

GAO

Testimony

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REFUGEES:

Issues Affecting Living Conditions

Statement of
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Before the
Select Committee on Hunger
House of Representatives



(472249)

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Select Committee:

We appreciate the opportunity to discuss matters of concern to the Select Committee regarding the world's refugee population. Over the past decade, the number of refugees more than doubled to an estimated 15 or 16 million people, and the number continues to grow. At least half of the refugees are estimated to be children below the age of 18. Funding for the care and maintenance of refugees has not grown proportionately with the increase in their numbers. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the U.N. agency mandated to protect and assist refugees, reported that in 1989, for the first time, it ran a deficit--totaling \$38 million--in its general programs.

Against this backdrop, you had asked that we

- identify the total amount of assistance that the United States has contributed from all sources over the past decade to improve refugee conditions, and
- examine and report on refugee living conditions around the world.

We were not asked and we did not address the root causes of the refugee problem. As we all know, these include civil strife and

armed conflict, famine and hunger, human rights violations, and economic deprivation.

Our report, entitled Refugee Assistance: U.S. Contributions for the 1980s (GAO/NSIAD-91-137), being released today, shows that the United States contributed, on average, about \$1 billion annually for refugee assistance. About one-third of this amount was used for overseas assistance efforts, and two-thirds for the admission and resettlement of refugees in the United States. I will say more about this later.

To examine the living conditions of refugees around the world, we selected six countries to visit--Malaysia, Pakistan, Guinea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Malawi. The video report that you have just seen is the result of that effort. And, in that regard, I would like to express our appreciation to those organizations that assisted and cooperated with us in this endeavor, including the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the UNHCR, the host governments, and the many voluntary agencies that provide assistance to refugees in the six countries.

FUNDING FOR REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

The video report raises, but does not directly answer, the difficult question about the adequacy of funding levels for refugee assistance. It clearly shows that millions of people are living

under marginal conditions and that food, water, shelter, health care, and other basic necessities of life are often in short supply. UNHCR officials in Geneva, as well as representatives in the field, told us that funding shortfalls had resulted in declining living conditions for refugees. And, indeed, we observed firsthand the difficult conditions under which many refugees live.

While doing our work, we were told of numerous improvements that would be made if funds were available. For example, funding shortages prevented UNHCR from purchasing supplementary food supplies necessary for a balanced diet in Malawi. High malnutrition rates and an outbreak of pellagra there are attributable in part to interruptions in critical food supplies.

However, we also observed during our visits to the six countries that funding was but one of several interrelated variables that led to delays in delivering food and water and reductions in living conditions. For example, in one instance, the government of Sudan had agreed to provide sorghum to be used for refugees in exchange for wheat provided through the World Food Program. However, the government failed to provide the promised sorghum after the wheat was delivered. Also, sorghum was not available on the local market due to drought conditions; commodities were delayed by customs at ports of entry; and some camps were inaccessible during the rainy season due to poor road conditions. In addition to all these

factors, funding shortages limited UNHCR's ability to purchase supplemental food supplies.

UNHCR officials also said funding shortages forced them to sacrifice spending on those sectors not necessary to sustain life, such as education and the search for longer-term solutions for refugees. For example, they said education in Ethiopia was a low priority due to funding restrictions. We observed that large numbers of refugees had been in camps in western Ethiopia for 5 or more years, yet little emphasis had been placed on education even prior to the 1989 financial crisis at UNHCR.

MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION OF RELIEF EFFORTS

Although our review did not focus directly on how well relief agencies were managing or administering these activities, we do have some observations that are pertinent, both to refugee conditions and, at least indirectly, to the question of funding adequacy.

As the video report shows, refugee conditions varied widely from location to location. The same was true with the management and coordination of programs. In some countries, such as Malawi, UNHCR, private agencies, donors, and the host government were working well together under challenging circumstances.

Coordination among agencies was effective, and uncertainties over

the roles of various relief agencies had been resolved. In Guinea, although there were some initial start-up problems, and the program was still in an emergency phase, coordination among UNHCR, its partners, and the host government appeared to be working effectively at the time of our visit in late October 1990.

