required to either immediately 
terminate or notify DHS of the continued employment of workers who do 
not successfully contest the tentative nonconfirmation and those who 
the pilot program finds are not work-authorized. 

Recent Proposals Related to Employment Verification and Worksite 
Enforcement: 

There is ongoing congressional consideration about employment 
verification and worksite enforcement efforts, and various initiatives 
have been proposed related to these issues, including possible new 
temporary worker programs. Since January 2004, the current 
administration has discussed the possibility of initiating a guest 
worker program in which foreign workers would be granted status for 
employment in the United States for a specified period of time. 
Similarly, some recent legislative proposals would provide a means for 
foreign workers to obtain temporary employment and possible permanent 
residency or citizenship at a later date. Other initiatives propose 
revising visa programs to increase the number of foreign workers 
legally admitted to the United States. In addition, legislative 
proposals have addressed methods for enhancing employment verification 
and worksite enforcement efforts. For example, one proposal would make 
use of the Basic Pilot Program mandatory for all employers, and another 
would increase the fine amounts for employers who knowingly hire 
unauthorized workers. These initiatives reflect differing perspectives 
on employment verification and worksite enforcement and touch on a 
variety of related issues, such as the number of foreign workers, if 
any, needed in the United States, the economic impact of illegal aliens 
residing in the country, and policy decisions on ways to address the 
millions of illegal aliens in the United States. 

Various Weaknesses Have Undermined the Employment Verification Process, 
but the Basic Pilot Program Shows Potential to Enhance the Process: 

The current employment verification process relies on employers' review 
of work eligibility documents to determine whether employees are 
authorized to work, but the process has several weaknesses. Document 
and identity fraud have hindered employers' efforts to reliably verify 
employees' work eligibility under the Form I-9 process. In addition, 
the large number and variety of documents acceptable for proving work 
eligibility have undermined the process. We have previously reported on 
the need to reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility documents 
and to improve the integrity of the documents.[Footnote 20] The Basic 
Pilot Program, as a voluntary, automated verification program, offers a 
mechanism with potential to enhance the employment verification process 
by reducing document fraud. ICE officials said that access to Basic 
Pilot Program information could help the agency better target its 
worksite enforcement efforts by identifying employers who do not follow 
program requirements. However, existing weaknesses in the program, such 
as the inability of the program to detect identity fraud, delays in 
entering data into DHS databases, and some employer noncompliance with 
pilot program requirements, could become more significant and 
additional resources could be needed if employer participation in the 
program greatly increased or was made mandatory. 

Current Employment Verification Process Based on Employers' Review of 
Documents: 

In 1986, IRCA established the employment verification process based on 
employers' review of documents presented by employees to prove identity 
and work eligibility. Under the process, employers must request that 
newly hired employees present a document or documents that confirm 
employees' identity and work eligibility. On the Form I-9, employees 
must attest that they are U.S. citizens, lawfully admitted permanent 
residents, or aliens authorized to work in the United States. Employers 
must then certify that they have reviewed the documents presented by 
their employees to establish identity and work eligibility and that the 
documents appear genuine and relate to the individual presenting them. 
In making their certifications, employers are expected to judge whether 
the documents presented are obviously counterfeit. Employers are deemed 
in compliance with IRCA if they have followed the verification 
procedures, including instances when an unauthorized alien may have 
presented fraudulent documents that appeared genuine. In addition, on 
the Form I-9, employers are required to reverify the employment 
eligibility of individuals whose work authorization has expired, such 
as aliens with temporary work authorization, to determine whether the 
individuals are authorized to continue to work. 

Document and Identity Fraud Have Undermined the Form I-9 Process: 

Since the passage of IRCA in 1986, document fraud (use of counterfeit 
documents) and identity fraud (fraudulent use of valid documents or 
information belonging to others) have made it difficult for employers 
who want to comply with IRCA to ensure that they employ only authorized 
workers through the current verification and reverification processes. 
In its 1997 report to Congress, the U.S. Commission on Immigration 
Reform noted that the widespread availability of false documents made 
it easy for unauthorized aliens to obtain jobs in the United States. In 
1999, we reported that large numbers of unauthorized aliens have either 
fraudulently used valid documents that belong to others or presented 
counterfeit documents as evidence of employment eligibility.[Footnote 
21] Furthermore, in 2004 we reported that unauthorized workers were 
able to use false documents to illegally gain entry to secure areas of 
critical infrastructure sites, such as airports, nuclear power plants, 
and military bases.[Footnote 22] Representatives from some of the 
employers and employer associations we interviewed for this review 
indicated that, in cases where employees present documents that 
employers suspect of being counterfeit, employers may not request that 
these employees present other documents proving their work eligibility 
because the employees could claim that employers are discriminating 
against them. To help protect against discriminatory hiring practices, 
such as employers requesting specific documents from foreign-looking or 
sounding employees, employers are prohibited under IRCA from requesting 
that new employees present specific documents from among the list of 
acceptable documents to prove their identity and work eligibility. 

Although studies suggest that the majority of employers comply with 
IRCA and try to hire only authorized workers, the studies have also 
noted that some employers knowingly hire unauthorized workers, often to 
exploit the workers' low cost labor.[Footnote 23] In 1997, the U.S. 
Commission on Immigration Reform reported that the minority of 
employers who knowingly hired illegal aliens avoided sanctions by going 
through the motions of compliance while accepting false documents. 
Likewise, in 1999 we concluded that those employers who do not want to 
comply with IRCA can intentionally hire unauthorized aliens under the 
guise of having complied with the employment verification requirements 
by claiming that unauthorized workers presented false documents to 
obtain employment.[Footnote 24]

Large Number and Variety of Acceptable Documents Have Hindered Employer 
Verification Efforts: 

The large number and variety of documents that are acceptable for 
proving work eligibility have also complicated employer verification 
efforts under IRCA. Following passage of IRCA in 1986, employees could 
present any of 29 different documents to establish their identity and/ 
or work eligibility. In a 1997 interim rule, INS reduced the number of 
acceptable work eligibility documents from 29 to 27. Eight of these 
documents establish both identity and employment eligibility (e.g., 
U.S. passport or permanent resident card); 12 documents establish 
identity only (e.g., driver's license); and 7 documents establish 
employment eligibility only (e.g., Social Security card without the 
legend "Not Valid for Employment").[Footnote 25] The interim rule 
implemented changes to the list of acceptable work eligibility 
documents mandated by IIRIRA and was intended to serve as a temporary 
measure until INS issued final rules on modifications to the Form I-9. 
In 1998, INS proposed a further reduction in the number of acceptable 
work eligibility documents to 14 but did not finalize the proposed rule. 

Since the passage of IRCA, various studies have addressed the need to 
reduce the number of acceptable work eligibility documents to make the 
employment verification process simpler and more secure. In 1990, we 
reported that the multiplicity of work eligibility documents 
contributed to (1) employer uncertainty about how to comply with the 
employment verification requirements and (2) discrimination against 
authorized workers.[Footnote 26] A 1992 report prepared by the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary noted that the first step to simplifying the 
employment verification process was to reduce the current list of 
acceptable work eligibility documents and make them more counterfeit- 
proof.[Footnote 27] In 1998, INS noted that, when IRCA was first 
passed, a long, inclusive list of acceptable work eligibility documents 
was allowed for the Form I-9 to help ensure that all persons who were 
eligible to work could easily meet the requirements, but as early as 
1990, there had been evidence that some employers found the list 
confusing. In 1999 we reported that various studies of IRCA's 
employment verification process advocated that the number of documents 
that employees can use to demonstrate employment eligibility should be 
reduced to make the employment verification process more secure and 
easier to understand.[Footnote 28]

Additionally, some of the employers, employer associations, and 
immigration experts we interviewed for this review told us that the 
large number of documents acceptable for proving work eligibility and 
the fact that the Form I-9 has not been updated have impeded employer 
efforts to verify employment eligibility. Representatives from three 
employer associations said that member employers have expressed 
concerns that the Form I-9 has not been updated to reflect changes in 
the list of acceptable work eligibility documents, causing confusion 
among some employers regarding which documents are acceptable. In 
addition, among the 23 employers we interviewed, 5 discussed the need 
to update the Form I-9 to reflect revisions to the list of acceptable 
work eligibility documents. Two of these employers told us that they 
manually edit the Form I-9 to reflect the changes in the list of 
acceptable work eligibility documents. 

DHS officials told us that the department is assessing possible 
revisions to the Form I-9 process, including revisions to the number of 
acceptable work eligibility documents, but has not established a target 
time frame for completing this assessment.[Footnote 29] They said that 
the Handbook for Employers, which provides guidance for completing the 
Form I-9, would also need to be updated. In May 2005, DHS released an 
updated version of the Form I-9 that changed references from INS to DHS 
but did not modify the list of acceptable work eligibility documents on 
the Form I-9 to reflect changes made to the list by the 1997 interim 
rule. In the absence of final regulations and an updated Form I-9 and 
handbook, employers, employees, and other stakeholders may not clearly 
understand the Form I-9 process, particularly which documents are 
acceptable for proving work eligibility. 

Proposals Have Been Made to Improve Document Integrity: 

We have previously reported on efforts to enhance the integrity of 
acceptable work eligibility documents, which could help reduce document 
fraud and make the employment verification process more secure, 
especially if the number of acceptable documents was reduced. For 
example, in 1999 we reported that INS had taken steps to increase the 
integrity of immigration documents, such as by issuing new employment 
authorization documents with visible security features like holograms 
and by issuing permanent resident cards with digital photographs and 
fingerprint images.[Footnote 30] We noted that, although INS enhanced 
the integrity of its documents, unauthorized aliens could present non- 
INS documents, such as Social Security cards, to employers to prove 
work eligibility. In 1998, we reported on estimates of costs associated 
with alternative proposals for SSA issuance of enhanced Social Security 
cards.[Footnote 31] We are currently reviewing SSA efforts to enhance 
the integrity of Social Security cards and how enhanced cards might 
strengthen the employment verification process and plan to report on 
these issues next year. 

