Selected Speeches, Testimony and Interviews by

General John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

October 1993 - September 1997

Table of Contents

1995

1996

1997

Appendices

FOREWORD

General John M. Shalikashvili was the first draftee and the first naturalized citizen to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Shalikashvili's story is the American story, but not one he told often and even then, only to groups of young people. Immigrating to America with his family at age 16, he was drafted into the Army during the same month he received his U.S. citizenship and college diploma in 1958. During his 39 years of service, General Shalikashvili served in a variety of key command and staff positions that made him the perfect candidate to tackle the challenges in Europe and Southwest Asia looming on the horizon for American policy makers. Not only had he been the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, but General Shali had previously led the task force whose mission it was to protect the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq.

General Shalikashvili's tenure is perhaps best characterized by his firm leadership during a period of continued force reductions, while the U.S. experienced a significant increase in major military operations due to the continuing instability of the post Cold War security environment; events that brought the debate over the use of force into sharp focus. During this period of historic transition in the international security environment, U.S. forces participated in more than 40 major operations and Joint Task Force deployments. Foremost among the challenges were American participation in operations designed to bring peace to warring factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, restore democracy in Haiti, and enforce United Nations-mandated sanctions against Iraq.

Intent on providing for America's security well into the 21st century, General Shalikashvili established new military-to-military relationships with countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union through the Partnership for Peace Program, laid the foundation for incremental expansion of NATO, and provided new direction for the modernization of U.S. military forces through the publication of the first ever joint vision statement for America's military.

This volume contains a chronology of representative speaking engagements and press conferences conducted by General Shalikashvili. But by no means is there sufficient room to include the text of every speech, press conference, and set of congressional testimony. Instead, selected speeches and excerpts from various press conferences are provided based on their importance to current events of the time or to illustrate the diversity of the audience to whom the Chairman must appeal. Researchers interested in material not contained herein should consult the historic record of all General Shalikashvili's correspondence, remarks, testimony, and press conferences maintained at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.

1993

Announcement by President Clinton of his Nomination of General John M. Shalikashvili
To be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The White House
Washington, DC
11 August 1993

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It's a great honor for me to be here today with the vice president and Secretary Aspin and General Powell to introduce you — to you and to our nation the person whom I have selected to replace Colin Powell as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili. He's widely known to his friends as General Shali, and since we're going to be seeing a lot of each other and you're going to have to write a lot about him, I think I'll just start using the shortened version of his name.

General Shali is superbly well qualified for this position. He is a soldier's soldier, a proven warrior, a creative and flexible visionary who clearly understands the myriad of conflicts, ethnic, religious, and political, gripping the world, as well as the immense possibilities for the United States and for the cause of freedom that are out there before us.

He has shown a proven ability to work with our allies in complex and challenging circumstances. He has shown me a real concern for the ordinary men and women who have enlisted in our armed services and who are living through this difficult and challenging period of downsizing. He understands how to downsize the armed forces and still maintain the strongest military in the world, with the equipment and, most important, the trained force with the morale we need to always fight and win when we have to.

And finally, I am convinced that he is in a unique position to be an advocate for the men and women in the armed services and for the national security of the United States to the Congress, to the country, and to our military allies throughout the world. General Shali entered the United States Army as a draftee and rose through the ranks to his current position of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and the commander in chief of all United States forces there.

He's demonstrated his outstanding military talents repeatedly throughout a distinguished career, from the day he was first drafted into the Army. He's a decorated Vietnam veteran. He ran Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in Iraq. He served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as General Powell's assistant. He has the deep respect of both the troops who have served under him and the military leaders who have worked with him.

I selected him because I believe he has the ability to lead and to win any military action our nation might ask of him. Above all, I am confident that in every instance he will give me his absolutely candid and professional military advice, which, as president, I must have. He is also a shining symbol of what is best about the United States and best about our armed services.

There is much more to his life than most Americans now know. It is a great American story. It began as so many American stories do: in another land.

General Shali was born in Warsaw, Poland, the grandson of a Russian general in the czar's army, the son of a Georgian army officer — that's the Georgia over there, not over here — the heir of a family caught in a crossfire of the kinds of ethnic and national rivalries that now trouble so much of our world. In 1944, when he was eight years old, his family fled in a cattle car westward to Germany in front of the Soviet advance. He came to the United States at the age of 16, settled in Peoria, Illinois, and learned English from John Wayne movies so that he could take a full course load from his first day in school.

Now, I intend to nominate this first-generation American to the highest military office in our land on the strength of his ability, his character, and his enormous potential to lead our armed forces. Only in America.

I intend to nominate him in particular because his skills are uniquely well suited to the security challenges we face today. He helped revamp NATO to be a more flexible military and political force. He created a NATO rapid-reaction corps to undertake peacekeeping missions that are significantly different from our Cold War challenges. He's been a leader in persuading NATO members to consider missions outside traditional alliance boundaries, a very, very important step in the recently announced NATO posture with regard to Bosnia.

The end of the Cold War has created many opportunities for our security and many new threats that lurk among the world's continuing dangers. General Shali is the right man to lead our forces in this challenging era.

Our nation is blessed with the finest military on the face of the earth and the best military we have ever had. That was made clearer to me than ever as I approached this selection, for the top ranks of our nation's military are an impressive bastion of talent, patriotism, and vision.

Nothing illustrates that better than the great soldier whom General Shali will replace as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And I want to take this opportunity before all of America to personally thank General Colin Powell for the magnificent service and leadership he has rendered to this country for so many years, to thank him especially for the last several months of difficult and challenging decision-making we have done together, for always giving me his most candid advice, and for the wonderful job he has done of working with the other service chiefs to come to consensus on challenging and very difficult issues. He has contributed a great deal to a grateful nation, and I know that we all wish him well.

I think there is no greater way for me, at least, to express the respect we all feel for General Powell than to name as his successor such an outstanding leader of such caliber, General John Shalikashvili. I now invite him to the podium for whatever remarks he might wish to make.

General Shali.

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your trust and confidence in me. For someone who at the age of 16 came from Europe to the United States, and who has in all those years since then benefited so richly as I have from the boundless opportunities that our country offers, it's extraordinarily gratifying to me to be given this opportunity in a small way to repay my country through service in such a position of such high responsibility.

I look forward with great enthusiasm, Mr. President, to helping you keep America's armed forces the very best that we have ever had, and soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that have no match. And I must tell you that I am also deeply grateful to the man who has carried on that task with such singular distinction up to now: my friend, General Colin Powell.

And so, Mr. President, from the bottom of my heart, thank you very, very much for the opportunity to continue in the service of my country. Thank you.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Will you take a question?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: Sure I will.

Q: Can we ask whether you're comfortable with the most controversial decision that has been made over the last six months, which is the compromise on service by gays and lesbians in the military?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: I'm very comfortable that a decision has been taken after very detailed and very concerned deliberations, that where we have arrived today is the best solution, and that we are ready to move on with the decision that our president has made. I feel comfortable with that.

Q: General Shalikashvili? Do you anticipate that the United States will be forced to use military action in Bosnia-Herzegovina while General Colin Powell still is chairman of the Joint Chiefs? Or will that await your tenure?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: I hope that we all can approach that from the standpoint that we will be more successful if we never have to use force. But that is up to those factions engaged in that senseless struggle in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And our intent is to persuade them to modify their behavior so, in fact, the just resolution of the conflict can come very quickly. Therefore, I hope that we do not have to bomb as long as General Colin Powell is there, and I hope we do not have to do so when I am asked to assume that position. But no one should make a mistake. I think the resolve is there to do so should those who are carrying on that struggle not modify their behavior.

Q: General, how do you feel about women in the military?

Q: Have you seen any signs that the Serbs are willing to withdraw from those mountains, willing to modify their behavior, sir?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: May I take this question, please? (Laughter.)

Q: How do you feel about women in the military?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: I feel great about women in the military. (Laughter.)

Q: Have you seen any signs that the Serbs are willing to withdraw from their positions, loosen their grip on Sarajevo and respond to the—

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: I think the signals are mixed right now, and I think we need to watch it very carefully over the next few days. We've had conflicting reports of some movement, but—I have not seen any yet where—that we could characterize as Serbian forces having vacated, in fact, those two mountain hillsides.

Q: Well, what will be the trigger for you? What do you think should be the trigger for air strikes?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: Oh, I think the concept that we have submitted to the North Atlantic Council is fairly specific on the sort of behavior that we would expect of the Serbians, and I think that it is now time for us to watch and see if, in fact, the stranglehold around Sarajevo is loosened, if humanitarian aid is brought in, if water, electricity and other necessary elements of a decent life there can be brought into the city.

Q: General Shalikashvili?

Q: General, will you seek to bring the Ukraine and Russia into NATO, sir?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: I have just been nominated for the position of chairman, not president of the United States.

Statement to the U.S. Senate
On Nomination to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, DC
22 September 1993

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Thurmond, and distinguished members of the committee for the opportunity to appear before you today.

Let me say at the outset how deeply honored I am to be here, and how humbled I am by the trust and confidence that the President and Secretary Aspin have bestowed on me. And if confirmed as the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will do everything in my power to be worthy of that trust and that confidence.

I also wish to acknowledge a deep debt of gratitude to my friend, General Colin Powell, for his caring and unselfish support of the men and women of our Armed Forces. Today, America has the very best military that the world has ever known, and General Powell deserves a great share of that credit. He has been a brilliant Chairman, and our Nation could not have been served any better.

During the historic period of his chairmanship, the world witnessed a revolution as large as it was unanticipated. And while the world and America were suddenly faced with unprecedented opportunities, we were confronted as well with a host of different challenges.

But we were able to meet those challenges, from JUST CAUSE to DESERT STORM to PROVIDE COMFORT, to name but a few, because America's soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines were and are today the best trained, best equipped, and best led team, a joint force of extraordinary quality and unwavering commitment, a team capable of working shoulder-to-shoulder with our allies in a world very much filled with tensions, instabilities and, yes, bloody conflicts.

The great American team has had very few moments of respite, and I suspect that the future will be just as taxing. That is why we must ensure that our Armed Forces remain ready — ready to deal with whatever challenges might arise in our freer but certainly not more peaceful world.

To ignore those challenges and the prospect of future conflict would be the height of folly, and to allow our readiness to falter would place at hazard our long-term security and that of our allies. So, we must continue to think seriously and coherently about defense. We must act with prudence, foresight, and commitment.

Secretary Aspin's just completed Bottom Up Review does just that as it fits strategy, force structure, and defense programs to the harsh realities of the post-Cold War world. It confirmed one of my foremost responsibilities as Chairman will be to provide sound, candid military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense on this and all other military matters.

And in this regard, I intend to follow General Powell's good example of holding such advice privileged, as well as recognizing that it is the Chairman's role to advise and it is up to the President and the Secretary to decide.

And I will do my level best to ensure that in my dealings with the Congress, those dealings are always characterized by openness, candor, and honesty. At this moment, there are many reasons for me to feel both pride and humility. There is none greater than the patriotism and devotion to our Nation of the servicemen and women with whom I am privileged to serve. They are a national treasure, the offspring of a great people whose contribution to our country and to the world beyond our borders commands our respect and our care, and I shall always feel the deepest sense of responsibility for their welfare.

Before concluding, allow me to comment briefly on the recent deeply disturbing reports that my father had been a member of the dreaded Waffen SS, and I perhaps withheld this information. I did not withhold this information, for I never had the slightest hint that my father was associated with the Waffen SS.

While my father's official German record shows uninterrupted service in a Georgian legion under the German army of Wehrmacht, it is most troublesome to me that according to his own writings apparently in the last months of the war my father was associated with some Georgian unit that was under the control of the Waffen SS.

I am deeply saddened that my father had this tragic association. To me, and I believe to all those who knew him, that is so absolutely out of character. To me he was a kind and gentle man, and I loved him very much. He was a man

who perhaps loved his native Georgia too much, certainly a man caught up in the awful tragedy of World War II.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to make these brief remarks. I look forward to your questions and, if confirmed, to working with you in the future.

Thank you very much.

Official Welcome Ceremony
The Pentagon
Washington, DC
3 November 1993

Mr. Secretary, members of Congress, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, men and women of our Armed Forces. To all of you here, thank you for coming. And I assure you that I am deeply moved by your presence, and by the honor you do me today. And I thank you for that.

To you, Mr. Secretary, many thanks for those most kind words. And I look forward with great enthusiasm, to serving on your defense team. And to you, behind me, standing this formation, my very special salute. You, and your flags and battle streamers, are a grand sight, and you are most fitting representatives of the hundreds of thousands of American men and women in uniform. And I'm absolutely certain, were they all here today, they would give you a thunderous applause. But since they can't be here, I wonder if all of you would join me in applauding these fine young men and women.

Standing here among you, I must tell you I am humbled by the confidence placed in me, by the President, and by you Mr. Secretary. And I am deeply honored by the chance to serve our nation, and our Armed Forces, as the next chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But I stand before you, as well, with a heart full of pride. Pride in our great nation, and pride in our incomparable Armed Forces. We are a nation that stands alone — a nation that stands alone as the world's richest, most powerful, and as its leading democracy. And contrary to our critics, we remain a nation of vision, and values — a nation committed to helping others in need, and to remain a beacon of hope and opportunity, that continues to draw so many countless to our shores.

Just as so many years ago, when a young man in Warsaw, Poland, dreamed of coming to America, children all over the globe today dream of some day coming to this very special place, this place called America. Yes, we are the greatest power, but we are also the best nation on earth.

But power is finite. As much as we would like otherwise, we recognize, that not every worthy cause can be our own, and that we must make hard, and painful choices. Now that the simpler world of bipolar confrontation has entered the pages of history, we must have strategic priorities, to order our efforts, our expenditures, and our risks.

This does not mean that we step back from our vision, of what we are as a nation, nor that we disappoint friends, and allies, who continue to rely on us, for security, for partnership, and for leadership. Indeed, it implies just the opposite. We need to remain active, and very vigilant, but we must invest our energies, our efforts, our resources, and our good will, where they will do our nation, and the world, the most good. President Clinton has made it clear, that we will neither waste the opportunities that the end of the Cold War has opened, nor shrink from the challenges and dangers of this new era.

And so my heart is full of pride — not only because of what our nation was or is, but pride as well, in the promise of what our nation will remain, the beacon of hope, of freedom, of opportunity, and of human dignity, that has lit the lives of billions of people all over the globe.

Our Armed Forces have had, and will continue to have, a decisive part in our nation's journey to greatness. America's men and women in uniform were there as our forefathers turned a dream into a nation. They were there to fight for this "more perfect union." They were there as we pushed westward into a new continent. And they were there to help rescue the world from tyranny no fewer than three times in this century. And they made history as they defeated a dictator, and freed a nation, in a 100-hour war called DESERT STORM. For over 200 years, our task was to be prepared, to be ready to fight our nation's battles.

And so it is today. We who wear our nation's uniforms have the responsibility to be ready, to answer the call, whenever it should come. After all, all Americans are enormously proud, and confident, of their Armed Forces. But it is a trust we must continually earn.

In turn, this country is blessed with the finest soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, who ever donned America's

uniform. They are more dedicated, more motivated, better trained, better led, and better equipped than any force in the world today. Day in, and day out, tens of thousands of these outstanding patriots stand ready along the DMZ in Korea, patrol the hostile skies over Iraq and Bosnia, enforce sanctions off Haiti, Iraq, and in the Adriatic. And at great sacrifice, and with great valor, and with considerable dignity, they are helping to bring hope to the people of Somalia.

We owe them the total and unequivocal support of this great nation, and wisdom, and leadership. When we must ask them to go in harm's way, as must we will, let us do so in the certain knowledge, that we have done all in our power, to make them ready, and that the families they leave behind, have the care that they so richly deserve. We owe them no less, for they are our most precious asset, they are America.

To have been asked to be their spokesman, is the highest honor, and the most solemn responsibility that can be bestowed upon a man in uniform, and I shall never shrink from the responsibility.

Ceremony Honoring Vietnam Women Veterans
Fort Myer, Virginia
12 November 1993

Secretary and Mrs. Perry, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, and you magnificent soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast guardsmen standing this very special formation — thank you all for your presence, and with your presence helping my fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and me, to honor our women veterans of the Vietnam War.

Yes, we are here to honor them; but perhaps just as significant, my fellow Chiefs and I are here finally, to officially, welcome you home. Welcome home Diane Carlson Evans! Welcome home! Welcome home all of you sisters who served during Vietnam and who are here this morning. Welcome home! And welcome home as well to the 11,500 women who served in Vietnam, and welcome home to all 265,000 who served our nation during the Vietnam era. To all of them, although they can't all be here today, welcome home!

And on this occasion we the Joint Chiefs offer a special salute to the memory of these eight women whose names are edged forever on the black granite of the Vietnam memorial and in the memory of a grateful nation. Welcome home to them!

You see, over the entire 39-year history of the observance of Veterans Day, America has seen in its mind's eye the image of the nation's *sons,* of its *male* warriors, of the *men* who serve, who fight, and who sacrifice on behalf of our nation.

But yesterday, on Veterans Day, just across the river, at the Vietnam Memorial, there yesterday at last, we threw a bright and so well-earned light, on another group of veterans — veterans who have served no less nobly, who have struggled with equal fierceness, and who have sacrificed as much as their brothers in the defense of this great country.

These are the *daughters* of this nation who raised their hands and donned America's uniforms and who went off to serve. They are the women, as well, who went to war as civilians — as USO and Red Cross volunteers, as special services personnel, and correspondents, and entertainers.

We are honoring them, in part, for what they did during that ravaging war. We are honoring them for their fortitude, their courage, their deathless loyalty, and for the nurturing solace many of them brought to a place of surreal pain and desolation. We are honoring them for the monumental courage it took to do their part in obscurity, to bury their feelings, to suffer their terrors and agonies, unnoticed, and in the background. We are honoring them for the painful secrets they have carried for these past 20 years. And we are honoring them for all the others they represent—the generation upon generation of American women, in all of our wars, who have chosen to answer the same call, as the men who went off to fight.

From Molly Pitcher during the Revolutionary War, to Sarah Edmonds, the Union spy, to the Yeomanettes, and "hello girls" of World War I, to the heroines of Corregidor and Anzio, to the hundreds who went to war in Korea, to the thousands of women who served, side-by-side with their brothers, in Panama, and the war called DESERT STORM.

The women of Vietnam, who have come together to create the stirring monument that was dedicated yesterday, are symbols for all their sisters who have rallied to the flag in years gone by, and who do so today in places as different as Mogadishu and Zagreb.

But most importantly, when you unveiled that monument, you lifted the veil of silence, you threw open wide, the doors to full recognition of service, for all generations of women to come. For what you did in Vietnam, and for what you did yesterday, we the Joint Chiefs, we the entire Armed Forces, on behalf of a grateful nation, extend to you a most

heartfelt "thank you." You have done our nation a great service. And we are proud to welcome you home.

But of course a celebration like this does not simply happen. A nation — a people — does not simply come to the realization, spontaneously, that it has overlooked an entire category of its heroes. That realization comes slowly; and it is the product of hard work, of dedication, of absolute and unwavering belief in the rightness of a cause. It comes, more often than not, from the heart of an individual who cares deeply, and who has the stamina to see the struggle to its end. Our special guest today is one of those individuals.

She was herself an Army nurse in Vietnam. She returned, like so many of her colleagues, to a nation that hadn't thought to offer its gratitude for what she'd done, or to understand the nightmares that were her souvenirs, or even to include her in its memory among the male veterans who served at her side, and healed under her hands. She saw a need for Americans to understand. She saw a need to erect a memorial in America's capital, to the women who served during this nation's longest war. The year was 1983.

Over the ten years that followed, she and the other men and women who joined in her effort, steadily overcame the financial, bureaucratic, and technical obstacles that stood in the way of the Vietnam Women's Memorial — until it became a stirring reality at two o'clock yesterday afternoon.

But the story is hers, not mine, to tell; and so it is my distinct honor at this time, on behalf of all the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to introduce to you Diane Carlson Evans — registered nurse, founder of the memorial project, and fellow veteran of the Vietnam War.

Department of Defense Press Briefing
The Pentagon
Washington, DC
14 December 1993

Thank you. I must tell you that I'm delighted to be here, but I also feel very bad because I looked at my calendar, and I realize I have been here almost two months now. I have been very delinquent in not coming to you much sooner and introducing myself, but I guess time flies when you're having fun or some kind of a cliché like that.

I have to tell you that I was under no illusion when I came here about what would be in my in-basket. After all, I had served in the chairman's office before going to Europe. But I guess I didn't realize just how full the in-basket could really get.

Whether those are the issues that are so well familiar to you — Somalia and Haiti and Bosnia and North Korea — or whether it's worrying about the process that's now ongoing in Russia as they build their democratic institutions and market economies and how all that will turn out or just downsizing and restructuring the force and making sure that we do all that right and that in the process we don't just get smaller, but that we also get better.

It would be a hit on us if we, in this process, didn't turn over every rock and try to figure out if there isn't a better way of doing things. But while we do that, ensuring that we protect the quality of life for our service men and women and their families and our civilian work force, and that's no mean trick, as you well understand.

Let me tell you that I have really enjoyed the challenges so far. I have been busier than I thought I would be. But having assured you of that, that I'm not underemployed, but that I'm enjoying it, and that I'm really enjoying the people that I work with here.

With that, I know you don't want me to talk too long. You'd rather ask questions. So what are your questions?

NORTH KOREA CHALLENGE

Q. General Shalikashvili, certainly one of the highest profiled challenges that face you now is North Korea, the problem of North Korea. You have a study under way, I know, with the South Korean military, on changes that might be needed to beef up the military there. Have you any preliminary results from that study? Do you think that forces need to be beefed up — U.S. and South Korean forces? And are you confident that the force that's there now could stop any North Korean thrust before it reached Seoul?

A. First, as far as the ongoing effort to determine whether their structure is right or whether their capabilities are in place and what it is that we, in a reinforcing role, ought to be doing, I think it's much too early to be talking about specifics, other than you need to view that it's an ongoing process and not something that has all of a sudden been

brought about by what we've been reading in the headlines, and that is the nuclear issue. I am satisfied, having gone to Korea about a month ago and meeting there with my counterpart, that that's going well.

As far as our confidence to stop a North Korean attack into the South, I am very, very confident. I think even the more pessimistic studies that you sometimes write about have no question that we will stop, that the South Koreans, together with our reinforcements, will stop North Korean attack far short of their reaching their war objectives. I would not want to stand here before you and speculate where that in relationship to Seoul is. Suffice it to say that I am very comfortable that no one has yet suggested that we would not be able to stop the North Koreans.

Q. How would you be able to stop them? In 1950 the Chinese came in on behalf of North Korea, and it became a very bloody, long war, and we know the outcome. What is your assessment of Red China today? Will they remain neutral? Do you think they'd come in if North Korea attacks?

A. I think the conditions are totally different. I certainly would not envision right now that we would be facing the Chinese government and the Chinese troops if, in fact, North Korea were foolish enough to attack the South.

Q. Given the North Koreans' vast numerical superiority, how is it that the South Korean forces reinforced by the U.S. would be able to repel an invasion?

A. First of all, there is more to a warfighting capability than the number of soldiers or airmen or marines that one side or the other has. It has to do with the quality of the force. It has to do with the quality of the armaments. It has to do with terrain, and also it has to do with whether you're the attacker or the defender. I am not alone in this military judgment, that the Republic of Korea forces, reinforced by the United States, as it's now envisioned, would be able to stop any attack.

But let me say, I don't want to leave it with the impression that something has changed in the last month or two or three that somehow makes it more likely that North Korea is engaged in some kind of preparation for an attack. I don't want to leave that impression at all. What I am saying is something that has been true for some time, and I think it's going to remain true for some time to come, without giving you all the impression that we ... sense that the North Koreans are in some kind of a preparatory phase prior to attack.

RUSSIAN REFORM

Q. You mentioned Russia. The parliament there, they're electing a parliament, the Nationalist Group, that has opposed many of President Boris Yeltsin's policies on denuclearization, on switching to defense conversion. What are your thoughts about that, and how it would change any U.S. military policy?

A. The first thing I would tell you is that it's useful to remember, as a start point, that there's an awful lot to be satisfied about in the sense that we've had the first free democratic elections since, I guess, 1917 probably and that we do have a new constitution that guarantees an awful lot of the rights to the citizens of Russia. So I think there's an awful lot to be very thankful about.

As far as the outcome between the reformers and those who would slow down the reforms or reorient reforms, I think I would like to reserve judgment until we see better, really, how that came out. Certainly, you could speculate that we hope that after all the votes are counted that the reformists will have the necessary majority to be able to get programs through the Parliament and through the Duma that would speed up reforms.

I think, unless you know more than I right now, I think it's a little bit too early to tell what the final vote tally will be.

Q. The latest is that Vice President Gore, in Moscow, is now saying it may not be as optimistic as they had originally thought. What about your own personal opinion of [Vladimir] Zhirinovsky? He had been quoted as saying that he believes that Germany and Russia should get together and divide up Poland as well as he would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons, and he thinks Alaska should be annexed. What are your...

A. I was going to say, I must be careful not to make any comments about someone who thinks that it's realistic to view Alaska returning to ...I don't know enough about him, other than what I have read in the newspapers. Again, I think it's useful to find out the difference between election rhetoric and appealing to emotionalism during this very heated election process they had and what the man is going to be like when he assumes responsibility as a member of the Duma.

Q. Does it give you any concerns about U.S. military policy? Are you beginning to have strategy looking at...

A. No.

Q. General, in view of the apparent outcome there in Russia yesterday, how can Ukraine be expected to give up its nuclear weapons now?

A. I think that we should have every expectation that Ukraine follows through on their initial commitment to the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty], as a nonnuclear state, to the ratification of START [Strategic Arms Reductions

Treaty], without the reservations that now have been imposed by Darara and by the Lisbon Protocols.

I don't think it's realistic to think that Ukraine would wish to use those weapons somehow in the defense of Ukraine against Russia. I think that's a faulty notion, and I am very hopeful that Ukraine will come to the realization and will go on with the process. And despite some of the reporting as to the statements that one side or another might have made during this election process, I think it's too early to tell whether there is any kind of a significant reversal in Russia and its commitment, the government's commitment, to democratic reform.

After all, they have just voted on a constitution where the presidency has been strengthened manifold. Right now, as far as I know, Yeltsin will continue with the democratic processes, in his views, towards Ukraine and the relations that he wishes to build with Ukraine that have nothing to do with threatening each other with nuclear weapons.

NORTH KOREAN OBJECTIVES

Q. Another question having to do with Korea. Your own assessment of the likelihood of a North Korean attack? And secondly, you mentioned in one of your answers, to a question on Korea, that you were confident that the combined United States/South Korea could stop a North Korean attack short of North Korea's war objectives. What are North Korea's war objectives?

A. I will tell you that none of us read their war plans, and I wouldn't want to pretend otherwise. I think logic would lead you to the conclusion that they probably would wish to reunify the country through force, and I think our friends in the Republic of Korea, together with us, have the capability of stopping them short of that.

Q. And the likelihood?

A. I think we have all heard enough about the unpredictability of Kim Il Sung and Kim Sung's regime, so I think it is very dangerous to speculate one with the other. All I would say is that I don't see anything different today than I did a few months ago when I came to this job, and people who have been here in this building and watching this part of the world longer than I have don't see anything that has particularly happened that would increase or decrease the likelihood between now and, let's say, six months ago.

Q. Just getting back to your idea of what their war objectives are, American analysts have assessed that one of their objectives would be to surround and possibly overrun Seoul. Do you believe that ROK forces reinforced by American forces could stop a North Korean invasion short of Seoul?

A. It's certainly a possibility, and our hope that we can do so.

Q. But you're not certain about that? Obviously, their artillery guns are well within range. It's an easy mark there. But in terms of ground forces actually coming in?

A. I think you're talking of a huge city that's only some, at its narrowest point, some 20-plus miles from the border. So let me simply say that we have every intention to try to do so. I certainly think there is a very good likelihood. However, there are also many imponderables that you simply cannot predict.

SOMALIA OPERATION

Q. A two-part question about Somalia. Did you see the video of the Oct. 3 battle in Mogadishu? And two, would you give us your evaluation of the performance of [Army Maj.] General [William] Garrison, [commander, joint] special operations?

A. Are you talking about the video that was made by the forces that participated in that operation?

Q. October third.

A. Yes, I saw it several times. In my judgment the military personnel involved in that operation performed with extraordinary courage in an extremely difficult situation and I think, from a military point of view, did an absolutely sterling job. I think General Garrison had gone through all the proper planning and precautionary steps that one would expect of a leader in that kind of an operation and led those troops with great distinction.

Q. When are we going to get that video?

A. I don't know. We'll look into it.

Q. Is there any security material in there?

A. There might be. There might be methods they used on the video that I just simply am not prepared to answer for you now. But those of you who have known me for more than a day or so know that if there is a way to make this available to you, I certainly won't stand in the way.

Q. On the issue of peace operations, considering the problems in Somalia, do you have reservations, and should there be solid conditions before U.S. forces are placed under United Nations command?

A. I have always maintained, even long before the 3-4 October fight in Mogadishu, that there must be very solid conditions before United States forces participate in any kind of operation, whether that's under United Nations or not. Certainly for operations under the United Nations, there ought to be some very strict conditions.

In addition to those that we would consider for an operation were it, for instance, under the command and control of NATO or unilaterally under the United States, is the issue of the robustness of the chain of command under the U.N., the specific rules of engagement, and whether they not only allow for the self-protection of the force, but also are robust enough to allow you to get the job done.

I think we ought to make sure that we judge those doings on a case-by-case basis, but I can well imagine that there will be United Nations operations in the future where we can all, with a great deal of confidence, say that the command/control arrangement is robust enough, the rules of engagement are proper, and then for me to recommend to my boss that it would make sense to participate. There are other cases where I would obviously have to say no.

Let us agree, I think, to judge each one of them on a case-by-case basis.

MILITARY OPTIONS

Q. Let me get your judgment on two military matters. First of all, on Korea. Does this country have military options in the event diplomacy fails that, in your judgment, are preferable to permitting the North Koreans to develop a nuclear weapons capability? Number 2, do you support extending the borders of NATO eastward over the next several years with no particular military infrastructure in place to defend this new territory, and at a time of shrinking defense budgets and real deep questions about the national will, to take on additional commitments?

A. On the first question, I know that you do not seriously want me to discuss any planning that we do on this or any other operation. I would hope that this building does not get caught short if we are ever asked to do something, and I feel confident that we won't be. But that's all I would really want to say on that matter.

As far as the issue of extending security guarantees to the East, I think for the longest time we were talking about whether security guarantees are to be extended or whether NATO membership ought to be extended.

It is, I think, becoming clearer and clearer that there is a consensus forming in the alliance that people would like to think, on that issue, that the question is no longer whether, but when and how. And while this process might be lengthy and this process might not satisfy some of our Eastern friends in terms of how quickly it can move ahead, that the alliance is beginning to come to that conclusion that we are now standing at the threshold of saying when and how, as opposed to whether.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

The issue of extending security guarantees in this time frame, I think, is premature as I view the debates in the various capitals, and I think one of the reasons why the United States has proposed its Partnership for Peace is to have a proposal on the table that is appropriate to the times we are in, in relationship to this issue of extending membership, this whole question of whether it is not premature, right now, to extend guarantees, and how are the capitals of the member countries of the alliance now willing to do so?

My sense is that the vast majority are not yet ready to do so, and yet there has to be a qualitative step forward from the NACC [North Atlantic Cooperation Council] process that was our first reach to the East. I think, viewed in that light, I think the Partnership for Peace has been embraced by all NATO countries that I'm aware of, and I think it's also going to get acceptance in the East.

PENTAGON BUDGET

Q. In your role as the principal military adviser to the president, what do you intend to say to him this week when he sits to consider the defense budget?

A. I'm not sure what you mean, "when he sits down this week to consider the defense budget."

Q. He and Secretary [of Defense Les] Aspin have to meet on the defense budget to decide whether, actually, to break the budget caps or to keep the budget within those limits.

A. I don't mean to evade your question, I really don't know. I know that they have a meeting. I've been told that

they have a meeting coming up. Whether that's just simply to outline, for the president, where Secretary Aspin sees the issue or not, I can't comment on it.

Q. The Pentagon is facing these shortfalls, $50 billion by some estimates. What's been your military advice as to what would happen if the Pentagon has to absorb those kind of cuts, $50 billion or any limit below that?

A. I think we probably can all agree that there is an issue, as Secretary Aspin said this weekend. We're not sure whether that's $50 billion or slightly smaller, a slightly larger number. So I wouldn't want to get hung up on the number.

The second thing I think that Secretary Aspin said, and I'd like to reinforce, it isn't a we-they issue. It is that, together, we have this dilemma of how to solve that problem. It's much too early to reach any conclusions that it cannot be solved.

We need to scope the problem and then look at realistic solutions to it, and we can only get there if we all work together. If we see that there isn't a solution that will get us to that, then I think we can talk about what the fallout would be. So I think it's a little premature for me to say what the dire consequences might be if we can't together solve the problem. I'm confident that there's a way that can be solved.

Q. But having said that and given that the Army especially has been complaining pretty loudly that they're not ready now, you're going to have to absorb the $50 billion adjustment, be it somewhat higher or somewhat lower. Aren't you really running the risk that the entire military won't be ready?

A. I was not aware that the Army said that they are not ready. I think all of the services are concerned. I think for every budget cycle that I am aware of, we've always tried to be very realistic as we look at the resources vs. the structure that's needed to execute a strategy. But in my discussions with the leadership of the Army, I was not aware that they were claiming that they are now somehow over the edge. I don't think they are.

All of the services, and certainly I as chairman, have a concern that we have sufficient resources to get the force structure and properly support that force structure in order to be able to execute the strategy that was developed and articulated during the Bottom Up Review, which I think is the right strategy.

Q. What do you foresee happening in Bosnia? Have you been able to give some time to a re-evaluation of a potential U.S. commitment of forces to any kind of NATO peacekeeping? And what would you imagine the size of that might be?

A. First and foremost, like last winter, the main effort right now needs to be to get folks through the winter. That means we need to redouble our efforts in a humanitarian area. And as you know, Secretary [of State Warren] Christopher announced when he was in Europe a couple of weeks ago, that we're doing just that. And I think we will, very soon, have the airplanes in place and the humanitarian goods to be able not only to significantly increase our air landings into Sarajevo and Tuzla, if the warring factions ever allow the airport to be opened, and certainly also to increase our airdrop operations.

But your question goes beyond that, and beyond that is the issue of supporting a peace agreement if, in fact, the three factions ever reach an agreement. There was a degree of euphoria here last week. As is often the case, in Bosnia it was not well founded, because once again, at least so far, they have not managed to come to an agreement. My understanding is that they're going to be meeting again on the 21st of this month to try to see if they can come to an agreement.

The United States has stated that if there is an agreement and it is a just agreement and all three parties sign up to it-not just the leadership, but there is indication that throughout, down to the warlords, that there is the willingness to implement that agreement and if it's implementable with military force — that the United States would be willing to, in coordination, in consultation with Congress, to participate in such an operation. I don't know of anything that has changed.

So where I now stand and all of us, we're very carefully watching the peace process to see whether, in fact, we can finally have an agreement that emerges from Geneva or any other talks.

Q. But there's a lot of ifs to that.

A. Not on our part. It's on their part, really. But I think we went into it — Europeans and Americans — from the very beginning, that we cannot impose a peace on them. We need to do all we can to help them reach an agreement, but ultimately, the agreement must be one that they all sign up to. So far, they have been unable to do so.

TROOP PULLOUT

Q. When the U.S. pulls its troops out of Somalia in the end of March, how many support troops will be left, and how safe will they be?

A. How many Americans?

Q. Yes.

A. We have indicated that ... I think when the president announced it, it was 300 or less. I am going to Somalia on Saturday. One of the things I want to look into is, not only what we will then, eventually, on the 31st of March have to leave. Where I come from I'd rather the number be smaller than larger.

Secondly, I want to make sure that while I have carefully viewed the withdrawal plans, I want to make sure that I have the opportunity to sit down with ... leaders there and review, in person, their withdrawal plans to make sure that we can do that as efficiently and as safely to ourselves and the other forces that are there.

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(Excerpts)
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MR. LEVON: Welcome to Worldnet's Dialogue. I'm Neil Levon. Today we present a live, unedited news conference with General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. Joining us from the Pentagon, General Shalikashvili will discuss the upcoming NATO summit, the Partnership for Peace initiative, and other global security issues with participants in Poland, Germany, France, and the Czech Republic. Welcome to Worldnet, General.

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: Thank you very much. It' s good to be here.

MR. LEVON: General, before serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you held the top job in NATO. With your background in that organization, what can we expect from the upcoming summit?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: Well, I think it's fair to say that all summits are terribly important. But it's equally fair to say that this summit perhaps is more important than any other one since 1949, when we launched the Alliance. We all know that the Alliance today, and Europe itself, is very much in a transition, and we know the reasons for it. But as a result of this transition, what we find today is that there are lingering questions about the continued relevance of the Alliance, the Alliance's ability to deal with those nagging security issues that plague Europe. There is also continuing doubt about the staying power of the United States as far the Alliance is concerned, and questions are being asked whether in fact there is an enduring nature to our commitment to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, or whether we're just in Europe until things go well in Russia or if we're just in Europe until the Maastricht process in fact runs its course. And it's terribly important that the Summit comes to grips with those issues.

There's the further issue of how the Alliance will tackle the issue of expansion to the East, of outreach to the East. And it is for those reasons that I think that the NATO Allies welcome so very much President Clinton's call for a summit that will occur here now on the 10th of this month because this summit will give us the opportunity first of all I think, to reaffirm once again the centrality of the Alliance. I think it is important that we understand that there are other institutions, security institutions other than the Alliance. But that this must be a cooperative effort and not a confrontational effort, and that the Alliance must in fact stay as a central institution where we bring our security concerns, as far as the transatlantic region is concerned.

Secondly, and perhaps just as important, this summit will give us the opportunity to squarely reaffirm once again the enduring nature of these Trans-Atlantic linkages, that the United States is in fact in Europe to stay, because it is in the security interests of the United States to do so. And of course it gives us the opportunity to come to grips with the issue of the outreach to the East, and that's where of course President Clinton's proposal for the Partnership for Peace comes in.

At the same time, it gives us the opportunity to reach agreement also on how the Alliance can best deal with Europe itself, with the European security identity, how the Alliance itself can become more flexible to deal with command and control arrangements to allow it to operate out of area, in such operations should it ever become necessary to move, for instance, into Bosnia to help implement whatever peace plan that might eventually be developed.

So, for those reasons, I think it is time to make a significant strategic redirection as far as the Alliance is concerned. And that's why I think this summit is absolutely crucial to all of us who are members of the Alliance, and all of us who are in the rest of Europe, looking at the Alliance and seeing how the Alliance will develop.

Q: (Inaudible) — Czech Television. General, don't you think NATO should distinguish between Russia and Central European states, at least for their historical experience and higher level of democracy in these states?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: I think we clearly distinguish. But when you ask me what the approach in the near term should be, I think this approach is exactly right when we suggested that the next step in this evolution needs to be something that we call the Partnership For Peace. Any other approach, I think stands in danger of establishing a new division in Europe. And, after all, we have spent — I don't know, 40 years trying to break down divisions in Europe. And what a shame it would be if all of a sudden we would now be rebuilding divisions. I think for the moment the best course of action is in fact something like the Partnership for Peace that does not establish divisions. But that is something different than saying that we consider Russia or East and Central European countries differently. Clearly they have a different history, and we look upon them differently.

Q: Jolanta Deinkowska — Television, Warsaw. General, it seems like the Partnership for Peace seems to be a big issue in Poland. Most of the politicians here say that this is the way to show that you do something without doing anything. Could you give us at least one argument that this is a good thing for Poland?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: Oh, certainly. First of all, I absolutely reject the argument that this is just simply some sort of a facade. The Partnership for Peace for is a qualitative step forward in the relationship between our cooperation partners and other European nations that would want to join the Partnership and the Alliance. It brings us a significant step closer together as we deal in bringing our militaries closer together as we deal in very practical things such as exercises, joint planning, and joint operations. It gives us an opportunity to break down any transparency issues between us, and it brings our militaries, if we pursue this correctly, so much closer together. So when the day comes when we wish to speak about extending membership, our militaries will already have the joint procedures, the joint operating experience, the joint training experiences that are absolutely vital to making an alliance like NATO work. So I reject the notion that this is a facade. I think this is an extraordinarily important and meaningful step forward in our relationship.

Q: (inaudible). General, the initiative Partnership for Peace is sometimes called the other half of the George C. Marshall vision for Europe. That plan took several years to realize. My first question, what is in your opinion the time line for the full realization of this Partnership for Peace?

The second question. The Eastern European countries were excluded from the Marshall Plan due to the — (inaudible). Do you think that now Russia itself will in fact — (inaudible) — especially now after the Zhirinovsky successes in the election?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: I think those are two extraordinarily good questions. On the first one, I think it is up to countries in Central and Eastern Europe to drive the pace how quickly we progress. And that is the beauty of the Partnership for Peace. It is not up to the Alliance to set the pace, but it is really up to our partners to set the pace. And those that want to move very quickly should do so, and we would be standing by, be as supportive as we possibly can. Others who want to move more slowly will move at their pace.

I think there is no reason why early 1994 we should not see the first positive results of the Partnership for Peace. When it is completed, I don't know, because how far we go will be up to you and us and principally up to you how far you wish to carry that process. But I think we ought to spend little time talking, lots of time doing. I think those are the sort of tangible results that both your people and our people are looking for.

As far as Russia is concerned, I am very, very hopeful that Russia will be supportive of the Partnership for Peace. After all, the Partnership for Peace ought to serve Russia every bit as much as it serves the Alliance. So I must tell you that as I sit here I am very, very hopeful and very encouraged that Russia will in fact find it's a positive move and will be very much supportive of that, despite election results, or maybe ...

Q: (Inaudible) — for Central European News in Prague. General, you talked a lot about the Partnership for Peace and a long-term best-case scenario. I was wondering whether you could say something about the shorter worst-case scenario. I come from a country that on numerous occasions throughout history surrendered its fate to more powerful neighbors. Now, I don't know how you review the reform process in Russia, but generally people here seem to regard the Russian reform process as all but dysfunctional. In the event that the situation deteriorates rapidly there, what are you prepared to offer the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarians, as far as security measures go? If not a NATO Partnership for Peace, then what in the immediate future? We're not talking years down the road; we're talking weeks, months.

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: Hall, let me be clear then. For those who argued that we should offer immediate security guarantees, you must understand that the offering of security guarantees to one country or another is not an overnight process, unless you think of security guarantees as purely empty political statements, which I hope the Alliance will never fall victim to. Those are never meaningful commitments, and therefore take quite a bit of time to institute. Just look at how long it has taken other members that have joined the Alliance to go through that process. So if not Partnership for Peace but immediate security guarantees, first of all, it is not done overnight.

Secondly, I submit that it would fuel such tensions that it would be more counterproductive to the countries of Central Europe than the Partnership for Peace. I think the best assurance that you can have from the United States, and the thing that I would look for from the United States in this period immediately ahead, and long range, is that we do everything possible to assist those in Russia, that are the reformists, that are driving Russia in a direction of strengthened democratic institutions and market economies, and that that will do more to assure your safety than setting up new divisions between you and Russia or some other country. So I think we are embarked on a course that in a short-term and in a long-term would yield much more benefits for your country and the other countries of Central Europe.

National Defense University
"Strategy for the 90's: Building on the Past – Looking to the Future"
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I'm delighted to be able to spend the next hour with you. And having just recently sat through an hour long State of the Union message, I promise to be nowhere near that long, and to leave you plenty of time for questions on any subject you might wish to choose.

The purpose of this series of speeches that I've been asked to participate in is to explore the question of what should be America's strategy in fact for the 90's. Well I guess that's the proverbial 64 thousand dollar question and I hope that I'm not going to startle any of you here when I tell you that I don't expect to walk out of this door at the conclusion of this speech with the prize.

But I do hope that you all understand that we are at a very extraordinary crossroads where the world is changing of course very rapidly and I won't belabor that, since you all have taken part in it and you read the newspapers as well as I do. But you also understand that we therefore as a nation are trying to rediscover our strategic footing. And so what I would like to offer you today are just a very few thoughts of how we might proceed along that road.

First if you will permit me though, I am going to take the liberty of pushing our focus well beyond the 90's and into the next century. Because I believe that at this stage in our history we have to look deep into the future to decide what we want and what we want the world to look like, because this is where we need to place the lodestone that will lead us through the rest of this century. I think this was the secret of our success over the past 40 to 50 years and it must remain the guiding thrust of our national strategy.

Secondly, I will tell you that we need to remind ourselves that we are not redefining our strategy from a blank slate. Times have changed but the world has not been completely turned over. There are historical tracks that have brought us to this juncture in history and we need to stay on some of the very same tracks that we have been on, and I'll explain that in a minute.

Over the course of the past 50 years, we evolved a fabulously successful national strategy that guided us through the tempestuous decades of the Cold War. It was a strategy, as you well know, built on the blocks of containment, of coalition building, of deterrence through flexible response, and of American leadership. We saw ourselves involved in an extended clash between our own political and economic systems and those of our former adversary, the Soviet Union.

The containment leg of our strategy was originated on the premise that our free market and democratic systems would prevail if we could keep communism bottled up. Throughout, we clung to a conviction that communism would prove too frail to survive the weight of its own burdens and its own contradictions. If we could prevent the struggle from being resolved by force of arms. In time, we believed, the Soviets would face a stark choice between outright failure or the necessity to change.

This effort to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union had broad geostrategic dimensions. It made us extend our defenses outward as close to Soviet borders as possible. It made us yank ourselves free from the isolationist grip of our heritage. On occasion it even caused us to go to war.

But it finally succeeded. To our very great relief, Gorbachev rose to power, saw that his nation was sliding toward a catastrophic failure, and began the process of change. So containment worked just as its authors had predicted some 50 years ago.

The second leg of our strategy was coalition building. This flowed rather naturally from containment because our coalitions formed the ring around the Soviet Union needed to stop its expansion. But there was another side to this element of our strategy.

Many years ago, I remember questioning one of the senior officers who had a key role in the military occupation and reconstruction of Japan. I asked him what was going through their minds as they helped to rebuild a nation that had been such a bitter enemy of ours only a few years before. To my great surprise, he never once mentioned the Soviet Union in his response.

And I'd like to recount what he said, because it shows the extraordinary foresight and wisdom of his generation of officers and statesmen. He began by explaining to me that when the Second World War ended, the American economy was around some 55 percent of the world's gross national product. Despite the fact that Americans were less than 5 percent of the world's population, our economy produced over half the world's wealth. Nearly every other economy in the world was crushed flat by the devastation of the war. Hundreds of millions were starving, homeless, and without

hope. Only America lay untouched. For us the war had rejuvenated our economy, pulling us out of the depression and exploding our productive capacity.

Recognizing that most wars find their roots in economics, his generation felt it was absolutely essential to correct this dangerous imbalance in the economic systems I just described.

Partly what was needed was to design and structure a new world order, one based on the principles of fair and open trade, on stable currencies, and on healthy economic competition. But there was another side as well. Unless we helped others to recover, unless we shared our great wealth, unless we lent a hand to get them get back on their feet, then the peace we had just won was destined to be frail and, of course, very, very short-lasting.

Then he told me of another of the factors that motivated their thinking. He said they realized that unless our nation helped develop prosperous and democratic partners, then Americans would be forced to carry the burdens of the world alone. Quite remarkably, they foresaw that the seeds they were planting in East Asia and Western Europe would grow eventually into a future generation of American allies and partners, other nations willing and able to share our interests, as well as our burdens.

I am recalling this conversation because it exemplifies the constructive element of our strategy. It also signifies the complexity, the depth of thought that went into the creation of our strategy. It intertwined economic, political, and security considerations and instruments together into a single framework. Comprehending that economic issues are the most common cause of wars, that how a nation's politics are structured can make it more or less prone to aggression, its framework crossed every dimension of national existence.

Its larger purpose was to find a way to stop the spiral of world wars; a cycle of conflicts driven by nationalism, colonialism, economic competition, and political chaos. Even as we were containing Soviet expansion this leg of our strategy progressed miraculously. We designed and built a new global economic order based on fair trade, on a stable monetary order, and on integrated economies. We encouraged the growth of democracy, principally through our own example, but also by extending protection to those nations willing to be ruled by the convictions of the ballot box.

We helped to reconstruct Europe from the ravages of war. Through the Marshall Plan we provided the solvency that Europeans needed to rebuild, to stabilize their currencies, and to trade with one another. In East Asia we did the same for Japan and South Korea. Forty years after the war ended, we and our allies have indeed become the richest, the most prosperous, and the most democratic nations in the world.

The third leg of our strategy was deterrence through Flexible Response. We arrived at this leg rather later than the others, because Flexible Response was terribly expensive to maintain.

Under Eisenhower we tested what he and his administration felt would be a less expensive and more effective strategy that we called Massive Retaliation. But, by the beginning of the sixties, Kennedy's theorists recognized that it was actually a very dangerous doctrine because it was too incredible a deterrent threat to protect many of our interests, and because it eliminated any threshold whatsoever between the first shot and nuclear annihilation. Kennedy's advisors recognized that its lack of credibility might contribute to aggression by the other side, whereas its promise of instant escalation was an invitation to the other side to escalate first.

Our paramount objective was deterrence. Although Flexible Response did, in fact, prove very expensive, it also proved to be a very effective and credible deterrent. And in the long run it was vastly less expensive than the all-out war that it was designed to prevent.

The effectiveness of our deterrent strategy became more and more evident as our principal adversary was prevented from attacking our most important interests and allies, turning more and more to indirect strategies of aggression, nearly always using surrogates rather than risk direct confrontation. It thus marginalized their ambitions.

The fourth leg of our strategy, of course, was American leadership. Again because of our isolationist heritage it was an element that made Americans perpetually uncomfortable. But the vast disparity in national wealth and power created by the war left us as the only nation capable of doing so and taking on this role.

In fact, American leadership has been enormously effective. Without it, there is no doubt the world today would look quite different in ways that no one would be happy with.

By now, of course, most of you must be wondering why I am dwelling on history when I am supposed to be looking toward the future. It is because, while there are elements of our strategy that we need to change, there are also elements we need to preserve.

First, I think we need to preserve the centrality of the core doctrine that motivated our strategy. Simply stated, democracy and free markets create prosperity and contentment, and these lead to peace. It is a proven doctrine. It has kept Western Europe at peace for the longest period in its modern history, it is changing the face of Asia, and it has led the nations of South and Central America away from their long flirtation with dictatorships.

But this doctrine is facing a new challenge, a challenge that in some ways is similar to what we experienced at the end of the Second World War, but in other ways, is quite different. With the end of the cold war, we saw that billions of new converts came to this belief in democracy and market economies. Most of these people are impoverished, they are economically insecure, and they are torn between the past they knew and a future that may look very frighteningly uncertain to them.

We therefore have to find ways to rapidly give them the knowledge and the skills to help them refit and modernize their infrastructures, to find and develop markets for their goods, to take them up the first steps of the ladder to prosperity. We have to dampen their fears and to build their confidence. Our National Security Advisor Tony Lake calls this element of our strategy "enlargement." It is the successor to what we were doing during the Cold War and it remains central to our new strategy.

I might note, for example, that of the flurry of new conflicts that have erupted like measles in these last few years, none have occurred between those states that have stable, well-established democratic institutions, which are prosperous. In fact, the more quickly these doctrines become embedded in Eastern Europe, in the nations of the former Soviet Union, in East Asia, and in other regions of the world, the safer the world will become.

But we and they have to realize that there will be no overnight miracles. It took Western Europe and Japan decades to recover their economies after the war. For the people of East Europe, in the former Soviet states, and in East Asia, it will be a long steady climb with plenty of rocks on the way.

The Cold War threw up barriers that divided nations, that divided neighbors, and that divided continents. Our most important objective is to prevent these divisions from growing back, or from merely shifting them to other places. We must simply resist the temptation to make a line of division, from one side of Poland, to another. That is, I think, why it was so important that President Clinton just last month at Prague, and at NATO, resisted the more popular course of action which called for the admittance of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic into NATO now. It would have simply moved that line further east, but the line would have been re-established. Such a course would have once again started that process of dividing Europe, of creating new tensions, of creating new divisions. I think, he chose instead the wiser course. He chose the course of a "Partnership for Peace," an inclusive concept, a concept which can bring all of Europe together for the first time in European history, a concept which gives every nation in Europe a choice.

As you know, the President sent Ambassador Albright and myself to the Visegrad states in advance of the NATO summit, as I just mentioned, and I will tell you that from the meetings with Presidents Walesa, Havel, and others, it was clear to me just how deeply they care for their own security.

But, you have to understand that if the question were asked, if we were to admit some other state but you into NATO, that their feelings of anxiety would be extraordinarily high. And the same would have been true had we done this just for the Visegrad states. This would have had the same effect on Romania, Bulgaria, and other states that would have been left out as a result. And while the press focused very much on the issue of how this effects the relationship between Russia and NATO, the bigger issue was really how it would effect the rest of Eastern Europe that would have been excluded as a result of such a proposal. And, therefore, I think we must await the time when we can re-look the face of Europe, but in the interim, we have to insist on a policy that, in fact, is inclusive.

The end of the Cold War also removed the imminent nuclear threat to our nation's survival. For the first time, I guess, in nearly half a century, we no longer fear two massive armies clashing along the inter-German border. But there are threats that survived this era, although their complexities and complexions have changed. For instance, the regimes of Iran and Iraq, North Korea, Cuba, and Libya have all outlived the Cold War without fundamentally changing their stripes. The difference is that these threats are now disassociated, far-flung, and independent. There is no hidden hand any longer tying them together, supplying them with arms, coordinating, or limiting their actions.

But they are nonetheless serious. Each of these nations could throw their regions into instability, turmoil, and war. And there are new threats peering out of the wreckage of the empire.

We have already witnessed the chaos that swept Yugoslavia off the map and are keenly aware of the battles raging in many of the former Soviet republics. We are watching old hatreds and crimes ignite the birth of new insecurities and anxieties, and they simply cannot be ignored.

The implication for us is that we need a new approach to our global strategy. We no longer need a global war plan to defeat a single threat. For that matter, the entire organization of our global strategy must be different. It is now an integrated collection of regional strategies, each tailored uniquely to the interests, objectives, and threats and dynamics in the regions to which they pertain.

But, I think that there are other central elements of our strategy that need to be maintained as well. Our emphasis on

deterrence and deterrent strategies makes timeless sense. It is always preferable to prevent an act of aggression rather than have to defeat it. It is, however, not enough for us to have a warfighting strategy, a warfighting posture, and warfighting capabilities alone. We need to factor our deterrent requirements into our defense calculations; we need to keep our forces stationed appropriately, and to tailor our regional strategies to achieve this deterrent effect.

But how we achieve deterrence will be different. The role of nuclear weapons, for example, has already changed. When President Bush made his dramatic November 1991 declaration that withdrew our land- and sea-based nuclear weapons, and stood down our CONUS-based bombers, it was both an implicit acceptance of this fact, and it helped activate this change.

The complexion and balance of deterrence, today, rests much more strongly on conventional forces. To go a step further, it rests much more on our readiness to fight and to win decisively using conventional force.