However, in other countries, particularly Ethiopia, we were told about and observed some management and coordination problems that had hindered the delivery of assistance to refugees. For example, in Ethiopia, donors and voluntary agencies cited numerous problems, such as slow or poor management decisions, that delayed needed assistance. As the video report points out, water supplies were inadequate in Ethiopia, even in the large camp that opened in 1983. U.S. officials and voluntary agencies attributed this shortage to weaknesses in UNHCR's planning and resource management. Coordination was also a problem. Voluntary and official agencies were not communicating with each other. This became apparent during our visits to the western camps, when workers representing several agencies met with us in an informal discussion. During that discussion, they discovered simple cooperative solutions to problems they had encountered in carrying out their individual responsibilities. I should add that there had been a change in UNHCR management in Ethiopia shortly before our arrival, and many were hopeful that program operations would improve as a result.

UNRELIABLE CENSUS DATA

The video report also mentions that census figures are unreliable. In most of the countries we visited, the actual numbers of refugees were unknown, and it was generally accepted that the census figures were inaccurate, even in countries with long-term refugee populations. There are many reasons why an accurate census is difficult. Rapidly changing situations in refugee-producing countries may result in sudden movements of large or small groups of people. Refugees may be reluctant to register, or they may register more than once. In countries such as Guinea and Malawi, refugees live among the local population, rather than in clearly defined refugee camps, and have some freedom of movement within the host countries. Also, depending on a number of circumstances, it may be politically advantageous for a host government to either underreport or overstate the number of refugees present in the country.

Refugee officials with whom we spoke almost universally expressed a frustration with inaccurate census data, because they need reasonably accurate numbers to plan and manage the assistance programs. Planning figures for food and other items are based on census data. If census figures are too low, too little food may be delivered. If figures are too high, too much food may be delivered--food that may be greatly needed in other areas. Excess quantities of food invite misuse and diversion to unauthorized

uses, such as use by host governments or rebel groups. Also, inaccurate census figures hamper UNHCR's and the World Food Program's credibility with their donors.

UNHCR has no uniform system for registering and counting refugees. In one large camp in western Ethiopia, the government's official statistics indicated that there were 239,394 refugees, and this number had not changed for months. Deaths and births occurred, and large numbers of refugees arrived during this period, but that precise number did not change. Some U.S. officials who accompanied us to the camp and most voluntary organizations believed this number to be grossly inflated, perhaps by twice the actual amount of refugees, but no one knew for sure. Inaccurate census figures made it difficult to maintain accountability for resources, and controls on food distribution in this camp were inadequate. No one could clearly explain or show us how the food was distributed from the main warehouse or how many refugees received this food. While we do not have a specific solution to this problem, we believe that UNHCR should develop a more systematic method of registering and counting refugees, especially in those countries where the refugee populations are relatively stable.

COUNTRY SPECIFIC INFORMATION

The video report you have seen shows the refugees' conditions, but there are a few specific points I would like to make about what we

learned in the various countries that were not brought out or emphasized in the video.

-- In Pakistan, we were told that large numbers of refugees had been expected to have begun to repatriate to Afghanistan. However, this had not happened, primarily because of continued fighting and other problems, such as land mines that are strewn throughout the countryside. In fact, refugees were still leaving Afghanistan for Pakistan, although the Pakistan government has stopped registering new arrivals.

Despite this, the level of international support and UNHCR funding for Afghan refugees has declined in recent years. We were told that UNHCR is attempting to restructure its assistance in Pakistan to target only the neediest Afghan refugees, and that the world donor community is shifting priorities away from the care and maintenance of refugees in Pakistan toward reconstruction work in Afghanistan.

-- In Malaysia, the government had refused to allow Vietnamese boat people to land on its shores since July 1990, an action not contemplated by the Comprehensive Plan of Action the Malaysian government agreed to in June 1989. Instead, it was reprovioning refugee boats and redirecting them to other countries. We were told that not only did this action continue to put the Vietnamese boat people at risk in the South China

Sea, but that almost all the redirected boats continued on to Indonesia, where the refugee population dramatically increased and living conditions worsened. Of those Vietnamese who arrived in Malaysia after March 1989 and before the push-offs began, an ongoing screening process found that only 30 percent were technically refugees according to the U.N. definition, because they could prove a well-founded fear of persecution in Vietnam. These refugees were therefore eligible for resettlement. The Malaysian government believes that the remaining 70 percent should be repatriated involuntarily, an action opposed by both the United States and Vietnam.