In addition, we have previously reported on the possible use of 
biometrics in verification and identification processes--such as those 
used at U.S. ports of entry.[Footnote 32] Biometrics covers a wide 
range of technologies that can be used to verify identity by measuring 
and analyzing human characteristics.[Footnote 33] Biometrics can 
theoretically be very effective personal identifiers because the 
characteristics they measure are thought to be distinct to each person. 
Because they are tightly bound to an individual, biometrics are more 
reliable, cannot be forgotten, and are less easily lost, stolen, or 
guessed. While biometrics may show promise in enhancing verification 
and identification processes, we have also reported on the trade-offs 
for using biometric indicators, such as concerns regarding the 
protections under current law for biometric data, the absence of clear 
criteria governing data sharing, and infrastructure processes such as 
the binding of an identity to the biometric data. We reported that 
while a biometric placed on a token, such as a passport or visa, cannot 
necessarily link a person to his or her identity, it can reduce the 
potential for an individual to assume multiple identities. We also 
reported that although federal agencies are required by statute to 
provide security protections for information collected and maintained 
by or for the agency commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm 
that would result from unauthorized disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction of the information, poor information 
security is a widespread federal problem with potentially severe 
consequences. In reporting on the possible use of biometrics in 
verification and identification processes, we identified several 
examples of such risks associated with using biometric data.[Footnote 
34]

Recent laws and legislative proposals have addressed possible ways to 
enhance the integrity of documents and strengthen the employment 
verification process. The Real ID Act of 2005 mandated that states must 
meet minimum standards in developing and issuing driver's licenses 
before federal government authorities can accept state driver's 
licenses as identification for official purposes.[Footnote 35] These 
standards include (1) adding physical security features to prevent 
counterfeiting and tampering, (2) including common machine-readable 
technology on driver's licenses, and (3) requiring driver's license 
applicants to provide evidence of their dates of birth and Social 
Security numbers. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004 required SSA to form a task force to, among other things, 
establish standards for safeguarding Social Security cards from 
counterfeiting, tampering, alteration, and theft.[Footnote 36] In 
addition to these laws, various legislative proposals address possible 
ways to make identity and work eligibility documents more secure and to 
enhance the employment verification process. For example, one recent 
proposal would mandate that individuals can present only machine- 
readable, counterfeit and tamper-resistant Social Security cards to 
obtain employment. According to the proposal, these machine-readable 
cards would allow employers to check employees' work authorization 
status against information maintained in an employment eligibility 
database.[Footnote 37] These laws and proposals differ in the extent to 
which they address issues related to enhancing employment verification 
through electronic means, such as the availability and accessibility of 
machine-readable technology and the security and privacy of information 
maintained on documents and in databases. 

Basic Pilot Program Shows Promise in Enhancing Employment Verification, 
but Current Weaknesses Could Undermine Increased Use: 

Basic Pilot Program May Help Employers Reliably Verify Work Eligibility 
and Decrease Document Fraud: 

Various immigration experts have noted that the most important step 
that could be taken to reduce unlawful migration is the development of 
a more effective system for verifying work authorization. In 
particular, the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform concluded that 
the most promising option for verifying work authorization was a 
computerized registry based on employers' electronic verification of an 
employee's Social Security number with records on work authorization 
for aliens. The Basic Pilot Program, which is currently available on a 
voluntary basis to all employers in the United States, operates in a 
similar way to the computerized registry recommended by the commission. 
Yet only a small portion--about 2,300 in fiscal year 2004--of the 
approximately 5.6 million employer firms nationwide actively used the 
pilot program.[Footnote 38]

The Basic Pilot Program assists employers in detecting document fraud 
by helping to eliminate employer guesswork as to whether information 
contained on work eligibility documents presented by employees is 
authentic or counterfeit. If newly hired employees present counterfeit 
documents containing false information, the pilot program would not 
confirm the employees' work eligibility because the employees' Form I- 
9 information, such as a false name or Social Security number, would 
not match SSA and DHS database information when queried through the 
Basic Pilot Program. In the evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, the 
Institute for Survey Research at Temple University and Westat found 
that the program appeared to reduce unauthorized employment arising 
from employee presentation of counterfeit or altered documents 
containing false information. Twenty of the 22 employers we interviewed 
who participated in the Basic Pilot Program indicated that the program 
helps them to reliably verify newly hired employees' work authorization 
status. 

ICE Sees Additional Benefit in Access to Basic Pilot Program Data: 

ICE has no direct role in monitoring employer use of the Basic Pilot 
Program and does not have direct access to program information, which 
is maintained by USCIS. ICE officials noted that, in a few cases, they 
have requested and received pilot program data from USCIS on specific 
employers who participate in the program and are under ICE 
investigation. ICE officials told us that program data could indicate 
cases in which employers do not follow program requirements and 
therefore would help ICE better target its worksite enforcement efforts 
toward those employers. For example, the Basic Pilot Program's 
confirmation of numerous queries of the same Social Security number 
could indicate that the Social Security number is being used 
fraudulently or that an unscrupulous employer is knowingly hiring 
unauthorized workers by accepting the same Social Security number for 
multiple employees. However, USCIS officials stated that they have 
concerns about providing ICE with broader access to Basic Pilot Program 
information for the worksite enforcement program. USCIS officials said 
that, if ICE has access to pilot program information for worksite 
enforcement purposes, that access might create a disincentive for 
employers to participate in this voluntary program and could be used 
for purposes other than identifying potentially unscrupulous employers. 
These officials stated that employers may be less likely to join or 
participate in the program because the employers may believe that they 
are more likely to be targeted for a worksite enforcement investigation 
as a result of program participation. 

ICE suggested that there could be possible benefits to their worksite 
enforcement efforts if employers were required to participate in a 
mandatory automated verification program like the Basic Pilot Program. 
ICE officials said that a mandatory automated verification system could 
help ICE focus worksite enforcement efforts on employers who try to 
evade using the program. They also stated that a mandatory system like 
the pilot program could limit the ability of employers who knowingly 
hired unauthorized workers to claim that the workers presented false 
documents to obtain employment, assisting ICE agents in proving 
employer violations of IRCA. Officials from 7 of the 12 Special Agent 
in Charge field offices we interviewed suggested that a mandatory Basic 
Pilot Program could help them better target their worksite enforcement 
efforts. 

Basic Pilot Program Does Not Help Employers Detect Identity Fraud in 
Verifying Employees' Work Eligibility: 

Although an automated verification program like the Basic Pilot Program 
has potential to enhance the employment verification process and help 
employers detect use of counterfeit documents, the program cannot 
currently help employers detect identity fraud. In 2002 we reported 
that, although not specifically or comprehensively quantifiable, the 
prevalence of identity fraud seemed to be increasing, a development 
that may affect employers' ability to reliably verify employment 
eligibility.[Footnote 39] If an unauthorized worker presents valid 
documentation that belongs to another person authorized to work, the 
Basic Pilot Program may find the worker to be work-authorized. 
Similarly, if an employee presents counterfeit documentation that 
contains valid information and appears authentic, the Basic Pilot 
Program may verify the employee as work-authorized. DHS officials told 
us that the department is currently considering possible ways to 
enhance the Basic Pilot Program to help it detect cases of identity 
fraud, for example, by modifying the program to provide a digitized 
photograph associated with employment authorization information 
presented by an employee. Yet, DHS cannot fully assess possible ways to 
modify the Basic Pilot Program to address identity fraud in the absence 
of data on the costs and feasibility of implementing such modifications. 

In addition, the Basic Pilot Program does not assist employers in 
verifying the work authorization status of employees whose status 
requires reverification and therefore does not help employers detect 
document or identity fraud in the reverification process. Employers 
currently may not use the Basic Pilot Program to re-verify the 
employment eligibility of individuals whose work authorization has 
expired, and employers agree not to use the pilot program for 
reverification when registering to participate in the program. 
Therefore, participating employers cannot fully use the Basic Pilot 
Program to verify the work authorization status of all employees for 
whom verification, including reverification, is required under the Form 
I-9 process. According to one USCIS official, the pilot program does 
not face any technological or other limitations that would prevent the 
program from being used for reverification purposes, if such use was 
required or allowed as part of the pilot program. 

Delays in Data Entry May Lengthen the Pilot Program Verification 
Process: 

Another current weakness in the Basic Pilot Program that could affect 
the program's success if use increased or was made mandatory is delays 
in the entry of information on immigrants' and nonimmigrants' arrivals 
and employment authorization into DHS databases. Although the majority 
of pilot program queries entered by participating employers are 
confirmed via the automated SSA and DHS verification checks, about 15 
percent of queries authorized by DHS required manual verification by 
immigration status verifiers in fiscal year 2004.[Footnote 40] 
According to USCIS, immigration status verifiers typically resolve 
cases referred to them for verification within 24 hours, but a small 
number of cases take longer. For example, nine employers we interviewed 
reported that a small number of immigration status verifier 
verifications took longer than 24 hours to resolve, with a few 
verifications taking as long as 2 weeks to resolve. 

Immigration status verifiers reported that the primary reason for 
queries to require verification by them is because of delays in entry 
of employment authorization information into DHS databases. USCIS 
officials told us that those verifications that take longer than a few 
days to resolve are generally caused by delays in the entry of data on 
employees who received employment authorization documents generated by 
a computer and camera that are not directly linked to DHS databases, 
such as those used at ports of entry for refugees and at USCIS field 
offices. They said that information on the employment authorization 
documents generated through this process is electronically sent to 
USCIS headquarters for entry but is sometimes lost or not entered into 
databases in a timely manner. By contrast, employment authorization 
documents issued at USCIS service centers are produced via computers 
that are used to update data in USCIS databases, which USCIS officials 
told us represent the majority of employment authorization documents 
currently issued by USCIS. The Temple University Institute for Survey 
Research and Westat found that verifications that require immigration 
status verifiers' review lengthen the time needed to complete the 
employment verification process. In addition, among the 22 employers we 
interviewed, 7 reported that they may experience some losses in work 
time, training, or money for background checks and physicals when 
employees contest tentative nonconfirmations. 