I believe, as well, that containment has a life after the Cold War, although in an entirely different sense than we over thought of it before. It is now our most viable solution to managing many of the regional threats that I mentioned earlier. It is no longer a global construct, instead it is a selective or even a situational response that we tailor to hem in aggressive regimes, to keep regional stability and peace, and to protect our allies. In practice, it is the strategy that we are already employing toward North Korea, toward Iran and Iraq, and toward Cuba. It is also the strategy we are using to limit the spread and the damage of the Yugoslav war. So it has grown into something quite different than the application that we used it for during the Cold War.

But, you know, enlargement won't work unless we are able to contain these regional threats, to isolate whatever eruptions do occur. After all, democracy and prosperity grow much faster in secure environments than in insecure ones. The title we have given to this part of our strategy is engagement, which we have divided into two principal thrusts. The first is prevention and the second is partnerships.

Prevention is obviously helping to create conditions that allow enlargement to succeed. It is one of the elements that gives our strategy a proactive bent, that makes it a driving force for change, rather than a series of reactive responses to external initiatives. It is partially the promotion of the ideals that are the heart of enlargement, and partially protecting the conditions of stability and peace that are the ripe soil for enlargement.

We have identified the long-term dangers to our interests and to the success of enlargement and through prevention we try to block or control these dangers. Partnership, on the other hand, builds off the traditional element of our strategy that we cannot go it alone. Although logically, our alliances and our coalitions must remain a central element of our strategy. Over the past half-century we have grown rich together, we have evolved common political systems, and we have developed and matured very common outlooks and interests. Our coalitions and alliances are the greatest source of stability and security in a world reeling from so much change in so short a time. They are also our greatest deterrent to a return to global conflict.

But we need to reshape them, to give them new missions and strategies, and adapt them to contemporary and future challenges. Just as they have been the foundation of our strength in the difficult years we have passed through together, they must remain our foundation for our future. This evolution has already begun in Europe, in Southwest Asia, and here in this hemisphere. But it must be broadened to other regions as well. We have to move at a pace that all are comfortable with, but we need to continue to pressure our allies to adjust to new realties and to expand their imagination.

There will be several kinds of rings in partnership. We will sustain our traditional alliances and coalitions. But we will also build other kinds of relationships, such as the Partnership for Peace in Europe. Or we may construct cooperative security relationships in regions where this seems most appropriate. But again, the thrust of partnership is to be proactive, to create regional frameworks that help to maintain stability and peace, and to help foster enlargement.

We also must stay in our role as the world's leading nation. We are still its wealthiest and most powerful state, and we are still its only remaining superpower. I emphasize this because all of us have heard a different argument, one that says that the burdens of leadership are sapping our material and our spiritual strength, that we have to force others to lead in our place. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The fact that we are the free world's leading nation has made us much richer, much more prosperous, and much better off. It has given us the influence to design the world's economic order in a manner conducive to our own economic systems and requirements. It has allowed us to shape the international community's responses to these threats that we talked about. For our own good, I submit, we must remain the leading nation. Well then, these are some of the thoughts that I have to offer you as we ponder how to reshape our strategy for the future.

First, we have to look far into the future, extending our vision well into the next century. Second, we do not want to throw the baby out with the bath water. There are a number of elements of the strategy we've been pursuing that we

need to carry into the future. Third, there are adjustments we need to make, modifying our global strategy, reorienting our alliances and coalitions, and yes, reducing our defense expenditures. And last, we must stay engaged in the world as its leading nation. This is vital to protect our interests, as well as the interests of our friends and allies, and our new friends.

As we look to the future, we need to take our inspiration from the generation of Americans that won the Second World War. They saw their world for what it was, but they refused to be discouraged by the magnitude of what needed to be done. They understood how economics, politics, and security are all part of a whole, that our strategy had to tie all three together. And, they had a great sense of imagination and self-confidence. They understood that great changes take decades to mold, to shape, and to bring to fruition. So, they extended their ambitions far into the future and reshaped the world. And, now, I think it's fair to say that it's up to us to show the same wisdom, and the same courage, that those before us showed in such very rich measure.

And that is, I guess, why I am so very pleased you have chosen this topic for this series of lectures. Many of you in this place will still be leading our armed forces, or the armed forces of your nations, well into the next century. Whatever choices we make now, will define what our world will look like, and what resources you will have available to meet your tasks. If we choose wrong, it could be a more difficult world and certainly a more dangerous world. If we choose well, it will put us on the path of creating a world that I think our grandchildren would be very happy to inherit.

But of this I'm sure. The process will be long and we will need your best efforts to shape this strategy for the next century. So I guess the advice I have for you is hurry, study, graduate, come work with us, because you know the next century is, what, less than six years away.

And with that, thank you very much and what are your questions?

Scientists' Institute for Public Information
Washington, DC
3 February 1994

I am really pleased to be here tonight and I thank all of you for this wonderful meal. And, now I suppose it is time me for to sing for my supper. I have not been as available as I would have liked for the past couple of months and I am most apologetic. I hope that you all understand this is not because I have been avoiding you. It is because it has been an extraordinarily busy period.

What has kept me busy are the same headlines that you have been writing and talking about. But before I turn to offer you a few observations on those headlines, I would like to explain my caution whenever I read any headline. For example, please let me quote for you the headlines from the forerunner to the modern Parisian newspaper, Le Monde, written during the short period after Napoleon broke out of his exile at Elba.

When Napoleon first broke out, on the day after he landed on French soil, the newspaper's headline screamed out in bold letters, "The Corsican ogre invades France at Antibes."

Ten days later the headline read, "General Bonaparte reaches Lyons."

Then only fifteen days later it read, "His majesty the emperor, the great Bonaparte, enters his palace at the Tuleries."

I think that when you look back at our own headlines and editorials over the past few years, you might find that history has repeated itself to some degree.

The sense of jubilation that occurred when the Berlin Wall came down and when Boris Yeltsin stood on top of a tank, literally facing down the Russian revanchists, has turned today into a much more sober, and in some quarters, an entirely pessimistic view.

The great enthusiasm for an omnipotent United Nations, one that could act with force and dispatch, one we thought was capable of managing the world's problems in our stead, has evaporated. In its place is a general lack of confidence in the institution and a growing movement, that we should never again place our forces under any form of foreign control.

In 1990, we were writing about the ascending unification of Western Europe and we were beginning to become frightened about what this integration would mean for us, that we might find ourselves excluded from Europe economically and politically. Today we are alarmed at how to manage the growing divisions in Europe.

I could go on, but I think this makes the point. The world is changing very quickly and we need to understand how it is changing, and how to keep our strategic footing. What would be most dangerous, because of our unique position in the world, is if we exhibit an unbreakable habit of vacillating from one extreme to the next, careening across a variety of

different approaches and objectives. We have to remember the old saying that if you don't know where you are going, you are just liable to end up there.

We have a strategy and we know in general terms what we want to achieve, but we have to learn how to make this relevant to a new era. What I'd like to spend the next few minutes addressing is how we see this taking shape.

In discussing our central purpose, Tony Lake expressed it as enlargement. It is a natural follow-on to containment because it is built on the same central doctrine that democracy as a form of government, makes nations less prone to aggression and that free markets create prosperity, and this in turn helps create peace. Over the past forty-five years we have seen it work in Western Europe, in East Asia, and it is beginning to work here in this hemisphere.

Enlargement is not like Cold War containment. It is not a forced doctrine. In fact, the greatest challenge of enlargement is accommodating the many billions of ex-communists who want immediate entry into Western markets, who want our prosperity overnight, and who want the full benefits of democracy but who are afraid of the growing pains and the insecurities that are necessary parts of their transformation.

It will take a long time to replicate the sorts of economic miracles that took place in Western Europe, Japan, and in South Korea. It may take a generation, or even two or three generations. And it will not go smoothly everywhere at once. If you look in Eastern Europe today, you can see this differentiation in pace quite plainly.

So we are not talking about a near-term strategy, one that will deliver peace and stability in our time. Instead we have to look far down the road just as we did at the outset of the Cold War, recognizing that great changes, changes that affect hundreds of millions or billions of people take decades or longer to bake before they are ready to come out of the oven. We are also talking about a strategy that combines economic, political, and military objectives and instruments. Again this is not unlike the Cold War.

What then is the role of Armed Forces? I think first and foremost it is to create and to mold the security environment that will allow enlargement to proceed. This means an environment that is stable and is as peaceful as we can make it. To do this, we have to maintain our preeminent focus on deterrence as an objective, as a motivating force in our strategies, and as a mental calculus in how we size and position our forces.

We need to keep our alliances and coalitions intact and we need to gradually reorient them toward evolving and future challenges. You have already seen this process at work in NATO with last month's approval of the Partnership for Peace concept, with its current out of area operations around the remnants of Yugoslavia, and with the restructuring of the NATO command arrangements, changes that will make its military forces more capable of operating out of area and of accepting force contributions from nations that are not in NATO's military command structure.

I am aware of the criticism that NATO is not moving fast enough, that it is failing to respond to the challenges in Bosnia, and that by refusing to take in new East European members right away, that it is creating a security vacuum in Central Europe and perhaps consigning itself to another Yalta.

As I think all of you know, I don't agree with any of these criticisms. The alliance has responded to the horrors in Yugoslavia. It just has not responded in ways that you or I might believe is best. But I would remind you that last year, the press was predicting that tens perhaps even hundreds of thousands of deaths would occur this winter unless the fighting was stopped. Well those deaths have not occurred and I think much of the credit belongs to NATO. It has contained the conflict it is working to keep it from spreading beyond current borders and it is providing humanitarian support that has saved countless lives. It is also pressuring the combatants to end the fighting. Again you might want NATO to do more but remember the alliance can do no more than the sum of what its democratic governments believe their people are willing to commit to.

And, I think the Partnership for Peace is designed to reverse Yalta. The sin of Yalta was that it created divisions, that it recognized the Soviets had a right to a sphere of influence outside its borders, one extending throughout Central Europe, and thereby Yalta selected which nations would stay in the west and which would go to the Soviets. The Partnership for Peace moves in the opposite direction, it is inclusive not exclusive. But if our first move had been to select a very few nations from Central Europe, perhaps from among the Visegrad states, and to have given them entry into NATO we would have created new divisions. I don't think any East or Central European nation would have appreciated the new environment we would certainly have created.

In other words, we need to reorient our alliances but we need to move cautiously. Our changes should contribute to stability, not cause instability. And they must move at a pace that democratic governments are comfortable with. We have to remember that security commitments are more than political promises. Only give security promises when you are willing to live with them.

This same process of change has to be applied to East Asia, where regional economic relationships have far outpaced security relationships, and to this hemisphere where the recent passage of NAFTA and the sudden popularity of

democracy and free market economics is increasing the sense of commonality between us and the nations south of us. I might add that eventually a regional coalition of some form will also be necessary for peace and stability in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

In the Bottom Up Review we talked of the four dangers that are long-term threats to our interests and we recommended a force package built on the ability to handle two nearly simultaneous regional contingencies. I am convinced that this is the right approach and that the size and mix of forces are adequate. But I'd like to caveat this affirmation.

The size and mix are right if and only if, we build the enhancements that are also part of the force package. This means the expansion in strategic lift, improved C4I, continued modernization of our systems, and the continued emphasis on research and development. Put simply, we can afford to move to lower numbers if we make the overall force more capable. And of course we have to protect readiness in all its various dimensions.

If we go down to the numbers recommended in the review and we do not follow through on the enhancements, then we have a problem. If we allow readiness to lapse again, we have a problem. If we fail to continue to attract the kinds of remarkable men and women we have in uniform today for whatever reasons, then again we have a problem.

We have to keep adequate numbers of forces stationed overseas and we have to keep presence in those regions where we have our strongest interests. We have to convince our allies and our potential enemies that we are still the strongest military power on earth and that we have the will to protect our interests.

Now, what I've tried to offer you as quickly as I could, is an explanation of our strategy and how American armed forces fit into its framework. I think it's important that you share this higher understanding, because it is what gives relevance to the daily headlines and the daily editorials. I think its very important that all of you gathered here in this room appreciate the long-term tasks ahead of us and that you are able to help the public discriminate the daily chaff from the long-term winds.

With that I've probably spoken longer than any of you wished. Harry told me that part of your tradition in these dinners is to force the guest to cede the floor early so that you could get down to the real business of asking direct questions and getting direct answers. So, I will be pleased to take whatever questions you have.

Military Order of the Purple Heart
Arlington, Virginia
12 February 1994

I guess it's hard for me to put into words how much I appreciate and how deeply honored I am to be able to spend this evening with all of you. I don't think there are too many here in Washington tonight, on this snowy, icy evening, that can say that they've spent the evening with a room full of genuine heroes, a room full of those who, at the risk of being melodramatic, gave their blood to ensure that our country would remain the "Home of the Brave and the Free." And I give you my very, very special salute.

And I have to tell you that driving over here this evening I was trying to figure out what it is that I could possibly and profitably talk to you about this evening. Like most of you here, I have been attending formal functions such as these, black tie and all, for all of my military career. In my case that's some 35 years of formal functions and 35 years of after-dinner remarks.

And no matter how hard I tried to recall, I couldn't remember a single one, despite the fact that I attended one just the other day, and despite the fact that most of them were given by people who are probably the most distinguished military leaders of my generation. And so I guess the only thing that you can conclude is that to have a memorable evening like this, the after-dinner remarks, at the very least, have to be very forgettable! And so, whatever else they might be, I can assure you that my remarks will be forgettable, which is, however, in very sharp contrast with what your deeds are all about. Your contributions, your sacrifices to our nation and to our Armed Forces are anything but something we're going to forget anytime soon.

After all as we just heard, the conditions for which "America's first Medal" could be awarded might have changed somewhat since President Washington devised the "Badge of Military Merit" back in 1782. Those conditions might have changed somewhat, but in fact the one condition that has remained constant has been that of "sacrifice."

And as recipients of the Purple Heart it's that sacrifice, that spilling of blood that sets you apart from the rest, and earns for you the admiration of those of us in uniform. And I think it is not an exaggeration when I tell you that you have a special place in the heart of every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine, because when we see you, we see the men and

women who spilled their own blood in the fight for freedom. And I know that embarrasses some of you to hear that, but that is the truth.

You have risked it all and by your determination you have given life to what Thomas Jefferson once said when he remarked that, "One man with courage is a majority." You have demonstrated that we are a nation of great courage, of great spirit. You are a living inspiration to those who still wear this country's uniform, and you have shown that we are a nation that won't accept defeat. You have shown that freedom is the greatest prize of all.

Today through the Military Order of the Purple Heart you continue to give and you continue to sacrifice. And I think if you think about it for a minute, it is through your combined efforts that you do more for veterans and their families than probably any other organization that I could think of.

Last year alone, you did such things as sponsoring scholarships to grandsons and granddaughters of Purple Heart recipients. Your national headquarters' mobile van shifted from assisting the hurricane victims of Southern Florida and is now still helping veterans in Iowa to get relief from the flood that ravaged the Midwest this past summer. Through your efforts in the national service program this year alone, you recovered more millions of dollars in veterans benefits for those who deserve them the most.

This year under the command of Commander Tomsey you will participate in the World Veterans Association Conference in Lisbon and you will sponsor the 50th Anniversary of D-Day with a month long reunion in Normandy. And I must tell you that I look forward to that historic event and I look forward to seeing many of you here and many of your colleagues there later on this year!

But most importantly, I think, your spirit is embodied in tonight's guest of honor, Commander Mike Tomsey. You all have a program and so you've glanced through but let me just remind you that it was on the 22d of September 1968, when he, as an 18-year old Marine from Tiffin, Ohio, came under fire and his life changed dramatically. Despite numerous setbacks, his life in service to the Nation took on a very different dimension. He became a hero of a very special type. He came and became the rock that other veterans could lean on when they needed help most of all.

He worked with juvenile offenders while going to college and in 1977, after several years in the private sector, he joined the Military Order of the Purple Heart. Soon afterwards in 1978, Mike began working for the Federal Government and since that time he has been deeply committed to the care and well being of veterans and their families. From juvenile offenders to Boy Scouts to Vietnam Veterans, Mike, you have given new meaning to the phrase "Public Service." I know as sure as we are here today that under your leadership, the Military Order of the Purple Heart will continue to be a source of great service and benefit to this nation's veterans and to their families.

And it seems fitting that a man whose life has been dedicated to giving to others is elected as the national commander of a group of people each of whom has been recognized for the sacrifices they have made and to an organization whose purpose it is to continue giving. Thank you, Mike. My very warmest congratulations to you.

Now with that, let me turn for a just few moments if you would permit me, to the future veterans, the young men and women in uniform that this organization spends so much time protecting.

Since becoming chairman some 3 1/2 months ago I have visited them in places like Somalia, in Korea, in Hawaii, in Europe, and of course here in the United States. Despite what you might read in some newspapers, they continue to be as outstanding a military force as ever wore America's uniform.

You can talk to the pilots who brave the skies over Iraq enforcing the "no-fly" zone, north and south. You can talk to the soldiers and marines in and around Mogadishu or the AC-130 pilots guarding the skies overhead over that city, or you can visit with our soldiers standing guard in Macedonia or running the finest hospital in all of former Yugoslavia in Zagreb, or watch the AWACS airplane crews, ABCCC, F-14s, F-18s, F-16s, tanker crews, all of them operating over the skies of Bosnia, together with the C-130 crews, day-in and day-out dropping supplies or air-landing MREs into former Yugoslavia. Their effort, by the way, those who deliver food to Sarajevo and airdrop food into eastern Bosnia has now exceeded in time and in amount that which we did during the Berlin Airlift. On the other end of the world you can meet with members of Task Force "Full Accounting" as they comb the jungles of Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia to leave no stone unturned to locate our comrades, or you can stand this winter with our brave young soldiers staring into north Korea just like you and I have done now for the last 40 years.

Well, you can't do any of that without walking away full of pride, full of admiration, full of awe for our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines for they remain, I assure you, the best trained, the best equipped, the best led, the most motivated and yes, the most confident that we have ever asked to do our Nation's work. And they are doing more than ever, more than even during the Cold War, but they are doing that with dramatically reduced numbers and considerably less resources.

And we don't know where the next conflict will be. Neither your nor my crystal ball are clear enough for that but

we know one thing: never in the history of this Nation has a soldier spent twenty years in the military without having to fight one of this Nation's conflicts. And there's no reason to think it will be otherwise from now on. So downsizing or not, we must stand ready.

But in order to preserve such a ready force, we need to view our military organization as a living organism, as a living force. It needs a continual supply of talented people, men and women of the same remarkable quality we have today, the same kind of wonderful patriots we saw in the Gulf War and we see in Mogadishu today and we see in Vietnam today and we see in Korea. And we need to continue to modernize and to harness the technology to make sure that our soldiers continue to have the critical edge in battle in the days to come.

The challenge of maintaining our forces is greater today than in a long, long time. We don't have an ogre knocking at our door and breathing down our necks, reminding us everyday that our survival is at stake. Those days are gone. But we have, through the hindsight of history, the lesson we have learned time and time again: that there will be one such ogre in the future.

The military we have today which we inherited from our predecessors, from you, is the most outstanding military force in the world. And there's no doubt about that. And the reductions that we will be dealing with in the remaining years will change the structure of our military.

But what we can't afford, what I refuse to allow, is for these challenges, for these reductions in any way to lessen the abilities of our fighting forces or to lessen the spirit of our war fighters.

We have each served, you and I. You have been on the front lines. You have helped make the military what it is today. We owe it to you, our predecessors, and to our successors to make our forces smaller but better and stronger. You are a large part of that effort.

I won't deny that the times ahead will be tough. But I refuse to believe they are impossible. Even as we reduce our forces we have to protect their readiness and to continue to make improvements to modernize where necessary. For every pound that we shed in weight we have to make the force stronger, more capable and quicker. We intend to see that through and we intend to make sure that each of you and your organization help us do that.

When you talk to talented young people today please remind them that the Armed Forces are still hiring. We are looking for new young leaders to carry our Armed Forces into the future. Tell them it is an exciting life, a life of great challenges and opportunities, but most importantly, it is today as it was for you, a meaningful life, a very noble life.

When these young folks enter the military, when they agree to make the sacrifices that can only be asked of fighting people, the sacrifices each of you and many who couldn't be here tonight have made, we owe them a special debt of gratitude. We owe them the hopes of rehabilitation when they need it. We owe them the possibility of an education to help them become as productive as their potential will carry them to be. We owe them help. We owe them the kind of services provided by the national service program. We owe them the kind of services provided by the organizations that you support and that exist only because you care enough. We owe them all that and we owe them more. Above all, we owe them as we owe you, our thanks.

Being here with you and talking about our great young men and women reminds me of what the legendary coach of the Green Bay Packers, Vince Lombardi, once said. When he was talking to his team, he reminded them that, "After the cheers have died and the stadium is empty, after the headlines have been written and after you are back in the quiet of your own room, and after you've put aside the Super Bowl ring and all the pomp and fanfare have faded, the enduring things that are left," he said, "are the dedication to excellence, the dedication to victory and the dedication to doing with our lives the very best we can to make the world a better place to live."

Mike, you, yourself, and the members of your great organization, typify so well the words of that great coach. You have established a tradition within the Military Order of the Purple Heart a determination to excel, a determination to win for the veterans of this nation, and you have done much to ensure that the world is a better place for those of us who follow you.

Thank you for this great dinner, for your time, and to all of you, thank you from the bottom of my heart for your continued service.

By 21 February 1994, the NATO ultimatum issued to Bosnian-Serbs was 36 hours old and appeared to be working. This was a briefing by the SECDEF and CJCS. Only the CJCS portion is included.

DoD Special Briefing - CJCS Statement
The Pentagon
Washington, DC
21 February 1994

I know that you are very anxious to ask questions, so I won't take very long. But let me just use a few slides here, or charts here, to tell you where I think we have been and where we are today. This first slide just simply shows you the history of the shelling of Sarajevo over the last 60 days, from a high of some 1,744 rounds in one day — just before Christmas, to, on your right hand side of the chart, eight days, zero shelling.

It might be also useful to remind ourselves that during the time that Sarajevo has been under siege during this war, since the beginning of this war, I'm told that over 9,000 people in Sarajevo have died — have been killed, and over 57,000 have been wounded, many of those children. And, I think, viewed in that light, those eight zeros on the right hand — lower right hand side of the chart assume a very special meaning.

This next slide shows you what we saw on the 9th of February, the day of the NATO decision. We were at that time tracking some 26 heavy weapons sites from both factions. Each one of the containing a multiple number of weapons. As you can see, all of them were within a circle of about 20 kilometers or 12.5 miles. And it is for that reason that NATO established that as the zone or the circle from which all weapons had to be withdrawn or, if they could not be withdrawn, would be turned over under NATO control.

This next chart will show you the 11 sites that the U.N. established into which those weapons would be brought in, and they're shown here as those blue squares with the NATO — with the U.N. symbol on them, and the round circles are those locations from which the weapons were either moved into these containment areas or from which they were moved outside of the circle.

Let me show you more importantly, the results, as we now know them. And please understand that this is the information we have right now. It will probably change in the next few days as they're catalogued better and so on. But what we know now is that in those 11 sites that had been established for the control of weapons, the Bosnian Serb Army has now moved 250 weapons, and the Muslims some 46 weapons.

Now, in addition to these weapons that the U.N. now controls, the next chart will show you an additional 18 locations where there are weapons still out in the countryside. Sixteen of those sites, marked by the blue symbol, are where right now there are U.N. personnel controlling those weapons. By the way, those are 45 additional weapons that are under U.N. control, in addition to those that I have shown you earlier. There are two sites which, at the time that we were meeting here, we still did not have U.N. personnel there. But those are weapons at two sites, containing seven weapons that have been turned over to us by the Serbs. We just have not been able to get there yet because of the heavy snow and the location where they are. We know where they are, and the U.N. teams are making their way over there to take control of those seven weapons and those two sites marked here in red.

The final chart that we wanted to show you sort of reinforces what Secretary Perry had said earlier, that we, on the military side, are very well aware that this is not the end yet, and that we have to remain vigilant, that we have to very carefully continue to monitor compliance with the NATO decision — and that is, that no weapons are brought back into the 20 kilometer circle, and that any shelling of Sarajevo is effectively dealt with. To that effect, NATO aircrews remain ready to continue — remain ready to strike, if that would be called for. As an example, just today, over 150 sorties have flown over that area.

And finally, I would say that military personnel continue to be involved in the humanitarian effort — many of our NATO colleagues on the ground in providing security to convoys; we in the United States military principally in participating in the airlift into Sarajevo, and the air drop that still is on going.

Annual Posture Statement
Washington, DC
22 February 1994

This nation is blessed with the finest and the most remarkable armed forces in the world. So, I am extremely proud to represent them before you today and to offer my judgment on the direction of our Armed Forces and the challenges that lie ahead.

Perhaps one of the most important contributions I can offer at the outset is to reflect very briefly on the human dimension of what we are talking about today, because it is hard to get this sense from the dry, lifeless columns of numbers and line items that appear before us in our budget books.

In the past few months, I have been privileged to visit our forces in South Korea, in Somalia and in Europe. In spite of the daily hardships of their duties, and in several cases the omnipresent dangers they face in some truly inhospitable places in the world, what I saw in these men and women made me thoroughly proud to wear this uniform and to be an American. Our men and women in uniform are out there, tough, determined and resolute. They are very proud of their accomplishments because they know theirs is a noble effort. We owe them our heartfelt thanks and every bit of the pride that I know Americans feel for our men and women in uniform. And of course, as all of you gathered here know all too well, they expect us to be just as determined and resolute, and to make the right choices as we decide the future of our Armed Forces.

This leads in to my larger purpose for being here today. I am here to give an explanation of what the Joint Chiefs, the Combatant Commanders, and I believe are the requirements we need to fulfill our missions and objectives.

Over the past five years, we were forced by circumstances to take a dual approach as we made these recommendations. On the one hand, when we realized over successive stages that the Soviet threat was changing complexion, then ultimately disintegrating, we were searching to discover what parts of our arsenal could be reduced. This part was a divestment strategy, pure and simple. We looked for all those units and capabilities that were becoming excessive to our needs.

But, at the same time, we were struggling to come to grips with what we would need for the future. As events unfolded we came closer to answering that question, and the direction of our budget moved accordingly.

The 1995 budget is part of the re-creation of our forces for the future. There is still some divestment, as there will be for a number of years. But it is vital to understand that the heart of this budget is an investment in a reorientation of our strategy, our forces, and our capabilities for the future. It is not a simple remodeling of the old; it is new construction that will carry us into the next century. We have a strategy, we are confident it is the correct strategy, and we know what forces and capabilities we need to pursue that strategy.

What we are recommending is not a flabby force. It is as lean as we dared make it if we are to retain our ability to execute two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. There is very little, if any room for miscalculation. We haven't provided a hedge of an extra division here or an extra fighter wing there.

I think we all know there are two critical schools of thought and two distinctly different moods dominating the public debate about our armed forces. Some believe we have not cut nearly enough, and that in the process, we are perpetrating an indefensible drain on our national treasury and contributing to our debt. Others believe that we are cutting far too much, far too quickly, and are thereby exposing our country to greater and greater dangers and risks; on the other hand, I believe that we have it right.

I hope that the series of hearings you are beginning today will convince those who think we haven't cut enough that they are wrong. I could point to the fact that our Armed Forces have been used in 29 different major operations just since the Cold War ended, including fighting in two wars. Or, I could talk of the many new dangers we see lurking around us. But, ultimately the best way to judge whether this budget is the right size is to look to the future, not the past.

For those who think we are cutting too much, I want to emphasize up front two of the principal corollaries of our thinking. This structure is adequate if, and only if, we stick with two linchpins: we must improve our capabilities and we must improve and maintain our readiness.

The first of these linchpins is based on simple logic. We can reduce our structure to the size and mix we are recommending, but only if in growing down, we improve by adding the capabilities required in our plans. That is why I used the questionable oxymoron of growing down. Our forces must grow in capability even as they become smaller.

If George Patton had just one of our modern armor divisions when he joined Eisenhower's forces at Normandy, he probably would have broken through to Germany in less than a week. If Jimmy Doolittle had flown his famous raid over

Tokyo in any of our modern bombers, he would have achieved his mission without losses, and then have been able to return all the way to the United States. If we could take modern Tomahawk-capable ships, and send them back in time, assigning them to Admiral Nimitz in World War Two, they would have had a dramatic affect on the Japanese mainland early in the war, thus saving thousands of casualties during the Pacific campaign. This is what I mean about improving the capabilities of our forces.

But, allow me to give this a more contemporary flavor. When we transition from the M1A1 tank to the M1A2 tank, we estimate that it increases a tank company's lethality by 18 percent. This nearly one-fifth increase in capability compensates for some of the reductions in armor forces we are making. Whereas it previously took one or more bombers for each target, new weapons will allow the B-2 to attack up to 16 high-value targets on one sortie and the B-1 up to 24 targets — a tremendous increase in capability. And we estimate that, if the C-17 had been available for Operation RESTORE HOPE, we could have nearly doubled throughput per day to Mogadishu, Somalia. I don't need to paint the picture for you of what that will do to our lagging airlift capability. Similarly, our Navy is restructuring its fleets to emphasize littoral operations and take full advantage of improvements in sensor and weapon technology. The net effect is an increase in the number of air sorties and firepower the Navy can offer a theater ground or air commander. This kind of logic must typify our approach across all of our forces of the future.

In the Gulf War we enjoyed a genuine superiority over Iraqi forces. It was this superiority and our knowledge of how to use this mismatch to every possible advantage that led to the extraordinary outcome of that conflict. But, one of warfare's most remorseless rules is that any nation too captivated by past successes is doomed to future failure. History books are full of woeful tales of militaries that were looking backward when they should have been looking forward.

Our improvement in capability must come from a number of sources. The Congress is going to have to fund a fair number of them. But we in the Armed Forces are also going to have to search for innovative ways to make our force more efficient, better trained, and more effective. We cannot and will not allow any sacred cows or gold watches to get in our way, to impede our progress, or to block our imagination. All must be open to change as long as it is an improvement.

The second linchpin of our thinking is that we will protect the vital readiness of our forces. I don't think anyone contests this point, but I'm not sure everybody is clear about what this means, about all that it involves, and about what it costs.

In 1945, our armed forces were 12 million strong. They were extraordinarily well trained, equipped and prepared, so much so that they defeated two of the world's major military powers. Five years later, what was left of this spectacular force was battered about the battlefield by a North Korean force that had been formed, equipped, and trained in a little less than two years.

Tragically, nobody had noticed how deeply our readiness had declined in such an amazingly short time. What did we do wrong? We built down much too fast. We did not grow down; we fell down. The pace was so furious that we lost track of vital capabilities. In the rush to convert defense industries to meet booming domestic needs, vital industrial mobilization capabilities were eliminated. In our rush to demobilize units and decommission equipment, our morale, our cohesion, and our training suffered. And, of course, the steep decline in the defense budget, a decline intended to rectify the great debts left behind by the war and to help restore our economy to a sound footing, forced the armed services to balance and rebalance their needs, to continuously compromise one measure of readiness after another. It took a war and terrible losses to expose the seriousness and the depth of our decline.

We have not made the same mistakes yet. But, not only must we keep our readiness from declining, we actually have to improve it. Our Cold War strategy and our robust structure allowed us to stairstep our readiness. It was a larger force; therefore, we didn't need to keep all our units fully ready to deploy and fight. We accepted tiers in our readiness that could be fleshed out in the event of a contingency. Our smaller future forces won't have this slack.

Now, having emphasized the two corollaries driving our thinking, I'd like to explain more fully why this is the right force for our strategy and what areas we need to emphasize.

FORCE ARCHITECTURE

I will begin by repeating for you some points you have heard, but they are still worth repeating and thinking about. The world today and the world we expect to see for the foreseeable future is a more uncertain, and in some ways, a more dangerous environment than we have known for decades. This uncertainty is an enemy in two respects: it diffuses our focus and it makes us too near-sighted.

If someone had asked us five years ago if we were planning to go to Kuwait, or to Somalia, or to contain the violent

disintegration of a nation in the heart of Europe, I think we would have looked at them strangely. It should make all of us wonder what's next? Where next?

Large expansions in the size and capabilities of our Armed Forces are the product of many years of effort. A new equipment program often takes fifteen to twenty years to go from the drawing board through production and fielding. Creating a new air wing, a new division, or a new Carrier Battle Group, even using existing technologies, could take between five to ten years, assuming the industrial base exists in the first place.

Our problem is that we just don't know what the global security environment will look like in another six, or ten, or twenty years. What we do know is that great changes are sweeping across the globe far more quickly than was the case in the preceding forty years. Any world globe selling in a store today that is over three years old is already an antique. We may be delighted to find that the future is more peaceful and tranquil than today. Or, we may find that it is far more violent and frightening.

This lack of clairvoyance does not preclude sound planning, but it surely makes it more difficult. The force we are building must take into account these effects of uncertainty.

The forces we are recommending are the proper response for this kind of uncertain world. Our core-sizing requirement has been described as keeping enough forces to respond to two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRC) and to prevail in both, as well as maintain our strategic deterrent posture. The aggregate FY 95 force list to accomplish this follows.

But, let me dwell for a moment on what we expect this force to accomplish, because our calculations are based on a lot more than the sizing scenario implies.

Our highest objective is still deterrence. The importance of deterrence was not washed away by the events of the past four or five years. What has changed is who and what we are deterring. There are still identifiable regional threats like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and others. But we also have to deter less precise threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And, in a larger sense, we have to keep the new fears and insecurities that are being unleashed from breeding new threats, and from undermining the great achievements and opportunities that we sacrificed for during the past forty-five years.

One point is clear — we must keep sufficient forces stationed overseas where our interests dictate, like Europe and East Asia. Our alliances and coalitions are our strongest bastions for stability and order in the world that is unfolding around us. Whatever savings we might reap by withdrawing our forces will seem foolishly inconsequential to our children who will inherit the damage this would certainly cause. Twice in this century we have made the mistake of divorcing ourselves from what was occurring in Europe or Asia. Both times it has led to disaster for them and for us. We cannot afford to make this mistake again. In fact, we need to build on our alliances, changing their focus to combat new threats and using our combined power to keep new fissures and new tensions from overturning our achievements.

We also have to be prepared to execute operations other than traditional warfighting. Being prepared for wars is our highest calling, one that we cannot and will not marginalize. However, when you look into the future, you cannot avoid the conclusion that our forces will be used more frequently for other types of missions and against other types of crises. Even today our forces are operating in Somalia, Iraq and the waters off Haiti; they are helping to contain the conflict in former Yugoslav states; they are supporting counter-drug operations; and they are bringing humanitarian relief to the earthquake victims in Southern California.

We are demanding and we will get a great deal more security from this two-MRC force than the title implies.

PEOPLE

No single investment we make is more important than our people. The Gulf War brought to the nation's attention something those of us serving in the Armed Forces have known for quite some time — that the men and women who are serving today are absolutely magnificent. They are bright, highly motivated, extremely well trained, courageous, and totally dedicated. It took a long time to get to this point after the demoralizing years of what historians term the Vietnam era, but, it would not take nearly as long to go the other way.

Our economy is now recovering from the longest and deepest recession in our post-war history. Our men and women in uniform are aware of this, and they are also aware that they possess skills and talents that businesses value just as highly as we do. As a matter of simple economics, we will have to compete even more tenaciously to attract and retain our high-quality people.

But, for the past four years we have been separating career people in large numbers. I think we have gone about it properly, and I applaud the Congress for "softening the landing" of all those whose careers have been unexpectedly cut

short. But, we would be blind if we ignored the reverberations these cuts have sent throughout our forces, or the message they have sent to the young people we are trying to attract into national service.

It boils down, again, to simple logic. We will not continue to attract quality young people if incentives and benefits subside. We have to take care of the welfare of our people in uniform, our civilians, and our families, or we will not retain the career professionals we will need to lead our forces into the next century.

It is an old and proven axiom that men and women do not choose military careers to pursue riches. Nearly all do so because they are intensely patriotic, because they are dedicated, and because they enjoy the great fulfillment of military life. But, there is an invisible bottom line that must be met if they and their families are to stay in the Service through one tough assignment after another, being asked repeatedly to put their lives in danger, and often being separated from loved ones for long periods.

We are asking our sailors and marines to endure a career of six-month cruises, year after year of living in austere quarters, moving about the world from one danger zone to the next. Some of our soldiers and marines have missed more than one Christmas away from their families in the past three or four years. For some, two of these warm, memorable holidays were spent in war zones or in Somalia. We are getting what we expect from our people, and we owe it to them to compensate them for their contribution.

The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) contains a number of items geared to our ability to recruit and retain quality people. Pay raises, funding for programs that offset special demands of military life, money for recruiting resources and advertising, dollars for reenlistment incentives, and health and educational benefits are all vitally important to our people and our families. Not covered in the DoD budget, but equally vital to the future of our forces, are the retirement benefits of our veterans. The men and women who serve today, and those who contemplate future service, watch closely how we honor our commitments to those who have served. All of these programs face constant scrutiny but are not areas in which to cut corners or find savings.

In the last six months alone, there have been two attempted assaults on the pay and benefits we have promised our people. Thankfully, this Congress fought off both of them, and I hope that, for the health and the future of our Armed Forces, we continue to resist future temptations to save dollars at the cost of the welfare of our men and women in uniform.

READINESS

In the past few years, I think all of us at one time or another have spoken of the need to protect readiness. I think there is a solid consensus behind this point. But, as I mentioned earlier, I'm not sure that everyone shares a complete grasp of all this entails.

Readiness equals the ability of our Armed Forces to achieve their specified wartime objectives.

There is a great deal that goes into this equation. Steaming days, flight hours, and operating tempo are just a few considerations. Each of the Services has its own models for measuring and assessing unit readiness that account for any number of variables, from whether there is sufficient equipment on hand and whether that equipment is adequately maintained and fully operable, through personnel manning levels and whether a unit has experienced enough training to accomplish its missions. And each Service gives credence to a commander's assessment based on his or her intuitive experience and judgment of whether the unit is ready for its assigned missions.

That judgment recognizes that people are essential to maintaining readiness. Morale and esprit cannot be measured on a scale, but they can undo a unit's readiness more terribly than any other factor. This is an area we have to watch very closely during this era of reductions.

To some degree, time and money in, equals readiness out. But this is clearly only a partial answer. There are too many hidden or indirect siphons that can detract from it. For example, although readiness accounts may be fully funded, if base operations accounts are under funded, then commanders are confronted with a delicate dilemma. They are forced to take funds away from their operations accounts and divert them to keep the lights on at their installations and to keep the heat on in their child-care centers.

Alternatively, I think all of us are aware of the potentially dangerous tactic we have practiced for too long of demanding that the services spend their carefully programmed moneys to fund actual contingencies. Even if the Services are repaid for these unexpected diversions at a later date, over the near term it forces them to put one unit into a state of readiness malnutrition in order to feed the growing costs of a deployed unit. If the amounts of diversion are small, the problem is manageable. But if we involve our forces in more and larger contingencies, readiness malnutrition migrates to more and more of the force, and the force could starve.

There is one more hidden siphon that disturbs field commanders, and this is the large backlogs that result when we underfund depot maintenance. In the long run, this underfunding is a guarantee of future readiness problems and possibly delayed modernization.

I think all of us would have difficulty explaining how we measure the readiness of our industrial base, which is crucial to our ability to sustain ourselves in prolonged major operations. This has been a problem throughout this century; and we have been shocked time and again to discover that when we most need to mobilize, vital areas are paralyzed or have atrophied so far that we have to rebuild from a dead start. I think we are going about it smarter this time, because we are identifying and protecting vital industrial centers, but it is an area we all need to watch.

The services all have good systems for measuring unit readiness, and we are improving our joint readiness assessment systems so that we can do a better job at assessing our ability to deploy and fight jointly. Our joint commands have evolved to the point where I think such a system is possible, and we are now making our first efforts to measure our joint warfighting capabilities. I hope to report on continuous progress in this area in future testimony.

What all this adds up to is that we need to do two things if we are going to protect our readiness. The first of these is that we are going to have to get better at how we measure all the various components that affect readiness. And, second, we are going to rely on your support to spend whatever is required to keep our readiness at adequate levels.

Over the coming months, you will hear from each of the Service Chiefs and from each of the combatant commanders. I am confident you will ask each of them to offer his assessment of the readiness of his forces. You will find, in general, that we all agree we are still above the waterline, but there are whirlpools and eddies that could suck us under. We are advancing carefully and all of us would be more confident if we avoided some of the bad habits I spoke of earlier. We will keep our eyes on the horizon; and if we see a problem looming in the future, we will ask for your help before we sink.

STRATEGIC AGILITY

Before the end of this century, we will have the smallest number of troops stationed abroad since 1950, when the war in Korea and the spiral of events and tensions in Europe finally convinced us that we could not return to the illusory comforts of isolationism, as we had tried to do twenty years before.

We have reduced our forces in the Pacific and the reductions in Europe are proceeding. When they are done, our remaining strength will be about two-thirds less than the numbers we stationed in Europe during the later years of the Cold War.

We are becoming far more dependent on our ability to project power from the United States to effect deterrence or respond to crises in these regions. But, we haven't significantly improved our ability to do so. One of the reasons we kept such large numbers overseas in the past was because our strategic lift was so insufficient. Because we are bringing so many of our forces home, we can no longer afford to casually accept the glaring shortfalls that still exist in our strategic power projection capabilities.

In the past, we approached our strategic lift shortfalls much like the Soviets treated their five-year economic plans. Time and again, we gathered great fervor and intensity behind our intention to correct these shortfalls, we drew up ambitious timetables and schedules, and then, with each succeeding year, we slipped these schedules as we failed to accomplish one objective after another, as projected increases in air tonnage and sea tonnage failed to materialize — until we finally succumbed to the old trick of modifying our original requirements, reducing them to levels that made us appear successful, when, in fact, we remained far short of our original goals. Then, a few years later, some coalescing event would cause us to repeat the same cycle again.

This budget is part of another of those five-year plans, but this time we have much more on the line than in the past. Because we have reduced our forward-deployed forces so deeply, we are a great deal more reliant on our ability to reinforce them.

Just as important, the shift in our strategy demands that we globalize our deployment capability. During the latter years of the Cold War, we focused primarily on Europe and our commitment to have ten divisions in place within ten days. During the eighties, we improved our capacity to move military forces to Southwest Asia, as well.

We are now in the process of dispersing this concentration and refocusing it to give us a global orientation so that we can respond with much greater acceleration to contingencies in Europe, in Southwest Asia, or throughout the Pacific.

The risk is this. Right now, we have enough lift to move small numbers of forces to any theater in the world very quickly. But, we don't have enough to rapidly expand this flow into a torrent bringing in more and more forces,

equipment and munitions at rates with which any of us should feel comfortable. The delays in time will be measured quite horribly in lives and territory lost.

A famous Civil War general disclosed the secret of his battlefield successes as the ability to "Get there the firstest, with the mostest." We have to get better at getting there the firstest. Our belief that we will is a critical assumption we accepted when we measured the size of our projected force.

The means to do this are the prepositioning programs and the lift expansion programs, both included in the FYDP. But, we also have to ensure the lift we currently possess is maintained and modernized. We do not want to rediscover, as we did in our deployment to the Gulf War, that some of the assets we are counting on are not nearly as ready as we believe.

MODERNIZATION

A difficult by-product of this new era is that we have lost the impetus that used to drive our modernization needs. How do we determine if we need a completely new piece of equipment, whether it is enough to simply modify an existing platform, or indeed, whether we need to add any improvements at all? For decades, it was our habit to make these decisions based on our analysis of Soviet developments and what we needed to counter them.

The risk we run today is that we will become complacent, that we will cancel one modernization program after another because we don't have a terrifying ogre knocking on our door. Alternatively, we know that we can't afford to invest in every modernization possibility that becomes available. So just how should we approach modernization?

In this budget we have steered our investments very carefully into those programs that will have the most dramatic affect on our capabilities for the investment, that will demonstrate the greatest payoff on the battlefield, and that will increase the survivability of our forces.

We have divided our modernization alternatives into two categories: those that can be achieved through inexpensive evolutionary modifications to existing equipment and those which require leading-edge technology that only revolutionary modernization can bring. The aggregate of these programs is a vital part of the capability we will need to field a capable force in the next century. From a technological standpoint, we will remain superior to any force that any other nation can field. We will enjoy new advantages in stealth, in standoff precision weaponry, in sophisticated ground and space battlefield sensors, in night vision capabilities, and in tactical ballistic missile defenses.

On the other hand, hidden from sight are the large numbers of programs we terminated, some of which we felt were important but unaffordable in this more austere environment. Many of these program terminations were painful, to our defense industries and to communities that depend on defense procurements. But, they were necessary.

But, we cannot relent on modernization. Two vital considerations rest on it. First, modernization is the key to future readiness; and second, it is the only way to provide our next generation with a viable defense.

We have to view our Armed Forces as a living mechanism, much like San Francisco views its famous Golden Gate Bridge. That bridge is continuously being repainted. As soon as the painters have reached one end of the bridge, they turn around and start over at the other end. If they do not, they will fall behind and the bridge will lose its famous color, it will begin to rust, and the city will have to hire more painters and spend even more money to catch up.

In a similar vein, we have to continue 'painting' our forces. If we fail to continue to modernize, we are merely creating a massive problem down the line for a future generation of military leaders, for future congressional leaders, and for future taxpayers. No piece of equipment or system lasts forever. We have to keep replenishing our stocks through a combination of continued fielding, rebuilding, modifications, or modernization. As I stated, we are asking you to modernize only the systems that will make a dramatic difference to our capabilities.

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND INTELLIGENCE (C4I)

During the Grenada invasion only ten years ago, we were shocked to discover that soldiers on the ground could not talk directly to Navy ships lying just offshore to coordinate vital gunfire support. During the Gulf War, only three years ago, we discovered interoperability problems in passing air tasking orders between different services. And, when the conflict ended, General Schwarzkopf noted that he didn't feel that he had access to strategic intelligence in a timely enough manner, nor was this intelligence being distributed to frontline fighting commanders in time to be properly used. These lapses did not cause catastrophic problems. But, in other conflicts and under other conditions, if they recur, they could cause disaster. We need to follow through right away on the problems we discovered in the Gulf War.

But, we have to do more than just correct problems we have already discovered. We have to harness the spiral of

innovations occurring in computers, in electronics, in software, and in communications technologies in our laboratories, and we have to adapt these innovations to improve our strategic C4I architecture and our ability to cut through the fog of war on the battlefield.

Key to this is protecting and improving our ability to stay inside any opponent's decision cycle. Doing so requires two capabilities. We must have the ability to see the battlefield with such depth and acuity that we know what an opponent's forces are doing even before they know. Then, all of our forces — air, land, and sea — must be able to act with such speed and joint precision that our opponents will be overwhelmed, frozen, and incapable of responding.

In each of the two world wars of this century, new technologies debuted that revolutionized the way we fought. In the First World War, it was the machine gun, barbed wire, and finding a new application for an age-old soldier's tool, using the shovel to dig trenches. In the Second World War, it was the radio, radar, airpower, and armored forces. The revolution occurring today is in C4I.

CONCLUSION

In these uncertain times, we must protect our readiness, we must keep our force structure at the right size to be able to respond to major contingencies in two regions nearly simultaneously, and we must ensure that these forces grow in capability even as they come down in size. But, even this will not be enough if we do not keep the same remarkable quality of people in our force as we have today.

Our strategy is right. And, the forces we are recommending are sufficient if we follow through on the enhancements contained in this budget. If we do so, we will be more capable of executing two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies than we are today.

We must be able to move our forces and our supplies to threatened theaters faster and in larger and larger quantities. For an embattled theater commander, this alone has dramatic and nearly immeasurable battlefield consequences. From a warfighting perspective, I think any theater commander would far prefer four divisions and seven wings within a month after they are asked for, than twice that number three months afterwards. And, the forces we send must have more raw battlefield capability than any we could put into the air or on a ship today.

We also have to be alert against complacence. For the time being, we are fortunate not to have a compelling danger that threatens our very existence. But, we must maintain our forces and our readiness, we must modernize, and we have to build and expand the vitality of our alliances. We have to do these things today, not because we have a gun at our heads, but because we want to keep anyone from putting a gun at our heads, or ten years down the road, from doing so to our children.

As a nation, we have learned to view our environment and our debt with an eye to the future. We are disciplining ourselves to be more responsible about the state of the treasury and the atmosphere our children and our grandchildren are going to inherit. We need to carry the same outlook over to how we view our Armed Forces.

Today, America's Armed Forces are as good as we ever had. When we call upon them, as we have been doing quite often, they respond brilliantly. I ask your support in helping to maintain this edge tomorrow, and into the next century.

Veterans of Foreign Wars
Washington, DC
28 February 1994

I walk out on this podium with a great feeling, for I know that I am among friends, that I am with a fraternity of men and women and their wives and husbands who share many of my experiences, many of my outlooks, and many of my convictions. But the very first thing I want to do before I say another word is to say "thank you."

"Thank you" for your outstanding service to this great country. "Thank you" for fighting America's wars and for keeping this nation and its principles safe. "Thank you" for creating a tradition of great courage, of service and of sacrifice to our country, a living tradition, a tradition that inspires every man and woman serving in uniform today. And "thank you" for fighting to make a world full of vast opportunities for our nation.

Five months ago President Clinton notified me that I was to be nominated to succeed as the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my good friend and great American hero, General Colin Powell.

It was the second greatest honor of my life. The first, was the day back in 1958 when I became an American citizen. But I also look back now very fondly on another great day in my life, also in 1958, the day I put on the uniform of a

private in the United States Army. It seemed to me then, as it does to this very day, that wearing this country's uniform is one of the greatest privileges for any American.

Now you must remember, that I was growing up in Europe when some of you here were fighting over there. Because of that fortuitous accident of history, perhaps more than most, I gained a first-hand appreciation for what Americans fight for and how very important it is that when we do fight, we win.

Throughout my career, and I am sure this was true for all of you who have known military life, I always found my greatest satisfaction from working with the terrific men and women of the profession of arms. Each time that I was promoted, it came as a most pleasant surprise, for it meant I could continue doing that which I enjoyed the most. But the President's call was more than a surprise, it was a shock. Once I got over the shock, I spent some time thinking about where we are headed as a nation and what our Armed Forces must do if we are to get there.

The first thing I thought of was the very great changes that have swept the world in the past six years. We don't wake up every morning worried about a nuclear holocaust. We don't debate whether this conflict or that conflict is another Soviet challenge, another move in a serpentine strategy to conquer the world. And we don't have this huge enemy on the other side of the world, an ogre that forces us to spend higher and higher amounts of our tax dollars on military forces.

So we are relieved from this sense of daily dread, this terrible sense of insecurity that we have known most of our adult years. But in its place is a new risk for our country one that I believe you in this audience appreciate better than most. The new risk is complacency.

It is the same kind of complacency that we experienced when our troops returned home victorious from the trenches of the First World War, the conflict they labeled "the war to end all wars." And what a terrible and tragic mistake that turned out to be.

Then, after many of you returned home from the victorious battles for Europe and the Pacific, after you destroyed the dictators who grew so powerful while our nation was complacent, it happened again. Once again, we had to pay the terrible price of this complacency in the opening days of the Korean War. So once again our soldiers, our airmen, our sailors, and our marines went out to fight another dictator, Kim Il Sung, and to save another nation, South Korea and another region.

Then many of us went to Vietnam, where we bled once again. And as we fought this long battle, we gave hundreds of millions of people in Indonesia, in Thailand, in Malaysia, and in Singapore protection to build their own nations and to become the democracies they are today. But when we returned home from this fight it happened again.

By the late seventies, our Armed Forces were hollow. We had ships that couldn't deploy, planes that could not be safely flown, and divisions that lacked the parts and the training to perform their missions. Thinking that Détente meant peace, we shrank our arsenals and we allowed our forces to atrophy once again. But then after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and our embassy was seized and our people were imprisoned by the Iranians, we finally shook off the complacency and began to rebuild our forces.

And it was a good thing that we did. In Grenada, then in Panama, we saw our forces grow stronger and stronger and then three years ago in the Gulf War, we saw our men and women execute an extraordinary military feat. DESERT STORM became the high point of our military high tech excellence.

So there has been this cycle throughout this century, a cycle of enormous and costly exertion followed by a false sense of relief, a delusion that we had done our part and that it was time to rest and collect the dividends of our efforts.

Well, this time around we have to, we must resist the dangerous embrace of complacence.

Let me remind you of a fact of American history. Since our nation was founded, we have never experienced a twenty-year period of uninterrupted peace. Put another way, no soldier in this country's history has ever completed a military career when our nation did not engage in armed conflict at least once. This is the reality that underscores our need to remain ready. But there is another reason to reject complacency and embrace military readiness. Today we are the world's most powerful nation we are its richest nation and we are its leading nation.

Recently some have suggested that we can't shoulder this leadership any longer, that the price of leadership is too high, that if we continue to pay this price we will soon exhaust and impoverish ourselves. Actually just the opposite is true. It is our leadership that has kept us the world's most democratic and most prosperous people.

Give it up, give up our leadership and it will be the beginning of the end of our greatness. It's as simple as that. You can't stand still. You either go forward with confidence or you slip backwards in self-doubt. But you can't stand still.

Those of you who took part in the occupations of Japan and Germany, who rebuilt Western Europe from the ravages of war, and who defended South Korea and kept it safe for forty years, and who stemmed the tide of the communist onslaught into Southeast Asia, you laid the foundation for the freedom and prosperity we are enjoying today.

You built the markets that have made us collectively, the three richest and most democratic regions in the world. You also created the democratic allies who helped us to defeat the many threats that emerged after the war. They were beside us, taking the same risks and the same stands throughout the Cold War. And they were there with us in nearly every conflict we have had to fight, from Korea to Vietnam to the Gulf.

Now there are new possibilities and opportunities in Eastern Europe, in the states of the former Soviet Union, and in China and Southeast Asia. So there is a new challenge for American leadership and new opportunities for this generation of young men and women. And we have to grasp these opportunities. We can't stand still.

These were the thoughts that were running through my head after the President called me. Because like you, I fought to create these possibilities and like you, I want our children to inherit a better and a safer world. So what does this mean for our forces today and into the future?

You know that we have been reducing large numbers of men and women from our ranks, that the dollars we spend on defense have been steadily declining, and that we are becoming more and more concerned about our readiness. And there are reports around that the old disease of complacency has once again returned.

Since I became Chairman some four months ago, I have visited our forces here and overseas in Korea, in Somalia, in Hawaii, in Panama, and in Europe just last week, when Secretary Perry and I visited our pilots flying daily over Bosnia-Herzegovina. I want to report to you that they remain ready and they continue doing a simply magnificent job. They are guarding our nation and our allies and are accomplishing the many missions we have assigned them with every bit of the courage, the skill, and the enthusiasm that you showed and that Americans have come to expect from our Armed Forces.

Last November in South Korea, as I stood with our soldiers along the DMZ, watching them as they watch North Korea, you know that our men and women are ready. Talking to our commander there, General Gary Luck, a great soldier, as I did just this Saturday, you know that were a conflict to break out once again on that peninsula, our men and women together with our South Korean allies, would prevail, they would win decisively. They are quietly confident of that for they are ready.

In December I went to see our forces in Somalia. Even though the memory of the early October fight, a sharp violent fight in which they had lost 18 of their comrades and another 75 were wounded, was still very much with them, they knew they had fought well. In that same short fight they had inflicted nearly a thousand casualties and they knew they were ready. There was that same quiet confidence I had seen in Korea, a confidence that comes from knowing you are the best.

But there was more to that confidence that I experienced in Mogadishu. Our young men and women there knew that they had come to Somalia not to fight battles, although they were ready to fight if they had to, but they had come to Somalia to stop the misery and the dying. And when I talked to them in small groups, they understood that because they had come, hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of children and old people are alive today.