-- In Sudan, we visited three UNHCR-assisted camps, but as I am sure you know, refugees, both those in camps and those living on the local economy, are only part of a much larger problem in that country caused by years of civil strife and a recent severe drought. During our visit there in October 1990, the drought conditions had heightened concern about an impending food shortage. The Food and Agricultural Organization in Rome has estimated a food shortfall of 1.2 million metric tons, and recent reports from Sudan indicate that thousands of people, including many Sudanese who have been displaced within their own country, face starvation. While our review concerned refugees, we did visit one displaced persons settlement near Khartoum and found conditions to be much worse than in the refugee camps.

-- During our visit to Ethiopia in November 1990, U.S. officials and agencies assisting refugees voiced concern over increasing instability in certain remote areas of the country where refugee camps were located. The Ethiopian government did not permit UNHCR officials and staff from private voluntary agencies to remain in refugee camps overnight, citing security concerns as its reason. Shortly before our visit there, voluntary agency staff had experienced several armed attacks during their daily travel to and from the camps, but it was not clear who was responsible for these attacks.

As you know, the situation in Somalia changed rather radically recently with the overthrow of the Siad Barre government. Although many hoped repatriation of large numbers of Somali refugees would result, the immediate effect has been an additional influx of Somali refugees to Ethiopia and the return of some Ethiopians who were living in Somalia.

-- The refugee situation in Guinea was relatively new and had not yet stabilized when we were there in late 1990. Refugees from Liberia are of the same ethnic groups as local Guineans and were warmly accepted by them. Guineans shared their food supplies with incoming refugees until the assistance effort could be fully mounted. However, local Guinean officials were expressing concern about the effect the large number of refugees was having on the well-being of Guinean citizens. We were told that grain

reserved for seed had been used to feed the refugees, some Guinean children were able to attend school only half days to accommodate Liberian refugee children for the other half day, and some roads were being damaged by the large volume of heavy trucks used to transport food to refugees.

-- Mozambican refugees had also been warmly received by the local population in Malawi. In many cases, refugees had settled in communities alongside the Malawi nationals. Sometimes the refugees had settled on land that was formerly farmed by Malawians, thereby further depleting the country's scarce food supply.

The government of Mozambique and opposition forces are currently participating in talks being facilitated by the United States, and the country recently adopted a new constitution providing for a multiparty system. Many are hopeful that Mozambican refugees will be able to return home, but it is too early to tell. The return of large numbers of refugees will obviously require political stability, but based on reports about conditions in Mozambique, the return of refugees will also require a major relief effort, including removal of land mines and provision of food supplies and other resources.

ALLOCATION OF U.S. RESOURCES

The United States has devoted large amounts of resources for refugee assistance--over \$9.7 billion in cash and commodities during the decade of the 1980s. About one-third of this amount was spent on cash assistance and food aid for refugees overseas, including \$1.2 billion to UNHCR. The other two-thirds was spent on the admission and resettlement of refugees into the United States--about 973,000 people during the 1980s, and another 119,316 in 1990. Appendix II details the numbers of refugees admitted into the United States during this period, by year and region of origin.

Assistance to refugees overseas increased from \$259 million in 1980 to \$418 million in 1989. This increase was primarily in food aid and emergency assistance. U.S. contributions to UNHCR remained relatively stable in actual dollars over the past 10 years but declined as a proportion of total donor contributions.

Nevertheless, the United States remains the largest contributor to UNHCR, followed by Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

The expenditures for admission and resettlement of refugees into the United States include processing refugee applications; cash, medical assistance, and support services to facilitate successful resettlement; and educational programs for refugee children. The funds are administered by a variety of U.S. agencies, including the Departments of Health and Human Services, State, and Education,

as well as the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Funding for admissions and resettlement increased significantly since 1987, primarily to accommodate increased admissions of Soviet refugees.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my formal remarks. We would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

REFUGEES: MARGINAL LIVING CONDITIONS FOR MILLIONS (VIDEO SCRIPT)

In the last decade, the world's refugee population has doubled-- from an estimated 7 million people to 15 million. Although census data are somewhat unreliable, an estimated 9.5 million refugees are living in the Near East and South Asia and 4.2 million in Africa. Despite the dramatic refugee population growth, funding has not kept pace. For example, funding for the United Nations agency primarily responsible for assisting them grew by only 15 percent.

Concerned about the effects of funding shortfalls and the rising number of refugees, the House Select Committee on Hunger asked the General Accounting Office to examine the living conditions of refugees around the world. "Are they getting enough to eat?" "Do they have adequate shelter?" "Do they feel safe?" These were some of the questions the Committee asked.