USCIS has taken steps to increase the timeliness and accuracy of 
information entered into databases used as part of the Basic Pilot 
Program. In June 2004, USCIS reported that, among other improvements, 
it had started work to expedite data entry for new lawful permanent 
residents and arriving nonimmigrants and to improve data entry for 
changes in work authorization status.[Footnote 41] For example, USCIS 
said that it has worked to reduce the time in which data are available 
for Basic Pilot Program verifications by expediting submission of data 
on newly arrived immigrants and nonimmigrants from ports of entry and 
field offices to USCIS service centers for data entry. The agency 
reported that, as a result of its efforts, data on new immigrants are 
now typically available for verification within 10 to 12 days of an 
immigrant's arrival in the United States while previously, the 
information was not available for up to 6 to 9 months after arrival. 
Moreover, USCIS reported it has worked to increase the timeliness and 
availability of temporary work authorization information in its 
databases by increasing the number of employment authorization 
documents issued by service centers as compared with the number of 
documents issued through computers not directly linked to DHS 
databases. The department reported that, while in 1999 less than half 
of all employment authorization documents were issued by service 
centers, over three-quarters of the cards are now issued through 
service centers. USCIS officials told us that the agency has continued 
these efforts to improve the timeliness and accuracy of information 
entered into DHS databases and noted that the agency is currently 
planning to fund another evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program that 
will include a review of the accuracy of DHS database information. 

Furthermore, analysis of the Basic Pilot Program database indicates 
that the timeliness and accuracy of the DHS automated checks against 
the Basic Pilot Program database have improved. In fiscal year 2004, 
about 10 percent of all queries were referred to DHS for verification. 
Among those queries authorized by DHS, the percentage of queries 
verified by the DHS automated check increased from about 67 percent in 
fiscal year 2000 to about 85 percent in fiscal year 2004, as shown in 
figure 2. 

Figure 2: Number of Queries Authorized by DHS through the Automated 
Check and the Immigration Status Verifier Check: 

[See PDF for image]

Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest hundred. 

[End of figure]

Although USCIS has taken some steps to improve the timeliness and 
accuracy of information entered into databases used as part of the 
Basic Pilot Program and plans to review the accuracy of database 
information as part of its planned evaluation of the pilot program, 
USCIS cannot effectively assess future use of the pilot program, 
including possible increased program usage, without information on the 
costs and feasibility of ways to further reduce delays in the entry of 
information into DHS databases. 

Employer Noncompliance with Pilot Program Procedures May Adversely 
Affect Employees: 

Another factor that may reduce the effectiveness of the pilot program 
if usage is increased or made mandatory is employer noncompliance with 
Basic Pilot Program requirements. These requirements are intended to 
safeguard employees queried through the program from such harm as 
discrimination or reduced training and pay. The Temple University 
Institute for Survey Research and Westat evaluation of the Basic Pilot 
Program concluded that the majority of employers surveyed appeared to 
be in compliance with Basic Pilot Program procedures. However, the 
evaluation found evidence of some noncompliance with these procedures 
that specifically prohibit screening job applicants and taking actions 
that adversely affect employees while they are contesting tentative 
nonconfirmations, such as limiting employees' work assignments or pay. 
For example, 30 percent of the employers surveyed for the evaluation 
reported restricting work assignments while employees contested 
tentative nonconfirmations, a practice that is prohibited under the 
Basic Pilot Program. Of the 22 employers we interviewed who participate 
in the pilot, 7 reported using the Basic Pilot Program in a way that 
did not conform with pilot program procedures, including using the 
pilot program to screen job applicants before offering jobs to the 
applicants. 

The Basic Pilot Program provides a variety of reports that may help 
USCIS determine whether employers follow program requirements. For 
example, these reports could help USCIS identify employers who do not 
appear to refer employees contesting tentative nonconfirmations to SSA 
or DHS, which is required under pilot program procedures. USCIS could 
then follow up to determine if such employers are following pilot 
procedures that require employers to refer all employees with tentative 
nonconfirmations to SSA or DHS. USCIS officials told us that efforts to 
review employers' use of the pilot program have been limited by lack of 
staff available to oversee and examine employer use of the program, and 
they noted that there are currently 15 USCIS headquarters staff members 
responsible for administering USCIS verification programs, including 
the Basic Pilot Program. The officials said that, as part of the next 
evaluation of the pilot program, USCIS plans to assess the extent to 
which employers follow pilot program requirements and procedures, such 
as employer adherence to requirements to notify employees of tentative 
nonconfirmations. However, without information on the costs and 
feasibility of routinely reviewing employers' use of the pilot program, 
USCIS cannot fully determine possible ways to regularly examine 
employer use of the program and therefore the extent to which employers 
comply with pilot program requirements. 

Current Program May Not Complete Timely Verifications if Use Greatly 
Increased: 

According to USCIS officials, due to the growth in other USCIS 
verification programs, current USCIS staff may not be able to complete 
timely verifications if the number of employers using the Basic Pilot 
Program were to significantly increase. In particular, these officials 
said that if a significant number of new employers registered for the 
program or if the program were mandatory for all employers or a segment 
of employers, additional resources would be needed to maintain timely 
verifications, given the growth in other verification programs. For 
example, the REAL ID Act of 2005[Footnote 42] mandated that states must 
meet minimum standards in issuing driver's licenses and nondriver 
identification cards, including verifying the immigration status of all 
noncitizen applicants, before federal government authorities can accept 
the licenses and cards for official purposes beginning in 2008. 
Currently, USCIS has approximately 38 immigration status verifiers 
available for completing Basic Pilot Program verifications, and these 
verifiers reported that they are able to complete the majority of 
current required checks within their target time frame of 24 
hours.[Footnote 43] However, USCIS officials said that because of the 
growth in other verification programs that would increase the number of 
verifications that require checks by immigration status verifiers, the 
agency has serious concerns about its ability to complete timely 
verifications if the number of Basic Pilot Program users greatly 
increased. 

USCIS officials also stated that the agency lacks funding to further 
expand the Basic Pilot Program. The Basic Pilot Program and other 
verification programs have been funded by fees USCIS receives from 
applicants for adjudication of immigration and citizenship benefits. 
USCIS allocated about $3.5 million from its fee accounts for all of its 
verification programs, including the Basic Pilot Program, in fiscal 
year 2005.[Footnote 44] USCIS officials said that this allocation 
included a $500,000 increase for additional employee verifications by 
employers using the Basic Pilot Program. However, these officials told 
us that current funding levels allocated for USCIS verification 
programs would not be sufficient to cover costs associated with 
mandatory use of the Basic Pilot Program for all employers, should this 
be adopted. In 2004, we reported that USCIS fees were not sufficient to 
fully fund the agency's operations but noted that cost data were 
insufficient to determine the full extent of the funding 
shortfall.[Footnote 45]

The Temple University Institute for Survey Research and Westat 
estimated a range of costs associated with expanding the dial-up 
version of the pilot program,[Footnote 46] including costs for making 
the program mandatory for a selected group of employers, like employers 
with more than 10 employees, and making the program mandatory for all 
employers, regardless of the number of employees. The report estimated 
that a mandatory dial-up version of the pilot program for all employers 
would cost the federal government, employers, and employees about $11.7 
billion total per year, with employers bearing most of the 
costs.[Footnote 47] USCIS has worked with participating employers to 
switch them to the Web-based version of the program and discontinued 
the dial-up version in June 2005. The Temple University Institute for 
Survey Research and Westat did not estimate costs for a mandatory Web- 
based version, although they noted that operating costs associated with 
such a program would be less than for the dial-up version because 
employer computer maintenance and telephone costs would be lower. As 
part of the next evaluation of the pilot program, USCIS plans to assess 
the costs and potential time frames associated with making the Web- 
based version mandatory for all employers or specific segments of 
employers. Given the growth in other USCIS verification programs, USCIS 
cannot effectively assess potential costs for making the Web-based 
version of the Basic Pilot Program mandatory without information on 
other possible resources needed for the program, such as staff needed 
for conducting manual verifications. 

Competing Priorities and Lack of Outcome Goals and Measures May Hinder 
Worksite Enforcement Efforts: 

The worksite enforcement program is one of various ICE immigration 
enforcement programs, and has been a relatively low priority. Since 
fiscal year 1999, the number of notices of intent to fine issued to 
employers for violations of IRCA and the number of administrative 
worksite arrests have declined, which, according to ICE, are due to 
various factors, such as the widespread use of counterfeit documents 
that make it difficult for ICE agents to prove employer violations. INS 
and ICE have also faced difficulties in setting and collecting 
meaningful fine amounts and in detaining unauthorized workers arrested 
at worksites. In addition, ICE has not yet developed outcome goals and 
measures for the worksite enforcement program, making it difficult for 
ICE and Congress to assess program performance and determine resource 
levels for the program. 

Worksite Enforcement Has Been a Relatively Low Priority for ICE, but 
ICE Has Proposed Additional Resources for the Program: 

Worksite enforcement is one of various immigration enforcement programs 
formerly managed by INS and now managed by ICE, and competes for 
resources with these other program areas, such as alien smuggling and 
fraud. Among INS and ICE responsibilities, worksite enforcement has 
been a relatively low priority. For example, in the 1999 INS Interior 
Enforcement Strategy, the strategy to block and remove employers' 
access to undocumented workers was the fifth of five interior 
enforcement priorities.[Footnote 48] In this same year, we reported 
that, relative to other enforcement programs in INS, worksite 
enforcement received a small portion of INS's staffing and enforcement 
budget. We noted that the number of employer investigations INS was 
able to conduct each year covered only a fraction of the estimated 
number of employers who may have hired unauthorized aliens.[Footnote 49]

In keeping with the primary mission of DHS to combat terrorism, after 
September 11, 2001, INS and then ICE focused investigative resources 
primarily on national security cases, such as investigations of aliens 
in the United States who may have overstayed their authorized time 
periods for being in the country and the National Security Entry and 
Exit Registration System; on participation in Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces;[Footnote 50] and on critical infrastructure protection. In 
particular, INS and then ICE focused available resources for worksite 
enforcement mainly on identifying and removing unauthorized workers 
from critical infrastructure sites, such as airports and nuclear power 
plants, to help reduce vulnerabilities at those sites. In 2004, we 
reported that, if critical infrastructure-related businesses were to be 
compromised by terrorists, this would pose a serious threat to domestic 
security.[Footnote 51] In 2003, we testified that, given ICE's limited 
resources, it needs to ensure that it targets those industries where 
employment of illegal aliens poses the greatest potential risk to 
national security.[Footnote 52] According to ICE officials, the agency 
adopted this focus on critical infrastructure protection because the 
fact that unauthorized workers can obtain employment at critical 
infrastructure sites indicates that there are vulnerabilities in those 
sites' hiring and screening practices, and unauthorized workers 
employed at those sites are vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists, 
smugglers, traffickers, or other criminals. 