Like a doctor, they stemmed Somalia's catastrophic slide into starvation and slaughter, they resuscitated that country, and they gave it a chance for life. Our terrific young men and women gave Somalia a chance, but now it is up to the Somali people. We will be gone by the 31st of March and we can't be sure what will happen after we leave. But we are sure that today, there are these hundreds of thousands alive who surely would have been dead without us. We are as sure as we can be, that our men and women who went over there were part of an extraordinarily noble undertaking. Nothing, nothing that happens after we leave can take that away. I know that you share my pride in what they did as you also share in my sorrow for the price that so many had to pay.

And although the Gulf War is now long over, our forces continue to patrol the skies over southern and northern Iraq, enforcing protective no-fly zones over the Kurds, and our ships continue to enforce U.N. sanctions against Iraq. And throughout the region, our men and women are providing a powerful counterweight to Iraq's and Iran's ambitions. They are doing dangerous work in a dangerous part of the world but they are doing it proudly. And they are ready as they have been countless times when challenged by Iraqi pilots or air defenses.

Two weeks ago, I went to Panama to visit our United States Southern Command. This is the command that, over the past 10 years, helped block the spread of communism in this region and helped usher in a new unprecedented era of democracy; one that has spread throughout South and Central America. And only four and half years ago, these were the same men and women who took down Noriega in Operation Just Cause. Today, they are waging a fierce fight to stop the flow of drugs into our streets and working with our regional allies to maintain peace and stability throughout this hemisphere.

And just last week, Secretary of Defense Perry and I went to Aviano, Italy to visit our aircrews and to check their preparations to conduct air strikes to stop the shelling of Sarajevo. Even though these pilots and the crews, who knew

they were only hours away from a decision to strike, were coolly and professionally going about their preparations. They had studied their targets, they were confident of their skills and their aircraft, and they were as ready as any aircrews we ever send into harm's way. And they understood as well the purpose of their mission. Their task was not to bomb one side or another to the conference table; airpower can't do that. Their task wasn't to stop the fighting in Bosnia. Airpower can't stop the hatreds that have fueled nearly two years of war.

Theirs was a much narrower purpose. It was to enforce NATO's ultimatum that the Serbs and Muslims stop shelling the innocent civilians in Sarajevo, and that the heavy weapons that have brought so much death and destruction to this city, a city that not many years ago so proudly hosted a Winter Olympics, that these weapons be placed under U.N. control or moved 12 1/2 miles beyond the city's limits or be subject to air strikes by NATO attack aircraft. They understood the narrow limits of their tasks and felt very confident in their abilities to carry them out.

Apparently the Serbs and the Muslims as well understood the readiness of our aircrews, for the city has now gone 18 days free from the horror of artillery or mortar shelling.

To know what this means to the people of Sarajevo, it is useful to recall that just in the past 60 days, we had many days when well over 1,000 shells a day would hit that city, and that since conflict started over there, over 9,000 people have been killed and over 57,000 have been wounded in Sarajevo alone. If the readiness of our aircrews helped give the people of Sarajevo 18 days of peace, our men and women who are responsible, have something to be very proud about.

But they know full well that peace will not come unless it is achieved at the negotiating table. That is why President Clinton has redoubled America's involvement in the negotiating process and that is why correctly that is where our emphasis is being placed.

Our forces are performing these missions I spoke about and a great deal more; from serving in Macedonia, keeping the conflict in Bosnia from spilling over; to enforcing the Camp David Accord in the Sinai; to combing the countryside in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos recovering the remains of our missing comrades; to responding to humanitarian missions such as the recent earthquake in California. And our forces are doing these multiple tasks magnificently.

When you think about these various operations I just described, you realize that we are in a totally new era, and our armed forces are asked to perform an extraordinary variety of tough demanding missions. They are asked to do that with a lesser number of forces than we have had in decades. But when you get so lean as we are getting, it becomes doubly important that we keep our readiness up and we keep our emphasis on people. For that reason, Secretary Perry has directed that the readiness of our forces be our highest priority, and he has, even while the force is shrinking, actually increased the readiness accounts in our budget now before Congress.

But our people are just as important, for they are the very foundation of our military excellence, our ability to fight and win wars. I cannot emphasize strongly enough what great men and women we have in our ranks today. They are remarkable in every sense of the word. When you look at what they are doing around the world in all the places I named, it is astounding.

When you think of their courage, the hardships they endure, the tough and demanding lifestyles that accompany military life, and the sacrifices they and their families willingly make for this country, it is humbling. They are talented and dedicated and if we want to retain them and continue to recruit more like them, then we have to take care of their welfare and the welfare of their families. They are a Super Bowl team but without Super Bowl wages. The very last place we should look for more savings is in their paychecks and in what we provide for their quality of life programs.

Once in while we have to remind ourselves how long it took and how very expensive and difficult it was to build this outstanding military force we have today. Frankly I depend very heavily on you, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, to help us. You are the great patriots who can speak to Americans about why we cannot grow complacent again about how critical it is to keep our Armed Forces strong. And I know that you are doing this. Just as you did when you were on duty you, are all still standing up to be counted, telling our leaders in Washington that the surest path to peace, in fact the only path to peace, is a strong defense.

Now, I want to close by telling you again, "Thank You." Looking at all of you gathered here, I feel enormously proud; proud to be an American, proud to represent our great Armed Forces, and very proud to spend this time with so many men and women who have done so much for our country.

God Bless you all and God Bless the United States of America.

Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Washington, DC
4 April 1994

Generally I use every chance I can get to speak of the need for Americans to retain a strong defense. But I decided not to do that tonight.

I decided not to do that because you, after all, already support a strong defense. And I am very well aware there are a heck-of-a-lot more defense experts sitting in the audience tonight than there are behind this microphone.

But the main reason why I thought I would forgo speaking about the need for a strong defense is that just earlier today, I returned from a trip to Europe and a visit to Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Skopje.

And so with that visit very fresh in my mind, I thought it might be of interest if I relayed to you some of my impressions of that visit and address what could very well turn out to be the next commitment facing our forces.

I arrived in Zagreb after having first gone to Italy to visit with our U.S. and NATO commanders responsible for all of NATO's air operations over Bosnia. Having earlier visited with the pilots who fly these missions, to include the two young captains who not long ago shot down the four Serbian Galebs, you walk away with a feeling of supreme confidence, confidence in the expertise of our aircrews our commanders and in NATO's military capabilities.

These Dutch, British, French, Turkish, and American pilots have no doubts and hold no debates about NATO's military capabilities or relevance in managing post-Cold War crises. They have quietly taken NATO out-of-area and into the first real operation, to include the first combat engagements in NATO's history. And you sense no crisis in confidence when you're among them.

In Zagreb I teamed up with Ambassador Albright and together we met with UNPROFOR's new commander, French General de Lapresle, and later with President Tudjman, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign and Defense Ministers, and the Croatian Chief of Defense.

Earlier that day, the Croats and Serbs of the Krajina had signed a long awaited cease-fire agreement that if it stands, will help defuse one of the most ignitable tinderboxes in that disintegrated nation.

That cease-fire agreement together with what has been termed as a "rolling peace" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that began with NATO's ultimatum for all sides to either withdraw or place all heavy weapons in and around Sarajevo under U.N. control, and America's leading role in the peace process that has led to the agreements to establish a Bosnian federation composed so far of Muslims and Bosnian Croats, has established a momentum that is sparking considerable hope even among the most cynical and pessimistic Yugoslav watchers. Certainly none of us know if the momentum will continue. We all learned long ago that the Balkans have a way of making fools out of most optimists.

Nevertheless, whether in discussions with General de Lapresle or President Tudjman, I sensed more optimism than on any previous visit.

General de Lapresle urged that more troops be sent to Croatia and Bosnia, to include American troops, to allow him to supervise the numerous cease-fires that are being negotiated. I, in turn, reminded him of President Clinton's decision not to send American ground forces until there is an overall peace agreement. And President Tudjman urged us to more quickly engage the Serbs in our peace negotiations before the momentum is lost and the window of opportunity closes. But his real worry was that the Muslims would stall further negotiations in the hope of first gaining more territory in the battlefield. There was a clear feeling that that would prove fatal to the peace process. However overall the mood was clearly upbeat.

From Zagreb, Ambassador Albright and I went to Sarajevo both to inspect the conditions in the aftermath of the NATO imposed ultimatum and to meet with General Rose, the very energetic new British commander of U.N. forces in Bosnia, and with President Izetbegovic, Prime Minister Silajdzic, the Foreign and Defense Ministers and Army commander General Delic.

Those of you who have recently visited Sarajevo know that large portions of the city are a very sobering sight. Ruined buildings, one block after another of shell pocked high rises left windowless and burned out from months of heavy artillery fire. In many ways it looks worse than it appears on television.

But the people of Sarajevo are back out on the streets for the first time in a year and half and everywhere you drive, there are hundreds of people out walking in the spring air with relief evident on their faces, just to be out of their basements and shelters and to be free from the daily dangers of artillery poundings and sniper fire. And in the ruins of what used to be beautiful parks, children are once again playing in the sunshine.

Yet despite these first fragile signs of rebirth of a war torn city there remain some dark and worrisome signs.

Cross through a military checkpoint from the Muslim part of Sarajevo to the Serbian side and you have the same feeling you used to have when crossing through Checkpoint Charlie from West to East Berlin.

You had the feeling then in Berlin that you were walking through a curtain of hatred and you have the same feeling now. And it is a sobering reminder of how difficult it will be to bring real peace to that city much less to that land. When I asked the Serb sentry manning the checkpoint whether he would ever wish to visit the Muslim side he spat out a single word: "Never."

In our meeting with President Izetbegovic, we were informed of the Republic Assembly's ratification of the U.S.-brokered Federation constitution. At the same time, Izetbegovic sought our support for a just agreement with the Bosnian Serbs that would "preserve the country as a unity" and called for the deployment of at least a small contingent of U.S. troops now, as "moral support for those who want peace." We in turn stressed the need to not allow the peace process to stall and the need to understand the limitations on American ground forces until a peace agreement is in place.

What was most striking about the meeting however, were not the words but the atmosphere of the meeting which on their part verged on the euphoric. I am certain that this mood was based in no small measure on the recent string of successes: NATO's ultimatum over Sarajevo; the shootdown of the four Serb jets; the Washington Accords; and a more effective UNPROFOR under General Rose.

Nevertheless, in this meeting and much more forcefully in a later meeting with General Delic and Bosnian Croat General Rosso, it became clear that the Muslims had much higher territorial expectations than one could ever expect the Serbs to agree to. When pressed on that point, Delic made no bones about the fact that he was prepared to continue fighting unless they could get a "just" agreement. I walked away from that meeting persuaded that Delic at least had not yet come face-to-face with the fact that he could gain more at the negotiating table than on the battlefield and that until he does we are facing very hard and potentially lengthy negotiations.

But two things were made very clear to us in discussions in Zagreb, Sarajevo, and later in my talks with President Gligorov in Skopje. First they believe none of the successes so far, no matter how limited, could have been possible without America's lead in the diplomatic process. And secondly, they all felt that America's involvement in helping them implement the peace agreements is absolutely essential if the peace process is to be carried out to its successful conclusion.

This second point of course brings us to the crux of the issue: the involvement of America's ground forces in the implementation of a Bosnia peace agreement.

Of course any such suggestion brings to mind a number of confusing and contradictory images.

There is the image of a region of ancient hatreds, religious intolerance, and unspeakable cruelty. A region torn against itself where lasting peace is but an illusion unless enforced with the iron fist of another Tito.

It is this dark region so well described in a book now making the rounds, a book so aptly titled: "Balkan Ghosts."

And there is that image of that young Serbian soldier standing guard among the burned out ruins of a once vibrant city, staring with hatred from the Serbian side to the Muslim sector of Sarajevo far from ready to reach out the hand of friendship. His young eyes as unforgiving as those of old men who had suffered for a lifetime.

But there is also the image of children playing in the dirt that was once a green neighborhood park, of a lone trolley car once again lumbering along what only a short time ago was known as "sniper alley." The laughter from a just opened outdoor café, if two chairs and an old table set up on a torn up sidewalk can be called an outdoor cafe.

And there is also the vision of Somalia, of 3 October in Mogadishu, of 18 American soldiers dead, of the body of an American soldier dragged through the dirt by a crowd intoxicated on anti-American slogans.

No one will deny that what happened on 3 October in Somalia sent a jarring shock of disillusionment across our country and will cast a heavy shadow on whether we should send our forces into Bosnia.

The question we have wrestled with ever since is how to contain that disillusionment. Because neither Americans nor the world can afford for that disillusionment to be a turning point that makes America over-cautious, ambivalent, or mute to its responsibilities. But on the other hand we cannot ignore the need to take measure of what our role should be in a world that has changed so very remarkably in the past six years.

As many of you know for many months, the administration has been drafting a Presidential Review Directive, whose purpose it is to form policy guidelines for when we should engage in multilateral peace operations and when we do under what terms and how we will engage our forces.

We must recognize that in this new era our country will face a whole host of security challenges. And our policy must be clear that our foremost requirement is to protect our warfighting capabilities.

While we might engage in other kinds of operations, we must not allow any diminishment or erosion of our un-

equaled capability to fight and win wars, either unilaterally or in coalitions, because this must remain the centerpiece of our national security strategy and the core safeguard of our country's security.

But we cannot ignore the cumulative effect of the many ethnic struggles, religious conflicts, civil disputes, and human disasters that are erupting like measles in many regions of the world today. And the vast majority of these kinds of problems cannot be resolved by dispatching American forces to fight and win. They require other kinds of solutions from humanitarian support through peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

So when and how should we decide when one of these problems requires American involvement and participation and how do we proceed once we decide that our involvement is necessary? We know that we cannot be the world's policemen, but we also sense that we cannot just hang a sign outside the Pentagon that says, "we only do the big ones."

Our policy should recognize that it would be imprudent to try to devise a set of rigid rules for making these decisions.

While it would perhaps be convenient to have a set of ironclad rules, the world is just too complex for such a Cartesian approach to national security decision making. We will have to continue to rely on our case-by-case judgment and political leadership for these decisions. But there are a series of factors that I believe should be considered.

The first set is for determining whether we should vote for or against a new U.N. operation or to extend an existing mandate. It reflects what President Clinton said last September that the U.N. needs to learn to say "no" more frequently. Among these considerations should be whether the situation represents a threat to international peace and security, whether there are clear objectives and a defined scope of operations, whether there is enough multilateral interest so that the burden of action and resources can be spread, that conditions for success exist, that sufficient financial and human resources are available, and that there is an identifiable endpoint.

The second set of factors should be used to determine whether the proposed operation advances U.S. interests, whether U.S. participation is necessary for success, whether we have sufficient personnel funds and resources available, and whether Rules of Engagement and Command and Control arrangements are acceptable.

But if the operation in question is a U.N. Charter Chapter 7 operation that is a peace enforcement operation, where there is a high likelihood of active combat, we should consider a third set of factors such as our ability to commit sufficient forces to achieve our clearly defined objectives, and once committed, that we have the mechanism to continually reassess the relationship between our objectives and the composition and mission of our forces.

Ultimately America's forces should be committed to war or to peace operations if there is support for such a commitment among the American people and our Congress, or if as a minimum there is a high expectation that such support can be garnered.

And it is in the context of this requirement that those images I spoke of earlier, and particularly Somalia, will play such a decisive role.

In fact, only a few weeks ago as I visited Mogadishu to thank our troops for their noble accomplishments and wish them a safe journey home, the dominant question from the press was whether our experience in Somalia should warn us to stay out of Bosnia. There is no doubt that the press was merely reflecting what is on many people's minds all across the country.

I would begin by paraphrasing then-Senator Benson: "I knew Somalia and Bosnia is not Somalia."

We should not make the mistake of confusing the two. We have very legitimate and very important stakes in what is happening today in Bosnia and in what could happen tomorrow. Our only stake in Somalia was our conscience. But in Bosnia we confront both our heart and the future of Europe.

Today, as all of you know, we and our European friends are trying to shape a new Europe. With the disintegration of the Soviet empire we suddenly have the opportunities we could only dream of during the Cold War.

For the first time in our adult lives the nuclear threshold is down and we can keep it down. For the first time since my childhood, there is no powerful empire casting a dark shadow across the European continent. And for the first time since the Second World War Europe is not divided by walls of armies.

The question that has bothered us since the end of the Cold War is nearly answered. Is there a life for NATO outside of the Cold War?

If we didn't know the answer to that question ourselves, the Central and East Europeans provided that answer when one after another they asked to join NATO and until that becomes a possibility, to anchor themselves to the alliance through the "Partnership for Peace." In their minds NATO is the very basis for stability in Europe. And America and American leadership is the anchor of that stability. Only we have the power the credibility and the trust to perform this role.

We have a deep interest in a stable and prosperous Europe. A Europe at peace with itself. Not just Western Europe but Central and Eastern Europe as well.

We have a continuing deep interest in a strong relevant NATO serving as the anchor of stability for our Trans-Atlantic region.

And we have a deep interest in preventing the widening of the conflict in Bosnia.

All three of these interests are threatened by continued conflict in Bosnia.

Surely continued war in the Balkans threatens the very stability of Europe and no one will argue that the United States was correct to redouble its diplomatic efforts to try to bring the conflict to as speedy an end as possible.

And if it becomes possible to successfully implement an eventual peace agreement using only the U.N. forces already there, without the need for American forces on the ground, then that would be a very good outcome.

But that will most probably not be the case. Commanders on the ground tell us that more forces will be needed and more importantly more quality forces will be needed as contrasted with those from most third world nations. Those quality forces if they have to come can come only from the United States.

Whether we like it or not our participation will most probably be asked of us as it is already being asked today.

So we will have to be very clear not only about the consequences of participation, but be just as clear about the consequences of refusing to participate.

If fighting were to continue or a peace were to unravel because of a lack of quality soldiers to adequately implement a peace agreement, then as a minimum European stability would be endangered, America's continued willingness to share in the day-to-day risks with its European partners would be thrown in doubt, and thus America's ability to lead in Europe would be weakened.

If NATO were asked to help implement the peace plan and NATO had to refuse because of American non-participation, some would argue NATO would be severely wounded. With NATO thus weakened, the adverse impact on the long-term developments in Central and Eastern Europe would be most significant.

Finally if the fighting continues or were to resume after a failed peace, the prospect for widening of the conflict would increase considerably.

While much of the talk has centered on the geographic widening of the conflict into Kosovo or into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, we must realize there could be an even more dangerous widening of the conflict, one in which outside nations get drawn into the conflict as active participants on opposite sides of the dispute; Turkey and Greece, Russia and the West, and perhaps to a lesser extent the United States and Western Europe over such disagreements as the lifting of the arms embargo. We must recognize such a widening of the conflict as the true nightmare of the Balkan wars.

No, Bosnia is not Somalia. In Bosnia we have much more at stake than just our heart.

Continued conflict in Bosnia threatens our very core interests. Bosnia is about our ability to shape a future Europe, it is about preserving NATO as our premier security alliance of the extended Trans-Atlantic family of nations, and it is about bringing this Balkan War to an end before it is allowed to tear at the fabric of Europe as previous Balkan Wars have done so tragically.

But if these are some possible consequences of inaction, we must however be clear as well about the risks of American involvement.

There must be no doubt that the risk to our servicemen and women would be extensive. Bosnia to date and Somalia have made that clear. Any military operation carries with it risks to life and limb and one in the land of the "Balkan Ghosts" surely doubly so.

We can somewhat reduce the risks by insisting we go in only after there is an overall peace agreement, after we have seen that it is holding, that we go in sufficient numbers to protect ourselves, that we insist on robust Rules of Engagement so no one can intimidate us or push us around, and that we operate under a chain of command that is experienced and which holds our trust. In other words that we participate only as part of NATO.

We most probably have a way to go yet until a peace agreement is in our grasp. And as today's news from Gorazde reminds us peace will not come easily. In the end peace might even elude us despite our best efforts.

But we cannot wait until peace is here to begin the debate about what part America should play in implementing an eventual peace in Bosnia. We, the public, the Congress, need to understand now what is at stake.

With that let me thank you and if I haven't already overwhelmed your sensibilities I will take whatever questions you might have.

Army and Air Force Mutual Aid Association
Fort Myer, Virginia
12 April 1994

I must tell you how very, very pleased I am to have this chance to share some thoughts with so many old friends and comrades. As Dutch remarked, I have been a member of the Army and Air Force Mutual Aid Association for 30 years. And I must admit to all of you, what a great relief it is each month to pay my dues, because I find the alternative so very unappealing. And I want to assure you, Dutch, that while I know the association's service is superb, I really am in no particular hurry for my wife to find out firsthand. Let's keep her guessing.

Now, I thought for quite some time about what I wanted to say to you, because I am addressing probably the most difficult audience for a man in my position, a room full of strong defense advocates during a period of steep defense cuts. And I know that one of your greatest concerns today is what we are doing with our Armed Forces.

Let me start with the raw numbers. By next year, our defense budget will be 40 percent smaller than it was in 1985. By 1999, our budget will shrink in real terms, by another 11 percent. And the Army will shrink to 10 Divisions, the Navy to 12 Carriers, and a total of 340 combat ships, and the Air Force to 20 Tactical Fighter Wing Equivalents and 160 Bombers.

Our total manpower will be reduced from slightly over 2 million men and women in 1990 ... to 1.4 million. We are cutting our force by nearly 700,000 people. In fact, we are already over 80 percent complete with these manpower reductions and we are continuing to reduce by nearly 11,000 people a month.

If Dutch Kerwin were to give as bleak a report as this, all of us would be heading for a new insurance company. These are dramatic numbers to anybody's ears. And when you hear them, it raises hackles up the back of your neck and understandably, makes you wonder about the future security of our country.

So in the next few minutes, let me give you a picture of all that our forces are doing and then address the forces and capabilities we will need for our future.

Let me start in Europe, for it is there that we face great challenges, but also significant opportunities: to help promote a democratic Russia and to realize the dream of European unity.

And it is in our European Command that we have undergone the greatest military changes. Five years ago, when the Cold War was still in earnest, we had 321,000 men and women assigned in Europe. Today there are 147,000 and by the end of 1996, we will be down to approximately 100,000, a dramatic reduction of over two-thirds, but sufficient I believe, to the new tasks.

But the magnitude of change is better captured by what our forces are doing. During the Cold War our forces, together with those of our NATO allies, were there to deter and if deterrence failed, to defend NATO territory.

They were a shield behind which alliance nations could grow and prosper into one of the richest and most democratic regions in the world and one of our strongest supporters, and best trading partners.

Today, our forces in Europe no longer stare across the Fulda Gap nor patrol a no longer existing inter-German border.

Today, our forces, as part of a new NATO, must be prepared to reach out to the East in a "Partnership for Peace" that will grow into an anchor of stability behind which Central and Eastern Europeans can build their own robust economies and democratic institutions that are so essential to fulfilling the dream of European unity.

As the leading nation of NATO, our forces must be prepared to participate with the Alliance in reducing tensions and managing crises such as the tragedy in former Yugoslavia, and for the time being, they must remain strong, credible guardians in the event of a reversal of the democratic process in the former Soviet Union. Recent events in Russia only underscore the importance of that part of NATO's mission. Finally, our European based forces must be prepared to deploy quickly in support of America's interests anywhere in that part of the world.

What does this mean in actual practice? Well today, our service men and women can be found in Warsaw, in Prague, in Budapest, in Bratislava, in fact in every Central and East European capital, engaged in very robust and most successful military-to-military contact programs doing their very important part in our outreach to the East.

Before the next year is over, our soldiers will be in Russia participating in a first ever U.S.-Russian ground force exercise.

At the same time, some 7,500 of our personnel, operating from airbases in Italy and from our Carrier Battle Group in the Adriatic, are providing some of the 160 tactical aircraft, enforcing the NATO "Heavy Weapons Ban" around Sarajevo; a ban that has now given that city 57 days free from artillery and mortar shells. They also are enforcing the U.N. mandated "No-Fly Zone" and last month shot down four aircraft that were bombing targets in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

And they fly combat air patrols over Bosnia, ready to provide Close Air Support to UNPROFOR forces as they did this weekend, and again yesterday when our F-16s and F-18s engaged targets around Gorazde.

Approximately 2,300 of our sailors, airmen, and marines are participating in Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, enforcing the maritime economic sanctions against Serbia. And by now, over 27,000 ships have been challenged and some 2,000 have been stopped or boarded in this most successful NATO operation.

Some 500 of our personnel under UNPROFOR are operating a field hospital in Zagreb and supporting other U.N. humanitarian efforts, while some 324 soldiers are in Macedonia supporting the Nordic Brigade in the UNPROFOR mission to prevent the conflict in Bosnia from spilling over into that country.

And over 1,100 of our pilots, riggers, and maintenance personnel work around the clock to fly in badly needed food and humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and airdrop these supplies into areas that can not be reached by ground convoys.

In all, some 12,000 of our military personnel are involved in one way or another in these operations. But they all know that the conflict won't end, unless there is an agreement at the negotiating table and it is in recognition of that, that the United States has redoubled its support for a negotiated settlement that so far has yielded the Muslim-Croat federation and that hopefully will, in the not too distant future, also result in an agreement between that new federation and the Bosnian Serbs.

Only time will tell whether this current renewal of fighting will unravel what has so far been achieved or whether peace will finally come to the troubled Balkans.

Now let me turn to the Pacific and to Asia. While in Europe our greatest challenge and opportunity is Russia, the result of the collapse of a superpower, in Asia we are facing the rebirth of a great new power, China. There too, strong military-to-military contacts in the days ahead will do much to build constructive ties with that very important nation.

However, the near-term focus of our attention in this region for the past several years quite correctly, has been on North Korea, both because of its alarming conventional threat and the nearly certain possibility that it is developing a nuclear weapon.

We have stabilized our military presence in Korea, postponing any more force reductions until North Korea makes acceptable progress on the nuclear issue.

I know that all of you are fully aware of where we are in regard to our stalemated nuclear negotiations with Kim Il Sung's regime. But I do want to point out that the nuclear issue is only one side of the equation. The other side is a million-man, highly mobile military force, an artillery-heavy army that is burrowed into the hills and mountains within close proximity to the DMZ.

Really since 1980, we have watched this force grow in size and capability and we watched more and more units and heavy weapons edge closer and closer to the DMZ.

This has been a matter of growing concern for it is destabilizing and eats away the amount of warning time we might have to react.

In the interim, our 37,000 men and women in Korea train very closely with our South Korean allies and stay very vigilant. There is no doubt at all that should North Korea attack, the United States would stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our South Korean allies. And while the conflict would cause untold damage and devastation, I am very confident that North Korea would be decisively defeated.

But of course managing North Korea is not all that our forces in the Pacific are doing. We still have some 45,000 men and women in Japan and nearly 44,000 in Hawaii, which gives us a strong, stabilizing presence in this part of the world that is experiencing unprecedented economic growth.

And it is, like Europe, a traditional arena of great power competition, one whose stability teeters on events in China and Russia, two great nations that are hurtling through vast economic and political changes.

As well, our Pacific forces are maintaining nearly constant presence in Southeast Asia where they are engaging in operations as diverse as exercises with regional allies, to continuing the searches in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos that will bring us closer to a full accounting of our comrades still missing from the Vietnam conflict.

Now, let me turn to our Central Command and its area of responsibility. The Gulf War crystallized what President Carter enunciated in 1978, that Southwest Asia is a crucial region for the free world. And there are two nations that remain of immediate concern.

Of most immediate concern is Iraq. There, we are participating with coalition forces in maintaining U.N. sanctions and enforcing the no-fly zone, designed to prevent the Iraqis from using their air force to slaughter Shias and the Kurds.

At the same time, we are countering Iran's ambition to expand its influence and destabilize governments in the region. This is partly a function of our forward presence and in an equal measure, our continuing efforts to help our regional friends build their own defenses and their own regional defensive alliances.

And the Central Command is also the headquarters that up to some two weeks ago has been supporting the United Nations operations in Somalia. Except for a small number required to support the U.S. Liaison Office in Mogadishu and a handful of advisors to the UNOSOM headquarters, all our ashore military personnel, that at one time numbered some 21,000, departed prior to the 31st of March.

And I would just like to take a moment to tell you how very, very proud I am of what our service men and women there have accomplished.

Today, there are thousands upon thousands of Somali women, children, and old men alive because of our men and women who went there to help. And nothing, nothing that might happen now that we are gone, can take away from that noble undertaking.

You can debate how Washington or the U.N. ran the operation, but there must be no debate about the bravery, and commitment, and competence of our service men and women.

I know you share my pride in what they did, as you share in my sorrow for the price so many had to pay.

Finally I would like to bring you back to this hemisphere. For if there is an untold success story of the past decade, it is the spread of democracy that has swept through Latin America. And this is inciting something that is long overdue, an economic recovery in South and Central America. It is occurring nation by nation as one after another tames inflation and restores the balance between its debts and its ability to produce and sell products.

But there are threats remaining. There remain some local insurgencies and there are the drug lords. Our Armed Forces are heavily engaged in the fight on drugs. But we have learned just how difficult it is to achieve progress.

The geostrategic breadth of our interests and the number of regions critical to our interests, whose stability and security depend so much on the commitment of our forces, make it clear that we need to maintain the ability to respond to two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies.

Were we to become involved in a major response to aggression in any one of these regions, it is entirely possible that another of these nations would be tempted to attack its neighbors if it believed the U.S. too weak to deal with two simultaneous contingencies. So this is the core-sizing requirement of our strategy.

The forces and capabilities that the Bottom Up Review has recommended are lean, in fact very, very lean. But I believe this smaller structure can do the job with an acceptable risk, if but only if we meet two assumptions.

The first is that we protect and improve the readiness of our forces. The second is that we continue to improve their capabilities.

All of you know what we went through after WW II, after Korea, and again after Vietnam. It was a cycle of declines followed by disasters that we cannot and will not repeat.

The Operation and Maintenance account needs to be increased, and steaming days, training hours, and flight hours, must be funded at levels that military commanders believe are essential. While the President's budget now before Congress does these things, I am very concerned about what will eventually emerge from Congress.

Now, let me return to our need to grow in capabilities as we reduce our structure.

This increase in capabilities must come from a number of sources. It will require a degree of modernization. It will require the enhancements that are recommended in the Bottom Up Review.

And it will require those of us in the Department of Defense, particularly those of us in the Armed Forces, to be bolder in challenging how we do our business and to be relentless in finding and implementing ways to make our forces more and more effective on the battlefield.

What specifically am I talking about?

When you go from the M1A1 tank to the M1A2 tank, it increases the lethality of a tank company by nearly 20 percent. If we had had the C-17 for use in our deployment to Somalia it would have doubled the cargo we were able to bring through the airfield at Mogadishu.

When we bring our Navy in closer to the shoreline, which is a core thrust of its new littoral doctrine, we increase the air sorties and the fire support available to the warfighting commanders.

The Bottom Up Review listed a number of enhancements that will make our forces more capable — strategically, operationally, and tactically. It is imperative that we maintain support for them from R&D through funding.

This means we have to continue to make our investments in expanded strategic lift and prepositioning of stocks in locations that will increase our global agility.

And, as I pointed out earlier, we have to make continuing, albeit selective investments in modernization. We must make sure that our smaller forces remain capable of defeating any two regional adversaries.

Now there is one last point about this future force and that is our people, the very foundation of our military excellence, our ability to fight and win.

I cannot emphasize strongly enough what great men and women we have in our ranks today. When you look at what they are doing around the world in all the places I have named, it is astounding.

They are talented and dedicated, and if we want to retain them and continue to recruit more like them, then we have to take care of their welfare and the welfare of their families. They are a Super Bowl team, but without Super Bowl wages.

The very last place to look for more savings is in their paychecks and in what we provide in our quality of life programs.

Now I would like to conclude with one or two observations. The first is a fact of American history. Since our nation was founded, we have never experienced a twenty-year period of uninterrupted peace. Put another way, no soldier in this country's history has ever completed a full military career when the nation did not engage in armed conflict at least once.

This is the reality that underscores our need to remain ready. My second observation is simply a reminder, a reminder of how long it took and how very expensive and difficult it was to build this outstanding military force we have today.

Nearly all of you here in Ceremonial Hall today, have had a hand in one way or another in its construction and I know you feel a sense of proprietary anxiety about what is happening to your force.

These reminders underscore our need to continue to shape and equip our forces for the future. In the past, we were on a roller coaster of declines followed by expensive surges, followed by another decline. We simply must put ourselves on a steady line, through which we maintain our balance in every critical measure of our Armed Forces.

We have a strategy. And, we have determined the leanest force structure capable of fulfilling that strategy. But in order to fit that very lean structure to the strategy, it is going to have to grow in capabilities. There are three factors that will make the difference; readiness, prudent modernization, and people.

I assure you that my focus will remain on these three areas.

And I ask that you too, keep them in your field of vision, for we are going to need your support to keep the American people and the Congress aware that too many peace dividends can very quickly become tragic regrets.

With that, thank you very much for this chance to share these thoughts with you. It has been great to escape the Pentagon and to be with so many great friends.

Thank you and God Bless.

Annual Military Appreciation Dinner
Fairbanks, Alaska
16 April 1994

Governor and Mrs. Hickel, Senator Stevens, Mayor and Mrs. Hayes, Mayor and Mrs. Cunningham, Mayor and Mrs. Sampson, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. Senator Stevens, thank you for that very kind introduction.

Now, standing here before you, I find it impossible to repress my memory of a famous story about Joe Namath when he played for Alabama, and his legendary coach, Bear Bryant. In Namath's senior year, Bear Bryant stood up to give the team his traditional talk on the standards that he expected of his team.

In his usual blunt style, he said, "I expect all of you to be neat and tidy. I expect you to keep your hair cut and your shoes shined and your pants creased."

"Further, I expect you to go to class, to study hard, and to get good grades. There will be no dummies on this team" he growled. Then, to see that his point got through, he challenged the team. "I expect each and every one of you to live up to these standards, but if you want to be a dummy, I want to know now so stand up."

At this point Joe Namath, his star quarterback stood up. Visibly surprised, Bryant asked him, "Joe, what are you doing standing up? You're no dummy." To which Namath smiled and replied, "Yeah, I know coach, but I hate like the devil for you to be standing all by yourself."

So you can just imagine what it feels like to be standing up here all alone. But if the truth were known, it is actually a terrific feeling to be standing here before you: for I know that men and women in uniform never had better friends than you, the members of the Fairbanks Chamber of Commerce. So before I say another word, let me say "Thank you."

Thank you, Margo Goodhew, thank you Jim Merser, thank you Gary Wilken, and thank you to each and every member of the Chamber of Commerce. And how about all of us in uniform giving them a great big hand?

And thank you as well, to all the service men and women here tonight. Just look at you! You are the finest who ever wore America's uniform. You are the guardians of our country's future. And so, how about if we give all of them a hand?

Yes, it is great standing here before you, for it brings back nothing but the fondest memories of the days back in 1959, when I arrived here in Fairbanks as a brand new green lieutenant. Much has changed since those years so long ago, but what has not changed is the caring support of the people in the state, for the thousands upon thousands of service men and women who have had the privilege to serve in the great state of Alaska. So "thank you" for that, Governor Hickel.

By the way, I believe that there are nearly 23,000 uniformed men and women stationed in Alaska today and that their family members add another 29,000. So there is a very large number of military folks who live, who train, and who thrive here in Alaska.

And one thing you might find interesting: for each of the 23,000 men and women in uniform you have accepted into your communities, there is a permanent citizen of Alaska serving today in our Armed Forces. That means 23,000 Alaskans are spread across the globe, serving in uniform.

And I want to assure you that they, like the men and women here tonight, are accomplishing the many missions we have assigned them whether here in Alaska, in Korea, in Europe, in Hawaii, in Panama, or the lower 48 with every bit of the courage, the skill, and the tenacity that Americans have grown to expect from their Armed Forces.

They are part of the 37,000 sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines standing constant vigil at the North Korean border as our military has been doing for over 40 years.

And they were part of the difficult and challenging operation in Somalia where they performed superbly and saved hundreds of thousands of Somali children, old men and women, from certain starvation. And because our men and women went to help, thousands upon thousands of Somalis are alive today. And now that we are out of Somalia, nothing, nothing that happens there in the weeks and months ahead can take away from that. And while we can debate what Washington should or should not have done, there must be no debate about the bravery and the sacrifice of those who serve as part of that noble undertaking.

And Alaskan service men and women serve as well as part of the operations in Italy, in Macedonia, in Croatia, and in Bosnia, where they are standing side by side with other U.N. and NATO forces trying to control the intensity of this civil war, and to keep the violence from spreading to neighboring countries and to broker a peace accord as soon as possible.

Our men and women are part of the air operation enforcing the no-fly ban over Bosnia and the U.N. mandate to stop the shelling of Sarajevo. These are the same air forces that just a few weeks ago shot down the four Serbian Galebs that violated the no-fly zone, and just last week, supported General Rose's order to protect U.N. forces by attacking Serbian positions firing upon U.N. observers. And today's reports from Sarajevo and Gorazde are a clear indication just how tough that job can be.

As an aside, while I was in Italy, I met with the two Air Force captains who shot down the Galebs that violated the no-fly zone and I saw the same steely confidence, that what they are doing is right, that they are the best trained, the best equipped and the best led fighting force in the world.

And these are just a few of the many places around the globe you will find proud Alaskan men and women, your sons and daughters, performing difficult and often dangerous missions for our Nation.

And tragic accidents, like Wednesday's downing of two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters over Northern Iraq, stand as a grim reminder of just how dangerous military life can be. While we still don't know all of the facts, I know each of you here tonight share in my sorrow. Because each of you understand as well as anyone, how very valuable each of these men and women are to their families and to their country. This is indeed a terrible loss.

But what about the future?

Well, the geostrategic breadth of our interests and the number of regions critical to our interests, make it imperative that we maintain the ability to respond to two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. Were we to become involved in a major response to aggression in any one of these regions, it is entirely possible that another of these nations would be tempted to attack its neighbors if it believed the U.S. is too weak to deal with two simultaneous contingencies. So this is the core-sizing requirement of our strategy.

But the forces and capabilities recommended in the Bottom Up Review to meet this core-sizing requirement are lean, in fact very, very lean. But I believe this smaller structure can do the job with an acceptable level of risk, if and only if, we meet two assumptions.

The first is that we protect and improve the readiness of our forces. The second is that we continue to improve the capabilities of our forces.

Readiness of our force must remain our central focus. All of you know what we went through after World War Two, after Korea, and again after Vietnam. It was a cycle of declines followed by disasters that we cannot, and will not, repeat.

And so, Operation and Maintenance accounts must be increased and we must fully fund the steaming days, the training hours, and the flight hours at levels that military commanders believe are essential.

And, as I said, we must grow in capabilities as we reduce our structure.

This increase in capabilities must come from a number of sources. It will require a degree of modernization. It will require the enhancements to our forces recommended in the Bottom Up Review. And it will require those of us in the Department of Defense, to be bolder in challenging how we do our business and to be relentless in finding and implementing ways to make our forces more and more effective on the battlefield.

What specifically am I talking about?

When you go from the M1A1 tank to the M1A2 tank, it increases the lethality of a tank company by nearly 20 percent. If we had had the C-17 for use in our deployment to Somalia, it would have doubled the cargo we would have been able to bring through the airfield of Mogadishu.

When we bring our Navy in closer to the shoreline, which is a core thrust of its new doctrine, we increase the air sorties and the naval support available to the warfighting commanders.

The Bottom Up Review listed a number of enhancements that will make our forces more capable; strategically, operationally, and tactically. It is imperative that we maintain support for them from R&D through fielding, in this and in out-year budgets.

We must improve our strategic lift so we can get to the crisis in time. We must increase our tank killing and smart munitions stocks and we must improve our command and control and intelligence systems. We need to do these things if this smaller force is to remain capable of defeating any two regional adversaries.

Now there is one last point about this future force, and that is our people, the very foundation of our military excellence, our ability to fight and win.

I cannot emphasize strongly enough what great men and women we have in our ranks today. When you look at what they are doing around the world, in all the places I have named, it is astounding.

They are talented and dedicated and if we want to retain them, and continue to recruit more like them, then we have to take care of their welfare and the welfare of their families. They are a Super Bowl team, but without Super Bowl wages.

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Let me make one or two observations. The first is a fact of American history. Since our nation was founded, we have never experienced a twenty-year period of uninterrupted peace. Put another way, no soldier in this country's history has ever completed a full military career when the nation did not engage in armed conflict at least once.

This is the reality that underscores our need to remain ready. We must remain prepared for the unexpected.

My second observation is simply a reminder, a reminder of how long it took and how very expensive and difficult it was to build this outstanding military force we have today.

It is wise to remember the great defense debate of our very first Congress in 1787, right after we had won our freedom. That debate started when a representative named Elbridge Gerry, who subsequently became Governor of Massachusetts and then Vice President under James Madison, introduced a resolution to permanently limit the size of our country's Armed Forces to 10,000 men.

Since in the minds of the members of our new Congress, there was a healthy distrust for large militaries, Gerry's resolution drew considerable support. In fact, the resolution was poised to be passed by a substantial majority until another representative, a man named George Washington, who had earned quite a reputation for himself during the Revolutionary War, remarked to the larger body, "It is a very good idea" he said. "And while we are at it, let us also limit by law, the size of any invading force to five thousand men."

Washington's reminder is as wise today as it was in 1787. We cannot legislate away our threats or our responsibilities. We have involved our military forces in more operations in the last few years than throughout the entire Cold War period and I expect that we have not yet seen the end.

So this smaller, leaner force must be more capable and more ready. But to be so, we will continue to need the strong will, the strong support, of people like you all across the country, of our President, and of our Congress.

The people of Alaska are well known for their stalwart support of the Armed Forces of this nation and that is certainly obvious tonight at this great gathering. And we will need your support even more in the coming years.

Make no mistake, without your dedication and commitment to the men and women in uniform sitting here among you, we will not be able to sustain this splendid force.

And so with that, let me close by once again thanking you for this evening and for caring so well for these outstanding men and women in uniform here tonight. God Bless you all, and God Bless the United States of America.

Memorial Service Honoring Victims of Friendly Fire Incident In Iraq
Fort Myer, Virginia
25 April 1994

Mr. President, Secretary Perry, members of the coalition armed forces, members of the foreign service, friends and families, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

We have come here to render last honors to the men and women who lost their lives on April 14th in northern Iraq. Their efforts were selfless. Their service was valiant. Their cause was noble.

We live in a dangerous world. From the policeman who walks our streets, to the fireman, to the soldier, sailor, airman, and marine, the dangers are real and tragedy is imminent. Yet our type of service and the nation's calling, demand that some will enter into harm's way to preserve the lives of people who are victims of aggression or natural tragedy. We are a nation of people that does this willingly and selflessly.

Twelve days ago, these heroes climbed into two Blackhawk helicopters and began an important mission, the same type that had been repeated many times over northern Iraq, the type that is repeated over and over around the world wherever our troops serve. But a terrible tragedy occurred, and now these men and women have come home for the last time.

To the family and friends — we grieve with you. Your loss is our loss. They were your sons and daughters, your parents your friends. They were our comrades in arms, fellow soldiers and airmen. I will not presume to say I know your hurt. I only know that part of me hurts when any of our service men and women you have given into my charge, falls in combat or suffers accidental death. Each of us here is aware of the dangers inherent with the missions we perform in foreign service in the air or on the sea. Troops don't talk about it openly but they and their families understand the dangers all too well.

What makes this loss doubly tragic is this particular mission. They were not fighting, they were providing care. They were saving lives protecting people from ruthless aggression. As much as each of us desire to alter the events of 14 April, sadly we cannot. We can only grieve the losses and take great solace and great pride in the work they were doing for others.

The scriptures talk about "Greater love hath no person than when they lay down their life for a friend." Feeding starving children, protecting people from aggression, they sacrificed their lives to ensure that others might live. What they were doing was valiant, and good, and right. To the Kurdish people of northern Iraq, to each of us here today, and to millions of people around the world they are truly heroes. No one understands that better or more clearly than the very people these men and women were protecting.

And in the dusty streets of Zakho, in Northern Iraq, the people have hung hundreds of banners in remembrance of these heroes, your family members, your friends and colleagues. One banner in particular stands out: "We mourn the loss of our heroes. God Bless their souls and God be with their families."

A proud nation honors your sons and daughters.

God Bless you and God Bless America.

Erskine Lecture Series
U.S. Marine Corps Foundation
Quantico, Virginia
10 May 1994

Thank you for the chance to be out of Washington for a while and to be here with you in Marine country, together with this country's senior Marine General, Carl Mundy. How about a hand for this great Marine and the Marine Corps's First Lady.

Now, I've been asked to spend a few moments talking to you about "Operations other than War," that is, peace operations ranging from humanitarian, to peacekeeping, to peacemaking operations. Frankly, I can't think of a more topical subject. Pick-up today's paper and the headlines will tell you why that is today's topic. Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq, and SOUTHERN WATCH in Southern Iraq, and the list goes on. And the stories behind the headlines will tell you just how far we have yet to go before we begin to understand, and begin to feel comfortable with our role in such operations. I cannot think of a better topic for the Erskine Lecture Series than "Operations other than War."

Certainly when you look back at General Erskine's extraordinary career, you will find an officer unsurpassed in leading our forces brilliantly and valiantly through some of the toughest campaigns of the First and Second World Wars.

But if you look at his career a little more closely, you will discover that between these wars General Erskine also saw service in Haiti, Santo Domingo, Cuba, Nicaragua, and China where his duties carried him outside of the stream of traditional warfighting. And you will also find that his final assignment was as Director of Special Operations, which in those days was a position nearly synonymous with Operations other than War. So let me spend these next few moments sharing some random thoughts on this still very controversial subject.

I first came face-to-face with "Operations other than War" in April 1991, when I received a call from General Jack Galvin, then our Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, telling me that he wanted me to leave right away for eastern Turkey and northern Iraq, to take command of an operation to save hundreds of thousands of Kurds who had been brutalized by Saddam Hussein. To save themselves from the attacking Iraqi Army, they had fled into the harsh mountains of northern Iraq. The headlines that day made the urgency clear: well over a thousand were dying every day and President Bush ordered our military to move with all dispatch, to protect the Kurds and to stop the misery and dying.

My first thought was that I have never heard of the Kurdish people and now my country expected me to organize an operation to protect them. My second thought was to go to my footlocker, the same footlocker I suspect many of you keep. The one where you store all those hundreds of manuals our service schools are so fond of giving out that you don't ever open, until you get back out to the field and suddenly discover you are expected to know what is in those manuals. And I started looking for something titled, "Operations other than War." And of course there was no such manual.

I wish there had been, and I wish we had studied that subject in school, for I could have been of more help to my terrific chief of staff then Marine Corps Brigadier General Toni Zinni, or to the first troops to rush to the scene under then Marine Colonel, now Brigadier General Bob Jones. With their help and the help of others from 13 nations, we were able to save hundreds of thousands of Kurds and to return them in record time to their homes in the valleys of Northern Iraq.

And while this operation was going on, another Marine, LTG Hank Stackpole was commanding Operation SEA ANGEL, saving thousands upon thousands of Bangladeshis caught up in one of nature's most savage typhoons. Both of these were essentially humanitarian operations and both were completed successfully. Since then, we have had other sanction enforcement in the Red Sea, in the Adriatic, around Haiti, humanitarian flights into the former Soviet Union, into Sarajevo in the world's longest running airlift, and airdrops into Bosnia, a peacekeeping force in Macedonia, medical care in Croatia, and peace enforcement over the skies of Bosnia. Only the other day, we rescued Americans from certain death in Rwanda, and as we speak, we are still extracting our people from north Yemen.

In short, since the end of the Cold War your Armed Forces have been, and are today, and I suspect will continue for the foreseeable future, to be involved in the full range of "Operations other than War."

Tonight let me narrow the subject to what I think are the most controversial of these operations, multilateral peace operations. It exploded with controversy on a hot, dusty October day in the streets of Mogadishu, when Special Operations forces conducted a raid to try to capture Aideed and his chief lieutenants. This raid came on the heels of several months of growing discomfort here in America about the meandering course of our mission in Somalia, an operation that started as a straightforward humanitarian operation. Then with some sense of disquiet, we found ourselves being

dragged reluctantly into something much larger, a murky hybrid between peace enforcement, nation-building, and sustained humanitarian operations.

Then on 3 October, Americans turned on their television sets and saw the same grisly scene repeated again and again; the searing image of a dead American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by bands of Somalis intoxicated on anti-Americanism. For some of us in this room tonight, that image from Somalia bore the disturbing trace of another image, an image we saw twelve years earlier: the sight of 241 Marines killed in Beirut, the moving picture of teams of medics sifting through the wreckage of a bombed and still smoldering building, and dazed survivors with bloody bandages and torn limbs milling about, shocked by the sheer carnage, as stretcher after stretcher was carried from this scene of horror.

That early experience with multilateral peace operations left a bitter and tragic taste. Like Somalia, Lebanon started with a clear logical and politically supported mandate. But we allowed events and circumstances to change our mission, to muddle our sense of purpose, to cause us to experiment with the limited application of force until with unexpected fury, incoherence, led to tragedy. So we find ourselves today trying to see past these images, wondering whether, and how to participate in multilateral peace operations, because twice before, our participation proved so very painful and so very costly.

But I have to share with you my view that comes after six months of sitting behind the Chairman's desk, watching the swirl of actions that sweep through my in-box, and visiting with all of our regional commands.

First and foremost, we must be crystal clear about one thing: the primary mission of our fighting men and women has been, and must remain, to fight and win our nation's wars. And nothing we do must detract from our ability to be the best fighting force around.

During the Cold War, with few exceptions like Lebanon, the weight of the bipolar confrontation kept most disputes well suppressed. Thus we grew up with the notion that the Armed Forces of the United States were there to fight major wars only. We didn't think much about it, it was an article of faith, that it was so. But the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War began to bring us face-to-face with a new reality.

I think the place to begin to understand this new reality is in understanding the great changes that have swept the world over the last five years, the threats facing our nation and our interests in this new era, and then how these changes have affected America's role in the world — our leadership.

Let me start with the changes. Unquestionably the greatest change was the disintegration of a global empire, parts of which existed for centuries, but an empire that grew from a regional power to global proportions in the last fifty years; an empire that engulfed in one form or another nearly one third of the world's nations, and then with great suddenness, the empire completely collapsed. This great upheaval led to the creation of more new nations and changed more national boundaries than even the end of the Second World War. And its useful to remember that it took nearly a decade following World War Two, for events to finally settle out.

Without a doubt we have just lived through a global earthquake, one that has left in its wake dozens of tremors, aftershocks, and fissures. And I think all of us need to realize, that it will be a decade or longer before some condition of normalcy returns. As President Yeltsin has written in his memoirs, "There are more cataclysms in store for us ... The empire is exacting its revenge for being dissolved."

What we see right now today, are more conflicts raging around the world than at any time during the Cold War: conflicts in Africa; in Asia; in the Middle East and Southwest Asia; around the periphery of what used to be the Soviet Union; and even in the heart of Europe.

A fundamental question we have to ask ourselves is what will deflate this frenzy of conflicts? Because if we and the other nations of this shrinking world do not act, then the cumulative effects of these conflicts will be a great risk to all of our futures. At risk is the world's economic order and the rule of international law we built over the past forty-five years. Also at risk are the great opportunities that are the fruit of the end of the Cold War, spreading democratization, and an end to divided regions and a divided world.

Some of these conflicts will threaten American interests or the security of our allies, as we see in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. Some of these conflicts will be threats to international stability, perhaps even the birthing grounds for much larger conflicts, again a factor in Bosnia. Others of these conflicts, however morally reprehensible they might be, will touch neither our interests nor our sensibilities, like I suspect the ongoing tragedy in Rwanda.

All of this said, I think it really is quite simple. We are the world's leading nation. We are a U.N. Security Council member, clearly its most powerful member. We are the leading nation of NATO. We are the only nation in Europe with the strength to counterbalance Russia's great power. We are the leading nation of our Asian alliances, our Latin American alliances, and our Southwest Asian alliances. When conflicts erupt in these regions, our allies will turn to us for our

leadership, our power, our prestige, and our singular ability to coalesce the action of the world's other nations. When a conflict in one of these regions touches our core interest we must not stand by idly.

Surely circumstances have arisen, and will arise in the future, in which it will be in our interest to proceed in partnership with others to preserve maintain or restore the peace. And the United Nations properly strengthened can be an important instrument of such partnership.

Certainly participation in U.N. peace operations can never substitute for the necessity of fighting and winning our wars, nor as I said a moment ago, must we allow it to reduce our capability to meet that imperative. It can, however, serve in effect as a "force multiplier" in our efforts to promote peace and stability.

Now, Americans have a very clear understanding of when we have to go and fight. We showed this in the Gulf. If the need were to arise, we would be prepared to go and defend South Korea. America understands where its core interests lie and we are every bit as willing to fight to protect those interests today as we were yesterday.

But we don't have such a firm foundation when it comes to peace operations, whether it is peacekeeping, the role of committing our forces to monitor a peace agreement between parties that appear legitimately to want peace, or peace enforcement, which might involve the use of our forces in combat operations to actually impose an end to hostilities. We badly need such an understanding. Because anytime the cameras start rolling, transmitting into our living rooms the brutal and heartrending pictures of faraway people fighting, of innocent children, old men, and women caught in the terror of war, of cities rubbled and in flames, the conflict moves much closer to the American people; it tugs at our hearts, it arouses our moral outrage. The holocaust that occurred in World War Two had made us alert that clearly there are times when moral outrage must be enough to propel us into action.

But at just such moments, we must also have a practical policy, a policy to guide us toward a workable and sustainable course because moral outrage and humanitarian impulses are brittle passions and their half lives tend to shorten when our own sons and daughters start to become casualties. And so we must be very selective when it comes to endangering our sons and daughters.

Before we commit our forces, we must necessarily ask whether the peace operation advances America's interests. And we must ask whether there is a strong prospect that the operation will have popular support and political support in our Congress. We cannot put the lives of American fighting men and women at risk against the will of our people. And we need to ensure that the operation has clearly defined political and military objectives, and a chain of command, and rules of engagement that we are confident in, because experience has taught us that peace operations are just as dependent on Clausewitzian principles as fighting wars.

Finally we must ask whether there is an identifiable endpoint for American participation, so that we do not find ourselves trapped in a string of quagmires, our forces tied down in dozens of the world's Irelands and Cypruses. I think that if we ask ourselves these questions and treat them rigorously we will have learned from some of our past mistakes.

But let me dwell on three principles, core principles that go to the heart of our strategic and operational doctrine for peace operations. The first principle is perseverance.

Peace operations, by definition, have different objectives than wars. To achieve these objectives, very often inaction must replace action, negotiation must replace battle, and avoidance must replace the desire to close with and destroy. In peace operations, attempts to rush or to prod the progression to peace with force rarely succeed. Such actions ignite the passions of the fighters and invite retaliation and escalation. Like war itself, peace is ultimately a political act. In peace operations we must have the patience and the perseverance to hold force in abeyance and let the diplomats do their job.

The second principle is that we must always, always be prepared for the worst. We must send in a force that can handle the unexpected, because to do otherwise invites any ill-intended opportunist from exploiting our vulnerability. In practical terms, this means that whatever forces we send must be trained, equipped, and positioned to shift immediately from keeping the peace to fighting. We must send enough of a force to ensure self-protection and our ability to get the job done. More is better, less is not.