To answer these questions, GAO studied the living conditions of refugees in six countries around the world. In September, October, and November 1990, GAO staff visited refugee populations in Pakistan, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Malaysia. Together, these countries contain more than one-third of the world's refugees--people who have left their homelands, who require international protection and assistance, and who are unable or unwilling to return to their countries because they fear

persecution, violence, or famine. The refugees GAO visited included

- Afghans who have fled to Pakistan since 1979, when the Soviet Union became militarily involved in their country;
- Liberians who have gone to neighboring Guinea to escape civil war;
- Ethiopians who have fled to Sudan, away from the famine and strife of war-torn northern Ethiopia;
- Sudanese and Somalis who have sought refuge in Ethiopia because of persecution and armed conflict in their countries; and
- Mozambicans who have crossed the border to Malawi because of civil war and famine.

In addition, GAO visited Vietnamese living in Malaysia who have left their homes because of persecution or economic hardship. Some are refugees, awaiting the opportunity to resettle elsewhere. But many have been officially classified as "economic migrants."

GAO, in its visits to these six countries, made three major observations. First, except for isolated pockets, the refugees generally received the minimum care needed to sustain life. Second, living conditions and provisions varied widely from location to location. Third, GAO saw that the host countries and agencies providing assistance often faced major obstacles in delivering aid. In Africa, especially, refugee programs operate on the margin; any unexpected change or problem--even an overturned truck--can break the lifeline between the refugees and the assistance and services they need.

Countries from around the world provide resources to help refugees. The United States has contributed \$9.7 billion in cash, commodities, and services to refugee assistance over the last decade. About one-third has been spent on the care and feeding of refugees overseas. The other two-thirds has been devoted to the admission and resettlement of refugees in the United States.

Many organizations play complementary roles in providing care and assistance to refugees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is the primary international agency mandated with providing this assistance. It is charged with ensuring refugee protection and seeking lasting solutions to their problems. The United States is the single largest donor of aid to the High Commissioner, providing almost \$1.2 billion over the last decade.

To coordinate the disbursement of overseas aid from the United States and other donors, the High Commissioner is responsible for working closely with various private voluntary organizations, other U.N. agencies, and especially the host governments. The working relationships and the effectiveness of the High Commissioner varied from country to country.

The host governments, by agreeing to take in refugees, assume a responsibility for protecting them and cooperating with the international community in providing the necessary assistance. In many cases, however, the host countries have few resources of their own and a limited ability to deal with the complex logistics involved in aiding thousands of refugees. Large numbers of refugees also impose tremendous ecological and economic burdens on the host governments. Refugees clear forest areas to farm and cut down trees for firewood. Heavily equipped trucks carrying food and other supplies damage roads.

Despite these strains, most host countries continue to protect and assist refugees. For example, the approximately 820,000 Mozambican refugees now make up 10 percent of Malawi's total population, an influx that would be the equivalent of 25 million refugees entering the United States over a 4-year period. The Malawi government has accepted this burden despite increasing demands on limited farmland and water. In some countries, however, the impact of

refugees on the local population and resources has helped to erode benevolent attitudes toward them.

Although many participate in assisting refugees, the question remains: What are their living conditions today? To make this evaluation, GAO focused on the key types of assistance provided. These include assistance necessary for sustaining life--that is, physical protection, food, water, and shelter--as well as assistance to promote the refugees' general welfare--health care, sanitation, and education.

Refugees whom GAO spoke with in all six countries generally felt secure. Although GAO learned of isolated instances of abuse, and there have been armed attacks on refugee settlements in Malawi and Ethiopia, the refugees' security did not appear to be a major problem overall.

Refugees generally received the necessary amount of food to sustain life, but this amount varied from location to location. Refugees in Malaysia regularly received rice, noodles, fish, fresh vegetables, and fruit, whereas in Ethiopia, deliveries of cereals, beans, oil, and sugar were sporadic. Refugees in African countries suffered from interruptions in their food supply and unacceptable shortages of some foods. In Sudan, refugees were to receive at least 1,800 calories of food daily. But officials estimated that, because of

interruptions and shortages in 1990, refugees received closer to 1,000 calories per day. A food intake of less than 1,500 calories per day can, over time, lead to nutrition-related disease or death.