Consistent with these priorities, in 2003 ICE headquarters issued a 
memo requiring field offices to request approval from ICE headquarters 
prior to opening any worksite enforcement investigation not related to 
the protection of critical infrastructure sites, such as investigations 
of farms and restaurants. ICE officials told us that the purpose of 
this memo was to help ensure that field offices focused worksite 
enforcement efforts on critical infrastructure protection operations. 
Field office representatives told us that noncritical infrastructure 
worksite enforcement was one of the few investigative areas for which 
offices had to request approval from ICE headquarters to open an 
investigation. According to ICE, the agency recently issued a memo 
delegating authority to approve noncritical infrastructure worksite 
enforcement cases to field offices' Special Agents in Charge. Eight of 
the 12 offices we interviewed told us that worksite enforcement was not 
an office priority unless the worksite enforcement case related to 
critical infrastructure protection. ICE has inspected Forms I-9 and 
employer records at hundreds of critical infrastructure sites as of 
March 2005. For example, as part of Operation Tarmac, ICE conducted 
investigations at nearly 200 airports nationwide and, as part of 
Operation Glow Worm, conducted investigations at more than 50 nuclear 
power plants as of March 2005.[Footnote 53] Between October 2004 and 
the beginning of May 2005, about 77 percent of the worksite enforcement 
cases opened by ICE were related to critical infrastructure 
protection.[Footnote 54]

Since fiscal year 1999, INS and ICE have dedicated a relatively small 
portion of overall agent resources to the worksite enforcement program. 
As shown in figure 3, in fiscal year 1999, INS allocated about 240 full-
time equivalents to worksite enforcement efforts, while in fiscal year 
2003, ICE allocated about 90 full-time equivalents.[Footnote 55] 
Between fiscal years 1999 and 2003, the percentage of agent work-years 
spent on worksite enforcement efforts generally decreased from about 9 
percent to about 4 percent. 

Figure 3: Investigative Agent Work-years Spent on Worksite Enforcement 
Efforts and Agent Work-years Spent on Other Investigative Areas for 
Each Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2003: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Although worksite enforcement may remain a low priority relative to 
other programs, ICE has proposed increasing agent resources for the 
worksite enforcement program by adding staff to its headquarters' 
worksite enforcement unit,[Footnote 56] which was comprised of three 
staff members as of July 2005, and hiring additional worksite 
enforcement staff for field offices. In particular, ICE plans to use 
the $5 million provided for fiscal year 2005 by a congressional 
conference report for the worksite enforcement program to fund 
additional headquarters positions for the worksite enforcement 
unit.[Footnote 57] In its fiscal year 2006 budget submission, ICE 
requested funding for 117 compliance officers, 20 additional 
investigative agents, and 6 additional program managers for worksite 
enforcement. ICE has proposed hiring these compliance officers to 
conduct the administrative elements of worksite enforcement cases, such 
as the inspection of Forms I-9 and other employment records. ICE 
officials said that these officers would pass cases involving potential 
criminal violations to investigative agents for review. ICE officials 
told us that the agency would use the compliance officers only for 
worksite enforcement efforts. According to ICE, compliance enforcement 
officers are less costly than investigative agents. ICE estimates that 
each investigative agent would cost the agency approximately $167,000 
to $176,000 in fiscal year 2006, while one compliance enforcement 
officer would cost about $76,000. At this point, it is unclear what 
impact, if any, these additional resources would have on worksite 
enforcement efforts. 

ICE Attributes Decline in Numbers of Employer Fine Notices and Worksite 
Arrests to Document Fraud and Resource Allocation Decisions: 

The number of notices of intent to fine issued to employers as well as 
the number of unauthorized workers arrested at worksites have generally 
declined. Between fiscal years 1999 and 2004, the number of notices of 
intent to fine issued to employers for improperly completing Forms I-9 
or knowingly hiring unauthorized workers generally decreased from 417 
to 3.[Footnote 58] (See figure 4.)

Figure 4: Number of Notices of Intent to Fine Issued to Employers for 
Each Fiscal Year from 1999 through 2004: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The number of unauthorized workers arrested during worksite enforcement 
operations has also declined since fiscal year 1999. As shown in figure 
5, the number of administrative worksite arrests declined by about 84 
percent from 2,849 in fiscal year 1999 to 445 in fiscal year 2003. 

Figure 5: Number of Worksite Enforcement Arrests for Each Fiscal Year 
from 1999 through 2003: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

According to ICE records, worksite enforcement criminal arrests totaled 
159 in fiscal year 2004 and 81 in the period from October 2004 through 
April 2005.[Footnote 59]

ICE attributes the decline in the number of notices of intent to fine 
issued to employers and number of administrative worksite arrests to 
various factors including the widespread availability and use of 
counterfeit documents and the allocation of resources to other 
priorities. Various studies have shown that the availability and use of 
fraudulent documents have made it difficult for ICE agents to prove 
that employers knowingly hire unauthorized workers. For example, in 
previous work we reported that the prevalence of document fraud made it 
difficult for INS to prove that an employer knowingly hired an 
unauthorized alien.[Footnote 60] In 1996, the Department of Justice 
Office of the Inspector General reported that the proliferation of 
cheap fraudulent documents made it possible for the unscrupulous 
employer to avoid being held accountable for hiring illegal 
aliens.[Footnote 61] ICE officials told us that employers who agents 
suspect of knowingly hiring unauthorized workers can claim that they 
were unaware that their workers presented false documents at the time 
of hire, making it difficult for agents to prove that the employer 
willfully violated IRCA. In commenting on a draft of this report, ICE 
also noted that the IIRIRA provision that limited employer liability 
for certain Form I-9 paperwork violations affects ICE's ability to 
substantiate employer charges for knowingly hiring unauthorized workers 
and, therefore, the number of notices of intent to fine that ICE 
issues. This provision came into effect in 1996, so it is unclear what 
effect, if any, the provision had on the decline in the number of 
notices of intent to fine issued between fiscal years 1999 and 2004. 

In addition, according to ICE, the allocation of INS and ICE resources 
to other priorities has contributed to the decline in the numbers of 
notices of intent to fine and worksite arrests. For example, INS 
focused its worksite enforcement resources on egregious employer 
violators who were linked to other criminal violations like smuggling, 
fraud, or worker exploitation, and de-emphasized administrative 
employer cases and fines. Furthermore, INS investigative resources were 
redirected from worksite enforcement activities to criminal alien 
cases, which consumed more investigative hours by the late 1990s than 
any other enforcement activity. After September 11, 2001, INS and ICE 
focused investigative resources on national security cases and, in 
particular, focused worksite enforcement efforts on critical 
infrastructure protection, which is consistent with DHS's primary 
mission to combat terrorism. According to ICE, the redirection of 
resources from other enforcement programs to perform national security- 
related investigations resulted in fewer resources for traditional 
program areas like fraud and noncritical infrastructure worksite 
enforcement. Additionally, some ICE field representatives, as well as 
immigration experts we interviewed, noted that the focus on critical 
infrastructure protection does not address the majority of worksites in 
industries that have traditionally provided the magnet of jobs 
attracting illegal aliens to the United States. 

INS and ICE Have Faced Difficulties in Setting Fine Amounts and in 
Detaining Unauthorized Workers, but Have Taken Steps to Address 
Difficulties: 

INS and ICE have faced difficulties in setting and collecting final 
fine amounts that meaningfully deter employers from knowingly hiring 
unauthorized workers and in detaining unauthorized workers arrested at 
worksites. ICE officials told us that because fine amounts are so low, 
the fines do not provide a meaningful deterrent. These officials also 
said that when agents could prove that an employer knowingly hired an 
unauthorized worker and issued a notice of intent to fine, the fine 
amounts agents recommended were often negotiated down in value during 
discussions between agency attorneys and employers. The amount of 
mitigated fines may be, in the opinion of some ICE officials, so low 
that they believe that employers view the fines as a cost of doing 
business, making the fines an ineffective deterrent for employers who 
attempt to circumvent IRCA. ICE officials at 11 of the 12 field offices 
at which we interviewed staff said that they experienced instances in 
which fine amounts were mitigated down in value. According to ICE, the 
agency mitigates employer fine amounts because doing so may be a more 
efficient use of government resources than pursuing employers who 
contest or ignore fines, which could be more costly to the government 
than the fine amount sought. Recently, ICE settled a worksite 
enforcement case with a large company without going through the 
administrative fine process. As part of the settlement, the company 
agreed to pay $11 million and company contractors agreed to pay $4 
million in forfeitures--more than any administrative fine amount ever 
issued against an employer for IRCA violations, according to ICE. 