Third we must proceed with the clear intent of decisively defeating any attempt at escalation. If we are going to respond with force it must be decisive force. Over a century ago, that most brilliant strategist, Clausewitz, warned that any time you approach an opponent with no more than an ornamental rapier when he is armed with a sharp sword, then you are moving on a devious path where the God of War may catch you unaware.

As in warfare, we must understand the centers of gravity of our antagonists and we must be prepared to strike those centers of gravity with effective force. Again, this is a vital element of deterrence, to convince all sides that we are able and willing to punish and that attacking our forces will be foolish.

I'd like to leave you with a final thought. It has become very popular to argue that the American Armed Forces

cannot be the world's 911 number. And certainly I think all of us here in this room agree with this sentiment. But having said this, what number are we? Because we cannot just be the world's operator transferring one difficult call after another to some other party. The essence of international leadership is carrying the most difficult challenges, and this includes cases that touch our interests of sending our forces into multilateral peace operations.

Our nation must keep its position of international leadership so that we can maintain our influence in the world's economic order, its political order, and so that our beliefs and interests remain a dominant factor in shaping the world as we enter the next century. This challenge will not go away. Today we are facing the question of what to do about Bosnia. But long after Bosnia is settled and the fighting has stopped, there will be other conflicts that will threaten our interests. It is not a problem of President Clinton's making. It is the unwelcome fallout of the welcome collapse of the bipolar confrontation. And it will remain one of the major challenges faced by future administrations well into the 21st century.

And so your and my challenge is to master these "Operations other than War," to understand them as well as we understand our principal mission, that of fighting and winning our nation's wars.

Now let me leave with you with a tale about a marine chaplain who was assigned to the Marine peacekeeping forces in Nicaragua between the First and Second World Wars. This particular chaplain, who was quite hefty, was with an infantry unit that was deployed to guard posts throughout the countryside. His physical condition made the long treks to visit the troops at their various posts quite arduous. Finally one day, he struck on an idea and visited one of the local monasteries to see if he could purchase a mule. To his great fortune, one of the monks had the perfect animal for him, a large and powerful mule clearly capable of carrying his great weight. But as he bought the mule the monk warned him that the animal only responded to two commands. If you wanted the animal to move then you uttered the words, "Thank God." But if you wanted the mule to stop, you said, "Hail Mary." The chaplain thought this was wonderful. "Thank God" to get the beast moving, "Hail Mary" to make him stop.

The next day, he mounted his mule said the obligatory, "Thank God," and trotted off to visit his marines at their outposts. After he visited the third outpost, he realized that it was getting late and that he and his mule had to travel faster. Digging his heels into the mule's flanks he spurred him on to a trot and soon a full gallop. Suddenly he looked ahead and saw that he was galloping toward a cliff. In his fear he couldn't remember how to order the mule to stop. As the mule continued to gallop furiously toward the cliff, the chaplain bellowed out every religious phrase that came to his mind. Finally, just before the edge of the cliff, he remembered the magic words and screamed out, "Hail Mary."

As promised, the mule came to an abrupt stop right on the edge of the cliff. The chaplain leaned over the beast's head and looked down at what appeared to be a thousand-foot drop. Overcome with relief he looked up to the sky and uttered out, "Thank God."

This story reminds me that sometimes it is entirely possible to say too much. And I certainly hope that I haven't already made the same mistake as the chaplain. Thank you for this opportunity to share these thoughts with you. And now if I have not already exhausted your attention, I would be pleased to take some questions.

Mid-America Club
Chicago, Illinois
13 May 1994

It is a great pleasure to come here today to Chicago and to share some thoughts with this great club on some of the more pressing issues of our national defense.

Although I must be candid. When I read the list of past speakers: three former presidents; government ministers from around the world; President Gorbachev; Maggie Thatcher; and most recently Warren Christopher and Jim Woolsey; I began to feel like Michael Jordan playing for the White Sox. I am afraid my shortcomings are going to be all too evident.

In another month as all of you know, we will join with the nations of Western Europe to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the D-Day invasion. Then, throughout the next year, we will commemorate other great battles of the Second World War. For many of us here in this room like myself, a young child who found himself trapped between the crushing pincers of the vast armies that fought across Europe, these great events seem very fresh and very vivid. This is because these events, after all, shaped the world we were to live in throughout our adult lives.

And it makes me wonder, and I think it should make all of us wonder, what the young people today will look back on as the great events that shaped their adulthood?

What images will flicker through their minds when they look back?

Will they think of the image of delirious East and West Germans rushing to embrace each other on that chilly but heart-warming November night when the Berlin Wall came tumbling down? Or will they think about the great ticker-tape parades of our victorious forces returning from their very extraordinary victory over Saddam Hussein's army? Or will it be more painful images like the sight of a dead American soldier dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by a crowd of Somalians intoxicated on anti-Americanism?

Or perhaps the ghastly and barbaric sights of the war in a disintegrated Yugoslavia; a war of long-stemmed hatreds that has raged on and on in the very heart of Europe for over two years, withstanding the unyielding pressure of every power in Europe and America to try to force it to an end.

And I wonder if there will be any Yaltas in their memories; Yaltas not in the sense that we would sit at a table and bargain away nations and peoples leaving them to the domination of a harsh dictatorship, as we naively did after the Second World War, but other more subtle forms of compromise where we bargain away the security of future generations because we lack resolve or confidence in our strength.

I wonder about this because we are truly in a pivotal period a period of sweeping changes, a time of great challenges and also a time of enormous opportunities. It is a time of decisions, many decisions; decisions about what we want for the future, decisions about what we are willing to do to shape that future, and decisions about how and when to engage our still enormous power. And this is what I would like to discuss with you today, what we must do to meet these challenges and to seize these opportunities. Because very clearly if we try to ignore the challenges, either because they are too great or too expensive, then the opportunities, opportunities fought for on the beaches of Normandy, and opportunities we fought for again and again throughout the Cold War, will wither away and today's opportunities may become tomorrow's nightmares.

Now let me step back a little in time to two events.

When I became Chairman only six months ago, then-Secretary of Defense Aspin had only a few months before completed the Bottom Up Review.

As a result of that review he and the administration recommended that we shape and size our future forces to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. This review and its conclusions sparked a debate that continues to this day. Even though by 1999 our defense budget will shrink to less than half what we paid for defense in 1985, and even though the size of our Armed Forces will be reduced by about a third of their size only three years ago, there is still great pressure to cut deeper.

And even though the Bottom Up Review built what I am thoroughly convinced is a very strong and defensible strategic justification for our forces, the ability to fight and win two major regional contingencies this justification is still being hotly debated.

The other event that occurred shortly before I became Chairman was the tragic firefight in the streets of Mogadishu on 3 October (1993), where 18 of our soldiers were killed and another 80 were wounded.

Against the backdrop of a public mood that was already uneasy over multilateral peace operations, the tragedy in Mogadishu created a searing image an image that charged the atmosphere of our public debate over whether we have any business getting involved in multilateral peace operations.

In one way or another throughout these past months we have been dealing with these two events: one, the conclusions of the Bottom Up Review and the other, the need to formulate a new policy for when and how we should engage our power and our forces.

Let me explain this more fully. While a number of the ever restless pundits of Washington have been criticizing the over-generosity of the Bottom Up Review, American men and women in uniform have been sitting along the Demilitarized Zone in Korea staring vigilantly across a narrow strip of land at the fourth largest military force in the world today. When North Korea's delegate walked out of a meeting with his South Korean counterpart, threatening that Seoul would be engulfed in a sea of fire, none of these men and women felt that we have failed to cut enough.

And in Southwest Asia, where our naval and air and ground units are still there three years after the Gulf War ended, still enforcing the U.N. sanctions and the no-fly zone against Iraq, still there keeping the Iraqis from using airpower to slaughter the Shiites in southern Iraq and the Kurds in northern Iraq, there is no doubt in the minds of the forces performing these dangerous missions about our need to keep our forces strong.

If you are in either of these two locations, Korea or Southwest Asia, maintaining and improving our ability to fight and win two major regional conflicts sounds very, very reasonable and justifiable. In fact anything less sounds astoundingly unreasonable.

Nor are there any doubts in the minds of twenty thousand more Americans from our command in Europe involved

in the series of NATO and U.N. operations in former Yugoslavia. Every day they are watching a modern, and what we used to regard as a civilized European nation, tearing itself apart in a fierce war between neighbors; a war inflamed by historical hatreds, a war that would have no limits to its barbarity were it not for our efforts to contain it.

These American men and women around former Yugoslavia have a very unique and a very revealing perspective on what this post-Cold War world is like.

They sense that if it were not for their efforts, that the war in Yugoslavia could very well have spread beyond the borders of Bosnia dragging in more surrounding nations and inebriating more people with the passions and hatreds that have already caused so many deaths.

Some wise man noted that Bosnia has become a gruesome paraphrase of George Santayana's very famous warning because it shows that in this new era, very often it is those who remember history who are destined to repeat it. Sadly this is very true in very many places in this new era.

My past six months have been spent shuttling between the debating forums in Washington to visiting our forces in the field in Korea, Somalia, Panama, Italy, and Yugoslavia where the action is very, very real and very dangerous.

In Washington, I read the views of columnists who one day criticize the administration for failing to cut our forces deeper and the very next day, criticize the administration for staying out of the fighting in Bosnia, or for not sending in our forces to overturn the military government in Haiti. It strikes me as the height of irony that many of the same critics who want more and more of our forces shelved also want their own brigades of infantry that they can dispatch around the world. While I applaud their very sincere human compassion I also question where they think we need to be economical.

Let me tell you that the uniformed young men and women on the front lines of this new era are not debating whether the Bottom Up Review is too generous.

When they see a man like Zhironovsky, a blustering disturbingly popular nationalist who thinks he is the modern reincarnation of Nikita Khruschev, there aren't any doubts in their minds why we have to remain strong.

When they see the reemergence of nationalism in Russia they have no illusions about what this could mean for our future.

When they remember the great battle of the Gulf War and the evidence of the atrocities committed by Saddam's forces in Kuwait City before we drove them out, they have no doubts.

To me and to them, there is no doubt that we need to remain strong, that our forces need to stay ready, that we need to continue to modernize and to improve the capabilities of our forces.

But don't misunderstand me. Our forces can grow smaller. As small as the administration recommended but no smaller.

We can shrink our structure but only if we add to the capabilities of our smaller force. We need to expand our strategic lift our ability to move our forces very swiftly to the trouble spots of the world.

And we must have more of the spectacular technologies that made such a difference in the Gulf War like stealth aircraft and very long-range and very precise munitions that will allow us to destroy enemy forces before they can come close enough to our own forces to fire back. It is these systems that allow us to win our battles with our brains, our technological advantages, and our superior training, not with the deaths of many thousands of our courageous young men and women.

And there are two areas we have to watch very, very closely. The first of these is our people, the true source of our military excellence. Today we have the finest people in uniform any nation could ask for.

But if we want to retain these quality men and women we must protect their pay their benefits and their quality of life. When you look at what our men and women in uniform are doing around the world today and what we may need them to do tomorrow, it should eliminate any temptation to look for more savings from their paychecks. They are a Super Bowl team but they are not getting Super Bowl wages.

The second watchword is readiness. We must keep our forces ready. We must break the cycle that has occurred every other time in this century when after a major conflict, we have reduced our forces, a cycle of far too-rapid reductions that resulted in hollowness and that devastated readiness. With our smaller future force there is no question it must be a ready force.

We must do these things and more because if we don't improve the capabilities of our forces, keep our outstanding people, and protect our readiness then the future force structure recommended by this administration will prove too small and today's peace dividends will become tomorrow's irreversibly tragic regrets.

Now let me return to that second concern I mentioned earlier, our need for a tangible understanding of when and how to engage our military forces in multilateral peace operations. I remember back to the week when it was announced

that I was to replace my good friend Colin Powell and a popular weekly news magazine published a cover story with my picture under the dubious title of "Globocop."

Well if any of you have been reading the editorials over past weeks, you will see that both Bill Perry and I are now being charged with pacifist tendencies. Apparently in the past six months I have made a very long spiritual journey.

The topic that led to this accusation was the quandary over what to do to accelerate the peace process in Bosnia and the appropriate use of American military power to support the multilateral peace operation on the ground.

What makes this issue so difficult is that Bosnia is a new kind of challenge and a new form of military operation for America and its Armed Forces. And this the same kind of quandary that we found so wrenching throughout our commitment to Somalia.

Throughout the Cold War, whenever it came to multilateral peace operations, both superpowers were issued a red card that excluded either of us from participation.

American forces were called to fight time and again but not to separate belligerents, because it was nearly impossible to either claim or to maintain the neutrality that is the calling card of any effective peacekeeper. We were the Super Bowl team not the umpire.

But the great change in the global environment has made us eligible for these kinds of operations, humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations.

In fact it has thrown us into the position where we must either participate or accept a lesser position in world affairs than is commensurate with our power, our stature, and our interests.

But before you accept this as a statement of fact let me explain why I make such a bold statement.

The end of the Cold War has led to the birth of more new nations and a greater shifting of international borders than occurred even at the end of the Second World War. And as all of you recall all too well, it took over ten years of conflict and civil wars and great turmoil before those changes settled out. As it was the great settling factor was the dynamic of the Cold War and the smothering competition between two great opposing blocs.

If you look around the world today at the fires that are smoldering or already burning around the periphery of the ex-Soviet Union, at the potent religious struggles bubbling very dangerously in Southwest Asia and South Asia, and at the inflammatory ethnic strains wracking the Balkans you realize that we are in another era of great turbulence. There are more conflicts raging today than at any time since the Second World War.

What this points toward is that we are going to have to decide what kind of a role America is going to take in combating this growing crop of conflicts. It is a difficult challenge for us because few of these conflicts will represent a direct and easily perceivable threat to our nation. Yet when you think about it, it is nearly axiomatic that a peace operation will involve something less than a clear threat to a compelling national interest.

Last week as you know, President Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive establishing our policy toward future involvement in multilateral peace operations. Among other elements, the new policy recognizes that peace operations are one of a number of ways in which we might engage our power, but never at the price of compromising our strategy of remaining prepared to fight and win two major regional conflicts.

The policy also detailed a series of factors we would consider before committing our forces to multilateral peace operations, such as whether the operation advances American interests, whether domestic and congressional support exists or can be marshaled, whether there are clear objectives and an identifiable endpoint for U.S. participation, and whether command and control arrangements are acceptable.

These factors apply to American participation in any peace operation, but more difficult questions arise when the peace operation entails the possibility of combat operations for our forces.

I think that when you review our experience in past peace operations, if you look back to Beirut or you look at more recent instances Somalia and Bosnia, you must necessarily ask how we will ensure that we don't repeat past mistakes.

Clausewitz probably said it best when he warned that any time you approach an opponent carrying no more than an ornamental rapier, when he is armed with a sharp sword, then you are moving on a devious path where the God of War may catch you unaware.

Whenever we send our forces into potentially dangerous operations we must send a force that can handle the unexpected. Whatever forces we send must be large enough and powerful enough to defend themselves and must be ready to shift from keeping the peace to fighting. And if we are going to respond with force it must be decisive force.

If we violate these principles, we place at risk both our forces and our objectives. The American people will not stand idly by while their uniformed men and women are hapless targets. And the American people know all too well that a slap on the face does not stop a boxer. It merely invites a punch.

But I also think that if we adhere to our new policy and we stand by the principles I just described, we will have

strong and effective guidelines for making the right judgments for future operations. Occasionally we are going to have to involve our forces in these types of operations. But we must be selective and when we do become involved we must do so effectively more effectively than the past.

Now before I finish speaking, you might be wondering why I grouped these two topics, the need to support the military force recommended by the administration in the Bottom Up Review and our policy for when and how to involve our forces in multilateral peace operations.

I combined these two in this speech because the first will determine the strength of our future military power and the second addresses our will to use our strength in what promises to be one of the greatest and the most recurring challenges of this new era. How the American people decide on these two issues will be the determinants of our ability to go strongly and confidently into the 21st Century.

All of you here know that the end of the Cold War does not mean we can take a vacation from our leadership. It has become cliche to argue that we cannot be the world's 911 number. I think all of us accept the sentiment underlying this now common warning. But if we are not the world's 911 number, then what number are we? Because we also cannot afford to be the world's operator forever transferring calls to others.

I spoke earlier of images and Yaltas wondering what our children would look back upon as the great events that shaped their lives. I think one Yalta we must avoid is leaving the next generation a gutted out defense, either because our military equipment is so antiquated or our national arsenal has shrunk so small and eroded to such a state of impotence, that America can no longer exert the influence to protect our vast interests or to exert the leadership that is commensurate with our power. Yet another would be the memory of an America too timid or too confused to effectively engage its forces to help shape and stabilize a world fraught with turmoil and conflict.

Today, America has the finest and the most powerful Armed Forces in the world. We are the world's greatest power. There is no challenge we cannot overcome. Let us keep it that way.

Thank you for this opportunity to share these views with you. I could not think of a better audience nor a more important group of people with whom to share my views on these very important topics and I am very, very appreciative for your attention.

Bradley University Commencement
Peoria, Illinois
14 May 1994

Distinguished guests, parents and families, faculty and staff, graduating students of Bradley University.

What a thrilling and splendid sight you are you — the graduating classes of Bradley University. I know that I speak for everyone gathered here in saying how very proud we are of what you have accomplished. You did it!

But your remarkable success has been made possible by a remarkable institution. And so this day is a triumph for that institution as well.

One of the many past speakers who came to this school reminded us that "after all, a school does not consist of stone and mortar nor of costly apparatus, but of human thought and love." It is the abundance of human thought and of love that makes Bradley such a great university, such a wellspring of learning and inspiration. And it is you the faculty and staff who add these qualities in such rich measure. Thank you.

And of course it is wonderful as well to see so many families and friends all gathered here to share in this joy and the accomplishments. Your presence makes this graduation that much more meaningful and memorable.

The last time I was in this field house was 36 years ago for my own graduation. Since then, some things on this campus have changed of course.

Back then the school mascot actually bore a striking resemblance to the name of our team, the Braves. This was even before Sully's Bar took the truly generous step of providing a bus shuttle service to and from the University.

In many ways Bradley was a more challenging school then. We had to walk to our favorite bars. Harder yet we had to find our way back afterward.

As I thought back and tried to remember what was said at my graduation, I found myself puzzled that I couldn't remember a word or even a thought from my graduation speaker. But as I look at many of you today, bleary-eyed, still thoroughly ravaged from the great strains of the Senior Walk, it is all very clear to me why I couldn't remember what was said.

So to ensure that not too much of what I have to say will be forgotten, I will be very brief. But I want to talk about the future, your future, and a little about the world that you are graduating into.

A few months ago, President Clinton sent me on a mission to Eastern Europe to meet with the leaders of the newly freed nations of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

It was a strange sensation returning to the cities of my childhood. For me it was a visit filled with nostalgia, memories of slow walks with my mother through the parks of Warsaw. While much is changing, it was sad to see the blight still hanging over what were once some of the most beautiful capitals in Europe. There is a grayness, the residue of nearly four decades of communist rule that has yet to fully dissipate.

But the people are now truly proud and erect. For the first time in many, many decades, they have hope for a brighter and more fulfilling future.

And I recalled as we went first to Warsaw, then Budapest, then Prague, and finally Bratislava, that all four of these cities once hosted some of the finest universities in the world.

They were once the breeding grounds of great philosophers, world famous writers, artists and musicians, and of the skilled engineers and architects who built some of the world's most majestic cities; towering cities overlooking the great rivers that run through Europe.

Then World War II came along. Suddenly all of Europe became a battleground. One army after another swept through the beautiful cities of my childhood leaving in their path destruction broken societies pain and suffering. Even after the war ended, the destruction continued. The Soviet Union emerged from that war with an unquenchable thirst for expansion for power for suppressing other nations and their peoples.

It was the universities that were most rigorously and ruthlessly repressed, because it is in universities where men and women are taught to question, to explore, to discover, to reject certainties and uncertainties alike. Soon, the great universities of Eastern Europe were no more. They lay buried under the boots of tyrants. And the lights went out in Eastern Europe.

And as I went to these cities where I had spent my early childhood, I thought of the great education I received here in America here at Bradley.

I thought what a great thing it is indeed to be able to go to a university where intellectual growth has no limits, where fear is not the prevalent emotion, and where one was free to choose any path.

Now, you are sitting where I sat 36 years ago, as have so many thousands of others over the years, filled with mixed emotions, with ambition and uncertainty, with confidence and insecurity, with enormous curiosity about what you have to offer and what the world has to offer you. Let me tell you something of that world.

When I came to Bradley, few families had a television. Only the very rich had air conditioning. Landing on the moon was a very distant dream; commercial jets were still a couple of years away. The few computers that existed were monstrous and ungainly things. They filled entire rooms with thousands of gas-filled tubes all producing less than a thousandth of the computing power of the microchips we find today in children's toys.

Small Pox, polio, and massive famines wiped out millions every year. Cooking, cleaning, and caring for children still took nearly every waking hour. Few women worked outside their homes.

The year before I graduated, the Soviets launched a tiny space vehicle called Sputnik that sent a shudder of dread across America. Suddenly we realized that a nuclear warhead could be placed on a missile and sent around the world to demolish our cities and our civilization.

All of this was less than four decades ago. It is simply astounding to realize how very much our lives have been changing in so short a time. At no time in the history of mankind have the very foundations of human thought, knowledge, and existence itself been changing so swiftly and dramatically.

We are in a revolutionary era all at once; an age of invention, an age of enlightenment, an age of unprecedented social progress, but also an age of great danger. For the first time in modern memory there are no empires on the face of the earth. So many miracles are occurring in our laboratories that it dulls our senses to the vastness to the extraordinary magnificence of the forces that are altering the most fundamental aspects of our lives.

No disease, not cancer, not AIDS, nor even the common cold will long survive the onslaught of our medical research. Bio-genetics will explode our ability to produce food. We are creating machines that can think, robots that can work, and vehicles that we launch into space to explore the darkest reaches of the universe surrounding us.

Our entire approach to learning to giving birth to sustaining our health and vitality to protecting our environment to nearly every aspect of our lives is evolving progressing and improving. We continue to find better ways to make ourselves more and more productive to entertain ourselves to construct our homes our cities and our roads.

With the end of the Cold War, billions of the world's citizens most of whom have never known freedom are free

now to choose their own governments, to embrace the prosperity that comes from free markets, and to find new ways to create world peace. For the first time in my life the world is not divided into armed camps on the verge of a conflict that would threaten our very existence.

But also, it is still a world with vast numbers of nuclear weapons with the power still to destroy ourselves. And with all the other great advances we have made we still do not have a cure for the fiery, explosive passions such as we see in Bosnia, in Rwanda, around the periphery of what used to be the Soviet Union, and in too many other places; passions that ignite wars of intense hatred. Nor do we have a remedy for ruthless dictators such as Kim Il Sung or Saddam Hussein who terrorize and murder without remorse.

This is the world you are entering. It is a different world then the one my generation entered 36 years ago. And while dangers abound in nearly every way I can think of, it is a remarkably better and a more hopeful world than what we have known.

In the cities of my childhood and in very many other cities around the world, the lights of freedom have come back on. You will have the challenge of keeping these lights burning because from these lights will come the extraordinary miracles that will make life in the next century so very, very promising.

America is strong and free and powerful and still the richest most prosperous and most productive nation on our planet. We are rich with educated citizens, rich with inventive and innovative industries, and rich with powerful democratic allies to help us carry the burdens of global stability and peace. Most importantly we are also rich in ideas and in principles and in our willingness to work hard. You must help keep it this way.

Each of you are now inheriting the dreams of our Nation, of our society, and of the world we are trying to build. It falls on your shoulders to carry forward the great progress we have been making and to seize the many opportunities that lay before us.

And as I look at you I'm very envious. The age ahead, the rest of this decade and the new century beyond, hold out a promise of opportunities and possibilities undreamed of even today. In your lifetime man will match dream with reality like he could never do before.

But most of all I envy your generation, for I think you have the wisdom and the heart to set aside old hatreds and old prejudices and make yours the century in which every race and nationality, men and women of every walk of life, can rise to their full potential and live in peace.

Winston Churchill, England's great wartime leader, once remarked, "To every man there comes a time in his lifetime, that special moment when he is tapped on the shoulder and offered the chance to do a very special thing unique and fitting to his talents. What a tragedy if that moment finds him unprepared for the work that would be his finest hour."

Graduation from this distinguished university is a major step in your preparation for the opportunities you will face. In just a moment, President Brazil will hand you your diplomas. This piece of paper is the key to all of life's vast opportunities and possibilities. You have earned it. I encourage each of you to use it well.

And as you walk into tomorrow, believe in yourself; set your own course and reach for happiness for yourself and those around you. Godspeed to you all.

American Academy of Achievement
Las Vegas, Nevada
18 June 1994

Let me begin by telling you what a great pleasure and honor it is for me to be here with you today, and to have a chance to share some thoughts with you. Today you will be hearing the life stories of 20 or so very remarkable people, men and women who have accomplished truly extraordinary things in their lives. So I must warn you that my particular story is really quite unremarkable. As I tell you this story, I want to impress that point upon you. Mine really is an unremarkable story in this great nation of ours.

I was born in Poland in 1936. When I was three years old, Hitler and Stalin concluded a secret pact to attack Poland and divide it between their two expanding empires. When their armies attacked that spring, it started the Second World War, and my life changed.

For the next six years, until I was nine years old, one Army after another fought across Europe. They were truly terrible years. One beautiful city after another was destroyed and entire societies were shattered, as these armies left in

their path tremendous destruction and despair. All across Europe, well over twenty million died and many millions of others were left homeless.

But when the war ended, it was not followed by peace. Instead it led directly into a new kind of war, the start of the Cold War. As one European nation after another fell to the Soviet Union, Europe remained poor, divided, tense, sitting on the verge of another terribly destructive conflict.

At the age of 16, I left Europe with my family to come to America. I arrived as part of one of the very many waves of immigrants that have formed this country, filled with hope and anxiety, and trying to adjust to life in a new land.

We settled in the Midwest, where a local church and our neighbors helped us to adjust and learn how to become Americans. I finished high school and college and was then drafted into the Army.

I must admit to you that when I was drafted I did not have any great longing of making the military a career. I was very, very proud to serve, and I can still remember the tingles on the back of my neck when I took the oath of service that is repeated by everyone entering the service.

I understood, perhaps better than most, why Americans must serve. I knew what a wonderful country this is, and my childhood had taught me what happens when a country is not well defended.

That was 36 years ago. Obviously, I decided to stay in the military. And, as I think about it, there are really two forces that kept me in uniform.

The first is my love for this country. There truly is no other country in the world like it. Whether by birth or immigration, there is no greater privilege than to be an American.

And second, like most other military men, I fell in love with military life. I found the greatest fulfillment from working with dedicated young men and women who are performing the very noble task of defending America. And I have always been tremendously challenged in ways that I have found personally gratifying, whether that was running a missile site in Germany, or performing staff duty in Korea, or bringing humanitarian aid to the Kurds in northern Iraq.

So what are my personal lessons? You must believe that what you are doing with your life is meaningful. You don't have to be defending your country to do this, although I would certainly love to see any of you decide to join the Armed Forces, whether for a few years or for a career. And I thoroughly recommend it to you. But when you look at the other men and women who will speak to you today, you will see that there are really very many ways to serve your country and mankind.

And you must love what you are doing. Because only if you love your work, will you have any chance to excel. All of you have taken classes in subjects that were not very interesting to you. And you probably learned that it is more difficult and tedious to master those subjects than the ones you enjoyed more. The choice you make in choosing a career has the same effect.

And so, knowing that you will be hearing from 20 men and women today, I only hope that I have not already spoken too long. Do you have any questions?

Press Briefing — Investigation into friendly fire incident in Iraq
The Pentagon
Washington, DC
13 July 1994

On Thursday of last week, the 7th of July, I forwarded the accident investigation report to Secretary Perry with the recommendations of General Joulwan, our senior commander in Europe, for correcting the problems within the task force, and more broadly, within the European Command, as well as my own recommended actions to be applied to American forces worldwide.

As General Andrus' report describes, there were a shocking number of instances where individuals failed to do their jobs properly. This fact, I'm convinced, more than any other contributing cause, led to this tragedy. Had everyone involved been doing their job correctly, this tragic accident would not have happened.

Now that Secretary Perry has accepted the findings and recommendations of this accident report, it has been forwarded, as he earlier mentioned, to the appropriate four star commanders for their review and their legal investigation, and where warranted, appropriate disciplinary action.

Neither the Secretary nor I can expand on this legal process beyond what I just said, without the fact or the appearance of improper command influence.

As far as the corrective actions are concerned, our first priority was to correct that which had gone so very wrong

in northern Iraq. To that end, almost immediately after the accident, new rules of engagement were issued to our European Command that provide greater protection for helicopters. Within the task force, AWACS crews were directed to follow procedures that fully integrate the operation of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. Command and control arrangements were revised to provide more effective oversight and direction over the task force. Communications with the task force were simplified, and all aircraft were directed to monitor a common radio frequency so they could communicate directly with one another.

In addition, the European Command has taken other steps that include checks to ensure that AWACS and flight crews are fully qualified to perform their missions, as well as making revisions to the techniques used by aircraft to visually and electronically identify other aircraft.

However, while these corrective actions in our European command are on track, we felt very strongly that it would have been a mistake to assume that what happened on the 14th of April in northern Iraq could not happen elsewhere. Therefore, Secretary Perry and I also directed a series of corrective actions aimed at our forces deployed worldwide.

We publish guidance to all forces that established procedures and guidelines that form the very basis of how we operate together to perform our mission. In this case, our forces were operating under the guidelines that pertain to joint task forces. These guidelines, if followed, should have ensured the safe integration of different forces and aircraft in the safe area of operations. We found that the members of the task force were not adequately familiar with the guidelines they were given, and failed to follow some critical directives.

While proper actions have already been taken to correct it in Europe, more broadly, we have directed a complete review of all task forces operating worldwide to ensure they are complying with published guidance. Additionally, the higher headquarters of all joint task forces have been directed to ensure that they rigorously and routinely inspect and check their joint task force. In addition, I've directed the Joint Staff to examine, and if necessary, to make appropriate changes in the training we use to prepare our officers to serve in joint task forces.

The second problem was the performance of the AWACS crew. General Andrus described this problem in some detail. As a result, we are taking action to ensure that no other AWACS crews worldwide, or for that matter, any of the other types of tactical air command and control crews we have in our forces, have similar problems. Therefore, we have directed all the services to reexamine how they train and certify their people to perform this very vital function.

The Air Force specifically has been directed to use the lessons learned from this tragedy to develop a retraining program for all AWACS personnel, and then to certify the accomplishment of that retraining.

The third major problem was the fact that the F-15 pilots did not correctly identify the helicopters as friendly Black Hawks. As a result, the Air Force is well into reviewing and revising the visual identification techniques and procedures, with particular emphasis on helicopters. We have directed the other services to do the same and have it completed by 30 September. Additionally, we directed them to ensure that our aircrews are trained to recognize all kinds and different configurations of aircraft they are likely to encounter in the area in which they might be operating.

The fourth problem which General Andrus described were the procedural problems of fast-flying fixed wing aircraft and helicopters operating in the same area. Different procedures were used for command and control of these two different kinds of aircraft. This led to confusion at the very moment when the decision had to be made about whether the helicopters were friendly or not.

While the European Command took immediate corrective action to end this problem, I have directed the Joint Staff to publish new guidelines for worldwide operations that build on the lessons learned from this tragedy, and to create a standard, uniform, operating procedure.

Complementing this effort, Secretary Perry has directed that in the broadest sense I examine the adequacy of our procedures for joint air operations and report back to him my findings as soon as possible.

The fifth major problem was the failure of the electronic identification system. Despite hundreds of hours of testing, we still don't know why the system failed to alert the F-15s that the helicopters were friendly. That is particularly in Mode Four. We will continue to try to find out why the systems didn't function as they were supposed to. But beyond that, we need to develop new and better technologies to minimize the chances of this happening again. As many of you know, we have been reviewing technological improvements for these kinds of systems, not just for our air forces, but also our land forces. Secretary Perry and I directed the services and the Joint Staff to expedite these reviews and to forward recommendations to us by the 30th of September.

Secretary Perry has also directed the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology to assure an aggressive acquisition effort to follow up on these recommendations.

As well, we directed the services to examine their training on these electronic systems and to expand their emphasis on the limitations of electronic identification systems.

The corrective actions that I have outlined have been communicated to the service chiefs and our senior commanders worldwide. I have also convened a conference of the Joint Chiefs and all of our senior commanders later this month. At that meeting we will review the progress made to date, and we will discuss what we need to do to implement all of these directives by the end of December.

Investigating a tragedy of this nature is an enormously difficult and emotionally straining task. I believe, and I hope you share the view, that the investigation was methodical, thorough, and candid. A wide range of errors and problems were disclosed, including leadership problems, which must and will be corrected.

Now, before I turn the floor back to Secretary Perry, let me convey one more time my deepest condolences and sympathy to the families and loved ones of those who died on April 14th. As I said on one previous occasion, the loss of these 26 men and women I think touches the very fabric of our institution.

The military is an institution whose code and passion is to take care of each other and to make sure that we protect one another from any danger. So when a tragic incident like this happens, it is for us an especially deep loss. But it also moves us on to an unwavering commitment to correct that which went on. That is what we now must pursue. We owe no less to those who died that day.

USCINCPAC Change of Command
Honolulu, Hawaii
1 August 1994

Admiral and Mrs. Macke, Melissa, Admiral and Mrs. Kelly, General and Mrs. Rutherford, Admiral and Mrs. Zlatoper, Admiral and Mrs. Clarey, Admiral Hays, Admiral and Mrs. Hayward, General and Mrs. Fields, General and Mrs. Ord, General and Mrs. Krulak, Representative Saiki, members of the diplomatic corps, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

Thank you all so very much for coming to help us in this festive way to say a special welcome to the next Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command, Admiral Richard Macke; his wife, Barbara; and their daughter, Melissa.

My very special compliments go to the members of the band and to the men and women standing this formation. You are a grand sight and you make us all very, very proud.

Some two weeks ago you held a similar formation to say farewell to Admiral Larson and Sally Larson. Regrettably, events elsewhere kept me from participating. So here today, let me first and foremost, express my thanks and my deep admiration to Chuck and Sally Larson. Their contributions to the security of our Nation to the protection of America's interests in this vast and most important Pacific region, and to the well being of our service men and women and their families has been enormous.

Over 3 years ago, Admiral Larson inherited a command trying valiantly to adjust to the totally new strains and stresses of the post-Cold War world. And because of his vision and his wisdom, and his ability to get things done, he left a command confident of its key role in this "new" Pacific trained and ready to protect America's interests and those of our friends and allies — and manned by men and women as competent, as confident, as well-trained, and as well-led as any who ever wore America's uniform. Chuck and Sally have left their imprint throughout the far reaches of this vast command and for that the President, Secretary Perry, and I, and our Nation are deeply grateful.

We are equally grateful that at this time of continuing change, of great challenges, but also of vast opportunities, we have Admiral Richard Macke, a gifted leader with the experience and proven record to follow Admiral Larson, and Barbara Macke who will make her caring influence felt in every corner of this vast command.

Now I have been most fortunate to have served with Dick on three separate occasions: first when I served as the assistant to General Colin Powell; next when I commanded our European Command and served as SACEUR; and now finally as the Chairman. Having watched Dick from these different vantage points, I join the chorus of his many admirers who so loudly and clearly sing his praises.

When I was in Europe I never worried for I knew that Dick was there worrying over every little detail and if I ever needed anything I only had to call. More importantly, I knew I could always call him for an azimuth check and that his advice and counsel would always be rock solid.

My admiration and respect for his many skills and flawless judgment have only been strengthened these last nine months that we have worked together so very closely. In these extraordinarily difficult times full of change and uncertainty he has been rock steady and his service to our Nation has been nothing short of remarkable.

And so I am delighted, and not at all surprised, that Admiral Macke was selected to serve as Commander-in-Chief

of our largest geographic command. A proven carrier deck pilot, a trained experienced test pilot, who put his enormous flying talents into practice in over 150 combat missions. Whether commanding an A-7 squadron, the USS CAMDEN, the EISENHOWER, two different carrier battle groups, or the Navy's Space Command — in each he proved a solid commander — steady under fire, seasoned and wise, and an inspiration and mentor to all.

As I look at the Pacific today, the grave challenges facing us on the Korean peninsula, and the vast opportunities in China and beyond, I feel very confident that our interests will be looked after very well -- as will the interests of our service men and women — and their families who are performing so magnificently across the vast stretches of the Pacific Command.

As I close, let me thank every man and woman of the Pacific Command for your outstanding service to our Nation these past three years — and tell you how proud I am to formally introduce you to your new Commander-in-Chief and his lady — Admiral and Mrs. Macke.

Our President has selected well and so let's publish the orders and raise Admiral Macke's flag, and thus start another chapter in the proud history of the Pacific Command.

Thank you very much.

National Security Industrial Association
and the National Defense Preparedness Association
Arlington, Virginia
4 August 1994

I am certainly pleased to be here today and to have this wonderful chance to share some thoughts with two such great organizations. It truly is a great honor for me to be among so many great supporters of a strong national defense.

Jim Hogg told me that I can speak on any subject that I choose. So I would like to spend just a few minutes telling you a little about what our forces are doing around the world today because I am extraordinarily proud of them and then move on to address what I am convinced is the largest challenge that you and I share.

I remember three years ago when I was serving in Europe as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of United States Army Europe. One day while I was sitting in my office attending to the normal flow of Army affairs in Europe, which at that point was providing support to the United States Central Command just as the Gulf War was ending, and General Jack Galvin who was the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe at that time called me on the phone.

He told me that I had been selected to form and command a Joint Task Force with the mission of providing humanitarian support to the Iraqi Kurds who were being persecuted by Saddam. As a result, Saddam had triggered a mass migration as the Kurds fled into the mountains of northern Iraq where they were dying in thousands because they lacked food, water, and shelter.

I must tell you that this came as quite a shock to me because in the first case, I had never heard of the Kurds before and in the second, I felt that my expertise was with warfighting with a particular focus at defending Western Europe from a Soviet invasion. As it was, I was still trying to adjust to a new era in Europe and I suppose like many others, trying to come to grips with what future roles our military forces in Europe should be accomplishing.

So as you might imagine, Jack Galvin's call most certainly gave me pause. The next six months were among the most challenging in my career because not only was I no expert in humanitarian support, but the members of the Task Force working with me were also not experts in this kind of endeavor. Thank God I was surrounded by truly remarkable men and women who performed brilliantly. As tough as these warriors could be on a battlefield, when they arrived in Northern Iraq and found the tragic sights of thousands of starving children mothers and old people, they threw every bit of their considerable talents and their waking hours into devising ingenious ways to stop the misery.

Just a few weeks ago, I felt no small sense of deja vu when I called General George Joulwan, the current Supreme Allied Commander, and told him that we needed to send General Shroeder, the current Deputy Commander-in-Chief of United States Army Europe, to lead another task force.

This time it is to go to the aid of the Rwandans, because there are an estimated two million refugees on the ground and thousands are dying daily.

I don't expect that General Shroeder had even heard of the Hutus and the Tutsis before Rwanda erupted into this incredible catastrophe just two months ago, but I am completely confident that in short order he and the members of his task force will be complete experts on Rwanda's problems and on providing humanitarian relief.

More and more often in this new era, our military forces are being called upon to perform kinds of missions that just

were not part of our lexicon during the Cold War years. When you look around the world today it truly is startling what our men and women are accomplishing.

In Iraq, we are still maintaining a no-fly regime against Saddam and his forces even while we are also working with our allies to enforce the United Nations sanctions that resulted from the Gulf War.

And of course in Bosnia, we are participating in the most unusual group of operations that I have seen in my career. In addition to enforcing another no-fly regime and more U.N. sanctions through NATO, we are also supporting the United Nations' peacekeepers on the ground, supporting their humanitarian operations, providing protection to the U.N. peacekeepers when called upon, and by stationing American forces in Macedonia we are helping to contain the fighting and keep it from engulfing more peoples and countries.

And around Haiti, we are also enforcing U.N. sanctions and our forces are picking up the Haitians, who have been fleeing occasionally by the thousands, and we are providing for these thousands of refugees and caring for them until their future directions are determined.

Many of you in this room are veterans of military service and I expect that you understand that each of these are extremely difficult operations. What our forces have been asked to do in Uganda and Rwanda is nothing short of creating a miracle. What is occurring is the largest humanitarian operation ever attempted and it is an operation confronted by enormous logistical difficulties and obstacles.

But I think that what is most amazing to realize is that our Armed Forces are doing all of this while still remaining the finest fighting force on the face of the earth, while deterring aggression against important American interests in several places in the world, and while serving as a vital lever of global stability and peace.

And I think the very first thing that this points toward is not the great technologies that this country provides its fighting forces, rather it is the truly astounding men and women we have in uniform today. It is their capacity to very rapidly conquer the most difficult challenges and to bring life and order and hope to millions of people who have no hope.

I must tell you that having commanded one of these task forces myself and having had the great privilege over the past nine months to visit our forces who are performing similar missions around the world, from Somalia to the Balkans, that in every case the success or failure of these operations rests on the professionalism, the grit, and the brains of our people. They are human enterprises. And very clearly our uniformed men and women have these qualities in great abundance.

So it only confirms what we realized during the Cold War, that we must preserve the outstanding quality of men and women in our forces. Because more and more we are not only asking them to perform the traditional and very demanding tasks of security upon which our country relies, but we are also sending them out around the world to create humanitarian miracles, or to try to bring peace between nations or within nations that have turned against one another.

From my perspective as their senior military officer, I could not be prouder. Five years ago we decided that our military forces would have to make a lot of adjustments to remain effective in this new era, and at every level our men and women have been accomplishing just this very splendidly. But it makes me question whether we have been backing up our field forces by making the same magnitude of adjustments back here.

Seven months ago when I testified before Congress in my posture statement, I told the Congress and the Armed Forces that we do in fact have to make great changes.

The fact is that our defense dollars are growing much smaller and we have to turn over every rock and look for every conceivable way to make sure that we are getting a full one hundred cents out of every dollar. And even after we have convinced ourselves of this, we have to squeeze that dollar even harder and try to get two hundred cents out of it.

At that time, Secretary Perry and Under Secretary Deutch disclosed to the Congress that they had critically examined the Department of Defense's financial management systems and it was their view that hundreds of millions of dollars a year, perhaps even billions of dollars, were being lost due to poor and antiquated managerial practices. And as a result they are instituting a fundamental overhaul in our practices to find ways to end this waste.

At the same time, I told the Joint Staff and the Services that we also are going to have to critically examine every gold watch, to look behind every tradition, and to question every one of our ways of doing business because we also are going to have to find more innovative solutions to provide for our forces.

I am convinced that the recommendations of the Bottom Up Review are just about right. When we are done we will have a lean force, very lean, but it will be adequate to accomplish the objectives of our strategy. But it will only be adequate if we possess all of the forces and capabilities and enhancements recommended by the review. My concern is whether we will get there.

I think that we have progressed a very long way at reforming our joint warfighting capabilities. In the aftermath of

the Goldwater-Nichols Act, we have streamlined how we command and control our forces, we have eliminated some major commands and consolidated others, we have built a joint doctrine, and we have inculcated a joint spirit in our forces. But I think we have to go beyond this and carry the spirit of jointness into how we man train, organize, and equip our forces.

On the one hand this means that we must continue to scrutinize how we organize the roles, missions, and functions of our forces and our military departments. But I must also tell you that this area of review can be deceptive. We must go deeper than roles, functions, and missions because these are really the endpoints of what our Armed Services provide.

And this is why I asked the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Bill Owens, and the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the services to expand the functions, the parameters, and the visibility of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and to use this institution as a base to search for more innovative ways to do our business.

This means that we must look from a joint perspective at how we provide our forces and our equipment, all the way from the stage where we define our joint strategic requirements for various forces and capabilities, through how we design and build our equipment, through how we school and train our forces, and how we station them, and sustain and maintain them, and the services that we provide our units and people.

I am encouraged that this effort will prove very fruitful. The fact is that all of the services realize that our budgets are going to stay lean. Unless we find ways to get more efficiency and output out of what we are being provided, we are going to have to cut away the few dwindling modernization programs we have left and then some more structure.

So we must carry jointness beyond warfighting. We must carry it into maintenance, into stationing, into training and sustainment, and every other function of our Armed Forces where it makes sense. The guiding spirit of this effort must be that we will do things separately only if it is essential to our readiness or more fiscally responsible to continue doing it this way. This does not in any way diminish the responsibilities and authorities of the services. In fact it furthers their own objective of providing the most cost-effective forces and capabilities for joint warfare.

Let me add that all of you sitting here have a role to play and will be heavily effected by this effort also. I know that over the past decade you have been inundated with dictums about procurement reform, about increased productivity, and about finding more innovative ways to build more with less. And I also know that our defense industries have been harder hit than any other segment of our economy over the past five years.

But I must encourage you to continue to look for more and more ways to squeeze more pennies out of every dollar, because as both of the organizations represented in this room recognize, this must be a team effort between the Armed Forces between industry and with the Congress.

In fact, already I am deeply concerned that we are losing our ability to maintain the proper balance in our defense programs.

Perhaps many of you have read that a fair number of our troops and their families are currently on food stamps. This may sound hard to believe, but I'm embarrassed to admit that it is true.

You may remember the same kind of reports back during the late seventies when in fact many of our young enlisted families also had to rely on food stamps. Of all the studies that we did during that period about what most contributed to our manning problems, the fact is that the greatest factor was pay and benefits. No other single factor contributed more to the erosion of our forces.

I think it's a very difficult thing when we ask a young private or seaman to deploy to Korea or Bosnia or Rwanda, to go out to perform a dangerous and difficult task for our nation and to leave his family behind on food stamps.

I think also that many of you here are all too aware that our modernization accounts have been cut to the bare bones in order to preserve essential funds for readiness and for manning our force. Each year since the late eighties, we have dipped deeper and deeper into our modernization accounts to find savings. What concerns me is that at some point we will cross a threshold where we have damaged our defense in the future in order to pay our bills today. Then before we know it the future is upon us.

So I am concerned about this element of balance also. We can exist for a while on all that we built during the last years of the Cold War. We remain more technologically advanced than any other military force. But we cannot be sanguine for too long. Warfare is an evolutionary art, but at certain times it is a revolutionary art.

Looking at the Gulf War, I am tempted to conclude that we are either in a very quickly paced evolutionary period or perhaps even in a revolutionary period in warfare. The same electronic-information revolution that is sweeping through the marketplace is seeping over onto the battlefield and it is transforming the ways we fight.

We must stay at the cutting edge of this revolution and that means that we must maintain a strong Research and

Development base and that we must maintain the ability to identify, and if warranted, to produce the kinds of revolutionary technologies that keep our forces better than any opponent they may have to meet in battle.

Now before I close I want to repeat again that all of us should be extraordinarily proud of what our men and women in uniform are accomplishing these days for our nation. When I was a young child in war-torn Europe, and later in the ravaged and contested Europe that emerged after the Second World War, I gained a very special appreciation and awe for America's Armed Forces. Perhaps with a better vantage than most, I saw America's Armed Forces as embodying the two great strengths of this nation. They are ferocious and insurmountable in war and extraordinarily noble in peace. I am proud to say that fifty years later our men and women are keeping both of these lights burning very, very brightly.

Again thank you and Godspeed.

USCENTCOM Change of Command
MacDill AFB, Florida
5 August 1994

Among the many great traditions of the Armed Forces none are more significant than Changes of Command. This one in particular is deeply moving and inspiring, as it should be, for these two great commanders. And I want to thank the United States Marine Drum and Bugle Corps and the saluting battery of the Second Marine Division for making this such a stirring event. And I salute the service men and women standing here so proudly. You look terrific and I am proud to be here with you.

We have such a wonderful group of guests here today that there is simply no way to do justice to them all. But I certainly would like to recognize the representatives and Ambassadors of some of our very good friends and allies in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Kuwait, Egypt, and Qatar.

We are also honored by the presence of Ambassador Martin Cheshes and Mrs. Cheshes, members of the State Department, Service Chiefs, and Unified Commanders.

And to everyone, our distinguished guests, to family and friends, and to the members of the great Central Command, I know how very much it means to General and Mrs. Hoar and General and Mrs. Peay to see you here today to help celebrate this very special occasion. Your presence is an honor to this command and for that I thank you.

This is a very memorable day for United States Central Command, another milestone in its history marking the end of one captivating chapter and the beginning of another. And how great it is to have General and Mrs. P.X. Kelly, and General and Mrs. Crist, and Mrs. Schwarzkopf who are so much a part of the history of this proud command here with us today.

We have just witnessed a very important event and that is the retirement of one of America's great military leaders General Joe Hoar.

And on behalf of our President, on behalf of Secretary Perry, on behalf of the Joint Chiefs and our Nation, I thank him for his extraordinary leadership and exemplary devotion and for over 37 years of truly remarkable service to our Nation.

When President Bush was looking for someone to take over Central Command three years ago, the men and women of this command had just orchestrated the stunning victory over Iraq and placed the Armed Forces of our Nation and the nations of the coalition forces in the highest regard throughout the world. How do you follow an act like this?

It would require a commander of great intellect, of great vision, a leader who could foresee the future needs of this very, very important region and design a security arrangement to fit the new balance of power within the region.

Nobody could have been a better choice than Joe Hoar, a man who had been tested in the jungles of Vietnam as well as the halls of Washington and whose tremendous leadership, integrity, and dedication were so legendary. Joe Hoar was the natural choice and of course the perfect choice to face the challenges that lay ahead.

But who could have imagined then that the region would become embroiled in one crisis after another. Who could have imagined the need to remind Saddam Hussein time and time again of our military resolve? And who among us could have possibly imagined a tragedy of such enormous proportions in Somalia, the starving millions, old men and women, children dying by the thousands daily?

Time and again, the United States Central Command was put to the test and time and again you performed magnificently. In response to these and other crises, Central Command, under General Hoar's wise leadership, organized, activated, and directed six Joint Task Forces, four of them simultaneously, an unprecedented accomplishment for any unified command.

But just as crucial to this region was a concept being formulated in the staff of Central Command, a strategy for regional stability. This three-tiered strategy has already made great strides enhancing the capabilities of our allies and encouraging cooperative efforts toward regional stability.

In fact, it has been the catalyst for the first multi-national exercises ever conducted in this region. And Joe, no one could have done it more brilliantly.

And isn't it ironic that this man, who by his own admission had not aspired to a career in the military, has become one of the most well-respected and most admired military men of our Armed Forces? And who capped his career so appropriately and so magnificently as the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Central Command.

So today we honor this low-key, soft-spoken leader as one of our great American heroes. And I am truly proud and honored to be a part of this great occasion.

And if you want to know where Joe gets his inspiration you only have to look to his college sweetheart, his wife, Charlie, and their beautiful family.

Charlie, you've been by his side through it all, the good times and the difficult times, in peace and in war, raising five wonderful children, often on your own.

And I honestly can't imagine how you ever found the time to complete a master's and a doctorate degree while raising a family. But that was just one more demonstration of the energy and caring you put into everything you do.

And that energy and caring extended well beyond your front door. It extended to the men and women in Joe's charge, to their families, and to countless charities. In every community you have been your limitless enthusiasm has left a lasting impression. You have been a wonderful first lady and we will miss you sorely.

But as we say farewell to Joe and Charlie Hoar, we have the wonderful task of welcoming on board General Binnie Peay and Pamela Peay, to whom we have just entrusted the men and women of Central Command and the safety and security of this important region. General Peay, as you all know, has just left a Pentagon tour and he is absolutely thrilled to be back among troops.

In his last tour, he served as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and before that, as the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; so he has a great reputation and a great following in the staff corridors of the Pentagon.

He is also a proven commander at every level. Long before DESERT STORM, Binnie showed his skills as a combat leader in Vietnam. And in addition to a long list of other extraordinary accomplishments in his career, General Peay commanded the 101st Air Assault Division magnificently during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. General Binnie Peay is a courageous warrior, a great innovator, a proven performer, and a compassionate leader and I am very proud and honored to introduce him as the new commander of the United States Central Command.

And walking beside him every step of the way has been Pamela Peay, well known throughout the Army and certainly among her many friends as a woman of tremendous warmth and charm.

What an incredible inspiration she was to the families of the 101st Air Assault Division during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. And what a wonderful first lady she will be to the United States Central Command. Welcome Pamela.

So Joe and Charlie, as you begin the next chapter of your lives together, as you cycle into the setting sun, you take with you our deepest appreciation for your unwavering dedication and your compassionate devotion to the men and women of our Armed Forces and our Nation.

On behalf of our President and all of us in uniform good luck and God Bless.

Jewish War Veterans National Convention
Dallas, Texas
24 August 1994

I must tell you all that I walk out here to this podium with a great, great feeling, for I know that I am among friends. And I know that with this group of men and women, I share not only many experiences, but also many outlooks and certainly many convictions.

But let me first, at the outset, thank you, thank you all very, very much.

"Thank you" for your outstanding service to this great country.

And "thank you," at the risk of being melodramatic, thank you for fighting America's wars, and for keeping this nation and its principles safe.

And "thank you" as well, for creating a tradition of courage, and of service, and of sacrifice for our country, a living

tradition, a tradition that inspires every young man and woman serving in uniform today more so than you will ever realize.

And when I look around this room, I see some slightly weather-beaten faces of those who fought in World War One, in World War Two, in the Korean War, in the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam probably, and I wouldn't be surprised if there weren't at least one or two in this room here, some new faces, those of you who tasted that great victory now called DESERT STORM.

Put another way, if you wish to reflect upon it, in your faces is reflected the triumph, and sometimes the tragedy, of America's military history in the twentieth century. But also, standing here, where I'm standing, you see in your eyes, a justifiable pride. Pride for having served our Nation in time of need, and pride for your untiring efforts, day in and day out, on behalf of our service men and women.

But I also see great wisdom, wisdom of those who understand the need for a strong defense, and wisdom of those who know the terrible price this country pays for complacency.

And that wisdom must never be lost on the people of this nation, for it is complacency, I submit to you, that is today's greatest risk to our country.

It is the same kind of complacency that some of you experienced when you returned home victorious from the trenches of the First World War — and I know that among you, even if not present here today, are those who did just that — when you returned from the conflict that was called "the war to end all wars." And what a terrible tragic mistake that turned out to be. Remember?

And then, after many of you returned home from the victorious battles of Europe and the Pacific during World War Two, after you destroyed the dictators who grew so powerful while our nation was complacent. And then it happened once again. Once again, we had to pay the terrible price for letting up, and we paid that price in the opening days of the Korean War.

So once again our soldiers, our airmen, our sailors and our marines went out to fight another dictator, then Kim Il Sung, and to save another nation, South Korea, and another region.

And then many of us went off to Vietnam, where we once again fought, and this time fought America's longest battle. But when we returned home from this fight, it happened yet again.

By the late seventies, our Armed Forces were hollow. We had ships that couldn't deploy, planes that couldn't fly safely, and divisions that lacked the parts and the training to perform their missions. And thinking that Détente meant peace, we shrank our arsenals, and we allowed our forces to atrophy once again.

And it was only after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, if you recall, and our embassy was seized and our people were imprisoned in Iran, that we finally shook off that complacency, and began to rebuild our forces.

And it was a good thing we did. In Grenada, then in Panama, we saw our forces grow stronger and stronger. And then three and a half years ago in the Gulf War, we saw our men and women execute an extraordinary military feat. DESERT STORM became the high point of our military high tech excellence.