To deliver food to the refugees, most countries have long supply chains that are particularly vulnerable to interruption. They are subject to inherent logistical problems related to poor road conditions and weather and to more controllable factors such as inadequate coordination and planning of food needs. United Nations and U.S. officials also explained food shortages by citing the sometimes slow response of donors to appeals for food and the failure of donors to honor food pledges on time or at all. For example, U.N. officials in Ethiopia told GAO that one country had pledged 3,000 metric tons of cooking oil for 1990. When the pledge was withdrawn after several months, refugees experienced a serious shortfall of oil. Also, as a result of shortages, reserve stocks in most countries were inadequate to prevent breaks in assistance. The effects of undependable food supplies are most severe for refugees in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Malawi, who have little or no means to make up for the lack of food.

Water is provided to refugees in various ways: wells may be drilled; water may be pumped from nearby rivers and then treated; or, as in the case of Somali refugees in Ethiopia, large volumes of water must be transported long distances by tanker truck. Ideally,

a refugee should have a minimum of 15 to 20 liters of drinkable water per day, although 10 liters is considered adequate for emergencies. Refugees were provided at least minimally acceptable emergency levels of water in all countries except Ethiopia, where the average water intake ranged from less than 1 liter to only 3 liters per day. Severe shortages in Ethiopia cause refugees to turn to contaminated water sources, such as standing pools or local rivers.

Refugees are generally provided with land and resources to build shelters similar to those of the local population. In Malaysia, overcrowding is a severe problem. Refugees are packed into government-built long houses, with less than 2 square meters of living space per person. Efforts to improve housing are hampered by the government's desire to relocate the camp.

Provision of non-food items such as clothing, blankets, soap, and fuel was minimal or nonexistent in most countries. The High Commissioner depends on voluntary agencies to provide much of the non-food assistance. However, donations have been insufficient, and the High Commissioner cannot afford to bridge the gap. Many refugees in Malawi must walk 6 to 10 miles in search of fuel wood; some risk injury or harassment by rebel or government forces by crossing into Mozambique for this purpose.

Private organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontieres, and host governments make health care services available to refugees. These services include outpatient clinics and inpatient hospital care in all countries. The health condition of refugees is generally similar to that of the nationals living in the host country. But, in some countries, such as Sudan, Ethiopia, and Malawi, the health of both the refugees and the local population is marginal. Leading killers of refugees in these countries include malaria, diarrhea, respiratory infections, and tuberculosis.

Mild malnutrition was common in some areas of Malawi, Sudan, and Ethiopia, and isolated cases of severe malnutrition were found in most countries. Special feeding programs for mild or severe malnutrition were available in varying degrees in all six countries, but because of limited resources and other problems, not all needy refugees were served. In Sudan, GAO found the termination of some special feeding programs, critical interruptions in deliveries of medical supplies, and deteriorating levels of overall medical care. These conditions can be attributed in part to the departure of private voluntary organizations. GAO was told they were leaving because of a lack of support from the Sudanese government and deteriorating security conditions.

Although efforts have been made to improve the health of refugees, less attention has been focused on improving sanitation because of funding limitations. Latrines were scarce in some countries. In Ethiopia, the construction of latrines in large crowded camps was behind schedule and moving slowly. Also, facilities for bathing and dish washing were often non-existent.

Primary education was available to some extent in all countries except in some areas of Sudan, and the refugees themselves were often heavily involved. In Ethiopia, for example, in one camp alone, more than 30,000 Sudanese boys have arrived without their families. Refugees organized the schools for them and taught the classes. In Malaysia, refugees also have access to secondary education and vocational training, which is provided through volunteer non-government organizations.

In all countries except Malaysia, there was a lack of educational supplies, classrooms, and teacher training. Representatives of the High Commissioner told GAO that while educational opportunities remain a priority, funding for them had to be sacrificed in favor of basic necessities such as food and water.

Overall, most refugees received at least the basic life-sustaining necessities. But pockets of refugees in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Pakistan have not received even this. These refugees are

unregistered--often for complex political reasons--and their numbers are unknown. Pakistan, for example, could have as many as 500,000 unregistered refugees, and those observed by GAO appeared to be living in worse conditions than registered refugees.

When GAO visited Sudan in October 1990, newly arrived refugees had not been registered for several months. They had no food ration cards and had not been provided with tents. They were living in makeshift shelters built with their meager possessions of blankets and mats.