One ICE official said that use of such civil settlements instead of 
pursuit of administrative fines, specifically in regard to 
investigations of noncritical infrastructure employers, could be a more 
efficient use of investigative resources. ICE officials also said that 
use of civil settlements could help ensure employers' future compliance 
by including in the settlements a requirement to enter into compliance 
agreements, such as the Basic Pilot Program. ICE recently employed this 
strategy in its $15 million settlement with the large company. As part 
of the settlement, the company agreed to enter into a compliance 
program with ICE. Other compliance agreements with employers could 
involve mandatory participation in the Basic Pilot Program. 
Additionally, ICE officials said that the agency has proposed working 
with employers who are not the subjects of worksite enforcement 
investigations to help them ensure compliance with IRCA through 
enhanced education and partnerships. In April 2005, ICE issued its 
interim strategic plan, which, as part of its objective on identifying 
critical industries for worksite enforcement operations, included an 
approach for partnering with businesses to help them comply with 
IRCA.[Footnote 62] This partnership program, called the ICE Mutual 
Agreement between Government and Employers, is intended to provide 
employers with training and best practices for complying with IRCA. In 
addition to implementing this partnership program, ICE plans to promote 
expanded use of the Basic Pilot Program to help encourage employers in 
critical industries to strengthen their ability to verify employees' 
work eligibility. The practice of civil settlements with employers and 
joint compliance programs are in the early stages of implementation; 
therefore the extent to which they may address the difficulties faced 
in setting fine amounts that provide a meaningful deterrent is not yet 
known. 

The former INS also faced difficulties in collecting total fine amounts 
from employers, but collection efforts have improved. We previously 
reported that the former INS faced difficulties in collecting total 
fine amounts from employers for a number of reasons including that 
employers went out of business, moved, or declared bankruptcy.[Footnote 
63] In 1996, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General 
reported that the deterrent effect of civil fines on sweatshop 
operators was adversely affected by collection difficulties and noted 
that INS had no national system for billing, tracking, and collecting 
employer fines. In 1998, INS created the Debt Management Center to 
centralize the collections process, and the center is now responsible 
for collecting fines ICE issued against employers for violations of 
IRCA and providing other collection services for ICE and USCIS. The ICE 
Debt Management Center has collected total amounts on most of the 
invoices issued to employers for final fine amounts between fiscal 
years 1999 and 2004--about 94 percent as of the end of June 
2005[Footnote 64].: 

In addition, ICE's Office of Detention and Removal has limited 
detention space, and unauthorized workers detained during worksite 
enforcement investigations are a low priority for that space.[Footnote 
65] In 2004, the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security 
sent a memo to the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
and the Assistant Secretary for ICE outlining the priorities for the 
detention of aliens. According to this memo, aliens who are subjects of 
national security investigations were among those groups of aliens 
given the highest priority for detention, while aliens arrested as a 
result of worksite enforcement investigations were among those groups 
of aliens given the lowest priority. Officials in 8 of the 12 field 
offices we interviewed told us that lack of sufficient detention space 
has limited the effectiveness of worksite enforcement efforts. For 
example, ICE officials stated that if investigative agents arrest 
unauthorized aliens at worksites, the aliens would likely be released 
because the Office of Detention and Removal detention centers do not 
have sufficient space to house the aliens. Field office representatives 
said that offices can expend a large amount of resources to arrest 
unauthorized aliens at worksites and that these aliens would likely be 
released and may re-enter the workforce, in some cases returning to the 
worksites from where they were originally arrested. As a result, the 
use of resources to arrest unauthorized aliens at worksites may be 
unproductive. A congressional conference report for fiscal year 2005 
provided funds to the Office of Detention and Removal for an additional 
1,950 bed spaces.[Footnote 66] Given competing priorities for detention 
space, the effect, if any, these additional bed spaces will have on 
ICE's priority given to workers detained as a result of worksite 
enforcement operations cannot currently be determined. 

ICE Has Not Yet Developed Outcome Goals and Measures for Worksite 
Enforcement: 

Given ICE's limited resources and competing priorities for those 
resources, ICE's lack of performance goals and measures for the 
worksite enforcement program may hinder the agency's ability to 
effectively determine and allocate resources for the program. 
Performance goals and measures are intended to provide Congress and 
agency management with the information to systematically assess a 
program's strengths, weaknesses, and performance. A performance goal is 
the target level of performance--either output or outcome--expressed as 
a tangible, measurable objective against which actual achievement will 
be compared. A performance measure can be defined as an indicator, 
statistic, or metric used to gauge program performance and may 
typically include outputs and outcomes. Outputs provide status 
information about an initiative or program in terms of completing an 
action in a specified time frame. Outcomes show results or outcomes 
related to an initiative or program in terms of its effectiveness, 
efficiency, or impact. Outputs should support or lead to outcomes and, 
for each outcome goal, there are typically several output goals. 
Outputs and outcomes together help agencies determine and report on 
products or services provided through a program and the results of 
those products or services. 

ICE lacks output goals and measures necessary to inform its resource 
allocation decisions. Output goals and measures are an essential 
management tool in managing programs for results. They help provide the 
information that agencies need to aid in determining resources for a 
program and whether they are using program resources efficiently and 
effectively. ICE officials told us that the agency does not plan to 
focus on developing and using output goals and measures for worksite 
enforcement, such as the number of cases initiated or number of 
worksite arrests made, because they believe that such goals and 
measures do not adequately indicate ICE's level of effort for worksite 
enforcement. Therefore, the ICE officials said that ICE plans to focus 
on developing outcome goals and measures for the program that better 
reflect the program's effect. Yet in its fiscal year 2006 budget 
request, ICE identified two output measures for its worksite 
enforcement program: a 20 percent increase in the number of 
administrative worksite case completions and criminal employer case 
presentations made to the U.S. Attorney's Office in fiscal year 2007 
and a 30 percent increase in these two indicators in fiscal year 2008. 
Although these two measures would provide a general indication of ICE's 
level of worksite enforcement activity, these measures alone would not 
allow ICE or Congress to effectively determine resources needed for the 
worksite enforcement program because these indicators address only two 
elements of the worksite enforcement program and do not address other 
program elements, such as critical infrastructure protection. 
Furthermore, in July 2005 the Secretary of Homeland Security discussed 
the need for DHS, of which ICE is a part, to be an effective steward of 
its resources. Without additional output goals and measures for 
worksite enforcement, ICE's ability to effectively determine and 
allocate worksite enforcement resources needed to meet program goals, 
especially given other agency priorities for resources, and to fully 
assess whether the agency is using those resources effectively and 
efficiently in implementing the program may be hindered. 

In addition, ICE lacks outcome goals and measures that may hinder its 
ability to effectively assess the results of its worksite enforcement 
program efforts, including critical infrastructure protection efforts. 
Outcome measures provide agencies with an assessment of the results of 
a program activity or policy compared to its intended purposes. ICE 
officials told us that the agency plans to develop outcome goals and 
measures for its worksite enforcement program, but it has not yet 
developed these goals and measures. As a first step, ICE officials told 
us that field offices conducted baseline threat-level assessments in 
August and September 2004 to help identify regional risks, such as 
risks to critical infrastructure sites. These officials stated that an 
action plan will be developed to address these risks. Field office 
agents will then measure how well a particular threat has been 
addressed by measuring the impact of ICE's investigative activities on 
deterring threats or decreasing vulnerabilities to national security. 
ICE has not yet established target time frames for developing worksite 
enforcement program outcome goals and measures and, without these goals 
and measures, ICE may not be able to effectively assess the results of 
program efforts. For example, until ICE fully develops outcome goals 
and measures, it may not be able to completely determine the extent to 
which its critical infrastructure protection efforts have resulted in 
the elimination of unauthorized workers' access to secure areas of 
critical infrastructure sites, one possible goal that ICE may use for 
its worksite enforcement program. 

Conclusions: 

Efforts to reduce the employment of unauthorized workers in the United 
States necessitate a strong employment eligibility verification process 
and a credible worksite enforcement program to help ensure that 
employers are meeting verification requirements. The current Form I-9 
employment verification process has not fundamentally changed since its 
establishment in 1986, and ongoing weaknesses in the process have 
undermined its effectiveness. Although DHS and the former INS have been 
assessing changes in the process since 1997, DHS has not yet issued 
final regulations on these changes, and it has not established a 
definitive time frame for completing the assessment. Completion of this 
assessment and issuance of final regulations should strengthen the 
current employment verification process and make it simpler and more 
secure. Furthermore, the Basic Pilot Program, or a similar automated 
verification system, if implemented on a much larger scale, shows 
promise for enhancing the employment verification process and reducing 
document fraud. However, current weaknesses in pilot program 
implementation would have to be fully addressed to help ensure the 
efficient and effective operation of an expanded or mandatory pilot 
program, or a similar automated employment verification program, and 
the cost of additional resources would be a consideration. Although 
USCIS plans to review current pilot program weaknesses, additional 
information on the costs and feasibility of addressing these weaknesses 
is needed to assist USCIS and Congress in assessing possible future use 
of the Basic Pilot Program, including increased program usage. 

Even with a strengthened employment verification process, a credible 
worksite enforcement program is needed because no verification process 
is foolproof and not all employers may want to comply with the law. 
ICE's focus on critical infrastructure protection since September 11, 
2001 is consistent with the DHS mission to combat terrorism by 
detecting and mitigating vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks at 
critical infrastructure sites which, if exploited, could pose serious 
threats to domestic security. This focus on critical infrastructure 
protection, though, generally does not address noncritical 
infrastructure employers' noncompliance with IRCA. As a result, 
employers, particularly those not located at or near critical 
infrastructure sites, who attempt to circumvent IRCA face less of a 
likelihood that ICE will investigate them for failing to comply with 
the current employment verification process or knowingly hiring 
unauthorized workers. ICE is taking some steps to address difficulties 
it has faced in its worksite enforcement efforts, but it is too early 
to tell whether these steps will improve the effectiveness of the 
worksite enforcement program. In addition, given ICE's limited 
resources and competing priorities for those resources, additional 
output goals and measures are needed to help ICE track the progress of 
its worksite enforcement efforts, effectively determine the resources 
needed to meet worksite enforcement program goals, and ensure that 
program resources are used efficiently and effectively. Moreover, a 
target time frame for developing outcome goals and measures is needed 
to assist Congress and ICE in determining whether the worksite 
enforcement program, including critical infrastructure protection, is 
achieving its desired outcomes. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To strengthen the current employment verification process, we recommend 
that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following action: 

* set a specific time frame for completing the department's review of 
the Form I-9 process, including an assessment of the possibility of 
reducing the number of acceptable work eligibility documents, and 
issuing final regulations on changes to the Form I-9 process and an 
updated Form I-9. 