You see, there has been this cycle throughout this century, a cycle of enormous and costly exertions, followed by a false sense of relief, a delusion that we had done our part, and that it was time to rest to collect the dividends for our efforts.

Well, this time around as we close this century, we have to, no, we must fight this dangerous embrace of complacence.

Let me remind you of a fact of American history. Since our nation was founded, we have never, we have never experienced a twenty-year period of uninterrupted peace. Put another way, no soldier in this country's history has ever completed a military career when our nation did not engage in armed conflict at least once.

This then is the reality that underscores our need to remain ready. We owe it to our sons and daughters to remain ready for the unexpected.

But there is another reason to reject complacence, and to embrace military readiness. Today we are the world's most powerful nation, we are its richest nation, and we are its leading nation.

Recently some have suggested that we can't shoulder this leadership any longer, that the price of leadership is too high, that if we continue to pay this price, we will soon exhaust and impoverish ourselves. Well, actually just the opposite is true. It is our leadership that has kept us the world's most democratic and the most prosperous people.

Give it up, give up our leadership and it will be the beginning of the end of our greatness. It's just as simple as that. You either go forward with confidence or you slip backwards in self-doubt. You can't stand still.

Those of you who took part in the occupations of Japan and Germany, who rebuilt Japan and Western Europe from the ravages of war, and who defended South Korea and kept it safe for forty years, and who stemmed the tide of the

communist onslaught into Southeast Asia, you laid the foundation for the freedom and prosperity that we, and they, are enjoying today. You helped build the markets that have made us — the United States, Western Europe, and Northeast Asia collectively — the three richest democratic regions in the world.

You also created the allies who helped us to defeat the many threats that emerged after the war. They were beside us, taking the same risks and the same stands throughout the Cold War. And they were there with us in nearly every conflict we have fought, from Korea to Vietnam to the Gulf.

But now, today, there are new challenges, new risks, but also new opportunities, in Eastern Europe, in the states of the former Soviet Union, and in China and Southeast Asia.

And as we have throughout history, so today we expect our Armed Forces to be ready to protect us from those who would wish us ill, wherever they might be, and to be there to help grasp the opportunities that might lay before us.

Now since I became Chairman some ten months ago, I have had the deep honor to visit our forces here and overseas — in Korea and Somalia and Hawaii and Panama, in Europe, and just less than two weeks ago, in the death filled refugee camps of Rwanda — and I want to report to you that without the slightest doubt, our forces continue doing a simply magnificent job.

Despite major reductions and continually shrinking budgets, they are guarding our nation and our allies, and are accomplishing the many missions we have assigned them with every bit of the courage, and skill, and the enthusiasm that you showed, and that Americans have come to expect from our Armed Forces.

But I must also tell you that when you sit down, and you talk to the old, experienced non-commissioned officers, they will tell you the danger signals are appearing, and that it's high time to stop reductions in people and in budgets. You and I know that.

But the operations tempo for our forces is higher than ever, and yet those forces are smaller in numbers than ever. And yet, we send them to more places than ever before. Just reflect on it for a moment.

Our young men and women stand watch in South Korea, along the DMZ, should North Korea and Kim Chong Il miscalculate, and once again bring war to that peninsula.

And when you talk to them, as I have, you walk away convinced that should conflict break out, our men and women, together with our South Korean allies, will prevail. There is this quiet confidence within them.

And although the Gulf War is now long over, our forces continue to patrol the skies over southern and northern Iraq, enforcing protective no-fly zones over the Shias and the Kurds, and our ships continue to enforce sanctions against Iraq. And throughout the region, our men and women are providing a powerful counterweight to Iraq and Iran's ambitions.

Not long ago, I went to Panama to visit our command there. The command that, over the past ten years, helped block the spread of communism in this region, and helped usher in a new unprecedented era of democracy, one that has spread throughout South and Central America. These are the same men and women, who only a few years ago, took down Noriega in Operation Just Cause.

Today, they are waging a shadowy, but tough fight, to stop the flow of drugs into our streets, and working with our regional allies to maintain peace and stability throughout that vital region.

But nowhere, nowhere have the changes been greater than in Europe. In nearly every capitol of Eastern Europe, you find American service men and women, reaching out a hand of friendship in a partnership for peace which is probably the most comprehensive military-to-military outreach program ever undertaken.

And in just two weeks, actually less than two weeks, in a place east of Moscow, American and Russian soldiers will begin the first-ever joint peacekeeping exercise between our two nations.

Our service men and women are doing this while others in Europe patrol the skies over Bosnia, while still others enforce sanctions in the Adriatic, and still others deliver humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo in what is now the world's longest lasting air bridge, far exceeding the Berlin Airlift of yesterday.

Others guard the border of Macedonia against the spread of that conflict into new regions, and still others, probably you are not even aware of, are still in Mogadishu, in Somalia, guarding that effort.

Closer to home, our ships enforce sanctions around Haiti while soldiers and marines on Guantanamo provide a safe haven for some 15,000 Haitians and now, as you so well know from the press, to thousands of Cubans, fleeing the harsh realities of their homelands.

And for the last thirty days, American men and women have been performing miracles, miracles in the midst of the most enormous human tragedy in Rwanda. No other nation has the capability to bring relief to that devastated country, and the suffering millions there, as quickly and as effectively as your sons and daughters, and they are doing that today.

And still others, probably unbeknownst to most of the public, comb the jungles of Vietnam today, and of Laos

today, and of Cambodia today, searching for the remains of their comrades as part of a task force called "Full Accounting." While nearly four thousand others are fighting forest fires here at home.

And I certainly cannot emphasize strongly enough for you, what great men and women we have in our ranks today. When you look at what they are doing around the world in the places I just mentioned, it is absolutely astounding.

They are talented and dedicated, and if you want to retain them, and continue to recruit more like them, then you have to take care of their welfare and the welfare of their families. And the very last place to look for more savings is in their paychecks and in what we provide for the quality of life programs. Whenever I have a chance, I like to call them our Super Bowl team, but without Super Bowl wages.

I must tell you, I find it wise to remember the great defense debate of our first, very first Congress in 1787, right after we had won our freedom. That debate started when a representative, named Elbridge Gerry, who subsequently became Governor of Massachusetts and then Vice President under James Madison, when Mr. Gerry introduced a resolution to permanently limit the size of our country's Armed Forces to just 10,000 men.

Now, since in the minds of the members of our new Congress there was a healthy distrust for large militaries and our foundling nation was very, very poor, Gerry's resolution, as you might expect, drew considerable support.

In fact, the resolution was poised to be passed by a substantial majority until another representative, a man named George Washington, who had earned quite a reputation for himself during the Revolutionary War, remarked to the larger body that this indeed was a very good idea. "In fact," he said, "let us limit as well, while we are at it, the size of any invading force to no more than just five thousand men." A true story.

And I will tell you that Washington's reminder is as wise today as it was in 1787. We cannot, we cannot legislate away our threats or our responsibilities. We have involved our military forces in more operations in the last few years than throughout the entire Cold War, and I expect we have not yet seen the end of it.

So, this much smaller, considerably leaner force must be more capable and more ready than ever. But to be so, we will continue to need the strong will, the strong support, of our President, our Congress, and of course, of each and every one of you here in this room.

I know that shortly, your business meetings will begin, and you will hear reports of all the many wonderful things that your organization has been doing that benefit, I think more than anyone else, the men and women in uniform today.

And the tremendous work that you are doing every day, as part of the Military Coalition, in Veterans' Hospitals, in shelters, in blood banks, and on our streets in rallies and celebrations, reaches across the spectrum of our society; to our youth, and our retirees, the healthy and the homeless. But the military, and our veterans, have been the greatest benefactors of your work.

You have had a tremendous impact on the quality of the men and women who serve our Nation, and I want to thank you for your enormous efforts to keep our military strong, and to ensure that the men and women who sacrifice so much for this great Nation, receive the benefits and the care that they so very richly deserve.

And one more time, on behalf of all of them, from the bottom of my heart, thank you.

And with that, God Bless you all, and God Bless the United States of America.

The Navy League, Association of the U.S. Army, and Air Force Association
Fort Worth, Texas
24 August 1994

Let me begin by thanking you all for this great excuse to come down here to visit the great state of Texas and to spend a day in this state. This is really a delightful break from Washington. And what a treat it is to speak to so many super organizations all gathered under one roof. I sure hope the roof doesn't fall down on this building because our Armed Forces would lose a lot of strong supporters.

Let me admit to you also, that I had a very difficult time deciding what to talk about because really there are far more defense experts sitting here in the audience than there are standing at this podium tonight.

Very clearly, I don't need to tell any of you why we must maintain a strong defense. So I thought instead that I would offer you a sort of state of the union address on the what the Joint Chiefs of Staff are working on today and perhaps elaborate on what I see as truly the most important challenges that we face today.

Let me begin by telling you that the Goldwater-Nichols bill that was passed back in 1987, that enhanced the role of the Chairman as well as the influence and authority of our CINCs, is a great success.

I must admit to you that if I harbored any doubts at the time that this reform act was passed they have completely vanished.

We have all seen what this law accomplished for us in Panama and in the Gulf, and certainly we are seeing its effects in our operations in many places around the world today; from Northern Iraq, to Bosnia, to where our forces are performing so magnificently in Rwanda. So Goldwater-Nichols and the joint reforms it ushered in have led us to a tremendous improvement in how our joint forces fight together, deploy, and perform together in other kinds of operations as well.

I am absolutely delighted that we have gotten away from the tyranny, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to gain consensus in order to take action. Under the old rules, as you can well imagine, the result was that on the truly tough issues, which very often were the truly important issues, very often the only way the Chiefs could agree among themselves was to vote for the lowest common denominator. Only on the rarest of occasions was that the best possible answer.

But now the Chiefs and I are facing a new challenge, a challenge that the authors of Goldwater-Nichols most certainly had in mind, but one that gains even more acute urgency because of the downward pressures of the defense budget. That challenge is how to carry jointness even further.

The genesis of this challenge is that over a year ago we all agreed and decided that the forces and capabilities recommended by the Bottom Up Review were to be our target for the future. I supported that target then and I support that target now. Although there are some agnostics running around saying this future force will be too much or too little, I still maintain that the Bottom Up Review recommendations are about what we will need to carry us into the next century.

Our challenge is actually getting there. As has been reported under current conditions, there is not enough money allocated to fund the force and the enhancements that were part of the package.

And when I say that I support the smaller force, that is only because with the enhancements, the additional strategic lift, the prepositioned equipment and stocks stationed overseas on ships and ashore, the command and control systems, the expansion of our intelligence capabilities to extend over two theaters, the smart munitions, the additional stealth systems, and all of the other sundries listed in the Bottom Up Review, that all of these will make our smaller force pound for pound so much more effective. But if these enhancements do not materialize and are not integrated properly in our forces, then the force structure will be inadequate. So I support the Bottom Up Review as adequate for our future needs but it must be the whole package not just a slice of it.

I am not sure how big the shortfall is, whether it is the $150 billion that the truly pessimistic claim or the $40 billion that we in the department have perhaps optimistically recognized. But the Chiefs and I are convinced that we must carry jointness further in order to find more efficient and more economical ways of doing business. We have convinced ourselves that we are on the right track on joint warfighting, but getting to this point was the easy part. We must now progress into the truly difficult and agonizing part. We must now push jointness into how we actually build, train, equip, and maintain our forces. But again there is no doubt in my mind that this is what the forefathers of Goldwater-Nichols intended from the start.

Those of you with long experience in the defense business know better than most how hard this task is going to be. We have just finally managed to overthrow the old tyrant of consensus between the five chiefs on operational matters and that took nearly forty very painful years and now we are importing jointness into pocketbook issues. But we have no choice. We have to change the ways we are doing business.

Over the past few years, we have been publishing joint doctrine and as all of you know, doctrine is the basis for all else in the Armed Forces. Well the doctrine has been going out into the field, but we have found that it has not been properly vetted and that the people in the field don't yet understand the doctrine enough or practice it enough.

So in part, the Chiefs and I know that we must work much harder to truly imbed this doctrine in our forces.

Part of this means paying greater attention to how we develop and disseminate joint doctrine but as all of you know, it is also a matter of training. We have in fact come a long way in joint training over the past few years. But the fact is that joint training still lags far behind the qualitative aspects of training that the Services have perfected so well. For example, the Services have made great strides over the past decade in employing simulations in our training so that we can reduce the need to send troops to the field and sailors to sea, where they end up as training aids in exercises that are really designed for the benefit of their higher headquarters.

Yet oddly enough, as far as simulations have progressed within the services and service-unique training we still don't have good joint software for our forces. As a result, if you go to visit joint training anywhere in the world, you are

left wondering why we are wasting the time of so many of our men and women and wasting our money when if we had joint warfighting simulations, we could get the same benefits but at a much lower cost.

This then carries you into readiness. Over the past year as some of you may know, General Shy Meyers and a task force of wise men concluded a super study on the readiness of our forces and how we measure and maintain readiness.

They discovered what I believe is true, that for the most part our Services are doing a terrific job at maintaining readiness and have pretty reliable techniques for assessing readiness. But we have two problems. First, for the most part, our systems are not designed to predict readiness problems and then allow us to act preventively to keep problems from occurring. Instead our systems are designed mostly to tell us when we have developed a problem.

Second, we simply don't have a way of measuring joint readiness. We measure by service but not the whole package. So we have this lag. We have made joint warfare the apotheosis of how we fight and operate but we don't have a way to measure joint readiness.

We have to develop a joint system for measuring readiness and it must be predictive so that we see what is looming over the horizon. I certainly don't know what this system will look like right now, but I have asked the Vice Chairman, Admiral Owens, and the Vice Chiefs of the Services to take on that issue with as much gusto and speed as they can muster.

In fact the Chiefs and I have asked the Vice Chairman and the Service Vice Chiefs to go much further and to take a truly hard look at all of our functions including how we define our requirements, not just to insure that there is interoperability between our systems and forces, but also to see if we can use jointness to shape our requirements.

I know this will be a difficult hurdle for the Services, but the Chiefs and I know that from now on we must think of requirements from a joint perspective.

For example, regardless of what Service they belong to the fact is that from a joint perspective our Armed Forces must only possess so many attack aircraft or so many tanks. And the perspective to analyze and decide how many of each, should be the joint CINCs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Already a fair amount of our requirements such as strategic lift or strategic intelligence emerges from a joint requirements process and this is how we ensure against wasteful duplication or excesses. And we now need to expand this more broadly.

In fact, we must put all of our major functions under a really critical joint microscope because the Chiefs and I are convinced that we can do much better. All of these things that we do now as a matter of habit, how we station and care for our people, how we maintain our equipment, and how we use our training areas have always been done as individual services and independent departments, a separate bottom up approach. Maybe we can do some of them much better and much less expensively if we do them from a joint perspective. You can go to towns here in America that have two or three different service forces stationed in them and each of these is a separate island that shares nothing with the other Service bases; not housing, not services like commissaries or PXs, finance, and lawyers. Maybe this doesn't make sense any more.

The Chiefs and I are convinced that it is time to break some rice bowls because we owe this to our forces.

Yet another area we are looking at is roles and missions. I think you all know that there is a long and bloody history in the evolution of Service roles and missions, but this time we have to make some bold changes, broader changes than we ever could have entertained in the past. Dr. John White has been appointed by Congress and Secretary Perry to head a panel to study and make recommendations on this area and I applaud this effort from the bottom of my heart. The Chiefs and I fully intend to support this effort to offer our analysis and our ideas and our full backing and to remain as open-minded as we can be.

The fact is that it is time for some boldness. Whether that's changes in the way we fight, the way we organize our forces, or how we allocate roles and missions. Unless we make changes we are not going to get there from here. Already in the field, the CINCs are changing the ways they are going about this. For example, Admiral Miller, the Commander-in-Chief of USACOM, has changed the old mold of configuring naval task forces and Carrier Battle Groups by building joint forces that are configured with greater balance but also that allow us to spread the burdens of forward presence missions more evenly across all the services.

We have to try this because our strategic requirements cannot be wished away and unless we dare to put Army helicopters on Navy ships, or when it fits, to provide air protection for some of our naval forces from land-based air forces, then a lot of our sailors and marines will be at sea far too much and we will pay heavily for this when it comes to time for them to reenlist. But let me assure you we are not looking to change things just for the sake of change or to save money. We will make changes only if we are convinced that it contributes to our defense and to the effectiveness of our forces. If it doesn't pass that litmus test it will be rejected.

Now as all of you might imagine from what I just explained the next few years are going to be very traumatic inside the Beltway.

Don't expect this process to occur quietly because if past history is any guide there will be a lot of sound and fury and criticism and much of this will find its way into the press. I harbor no fantasy that this will occur harmoniously. Very many long vested interests and institutional habits are going to be challenged and some of them are going to be thrown aside. And as I look around this room at the Navy League, the Airpower Council, and the Association of the United States Army, I am wondering if when all this comes to pass if any of you will want to invite me or any of the Chiefs back here to speak when all this is done.

But we cannot afford another mild roles and missions report. We really are at the stage where the dollars won't support it and our troops and sailors and airmen don't deserve it.

All you have to do is to look at the front pages today and you will see the extraordinary adjustments that our men and women have already been making in this new era.

Whether it is Bosnia, assisting the humanitarian efforts or enforcing the United Nations sanctions regime, air-landing in Sarajevo in the longest airlift in history, or if you turn to Rwanda where our forces are splendidly undertaking the most challenging humanitarian operation in modern history, you will see what they are doing. And we owe it to them to push the upper crust resistance aside because otherwise, many will be tempted to find future savings in readiness funds and modernization accounts, in the Bottom Up Review enhancements, or in the paychecks of our men and women.

And I firmly believe that we owe it to them and to the American people to do all that we can to keep this from happening.

But I spoke of other challenges also. One of those can also be found on the front pages of the newspapers and that is our challenge of trying to come to grips with how and when to use our forces. Nearly all of you saw your service during the Cold War. We knew that when the Soviet forces began rushing into the Fulda Gap that we were going to fight and spend no time debating or questioning it. There were no doubts in our minds, no cobwebs of complexity for this scenario or most others. We either fought with overwhelming forces to achieve decisive victory or we fought with limited forces to achieve a lesser outcome.

But we knew what outcomes we had in mind. Today it is not so clear. Yes, there are still the Koreas where I submit to you, we continue to entertain no doubts. If God forbid, the North Koreans miscalculated and we had to fight to protect our ally and our forces sitting along the 38th Parallel, we wouldn't wonder for a minute or even a second what to do; whether to use overwhelming or underwhelming force or whatever. We would know what we have to do and we would know very clearly what victory meant. But what about Rwanda, or Bosnia, or any number of others like this that are looming just over the horizon? What is victory in these cases? And what is overwhelming force in an environment like that?

To some, because of these ambiguities, these are situations to avoid. Some feel we should just a hang outside of the Pentagon that says we only do the "Big Ones." And very often you hear this warning that we cannot be the world's 911 force dashing from one crisis to the next always the first to be called.

But I cannot agree with this. What do we do; wait until the next decade until the world settles down a bit and the threats are then the big ones, but unambiguous? I would submit that these new kinds of challenges are the very unwelcome consequences of the very welcome turn of events we all fought so hard to create for so many decades and we cannot shy away from them.

I am not convinced that we can maintain the position we must have in this world or the influence we must possess if in our effort to keep from becoming the 911 force, we try instead to become the operator always trying to redirect the tough calls for help to someone else.

But on the other hand, I am also convinced that the most important missions of our forces are deterrence and warfighting. And deterrence today rests on our ability to fight and win wars. And if there is one thing we must preserve and protect above all others, it is the unequaled fighting qualities of our forces. So how do we square this circle?

How do we maintain our ability to stay the finest fighting force in the world, protecting our very important interests through deterrence and also perform the humanitarian and peace operations that are so rampant but that tear at our fabric of warfighting readiness?

And this I submit is our second greatest challenge because if we try to shift to either extreme in how we answer this question we will squander our ability to shape the world outside our borders and we will squander the vast opportunities we won in the Cold War. We must, I am convinced, end up somewhere in the middle. We must do the Rwandas when we are called upon because we cannot look ourselves in the mirror if we do not and we will lose our global leadership.

But we must also protect our readiness and our ability to fight because our survival and our interests depend upon it.

Now some of you have perhaps been to visit our forces in Korea, Bosnia, Northern Iraq, Kuwait, or off the coast of Haiti and you will know what a truly incredible job they are doing. From my own visits to all of these places and many others, I must tell you that there are no doubts in their minds what this new era is about or what challenges we must meet. When you look in their eyes, whether it is in Rwanda or in a field hospital performing humanitarian work in Croatia, or along the 38th Parallel, or at an airfield in Germany where our crews our shuttling aid to three or four different places in the world, you see no doubts at all.

What you see instead is a steely resolve; a brisk pride in what they are accomplishing and a complete sense of confidence that our Armed Forces are ready and the best and that we can shape a great future for our nation and for the world.

But this brings to mind one other challenge where we badly need your help and that is protecting the pay and benefits that we owe our men and women in uniform. There are a lot of new ideas floating around Washington today, just as there always are when money gets tight, to reduce military medical benefits or charge a price for those benefits or to keep our military pay raises below the rate of inflation or to start reducing vital quality of life items like the funds we need to maintain our housing and facilities or to eliminate PXs and commissaries.

I don't need to tell any of you here that this is the worst and the most self-defeating way to find savings. When I was in Rwanda just two weeks ago, I went to the water purification point where a young major and a handful of soldiers had been rushed in and worked twenty hour days to set up their equipment and worked past one obstacle after another using enormous imagination to find ways to get the water to the hundreds of thousands of Rwandans whose lives depended them. This handful of men performed heroically and completely selflessly under the most terrible conditions and saved tens of thousands of lives. We cannot afford to lose them or the million and a half others just like them who we are asking more and more from to meet the very many challenges of this new era.

Looking around the world today, our Armed Forces are involved in more operations than at any time during the Cold War. We are asking a great deal from our men and women in uniform. I like to say that they are a Super Bowl team, but we are not paying them Super Bowl wages. I need all of the help that you can muster to protect their pay and benefits.

So I ask for you continued support as those of us in uniform continue to address the challenges of this era. And I ask that you maintain the powerful pressure to the Congress and the American people, keeping them aware that there are no respites in defending our nation. Let me assure you that our men and women in uniform are performing magnificently in all of the very great challenges we are facing and they deserve our very best support.

And with that I have probably spoken far too long. So I will end by thanking you for everything that you are doing for our nation and for our Armed Forces. God Bless you all and thank you.

USSPACECOM Change of Command
Colorado Springs, Colorado
13 September 1994

As all of you know, we are here today to carry on a very special military tradition, a change of command ceremony; a very special moment in the history of every command and certainly every new commander. And how great it is to have General and Mrs. Jim Hartinger, General and Mrs. Jim Hill, and General and Mrs. Don Kutyna, who are so much a part of the history of this proud command here with us today.

And I would like to thank each of you, our distinguished guests, for being here as well and helping us mark the end of one captivating chapter in the life of this proud command and the beginning of another. And to welcome the new Commander-in-Chief of Space Command, General Joe Ashy and his wife Sue. Your presence honors this command and I know means a great deal to Joe and Sue Ashy and Chuck and Mary Jo Horner.

And this is certainly a grand ceremony and I would be remiss if I did not offer my very special thanks to the men and women of NORAD, U.S. Space Command, and Air Force Space Command standing in ranks in front of us and to Canada's Air Command Band and the Air Force Band of the Rockies, our joint and combined color guard, and of course Charlie Battery for the special role you play in making this ceremony even more memorable. You make a wonderful sight.

Just about two months ago, with the hope that we would soon be able to steal Joe Ashy away from Southern Europe, we held a similar formation to say farewell to Chuck and Mary Jo Horner.

Well, things took a little longer than we expected and I would like to pass on my deep appreciation to Chuck and Mary Jo for their continued commitment to the men and women of NORAD, U.S. Space Command, and Air Force Space Command and for putting their retirement plans and some well-earned down time on hold.

And if you will allow me, I would like to spend a brief moment to thank the men and women of NORAD and the Space Commands for your magnificent performance over the past two years under General Horner.

I know that General Horner is enormously proud of what you accomplished together and I must tell you that the rest of the Armed Forces and I are also proud of your many achievements. You have established an impressive reputation and a tradition that I know you will carry into the many challenges of the future.

And now I would like to introduce your new commander, General Joe Ashy and his wife Sue.

I had the great privilege of working with General Ashy when I was the NATO Commander and he came to Europe in a time of crisis and unprecedented change to take on the job as the Commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe.

And what a tremendous impact his experience and expert leadership lent to the success of some of the most difficult and most unusual air operations in military history in operations SKY MONITOR, DENY FLIGHT, and PROVIDE PROMISE. I know it will not come as a surprise to any of you when I say that Joe Ashy is one of the most gifted and talented leaders in the Armed Forces today.

He is a battle-tested warrior with over 250 combat missions in Vietnam and a proven leader as the commander of two air wings, the Air Force Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, a Major Air Command, and most recently as the Commander of AIRSOUTH and 16th Air Force. And he brings with him an intimate and personal understanding of the needs of our men and women on the front line and the needs of our combatant commanders.

In short, he is the right man to lead U.S. Space Command to keep it focused on the challenges of tomorrow, its commitment to excellence, and its exceptional service to our front-line warriors.

And beside him every step of the way has been Sue Ashy. What an incredible inspiration she has been to the families of the men and women of AIRSOUTH during the last two years of continuous tension.

Sue has become well known throughout the Armed Forces and certainly among her many friends as a woman of tremendous compassion and charm. And what a wonderful first lady she will be to the United States Space Command.

So as we give one last salute to Chuck and Mary Jo Horner we extend a warm welcome to Joe and Sue Ashy.

Joe, Sue — all of us here wish you the best of luck and our heartfelt congratulations on this very special day.

And now Chuck, Joe, if you will please join me we'll conduct the change of command for United States Space Command.

The Retired Officers' Association
Cincinnati, Ohio
26 September 1994

Let me begin by telling you what a great pleasure it is to be here in Cincinnati, to have the honor to spend this evening, and to share some thoughts with so many friends and comrades.

On my way here I was reminded that I have had the pleasure to speak as an alumnus to a number of schools or organizations that I used to be part of, but it is a particular pleasure to speak to members of an organization that I have belonged to now for some 16 years, and on whose roster I plan to remain for the rest of my life. I guess it's like being with your own family.

And it is doubly nice to be here, for it gets me out of Washington and particularly away from the corridors of the Pentagon, and you all still remember how nice it felt to leave all that behind even if only for a short time.

Let me report to you that the Pentagon has still not yet sunk into the depths of the Potomac River as so many officers have wished over the years, and probably the same rats that were there in the basement when many of you served there can still be heard scampering around at night.

But I also must tell you that the men and women of the Pentagon are busier these days than any time that I can remember.

And this is not just a function of this administration, but rather it is a function of this new era we live in, an era that began when the Berlin Wall came down on that chilly fall day back in November 1989, that instigated so very many changes in the world and produced so many new challenges for our Armed Forces.

And of course last week, I believe I made history by becoming the very first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to launch an invasion force against another nation and then moments before a single shot was fired, to have the pleasure to recall the invasion force and order it to return home because it had already accomplished its mission.

What we saw unfold in Port-au-Prince Sunday, a week ago, was the perfect example of military force in support of diplomacy. But it wasn't until the planes took off from Fort Bragg that General Cedras and his gang, finally got the point that an overwhelming force was about to descend upon Haiti and agreed with President Carter to leave power on the 15th of next month.

I think it was General Eisenhower who once wrote that, "If I was ordered to capture a town defended by a battalion, I would ask for a division and I would take the town without firing a shot." Well, we heeded his advice and thank God it succeeded.

So instead of making a forced landing, our men and women entered Haiti last week without firing a single shot.

And regardless what your thoughts might be about the wisdom of finding ourselves in Haiti, let me assure you that our men and women are performing magnificently and if you would visit them as I did Saturday, your heart would swell with pride.

They are doing great under very difficult circumstances, knowing that the days ahead won't be easy; that fire fights like we had last Saturday night at Cap-Haitien when a Marine patrol clashed with Haitian police, won't be the last one, knowing that they will have to stay there months rather than weeks.

They're confident because they trained hard, because they are led by superb leaders, from Admiral P.D. Miller, to Lieutenant General Shelton, to experienced Division, Brigade and Battalion commanders, because they have the right equipment, because they are ready.

And that in itself ought to make you feel good, being ready, considering all the other things our Armed Forces are asked to do.

Whether it is continuing to deter a still very uncertain threat in Korea or all of the things we are doing in Europe, including what we are doing as part of NATO in and around the intractable tragedy that we used to call Yugoslavia, or standing up the Partnership for Peace, to our humanitarian actions in Africa.

Even with all of this and a lot more going on, the forces involved in this Haitian operation were as well prepared and ready as any force we have ever sent into harm's way.

So I think this is an extraordinary testament to the Armed Forces, that you helped shape and build while you were on duty, that we have these magnificent leaders and these remarkable men and women throughout the ranks and that we have the equipment and capabilities to accomplish all of these tasks and missions.

Our Nation and those of us still on duty owe you our appreciation and admiration for this.

But just as you overcame the challenges that created this unequaled military force today, we face new challenges.

And I thought that I would spend a few minutes explaining what I believe are the three greatest challenges that lie in front of us.

Let me start with what is in my mind the greatest challenge confronting us today. I firmly believe that it is having the foresight to take a long view of the future. Over the past few years the most dominant issues have been Somalia, Rwanda, North Korea, Iraq, and Bosnia and now Haiti. On the one hand each of these situations is serious and merits our attention and our best efforts.

But on the other hand, what happens in any of these countries will probably not be the pivotal forces that will shape the next century.

North Korea and Iraq are clearly the most serious of these situations. But they are near term threats. True, they are threats that could throw their regions into turmoil, but they will not be the determinants of what the world will look like in the next century. In fact neither of these nations may survive in their current forms into the 21st Century.

The future of Asia will be decided in the bustling markets of Shenzin province and on the stock exchange of Tokyo, not in Pyong-yang.

China is the world's most populous country and it is by most estimates already the third or fourth largest economy in the world, with the largest conventional military and the third largest nuclear force in the world. Japan is the economic engine of Asia, with the second largest economy in the world behind our own. The already great power of these two nations is growing, as is their influence regionally and globally.

And in Southwest Asia, until the Gulf War, Iraq was the military power in the Gulf. Had it fielded a nuclear arsenal it might still today be our most serious concern in the region. Instead it is now a defeated country internally divided, its armed forces a shadow of their former strength with its nuclear programs more carefully monitored than any other nation's.

Rather it is Iran, with its religious zealotry and increasingly more powerful and more modern Armed Forces, that is today the more fearsome and long-term regional threat.

But the true gravity of its threat, is less its Armed Forces as its ability to inflame and fan religious conflicts in a region that is already a tinderbox of economic and political issues.

What could prove most ominous is Iran's very clear drive to expand its influence through the pulpit into the Caucasus, a drive that is very threatening to Russia to the Balkan states and our NATO ally, Turkey.

In the same vein in Europe, we must remind ourselves that as much as Bosnia is a very serious concern, the situation there pales when considered against what is happening in the streets of Moscow or Kiev. The true threat of Bosnia is that the conflict that has raged there for two years might spread, dragging more Balkan nations into the cauldron of violence and hatred.

But the future of Europe will not swing on whether the Serbs control 51 percent or 70 percent of Bosnia's soil. It will swing on the future of Russian nationalism and whether we can find a way for Russians and Ukrainians to live peacefully side by side.

There are still over twenty thousand nuclear warheads in the former Soviet states and the mere existence of this arsenal will remain a most profound danger to our future security.

And of course what happens in Russia and the other former states of the Soviet Union will shape the future of the rest of Europe, ultimately determining whether Europe will grow together or fragment apart, the cause of so much warfare over the past centuries.

The point is that while we must deal effectively with the Bosnias, the Koreas, the Rwandas, and the Haitis of today and of tomorrow, we must not allow them to distract us from the truly vital issues that loom before us.

What we all of us must understand is that developments in Russia, the CIS, Germany, and the rest of Europe, China, Japan, and Iran are where we must place our greatest investments and where we must keep our attention most strongly focused. These are the main events.

Our second greatest challenge is settling on a future military force, one that is powerful enough to protect our interests and our international leadership well into the 21st Century.

As all of you know, this was the purpose of the Bottom Up Review. And out of that, we decided that to protect our global interests we had to maintain as a minimum, the capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.

I think this force-sizing goal is generally accepted, but clearly the challenge now is to find the resources to realize it. That said, I expect there are some among you who think that we are cutting too deep and that the Bottom Up Review Force won't be sufficient to fight and win two major conflicts.

I personally think the Bottom Up Review Structure will be sufficient, but I remember that we never thought we had enough. As recently as 1987 our scenarios said that it would require 36 Army divisions, 21 Carrier Battle Groups, and 67 Tactical Fighter Wings to fight and win against the Soviets.

Of course we never came close to building a force this large. And so in those simpler days of the Cold War, we were living with levels of risk that military planners could only characterize as very high.

The end-state force of the Bottom Up Review is more capable of accomplishing its warfighting objectives than our forces of the Cold War. As a matter of fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff view the risk as moderate.

The fact is that in a warfighting scenario against North Korea and the Iraq of today we will win.

My real concern about our future force structure is broader than our ability to fight and win two major regional conflicts like North Korea and Iraq, either of which might not even be a threat by the end of the century.

My concern is maintaining a force that is powerful enough for the unexpected, because our historical experience shows that it is impossible to predict what kind of a strategic environment might emerge ten or twenty years from now.

I believe that the two-MRC force structure is enough for the unexpected, but it must have the same kind of remarkable people in its ranks, the same technological advantages we have today, and the same intense understanding of how to prevail in battle.

Right now the most urgent task is to fight for strong support for these objectives, keep our forces ready, protect the quality of life, and to continue to attract and retain the same kind of outstanding men and women we have today.

Other aspects of our future force are especially fragile, particularly modernization. While for the next few years we can continue to live off the spoils of the Cold War, we know that before the turn of the century we are going to have to start replacing our current stocks simply because our existing equipment will start to wear out. If we eat our seed corn today we will have nothing to take off the shelf later. I am concerned by our own ability to adjust to protect our future force. We in the Armed Forces are going to have to find new innovative ways to train organize and equip our forces.

The last of our three great challenges may prove to be the most difficult and that is adapting to this new world in which we find ourselves.

Even if we manage to build the right force to protect our interests well into the next century, it won't be enough unless we begin to reach consensus as a nation how and where to use this force, to advance our interests in this world of instability of humanitarian crises, of sudden outbreaks of fighting, and of mass migrations.

We had consensus on how and when to use force during the long years of the Cold War. We understood concepts like "overwhelming force" and "total victory."

But now in this era of operations other than war, of operations like Somalia and Rwanda and Haiti, we feel uncertain, unsure. The templates of yesterday have less meaning and don't fit quite as neatly anymore.

Yet the need for these operations won't go away for years to come. The world won't settle down for quite some time to come. It took us a decade to find our bearings at the end of World War Two. It will take us every bit as long to do following the end of the Cold War.

So we must come to grips with this challenge of the role of the Armed Forces and the rest of the force in operations other than war. If we don't, every future operation will tear at us and in the end, will only weaken public support for our government and our military.

These then are the three great challenges that lie ahead. First is having the vision and foresight to take the long view of the future. In our preoccupation with the Somalias, the Rwandas, the Bosnias, and the Haitis not to be distracted from the big issues that will shape the future; developments in China and in Russia, the stability of Northeast Asia, and of Europe.

The end of the Cold War unleashed many new challenges, but it also opened enormous opportunities, opportunities that many of you fought to create. We must try to seize these opportunities if we want the next century to be more peaceful and more secure than this century has been.

Second, we must maintain a military force strong enough and talented enough to protect our interests and our international leadership against the challenges of the next century.

And third, we must find ways to master operations other than war, particularly peace operations, for they will stay with us well into the next century.

These problems are the unwelcome product of a very welcome change in the global security environment.

Now, before I wear out my welcome with all of you, let me close by thanking each of you individually and you all collectively as members of the Retired Officers Association for your extraordinary service to our great Nation, and for what you continue to do for our men and women in uniform.

You did your part superbly to keep America strong. I hate to ask you to pitch in once again. But if we are to retain our military strength as we enter the next century, we will continue to need you by our side. I know that we can count on you to carry the fight for a strong defense and so I thank you and salute you.

God Bless you all and God Bless the United States.

DoD News Briefng — Haiti Update
The Pentagon
Washington, DC
4 October 1994

I'd like to take this opportunity to provide you a very short update on our operations in Haiti so far. As you well know, today now marks slightly over two weeks since our forces were introduced peacefully into Haiti. From the beginning, our mission in Haiti has been to assist in establishing a secure and stable environment that will allow for the restoration of civil order and permit the return of democratic government.

Before I take your questions, I'd like to take a few minutes to fill you in on some of the progress to date.

The deployment of U.S. Forces is essentially complete. Our Forces peaked at the neighborhood of some 21,000. Sunday, U.S. Marines started pulling out our 1,300 Marines from Cap-Haitien, and completed that pull out yesterday. These Marines, by the way, will now be on standby as an afloat reserve. We expect U.S. troop strength to draw down in the near term to around 16,500; then down to some 15,000 by the end of the month; and down to 6,000 by the time we turn this operation over to the United Nations.

At the same time, some U.S. troops are withdrawing and multinational forces are now beginning to arrive in Haiti.

Over 200 Caribbean community troops recently arrived in Haiti, and international police monitors are arriving daily, and I'll have a little bit more to say about that in a minute.

Our Forces are establishing themselves ashore in many ways including: development of an on-shore logistics capability; an expeditionary medical facility in Port-au-Prince; and the reopening of Port-au-Prince International Airport to commercial traffic by tomorrow morning.

In the outlying areas of Haiti, our special forces teams are deployed to assist the Haitian people during this transition period by providing a more secure environment in which people can conduct their daily affairs.

Much has been reported about the security environment in Port-au-Prince. Multinational forces, I think, have made significant progress and will continue to act to establish the safe and secure environment necessary for the restoration of democratic government. We have successfully initiated a weapons control and reduction program, collecting, as of today, over 4,000 weapons, including over 1,000 hand grenades. We will aggressively continue all of our programs to this end.

I'd also like to briefly address the notion of mission creep. I simply don't see it that way. Our mission has not changed from the beginning. What has happened is that we have changed our capabilities and adjusted our procedures slightly, consistent with the changed circumstances on the ground, and I don't think you would want us to do any different.

I recently visited our Forces in Haiti, and was extremely pleased with the performance of our Forces. By the way, Admiral Miller, the overall commander of this operation, is in Haiti today conducting a personal assessment and will be reporting back to me later on today with his personal observations.

Let me run through just a couple of slides for you to make some of the points that I had in the prepared statement. First of all, much of the reporting is always focused on Port-au-Prince, and perhaps Cap-Haitien, so we tend to lose sight that there are Americans in all the other locations. They are the ones that are providing the very needed sense of security to the people out in the countryside, providing medical assistance, and in general, ensuring that the countryside is in fact very quiet — as it has been day in and day out, but with very, very few exceptions. The countryside has been very quiet. So I just wanted to point out to you that American presence is not confined to Cap-Haitien and Port-au-Prince.

One of the things that I address is the weapons buy-back program. These are catalogued weapons that we have collected so far. This chart is as of three o'clock yesterday. Since then [and] in my discussions with Admiral Miller about half an hour ago — he tells me that the count is now well over 4,000 that they have collected.

I am particularly impressed by the 1,100 or so grenades that we've been able to collect, and some 226 that we've been able to buy back. I would make the point to you, as I have on previous occasions, this is not an all-or-nothing program. I'm sure that 1,000 grenades are nowhere near all the grenades that are out there. But that's 1,000 grenades that are off the street today that weren't off the street just a few days ago and that could have done the damage that we saw earlier in this operation.

The second point I will tell you is that it's often thought that somehow we have expanded our operation, and that we are now going from house to house searching for weapons. We are not. We are not doing that. We are going to houses only in response to specific information that those houses contain caches of weapons or automatic weapons designed to hurt us all, as opposed to weapons that are maintained by people who are properly licensed to have weapons such as guards or private industry and others. So I want to dispel the notion that we sometime have had mission creep and now are searching house-to-house for weapons, which we are not doing.

The other point that has to do with security and the secure climate are the international police monitors. This slide shows you the first group of these international police monitors who started deploying on the 29th of September and who will be fully deployed by the 7th of October. These are the countries and the numbers shown in parentheses where this first batch of police monitors is coming.

The next chart will show you the remainder of the police monitors and when they will be arriving. As of today, we have nearly 200 police monitors in country. And you can see the rest of the dates, until the 11th of this month, when all of them will be in place from this initial group; some 840, 850 police monitors, who are very, very important in the effort now to go along with the existing police, ensuring that human rights are not being violated by the existing police, being able to coach them on proper police techniques. Later on as we begin to introduce the new interim police, they, of course, will be key in doing the same function — particularly then the function of coaching the new police in proper police procedures.

To put it in perspective, there will be some 840 police monitors. In Port-au-Prince right now, to the best of our knowledge, there are some 1,700 policemen.

That means we will have nearly one police monitor for every two policemen on the beat. So certainly it signals the

importance that we attach to this program and how key I think these individuals will be to the restoration of law and order and the conduct of law and order by the Haitian police.

Press Conference Opening Statement
Withdrawal of Iraqi Forces from Kuwait Border
The Pentagon
Washington, DC
11 October 1994

Late yesterday, we began to note changes in the readiness and alert status of Iraqi forces, which indicated a change in their intentions. Early this morning, we detected the beginnings of movement by Iraqi troops from field locations toward rail-loading sites and assembly areas.

However, other indicators continue to show that Iraq still has significant combat forces in the South. It is still too early to tell that the crisis is ended, and we will continue to monitor the situation. Saddam's intent and his willingness to create this crisis are of great concern, so we are continuing our deployment of forces, and will do so until there is no longer a threat from Iraq.

I'd also like to take a few minutes to give you a brief update on the deployment of U.S. forces to the Gulf in response to Saddam Hussein's latest threat to stability in that very important region.

We currently have just under 20,000 troops in theater, with another 45,000 planned for deployment. We have also placed an additional 156,000 troops on alert and ordered them to make the necessary preparations for an imminent deployment. In addition to manpower, we have almost 200 aircraft in the theater, and another 467 planned. Our forces are complemented by another 52 allied warplanes. Also in-theater are 12 U.S. ships which include the aircraft carrier, the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, and two missile-equipped cruisers. I also want to mention the 5 allied ships already in theater, and an additional 21 U.S. ships en route to the area of operations.

Since the Gulf War ended, over three and a half years ago, Iraq has continued to test the resolve of the international community. This latest violation of U.N. resolutions not only tests our resolve, but threatens, once again, the Arabian Peninsula.

At the direction of the President, we have tailored a force designed to meet this threat, and that force will, if attacked, conduct combat operations against Iraq to defend the peninsula, and if ordered by the President to do so, to conduct offensive operations into Iraqi territory to destroy Iraqi offensive military capabilities which threaten our allies.

"Salute to the Military"
Gulfport, Mississippi
14 October 1994

You know it was a year ago, in fact only shortly after I passed the point of my 35th year of military service, when President Clinton called me into his office and told me that he was going to nominate me for the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I remember that day very well.

At first I thought of my good friend General Tony McPeak, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Some of you may remember that Tony spoke at this occasion last year. Whenever somebody asks Tony what made him decide to make the military a career he usually pauses grins and observes that well, actually he hadn't made up his mind yet to stay.

Well when the President called, I thought gosh, if I take this job then the next thing you know I'll have to make the military my career.

Well as you can see, I took the job and so I stand before you as a "lifer," one who has finally made the military a career.

But I want to assure you that contrary to my stern look on CNN, I'm usually enjoying whatever it is that I am doing.

Now, your invitation forced me to sit down and think about what it is I have gotten myself into. It made me think long and hard about why so many wonderful people would gather together to take a night out of their very busy lives, in many cases to drive many miles, to come here for this event.

I know why all of these wonderful men and women in uniform are here. They, after all, are members of the military. It is engrained in them. They like salutes. And of course the food is wonderful.

This meal is what we in the military, with our odd way of renaming virtually anything so that we cannot be mistaken for civilians, this meal is what we call a hot A-ration.

To those of you without experience in military matters we further define an A-Ration as a fully home-cooked meal, one each. As a matter of instinct, military men and women never miss a chance for a good A-ration because they never know when the call will come to deploy and live off MREs, meals ready to eat.

So I know why they are here. But what about the rest of you? What have those terrific men and women in uniform done to deserve this very great honor you are bestowing on them tonight?

This question made me think back over the past, now 36 years, to reflect on that very question. And I would like to share some of my thoughts with you.

As many of you know, I was born in Poland and spent my childhood in Europe. When I was three, Hitler attacked Poland and the German Army rolled over my hometown on its way to places like Leningrad and Stalingrad. When the Second World War ended, I was nine years old and that began the conquest of Central Europe by the Soviet Union.

So from the time I was born through my teen years, I saw firsthand the place of my birth destroyed by war and I saw it pass from conquest by one dictator into the hands of another.

When I was 16, my family left Europe and we came to the United States, and I learned firsthand of freedom, hope, and of boundless opportunity.

I was fortunate to go on to college and graduate four years later with a degree in engineering. And with this degree and a job offer in my hands, I went out, took out a loan, and I bought my first spiffy used car.

It was at this point that I received a telegram from Uncle Sam that said, "Not so fast," and like so many others from my generation, I found myself in Basic Training and in the hands of one of those drill sergeants that make Basic Training such a fond memory to have behind you.

And some lucky civilian was driving around in my spiffy car, his hair blowing in the wind while I was left wondering what had happened to my hair.

But you know, looking back on the day I put on that uniform, that really was the proudest day of my life and that pride has never, never tarnished in all of the years and decades that have passed ever since.

In fact, after spending now most of my lifetime with the men and women of our Armed Forces, my pride has only increased with each passing year and so has my love for the military.

But I remember back in the early seventies, when President Nixon made the decision to end the draft. I suppose that like many of you here in this audience, I entertained great doubts about the wisdom of that decision.

I remember wondering then whether we would be able to make a go of the volunteer force. Wondering whether there would be enough who would want to be professional soldiers.

After all, military life places extraordinary demands on its members and on their families.

There is the discipline, which to many can be oppressive. There are the endless days and months and years of time away from home, missing children's birthdays, missing those special moments and holidays with family and friends.

There are six-month cruises at sea with the endless monotony of 18-hour shifts in the engine room, seven days a week, week after week and month after month.

There are the constant moves uprooting our families every few years just when they are becoming members of the community and having to start all over in a new place. Whether you are in the Army or the Navy or the Air Force or the Marine Corps, all of the services put these great demands on their people.

But most difficult of all, there is that perpetual uncertainty of a late night phone call and being told to deploy on moment's notice, leaving your family to go into harm's way, and leaving them behind praying that you will return safely.

And so I wondered back when this decision was made what kind of Armed Forces we would have.

Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since then. Whatever doubts I had then have completely vanished. The fact is we have managed to keep absolutely extraordinary people in our Armed Forces. In fact our men and women in uniform today are regarded worldwide as the finest military force on the face of the earth. And what has made it this way?

A great part of that is because the American people have continued to arm our forces with the finest equipment, like the superb Aegis Cruisers that are built here, and also to fund the kinds of constant and demanding training that military forces require. These two things, modern and capable equipment and readiness have been an absolutely crucial part of why our Armed Forces are the best in the world.

But do you know what is even more important in fact the most decisive factor? To those sitting here in this room, those of you in uniform, and those of you who have come here for this evening's event, I suppose the very fact that you are here shows that you already know the answer. It is of course the men and women in our ranks.

Saddam Hussein had a lot more military equipment than our forces in the Gulf War. And if you ask those who were there, they will tell you that much of it was very modern and certainly very lethal.

What he didn't have was several hundred thousand men and women who knew how to fight, how to think on a very-fast moving battlefield, and who cared far more for their country and the importance of what they were there to do, than for their own safety. In other words he didn't have American troops.

And if you go to visit our troops in Haiti as I did just last week, you will see again the same caliber of men and women in our ranks. And you will see under very different conditions than the Gulf War, the same kind of courage and determination and skill and initiative.

Now as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nothing that I do is more important than protecting this quality force and ensuring that we have the same extraordinary caliber of people in our future force. And like Colin Powell before me, I have wondered how we are going to do this with all of the cuts and reductions that have come in the aftermath of the Cold War.

By 1996, we will have reduced our Armed Forces by 32 percent just since the Gulf War ended. By 1999, our defense budget will be worth less than half what it was in 1987. These are drastic numbers. Over 600,000 people smaller. A budget that is less than half what it was.

That means we have had to tell many outstanding men and women that they must leave the military. And this has been very difficult, in fact agonizing, for very often we are telling men and women who have done great things for this country and that were fully committed to do more great things that they must leave.

But of equal concern, I want to emphasize again that we are cutting around one third of the force but the budget is being cut by a far deeper proportion. When I learned these numbers, it really didn't take long to realize that there are some flaws with this equation.

This is now the heart of the defense quandary and debate in Washington: how to balance this problem. And of course it puts tremendous downward pressure on every part of our Armed Forces.

But there are two things that we must protect above all others. One of these very obviously is readiness. All you need do is take a quick glimpse in the rearview mirror at the past five years, at all of the operations we have sent our forces to do, and even a cursory look at the world around us today and it places a giant scarlet pulsating stop sign in front of our readiness accounts. Clearly this is not an area to go and try and find savings.

But that stop sign creates the temptation to go elsewhere. And that area very clearly is to go after the money that we need to pay our people to take care of their medical benefits, to provide them and their families an adequate quality of life, and once they have completed a long career of honorable and dedicated service, the money to pay for their retirements.

But this is not the place to balance the budget because it will surely drive people that we need out of the service. The equation is really very simple. Readiness built on the foundation of truly superb people is a very different thing than readiness built on a weaker foundation.

But you know there is one other factor beyond superb equipment, readiness, and quality people that have made this professional force of ours such a remarkable success.

Again thinking back to the doubts I entertained when the decision was made to eliminate the draft, I wondered if this would drive an intangible wedge between the American people and their military. I wondered if the same warmth, caring, and mutual pride that was so evident in American history, I wondered whether that would still be there.

And I was bothered by this perhaps more than any other single thought, because I have learned that nothing is more important or more uniquely American than the bond and the affection that exists between Americans and their men and women in uniform.

If you go visit our forces in Haiti today or if you remember the thousands of interviews with our soldiers in the Gulf War, what you see are many young faces, very often smudged with dirt and sweat bags of exhaustion under their eyes and tension very clearly written on their faces, but you see how very much these men and women want to make their country proud of them and how much their thoughts are not on their own dangers and risks, but rather wondering how their families and loved ones are doing.

This is what I see and hear every time I go to visit them. Nothing, and I mean nothing, is more important to our people than their confidence that their country supports them, loves them, is concerned about the risks they are enduring, and that their families are well cared for. And that, God forbid, should they become casualties that someone will be there to care for their families.

That is why I so eagerly accepted this invitation to come here to the Gulf Coast Salute to the Military and why this

event made me think back over the years to what I have been doing and why it is that there should be a salute to the military.

To all of the members of the Armed Forces who are here tonight, you very much deserve this salute. What you do for this country every day, the magnificent way in which you do it, are clearly worthy of a salute from your fellow citizens.

And those of you who spent so much of your time organizing this event and to all of those of you who are here who have given your time to be here, you also are to be saluted because you remind each of us in uniform for what we serve.

50th Anniversary of the Battle of Leyte Gulf
Hill 120 Flag-Raising Ceremony
Philippine Islands
20 October 1994

I imagine that to many of you, who were here fifty years ago, this beach must look very, very different. Then, its sands were littered with equipment and vehicles, the air reeked with the odor of cordite, and the ground rocked with the pounding of artillery. The trees lay flattened. Few, if any, homes or buildings were standing, and the ground was literally measled with shell holes. It was a violent and dangerous place, with none of the beauty, nor the serenity that surrounds us today.

Even this monument where we have gathered, Hill 120, was stripped and barren, hardly the lushly treed mound we see before us today. But here, today, there is still one group of recognizable landmarks, truly the greatest monument we have come to honor — you — the veterans of this campaign, those who fought from the great naval battles here at Leyte, to those who came ashore, who fought from this beach across thousands of miles, through dozens more operations that it took before this nation was free.

Today I have the great privilege of introducing one of these men, then a 24-year old captain with the 96th Infantry when it landed on these beaches. Milton Marks, like many others, was still in school when Pearl Harbor was attacked on 7 December 1941. Within a month, however, he had joined the Army and traded his law books for a carbine.

Like the rest of the 96th Division, Captain Marks saw his first combat here on the beaches of Leyte. He stayed with the 96th, then the 1st Cavalry Division, through the remainder of the fighting until the war ended, battling across the breadth of Leyte, and through the operations in Luzon. In the process, he was one of those who participated in the liberation of the Santo Tomas prison.

After leaving the service as a major in 1946, Milton Marks finished that law degree he began in 1941. Among his many distinctions since then, Milton Marks has been a state assemblyman, a judge, and is currently a state senator in California.

I am very proud to introduce to you this honored veteran, one of many who came with MacArthur to fight, and if need be to die, as so many did, to make this nation free once again. Ladies and gentlemen, let me present state Senator Milton Marks.

Philippine WW II Memorial Ceremony
Philippine Islands
22 October 1994

We gather here on this cloud filled afternoon to commemorate the extraordinary bravery and sacrifice of those who fought and suffered and persevered and in the end prevailed so the people of the Philippines could be free once again.

Fifty years ago, a great invasion fleet, the largest and the most powerful force ever assembled in the Pacific, lay off the shores of Leyte Island and the rolling thunder of the long awaited march of liberty was about to start.

No sooner were the first assault forces ashore with the clash of battle still ringing about, than the voice of Douglas MacArthur was heard throughout the Philippines in that unforgettable radio broadcast.

He began with the same haunting phrase that was used to close the final radio program from besieged Corregidor, two blood stained years before

"This is the voice of freedom," MacArthur spoke.

And so today we have come here, all of us, to remember, to salute the bravery, to remember the sacrifice, to vow never to forget that these silent white markers all around us were the ultimate price of freedom.

And what better place to remember than here, surrounded by such moving symbols amidst these white-marbled graves of 17,201 brave souls and the long walls carved with 36,281 more names, those whose bodies were never recovered. What better place, than here on this hillside where so many heroes rest, to come to remember.

We come to honor the men and women living and passed whose extraordinary valor and spirit changed our lives, changed the fate of every nation in this region, and forged such a special bond between the people of our two nations.

It is said that any nation that forgets its heroes will itself soon be forgotten. Neither we, the children of those who fought and bled here for the cause of liberty, nor our children shall ever forget. We have a very special monument to remind us. And that monument is our freedom.

Here on this gray day, seeing so many old American and Filipino comrades-in-arms reunited once again, hearing you share your now distant memories of a much more difficult time, you remind us of something else we must not forget; that no two nations in the world ever endured more nor suffered more greatly ... for loyalty to one another.

I once asked a veteran of this war what he felt he accomplished fighting through one campaign after another, seeing so many of his comrades fall in combat. "That was the challenge of my generation," he told me, "It is up to you now and your generation to make it worthwhile."

And Americans and Filipinos have endeavored to do just that, and time has not erased that special bond you forged between our two nations. For all who are listening today, we must always remember that veteran's challenge. Let us never squander what they paid so dearly to obtain.