In Ethiopia, two groups were most at risk--those unregistered refugees who had arrived from Sudan over the last 6 months and those refugees who had been displaced by armed attacks on their previous camp. Some had walked for months to arrive at a new camp. Both groups were severely malnourished and needed special feeding and medical care. Their rate of malnutrition in September 1990 was over four times higher than that of the nearby registered refugee population. These refugees had gone without assistance for up to 6 months.

The High Commissioner, private groups, and host countries have succeeded in providing for the most basic needs of millions of refugees despite numerous obstacles. But in many cases this assistance has been provided at levels acceptable only for short-

term emergencies--water is provided at minimal emergency levels, food supplies are interrupted, and few resources are available for education and non-food necessities. The problems that cause refugees to flee are complex, and lasting solutions are elusive. As a result, refugees can end up living under these bare minimum conditions for many years.

Other GAO reports and testimony on the conditions of refugees and on U.S. contributions to refugee assistance are available. For additional information, please call (202) 275-5790.

SUMMARY OF REFUGEE ADMISSIONS

Fiscal Year	Area						Total
	Africa	Asia	Eastern Europe	Soviet Union	Latin America	Near East Asia	
1980	955	163,799	5,025	28,444	6,662	2,231	207,116
1981	2,119	131,139	6,704	13,444	2,017	3,829	159,252
1982	3,326	73,522	10,780	2,756	602	6,369	97,355
1983	2,648	39,408	12,083	1,409	668	5,465	61,681
1984	2,747	51,960	10,285	715	160	5,246	71,113
1985	1,953	49,970	9,350	640	138	5,994	68,045
1986	1,315	45,454	8,713	787	173	5,998	62,440
1987	1,994	40,112	8,606	3,694	315	10,107	64,828
1988	1,588	35,015	7,818	20,421	2,497	8,415	75,754
1989	1,922	45,680*	8,948	39,553	2,605	6,980	105,688
1990	3,493	51,611*	6,196	50,716	2,309	4,991	119,316
Total	<u>24,060</u>	<u>727,670</u>	<u>94,508</u>	<u>162,579</u>	<u>18,146</u>	<u>65,625</u>	<u>1,092,588</u>

*Includes Amerasian immigrants

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs

LIST OF GAO REPORTS, TESTIMONY, AND VIDEO REPORTS ON REFUGEE ISSUESReports

<u>DATE</u>	<u>REPORT NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
03/21/91	GAO/NSIAD-91-137	REFUGEE ASSISTANCE - U.S. Contribution for the Decade of the 1980's
03/12/91	GAO/NSIAD-91-160	PERSIAN GULF CRISIS - Humanitarian Relief Provided to Evacuees from Kuwait and Iraq
01/22/91	GAO/NSIAD-91-99FS	CAMBODIA - Multilateral Relief Efforts in Border Camps
12/20/90	GAO/NSIAD-91-63BR	FOREIGN ASSISTANCE - Resettlement of Panama's Displaced El Chorrillo Residents
05/09/90	GAO/NSIAD-90-158	SOVIET REFUGEES - Processing and Admittance to the United States
04/11/90	GAO/NSIAD-90-137	REFUGEES PROGRAM - The Orderly Departure Program from Vietnam
07/31/89	GAO/NSIAD-89-150	CENTRAL AMERICA - Conditions of Guatemala Refugees and Displaced Persons
05/04/89	GAO/NSIAD-89-159	SOMALIA - Observations Regarding the Northern Conflict and Resulting Conditions
03/17/89	GAO/NSIAD-89-92	REFUGEE PROGRAM - Financial Accountability for Refugee Resettlement Can Be Improved
03/01/89	GAO/NSIAD-89-54	CENTRAL AMERICA - Conditions of Refugees and Displaced Persons

Testimony

11/02/89	GAO/NSIAD-T-90-07	Refugees from Eastern Europe
09/14/89	GAO/NSIAD-T-89-47	Processing Soviet Refugees

04/21/89	GAO/NSIAD-T-89-25	Conditions Creating Refugees and U.S. Asylum Seekers from Central America
04/06/89	GAO/NSIAD-T-89-22	Processing Soviet Refugees
03/30/89	GAO/NSIAD-T-89-21	Processing Soviet Refugees
03/09/89	GAO/NSIAD-T-89-16	Refugees and U.S. Asylum Seekers from Central America

Video Reports

04//91	GAO/NSIAD-91-02VR	REFUGEES - Marginal Living Conditions for Millions
06/89	GAO/NSIAD-89/03VR	GUATEMALAN REFUGEES - Their Conditions and Prospects

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