To assist Congress and USCIS in assessing the possibility of increased 
or mandatory use of the Basic Pilot Program, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS to take the 
following action: 

* include, in the planned evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, an 
assessment of the feasibility and costs of addressing the Basic Pilot 
Program's current weaknesses, including its inability to detect 
identity fraud in the verification and reverification processes, delays 
in entry of new arrival and employment authorization information into 
DHS databases, and employer noncompliance with program procedures, and 
resources needed to support any increased or mandatory use of the 
program. 

To assist Congress and ICE in determining the resources needed for the 
worksite enforcement program and to help ensure the efficient and 
effective use of program resources, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for ICE to take the 
following two actions: 

* establish additional output goals and measures for the worksite 
enforcement program to clearly indicate the target level of ICE 
worksite enforcement activity and the resources needed to implement the 
program, and: 

* set a specific time frame for completing the assessment and 
development of outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement 
program to provide a target level of performance for worksite 
enforcement efforts and measures to assess the extent to which program 
results have met program goals. 

Agency Comments: 

We requested comments on this report from the Secretary of Homeland 
Security. In its response, DHS agreed with our recommendations. DHS's 
comments are reprinted in Appendix V. DHS also provided technical 
comments, which we considered and incorporated where appropriate. We 
also received technical comments from SSA, which we considered and 
incorporated where appropriate. 

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
after the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of 
this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of 
Labor, the Attorney General, the Commissioner of the Social Security 
Administration, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 
and appropriate congressional committees. We will also make copies 
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix VI. 

Signed by: 

Richard M. Stana: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: Employment Eligibility Verification Form (Form I-9): 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure] 

[End of section]

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine how the employment eligibility verification (Form I-9) 
process functions, we examined laws related to the employment 
verification process, including the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996; federal regulations on the Form I-9 process; and former 
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) guidance on the Form 
I-9, such as the Handbook for Employers, which provides instructions 
for completing the form. We evaluated this information to identify the 
Form I-9 requirements, including employer and employee responsibilities 
for completing the form, and challenges to meeting those requirements. 
We examined our past reports and other studies, such as the 1997 U.S. 
Commission on Immigration Reform Report to Congress, to obtain further 
information on the employment verification process. We analyzed former 
INS plans for addressing Form I-9 challenges, including its plans to 
modify the list of acceptable work eligibility documents. We also 
examined U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) interim 
guidelines on the electronic Forms I-9 to determine what guidance, if 
any, they provide to employers using the electronic form. 

To determine challenges to the Form I-9 process and obtain information 
on the Basic Pilot Program, we also interviewed and obtained 
information from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), 
ICE, and Social Security Administration (SSA) officials. In addition, 
we interviewed representatives of 23 employers; 12 employer, employee, 
and advocacy groups; and 6 immigration experts to obtain their views on 
employment verification and worksite enforcement.[Footnote 67] We 
selected the employers to interview based on a mix of the following 
criteria: the total number of Basic Pilot Program queries; the total 
number or percentage of pilot program queries that resulted in 
authorized employment, tentative nonconfirmations, and final 
nonconfirmations; geographic proximity to the ICE field offices we 
visited; previous records of being sanctioned for Form I-9 violations; 
and industry categorization. The 23 employers we interviewed were 
located in the following states: California, Illinois, Michigan, New 
Jersey, New York, and Texas. The 23 employers were also part of the 
following industries: meat processing, transportation, health care, 
landscaping, manufacturing, accommodation, food services, agriculture, 
janitorial and maintenance, temporary employment, critical 
infrastructure, local government, and newspaper. One of the employers 
we interviewed did not participate in the Basic Pilot Program. As a 
result, when we discuss employers' views on the Basic Pilot Program, we 
refer to the views of the 22 employers we interviewed who participated 
in the Basic Pilot Program. 

We selected the 9 employer and employee associations with which to meet 
based on a mix of criteria, including industry categorization, gross 
output by industry in 2002, number of paid employees by industry in 
2002, and estimates of the number of illegal immigrants employed by 
industry.[Footnote 68] We interviewed officials from employer and 
employee associations in the following industries: construction, 
agriculture, accommodation, food services, retail, health care, and 
meat. We selected the 3 advocacy groups to interview based on the 
groups' interest in issues related to employment verification and 
worksite enforcement efforts and interviewed officials from advocacy 
groups that represent a range of views on these issues. We selected the 
6 immigration experts to interview based on the experts' range of views 
on immigration issues. We analyzed information from these agencies, 
employers, groups, and experts to determine their views on the Form I- 
9 process and difficulties in verifying work eligibility through the 
process. We used information obtained from employers, employer and 
employee associations, and advocacy groups only as anecdotal examples, 
as information from these entities cannot be generalized to all 
employers and groups in the United States. 

Furthermore, we evaluated information from USCIS and SSA on the Basic 
Pilot Program, including the Basic Pilot Program user's manual and 
memorandum of understanding for employers, to determine how the pilot 
program functions and how it might assist participating employers in 
reliably verifying employees' work eligibility and in detecting 
counterfeit documents. We analyzed this information to determine 
ongoing challenges in implementing the Basic Pilot Program and ways 
these challenges could affect increased or mandatory use of the pilot 
program. We did not evaluate security measures in place for the Basic 
Pilot Program or the program's vulnerability to security risks. To 
identify pilot program challenges, we examined the findings and 
methodology of the evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program completed by 
the Institute for Survey Research at Temple University and Westat in 
June 2002. In addition, we analyzed data on employer participation in 
and use of the Basic Pilot Program, including data on Basic Pilot 
Program employment authorizations, to determine how participation and 
use have changed since fiscal year 2000. We assessed the reliability of 
these data by reviewing them for accuracy and completeness, 
interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data, and 
examining documentation on how the data are entered, categorized, and 
verified in the databases. We determined that the independent 
evaluation and these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 
of our review. 

To obtain information on the implementation of the worksite enforcement 
program, we interviewed officials from ICE, the SSA Office of the 
Inspector General, the Department of Labor, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration- 
Related Unfair Unemployment Practices. We also interviewed officials 
from 12 of the 26 ICE Special Agent in Charge field offices. We met 
with officials from the following 8 field offices: Los Angeles and San 
Diego, California; Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, Michigan; Newark, New 
Jersey; New York City, New York; and Houston and San Antonio, Texas. We 
spoke with officials from the following 4 field offices over the 
telephone: Denver, Colorado; Miami, Florida; Buffalo, New York; and 
Seattle, Washington. We selected the 12 field offices based on a mix of 
the following criteria: the number of investigators in each field 
office in fiscal year 2003, the number of investigations conducted by 
each field office in fiscal year 2003,[Footnote 69] the estimated 
number of undocumented immigrants in the state in which each field 
office was located, the number of sanctions issued to employers as a 
result of closed cases located in the same city as the field office 
between calendar years 1986 and 2000,[Footnote 70] the number of 
critical infrastructure operations in which the field office 
participated from October 2001 through April 2004, the number of 
employers located in the same city as the field office that 
participated in the Basic Pilot Program, and geographic area. We also 
interviewed officials from 4 U.S. Attorney's Offices that were located 
in the same areas as 4 of the field offices we visited. We met with 
officials from the following 3 U.S. Attorney's Offices: the Southern 
District of New York U.S. Attorney's Office; the Southern District of 
Texas U.S. Attorney's Office; and the Western District of Texas U.S. 
Attorney's Office. We spoke with the Southern District of California 
U.S. Attorney's Office over the telephone. We used information obtained 
from the field offices only as anecdotal examples, as information from 
these entities cannot be generalized to all field offices in the United 
States. 

We analyzed ICE headquarters and field office guidance, memos, and 
other documents on worksite enforcement to evaluate ICE's priorities 
for and management of worksite enforcement efforts and to identify any 
challenges in program implementation. We analyzed ICE's April 2005 
Interim Strategic Plan to determine ICE's strategy for its worksite 
enforcement program. We also examined former INS guidance and 
strategies and other studies, such as reports from the Department of 
Justice Office of the Inspector General, to determine how worksite 
enforcement priorities, implementation, and challenges have evolved. 

In addition, we separately analyzed ICE and INS data on the worksite 
enforcement program and assessed their validity and reliability by 
reviewing them for accuracy and completeness, interviewing agency 
officials knowledgeable about the data, and examining documentation on 
how the data are entered, categorized, and verified in the databases. 
We determined that the data from each agency were sufficiently reliable 
for the purposes of our review. However, we could not compare the INS 
and ICE data because, following the creation of ICE in March 2003, the 
case management system used to enter and maintain information on 
immigration investigations changed. With the establishment of ICE, 
agents began using the legacy U.S. Customs Service's case management 
system, called the Treasury Enforcement Communications System, for 
entering and maintaining information on investigations, including 
worksite enforcement operations. Prior to the creation of ICE, the 
former INS entered and maintained information on investigative 
activities in the Performance Analysis System, which captured 
information on immigration investigations differently than the Treasury 
Enforcement Communications System. 

Additionally, ICE officials indicated that, in a few cases, the INS and 
ICE data did not completely account for all worksite enforcement 
operations results. ICE officials told us that agents use judgment in 
categorizing cases entered into both systems and there are a limited 
number of instances in which agents did not appropriately categorize 
cases. For example, ICE officials told us that, in reviewing worksite 
enforcement cases in the ICE system for fiscal year 2004, they found a 
few cases that agents inappropriately categorized as worksite 
enforcement. 

To determine the investigative agent work-years, or full-time 
equivalents, that INS spent on the worksite enforcement program for 
each fiscal year from 1999 through 2003, we divided the total hours INS 
reported spending on employer investigations by the total hours spent 
on all investigations, including agent hours spent on leave, training, 
and other administrative and noninvestigative work. We then multiplied 
this result by 2,080 hours, which constitute one work-year, to 
determine the number of work-years spent on worksite enforcement. 