In the shadow of the chapel and bell tower at this site, lies a small plaque. Engraved in bold letters there, it reads, "As these bells ring, honored dead rest, freedom lives." And surely so it does.

Now it is up to us to ensure these bells never stop ringing. And we will so ensure. God Bless those who rest here. God Bless the Philippines. God Bless America. And God Bless you all.

The Fuehrungsakademie
(German War College)
Hamburg, Germany
9 November 1994

Let me begin by telling you what a great pleasure it is to be here today and to have this chance to share some views with you. I know that Secretary Bill Perry was here several months ago and he told me what a great time he had here with you.

At our own war colleges, we have an annual tradition of bringing in each of our service chiefs and each of the joint warfighting commanders each year to discuss their most current concerns and issues.

In this way the students at the war colleges gain a first hand explanation of the most current issues from around the world and an appreciation of the kinds of issues and challenges they are likely to face after they graduate.

So I thought that today I might extend this same tradition and spirit to you here at the Fuehrungsakademie and to offer you a report on the issues that have been crossing my desk in the Pentagon.

It was fifteen months ago when President Clinton called and told me that I was to be his choice for the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I had been the SACEUR for only 14 months. But in that time, I had been completely and exclusively absorbed in the challenges facing our great alliance. As you know, my time as SACEUR, just like General Jack Galvin's before me, was consumed by the alliance's reinvention and trying to assist the very fundamental adjustments we had to make to this new era as well as dealing with the crisis in Bosnia.

So I returned to Washington a little bit out of touch, but also very curious about what challenges face a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in this new era.

Earlier in my career I had several assignments in the Pentagon working on joint issues. In fact, just before becoming SACEUR, I had been the Assistant to the Chairman. So you would think that I should have been firmly grounded in the kinds of issues confronting a chairman today.

But I must tell you that this was not the case. The world has changed so quickly and so fundamentally over the past five years that the issues and challenges are very different.

Let me offer an example. During the decades of the Cold War the fixation of the Armed Forces was on enforcing the doctrine of containment.

But over a period of four decades, the rules and by-laws of containment had long since been ironed out and really, our forces were just manning long-established trenches. To the degree that there were still debates and uncertainties they were nearly always somewhat narrow tactical questions.

Here in Europe for example, if you look back to the period from the late seventies to the late eighties, there were only two significant issues. The first was whether or not to modernize American nuclear systems with the cruise missile and Pershing II.

And although this was a very serious issue at the time, looking back from the vantage of the past few years at the magnitude of issues and changes we have accomplished very expeditiously, it is hard to appreciate why this was such an agonizing and consequential struggle for the alliance.

And the second was the out-of-area debate that began in the late seventies and lingered until 1985 or so. By that time, even the most fervid advocates for NATO to expand its out-of-area responsibilities recognized that it was a mute issue. There was simply no way that the alliance was going to go beyond its immediate defensive obligations.

Again, if you look at the all the changes that this alliance accepted in the past few short years including out-of-area responsibilities, that only underlines the impact of this new era.

In the American defense establishment the greatest debate was over the merits of a maritime or a continental strategy. Actually, this debate was more window dressing than substance. For all the noise and debate there was never any question of veering off toward either extreme. Given America's geostrategic position, we need a powerful global naval force to extend our influence. But we could not and still cannot afford for that influence to end at the shoreline of other continents.

The true stake of this debate all along was a marginal adjustment in how we would balance the increased defense dollars of our defense build-up during that period.

Then came the events of 1989 and 1990 and quickly in succession, the Gulf War and then the explosion in Yugoslavia. And suddenly the kinds of issues that all of our nations were having to confront were very strategic and very grandiose in nature. All of us knew that the world had changed in very great ways, but I think that in Moscow, Bonn, Washington, and every other nation, nobody was very certain where events were carrying us.

In any strategic analysis, the same refrain was echoed again and again, the same three words: uncertain; ambiguous; and unpredictable.

Then, shortly before I left Europe, there was the very tragic firefight in Mogadishu, which left 18 soldiers dead. This event created a searing image in American minds, an image that flashed across television tubes in every living room in our nation, the terrible sight of the bodies of courageous American soldiers being dragged through dusty streets while jeering crowds jogged alongside, crowds intoxicated with anti-Americanism.

And Americans were left wondering how our soldiers who went to Somalia to accomplish such a noble cause, to bring food to millions who were on the verge of starvation, could suddenly be caught in a whirlpool of such violence and hatred.

So when I returned to Washington last October, we were at a point of great urgency in determining our future course. And over the past year what I think we have learned is that there really are three great challenges that lie before us; truly the three great challenges that we must overcome if we are to succeed in the next century.

The first of these challenges is our need to take a long view of the future. As you know, over the past year the headlines that have dominated America's attention have been Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, North Korea, Bosnia, and most recently Iraq. On the one hand, the issues in each of these nations are serious and deserve our attention. But on the other hand, what happens in any of these countries will probably not be the major forces that will shape the next century.

The prospect of North Korea gaining a nuclear weapon is troublesome in many ways. And a North Korean attack against South Korea would throw Northeast Asia into turmoil.

But if you look at North Korea's stature and potential compared to the other nations of Asia, I think you would quickly conclude that it will not be a pivotal force in shaping the future of Asia.

That future is being shaped right now in the booming ports and factories of China and in the government ministries in Beijing. And it is being decided in Tokyo's financial district, where every other Asian nation goes for the seed money needed to start new companies and finance new technologies.

And with regard to Iraq, certainly Saddam Hussein's desperate slyness cannot be ignored. But today, Iraq's Armed Forces are a fraction of what they were in 1990 and I would not recommend for anyone to bet on Saddam's future. A far greater threat is what is happening in Tehran, where the mullahs are very actively trying to spread a creed of hate

throughout the Arab region, into North Africa, and even into the Trans-Caucasus and Turkey. They are trying to undo the progress of a century and to undermine those secular regimes that have a hold in the region. And by tickling Russia's underbelly they are taking great risks.

And so what we have to ask ourselves is how to create a stable multipolar world. Because if you look at the shape of the next century it is very clear that the true shape of things to come is being formed in Washington, here in Bonn, and in Kiev and Moscow, and in Tokyo and Beijing.

Two and three years ago, what many feared was that what would evolve would be three great blocs, each separate and distinct from the others where the practice of exclusion would stunt global interaction and economic prosperity.

I don't think this was ever a very realistic prophecy because global interdependency has simply proceeded too far. So this is not what we must prepare for. To the contrary we must prepare for the opposite.

We face a very unique era, an era very different from anything in the past. It will be a multipolar world with a number of major powers. And despite our best efforts to reduce the numbers of nuclear warheads, there will still be nuclear weapons that make the risk of future conflicts far more dreadful than anything that could have happened before the Cold War.

And it will be a very interdependent world, because no nation today can succeed economically without vibrant trade and because of the continuing explosion of global information systems. So it is important for all of us to take this long view and to invest our resources and efforts accordingly. We must appreciate which are the main events and we can never allow ourselves to lose sight of this.

For Americans the second great challenge is preparing our Armed Forces for the challenges of the next century. This same challenge is affecting every other nation in the world today but I thought it might be helpful if I explained the direction of America's Armed Forces.

We now have had two administrations in a row agree that our forces must be shaped to be able to fight and win two regional conflicts that erupt nearly simultaneously. Our senior military leaders all agree that this is the right template to shape and size our forces. Today we are using Iraq and North Korea to measure this response. But that is not a prediction of where we will have to fight nor is it a fixed array of threats for the future. It is impossible to predict who we may have to fight in the future. So this two contingency force also gives us the equilibrium to stay ready in the event another more powerful adversary, one that is not yet in our vision, could emerge in the future.

But what makes this goal very challenging is that by 1997, we will have cut our forces by one third. In fact we are already well over 80 percent done with these reductions. But by 1999, our overall defense budget will shrink to less than half what it was in 1988 which was the highpoint of our Cold War defense budgets. This is not a balanced equation. Our budget will be less than a half of what it was but our forces will be a third smaller. So the true challenge is how to protect the essential qualities that have made the American Armed Forces such a superb force. In other words we must find ways to get more value from our defense dollar.

There are three elements of our force that must be protected if we are to accomplish this goal. The first of these is maintaining the quality of people. As all of you know nothing is more important to a military force than outstanding people. So to do this we must protect the benefits and incentives and quality of life that attract the right kind of recruits and also that keep professionals and their families satisfied with military duty.

The second element we must protect is readiness. This point was underlined very dramatically just a few weeks ago when we had forces in Haiti ensuring stability helping President Aristide's government reinstitute democracy in that troubled nation and suddenly we had to send forces to protect Kuwait from Saddam's latest challenge.

What underwrites this challenge is that right now we have forces along the demilitarized border of a still threatened South Korea, we have forces operating as part of the multinational force in Northern Iraq, and we also have our forces committed to the operations in former Yugoslavia.

Any of these could escalate overnight and we could find ourselves in the position of having to undertake a major operation. So we really have no choice but to keep our readiness very high because our experience over the past few years, and everything that we can see in the future, suggests that our readiness will be tested.

The third element we must protect is the programs that we need to continue to shape our forces to accomplish this two contingency mission. And I am encouraged that we are making the right strides on this path. Since the Gulf War, we have greatly expanded the numbers of weapons platforms that can deliver long range precision munitions.

We have improved our strategic and operational level C4I capabilities to correct problems we had during that conflict, we have expanded our strategic lift, and put prepositioned equipment sets in Southwest Asia and Northeast Asia to increase our flexibility to address crises anywhere in the world.

But we must continue with this progress. Let me add that one of the ways we are finding to balance these goals is to look for ways to expand upon the jointness of our forces.

Really, until the late 1980's, although we had a joint command and control structure in place — one that extended from the Joint Chiefs of Staff down through our joint warfighting commands, we really had not used this structure nor the spirit of jointness to achieve the great benefits that we should have.

The reforms ushered in by our Congress in the 1987 Goldwater-Nichols Act, reforms that improved the operational jointness of our forces and the quality of our joint staffs, were proven to be enormously effective during the Gulf War. But now we are going to proceed beyond this point to carry jointness into the way that we train, organize, equip, and man our forces.

Up until now these functions have fallen under our military departments and our service staffs. So if you were to characterize how we have done this business it has been as four separate entities.

But all of our senior military leaders recognize that we can no longer afford or accept the inefficiencies of this approach. You may have noticed for example that in the Haitian operation, we sent two aircraft carriers to participate. But the aircraft carriers had left their Navy jets back in the United States and they were carrying instead Army troops and their flight decks were filled with Army helicopters.

This innovation fitted the unique operational requirements of the Haitian operation where attack aircraft could not be used, but it was a step that shattered some old dogmas within our services. Even as recently as the Gulf War, it would have been anathema to attempt such a thing. So this is one evidence of the great changes we are doing.

But let me offer you another example. In the past, the Air Force used to come forward and say that it needed so many air-to-ground fighters and the Navy would come forward and say it needed so many and the Marine Corps would do the same.

Now our joint warfighters say they need this many fighters and then the joint system says this is how many will be Air Force and this many Navy and this many Marine Corps. Then we go a step beyond this and tell the Research and Development people that the planes may be different because the needs may vary but the parts must be interchangeable. The guidance systems and the targeting systems and the weapons platforms and munitions should be the same.

So this is a major effort right now and it is forcing the military leadership in Washington to break a lot of old traditions and to violate a lot of things that until now were considered sacred.

Now there was a third challenge that I mentioned, and again, it is a challenge that is being faced by many the Armed Forces of many other nations as well, including you here, and that is the challenge of how to deal with the growth of these operations like peacekeeping and humanitarian missions that fall in the crack between peace and war.

In some ways, this is a very difficult issue both for America as a nation and for our Armed Forces. It is difficult because we still have enormous warfighting responsibilities and very many commitments that rely on our ability to fight and win.

And this must remain our focus. Protecting our most important interests is a function of warfighting and we will allow nothing to degrade this capability.

But what we have learned over the past few years is that we are going to have to participate in these other kinds of operations. If we just look at America's experience over the past year, even after Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia, it is clear that we will become engaged in these kinds of tasks. And as I see the future unfolding these kinds of tragedies have by no means run their course.

In part, there is the military challenge of how to undertake these operations successfully. And this presents a very great challenge because we train our foot soldiers and marines, those whom we send to do these kinds of missions, we train them to be warriors. Their instincts are honed to respond to an ambush by immediately returning overwhelming fire and then charging the ambushers, because their only hope of survival depends on reacting with such ferocity that they can violently overwhelm their enemy.

And how do you retrain that same soldier or marine to holster that instinct and in the place of action to react with caution and inaction?

How do you train that lieutenant who has just learned to maneuver a force onto an objective, to instead become a superb negotiator who can step between two angry opponents without making himself a target?

And if you are able to train these things, is there a risk that we will have undone that warfighting edge that is so very vital to survival in a different kind of environment? I don't know the answers to these questions. But I know that we have to get better at this because the world situation demands that our forces be able to operate successfully in both kinds of environments.

But there is one other issue associated with this challenge and that is how our nations adjust to these kinds of

missions. Throughout the years of the Cold War, our societies accepted that if we had to go war, then we would fight with all we had to achieve victory. This is what our geostrategic circumstances dictated and this was an engrained understanding. But what is victory in these other kinds of operations? And how do we apply our force?

I think nothing better illustrates this part of the challenge than what has been happening in Bosnia where our intervention has been very beneficial, but has failed to completely resolve the problem.

And for every nation involved in this operation, that has proved very unsatisfying. So for all of us, Americans and Germans alike, this will remain a great challenge.

Now I have probably spoken too long already. But I wanted to share with you the issues we are facing in Washington today, rather than discuss American-German relations; because I suspect you have already heard so much on that topic, but also because the great importance of this alliance depends on both American and German officers sharing a common understanding of each other.

I remember two years ago when I came to the Fuerungsakademie, I had the great honor to speak as the SACEUR and I spoke of the challenges confronting NATO and the Trans-Atlantic partnership that has been such a vital link for these past 45 years. At that time I think there were still many doubts about whether this linkage would be maintained.

Now two years later, I would hope that those doubts have dissipated. But I suspect this is a forlorn hope because I recognize that even in the darkest moments of the Cold War and regardless of how many great challenges our alliance had weathered, these doubts were still present.

But certainly in Washington today, there are no debates about whether America is in Europe to stay or not. American forces are here to stay and we have no intention of relinquishing the great bond that we spent so many decades building.

I remember speaking to an American officer who had a key role in Germany in the years right after the Second World War. I asked him what he and the other American officers were thinking about during the period of military occupation. What was on their mind as they worked with Konrad Adenhauer's newly forming government and helped to create this new Germany?

To my surprise he never once mentioned the Soviet Union or the needs of containment. What he said was that he and his generation of officers felt it was crucial to build strong democratic allies for America because America's extraordinary power at that time could not last. It was an unnatural circumstance of the war that was bound to recede as other nations recovered. He told me that he and his peers felt it was imperative to build the seeds for America's future by creating this strong alliance to help our nation through future challenges.

Well that time is now upon us. And for you, the officers here today and for your peers in America's war colleges, this alliance is now available for our future challenges.

It will be up to you and your American counterparts to shape the direction for the future to make this alliance work for the benefit of both our nations, the rest of Europe, and the world as well. For all the fears that you hear that this alliance may drift apart because there are now fewer Americans stationed in Germany than during the Cold War, or because there is no Soviet threat to force us to stay together, I would answer that today we must remain together because there are these very great challenges remaining, but also these great opportunities that we fought so hard to create. And it will be up to you here today to ensure this. You must continue with the task of building an alliance no longer built on dread but instead built on hope. I have no doubt that you will.

Thank you.

Georgetown University Institute of Foreign Service
IDEN Lecture
Washington, DC
16 November 1994

Certainly the theme of "diplomacy and force" couldn't be any more timely or appropriate, and speaking of force, what a perfect case study we've just had, with major emphasis on force, in the just completed Republican march from coast to coast.

And of course just last month some of you may have noticed that very title of "diplomacy and force" was splashed across the cover of Time magazine. And Henry Kissinger's latest book wrestles with this same subject as well, not to mention Tony Lake's recent lecture at Harvard, again, on that same subject.

So it seems that we are seeing a sort of revival of interest in these two very fundamental elements of American

power. But that should not surprise us, for what we have come to realize over the past several years is that the world has in fact so very fundamentally changed that it is time for us to think anew of the relationship between American diplomacy and force. And I believe there are two challenges that lie before us, two issues that we must come to terms with:

First, to redefine this relationship between diplomacy and force in the post Cold War era, to guide, to harness, and balance these two elements of our national power towards a common purpose, particularly as we enter the 21st Century.

And second, to learn how to deal with the growing number of what I call "Operations Other Than War," the Somalias, the Rwandas, the Haitis, and the Bosnias of today and tomorrow. For I believe that these sorts of "Operations Other Than War" will stay with us well into the next century.

Let me first turn to the relationship between diplomacy and force. I remember reading in George Kennan's autobiography his prognosis that in peacetime, soldiers are the servants of diplomats. But when war erupts, the relationship shifts and suddenly diplomats are no more than the lawyers of the Department of Defense. Now at the time Kennan wrote this, he was expressing a view he learned during the years between the First and Second World Wars. However, the peculiar conditions of the Cold War certainly changed this equation. Throughout the long decades of the Cold War, in almost everything we did, it was simply accepted that security was our paramount concern because, after all, our survival was at stake almost every day. And so we had a strategy, that of containment, that placed the security dimension of our power at the forefront.

From the very beginning of the Cold War an interagency process was developed and then matured to ensure unity between our diplomats and our military. But if truth be known, whatever differences there were, were generally very slight. Sure, there were debates over arms control, or the diplomatic difficulty of supporting certain military measures, such as bringing new missiles into Europe, or constructing bases and training agreements, or how to work through burden-sharing arrangements, particularly in Europe.

But I think that if you look back from today's vantage, from the kinds of issues and decisions we have had to face over the past several years; the issues of the sixties, the seventies, and even the eighties, appear, in retrospect, to have been very undramatic. As containment matured as a strategy there was simply less and less room for disagreement between the diplomats and the soldiers.

But then came the great events of the late eighties and early nineties, when suddenly, our colossal threat collapsed and the bipolar structure that we were so long accustomed to disintegrated right before our eyes.

Immediately, there was a drumbeat to go back to something resembling George Kennan's old relationship. Economics would displace security as the foremost priority of our national strategy and the military would shrink considerably as a tool of our influence. And so, our diplomats were told, sheath your swords and relearn the art of trade agreements.

Now, I guess three or four years later, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, Somalia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, our latest troubles in North Korea and Haiti, I think that some of us, at least, are beginning to recognize that there really was a degree of wishful thinking in that particular view.

We have found that our global leadership is something that we value very highly. And we have also learned to appreciate that it is probably not possible to sustain our leadership if we are unwilling to use one of our two principal strengths, that of military force. As well, we now understand that Kennan's formula worked when our nation had no significant commitments outside of our own territories, commitments like Korea and Kuwait, and many others that you can think of — commitments that rely very heavily on the use of American force, or the preparedness to use American force.

But if we are not back to Kennan's model, we are also not back to the Cold War relationship between diplomacy and force. But then, where are we, and how should we proceed?

I'm not sure that I have the answer to that question. But I would like to offer you some things to think about. Because, if we are going to get it right for the next century, I think we are going to have to find the proper balance in this partnership between diplomacy and force.

In the first instance, both diplomacy and force are operating in a new kind of global climate and structure. And that's no news to anyone. We are now firmly into a multipolar world. And, compared with yesterday, it is a far more complex environment, and a far more fluid environment, one that moves and changes at a much faster tempo than we have been accustomed to these last few decades.

America still has unequaled global power and persuasiveness. We are the richest nation, even though, as a total percentage of world production, our position has diminished considerably since WW II ended. We still have the world's finest and most powerful military. But to project this force abroad, we rely upon other nations for bases, for overflight rights, for cost sharing, and very often, for coalition partners.

But it is the combination of these two, our economic might and our military might, that give us such extraordinary diplomatic leverage all around the world. They are what make America's diplomats the first among equals.

But, perhaps most importantly, as you look into the next century it is clear that there is going to be more multipolarity, not less. As China gets richer and more powerful; as the Russians recover from the loss of an empire; as Germany recovers from the costs of reunification; and as Tokyo finds a new role in Asia and the world; the combination of all of this will reduce our latitude to influence unilaterally or to act independently. It is not that our strength will decline, because I am very optimistic about our prospects in the next century. But I happen to be optimistic about the prospects of others as well.

And so, I think there is a very real need for us to build the framework of this multipolar world.

In the past, this may have meant striking a balance of power between competing powers, the traditional European solution to finding security. But, the world is not so simple today. There are nuclear weapons that cant the equation of power in odd ways. How else could the Soviet Union, with an economy that was so backward and impoverished, have been considered such a powerful opponent?

As well, it is axiomatic that in a balance of power there is a nemesis you are balancing against. Today, who do you want to balance power against? And, is this an optimal solution if the opportunity exists to instead bring all of the major powers into cooperative global roles?

So, this is the first great challenge we face. How do we define this new relationship between diplomacy and force in this very different era? And then, how do we guide, and harness, and balance these two elements of our national power toward a common purpose?

But, there is a second challenge that has been with us since 1990 as well, and you can't separate the two. And that challenge is the growing number of what we in the military call "Operations Other Than War." These are the Somalias, the Bosnias, the Rwandas, and the Haitis, that range from peacekeeping, to peace enforcement, to humanitarian operations, to the counter-drug efforts we are pursuing in Latin America and other regions as well.

They sit in that netherworld between war and peace where the lines between diplomacy and force are intermingled and certainly muddled.

We did such operations during the Cold War but they were very few and far between. And frankly, we didn't always do them very well. So we really don't have a time tested template that we can lay down every time we commit to one of these operations.

And, I think that these operations become even more complex when the effort involves United Nations, or coalition forces, because the job of the warrior, and the job of the diplomat, both, in such cases, become more difficult.

Any of you here that have been involved in one of these United Nations or coalition operations will hopefully agree with me that there is much less leeway then when you are operating unilaterally, because any daylight or confusion between our diplomatic and military strategies, very quickly becomes a source of confusion to our partners. And, if we are leading the effort, as is often the case, it is all the more deplorable, and all the more dangerous.

I think our record over the past year, on the other hand, has been getting better. If you look back on Rwanda, and what we have done so far in Haiti, and in a slightly different way in North Korea, you would, I think, conclude that the interaction between diplomacy and force has, in fact, been quite good.

And so I think we have learned a few lessons that we will be able to apply to the future. And I'd like to spend just a moment discussing some of these lessons with you.

I can remember a time when the military viewed diplomats as elitists in striped pants who put greater stock in turning an elegant phrase than taking action.

And this disenchantment was reciprocated. For their part, diplomats viewed the military as men who saw the world simply as black and white, and who admired action for action's sake. We were very uncomfortable in one another's presence, and both institutions studiously sought to avoid each other. When we met, we very often talked past each other.

But the time when these feelings permeated passed long ago, probably because the pressures of the Cold War forced such a constant interaction between us.

To fully appreciate how far we have come, all you have do is to spend a day with Ambassadors Albright and Redman, as I have recently done, flying into the bullet-riddled city of Sarajevo. For that particular trip, both of them had traded in their striped suits for their flak jackets and steel pots. And instead of riding around in shiny limousines, both of them spent the day in French armored cars, surrounded by tough and vigilant young guards.

Instead of going to meetings and exchanging pleasantries, both of them were completely absorbed with going to the

site of the latest atrocity in that city, and studying the logistics of how we were going to keep the people of Sarajevo fed for just another year.

And I have seen the same kind of sharing of understanding and of risks in Rwanda, and Somalia, and Haiti, as well. So, I think this is one point. In these kinds of operations, because of their complexity, and because of the blend of diplomacy and force, it is especially vital that our diplomats and warriors operate in complete tandem.

But, there are still very real differences between our two institutions, and we must all understand these differences, because they tend to become clearest whenever a crisis emerges. And, this surely is not a good time to become enlightened.

The military is, in fact, most comfortable when the objectives are clear and precise. Institutionally, the military is very solution oriented. When force is used, we have a strong preference that its use results in achieving that state we call victory. When we fight, our first recourse is to apply overwhelming force to achieve a very rapid and a very decisive conclusion.

Partly, this is because we think lives are at risk. But, also because once diplomacy turns to force, rationality falls prey to emotion and unpredictability.

On the other hand, as Henry Kissinger observed, diplomacy is very often the art of managing the insoluble. So the diplomat operates inside the milieu of rationality, a world of half measures, of compromises, and of the kinds of complex arrangements that we call "peaceful relations." An experienced diplomat is an expert at finding just that particular line in the sand that leaves both sides least dissatisfied. When force is used, a diplomat might reasonably ask if it isn't possible to use just the right amount of force to accomplish the very specific purpose in mind.

Traditionally, this has been the great clash in outlooks between diplomats and the military. One looks to apply just enough force to gain a negotiated agreement: the other, the military, to apply so much force that he gains acquiescence from the other.

But, in "Operations Other Than War" this traditional clash of outlooks tends to get confused and turned on its head. Nearly always, these kinds of operations are not about vital interests. And, because our interests are limited in such operations, so are the means we are willing to apply and what we want to achieve. And so there is an intangible struggle to find the right balance.

As well, there is a struggle to find the right way to use force, because very often in these "Operations Other Than War," the adversaries are not opposing states but are instead warring factions, tribes, or ethnic groups, and the effects of either diplomacy or force are not easily calculable, rational, or predictable.

In the Cold War, we were wary of limited operations, because there was always this risk of a limited conflict getting out of hand and escalating to a superpower confrontation. But, now that the Cold War is over, our visceral concern in these limited operations is that the operation might escalate in risks and costs beyond the level of our more limited interests.

And we recognize, as well, that once American lives are lost, our interest will swell. And so, we necessarily ask ourselves, how many casualties can we stand in this particular operation?

I remember when it was first announced that I was to be nominated by the President to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That week a national magazine carried my picture on its cover under the dubious title of "Globocop." More recently, on several occasions I have seen several newspapers refer to me as a pacifist. And I have seen others argue that I have a phobia about placing American lives at risk. So apparently I have traveled quite a distance in this past year!

But, really, the issue is not a reluctance to use American force for the right reasons or in the right ways. The issue is for what interest are we using force, and then how do we balance our risks, and use force appropriately and effectively to protect that particular interest? And understanding that once we commit American prestige and lives, can, or should, we resolve ourselves to something less than a decisive outcome?

In Bosnia, for example, there has been this recurring debate about using American airpower to influence the Bosnian Serbs to stop the fighting. I'm not sure there is anywhere in the world where airpower, by itself, is enough to convince a determined nation or people to do anything in particular. But I know with nearly complete certainty that Bosnia is not the place to try such a thing. And once you move down this road, you begin a chain of events where you are not the only one making decisions. And once American prestige and lives are committed, we always have to ask if we are willing to follow through. I am not saying that we cannot use airpower to help enforce the United Nations protected safe zones in Bosnia, or to protect peacekeepers from attacks in that country. For those limited purposes airpower has a legitimate role. But, you have to understand what is lurking around the corner, before expanding beyond this purpose.

In another place, in Rwanda, some proposed that we needed to expand our humanitarian support and intervene

between the warring factions. This would have been a large step beyond providing clean water, medicines, and food. Our risks would have been much greater and this step could have dragged our forces into a very deep and tempestuous well.

Along the same vein, in Haiti, where we are today, some have called for us to use our forces to do more, to perform civil police functions, for example. Again, we have to carefully examine what it is that we must accomplish, and what it is that the Haitians must accomplish for themselves, to build what is, after all, their own nation.

I am not saying that we should stand idly on the sidelines and watch Haitians get beaten and murdered. Long before we entered Haiti, one of our purposes was to keep this from happening. But there is a dangerous line between acting to prevent this and becoming the police force for an entire nation.

Secretary Perry has recently proposed what I believe to be a very sound formula for making these kinds of choices. There are still interests that are vital to the security of our nation. If Saddam Hussein were to attack tomorrow, we would not pause, nor hesitate, nor debate for a moment whether to send an overwhelming force to defend the region and to achieve decisive victory. We would go immediately and, if need be, we would fight until the job was done. In fact, we did go just recently, and because we did, we didn't have to fight!

But we also have interests that are other than vital interests. We have important interests, that are clearly, however, not vital. In these cases, we are willing to use our military power primarily for coercive purposes in support of our diplomacy. But, because our interests are limited, so are the means we intend to apply. Haiti is a good example where we were prepared to use limited force in support of diplomacy, and had diplomacy failed, we would have used force to get the job done. Fortunately, it wasn't necessary.

And finally, there are cases where our interest may not be very strong, but our humanitarian motives may come into play. And, here, Rwanda is a good example where the need was so great, and the actions of one party to the conflict so morally reprehensible, that we, as Americans, could not simply turn away.

But, even having this equation, I think there is one other thing we must understand if we are to keep a proper balance between our risks and our stakes. There will always be this temptation to shift the mission a little this way, or use a little more force for this, or that purpose. And, I believe the only way to guard against these temptations — this urge to allow mission creep — is to have a very firm, and very clear, understanding of what it is that we want to achieve before we commit, and then, we must all adhere to a principle called perseverance. Or, as we say in the military, "Steady as you go. Keep your eye on the objective."

I think this is what has succeeded so far in Rwanda, and is succeeding today in Haiti, and that has led to a smooth partnership between our diplomats and our military, in both those places.

But, I am not so optimistic that I believe we have learned all that we need to learn about how to manage this in all future circumstances. And, I think that we still need to have some of our best minds working on the very real quandaries and kinds of problems that are endemic in these "Operations Other Than War."

Just as I also believe that it is very important that our best minds continue to explore how we arrange the balance and purpose of our diplomacy and force; to construct the right arrangements for the challenges and demands of the next century.

And that is why I am very pleased to come here today and to have this chance to share my views with you, here at Georgetown, really in the birthing room of our diplomatic corps. Because, how well we are going to handle these challenges depends so very much upon your thinking.

And now I have probably spoken far too long and answered far too little. So before we let this get any longer, let's change the format, for I would be most pleased to try to answer your questions.

Thank you very much.

Field Artillery Ball
Arlington, Virginia
19 November 1994

I remember the last time you introduced me, almost exactly 5 years ago, when you were commanding the 1st Armored Division Artillery, and you were kind enough to invite me to speak to your gunners. I can only tell you that I must have been quite a hit, if John had to wait five years to invite me back.

But, regardless, let me assure you what a great thrill it is for Joannie and me to share this evening with so many

distinguished Army and Marine Corps gunners. After living in the joint world, as I do, it's truly very nice to come here to share this evening with fellow Redlegs.

Now, I must confess that knowing so many great artillerymen would be assembled here this evening caused me to give more than casual thought to what I should talk to you about this evening.

But as I reflected on this evening, it occurred to me that today is also the day on which, 35 years ago, I attended my first Artillery Ball, blues and all, and was formally inducted into the Order of Saint Barbara, just like Sergeant Major of the Army Kidd just was. If you think about it, that is over a third of a century of attending such Artillery functions, and over a third of a century of Artillery Ball speeches, and yet, no matter how hard I tried, I couldn't remember a single Artillery Ball speech I had ever heard!

Now, because I know that many of these speeches were presented by some of the most distinguished and articulate Redlegs that this century has produced, and many of them are here tonight, I can only conclude that an Artillery Ball speech, to be truly memorable, must be, at the very least, also very forgettable! And I shan't disappoint you!

Now, despite my reference to forgettable speeches, you and I know that tradition dictates that my remarks include, at the very least, a word or two about the King of Battle, our Artillery. And so, qualifications not withstanding, I am pleased to stand here before you as your representative, to offer a few modest thoughts about the profession that has brought us together here this evening.

We in this room have grown up recalling the greatness of artillerymen, from ancient times, when we were no more than simple stone throwers, to the earliest firing engines that were more dangerous to the users of these devices, than to the recipients of their projectiles. On occasions such as these, we like to really beat our chests, and recall all of the great sayings ever uttered by important captains of war, about how artillery proved decisive in winning battles large and small. Great stuff, all of it true, well, most of it.

But what has been undeniably true — from the birth of America's Artillery, and men like Henry Knox, and women like Molly Pitcher, now somewhat shrouded in the fog of receding history, through all our wars, and the suffering, and the pain, and the glory of building a nation, and a better world, to the more sharply-focused memories of great Redlegs like Ott, and Kerwin, and Vuono, and Keith, and Merritt, and Scott and Crosby and Trefry and all the other great gunners here tonight — that one undeniable truth about them all, and the long columns of others as far as the mind's eye can see, has been that they have been men and women of extraordinary courage, of deep love for their country, of wisdom to do what's right today, and of the vision to know what to do to move us into tomorrow.

There is something special about Artillerymen. You can see it in this room in the eyes of the young, and not so young. They are proud to be part of the team. We talk about it a lot, and yet we're a breed apart.

So before I say another word, let me salute you all here tonight, and ask you, to raise your glass to yourselves, such extraordinary men and women of the Artillery. To you all, to the Artillery!

With that done, let me vary somewhat from tradition, and say a word or two about three revolutions that are currently in motion and what these revolutions mean to us here in this room.

Whenever you say the word "revolution" it invokes this image of a noisy, swirling maelstrom that sweeps aside all in its path. And in fact, some revolutions do fit this mold. But there is another kind of revolution. This second kind of revolution is in some ways more dangerous, because it is quiet, less transparent, and easily missed.

Of the three revolutions in question, one fits into the mold of the noisy, transparent type, and the other two are of the second sort: subtle; steady; and silent.

The first, the transparent revolution, was begun four years ago, on the day that Boris Yeltsin stood on a tank in front of the Soviet White House.

When that day was over, it signaled the end of a global empire, and the end of a world order that had existed for nearly 50 years. But the forces that were set in motion are still cascading around the globe, and I suspect that they will still be reverberating for many years to come.

For us, the greatest challenge of this revolution is the sheer difficulty of interpreting both its effects — on both sides of the Atlantic — and what we should do to steer the course of change, again on both sides of the Atlantic.

We know that we are in a new era — we feel it — one filled with new kinds of challenges, and certainly with great opportunities as well, and our military forces have, without a shadow of a doubt, a great part to play, both in handling the challenges of this new era, and also in seizing the great opportunities that can make the next century so much better than the one we are now leaving. But to seize this historic opportunity, we need today, more than ever before, the same kind of men and women of wisdom and vision, that I mentioned just a moment ago. And yet I am confident that we will find them, and that many of them are here in this room tonight.

Now, the second revolution that I mentioned is the quiet, unobtrusive sort. And that revolution is caused by the very

great reductions in defense spending. To appreciate the magnitude of this revolution, you must realize that by 1999, just around the corner, the defense budget will be less than half of its size in 1988, which of course as you recall, was the apex of our Cold War defense spending. Against this, our force will be one third smaller. If you think about these numbers for a moment, you will quickly realize that this is not a well-balanced equation: a force one third smaller; trying to survive on a budget that is less than half the size.

And this is why I title this a revolution, because in order to make that equation work, we are going to have to change the way we think, the way we are organized, and the way we do our business, in every way. The math tells you that we cannot fit inside that equation unless we make some very dramatic, and very revolutionary, changes.

And the path we are going to have to follow I call jointness. Sure, we can, and we must, find more savings by closing some more bases, and by increasing productivity, things that fall well outside of jointness. But in the end, we must do far more than that. We are going to have to entertain fundamental changes in how we organize, in how we fight.

We are going to have to bring jointness into the very beginning of how we define our military requirements, and even into how we base, and how we train our forces. We are going to have to be revolutionary in every sense of the word in our thinking.

The same kind of thinking applies to the third revolution as well, what some call a "Revolution in Military Affairs." This revolution is also quiet, indeed so quiet that many are still debating whether it exists at all. But it does exist.

Advances in technology in this age of information offer us opportunities not even dreamt of before. Just as an example, the Advanced Field Artillery System that is surely to come is not just a better howitzer, brilliant munitions that are now coming on are not just better dumb bombs or projectiles, systems that tell us instantaneously and continuously where our forces are on the battlefield are advances we do not yet understand.

We are not just getting better at what we do, we are potentially on the threshold of a breakthrough, the beginning of a revolution, and that's exactly how we must answer the challenge presented by these last two revolutions I mentioned. We must, all of us, learn how to become — ounce for ounce, and pound for pound — more powerful, even as we become smaller. And I am proud to see the Artillery leading the way in this revolutionary thinking.

So, these three revolutions are occurring all at once, each affecting our Armed Forces in different ways, and each having a very direct impact on all of us here tonight.

It will not be an easy task to overcome these great challenges, and to realize the great opportunities. But I know this: Today our Armed Forces are the envy of the world. We have the best people and our challenge is to retain them, and to recruit more like them. We have the finest equipment of any military force in the world, and we must not allow that to change either. But as I look around this room tonight, at the extraordinary men and women sitting at these tables, I have no doubt that we will accomplish all of this.

I have no doubt, because the men and women in this room are accustomed to accomplishing miracles and, perhaps from the prejudices of my own experience, there is no question in my mind that the gunners of the King of Battle will be indispensable in leading these three revolutions.

Now, let me close by returning to the early days of our Artillery, and with a story that was told around the campfires at Valley Forge.

It seems that Henry Knox's artillery regiment lived, and fought, under the watchful eye and protection of a portly regimental chaplain who, not unlike most chaplains in today's battalions that you're so well familiar with, found himself without a way to make his rounds.

So, to spare his feet, our chaplain bought himself a mule.

He soon learned, however, that this mule had an even greater than normal stubbornness.

Our chaplain complained to its former owner, an Anglican minister from a neighboring Dragoon regiment, who apologetically explained that through sheer oversight he had forgotten to mention the unique language to which the mule responded.

He promptly revealed the key: to move forward, the mule responded only to the words, "Thank God."

To stop, "Amen." (To move forward, "Thank God;" to stop, "Amen.")

Our chaplain, reassured by this new knowledge, leapt upon the mule and bravely shouted, "Thank God."

The mule jumped forward with a lurch, and down the road and beyond the battery perimeter flew chaplain and mule.

Shortly, however, our chaplain noticed that they were approaching a sheer cliff, and to his horror, he could not recall the phrase required to stop the mule.

But at the very last moment, however, with clammy hands and a scream trying to escape his throat, our chaplain finally remembered, and at the very last possible second screamed, "Amen."

The mule screeched to a halt, its forward hooves quivering at the very edge of the cliff. Peering off the thousand-foot drop, our chaplain uttered an enormous sigh of relief, and without further thought, spoke a very heartfelt, "Thank God."

Clearly, our chaplain knew not when he had said enough.

I hope I haven't fallen victim to a similar failing, so let me close with a heartfelt "Amen", and my sincere appreciation for the opportunity to share this evening with you, and I hope God Blesses you all. Good night.

National Military Family Association
Arlington, Virginia
30 November 1994

Let me start out by adding my congratulations to Secretary Perry, and to you, Catherine (Ahl). I think that all we have heard in the introductions and in the presentation of these two awards speaks volumes to the wisdom the selection committee had in selecting those two. I cannot think of anything more important to the quality of the force, to the readiness of the force, than the successes that these two have had and I am absolutely delighted that you would recognize them.

Now before I say another word, let me add my congratulations to, and applaud the National Military Family Association. You know — and you have heard today from Sylvia, Michele, and Catherine — the many, many programs that you are involved in, the things the Association is doing, but I am not sure how many of you think of that as helping the readiness of the force, as opposed to helping the quality of life of families. You are probably so unique and do so much, and are so absorbed in the day-to-day operations that you don't have the time to reflect upon how much you are doing. Or you stand at home in front of a mirror and look at yourself and you don't know what you have accomplished that particular day, so often against such great odds, because this world and this town is full of people who like to say "NO," instead of people like Mr. Perry, who like to say "YES." I am well aware that those successes of yours are very, very hard fought for, and are therefore that much more meaningful.

You know, Secretary Perry, when he stood here a few minutes ago, alluded to this extraordinary force that we have, the young men and women in uniform today, and how accustomed we are, and rightfully so, to saying that they are the very best who ever wore an American military uniform.

And as you go around and visit, as I have the opportunity to do, whether it's in Somalia, or in the refugee camps in Rwanda, or on an operation in Haiti, or in Bosnia, or in the Adriatic, flying no-fly missions over Bosnia — wherever you go, in Korea, or in Germany, you cannot but be amazed at what they do so willingly, and what they do so superbly. We understand that and we are fond of saying that if we wish to retain them, and if we wish to recruit more like them, we have to do everything we can for them. That includes ensuring that we compensate them for their service, and that we train them correctly to do the tasks we ask them to do, that are often so very difficult.

We're used to understanding that we have to equip them, so that they have the tools with which to do the job, and that we have to take care of their quality of life. But you see, the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard aren't what they use to be when I first came in (in 1958) and was drawing 75 bucks a month! My car payment was $110 dollars! It's a very different Force today, and you all know that. Well over 60 percent are married. So we have to understand, and you do that so well, and you remind the rest of us, that what is true of the Force itself — to which you speak so often, and many people so very eloquently — the same thing applies every bit as much to those great military families. What they contribute under the circumstances in which we place them is equally extraordinary, and deserves every bit as much our attention and our best effort.

You in this room know so well what it means to move every two or three years. You know very well what it means when you end up at the end of a 20-year career with 50 sets of curtains! You can't move them from house to house because, for some reason in our great wisdom, we put different size windows in every set of family quarters! You know what it means to take your children out of school in the middle of the year and move them to someplace where the two schools are not in synch for the new children. You all, at one time or another, either have, or know someone intimately who has, moved a son or a daughter between the junior and senior year, and you know what price that family pays. You know what it means to all of a sudden get assigned to a place in Belgium, where there isn't an American hospital within miles and miles. You know very well what it means to get assigned to some place in Turkey and your 19- or 20-year old wife is about to give birth to a child, and you have to do that in a Turkish hospital because there are no American hospitals. You know what it means, and you know how very important it is — not that we fix all the ills for them, as

much as we would like to — how terribly important it is that they feel that there is an organization like yours, that's devoted to their welfare, that's ready to stand up, day-in and day-out, against those who like to say "NO," and fight for them, and how good they feel when they know that there is a Secretary of Defense like Bill Perry, who listens and goes out there himself and finds out what the problem is, and does something about it.

One of you alluded to the fact that this is a man who doesn't just talk about it, but he does something about it. That's what those families appreciate. That, I tell you, translates directly into the readiness of the force, every bit as much as buying a new tank, or buying a new F-16, or a new frigate. That is what readiness is, when the soldier knows that, when he or she gets deployed to Bosnia, or to the Adriatic, or goes on a separation tour to Korea, his or her family back there is going to be cared for, that someone cares, and someone is prepared to do something (to help). Now, it would be wonderful, if we could repeat over and over again what Secretary Perry did when he moved those $2.7 billion into the Quality of Life programs, if we could do this over and over again until we fixed all the problems. But you know that is not possible. You know that there are challenges out there that we need to come to grips with together, that we need to find the answers to, in the smartest way that we can.

Let me just mention a couple. The first one is the one that we've been wrestling with, I guess, ever since the end of DESERT STORM, and that is the very significant reduction of our Force. You know that we are going down from that force at the end of DESERT STORM by approximately one third. When you think about it, that's a significant number of people, a significant number of lives that are affected. Those are countless worries of people who wanted to stay but couldn't, countless worries of those who are still with us today, but aren't sure they will be able to stay. It translates into shorter tours, it translates into moves sooner than we expected, because all of a sudden their unit is being inactivated. It translates into Quality of Life programs being terminated ahead of time, before all the people have left a particular installation. All these stories, you have heard.

And yet, I think the people that have gone through this have been extraordinarily strong, extraordinarily patient and understanding. But what worries me, and what I think the challenge is that you and I face, is that it isn't over yet. We are about 80 percent complete, but it won't be until about '97 when the reductions are fully done. And that means that there are still people out there who worry about whether they will be able to stay, people who have signed up to make this their life's work. There will be children still that will have to relocate in the middle of the school year to go somewhere. There will be wives who are working in an MWR facility that's going to close before the family leaves, and the wife will lose her employment, and all the things that were true in the very beginning will be true at the very end. The challenge for you and I is, first of all, not to forget that this isn't over yet. Secondly, that in reductions in force of the magnitude we're going through — or for that matter, any reduction — it's not a matter of numbers, it's a matter of people. We tend, particularly in this town, to talk about "80 percent completed, so many more to go," and they are numbers, but each one of those numbers is a person, each one of those percentages represents people. And the third challenge to us — and remember that we are talking about people — is to remember that we owe the same sort of concern, the same sort of a helping hand to the very last one in this drawdown as we provided to the first one and the hundreds of thousands in between. So I ask all of you, as an organization, don't let us forget that those are people. Don't let us forget that it isn't over yet. Don't let us forget that we owe this concern, that we owe this help to them, and that we owe this understanding to them, to the very last person that we relocated either into civilian life or to some other military post. I'm very thankful to the Congress. I think they have done yeoman work to cushion the process for people who had to leave the service. We just need to make sure that those programs stay in effect and that we all concentrate on that huge task that is still ahead of us.

The second challenge, I will tell you, I think is very much tied to that, and that is the ever-reducing budget numbers. I just told you that we are reducing the force by one third, that by 1997 the force will be reduced by one third. Yet when you look at our budget by 1999 in real terms, it will be reduced by one half. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to recognize that we simply cannot do business the same way we've been doing it when we are reducing the force by one third and reducing, in real buying power, the budget by approximately one half. The challenge is enormous. It will take on your part and my part and on everyone's part a determination to question everything we do, to find a better way of doing it.

When I talk to young officers and NCOs, particularly when they are in schools and they are on their way back out to units, I ask each one of them not to go back to that unit and just find out how things are being done and then fall in a groove and "do it the way things have always been done." But rather, I want them, from the first day they arrive, to question what is being done and why, and search, not in a destructive way, but in a very constructive way, for better ways of doing it, because if we don't, we will be on a collision course. If we don't, then Secretary Perry will be hard-pressed in the years to come to do what he did, to make those extraordinarily difficult choices to move money to what is clearly his, and certainly in this room, everyone's priority, which is our extraordinary people. The money simply will not be

there. So it isn't just an issue of "tightening our belts," it's more than that. It's finding better ways — innovative, revolutionary ways — of doing our business. That's true whether we're talking about procuring things, or how we take care of people and how we house people. We simply can't afford to be doing things the same way that we used to.

Now, what does that mean for you and me? What does it mean for the subject that we here gathered to address, which is the Quality of Life for our families? I think we need to be realistic about some things. We've gone through an extraordinarily rich period of time, when we were able to do some badly needed, great things for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen and their families. We today enjoy child development centers never dreamed of when I was only a colonel, not so long ago. We today enjoy athletic facilities that would be the envy of the richest community here in Washington, and the list goes on. I think we need to be realistic, that perhaps in the near term at least we have to constrain our appetite for new things or ever-better things. We need to concentrate more and more on retaining those things that we now have, and the gains that we've been able to make because of what you have done and because of what men like Secretary Perry have done. In some cases this works. For instance, on commissaries, Secretary Perry put his foot down and said we are going to retain commissaries the way they are, and "let us not talk every year about new surcharge charges, or other nonsense. Commissaries are terribly important and we ought to retain them the way they are."

We must not go back on most of the things that we have been able to give our service men and women and their families. But we have to be very careful and very honest with each other. Otherwise, you will not be able to prioritize the few dollars we will have left for quality of life to apply against those new projects we need. But they must be applied only against those new projects where the need is really great, or where we get the greatest benefits.

Let me give you an example of that. That is the one (that is) so near and dear to your endeavors this last year, and that's health care. It's no secret to anybody that health care, with each year, is getting more and more expensive, and you know the reasons for it. It is no secret to you that with every year it is getting more and more difficult to get entry into the military health care system, because the population that draws on that is increasing more and more each year. Here, I don't think it's an issue of being able to just protect what we have, because what we have right now is heading towards a cliff. Here, there's an issue where we will very wisely have to apply not only our limited resources, but hopefully our unlimited imagination and energy to fix something, whether that's all of us agreeing on some HMO option, or whether that's me taking good advice that I receive from many of you! I think Sylvia beat up on me long enough for me to finally understand that you cannot have — whether that's in an HMO or whether that's in our health care system that we now have — a fee system that somehow charges a youngster, even if it's only a nominal fee, towards the end of the month, because there aren't too many privates or young specialists who are cash-rich on the last day of the month. So, even if we have some other modest fee system, whatever the wisdom of that might be, we have to ensure we have a system where that young man or woman isn't kept from going to the doctor simply because he or she does not have the cash on hand at that time. That is very simple to do, and I thank you all for pointing that out.

Now, there is also the issue that I know many of you have been pushing, of going with the Federal Employees' medical benefits program. I don't know yet what the answer is for that, but I know that because you spoke, it is one of the programs that is being considered for inclusion, not as a substitute, but as an alternative to either an HMO or going to the health care facilities we have right now. While we still have some work to do, it is that kind of thinking on your part that at least allows us to explore more alternatives.

The point I am trying to make to you is — please understand that we are in a period in our budgets where we have to set priorities — we just absolutely have to. Then, we must protect what we have. I don't think the families out there, or the soldiers out there, would understand if we started sliding backwards. And then, with whatever resources are available, we need to be clear where we want to apply those, so we get the maximum benefit and apply it against the largest hurdle. And if we do that, we must remember that this is all about people; this is not about things. This isn't even about building a new hospital, or a new commissary, certainly not about building a new tank. This is about making sure that the corpsman who works in the hospital, or the family that visits the hospital senses, that although the wall might not have a fresh coat of paint, the people there are seized with helping, seized with trying to do some good. It is the commissary, not because we live on the post that has the newest commissary, but because when you walk in, people smile. They have all gone to "friendly school." They care, they want to help, so the families that go in there, the single soldiers that go in there, the single airmen that go in there feel that it's a pleasant place to be. We are all part of a larger family than just our immediate one. We all care for each other. That is what gives us real strength — and that is what we have to retain. We must remember those priorities and put our emphasis to where it counts.

I must tell you that I am extraordinarily optimistic that we will transition through the next few years and that we will enter the next century with a military that we will not only be extraordinarily proud to be part of, but a military that will

be seized with its mission and with its morale way up there — a military force that without any question will be able to protect our interests worldwide.

If you go out and look those youngsters in the eye, as I do, you see their enthusiasm. You see it as they try to help in some village in Haiti or in some refugee camp in Rwanda, in how they cared for those who were dying in the streets of Mogadishu because they were too weak to drag themselves off to the side of the road to die there. You cannot have the slightest doubt that as long as we have people like that, backed up by families that are in turn backed up with organizations like yours, who fight for them back here, we'll have absolutely no problems. We are not on some glide path down. We are not even "just holding our own." We are on an upswing, as far as the quality of this force is concerned. We have to measure it not by just how many spare parts we have for the tank, but how that tanker feels about himself, and how he feels about how we take care of his family.

Let me conclude by telling you what I started out saying, you're an extraordinary group, you're every bit as extraordinary as those young men and women in uniform out there and their families. Without you, there would be a great hole in this family called "the military." So whatever you do, keep smiling, keep fighting for whatever you have been fighting for up to now, and keep prodding us along. We need your good ideas. Take care of yourself and God Bless you all!

50th Anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge
St. Louis, Missouri
15 December 1994

Earlier today, my wife and I left Belgium to spend this evening with you.

It is, for me, indeed a great honor to stand before you. Inside this container I am holding is soil collected just yesterday from a small town in Belgium. It came from an otherwise unexceptional town, indistinct from the many other beautiful villages that spot the Belgian countryside.

But for two facts. One, if you are traveling from east to west, this town sits at a key intersection of roads that leads to Belgium's seacoasts. And second, because of its location, this town, Bastogne, became the best-remembered fight of the battle we memorialize here tonight.

The Second World War was won on many, many battlefields. But there was something different about the Battle of the Bulge, something truly exceptional.

In our memories of this war, this battle — your battle — has a mystical echo. For in a war where American heroism and tenacity were commonplace, at the Battle of the Bulge these qualities became a legend.

It was on this very night, now fifty years in the past, that three massive field armies, the most powerful and best-equipped units in the German Army, lay in wait, sitting behind the Seigfried Line. In just a few more hours they would be unleashed.

Hitler planned and prepared this attack for months. It was his greatest, his most desperate gamble of the war. Ever since the June landings at Normandy, Hitler and his forces had been shoved across Europe in a wave of defeats, a wave that seemed to have no end. Hitler and his forces were stymied. Accustomed to victory, to them it was incomprehensible that America's forces could best their own in battle.

Rather, Hitler and his generals took solace from the only explanation they could accept: that their defeats came not from the mettle of America's fighting men, but instead from America's material superiority; from the sheer mass of America's equipment; from its huge armadas of tanks and artillery; and from its vast fleets of airplanes. It was only American steel that outweighed German courage and skill, but not American spirit and skill ... or so they thought!

And so, it was in the Ardennes where Hitler thought he would reverse these advantages, where in one decisive counter-thrust, he would try to break the spine of the offensive closing on his country. This time, for once, Hitler's forces would have the advantages: the advantage of surprise, which was achieved; and advantages in firepower, and tanks, and mass. Even the weather worked to his favor. For the first week of his attack, American aircrews would sit grounded, despairingly helpless to come to the aid of their besieged comrades on the ground.

In the fog and bitter cold of the early morning hours the historic struggle opened with bewildering fury. Thousands upon thousands of German tanks and half-tracks and artillery rushed against the thinly held American sector in the Ardennes. Instantly, the battle became a melee of hundreds of fights, with isolated and beleaguered units fighting to hold against seemingly insurmountable odds.

Even in hindsight, the cold calculus of battle should have dictated victory for Hitler and his forces. Within days they should have been across the Meuse River, dashing toward the port of Antwerp.

But there had been one miscalculation, one flaw that unraveled — and then completely unhinged — Hitler's last gamble. It was the one factor that cannot be estimated in the cold logic of battle. It was the one feature that Hitler had discounted, had in fact assumed would not be there. And that, very simply, was the courage, the grit, the implacable resourcefulness, initiative, and spirit of the American fighting man. Outnumbered, outgunned, often out-flanked or surrounded, dozens of pockets of desperate, but determined soldiers blocked, impeded, and hindered the advance. Where Hitler thought he would be pounding a sledgehammer through water, he found himself, instead, striking against an unbreakable anvil, an anvil of iron forged from courage and determination.

Americans were transfixed by the stand of the 101st at Bastogne. But, the same spirit occupied dozens of other places on this battlefield, and it was there among our allies, as well, among the Belgian people, and the people of Luxembourg, who fought and suffered and stood beside our own forces. And, outside of the Bulge hundreds of thousands of others fought just as tenaciously to stop the advance, and to break through, to relieve those forces trapped within German lines. Within weeks, Hitler was stopped and the jaws of the Patton's Third Army were closing from the south, eliminating what remained of the bulge.

You, the veterans gathered in this room were the heroes that Hitler had not counted upon; you and thousands of others who are not here tonight, some American, some Belgian, and those from Luxembourg as well.

Yours was an act that remains an inspiration to every man and woman in uniform today, men and women who so proudly carry the same valorous tradition to other battlefields and other missions.

This weekend we will remember. We will remember, first, our missing comrades, those who lay under the neat rows of white crosses and David's stars in a quiet field outside of Bastogne: a silent and eternal testimony to American courage and strength, and to the price paid for Europe's freedom. But we also remember and honor the living: the veterans of the Battle of the Bulge gathered here in this room, and others who could not attend.