We conducted our work from September 2004 through July 2005 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section]

Appendix III: Information on the Electronic Form I-9: 

In October 2004, Congress authorized the electronic Form I-9 to be 
implemented by the end of April 2005.[Footnote 71] ICE has provided 
interim guidelines for using electronic Forms I-9, until the agency 
issues final regulations on their use. The interim guidelines specify 
that employers will have options for completing, signing, storing, and 
presenting for inspection electronic Forms I-9. For example, the 
guidelines note that employers may choose to complete Forms I-9 on 
paper and store the forms electronically or they may choose to both 
electronically complete and store Forms I-9. The guidelines also state 
that electronic signatures could be generated through various 
technologies such as electronic signature pads, personal identification 
numbers, biometrics, and dialog boxes. The guidelines also state that 
employers could use electronic storage systems to retain Forms I-9 that 
include quality assurance steps to prevent and detect the unauthorized 
creation, addition, alteration, deletion, or deterioration of 
electronically stored data. In addition, employers may consider an 
electronic storage system that includes an indexing system and ability 
to reproduce legible and readable hard copies of electronically stored 
forms. 

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Data on Employer Participation in and Use of the Basic 
Pilot Program: 

Employer participation in and use of the Basic Pilot Program has 
generally increased. Between fiscal years 2002 and 2004, the number of 
employers actively using the Basic Pilot Program increased from 1,205 
to 2,305. In addition, as shown in figure 6, the number of total 
queries processed through the Basic Pilot Program has generally 
increased since fiscal year 2000. 

Figure 6: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries Run by Participating 
Employers for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004: 

[See PDF for image]

Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest thousand. 

[End of figure]

As shown in figure 7, the majority of Basic Pilot Program queries that 
resulted in employment authorizations for each fiscal year from 2000 
through 2004 were issued by SSA. 

Figure 7: Number of Basic Pilot Program Queries that Resulted in 
Employment Authorizations for Each Fiscal Year from 2000 through 2004: 

[See PDF for image]

Note: Data have been rounded to the nearest hundred. 

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

August 26, 2005: 

Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Stana: 

Re: Draft Report GAO-05-813, Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder 
Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report. The following 
represents the Departmental response to the recommendations contained 
in the draft report. 

Recommendation: To strengthen the current employment verification 
process, GAO recommends the Secretary of Homeland Security take the 
following Action: 

* Set a specific timeframe for completing the department's review of 
the Form I-9 process, including an assessment of the possibility of 
reducing the number of acceptable work eligibility documents, and 
issuing final regulations on changes to the Form I-9 process and an 
updated Form I-9. 

Response: Concur. The Department's Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) agrees that a timeframe should be established to assess the 
possibility of reducing the number of acceptable work eligibility 
documents for the I-9 Form. 

Recommendation: To assist Congress and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) in assessing the possibility of increased or mandatory 
use of the Basic Pilot Program, GAO recommends the Secretary of 
Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS to take the following 
action: 

* Include, in the planned evaluation of the Basic Pilot Program, an 
assessment of the feasibility and costs of addressing the Basic Pilot 
Program's current weaknesses, including its inability to detect 
identity fraud in the verification and re-verification processes, 
delays in entry of new arrival and employment authorization information 
into DHS databases, employer noncompliance with program procedures, and 
resources needed to support any increased or mandatory use of the 
program. 

Response: Generally Concur. The Basic Pilot Program has the potential 
to enhance the verification process and substantially reduce document 
fraud. The testing of alternative pilots and continuous improvements to 
the Basic Pilot has collectively made a step toward developing workable 
alternatives to enhance the employment verification process. 
Furthermore, it has been important to test and evaluate alternative 
employment verification systems. before creating an expensive new 
mandatory national employment verification system. USCIS concurs with 
GAO's recommendation concerning USCIS' upcoming evaluation of the Basic 
Pilot Program. The evaluation, which will begin in the fall of 2005, 
will evaluate the new Web-based access method to determine the extent 
to which it resolves the deficiencies found in the computer and modem 
access method evaluated earlier. The assessment also will address why 
some employers appear to have more problems following proper pilot 
procedures than others. In addition, the evaluation will address the 
feasibility and cost accuracy of the pertinent databases. 

Recommendation: To assist Congress and ICE in determining the resources 
needed for the worksite enforcement program and to help ensure the 
efficient and effective use of program resources, GAO recommends the 
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for ICE 
to take the following two actions: 

* Establish additional output goals and measures for the worksite 
enforcement program to clearly indicate the target level of ICE 
worksite enforcement activity and the resources needed to implement the 
program, and: 

* Set a specific timeframe for completing the assessment and 
development of outcome goals and measures for the worksite enforcement 
program to provide a target level of performance for worksite 
enforcement efforts and measures to assess the extent to which program 
results have met program goals. 

Response: Concur. ICE Office of Investigations will proceed with the 
recommendation to establish additional goals and measures for the 
worksite enforcement program to more clearly indicate ICE's target 
level of activity, based on current resources and mandates. The 
established goals and measures also will address the needed resources 
to implement the program and achieve the target level of activity. The 
Office of Investigations will establish a timeframe for completing the 
assessment and development of outcome goals and measures for the 
worksite enforcement program. 

We thank you again for the opportunity to review the report and provide 
comments. 

Sincerely,

Signed for: 

Steven J. Pecinovsky: 
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section]

Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Richard M. Stana (202) 512-8777: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Orlando Copeland, Michele 
Fejfar, Ann H. Finley, Rebecca Gambler, Kathryn Godfrey, Charles 
Michael Johnson, Eden C. Savino, and Robert E. White made key 
contributions to this report. 

FOOTNOTES

[1] U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American: 
Immigration and Immigrant Policy (Washington, D.C: September 1997). 

[2] In March 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service was 
merged into the Department of Homeland Security. The service's 
immigration functions were divided between U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement is responsible for managing and implementing the worksite 
enforcement program. 

[3] P.L. 99-603, 8 U.S.C. 1324a et seq. 

[4] See appendix I for a copy of the Form I-9. 

[5] GAO, Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized 
Alien Employment Exist, GAO/GGD-99-33 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 1999). 

[6] One of the 23 employers we interviewed did not participate in the 
Basic Pilot Program. As a result, when we discuss the views of 
employers on the Basic Pilot Program, we refer to the views of the 22 
employers we interviewed that participated in the program. The 23 
employers we interviewed were located in the following states: 
California, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Texas. They 
were part of the following industries: meatpacking, transportation, 
health care, landscaping, manufacturing, accommodation, food services, 
agriculture, janitorial and maintenance, temporary employment, critical 
infrastructure, local government, and newspaper. According to 
Department of Labor data, there were about 5.6 million employer firms 
in the United States in 2002. The most current data available on the 
number of employers in the United States were from 2002. 

[7] We interviewed officials from 9 employer and employee associations 
in the following industries: construction, agriculture, accommodation, 
food services, retail, health care, and meat. We interviewed officials 
from three advocacy groups that represent a range of views on 
immigration-related issues. 

[8] The 6 immigration experts we interviewed have a range of views on 
immigration-related issues. 

[9] Institute for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Basic 
Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: June 2002). 

[10] We met with officials from the following 8 field offices: Los 
Angeles and San Diego, California; Chicago, Illinois; Detroit, 
Michigan; Newark, New Jersey; New York City, New York; and Houston and 
San Antonio, Texas. We spoke with officials from the following 4 field 
offices over the telephone: Denver, Colorado; Miami, Florida; Buffalo, 
New York; and Seattle, Washington. 

[11] We met with officials from the following 3 U.S. Attorney's 
Offices: the Southern District of New York U.S. Attorney's Office; the 
Southern District of Texas U.S. Attorney's Office; and the Western 
District of Texas U.S. Attorney's Office. We spoke with the Southern 
District of California U.S. Attorney's Office over the telephone. 

[12] GAO, Immigration Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration 
Enforcement Objectives and Is Addressing Future Planning Requirements, 
GAO-05-66 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 8, 2004). 

[13] In 1999, the Department of Justice increased the amounts of the 
civil penalties from those established in IRCA to the current levels to 
reflect a ten percent adjustment for inflation. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b). 
Under the Federal Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 
1990, as amended, federal agencies are to make regular adjustments for 
inflation of civil monetary penalties that they are charged with 
enforcing. 28 U.S.C. 2641 note. 

[14] 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b). IIRIRA of 1996 was enacted within a larger 
piece of legislation, the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
1997, P.L. 104-208. 

[15] According to IIRIRA, a person or entity with certain Form I-9 
paperwork violations must be informed of the violation and provided 
with a period of not less than 10 business days to correct the 
violations. If the person or entity does not correct the violations 
within the specified time period, the person or entity would not be 
considered to have made a good faith attempt to comply with the Form I- 
9 requirement. 

[16] Basic Pilot Extension Act of 2001, P.L. 107-128 and Basic Pilot 
Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, P.L.108-156. 

[17] P.L. 108-156. IIRIRA required the INS to initially operate the 
Basic Pilot Program in at least five of the seven states with the 
highest estimated population of undocumented aliens in the United 
States. In 1997, INS began offering participation in the Basic Pilot 
Program to employers in California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and 
Texas. In 1999, INS began offering participation in the Basic Pilot 
Program to employers in Nebraska because, at the time, INS was 
conducting an initiative in the state, called Operation Vanguard, to 
help the meatpacking and processing industry gain and maintain a legal 
workforce. 

[18] Under the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot Program, only the 
status of newly hired employees attesting to being work-authorized 
noncitizens was electronically checked against information in INS 
databases. The evaluation of this pilot program identified several 
problems, including inherent discrimination against work-authorized 
noncitizens and the lack of strong safeguards against fraudulent 
citizenship attestions. The evaluation stated that individuals who 
attested to being citizens did not need to show documents proving their 
citizen status, and the individuals' information was not queried 
through the pilot program. The Machine-Readable Document Pilot Program 
was initiated only in Iowa because Iowa was the sole state at the start 
of the pilot program issuing driver's licenses and identification cards 
that included machine-readable information needed for completing the 
Form I-9 (e.g., name, date of birth, Social Security number). In 
evaluating this pilot program, the Institute for Survey Research and 
Westat found that the program had a number of technical and procedural 
problems, such as card reader difficulties in reading the driver's 
licenses and Iowa's no longer requiring the Social Security number as 
the driver's license number. This change in Iowa's requirements 
resulted in the inability of employers to use the readers on driver's 
licenses without Social Security numbers. See Institute for Survey 
Research and Westat, Findings of the Citizen Attestation Verification 
Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: April 2003) and Institute 
for Survey Research and Westat, Findings of the Machine-Readable 
Document Pilot Program Evaluation (Washington, D.C.: May 2003). 