I am here tonight representing a thankful nation, and a proud and admiring military. And I have come to salute you all. I have come to tell you that we shall never forget what you did, for today's soldiers are the children who bask in the freedoms you fought for so nobly.

We shall never forget your courage and your heroism. Indeed, you are an inspiration to us today, of what is demanded of us as we look toward the future that we must create for our children.

This is why I brought this container of soil. To some, it may seem only a small handful of dirt. But it is far more than that. It is soil mixed with the blood and sacrifice of heroes. Fifty years ago, it was the soil you fought and struggled over. Today, it is the soil of a proud and free nation. This is your monument.

You are our nation's heroes. We are forever grateful. God Bless you all and God Bless the United States of America. Thank you.

1995

Annual Posture Statement
Washington, DC
8 February 1995

I am pleased to be here today to share my views about the state of our Armed Forces.

Last year, I remarked that our discussions were set against the backdrop of a serious debate. At that time, some believed that our defense budgets were still too high, while others were convinced we had already cut too much. Twelve months later, the debate seems to have gained added stridency. It also appears to have found a new center. The question we seem to be asking this time is whether we've added enough back in.

Ever since we began this still ongoing round of reductions, all have been mindful that every time in this century America has drawn down, we blundered and did it badly. This happened after the First and Second World Wars, after Korea, and after Vietnam. Each time, after ignoring the warnings of past failures we repeated the same remorseful cycle: we cut too deep and we reduced too fast. Not long afterward we regretted it dearly.

So we need this debate and it should be vigorous. We must not repeat the tragedies of the past. I only hope that what I have to offer is helpful as you make decisions on the issues before you.

Looking back over the past year, at events in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, the challenges in the Gulf and Korea, and everything else that our forces have been involved in, it has been a difficult and demanding year. What have we learned from this year? I think there are three distinct lessons worth your attention today.

What stands out foremost is the caliber of men and women in our Armed Forces. There is no need to chronicle everything they've accomplished in all of the places just named. You know what they've done and you know how extraordinarily well they've done it. They remain our most precious asset.

But dwell for a moment on the great magnitude and complexity of tasks we asked of them. In the last year, the Transportation Command executed the equivalent of five Berlin airlifts. At one time or another, four nations depended on our forces for humanitarian supplies. At Guantanamo Bay and Panama, we constructed tent cities and kept their populations clothed and fed. In Rwanda, it took our forces less than three weeks to build an air bridge into one of the world's most remote and underdeveloped regions and deliver enough clean water, food and medicines to push back the flood of dying.

Many of these operations were dangerous. Twice, we deployed major forces for combat operations. The first was to Haiti, when in a tense evening we launched an invasion just as a last-ditch diplomatic effort seemed stalled. In a remarkable and welcome turn of events, our envoys negotiated away three years of defiance and a bloodless transition to democracy was promptly arranged. This was the first time in our history that we launched an invasion and then recalled it in midstream. As the Secretary of State remarked the next morning, it would be hard to imagine a more exquisite marriage between diplomacy and force. It would be even harder to imagine a more suspenseful marriage.

Then, only three weeks later, we detected three of Saddam's divisions bolting from their garrisons and maneuvering toward Kuwait. Without hesitation, we alerted a large combat force and almost overnight began deploying that force with orders to fight, if necessary. Again, in a dramatic turnabout, as the first of our forces moved swiftly into theater, we watched Saddam's divisions first slow, then halt, and then hurriedly reverse direction and return to their garrisons. It was a striking illustration of successful deterrence at its best; swift decisions, a powerful response by ready forces, and such rapid execution that we were there before the breach was made.

Not since the Second World War have we engaged in so many operations in such a condensed period. At times, up to six separate Joint Task Forces were in the field. To make this happen took an unprecedented degree of decentralization. As well, the unique character of many of these operations diluted the advantages normally afforded by our superior equipment and advanced technology. What separated success from failure came down to one vital ingredient. That was the remarkable qualities of our people: superb and thoughtful leadership; and courage, grit, and improvisation at all ranks.

We often talk about how great our military is. It is indeed great, in fact, the very finest in the world. This past year, our men and women demonstrated precisely why they deserve this reputation.

Then, there was a second lesson. Several years ago, when we first referred to uncertainty as a threat, one member of Congress pointedly asked, "And just how many tanks does uncertainty have?" It was a shrewdly couched question that penetrated to the core of our quandary. Every year, for half a century, we grew used to generals and admirals

coming here to the Hill and pointing with complete confidence at the same habitual threat, a threat we grew to know and understand in great detail.

Yet, even with such complete confidence and clarity, we still debated at length about what we needed to defend ourselves. How could we possibly measure and agree on our needs against something as shadowy and fathomless as uncertainty?

We still may not be any closer to knowing how many tanks uncertainty has, but the past few years have shed some light on its shadows. It is unstable, violent, and dangerous, with a large arsenal of exploding nations, ethnic outbursts, and clashing nationalisms. Caught in its grip are several powerful nations struggling to remain on a path of reforms, right beside dozens of smaller, newly founded, and threadbare nations simply struggling to survive. And from this uncertainty are other nations building, or trying to build, weapons of mass destruction. We also now understand that this uncertainty is not going to go away quickly; it is going to be with us for a while, perhaps well into the next century.

For Americans, there is this reality: out of the stream of events unfolding around us, an entirely new world order is being forged. We are experiencing the kind of enormous upheaval that comes only once every few generations.

And from this comes the third lesson. The profusion of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) has elicited a stream of ideas about how to restructure or reorient our forces specifically for this purpose. This would be wrong. We cannot become confused about the fundamental purpose of our Armed Forces. That purpose is their readiness to fight and win our nation's wars. No other purpose is as vital to our security. As we reshape and train our forces, it must be for this purpose above all others.

It is an often quoted fact that throughout our nation's history no man or woman has ever completed a 20-year military career when this nation did not engage in armed conflict at least once. In the past eight years, no man or woman has even completed a term of enlistment without this happening.

The warning is clear. Our forces must stay ready to fight and win.

THE FUTURE FORCE

Since 1991, we have been through four exhaustive assessments of how many and what kind of forces we need. Most recently, the size and mix of our conventional forces was established through the Bottom Up Review, and the even more recently completed Nuclear Posture Review established our strategic force posture for entering the next century.

While the process of finding a new endpoint attracted the lion's share of the public's attention, a great deal more has been done to reorient our forces and to reorder the other elements of our defense. A new military strategy was developed and is now in its second stage of refinement. New approaches to readiness, sustainment, and modernization have been implemented. All of the Services have adapted their doctrines and are well on the way toward adapting their forces to the challenges of a different world. And the progression of jointness has accelerated.

Within the strategic nuclear area, we have already cut our investment by some 75 percent, made major changes in our alert posture and weapons targeting, and are well into a major force reduction as we move toward START limits.

Driving these changes is our response to three revolutions that are sweeping us into the next century. The first of these is the changing world order set in motion by the end of the Cold War. This has caused profound changes to our strategy, our military posture, our missions, and our doctrines.

We have shifted from a global strategy against a global foe, to a global strategy focused on regional threats. We are nearly done repositioning large numbers of our forces and are still in the process of prepositioning equipment and war stocks to align with this new strategy. Significant numbers of forces have returned home from their overseas Cold War garrisons to support a new global power projection strategy. Our force building priorities have been reordered to meet our new needs. At the same time, we are adjusting our overseas force — around 100,000 in the Pacific and approximately 100,000 in Europe — to help preserve stability in these two vital regions as well as retain forces an ocean closer to potential trouble spots. We have begun reorienting our alliances to new challenges. For example, in NATO, we have developed and implemented the Partnership for Peace (PFP) Program, an active program to reach out to our former adversaries through military-to-military contacts, and have opened International Military Education and Training (IMET) to foreign militaries of many of the same nations. These programs are invaluable for building new security architecture in a Europe that was divided for forty-five years and in emerging democracies worldwide. All of this is being done in response to this first revolution: the changing world order.

The second revolution is the result of defense budget outlays that have been shrinking for eight consecutive years. It is not just the fact that our budget has been shrinking. This revolution is framed by the fact that by 1999 our force will

be one third smaller than it was in 1988, but in real terms our budget will be around 40 percent less than what it was that same year.

What these figures suggest is that we are going to have to be revolutionary in our thinking and in finding new ways to lead and manage our forces. We are going to have to look for every feasible way to do our business more efficiently, whether that is how we procure our equipment, how we house and care for our forces, or even how we use our forces to accomplish our missions.

In response, we are pursuing a number of initiatives, mostly through greater jointness. The joint reforms that Congress ordered back in 1986 have been implemented. Due largely to assistance from the Congress, another proven tool for maintaining and improving our joint warfighting capabilities is the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Program. Our Unified Commands are now staffed with the best-educated men and women we can offer, fully versed in the joint arena, and able to effectively combine the unique capabilities that each of our Services has to offer. JPME has become one of the foundations of our joint operations capabilities by producing officers who can respond rapidly to short-notice crises as well as develop visionary strategies — leaders who think creatively and critically.

This year, we established the Joint Warfighting Center as the locus of worldwide joint exercises and joint simulations. This new center will support our CINCs in continually refining joint exercises and training through the use of joint simulations that improve the readiness of our commanders and staffs.

We are now carrying the same spirit embodied in Goldwater-Nichols to spearhead new ways of looking at our warfighting responsibilities. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Vice Chiefs of the Services meet weekly as the expanded Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC cuts across compartmentalization and traditional service turf to examine every battlefield and strategic function, to look for ways to employ our forces more efficiently and effectively, and to determine the best way to spend our precious research, development, and acquisition dollars to modernize and improve our existing forces.

One of the most important products of this expanded JROC is the sharing of ideas and technologies and the imposition of joint interoperability standards. Another product is that our Services are working together to build common and mutually supportive approaches. The result will be a future force that is more and more streamlined by jointness.

In the Gulf War in 1991, our forces had very few joint manuals to guide their efforts. Today, we are publishing new doctrinal manuals at a rate of four per month. In the Haiti operation, our invasion force included Army forces and Army helicopters poised on Navy carriers. Remembering back to Grenada, where Army helicopters were at first not even permitted to land on Navy carriers, you can appreciate the magnitude of cultural change. But it remains, and I suspect it always will remain, a work in progress.

Another way we are adding effectiveness is to continue to examine how we divide the roles, missions, and functions between our forces. By next summer, the Congressionally mandated Commission on Roles and Missions is scheduled to report back to Congress. As news accounts have accurately reported, the Services, the CINCs, and the Joint Staff are working with this commission and providing candid views and analysis about what should and should not be changed.

Then there is the third revolution, which runs counter to all of the downward pressures exuded by the second. This one is the battlefield revolution that we ourselves ignited with our doctrinal and technological innovations. The Gulf War showed a snapshot of this revolution in progress.

What we set in motion is an entirely new era in warfare. It is not a quick-fire revolutionary change catapulted by any one invention or one idea. Instead it is a quickly moving progression of advances across a broad front of concepts, technologies, and functions. The radar evading technologies of a few squadrons of stealth aircraft are spreading to other systems. Our inventories of long-range precision weapons are growing. Faster, more capable computer chips, digital systems, and other advances are creating staggering improvements that affect every function of modern battle. The combination of what is being done in military research and development in our partnership with civilian industry and their laboratories is creating a host of promising technologies. Our improving capabilities to fight at night and in poor weather, and our dominance in space that ensures that our commanders have extraordinary situational awareness, are giving our forces the ability to drive the tempo and depth of battle beyond the endurance and capability of any potential enemy. What is changing is the very nature of modern battle.

As we proceed into the next century, in one way or another, it is these three revolutions that drive our every effort.

FORCE STRUCTURE

The force recommended in this budget bases its size and capabilities on the National Security Strategy. That strategy calls for a triad of strategic nuclear forces, and a mix of strategic and non-strategic nuclear systems positioned

at home and deployed overseas, of sufficient size and capability to deter any future hostile nation with access to nuclear weapons from using these weapons against our interests. That strategy also requires us to be able to fight and win two, nearly simultaneous, major regional conflicts. The past year has thoroughly validated this "two MRC" requirement.

Each time when we were on the verge of committing forces to a contingency, foremost on our minds was looking over our shoulders to ensure that the remainder of our forces were ready and postured in the event a conflict erupted elsewhere. Early in the year, tensions with North Korea rose to such a point that they could only be described as edging toward war. Later in the year, we actually had to deploy forces against Iraq. Aside from validating that we were right to select these two nations as the current adversaries for our two contingency force, this past year also validated the plausibility that we could find ourselves enmeshed in two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts. Many times, we were balancing tensions in two or three different regions at once. Even though Haiti was not a major conflict, we were in the midst of that operation when we sent our forces to protect Kuwait. Anybody who sat in my chair this past year wouldn't have any reservations whether or not the requirement for "two-MRCs" is the right strategic choice. We cannot afford less.

But even as you accept that this is so, you might still question whether the force size is right. Should it be larger? Could it be smaller?

I am confident that the force and capability objectives we are building toward are about right. Once we reach the force and capability objectives, and field the enhancements that came out of the Bottom Up Review, we will be able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts at an acceptable risk.

On the other hand, I am convinced that a smaller, less capable force would most probably suffer unacceptable casualties, our forward deployed forces would be extremely vulnerable, the allies we are committed to protect could experience far greater damage, and a great deal more time and mobilization would be required to build to the force levels needed to win.

These are "risks" that I believe we must avoid. The force recommendations that emerged from the Bottom Up Review, with its programmed enhancements, decreases these "risks" and I would not recommend anything smaller.

With the previous, larger base force, the Joint Chiefs, the CINCs, and I were convinced we could support a reasonable number of Operations Other Than War, such as peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement operations, and still have enough additional forces to fight and win two MRCs. But the smaller force that emerged from the Bottom Up Review eliminated this latitude. Under ordinary conditions, there will be enough forces to perform Operations Other Than War. But in the event we become involved in a major conflict, we will have to withdraw our forces committed to Operations Other Than War in order to restore our posture to respond to a second major conflict. That is about as lean as I believe we can afford to be.

This past year we also completed the Nuclear Posture Review, that thoroughly examined our strategic and non-strategic forces, and the capabilities needed to support the maintenance of an effective and credible nuclear deterrent. It reaffirmed the importance of a strategic Triad, the need to keep some non-strategic nuclear forces deployed overseas to protect our allies, and it outlined an affordable and sustainable strategic nuclear force structure which will be in compliance with the expected future implementation of START II. It also identified cost-saving changes in our non-strategic nuclear force posture, necessary improvements to our C4I infrastructure, and a series of measures to promote the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear stockpile.

While our nuclear forces are substantially smaller than they used to be, no other part of our forces is as vital. We must continue to make the investments needed to maintain these forces at the right levels and with the right capabilities to deter the worst threats to our nation. There are still tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in the hands of other nations today. Over the long term, both our survival, and our ability to contend with conventional threats to our interests depend on a strong and well-maintained nuclear force.

The key watchword of our force plans is balance. All of the key elements of our forces — people, readiness, modernization, force structure, sustainment, and our infrastructure and industrial base — must be maintained at the right scale to support the whole force. The sum will be no stronger than its weakest part. For example, readiness without adequate sustainment sentences any operation to a very short half-life. As we continue toward the future, we must maintain balance among the critical elements of our forces. But we also have to balance today's readiness needs against tomorrow's, and modernization is the linchpin of this future readiness.

PEOPLE

Of all the elements of our force, none is more important than our people. It is never the best tank that wins wars, it is the best tankers.

Today, we have extraordinary people in our ranks. It was their ingenuity that overcame the obstacles that were defeating the relief agencies in Rwanda; their discipline and intellect that have made the Haiti operation far more successful than many anticipated; and their courage and fighting prowess that caused Saddam's divisions to turn back north to return to their garrisons.

But we can't afford to be sanguine. In the past few years we have put great strains on our people. The pressures and separations of so many operations have been hard on them and hard on their families. At the same time, we were "downsizing," through a combination of voluntary and involuntary separations that proceeded by the thousands nearly every month since we started. Since 1991, we have reduced by some 625,000 uniformed military and nearly 177,000 civilians.

Fortunately, the Congress has broken the cruel pattern of past drawdowns by offering our people better separation benefits than in the past. Between separation allowances and early retirement packages, this time around we have been able to at least soften the blow to the men and women who served this nation so very well for so many years and then suddenly had to be told that their service was no longer needed.

What we need to do now is focus our attention on keeping the million and a half men and women who remain with us today, and attracting people of the same quality for our force of the future. This is our highest priority.

The President's decision to request 25 billion dollars more over the next six years will help fix some of the problems that I believe are most troublesome. It will fund pay raises that slow the growth of the pay gap. But it will not bring military pay to levels of "comparability" with the civilian sector. The increase also begins correcting another key concern: our obligation to ensure our people live in safe and affordable housing. For those forced to live off-base, this means fixing another pay problem: the Basic Allowance for Quarters. Our policy is to reimburse our people 85 percent of the costs of their off-base housing; today, we fail to reimburse even 80 percent of those costs. I fully support the legislation that will allow us to begin reducing this gap, starting with a 1 percent reduction this year. For those living on-base, we are taking steps to reduce the large backlog of deferred housing and barracks maintenance. Part of the 25 billion dollar increase will go toward renovating some 5,000 barracks spaces most in need out of the over 600,000 barracks spaces we own.

Today, we are dipping into the pockets of our men and women, and their families, by making those who are forced to live off-base absorb more of the costs than they should, and by failing to ensure that some of our military bases and facilities are maintained at proper standards. As we anticipate future spending increases, we must continue to put additional funds into the programs that benefit our people; adequate and fair compensation, steady and dependable medical benefits, a stable retirement system, and safe and affordable housing. If we continue the long decline that we started in these areas over a decade ago, we will find it more and more difficult to attract and retain the remarkable people we have in our force today.

READINESS

In the last quarter of 1994, in order to find funds to support our forces deployed to contingencies, the Army leadership took operations and maintenance funds from three later-deploying divisions. This forced the commanders of these three divisions to make hard choices. They canceled some major training events and imposed constraints on repair parts. As a result, these three Army divisions reported that their readiness had degraded to the point that they would need additional time to train to acceptable standards before they could be deployed.

Aside from the fact that this was an undesirable way to learn this point, among other things this incident proves that our readiness "checks and balances" are working. First, as I promised you in last year's testimony, our commanders will honestly apprise you when readiness problems develop. That is exactly what happened in this case, and I was gratified to see that the Administration and Congress responded with speed, concern, and the necessary resources to address the problem.

Secondly, last year, I pointed out the pitfalls of diverting from service operations accounts to pay for contingencies. I also promised you that we would do our best to predict readiness issues before they become a problem. Months before these division commanders submitted their reports, we did warn that unless the Army's operations account was supple-

mented in a timely manner, before the fourth quarter, there would be readiness problems. Again, our systems for tracking and reporting readiness worked properly.

If we divert funding from Service readiness accounts, as we have had to do for FY94 and FY95 to support unplanned contingencies, the price is paid in canceled training events, needed repair parts not purchased, and ultimately, degraded wartime skills. Even if the money is later replaced, many times the opportunity to go back and reschedule canceled training events is lost. And, it may take longer to rectify the readiness problem than it did to create it in the first place.

To help resolve this problem, Secretary Perry has asked Congress to establish a readiness preservation authority. It will help prevent a recurrence. On top of other systemic fixes, it will provide the Department with standing authority to mitigate the impacts on readiness from funding contingencies that arise late in the year.

But this is not all we have to do. The Joint Chiefs, the CINCs and I are watching readiness more closely and in more ways than any time I can remember. We are also building new safeguards. One of these safeguards is a Joint Readiness Review that meets monthly to examine the state of our forces. In addition, and following up on last year's testimony, I stated that we intended to create a new system to assess joint readiness. The Services' readiness systems, as you know, track unit readiness. What we have always lacked is a clear picture of how ready our forces are to engage in joint operations.

Over the past year, we designed such a system and it is now in being. We assess and report both the readiness of our forces to conduct joint operations, and the readiness of selected critical systems and capabilities. This system is still at an early stage and considerable refinement is needed. But it is already affording us greater visibility and a more complete picture of the state of our forces.

Another readiness trend we are trying to correct is the problem caused by today's high operations tempo and the corresponding effect on personnel tempo. Selected units and capabilities, particularly in some of the support forces, have been overextended — we recognize that and are working to correct it.

In some cases the solution is to add more of the capability or type units that are in high demand. But it takes time to build and train, for example, more AWACS crews. As well, when we add more of something, we have to take something else out. We have to be sure that what we are adding to make us more capable of managing our peacetime and Operations Other Than War commitments doesn't come at the expense of a capability we need in war. Other approaches to address this problem include making more effective use of our Reserve Component in augmenting units committed to these Operations Other Than War, spreading the burden of these commitments and operations among nearly all of our commands worldwide, simply adjusting our exercise requirements, or combinations of all three approaches.

However, the key point is this: in the final analysis, continued readiness to fight depends on adequate, stable funding of readiness accounts; commitment to a well educated, highly trained, quality force; investments in force enhancements; and rapid restoration of funds and resources expended for unplanned contingency operations. If we stay on this path, our near-term readiness will not suffer.

MODERNIZATION AND ENHANCEMENTS

A problem I am equally concerned about is protecting our long-term readiness. In the past eight years, continuing budget reductions have caused us to cancel, stretch out, or revert to prototype many modernization programs. The end of the Cold War justified many of these actions, because it left us with a rich inventory of modern systems and equipment large enough to see us through the end of the century. But the end of the century is now approaching, when we will no longer be able to rely on what we built in the early eighties.

Recently, we've begun practicing what our corporations call recapitalization: part of which is the process of terminating or diverting funding away from programs that are either less promising or less valuable so that we can reinvest the funds into programs that have more punch. This has driven us to thoroughly reconsider old R&D efforts and modernization programs to see if they still offer the value we once thought was there. On the whole, it is a good practice and we will continue to pursue it. But, recapitalization must be fed with new funding as well.

When the Bottom Up Review was done, we reformulated the entire basis of our modernization plans to fit the future. The core philosophy that guided this effort was to balance our future strategic requirements against a still shrinking force. The counterweight was the combination of planned service modernization programs and selected force enhancements, the sum of which would make our forces faster to deploy and more effective and lethal when they go to battle. The idea is to "grow our force down" without allowing the force to become too weak.

But as we do this, we must carefully watch two trends. The first trend is one of pushing modernization programs down the road year after year through a process of new delays, stretch-outs, and schedule changes. This could cause an unsupportable swelling of the modernization funding needed early in the next century. Second, some of the systems in our inventory are approaching their expected life span. Our modernization plans are structured to upgrade or replace old systems before they become obsolete or worn out. These plans must be supported. We must bring replacement systems on line before the systems they are designed to replace or upgrade reach the point where problems begin to occur.

I can think of no programs more vital than those that are designed to enhance the strategic deployment of our forces. To fit our new strategy, we planned for a combination of pre-positioned equipment in strategically vital locations, additions to our Ready Reserve Fleet, and the procurement and fielding of the C-17, or a mix of Non-Developmental Airlift Aircraft, that would expand our airlift and replace our aged C-141 fleet. In making these decisions, we drew on the lessons we learned from the Gulf War that showed how seriously deficient we were in our ability to move our forces quickly to that conflict. When that conflict ended, the strain that had been put on our C-141's forced us to ground significant parts of that fleet for major structural repairs. It took well over a year before those repairs were completed. Some of our sealift broke down en route also, causing some units and capabilities to arrive late. The awareness that these problems caused at the time has dissipated somewhat and needs to be rejuvenated.

In order to respond to a major regional contingency, most of our Armed Forces will be deployed from the United States. Units will rely on airlift, such as the C-17, C-5 and C-141 to deploy their personnel and limited amounts of equipment, while the major portion of their combat equipment will move by fast sealift ships and large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships. However, sealift alone cannot meet the required response times for Southwest Asia. To do so requires us to deploy our initial forces by air to link-up with equipment pre-positioned in theater. Already we have one pre-positioned site with an armored brigade set of Army equipment in Kuwait. Plans are proceeding to position a second brigade set in the region. I urge you to support this requirement.

Some of the enhancements that I mentioned earlier include those that are needed to keep our forces ahead of the third revolution that I described; the revolution on the battlefield. There are three broad parts of this revolution that we must push ahead on.

The first two of these three, sensor systems and command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence systems (C4I), with their supporting space systems, are intertwined. Sensor and C4I systems enable us to detect and evaluate threats to our security and to then maintain effective command and control over our forces through every phase of our operations. Our stunning victory in the Gulf War showed the extraordinary effects these systems can have on the battlefield. They enabled our commanders to see the full depth of the battle area, to "sense" what the enemy was doing long before contact was established, and to prepare their forces accordingly. No one should doubt the value these systems gave our forces.

MILSTAR is one of the key programs in our evolving C4I architecture. Although we have access to commercial systems, MILSTAR provides secure, survivable, and protected support, from the tactical through the strategic level. It is a crucial part of our Global Command and Control System that ties together our deployed forces in our overseas theaters, those outside the theater that provide their support, and the National Command Authorities.

The third area of this revolution we are emphasizing is the fielding of more long-range, advanced, precision strike air, ground, and sea delivered munitions. Just as our sensors and C4I afford our commanders the ability to see to much greater depth, these systems complement this advantage by allowing our forces to strike at greater depths and with greater accuracy and lethality.

Finally, we also need to stay on track with the development and fielding of a Theater Missile Defense system. The Gulf War underscored our vulnerability to proliferating missiles, even in the hands of less developed nations. All of us remember the searing image of our forces scouring the remnants of a destroyed building, looking for American survivors after a SCUD missile made it through our Patriot defenses. We must prevent this, or worse, from happening again.

CONCLUSION

Some twenty years ago, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, our military was at its lowest state since before the Second World War. Readiness was languishing, morale was low, recruiting and retention goals were habitually missed, and disciplinary problems were evident all around. From this poor state, with the support of Congress and the American people, we built the finest Armed Forces in the world.

Protecting that excellence depends on our firm commitment to our people, on adequate and stable funding of

readiness accounts, investments in force enhancements and modernization, and balance in how we fund operations, infrastructure, depot maintenance, modernization, and force structure.

Our challenge now is to balance readiness today with tomorrow's modernization. To accept the force decreases that have been enacted over the past five years, but fail to purchase the enhancements and modernized systems upon which the reduction decisions were based, would invite great risks early in the next century.

I am confident that our goal to maintain this balance is the right way to proceed. We must provide the resources to achieve this goal.

Let me close by again emphasizing how very proud I am to represent the truly magnificent men and women of our Armed Forces. Looking back on this past year, I have never been prouder.

The Officer Magazine
"The Guard, The Reserve, and The 21st Century"
February 1995

In last year's special edition of the Reserve Forces Review, I wrote about the newly emerging roles of the Guard and the Reserve in our new National Military Strategy. In that article, I used the term "Active Reserves" to emphasize how very much the roles of the Guard and Reserves are increasing from Cold War years and that today's citizen-soldier must be more prepared than ever before. Looking back a year later, it was a warning that proved more true than I anticipated. From Somalia, to Bosnia, to Rwanda, and today in Haiti — our citizen-soldiers have in reality become "the Active Reserves."

So let me begin this year's article by telling you how very superbly our Guard and Reserve forces performed in every one of these operations I mentioned, and dozens more as well. Whether it was bringing life to starving and disease-plagued Rwandans, or providing police forces to patrol Haiti's dusty streets, or most recently, streaming reinforcements to the Gulf to confront Saddam's latest foolishness, American Guardsmen and Reservists have been all around the globe accomplishing important missions for our nation, very often with no more than a moment's notice before deployment. Despite the severe demands on our citizen-soldiers, the nation could not have asked for more.

This year, I would like to share my views of the great challenges that lie ahead as we prepare our Armed Forces for the next century. There can be no doubt that the Guard and Reserve have vital responsibilities in conquering these challenges. So I believe it is very important that I offer my views on these challenges and what they mean to you.

THE NEW WORLD

Five years have passed since the Cold War ended, five years in which we have learned a great deal about the character of this new era. It is true that America no longer faces the terrible dangers that were with us throughout most of our adult lives. The shadow of a huge nuclear arsenal aimed at American cities is gone. The old border town of Fulda, which for generations of military planners was to be the opening clash if the Cold War suddenly turned hot, is today a bustling and peaceful town in the center of unified Germany. Russian forces are serving beside our own in former Yugoslavia and there are a mix of strange new uniforms in the halls of our military schools; Romanians, Czechs, Poles, and dozens of other nationalities that were our adversaries only a decade ago. All of this is enormously gratifying.

But other aspects of this era are more troubling. A famous philosopher once warned that those who forget history are destined to repeat it. Ironically, what we have seen in this era is a tragic reversal of this sage advice: Very often it is those who remember history that are condemned to repeat it. In Yugoslavia, and all around the periphery of the former Soviet Union a number of ancient feuds have been revived by the swift changes that ushered in this new era. In addition to these, a fair number of other conflicts and tensions survived the passage of the Cold War fully intact. Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Cuba remain very dangerous, just as they were in the Cold War. And, of course, in Africa we have seen one tragedy after another unfold, most recently when Rwanda erupted in bloodshed and misery.

So in the place of a huge global adversary, we now face a hard-to-predict family of smaller threats and instabilities, strewn around nearly every corner of the world. None are as menacing as the Soviet Union was, but each could inflict unacceptable damage to our interests and undo the vast opportunities that we struggled for so long to create.

CHALLENGES

In the face of this vastly different global environment, our Armed Forces face two great challenges.

First of all, we are still reducing our budgets and our forces. By 1999, our defense budget will shrink to the point where it will be less than half what we were spending in 1988 when our Cold War defense spending reached its peak. At that point, we will be spending a lower proportion of our gross national product on defense than at any time since the years before WW II. So one challenge is how to preserve the excellence of our Armed Forces in the face of these declining budgets, and at the same time to prepare our force for the demands of the 21st Century.

Our second challenge emerges from the fact that there is a revolution in military affairs, in the way that we fight, a revolution that we sparked with the extraordinary technologies we put into our forces in the eighties and early nineties, and in the way that we use these capabilities in battle. The effects of that revolution were put on display for the entire world during DESERT STORM. In less than 100 hours of lightning warfare our forces crushed the world's fourth largest army.

Even as recently as twenty years ago, we were still amazed by the wire-guided technologies packaged in Tow and Dragon missiles, by infrared night vision devices, and by laser-guided bombs. By today's standards these technologies seem ancient. There are now dozens of types of smart and long-range precision munitions in our land, sea and air forces; computers, digitalization and other technologies have carried our C4I to an extraordinary level of capability, and; in all of our services we have fighting systems that operate, day and night, with lethality, maneuverability, and survivability that would have staggered anyone's imagination two decades ago. So there is a revolution afoot that continues to leap ahead and our challenge is to stay on its leading edge.

What makes these two challenges even more difficult is that they push against one another. On the one hand we are reducing and economizing; on the other hand, we are on the crest of an entirely new way of fighting, but a way that is very expensive to develop and field.

It is these two imperatives that are shaping the outlook of our senior military leaders and the recommendations on every aspect of our future force.

DIRECTION

The conflicting pressures of these two challenges mean that we have to fundamentally change the way we have been doing business. We have to reassess everything, from how we train, organize, man, and equip our forces, to how we fight. The numbers say it all. We will have an active force structure that is one third smaller, a budget less than half what is was ten years before, and a growing range of demands for the use of American forces.

Today we have the strongest, most powerful, and most technologically advanced military force in the world. To keep it that way, we must protect the essential elements that have kept our force strong, and continually look for innovative ways to sustain those strengths.

We are convinced that we have the right overall strategic equation for our future force. We must have the capability to fight and win two major regional contingencies that occur nearly simultaneously. Today that requirement is premised on the need to be able to fight and win against North Korea and Iraq. But this is not a prediction. Nor do we expect North Korea and Iraq to remain our adversaries into the next century.

We are concerned that other threats may emerge in the future, threats that we cannot foresee today. Just look at our experience over the past 40 years. In 1949, the year before the Korean War broke out, Korea was viewed as one of the least likely places where we anticipated we would have to commit forces to combat. Again, in 1960, nobody envisioned that we would become involved in a long and costly struggle in Vietnam. Or, even more recently, as late as 1988 our Southwest Asia contingency force was oriented at countering Iranian expansion, not an Iraqi attack against Kuwait. We have learned to respect this lesson of history: It is a rare instance when we know who our future adversaries will be.

As a result, we view this two contingency force as about right. It is the right size to ensure we do not fall into the predicament of dispatching a contingency force to one theater and then awaken to find that another adversary is exploiting our vulnerability to attack elsewhere. And it is the right size to give us a hedge against the uncertainty of tomorrow's threats.

We have already made the decisions on our future force structure and I do not expect any great changes from our current plans. There will be 10 active Army Divisions, 13 active Fighter Wings, 11 active aircraft carriers, and 3 Marine Expeditionary Forces. When the reductions are complete, the total strength of our Active forces will be only 1.4 million, the smallest number since before the Second World War.

The only way that such a vast reduction could be palatable is because beside these Active forces will be 8 National Guard Divisions, 15 National Guard Enhanced Readiness Brigades, one Reserve Carrier, 7 Reserve and National Guard Fighter Wings, and one Reserve Division/Wing/Logistics Team. But, this only tells part of the story. Beyond this combat structure we also depend on our Reserve and Guard for Combat Support and Combat Service Support forces to make the Active forces deployable. In small and large contingencies alike, the Guard and Reserve will be on the frontline.

In fact, in this world in which we have multiple Joint Task Forces operating simultaneously in several places around the world nearly continuously, the involvement of Guard and Reserve forces has proven necessary simply to sustain our daily missions.

Considering all of this, we have to protect three vital elements of our forces. The first of these is people. Today the men and women who wear our nation's uniform — those who wear it full time and those who wear it part time — are the finest in the world. Our people are the true source of our military excellence. And as much as all of us recognize that nobody expects to become wealthy from military service, it is imperative that we protect the pay, benefits, and quality of life that have attracted such outstanding people to our ranks. Fortunately, this fact is recognized by President Clinton and Secretary Perry, and the members of Congress, all of whom are committed to keeping our pay and benefits at adequate levels.

The second element of our force that must be protected is our readiness. Again fortunately, this fact appears widely accepted and supported. The events of the past few years have left no doubt in anyone's mind that our military forces are seeing a lot of use. But protecting our readiness is no simple task. And as difficult as it is for the Active forces, the challenge for the Reserve and Guard is even more difficult. In today's military, the intellectual and physical challenges of readiness are immense.

So, preserving the readiness of our Reserve and Guard is going to require an unrelenting commitment to provide the resources and the right kinds of training opportunities to Guard and Reserve forces. But it also demands that we apply available technology more effectively, such as in training simulations, and that we assign the right people to help Guard and Reserve units to meet their responsibilities. Today I am encouraged that these steps are being taken and that we are on the right path.

Third we must protect the enhancements and modernizations that are necessary to ensure that we can perform the mission of fighting and winning two, nearly simultaneous, major regional contingencies, and also that ensure our forces stay ready in the future. In a world of shrinking resources and competing demands this will be no easy task.

Frankly, even in 1990 we could not have deployed to two major contingencies with the speed and the kind of capabilities that we need in the future. We lacked sufficient strategic lift, our strategic C4I was inadequate, and we did not have enough of the right kinds of combat systems. So even as we are shrinking the size of our forces, we are also having to improve and expand selected capabilities. The term we have been using to describe this process is growing our forces down.

Just since the Gulf War, we have greatly expanded the numbers of long-range precision weapons systems; we have expanded our strategic lift and placed prepositioned equipment sets in Northeast Asia and Southwest Asia; and we have made significant improvements in our strategic and operational C4I.

But if we are to continue these programs, the fact is that we are going to have to make some significant changes. And the path we are going to have to follow is jointness.

Before ten years ago, jointness meant that the members of each service had to be familiar with the capabilities, cultures, and habits of other services so that when the time came to operate together we could fit our forces together, make a few adjustments, and then perform our mission. Unfortunately, this long engrained way of creating jointness led to problem after problem. In the midst of conflict we would discover that our service forces had different communications systems, different doctrines, and different approaches. At times these differences led to tragedy.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1987 was designed to rectify these problems and it succeeded magnificently. In the Gulf War, we fought as a single, synchronized joint force and the result was extremely gratifying to everybody but Saddam Hussein and his forces.

But today we must go further. A little over a year ago, we stood up a joint command here in the United States — the United States Atlantic Command — which is responsible for the training and preparedness of joint forces here in the United States. This is in itself is a bold leap because it gives us the capability in peacetime to continually train our forces here as a joint team.

In addition, starting three years ago, we began the process of producing a new joint doctrine, from the broadest principles of how we fight at the strategic and operational levels, down through the technical, training and procedural

manuals needed to tie together every level and function of our joint forces. Currently the Joint Staff is producing four manuals a month and these are being distributed to the field as rapidly as possible. But as every military man and woman knows, it is one thing to publish a manual, it is another thing entirely to ensure that the manual is read and put into daily practice.

We have also formed a Joint Warfighting Center in Norfolk. The center will assist the CJCS, the CINCs, and the Service Chiefs in their preparation for joint and multinational operations by developing and assessing joint simulation and wargaming systems and providing support to joint warfighting commanders for their exercises. The center will also provide analysis and recommendations on the effectiveness of joint doctrine and how it is being accepted in the field.

But there is one other area where jointness must expand. And that area is in the very business of how we train, organize, man, and equip our forces. Until recently, the Service staffs would once a year recommend to the Secretary of Defense exactly how many forces, and what kind of capabilities each Service needed to perform the missions and tasks assigned to our Armed Forces. The Air Force would say it needed X numbers of fighters, the Navy would say it needed X numbers of fighters, and the Marine Corps would say it needed X number of fighters. Today, and for the future, that system has been reversed. We now go to the joint warfighting commanders and ask each of them how many fighters or tanks or Aegis Cruisers they need in the event of a contingency. The Joint community then turns to the Services and tells each how many fighters or tanks or cruisers it needs to build and field.

But today we are exploring whether it is feasible to expand this same approach even wider, into how many military bases and commissaries we need, how many ground training areas we need in California, or whether we can't train all chaplains or lawyers at the same schools. In part, our purpose is to try to use jointness as a way to economize, but without damaging any of the elements of our forces that are important to our warfighting effectiveness. And in part, we are trying to find ways to improve on jointness so that we will be more effective on the battlefield.

So far I am very encouraged by the progress we are making along each of these paths. Throughout the Armed Forces, I sense that there is a broad awareness that we must change and adapt; that we must embrace rather than fight the steps that need to be taken. And I also believe that we have the talent and leaders to reinvent this force for the future.

WHERE TO NEXT

I have intentionally departed from the normal practice of submitting an article for this journal that describes what the Reserve and Guard are doing around the world today. I have done so because you, the Guard and Reserve, must understand and appreciate the challenges that lie before us, and how much we depend upon you.

We are long past the point of debating the importance or responsibilities of Guard and Reserve forces to our national defense. Your role is vital today, and will be even more vital when our reductions are completed in 1998. These challenges and directions that I have described will shape the future of our entire force, Active and Reserve. The sweep of jointness embraces every element of our future force and all of us must work now to prepare for the next century. I thank you for your extraordinary performance over the past year. As I have believed from the day I entered the service, no nation in the world can match the American Guard and Reserve forces.

Oral Testimony on START II
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
1 March 1995

Since the late 1950's, we and the former Soviet Union engaged in a series of protracted and labored arms control negotiations always with the goal of trying to find a way to make our nation safer from the threat of nuclear destruction. For decades we pursued this course, first avoiding a new incentive to an even more frantic arms race when we obtained an agreement to forgo antiballistic missile systems designed to protect our national territories and then later, when we signed treaties that limited the growth of our nuclear forces. These treaties primarily arrested the expansion of our arsenals, but always it was our hope that we could eventually accomplish something much more meaningful.

The START I Treaty that entered into force last December, the result of ten years of difficult and exhaustive negotiations, was such an accomplishment. For the first time we actually agreed to reduce our arsenals. But the end of the Cold War opened the opportunity for even more profound reductions.

This was the spirit that permeated the START II negotiations, some of which I attended as the Assistant to then-

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell. From my firsthand perspective, I can attest that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted every step of the way and that their views were accommodated in the Treaty.

This Treaty, START II, builds on the progress of START I but goes beyond it because it will restructure our nuclear forces to eliminate instabilities that have always been matters of great concern to military planners and to our citizens alike. By this I am referring to the elimination of all land-based missiles with Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles or MIRVs as well as all land-based heavy ICBMs. As Secretary Perry mentioned before, we have always been convinced that these particular systems are intrinsically the most dangerous and unstable elements of our strategic arsenals. Because they are vulnerable to a first strike from the other side, they impose a "use or lose" instinct that would be a very unstable factor in a crisis. Eliminating these systems makes both of our nuclear forces more stable deterrents.

Again as the Secretary mentioned, the Nuclear Posture Review that we completed last September resulted in the design for a post-START II nuclear force that preserves a mix of U.S.-based and forward deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons and a balanced triad of land-based ICBMs, bombers, and SLBMs that is survivable and maintains rough equivalence against Russia's post-START II forces. From extensive analysis the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I agree that this future force will remain an adequate deterrent against the only nation that forseeably threatens our national existence, Russia, and that it will provide extended deterrence over our allies as well.

The verification procedures that will be used for START II build upon the same interlocking and mutually reinforcing methods and procedures that we have been using under START I, but with an even greater degree of intrusiveness. Again, the other Chiefs and I are confident that these levels of verification are sufficient to alert us to significant violations and that adequate hedges will exist to respond should the Russians not comply with the treaty.

When both the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces are reduced to the levels established by this treaty, our forces will remain roughly equivalent but without the unstable pockets that have troubled us for decades. This, beyond even the considerable reductions to our nuclear forces, is the beneficial hallmark of this treaty, a security gain that is as positive for the Russians as it is for Americans.

The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have no reservations toward this treaty about the strategic force reductions it entails or about our ability to properly verify that the Russians are complying with its provisions. I encourage the Senate to promptly give its advice and consent to the ratification of the START II Treaty.

Brazil's Escola Superior De Guerra
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
7 March 1995

Let me begin by telling you how very pleased and honored I am to be here today and to have this opportunity to share some thoughts with the very distinguished faculty of the Escola Superior de Guerra and the local commanders who have been kind enough to take time away from your very important duties to come here today.

We are as all of you know, in a very new and a very different era than we have known over the past fifty years; indeed a very different era than we have known in our lifetimes.

The combination of the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the bipolar world order that were such dominant features of the international landscape for the past half century, have given way to something remarkably different. We are in a rare period of unparalleled opportunity when with the right decisions we have the chance to make the future safer than the past. We have at our feet great opportunities, opportunities that far surpass anything the generation of Brazilians and Americans that fought World War One or World War Two together could ever have imagined.

And truly this is why I am so pleased to have this chance to spend some time with you today, for this war college has long had a great reputation for brilliant and original thought and for influencing the fate of Brazil and the fate of this hemisphere.

For tomorrow your vision and your responsibilities are going to have to grow to keep your country and the rest of us in this hemisphere ahead of our own remarkable evolution.

Just a few months ago, President Clinton sent me to Europe to visit several of the newly liberated Eastern European nations to discuss with them the future of Europe and the roles they wish to take to help shape a new destiny for that continent, a continent which for the past century has suffered through two world wars and then fifty years of division and tension. I went to Poland, the newly created Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary. These four nations perhaps suffered more cruelly than any from the great events of this century. But what I saw in each nation was truly heartening.

In Warsaw, a city once known as one of the handsomest cities in all of Europe but also the city that suffered greater destruction in the Second World War than any other, what you see today are block after block of gray and oppressive buildings built by the communists. Where once stood such great beauty there is now in its place a very dark and foreboding looking city. But the people bustling about in the streets stand in great contrast to their surroundings. There is no darkness or gloom in their faces, but instead these wonderful expressions of hope and confidence in their future and the joyousness of new found freedoms. And you see the same kinds of sights in the other three nations that I visited as well. Side by side with the leftover evidence of the decrepit communist dictatorships that ruled these nations for four decades are millions of people bursting with hope who are cherishing the freedoms they were denied for so long.

Not long thereafter, the President sent me to visit Sarajevo the city which looked so beautiful and idyllic when it hosted the 1984 Olympic games. Today it looks neither beautiful nor impressive, rather it is a grim picture of tragedy and hopelessness. Although by land Sarajevo is only a short distance from the four European capitals I visited earlier, emotionally it is on the other side of the world from the others. One group of nations are looking to the future filled with great ambitions and hopes. earnestly trying to make sure that their children will not know the suffering they have known, the other nation has trapped itself in the past unable to break itself free from the stranglehold of old hatreds and passions. And in the process they have sentenced their children to terrible futures.

By now I would expect that some of you are wondering why I am here in Brazil talking about the problems and challenges of Europe. Actually, it is to make several points.

The first point is to elaborate the struggle that all of us are facing, to leave behind the challenges and perceptions of the era we should happily regard as the past and then redirecting our focus and our energies to the future we want to create.

What does this mean for this hemisphere which is home for the 30 nations that make up the Americas? Within the past decade, a very large number of countries in this hemisphere committed themselves to very bold reforms, very fundamental changes in the way they are governed, in the economic models they have adopted, and very serious attempts to redress some of the social problems and inequities that have plagued us for a very long time. If you think about this, you realize that within this hemisphere a very great shift is still underway, a shift that is changing the way that hundreds of millions of our citizens live.

In the history of the world, never before has there been a time when such an overwhelming number of nations in a single hemisphere shared common ways to govern their nations, when literally the fate of this hemisphere is no longer decided by a few leaders, rather it will decided by the many millions every time they go to the ballot boxes. Truly history offers no precedent for this. And the question we must all be asking ourselves is what advantages and opportunities this opens up for each of us, independently, and for all of us as the common inhabitants of this hemisphere.

Already we have realized that the growing similarities in our economies, nearly all of us are now swimming in free markets, opens great opportunities. Today's predictions are that by the end of this century, the Gross National Product of this hemisphere will exceed over 13 trillion dollars a year. Outside of East Asia the world's fastest growing economies are now here in Latin America.

But I think we recognize all of us that there are even greater economic opportunities, such as wider integration of the North American Free Trade Agreement, opportunities that in the next century could very well propel both the northern and southern halves of this hemisphere so much further.

And I have no doubt that we will take advantage of these opportunities, that our economies will grow closer together, that the gaps in national wealth that used to so strongly characterize the differences between the northern and southern halves of this hemisphere, that these gaps will continue to disappear. And this will usher in so many other changes that it is nearly impossible to estimate the full effects.

So from the economic perspective of this hemisphere I am confident that we are allowing our imaginations to push us toward a better future. But I wonder if the same can be said for how we think about our future security. We have today the same hemispheric security bodies that have existed for many decades, unchanged in any significant way despite our passage into a new era. Perhaps this is as it should be, but I still wonder.

When General Leonel and I were young officers, we both were associated with the Inter-American Defense Board that meets in Washington and I suspect that if he were to go visit one of its meetings today as I have had occasion to do in the past few years, he would be surprised how very little that organization has changed. Is it time to consider a new approach? I don't know the answer but I do think that the brightest minds in our defense communities such as you gathered here in this room that we need for you to be thinking about this.

For decades it has been a precept of security relations in this hemisphere to keep our ties very loose and very informal. Compared to NATO for example, the security dynamics here are very, very different. There are obvious

reasons why this has been the case that all of us here understand, but should it be different in the future? Again I don't pretend to have the answer to that question but it would seem that our commonalties are much greater today than ever in the past. And certainly we do share the same half of the world.

This comes to the second point that I wanted to discuss with you. Ever since I was a very young child I have always heard stories of this great nation of Brazil, truly a wondrous nation endowed with vast resources and courageous and energetic people, a nation that would one day become a giant on the world stage.

Today Brazil by every measure has very clearly crossed the threshold into regional and world leadership. In population, this nation is the second largest in this hemisphere and the 5th largest in the world. Brazil has the 9th largest economy in the world and is rapidly approaching the 8th and accounts for 40 percent of the entire economic output of Latin America. And as your country has grown so have your interests. Like the United States you are a major force in the international marketplace which for Brazil is largely good, but partly bad. Just as is the case for the United States this means that Brazil will flourish as other international markets grow but also that again, like the United States, Brazil is now hostage to events in other corners of the world where you have economic interests.

It means something else as well and I am sure that this is the major issue that many of you have been contending with over the past few years. And that is what role Brazil should assume as it continues its evolution. Again this is an issue I don't pretend to have the answer to and it is very much up to the Brazilian people themselves to provide the answer in any regard. But I do want to offer the perspective of the United States on the partnership between our countries, because we are now the two largest powers in this part of the world. And when two giants must live so closely together it is essential we understand and trust one another.

Americans appreciate Brazil's great power and view it as a very positive force. Americans also appreciate Brazil's independent views and, again, we view this independence as a constructive force for this region.

Although we may not always agree on some key issues from our perspective, these are like arguments between brothers. Let me add that I am very glad that I have not heard any mention lately of the old suspicion that the United States has designs on the Amazon region. If you have ever lived in the United States you would know how very absurd that theory would be to most Americans. So while here, I would like to put to rest any remaining residue of this old suspicion or assertion that the United States covets this region. You would be surprised at how shocked we were when we learned that we had been accused by some of harboring designs on the Amazon. It would be like accusing Brazil of wanting China's Gobi Desert.

But it is not enough to just share trust between our nations, because trust will not accomplish what we must ensure together. As our hemisphere grows more closely together it is important for us to recognize that this results in ever increasing interdependency and that the openness of our borders makes us more and more vulnerable to common problems. By this I am talking about the host of threats that we have been referring to as transnational issues: spreading diseases; illegal immigrants; and drugs. If we all closed our borders to one another then we could deal with these problems, independently building barriers between ourselves to ensure that some other nation's problems are kept in isolation. But that approach is neither possible nor desirable.

Our only recourse is to find ways to approach these challenges together. For years, as you know, the United States and Colombia have been waging a common war against drugs. In Colombia are the suppliers and in the United States are the consumers. About a decade ago both of us realized that this presented each of our nations with an equal dose of problems. The drugs coming into our shores kill thousands of Americans each year, even as the trade breeds crime problems that make many of our communities frightening places to live. But being a producer nation left Colombia with equally serious problems. One day the Colombian government woke up to realize that the cartels were contesting it for rule of their entire nation.

Yesterday, I had the great pleasure of witnessing the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding authorizing a joint U.S.-Brazilian Army Medical Research activity. The purpose of this activity is to perform research and to explore new ways to combat some common diseases such as resistant malaria, dengue fever, cholera, and others that afflict all of our populations. If you think about it nothing could make more sense for the benefit of both our countries and the world.

And of course I cannot overlook the common effort that we are taking together to help end the fighting between Ecuador and Peru. With Brazil's leadership and bold diplomacy, I am confident that this effort will be successful.

Indeed, I am very confident that the partnership between our two countries will continue to grow and to prosper. I know that from the United States' standpoint we very much need Brazil's leadership and active engagement in managing the problems of this hemisphere. I suspect that from Brazil's standpoint, your need for our partnership is equally great. And as we move into the next century, just around the corner, the world will need Brazil's vision and energy.

In this region we cannot afford to have a tragedy such as Yugoslavia occur. We must all of us ensure that old hatreds and angers remain buried in the past where they belong. Our commitment today is to our children and to their children, not to the arguments between our great-grandparents. Again this is why I am so very appreciative of Brazil's crucial role in ending the fighting between Ecuador and Peru because all of us must keep our eyes to the future.

Now I have probably said far too much. I only hope that I have not spoken so long that I dulled any enthusiasm you came here with. But I wanted very much to share these challenges with you because all of us, Brazilians and Americans alike, need to be thinking about these challenges and generating the ideas and the vision to make the next century so much better than the last. I was very much struck by one of the things that President Cardoso said in his inauguration address at the beginning of this year. He said that for him, like so many other Brazilians, hope has become an obsession. I think that this true for all of us in this hemisphere today, that hope has become our common obsession. And I am confident that we will act on this obsession to turn our hopes into reality.

So now I turn the floor back over to you so that I may hear your views.

The Lancers Boys Club
Baltimore, Maryland
7 April 1995

Your very kind introduction brings to mind a famous story of the Second World War that involved Admiral Chester Nimitz, the commander of all of our naval forces in the Pacific, and General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of all our ground forces in the Pacific Theater.

Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur were trying to formulate their strategy and they wanted a little privacy. So they found a small dinghy and they pushed off shore where they couldn't be bothered. As they were working, they failed to notice the winds pick up. Soon after, the seas got terribly rough and before they knew it the dinghy had overturned, dumping both of them into the water.

Well they weren't very far from shore so General MacArthur decided that they would just swim in, but he noticed Admiral Nimitz struggling; the commander of our naval forces couldn't swim. So he swam over to Nimitz and helped him to the dinghy where Admiral Nimitz could hold on.

Just then Nimitz turned to MacArthur and said, "Douglas you have to promise never to mention the fact that I can't swim to my sailors because it will completely destroy my credibility in the fleet." And General MacArthur responded, "Chester, I promise. I won't tell your sailors you can't swim. But you have to promise not to tell my soldiers that I can't walk on water."

So I will agree to continue my remarks but you have to promise not to tell anyone that I am not a very good speaker.

But truly, I simply can't begin to tell you what a very great pleasure it is for me to be here tonight. This is an evening I have been looking forward to for quite some time and I really appreciate this chance to meet with you and share some of my thoughts with you.

The reputation that the Lancers Boys Club has in this area is absolutely tremendous and the activities that you are involved in and your many accomplishments are remarkable. And I think it is very important for me to take just a moment to thank you for your commitment and to congratulate you on the many contributions you make to the community and to urge you to continue, because you really do make a tremendous difference. So when I received your invitation, I couldn't have been more pleased.

By now, you are probably wondering where I got my accent. I got it from John Wayne. It's true. But it is kind of a long story.

You see, I was born in Poland. I was three years old when the leader of Germany, Hitler, and the leader of Russia, Stalin, made a secret pact to attack Poland. You will recall that it was their joint attack on Poland that began the Second World War.

For the next six years until I was nine years old, one army after another marched and fought through the cities where my family and I lived. By the time the war ended, one beautiful city after another had been destroyed and millions of people across Europe had died or were left homeless.

The entire country was prostrate, its economies ruined, and its people impoverished. On top of trying to dig out from that, the world faced a new threat, the threat of another even more destructive war because when the Second World War ended the Cold War began.

Several years after the war ended my family and I came here to America to look for a new start. With the help of our church we were given the chance to come here to America.

Looking back, it is easy to say that we made the right decision. But when I was sixteen and moving to a new land where I couldn't even understand the language, well that was pretty scary. So of course I wanted to learn English as quickly as possible and the best way I found to learn English was to go to the movies. John Wayne was a very popular figure in those days and his movies were constantly playing at the theater near my home. So he very literally taught me how to speak English.

But the funny thing about learning English that way is that you never get to talk back. And so I never shook this accent that you hear.

Well, with the help of our church and John Wayne's English lessons, we began a new life in Peoria, Illinois. I went to high school at Peoria High and then I went on to college right there in Peoria at Bradley University. Six years after we had arrived in this wonderful country, I graduated from Bradley University with a degree in Engineering.

Within a few weeks I had it all — a degree in hand, a job, and a brand new convertible that I bought as soon as that first paycheck hit the bank. At this point I should add one other thing. Just about a month before I graduated, I was granted the most valuable thing I could have wished for — citizenship. So the world looked pretty good from where I was sitting, which was mostly in the front seat of my new car.