[19] In February 2005 we reported that verification services, like the 
Basic Pilot Program, provide a valuable opportunity to prevent many 
unintended or careless mistakes when hiring new workers and reporting 
worker earnings. In particular, we concluded that the Basic Pilot 
Program provides an option for addressing the problem of unauthorized 
workers' earnings posted to the Earnings Suspense File, which occurs 
when individuals' names or Social Security numbers in wage reports do 
not match SSA records. According to SSA officials, when individuals 
contest SSA tentative nonconfirmations, SSA can update the individuals' 
information in the SSA database when, for example, individuals provide 
information on name changes or correct inaccurate birthdates. SSA 
officials said that such updates may help prevent wage reporting 
problems and the posting of individuals' wage information to the 
Earnings Suspense File. GAO, Social Security: Better Coordination among 
Federal Agencies Could Reduce Unidentified Earnings Reports, GAO-05-154 
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 4, 2005). 

[20] GAO, Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the Question of 
Discrimination, GAO/GGD-90-62, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 1990) and 
GAO/GGD-99-33. 

[21] GAO/GGD-99-33. 

[22] GAO, Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a 
Layered Defense, GAO-04-82 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004). 

[23] There are no current reliable data available on the number or 
percentage of employers who seek to comply with IRCA and those who 
attempt to circumvent it. 

[24] GAO/GGD-99-33. 

[25] See appendix I for the complete list of acceptable work 
eligibility documents. 

[26] GAO/GGD-90-62. 

[27] U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on 
Immigration and Refugee Affairs, Options for an Improved Employment 
Verification System (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 1992). 

[28] GAO/GGD-99-33. 

[29] In addition to developing a rule on the reduction of the number of 
acceptable work eligibility documents, DHS is also developing 
regulations on the electronic Form I-9, which employers were authorized 
to use beginning at the end of April 2005. See appendix III for more 
information on the electronic Form I-9. 

[30] GAO/GGD-99-33. 

[31] GAO, Social Security: Mass Issuance of Counterfeit-Resistant Cards 
Expensive, but Alternatives Exist, GAO/HEHS-98-170 (Washington, D.C.: 
Aug. 20, 1998). 

[32] GAO, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security, 
GAO-03-174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002). 

[33] GAO, Information Security: Challenges in Using Biometrics, GAO-03- 
1137T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003). 

[34] GAO-03-174. 

[35] P.L. 109-13, 49 U.S.C. 30301 note. 

[36] P.L. 108-458. 

[37] Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Social Security Protection Act 
of 2005, H.R. 98, 109TH Cong. 

[38] The number of employers who actively used the program in fiscal 
year 2004 includes a small number of employers who switched between two 
versions of the program and, as a result, were counted twice as active 
users. USCIS is not able to easily determine which employers were 
counted twice. In addition, the approximately 2,300 employers who 
actively used the pilot program in fiscal year 2004 do not reflect the 
number of worksites or individual business establishments using the 
program. In 2002, the most recent year for which data are available, 
there were approximately 5.6 million firms in the United States. Under 
the Basic Pilot Program, one employer may have multiple worksites that 
use the pilot program. For example, a hotel chain could have multiple 
individual hotels using the Basic Pilot Program. This hotel chain would 
represent one employer using the pilot program. A firm is a business 
organization consisting of one or more domestic establishments in the 
same state and industry that were specified under common ownership or 
control. See appendix IV for data on employer participation and use of 
the Basic Pilot Program. 

[39] GAO, Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost Appear to Be Growing, GAO-
02-363 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2002). 

[40] In fiscal year 2004, about 10 percent of total Basic Pilot Program 
queries were referred to DHS for verification. Of these queries 
referred to DHS for verification, about 85 percent were confirmed via 
the DHS automated check. 

[41] DHS, Report to Congress on the Basic Pilot Program (Washington, 
D.C.: June 2004). 

[42] P.L. 109-13, codified at 49 U.S.C. 30301. 

[43] Other immigration status verifiers are dedicated to completing 
manual verifications for other USCIS verification programs. 

[44] According to USCIS, in fiscal year 2005, the agency allocated 
about $475,000 to reimburse SSA for Basic Pilot Program query costs and 
about $337,500 for employer query costs. In addition, USCIS estimated 
about $7 million in annual costs for verifications by immigration 
status verifiers. 

[45] GAO, Immigration Application Fees: Current Fees Are Not Sufficient 
to Fund U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Operations, GAO-04- 
309R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 5, 2004). In April 2004, USCIS raised its 
fees for immigration benefit applications. 

[46] Under the dial-up version of the Basic Pilot Program, employers 
installed pilot program software directly onto a computer and used a 
dedicated telephone line to access the pilot system. 

[47] The Institute for Survey Research and Westat estimated that the 
contractor who runs the Basic Pilot Program charged $0.28 per query. 
They estimated that it cost about $6 to resolve each query that 
required review by immigration status verifiers. 

[48] INS, Interior Enforcement Strategy (Washington, D.C.: January 
1999). 

[49] GAO/GGD-99-33. 

[50] The National Security Entry and Exit Registration System domestic 
registration required selected groups of aliens from a number of 
countries to register with immigration authorities between November 
2002 and April 2003. Joint Terrorism Task Forces are multi-agency 
investigative teams composed of federal, state, and local agencies that 
work jointly with other nonmember agencies to investigate terrorism 
matters. 

[51] GAO-05-66. 

[52] GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges to Implementing the Immigration 
Interior Enforcement Strategy, GAO-03-660T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 
2003). 

[53] Operations Tarmac and Glow Worm were ICE initiatives to detect and 
remove unauthorized workers from airports and nuclear power plants, 
respectively. 

[54] Data are not available on the number of critical infrastructure 
and noncritical infrastructure worksite enforcement cases ICE opened 
prior to fiscal year 2005 because before fiscal year 2005, ICE's case 
management system did not distinguish between the two case types. 

[55] One full-time equivalent is equal to one work-year or 2,080 
nonovertime hours. 

[56] ICE headquarters' worksite enforcement unit is responsible for 
managing the agency's worksite enforcement program. 

[57] H.R. Conf. Rep. 108-774 (2004) accompanying the Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, P.L. 108-334. 

[58] ICE worksite enforcement investigations can span several fiscal 
years. For example, ICE can open an investigation in one fiscal year, 
but may not complete the case, including issuing a notice of intent to 
fine, if warranted, for several fiscal years. In addition, after ICE 
issues a notice of intent to fine, employers may negotiate with ICE 
attorneys to set a final amount for the fine. Therefore, ICE could 
issue a notice of intent to fine in one fiscal year, but not issue the 
final order for the fine until the following fiscal year. 

[59] These data on worksite enforcement criminal arrests for fiscal 
years 2004 and 2005 do not include data on the number of worksite 
enforcement administrative arrests for those fiscal years. Fiscal year 
2004 and 2005 data cannot be compared with data for previous fiscal 
years because the way INS agents entered data on investigative work- 
years into the INS case management system differs from the way ICE 
agents enter such data into the ICE system. Following the creation of 
ICE in March 2003, the case management system used to enter and 
maintain information on immigration investigations changed. With the 
establishment of ICE, agents began using the legacy U.S. Customs 
Service's case management system, called the Treasury Enforcement 
Communications System, for entering and maintaining information on 
investigations, including worksite enforcement operations. Prior to the 
creation of ICE, the former INS entered and maintained information on 
investigative activities in the Performance Analysis System, which 
captured information on immigration investigations differently than the 
Treasury Enforcement Communications System. 

[60] GAO/GGD-99-33 and GAO, Identity Fraud: Prevalence and Links to 
Alien Illegal Activities, GAO-02-830T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002). 

[61] Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service Efforts to Combat Harboring and 
Employing Illegal Aliens in Sweatshops, I-96-08 (Washington, D.C.: May 
1996). 

[62] ICE's objective for identifying critical industries for worksite 
enforcement operations included the following five elements: (1) 
identify and remove unauthorized workers from critical industries; (2) 
implement and expand an ICE-employer partnership program to enhance 
employer compliance, training, and information sharing; (3) investigate 
criminal employers linked to smuggling, trafficking, worker 
exploitation, and other criminal violations; (4) revitalize employer 
sanctions to provide financial deterrence; and (5) promote use of 
employment eligibility verification technology, like the Basic Pilot 
Program. See ICE, Interim Strategic Plan (Washington, D.C.: April 2005). 

[63] GAO/GGD-99-33. 

[64] The Debt Management Center issues invoices to employers for 
collecting fine amounts. According to ICE, multiple invoices can be 
issued for each final order for an employer fine, as a payment plan is 
typically established for employers as part of the final order for the 
fine amount. 

[65] The Office of Detention and Removal is primarily responsible for 
identifying and removing criminal aliens from the United States. The 
office is also responsible for managing ICE's space for detaining 
aliens. 

[66] H.R. Con. Rep. 109-72 (2005) accompanying the Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, 
and Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-13. 

[67] According to Department of Labor data, there were about 5.6 
million employer firms in the United States in 2002, the year for which 
the most current data are available. 

[68] At the time of selection, 2002 data on gross output by industry 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce were the 
most current data available. Also, the most recent data available on 
the total number of paid employees by industry from the U.S. Census 
Bureau, Department of Commerce were from 2002. 

[69] At the time of selection, the most current data available on the 
number of investigators in each field office and the number of 
investigations conducted by each field office were from fiscal year 
2003. 

[70] At the time of selection, the most current data available on the 
number of sanctions issued to employers located in the same city as the 
field offices were from calendar years 1986 through 2000. 

[71] P.L. 108-390. 

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