Then a strange twist occurred because one of the things that citizenship made me available for was the selective service system, the draft. And sure enough, that summer I received my draft notice. I still had my degree and I had a job, although it was a much different one than I had anticipated upon graduation. But someone else was driving my new convertible because I simply couldn't afford it on a private's pay.

But when that draft notice came I felt an obligation to serve. This nation had offered me some tremendous opportunities already and I was more than willing to now offer my service in return. But I have to tell you, I had no designs on the army. I was going to serve my two years and that was going to be the last of it. Then I was going to return to civilian life, get that job I had lined up after college, and find that guy that had my convertible and buy it back.

But as it turned out I absolutely fell in love with the Army on my very first assignment. I have never had any desire to return to that job I had after graduation and I have never sought out that convertible, although I have to admit that I have thought about it from time to time.

A year and a half ago I was in Europe, in Mons, Belgium, where I was serving as the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe. What that means is that I was the Commander of all U.S. forces in Europe and that in time of war, I would also serve as the commander of all of the forces of the 16 nations that form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO. I was enormously proud and honored to have been appointed to that job and with all of my previous experience in Europe, I hoped to offer a lot to NATO.

But President Clinton had something else in mind and he offered me this job as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was something I had to think long and hard about because I really felt that I was making a difference in Europe. As SACEUR, I was a commander, and for an Army officer there is simply nothing better than being a commander of troops, surrounded by smart and talented young men and women dedicated to serving their nation. Well you know the decision I made.

Now, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am the senior officer of the United States Armed Forces. But I am not the commander of the Armed Forces — the President is the commander of the U.S. Armed Forces. That is why you hear President Clinton referred to as the Commander-in-Chief.

My job is to advise the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. My job is to give my best recommendations as to how big the military should be, where the men and women of our Armed Forces should be stationed, and what kind of capabilities our military should have to be able to do the kinds of operations we have been seeing over the past few years and the kinds of operations we may be asked to perform in the future. When the President thinks we need to use our Armed Forces to perform one mission or another, it is my job to recommend to the President the best way to do that mission. So my job is truly to serve as an advisor.

I could not have asked for a more challenging role because truly, the end of the Cold War placed this nation in the most difficult and complex period of our history.

The Cold War was a tense a period in our history, but that tension lent an enormous degree of stability to the world to the nation and certainly to our Armed Forces. Throughout the Cold War there was always a firm understanding of what our mission was, to contain the communist designs of the Soviet Union. There was no great debate like you see today about the purpose of our Armed Forces. There was no revolution in the shape or size of our forces. Once the

Vietnam War ended, the size and position of our forces and the way we were expected to fight remained pretty stable. For the most part, the decisions that had to be made concerning our Armed Forces were marginal issues.

But the end of the Cold War changed all this because it so very fundamentally changed the face of the world. The Soviet Union fell apart and dissolved into 13 new nations. East Europe became free. The Berlin Wall that had gone up overnight and separated families and friends from each other for almost thirty years, came tumbling down.

And today there is only one Germany, where there were two just a few years ago, and China is slowly opening its doors trying to find its niche in the new world.

One after another, new nations are adopting democracies and becoming members of the free world and building free market economies. They are looking to the United States as their model. They are striving for the kinds of things that many of us simply take for granted.

We are pretty lucky when you think about. How wise the colonists were to choose the form of government they did. And how lucky you and I are to have the kinds of opportunities that hundreds of millions of people around the world can only dream of today.

But for many of them, this is a difficult journey. These enormous contortions and changes that these nations are going through are causing a tremendous amount of instability.

Since the end of the Cold War more nations have been born and more borders have changed than what occurred after the Second World War.

And what you have been seeing these past few years is the United States as the most powerful nation in the world, today, doing its very best to lend some stability to these difficult processes. Since 1990, the Armed Forces of the United States have conducted more operations than we performed throughout the entire Cold War period. So we have placed some enormous challenges and demands on our nation's military and on the men and women that serve in uniform.

And in the face of these many challenges we have also been making some very fundamental decisions about the size and the shape and the capabilities of our Armed Forces.

In the absence of the kind of threat the Soviet Union once posed, we have reduced greatly the size of our budget. As you can imagine, that has affected every facet of our military; our size the number of bases we have, the kinds of equipment we buy, everything.

We have realized that we no longer need and that we can no longer sustain a force of 2.2 million men and women and so we are in the process of reducing that number to 1.4 million. That has meant a tremendous amount of turmoil within our ranks. We have had to tell an awful lot of very good people who had served our nation well that their services were no longer needed.

That has been one of the toughest challenges I have had to face. But today we are just about through with these reductions and are well on our way to building the force that we will need in the future — a force of the right size and the right mix of capabilities to meet our security requirements of the future.

So you can see how very fundamentally this new world has affected our Armed Forces and my role as Chairman, but what does this new world mean to you?

As democracy continues its march across the globe and as new nations join the global marketplace, the world, our nation, and each of you will benefit enormously. Just consider what we have witnessed over the span of my adult life and your parents'.

When I was your age very few families had a television and if you can imagine, what computers we did have were huge ugly monstrosities that filled rooms and did less than what some wristwatches today can do.

Advancements in science and technology, as rapid as they have been over the past 40 years, seem to be moving faster than ever before.

It is easy for me to say with great confidence that your lives will be longer, healthier, and more productive than you or I can even imagine. This new world has opened an entire new era for your generation an era filled with more hope and more possibilities than the world and our nation have ever witnessed before.

But what we must now be careful to ensure is that we secure these hopes and dreams for you and for your children. We have to maintain our ability to prevent anyone from threatening our nation, from threatening our allies, and from taking away from us the opportunities that we have worked so hard to achieve.

And today we can do that very well. America has the finest fighting forces in the world. We must keep it that way because we will continue to need it and your generation will need it when you take over leadership of this country.

This is the world that is waiting for you; this is the task that you will one day help us undertake. So all of you hurry, study, finish school, and come join us. I think you are going to find it tremendously exciting.

As you think about how you will contribute to this new world, I urge you to consider the military. 1.6 million men

and women wear America's uniform today and are having a tremendous impact on the world. It's a great feeling to be part of that.

But regardless of what you do in the future please remember what Judge Hammerman and your experience with the Lancers has taught you about service to your community and continue to do the kinds of things you are doing today with this wonderful club.

Now I am sure that I have already spoken for too long. Thank you for having me here tonight. It has been a great pleasure and I hope I have at least given you a couple of things to think about and a little more information to base your future decisions on. Now what is on your mind? What questions can I answer?

The Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation
George Washington University
Washington, DC
4 May 1995

It is a particular pleasure to see so many representatives from our humanitarian organizations. I know that Fred Cuny, who was also invited, has been reported as missing while leading an aid mission into Chechnya. I know that you join me in praying for his safe return, but it is a reminder to all of us how very fortunate we are to have such courageous people in our midst.

Ever since I commanded that operation that was just referred to, that humanitarian effort in northern Iraq back in 1991, I have had a number of occasions to watch and admire the invaluable work being done by humanitarian organizations all around the globe. And it has always struck me as unfortunate that their work is not better known, for I know of no finer role models for our young people in this country than these extraordinary men and women who run from one tragedy to the next, often at great risk to themselves, to bring, literally, the miracle of life to so many.

I think you have chosen a most interesting topic for this conference, although the public debate on this issue seems to have lost a few decibels since that tragic October day in 1993 in Mogadishu. Putting our arms around the issue of employing our forces — and sometimes having to use force — in operations short of war, such as humanitarian operations, and peacekeeping, and peacemaking remains nevertheless a very tough challenge for us all.

Nothing could have dramatized this better than the revival of the Vietnam debate that Mr. MacNamara's book resuscitated just last month. In skimming the many scorching editorials and commentaries that his book attracted, you can only conclude that as a Nation we still do not have a consensus about limited wars, much less about operations short of war.

And it is not just a matter of the Cold War being over, for many of the mistakes that Mr. MacNamara wrote that he recognized as early as 1965 had really nothing to do with the Cold War.

It would be just as possible today, I submit, to find ourselves drawn too deeply into a conflict where our interests prove too thin for our commitment, to find ourselves trapped in a quagmire, as Mr. Halberstram termed it, where we have no commitment to achieve victory, to find ourselves at the wrong place and at the wrong time. But, conversely, ever since that conflict, there has always been an equally great danger that, with Vietnam in mind, we could become too timid; that we may imagine parallels from Vietnam where in fact no parallels exist. And in many ways, I tell you, this would be a much worse failure for our Nation, and for the world.

But the debate has changed in one way. During the Cold War, it was those on the left criticizing the Cold Warriors for taking too many risks, for over-committing our lives, our treasures, and our morality, for over-extending our power and our commitments for the purpose of containing communism. Today of course, that is different. It is those on the right who are castigating those on the left for allowing their humanitarian and their moral impulses to places where our interests, in fact, are thin or nonexistent. So the core debate has not ended at all. The real issues have not been resolved. Only the tables have been turned.

And the experience of the past four to five years is a warning; i.e., the kinds of tragedies we have seen, the exploding nations, the humanitarian disasters so catastrophic that they overwhelm the world's relief organizations, the floods of refugees from wars and oppression that can be numbered in the millions, and the near-certain knowledge that there will be more of these in our future.

So I think this conference is very timely, indeed — for the media, for the policymakers, and for the military — for we are all in this together. And while some might regard us as a very unholy trio, all three of our institutions must search for better clarity about the challenges that exist in the netherworld between war and peace.

Now I don't pretend to have that clarity with me at this podium. For that matter, I'm not sure that anyone does today. But the experience of the past several years has taught us a thing or two, and I thought that I might spend a few minutes sharing some loosely-connected ideas that you might want to explore further in the panel discussions you will be holding tomorrow.

We should start by recognizing that while these kinds of challenges are certainly not a phenomenon of this era, the growth of our involvement in these kinds of operations is, in fact, something rather new. As you well know, during the Cold War we rarely used our military forces for peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. After Vietnam — and the Nixon Doctrine that resulted from that conflict -- we even sought to avoid military involvement in limited conflicts altogether.

We learned that we had to be most selective, that we had to be very clear where our vital interests lay, that we needed to preserve and to concentrate our abilities to be ready to defend those vital interests against the massive forces of the former Soviet Union.

Today we are asking ourselves, "what has changed?" I would start by answering that in some ways not as much has changed as some might have suggested. First, we need to understand that our Nation still has vital interests and we retain dramatically large responsibilities around the world.

True, there is no longer a global threat from the Soviet Union. But neither our interests around the globe, nor regional threats to those interests, have disappeared. In Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and here in this hemisphere, we are still very much interested in stability and in the security of our friends and allies.

And when you see Iraq, Iran, the North Koreas, the Bosnias, the nationalist reflexes we are witnessing in Russia, and the opportunity for peace in the Middle East, there remains a most important role for our military power in each of these places as well.

And it is our continuing and effective engagement in these regions, and against these challenges, that is most meaningful and beneficial to ourselves and to the world. And I think that the realists in our country understand this.

And it should carry equal weight among the moralists as well. For it can be argued that the greatest victory for human rights the world has ever witnessed was the peaceful termination of the Cold War. For in that termination, billions of the world's people were released from near-slavery and oppression.

And it was an unequaled victory for world peace as well. But for these victories to be sustained, the gains that were made must, of course, be protected.

As well, a new world order must be formed to replace the bipolar order that is gone, and what that order will look like will have an incalculable impact on every nation in the world. As the world's leading and most influential nation, that must be a primary issue for our policy and for our military forces. The simple fact is, of course, that no other nation in the world has the power or the reach to perform this role.

Just like during the Cold War, we must have a clear sight of what today constitutes the main events. And no matter what else we do, we must not allow ourselves to neglect or to forfeit what is required to manage these main events.

Now, I must tell you that some, at least in my profession, would prefer that we put a sign outside the Pentagon that says, "we only do the Big Ones." That is because we feel comfortable with yesterday. We understand terms like "overwhelming force" and like "decisive victory." But as strong as the temptation may be to do this, the fact is that we cannot lead, we cannot remain that most influential Nation if we turn a blind eye to tragedies where millions are at risk, or if we try to ignore the Bosnias and the Haitis. Nor do I believe the American people would ever allow this to happen, for I do not believe that our Nation is morally capable of watching tragedies of the scale of a Somalia or Rwanda and of remaining a silent bystander. Surely, there are some things that are so morally reprehensible or so inhumane that we as Americans, when we see them, must act.

But, the difficulty lies in distinguishing between helping — narrowly defining our interests and our involvement — and on the other hand, getting caught in someone else's hatreds, prejudices, and intrigues.

And even when we enter with the best of intentions, if we are not extraordinarily cautious, there is always this impulse to try to bring more than relief — in fact, to bring solutions.

Largely, it becomes a matter of expectations. In war we expect victory. But in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, what do we expect? At what point do we declare an endpoint and return home?

All of us remember a time when the word "Nation-building" gained great currency in this town. Perhaps our successes in the military occupations of Japan and Germany and our successes in rebuilding Western Europe led some to believe that we could reconstruct other nations. I submit to you, if that was so, we drew false confidence and we drew false analogies from what happened after World War Two.

The fact is that we cannot rebuild or restructure other nations. Such an undertaking is the work of decades and of

sustained efforts by generations. When you go to Haiti today, you will find that our forces are not attempting to rebuild that nation. We are trying to give the Haitian people the chance to rebuild themselves. We cannot police their streets.

But we can help them to rebuild and retrain their own police force. We cannot build for them a new government. But we can offer stability while their own leaders rebuild their government and create the means to maintain stability for themselves. And we cannot rebuild their economy. But we can help them to create conditions that begin that process. But don't expect to see an instantaneous success.

It may take years before Haitian streets are modern and paved, before the kind of poverty we see today is considerably lessened, and before democracy is so firmly rooted that Cedras and his people are just a bad memory.

So the issue remains one of expectations and of perseverance. And when a tragedy has great humanitarian proportions, when our hearts are most affected, then perseverance becomes all the more difficult, but also all the more necessary. There will always be this tug to do more than we set out to do, to find the source of the tragedy and to try to cure it for all time. But that is a very different undertaking than providing relief.

In the Orient, there is this old Confucian saying that when you save a person's life, you are responsible for that person for the rest of their life. If that rule were actually practiced, I suspect that very few people would ever want to become doctors.

And we must understand that in helping other nations as well, that there are limits to the help we can offer, that if we are to go beyond offering relief, then we must have interests strong enough to sustain a much greater commitment.

I think we stayed within these guidelines in Rwanda last year, and that was the key. We went in when the situation was so hopeless that it was overwhelming most relief organizations. We helped to restore the relief effort and then, when a degree of stability was restored, we left the humanitarian operations back in the hands of the professionals.

But there are situations much more complex than this, and the situation in the Balkans today illustrates this better than any other. Clearly, we have a great interest in the stability of that entire region. From the beginning, we recognized that this is the traditional flashpoint of European wars. We must be clear that that conflict has the potential to embrace other nations and to drag others into its cauldron of hatred and of violence. And so our very strongest interests are endangered by that conflict — interests such as the stability of Europe, the future health of NATO, and our ability to shape a new Europe free of competing power blocs and new dividing lines.

But more germane to our topic, Bosnia is as well a great humanitarian tragedy, one brought about and fueled by barbarous kinds of human behavior..

But it has proven terribly difficult to solve. Hans Morgantheau, the great realist, wrote that "Nations have three tools to influence others: logic ... riches ... and force." We have tried the first two in great abundance, and limited amounts of the third, and have failed to achieve the full effects we want. We have learned that there are very powerful passions in play there ... and that all sides are willing to lose a great deal in order to gain — or maintain — that which they want.

For our part, and on the part of our allies, there is great dissatisfaction that we have not done enough, that we failed to stop the disintegration of that nation in the first place, and that we have failed to end the fighting ever since. Notwithstanding all of our efforts — and even our limited successes — at providing humanitarian assistance, at having saved hundreds of thousands of lives, and at limiting the scope and the intensity of the fighting, still we feel a sense of frustration and of anger because we feel we have not done enough.

Regardless of our disappointment, we should not allow this dissatisfaction to cause us to overlook what are in fact some extraordinary developments. At least for now, for the first time in this century — or before — a conflict in the Balkans has not unleashed the worst in the other nations in Europe.

To the contrary, it has led instead to the very finest of motives from all parties. Nearly every nation on the continent is involved, in one way or another, in trying to end the fighting rather than to seek some gain from it, as they did in the past. For the first time I can remember, nearly every nation in Europe is working collectively to bring peace. For any student of European history, this is quite a remarkable achievement, one that probably would not have been possible at any time before Gorbachev came to power.

A number of our European partners have had soldiers killed in that effort, and all of us have spent considerable resources to reduce the misery and to protect the innocent. We should not overlook the significance of that fact.

Let me add that much of the anger directed at the UNPROFOR has been entirely unfair. They were sent — and have been organized and equipped — not to end the fighting, but rather to keep alive as many innocent victims of this tragedy as possible. And the Nations and forces of UNPROFOR deserve our appreciation and admiration for what they have done and what they continue to do. Let me add that they also deserve every ounce of our support, both because

they are accomplishing much on the ground and because as long as they are there, they are contributing to keeping that conflict from growing out of control.

And let us be crystal clear. If UNPROFOR were to leave, either because the level of fighting on the ground were to become intolerable, or because the United States Congress were to pass a unilateral lift of the arms embargo, the humanitarian situation on the ground will most likely turn to a much worse tragedy yet — as a minimum, in the Eastern enclaves, and most likely in Bihac as well.

Our goal, therefore, must be to keep UNPROFOR in place. Until a negotiated end to the fighting can be hammered out, UNPROFOR remains the best hope we have to keep the conflict contained and the level of suffering down.

But should it become necessary for UNPROFOR to withdraw, we must be a part of NATO's effort to safeguard their departure. For the United States to fail to stand with our allies on this issue could very well prove fatal to NATO and put enormous strains on our transatlantic partnership.

But the larger issue that Yugoslavia has taught us is that the most successful humanitarian and peacekeeping operations are those that prevent a conflict from ever occurring in the first place. And this returns us full circle. It reminds us that our greatest contribution lies in ensuring that peace and stability are maintained in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and in this hemisphere.

We can never undo what has happened in Yugoslavia, but I am certain that our active military involvement through military-to-military contacts, through combined exercises, through innovative outreach programs, through forward stationing and forward-deployed forces, and every day helping maintain stability is doing its part to prevent other conflicts from occurring.

And, what of the role of the media in these events? Are we in fact being forced into these situations by the "CNN effect" that your panels will be discussing tomorrow? Is media coverage forcing us to alter our approach to these operations? And, perhaps more basically, what ought to be the relationship between the media and the military during these Operations Other Than War?

Let me try some random thoughts on you. The CNN effect: surely it exists, and surely we went to Somalia and Rwanda partly because of its magnetic pull. Surely the world's actions — or inaction — and political leaders' pronouncements are greatly influenced by this effect. Since instant, global, constant information is here to stay, and if anything will become even more widely available, how will governments be able to make choices if those choices are different from those suggested on our television screens? What if our country had wanted to go to the Sudan instead of Somalia, although only Somalia was on our screens?

I surely don't have the answer, but while these decisions will be harder in the future, they might prove not as difficult as we might imagine. Governments and publics will become more sophisticated as they become more used to this phenomenon, and all of us, most probably, will have our senses dulled by overexposure to pictures of starving children and atrocities committed by one group upon another. Either way, your discussions on this should prove most useful.

Is media coverage forcing us to alter our approach to Operations Other Than War?

The answer is a near-certain "yes" when it comes to peacemaking operations, a more tentative "yes" in the case of more benign peacekeeping operations, and probably "no" in humanitarian operations, unless we talk of places like Bosnia, where all three are intertwined.

The answer is "yes" in peacemaking operations because operational security and safety of our troops are more at stake, and in these operations an all-intrusive press tends to aggravate the natural tensions between these two organizations — the press and the military — organizations with essentially very different missions.

We all know the cases: the bright lights on a beach off Mogadishu, as Marines are attempting a night amphibious landing; the hundreds of reporters awaiting in Port au Prince the night an airborne assault was called off just hours before the sky was to have been filled with paratroopers, and the fear that the sky would have been illuminated with a thousand white lights, making floating ducks of our soldiers.

What is less well known is that all major U.S. networks had agreed to use night vision devices and to delay broadcasting for some time after the troops were safely on the ground. So perhaps we are more tolerant of each other's needs than is generally believed. But we must continue to work this issue.

I submit to you, a young sergeant leading a squad to clear a narrow street will not show the same caution when he notices his progress being filmed by a TV crew. He will be embarrassed to slip from doorway to doorway and could thus become a more likely casualty. But when more benign, less-dangerous operations such as peacekeeping or humanitarian operations are involved, the tensions between media and the soldier are much less present. From my experience in the Kurdish operation following the Gulf War, the tensions were practically non-existent and we not only were

able to give the press total freedom to roam the operations area, but we gave them maximum support to get around and be better informed. The result was a more factual story filed, a better-informed public, a better-informed Washington, and thus better support for us in the field.

By the way, we used the same model in Rwanda, and once we got on the ground in Haiti and received, with very few exceptions, excellent press and the operation — and the country — benefited.

In fact, I am convinced that the press should be free to go and do its job with restrictions only where safety and operational security are truly of concern and that these restrictions be lifted just as quickly as possible.

Well, what about these disjointed thoughts? What about the media, the military, and peacekeeping and humanitarian missions? An unlikely combination? Not really! Of course, when speaking of humanitarian operations I would add another unlikely ingredient—humanitarian organizations—to this mixture.

You see, the media, the military, and humanitarian organizations can be the perfect combination, particularly for dealing with large humanitarian disasters, but only if they draw on each other's unique strength and not on the fears and the prejudiced views they sometimes have of each other.

The media, in a responsible and balanced way, must alert and educate the public and the decision-makers and then keep all informed of the progress.

The humanitarian organizations must provide the real expertise of how to deal with the tough, heart rendering challenges of a Somalia or Rwanda.

But only the U.S. military possesses the resources, the strategic lift, and the long-range communications to be able to deal quickly with large-scale, rapidly-developing tragedies that simply overwhelm the traditional humanitarian organizations. And so yes, these three strange bedfellows can be a very good combination.

And who knows? If we are selective and only engage when our interests are very clear, when we have agreement on the limits of our involvement and the conditions of our withdrawal, and we go in when we can make a difference and have the support of an informed public, then maybe in time we will view such missions as supportive of our interests and not as damaging to our security.

With that let me close and thank you all for letting me share my thoughts with you.

Town Hall of California
Los Angeles, California
11 May 1995

As you know, this year we are commemorating the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. Starting with last summer's D-Day celebrations at Normandy, I have had an opportunity to attend a number of these World War II commemorations, in the U.S. and overseas.

As you might imagine, these are immensely inspiring events. But at each one of these commemorations, unquestionably the greatest sights are the veterans who fought the battles and campaigns of that war so very long ago. They were remarkable men and women, so I was wondering if we could just digress for a second and see if there are any World War II veterans with us here today? If there are, please stand, so we can thank you. I think they are remarkable, not only because they won that war, but perhaps just as importantly, because after that war, they worked so very hard create a better world, to exploit the opportunities their sacrifices created for all of us.

President Clinton perhaps said it best when he spoke to the veterans at Normandy. He told them that we were the children of their sacrifices and of their struggles. He told them that because of them, in our lives we have known nothing but freedom and liberty, and that we shall never forget; and that we shall forever be grateful.

And of course, this makes me wonder what our children will think when they look back 50 years from today, when they look back to see what we created for them. Here in this room are some of those young people; we were just introduced to them. What great events will they look back on half a century from now? What will they be thankful for?

Now, I have no doubt that they will in fact look back at this time in history because we are now in one of those pivotal moments that occur only once every few generations when the world is in the grips of revolutionary change. This really is what the end of the Cold War created — a time of vast challenges and of vast opportunities, one that rivals in every way what the end of World War II had created.

And we must wonder: what will be on the minds of these young people when they look back on us? What will they see as our Marshall Plan, a plan that for all of the controversy that it evoked at the beginning we now recognize was a brilliant vision and a great effort, one that pulled an entire continent out of the ashes of a terrible war and that gave hope

and freedom and prosperity to hundreds of millions of people around Europe? And it created for future generations powerful democratic allies, without whom we could not have won the Cold War. Or what will they see perhaps as our Yaltas, where because of wrong choices we could leave them instead problems and conflicts that could bedevil their lives and perhaps the lives of their children?

Right now as we are gathered here in this room, thousands of our men and women in uniform are deployed around the world on actual operations. They operate over northern and southern Iraq, in and around Bosnia, in Macedonia and Croatia, in the streets and alleys of Haiti, and along the border of Peru and Ecuador. Even as we are still negotiating the nuclear issues with North Korea, our forces are staring across the DMZ at a million-man army, one that is clearly equipped and positioned for attack, not to defend. On the other part of the world, Iran is building up its military capability and has recently begun to fortify its ability to block international shipping into the Gulf. And as all of you know, these are only some of the world's trouble spots. There are the conflicts around the periphery of the former Soviet Union, and within Russia itself, of course, there is Chechnya. Turkey is fighting the Kurdish PKK, Algeria is caught in a terrible civil war, and several nations in Africa face the risk of imploding into the same kind of tragedy as we witnessed not long ago in Rwanda.

Who could have predicted that the world would be like this, when back in 1990 and 1991 we were flushed with the crumbling of the Wall, and of Boris Yeltsin climbing on that tank, and with that single act bringing to an end an empire that had lasted for three quarters of a century? And that in itself is a warning to us all, not to confuse what we hope will happen with the realities of what could happen, and often without any warning.

This explosion of conflicts and tragedies has led to the debates that we are now seeing in places like Washington, DC; debates about Somalia, about Haiti, about expanding NATO, about the need for a national missile defense, and about so many other vital issues. And certainly I don't pretend to have all the answers to these very difficult questions, but I would offer one suggestion, and that is that we must learn to take the long view. We must understand what the main events are. We must not let ourselves become trapped in the events of the moment, without understanding their relevance to the future. As we make our decisions today, always we must think about tomorrow and "how do today's decisions affect our tomorrow?"

In that regard, I will tell you that, first and foremost, this means that we must maintain our international leadership. This, after all, is what the generation that fought World War II gained for us and in the past 50 years we have used our leadership to extraordinary benefit: for our Nation, for the welfare and prosperity of our people, and for billions of others like them around the world. Looking backward, I think it would be obvious to us all that there is no other nation that would have — or that could have — produced the results that we created. No other nation could have produced GATT or the Bretton-Woods agreement, and then turned these visions into reality. No other nation could have successfully led the west through the Cold War. No other nation but ours could have successfully engineered and built the United Nations. No other nation could have built NATO. All of this we can see clearly. But what we see less clearly is what our leadership could mean for our future.

Nor are we very clear what it means to lead in a world that is not divided into two camps, a world where the focus of international leadership is much more opaque, and where the kinds of problems that a leading nation must address are far less focused, are far more ambiguous and messy than what we experienced during this last half century. Very rarely, for example, did we ever become involved in such things as peacekeeping, or in "Operations Other Than War," if we even understand that term. Our consuming purpose was to deter the former Soviet Union and if deterrence failed, to fight and win that one big war. Smaller problems were simply left for others to handle.

As well, it has become more difficult and more frustrating to lead in an international environment where neither we nor our allies are pressed by the kind of urgencies and stakes that the Cold War kept over our heads for so many years. And this has not been helped by the fact that many of the challenges that we face simply are not built for black-and-white, clear-cut solutions. What do you do about a Bosnia, where passions that are centuries old smother any form of reason? And how to handle a Russia that, even while it is careening through reforms and problems that are vital to all of our futures, can suddenly turn with such force on its own citizens? And how do you expand NATO without again dividing Europe, and in the process perhaps isolating and adding to the insecurities of those who are not immediately included? These are very difficult questions for us all. And the more you look at these questions, the more reasonable it becomes that we might differ in our views.

But as we have learned from our experience of the past half century, you cannot be the world's leader by only talking about the things you are unwilling to do. Ultimately, our unequaled national power will always ensure that we have a seat at the table. But staying at the head of that table means that we must stay involved in the world's most truculent problems and that we commit ourselves to their solutions.

This raises the second thing we must do, and that is to be selective. With all of the conflicts and tragedies that I described earlier, we need to recognize that some of these are critically important to our interests and to our futures, and others are less so. And as the world's most influential nation, the problems that most require our sustained attention and commitments are those that have global impact, or that will shape the futures of regions where we have, in fact, important interests.

And so although North Korea is a very serious near-term threat, and South Korea is an important ally that we must help defend, we also need to recognize that North Korea will not be the moving force that shapes the future of that part of Asia. It is an isolated nation with a disproven system that no nation in the world wants to emulate. Rather, I submit to you, it is Beijing and Tokyo that are propelling that region's future; it is in those capitals where we must sustain and enlarge our influence.

The same is true in Europe, whose future is being molded in Bonn, Moscow and Kiev, not in the bloodstained mountains and cities of what used to be known as Yugoslavia. For all that, we cannot ignore what is happening in that conflict, or allow it to expand beyond its current borders, and we also cannot afford to allow it to undermine what we must do on that continent that is so much more vital to our long-term interests. We cannot allow it to unravel NATO for, despite the debates you see about this alliance today, maintaining the vitality and the coherence of our Trans-Atlantic partnership is vital to our future. Certainly we as part of NATO must be prepared to participate in the withdrawal of U.N. forces from former Yugoslavia if it becomes necessary to do so, and should we be asked to do so. We must not allow that conflict to destroy either the confidence or the trust that we and our NATO allies have shared through so many dangerous trials. If we allow this to happen, if we allow NATO to be marginalized or damaged, then we will have compounded a tragedy with an unforgivable blunder.

And in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, we are finally seeing the fruits of what for so long we tried to bring about — the hope of peace between Israel and its neighbors. We must not forget just how very crucial this is to our future, or how very dangerous the conflicts in that region were to our past. And while we must preserve our guard against Iraq — as Saddam Hussein reminded us last fall — we must also recognize that the growing danger in that region of the world is Iran.

And in this hemisphere we must grasp the opportunities now before us. Today, democratic institutions and market economies are at a historic high. And this offers us — at last — the chance that has been sought for two centuries: to build within this hemisphere a zone of peace and prosperity and mutual cooperation.

It is these challenges and these opportunities that will shape the world that our children will inherit. Those of you involved in international business know very well that economically the world today is multipolar. The time is long past when the dollar alone could propel the global economy out of a slump. To create that kind of a force today would take, at the very least, the combined efforts of the dollar, of the yen, and of the German mark. And this same multipolarity is spreading to diplomacy and security. I suggest it will be a feature of the security order of the coming century. What this order will look like, and how stable it will be, depends very much on what we do today.

Finally, the third thing we must do is to protect the unequaled excellence of our Armed Forces — the ultimate protector of our interests and of our way of life — both because we are using our forces more frequently today, and because I am convinced that what we are seeing will be, most likely, the wave of the future.

Look, in the past year alone, we dispatched our forces to be prepared to fight on at least two occasions. First, to Haiti when, just as our last-ditch diplomatic effort had stalled and seemed on the verge of failure, we launched an invasion. Fortunately, once Haiti's military rulers learned that our forces were actually in the air, an agreement was hastily reached and the invasion was turned into an unopposed landing. And only three weeks later, last October, after we detected Saddam Hussein's divisions bolting south to Kuwait, again we dispatched a force with orders to fight. And once the first of our forces began arriving, we watched Saddam's divisions change their minds and return to their garrisons. In the same year, by the way, in Korea, the tensions over the nuclear issue grew so severe that they could only be viewed as edging toward conflict. And so we reinforced that peninsula and prepared ourselves for a military clash.

So, if you recall last year, and these events that I just mentioned, it becomes clearer why it is necessary that we maintain the ability to fight and win two nearly-simultaneous regional conflicts. After all, at several points in the past year, we were very close to just such a scenario.

And I believe that we now have a consensus on that issue. But what I worry about is our ability to maintain all of the parts of this force that must be sustained. We have — I believe — strong political support to protect our near-term readiness, the training and maintenance and preparedness to respond to today's challenges. And I think there is also a firm appreciation that the backbone of our military excellence — our people — must be protected; their pay and their quality of life must be protected, or we will find it increasingly difficult to retain them, or to attract more like them. But

I am not nearly as confident that there is as much support for our long-term readiness: modernizing our force where necessary, and just replacing the many items of equipment as they grow old and simply wear out.

By 1999, our force will be over one-third smaller than it was in 1991 when the Gulf War ended. And our budget will have shrunk by over 40 percent in real terms from what it was in 1988. In fact, our budgets have now been declining for ten straight years. If you add this up, an awful lot of swords have been pounded into plowshares and an awful lot of great soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have been asked to leave the military — nearly 700,000. But I think that we have reached the point where we must stop looking backward — trying to judge whether we have cut enough from the past — and instead turn our eyes to the future, to decide whether we are building the best possible force to protect interests in a new century, with all the new challenges that century offers. We must make this turn very quickly, because that future is just around the corner. And we have learned to stop thinking about peace dividends as well, because what we are witnessing in so many corners of the world bears very little resemblance to the peace we had hoped for.

If you return to the question of what we want our children to think when they look back in fifty years — at what we did with the opportunities and the challenges that grew out of the end of the Cold War — their judgments will weigh on how well we kept our focus on the future. Did we preserve our global leadership and use it productively and wisely. Did we understand what was truly important to the future, expending our energies where it was important? Did we preserve our military strength, avoiding the mistake that our Nation made so many times in our own past, after both world wars, after Korea, and after Vietnam, where each time our hunger for peace dividends outweighed our cautions and left us poorly prepared for future conflicts? If we do these things I just mentioned, I think we have every reason to be confident about our future.

After all, we are in fact today the dominant, leading nation in the world. It is probably the first time in modern history that a leading nation has been challenged so little by another power as we are today.

And as the last 50 years have shown, we do have the wisdom and the skill and a vast capacity to do good. From where I stand, the glass is a lot more than just half empty.

Let me tell you that I have probably spoken too long already, as I look at my watch. And between the earthquakes you have suffered here, and floods, and the O.J. Simpson trial that is occurring just a few blocks from here, I should not subject you to another hardship!

So let me stop, and thank you again for giving me the opportunity to share these thoughts with you. And if I haven't suppressed your enthusiasm for questions, I would more than happy to try and answer some of them.

Thank you very much.

"This Week with David Brinkley," ABC-TV
Remote Interview from Vienna, Austria
4 June 1995
(Excerpts)

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, General, the president said a day or so ago that we cannot leave our allies in Bosnia in the lurch. Now, what did that mean? What does it mean now?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: I think it means that if our allies under NATO's leadership and under NATO's rules of engagement were to embark on one of three possibilities, we should be with them and we should assist that effort, subject to consultations with Congress. The first of these is that if in fact eventually there is a peace agreement, a fair peace agreement that can be implemented, that the United States, together with its other NATO allies, should be prepared to help implement that agreement.

Secondly, that if despite our very best efforts, UNPROFOR does have to withdraw from Bosnia, that the United States under NATO, NATO's rules of engagement, NATO's command and control, should then be prepared to help UNPROFOR withdraw from Bosnia, again subject to consultations with Congress.

It was during the planning for this operation and the consultations that are now ongoing with Congress on this issue that an option came up which was that it might be necessary, again under NATO leadership, to in an emergency — on an emergency basis, to help UNPROFOR relocate from some location that is no longer tenable, for instance, one or more of the eastern enclaves.

It is on this matter that we are now consulting with Congress as well, but I need to make a point that no one has asked NATO to do that, nor is there a likelihood that this will come up. After all, our allies, particularly the French and

the British, have in the last few days been talking and acting in a belief that they can and should stay in the enclaves, and certainly that UNPROFOR should stay in Bosnia.

MR. WILL: General, the Europeans seem to be determined now to put in more troops in a multinational force, and I'm curious as to what the United States' involvement might be. There are reports that we would be involved in close air support and transportation, and they have mentioned attack helicopters and gunships.

But I gather Americans would not fly those. Can you tell us what our role would be?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: Yes, and let me be very specific. The United States will not participate on the ground in either the normal UNPROFOR operation or this quick reaction force that is now being established by the British and the French and the Dutch and others. What we have stated is that if our allies need assistance with strategic lift to get them to the area, we would be prepared to provide that.

Secondly, if they needed some equipment — helicopters to be flown by them, not by us, or any other equipment, to let us know. We would do our level best to provide that.

Thirdly, we said that as part of NATO, we would be prepared to provide close air support to such a quick reaction force, as we are to all the other UNPROFOR forces.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, let me press you on the use of U.S. forces. As I understand it, on Friday the president approved the use of 25,000 U.S. combat troops within a 50,000 NATO force, if necessary, for the extraction, should if come to that, of U.N. forces. Is that correct?

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: Well, it is — the president was briefed on that plan and is aware of it, and the discussion has always been that, subject to consultation with Congress, the United States ought to participate with NATO in the extraction of NATO. And the U.S. contribution would in fact be 25,000, and the president was briefed on that.

MR. DONALDSON: All right. If I may, then, sir, if it comes to that, the extraction of NATO forces, I take it that we would have U.S. troops on the ground in Bosnia.

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: For that specific purpose of withdrawing, helping to withdraw UNPROFOR, providing that operation is a NATO operation under NATO command and control and NATO ROE. And we have been saying that for quite some time.

Oral Statement on Bosnia
Senate Armed Services Committee
and the House National Security Committee
Washington, DC
7 June 1995

I would like to begin by discussing the two events of the past few weeks that I know are matters of great concern to this committee: the airstrikes that occurred on 25 and 26 May and the 2 June downing of our F-16 participating as part the NATO force enforcing the no-fly zone.

Following that I would like to brief you on NATO OPLAN 40104 the plan for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia.

NATO AIRSTRIKES

Let me start with the events that led to the airstrikes on 25 and 26 May. You are all aware that NATO has agreed to provide close air support to protect UNPROFOR personnel and to provide airstrikes in support of the enforcement of U.N. mandates.

Throughout the winter of 1995 the fighting in Bosnia was at a low level due to the cessation of hostilities as well as the traditional winter refitting and reposturing of forces that we have repeatedly seen conducted by both sides. In early spring the fighting intensified when a stronger Bosnian Government force opened limited offensive actions. At the same time the Bosnian Serbs intensified their own attacks and began what appeared to be a systematic harassment of UNPROFOR forces as well as stepped up artillery attacks against civilians in the safe areas.

On 8 April, the Bosnian Serbs announced that they would no longer guarantee the safety of flights in and out of Sarajevo Airport in effect closing the airport. Throughout the month of May, Bosnian Serb harassment and restrictions of ground convoys grew so severe that only 38 percent of that month's scheduled humanitarian aid was able to be

delivered to Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs used the same tactics to limit humanitarian aid deliveries and UNPROFOR re-supply to other enclaves as well.

Then in mid-May the fighting in and around Sarajevo increased dramatically. In one day alone more than 1,000 artillery rounds rained down on the city of Sarajevo.

Between 22 and 24 May, the Serbs entered weapons control points outside of Sarajevo and withdrew four heavy weapons. On 24 May the Commander of UNPROFOR issued an ultimatum giving 24 hours for both sides to cease firing heavy weapons and for the Serbs to return four heavy weapons taken from a Weapons Control Point, and within 48 hours, to remove all heavy weapons not inside approved heavy weapons control points to locations outside the exclusion zone outside Sarajevo.

On 25 May, in response to the failure of the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the first part of the ultimatum, the UNPROFOR Commander requested a NATO airstrike against the Pale Ammunition Depot.

At 2:33 that afternoon, a strike was launched in response to that request. NATO attack aircraft struck the Pale Ammunition Depot and destroyed two bunkers. Later that day, most probably in response to the strike against a purely military target, the Bosnian Serbs shelled a public market square in Tuzla. 70 civilians died.

The next day, on the 26th of May, the Serbs still had failed to comply with the first ultimatum. The UNPROFOR commander requested NATO to conduct an additional airstrike against the Pale Ammunition Depot. At mid-morning this second strike was launched against the six remaining bunkers.

When UNPROFOR requested the airstrikes, all were aware of the possibility that the Serbs would indeed retaliate and very likely take hostages.

The procedure for requesting airstrikes runs from the United Nations commander requesting the strike directly to the NATO commander, CINCSOUTH, currently U.S. Admiral Leighton Smith.

On this occasion, as has been the case every time in the past when the option of an airstrike has been raised, the risk of retaliation was considered.

But that risk had to be weighed against the consideration that if NATO airpower were not called in then the Bosnian Serbs would continue to shell the civilian population.

Furthermore, UNPROFOR judged it impractical to consolidate its forces before the airstrikes because that act itself would have been a clear signal that airstrikes were imminent and would very likely have provoked the same preemptive hostage taking.

The belief was that accepting the risk of Serbian retaliation was preferable to allowing the shelling to continue and the violations to go unchecked.

F-16 SHOOTDOWN

Now let me turn to the shootdown of the F-16 that occurred on 2 June just one week after the second airstrike.

The F-16 was part of a two-ship formation that took off from Aviano Air Base at around 7 o'clock on the morning of 2 June. They were on a combat air patrol mission over Bosnia and they were armed as well to conduct close air support in the event that the need arose.

The two aircraft were orbiting at 21,000 feet when a track-mounted Bosnian Serb SA-6 fired two missiles at the flight. The first missile exploded between the two fighters who were flying some distance apart. But the second missile struck the underbelly of the number two aircraft. The flight lead observed his wingman's aircraft as it began its descent but lost sight when the aircraft entered the cloud cover below.

Search and Rescue missions commenced immediately and have continued ever since but the status of the pilot remains unknown. A number of conflicting reports have appeared, but frankly we still have no confirmation on the status of the pilot. We are vigorously continuing our search efforts.

In the meantime our sympathies are for his family and we continue to work for his safe return.

Because the fighters were orbiting in an area that had no history of known or suspected surface-to-air missile activity, these two F-16s were not accompanied by aircraft with the capability to suppress enemy air defenses.

Other flights that day, those that were operating over areas where there were known or suspected surface-to-air missile threats, were accompanied by aircraft with the capability to suppress enemy air defenses.

The command was practicing a standard tactical procedure of tailoring their air packages for the expected missions and threats. Tactical judgments like this have been made for over 2 years and for 69,000 sorties, which is a remarkable testimony to the command's operational acumen.

In light of this incident, Admiral Smith has directed that all operations over Bosnia-Herzegovina must assume a

surface-to-air missile threat and must be accompanied by aircraft with the capability to suppress enemy air defenses in order to limit the future risk to NATO aircraft.

NATO OPLAN 40104

Now I would like to brief you on the purpose and details of NATO OPLAN 40104 to answer any questions and then to listen to your views and concerns.

Let me start with a brief description of the area and the scale of this plan. I am confident that you are all very familiar with the territory of the former Yugoslavia. United Nations Peace Forces are located in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia.

Of the 38,500 forces from 35 contributing nations, 22,500 are the UNPROFOR force located in Bosnia-Herzegovina in positions stretching throughout the breadth of that nation. They are distributed in many pockets including those in and around the various enclaves and safe areas.

The road network and logistics infrastructure are rugged and very limited. Much of the terrain is mountainous and many of the UNPROFOR units are in isolated and vulnerable positions.

So a secure withdrawal of all of these forces presents many obstacles and difficulties in part because of UNPROFOR's widespread distribution, in part because of the logistics and intelligence difficulties, and in part because a withdrawal could become vulnerable to harassment and disruption.

The plan that has been shaped could be used to withdraw U.N. forces from either Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, but today I will focus on plans to handle the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is right now the most volatile area of U.N. operations. The plan is flexible in that it is designed to accommodate either a deliberate withdrawal of UNPROFOR's forces or an emergency extraction of UNPROFOR forces.

The most likely scenario for an emergency extraction involves the eastern enclaves where the situation has always been most tenuous.

The execution of the deliberate plan would have to be triggered by a UNPROFOR request to the United Nations Security Council to withdraw UNPROFOR forces. This would then be followed by a U.N. Security Council request to the North Atlantic Council to support the withdrawal.

I should note that the plan is limited to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces. It does not provide for humanitarian or refugee support either during or after withdrawal operations.

Nor does it include planning for any subsequent operations by U.S. or NATO forces once a withdrawal has been completed.

This plan will be executed under a single chain of command under NATO command and control using robust NATO ROE and there will be no dual-key arrangement for NATO forces. At execution all forces UNPROFOR included will fall under and will remain under NATO command and control until released back to the U.N. or their national command authorities.

The operation will be conducted sequentially in five phases and if executed as I will brief today, which is the most robust option, could take up to 22 weeks to complete.

First is the preparation phase. The purpose is to establish the theater communications and logistics architecture and, where possible, to secure support for staging bases and needed facilities. While these initial steps are being taken the forces designated for the plan will conduct training and other preparatory actions.

Second is the Theater Opening and Deployment Phase. In this phase the logistics elements will deploy to establish logistics bases and to open port facilities for follow-on units. Following the establishment of the logistics structure, the main body forces which will conduct the withdrawal will deploy into theater and assemble outside Bosnia.

The third is the execution phase. This is the critical phase of the operation. The combat forces will deploy into the interior of Bosnia to conduct withdrawal operations that will facilitate and safeguard the movement of UNPROFOR units.

In the fourth phase, Reorganization, UNPROFOR units will be moved to holding areas near ports of embarkation and released from NATO control back to U.N. or national command and control.

In phase five, Redeployment, NATO units will depart the staging locations to return to their home bases.

In the event a situation arises that requires an emergency extraction the plan has a Quick Response Option using selected NATO forces that are in close proximity to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

American participation and support for this plan are essential. The plan is built to a large degree on capabilities that only we possess. But just as importantly our European allies who are even now in the process of increasing their

contributions to UNPROFOR feel it is essential that there is a viable workable and supported plan capable of assisting the withdrawal of their forces in the event that becomes necessary.

Because it will be executed under NATO command and control using NATO ROE and there will be no dual-key for NATO forces, the right arrangements will be in place. Let me add that I believe it is extremely prudent for NATO to have such a plan on the shelf and to be prepared to execute it.

It is never a good idea to wait until an unwelcome contingency arises before beginning preparations.

The approval of this plan is the best insurance possible that it will not have to be carried out. It gives the UNPROFOR contributing nations the assurance that they must have to sustain their commitments to that very important mission.

Naval War College Graduation
Newport, Rhode Island
16 June 1995

What a great pleasure it is to be here today, to share in this very special ceremony. It would be pleasure enough, just to return to Newport, which holds so many fond memories from the year I spent here as a student. And who could imagine a more wonderful place to spend a year? But to that is added the honor of addressing this graduation. So this is truly a special occasion for me. And the band, and the Newport Choirsters, make it all the more enchanting and stirring.

Now, I am afraid that this ceremony has been designed so that all I do is give a speech, and then sit down. There will be no question and answer period afterward. And I have been told that this will rupture what has become a well-honed tradition of your class.

So before I begin, I want to first apologize to Darrell Jenks, for denying him the chance to ask another of his brilliantly composed questions, that so many speakers from this past year, have warned me about.

Let me begin by congratulating all of you. You are here because you are the best. And I am confident, after this past year at the Naval War College, that now you are even better prepared to serve our Armed Forces and our nations. And that we owe to the extraordinary faculty and staff here at Newport, for keeping this as one of the finest, and the most stimulating schools of national security in our country.

And we owe it to Admiral Joe Strasser, who for the past five years has dedicated his life, his great intellect, and his remarkable leadership to improving what was already a great college.

Joe, I know that I speak for everyone here today, when I offer my deepest thanks for your service, and for your leadership. In a few weeks, when you retire, you will be leaving behind a great legacy. The Joint Chiefs thank you, and so do I.

And a special thanks, as well, to the wonderful families gathered here today, for enduring all of the consequences of yet another one year assignment, for suffering through the trials and ordeals of having one more student in your homes, and of course, for adding such a delightful atmosphere to this school. Thanks to each of you.

Now, as Admiral Strasser mentioned, 25 years ago I was sitting where you are today, waiting to graduate from the College of Naval Command and Staff. It was a different era then, but there were some very striking similarities to what you face today. It was 1970. The Vietnam War was just winding down. As a matter of fact, I, and most of my fellow students, had come here straight from that war.

During the time we had been absorbed in that war, the Soviets had spent the decade very energetically rebuilding their Armed Forces. Their army, a force that had entered the sixties as a mostly light infantry force, had by 1970 been transformed into a heavy, fast-paced, nearly fully mechanized force, one we believed was far more capable of rapidly overrunning Europe.

And while the bulk of our surface ships and carriers were of World War Two vintage, the Soviets were still laying the keels of a shiny new, very modern blue-water fleet.

While Vietnam had monopolized our resources and focus, the Soviets had greatly expanded their ability to challenge us in more vital areas, in Europe, and on the high seas.

So as we sat in these chairs, my class saw what we believed were very considerable challenges ahead. We needed to refocus our efforts, and our thinking, and our training and preparations, away from Vietnam, and back to other missions.

And in that sense, I think there is a resemblance between that era and today. Yes, the challenges are different, and

the adjustments are certainly different, but you also face the need to guide our forces toward new tasks, and new missions.

And as I thought about how I would try to step up here to talk about your challenges, I thought back to my own graduation 25 years ago. By that time of the school year I had heard more about challenges than I cared to remember. And as I tried to recall what our graduation speaker had to say, while I am sure that he was very eloquent and wise, I can't remember a single word he said. And that, of course, is a warning to me, for, undoubtedly, my own thoughts will prove equally perishable and fleeting.

But, if I had to gather all of these challenges that I wish to discuss with you, under one single heading, it would be to turn your focus to the future.

For fifty years, all of us have been accustomed to a great strategic consistency. Although the cause of the consistency was deplorable, the fact of the consistency was reassuring, and oddly comfortable.

We lived in the era of Containment, and it was thoroughly understood; it was uniformly accepted, it was as unchanging as the environment that dictated that strategy. Ironically, for although it proved to be perhaps the most strikingly successful strategy of its kind in history, we never envisioned what would happen if it succeeded. For as long as it lasted, you would expect that we would have given some thought to what its success would create. But we didn't.

The lesson that I hope we have learned is that our strategies must extend beyond their own successes, or their failures, to envision and prepare for the consequences that could be created.

For when in 1991 our strategy did succeed, the result was surprise, and an absence of thinking and preparation for the very conditions and consequences we had struggled for so long to create. As we should have anticipated, the culmination of containment caused a great deal of motion in a global environment that had been unused to much motion for many decades. An empire disintegrated, the bipolar global order collapsed, and more new nations were born, and more borders changed than we witnessed even after the Second World War. Any one of these three events would shake the world. All three combined have been like putting an eggbeater into a pool of still water.

During the year that you have been here, there have been continuously six to seven joint task forces in the field. Twice we have deployed forces to fight, once to Haiti, and then only a few weeks after our peaceful entry there, we went to the Gulf, to prevent another Iraqi attack against Kuwait.

We went to Rwanda, and we had a tough, but very well run operation that safely withdrew the last of the U.N. forces from Somalia. And of course in the no-fly zone over Bosnia, our aviators have been involved in several skirmishes. All of this in only one year. And of course, we are even now in the midst of yet another crisis in Bosnia. Some suggest that our world has become like a football game, with no halftimes and no end in sight. Although, very clearly, our forces have performed magnificently. They have risen to every challenge with toughness, with skill, and with determination.

And this was certainly on display in last week's daring rescue of Scott O'Grady. Whether it was Scott O'Grady's inspiring heroism, or the courage and commitment by those who desperately searched for him, or the skill and daring of those who went in to get him, America saw once again the spirit, and the remarkable qualities of the men and women in our Armed Forces. And they saw, as well, the very human concern for and commitment to one another that is such a hallmark of our people.

But these kinds of challenges that we have experienced in this past year, these kinds of challenges are going to remain with us. For you here, this is, in all likelihood, the nature of the world you will be contending with, for much of the rest of your careers.

Many of you are going to find yourselves, either as commanders, or as staff officers, on Joint Task Forces, even as I am sure many of you have already experienced, deployed to perform one or more of the missions arising out of this era.

And this is true not only for the American officers here today, but it is equally true for the international officers. For, if you look back on the operations of the past several years, they have nearly all been multilateral, coalition operations. In nearly every operation that I just mentioned, including the search for and rescue of Scott O'Grady, it was not just American forces, but the forces of many nations that were, or are still involved.

And you are going to have to be able to explain to your people, and to their families, the grander, overarching purpose of what you are doing. It is one thing, to say that you are going to enforce a no-fly zone over Bosnia or Iraq; it is another thing to explain why. It is one thing, to say that you are going to bring democracy to Haiti, or to enforce nonproliferation in North Korea; but another to explain why. And it is one thing, to say that the reason we are training and preparing is to deter the worst nightmares that could grow out of today's uncertainties; but yet another thing to explain why.

One administration called it shaping a new world order, even as this administration refers to it as Engagement. The

fact is that our engagement does have a very real, and a very vital, purpose. Our underlying, but clearly our manifest purpose in the Cold War, as should be true of any conflict, was to create new possibilities and opportunities.

And the end of the Cold War created opportunities of a far grander scale than any other in history.

In Europe, for 45 years, even as we were engaging in containment, we were just as engaged building a new order in Western Europe, where so many of Europe's past wars emanated. The vision we helped to sow, was of an integrated Europe, a condominium of nations whose security, whose economics, and whose political systems were so intertwined, that conflict between them would grow more and more unthinkable.

It was the work of generations, but it has succeeded wildly. And now, we must protect that order, even as we spread this same vision and reality of constructive integration to those in the eastern half of Europe.

We must draw these nations into the same webs, because it is the surest manner of limiting conflicts on that continent, which has fostered two world wars and a global cold war in this century. That is the cycle we must ensure is not repeated.

And today this means that two challenges must be met; the first, is to help ensure the success and stabilization of the reforms underway in Russia, and Ukraine, and the other former Soviet republics. While much of that challenge rests on the shoulders of the people of these nations themselves, we can and we must offer them political and economic support along the way. We must never forget that their success is critical to our interests as well as theirs.

But the second, and equally critical challenge, is to reduce the fears, the insecurities and the instabilities in Central Europe. That region, after all, was precisely where both world wars and the Cold War of this century began, and an even longer litany of wars in the century before. The best, and probably the only approach to this, is to expand NATO into Central Europe, bringing in new members that are committed to democracy, and committed to becoming members of a defensive alliance. Many nations of Central Europe believe this is essential, and the members of the alliance are convinced of this as well.

But today, there are some in Russia who oppose this expansion. They argue that if NATO were to take this step, that it would represent a threat to Russian security, and that it could unhinge Russia's reforms, by exciting a nationalist backlash from its people.

Yet both NATO's members and the Central Europeans find such arguments confusing, in fact contrary to what they perceive as being Russia's own security interests. Other than the Central European nations themselves, no nation has suffered more perilously than Russia from Central Europe's volatility, or its dreadful flair for igniting larger European wars. It is very strongly in Russia's favor to see Central Europe made more stable, by a regional security structure, one that reduces insecurities, and instabilities, and the chances of conflict, either from within or from without. Nor has anyone argued that expansion would fail to improve Central European stability. It very clearly would improve stability. Opposing views find their roots in a fear that Russia would find itself isolated, and encircled, by a threatening alliance.

Yet, I am convinced that these fears are founded on a misperception of NATO, and the interests of its members. Very clearly, the Trans-Atlantic partners want Russia engaged in Europe in every sense, politically, economically, and militarily. It is a great power that has so much to offer the rest of Europe. And the alternative to this has been tried for the past fifty years, and no NATO nation looks back on those days with any sense of fondness. As we and our European friends have discovered since the Second World War, the path to peace and prosperity lies in an integrated continent. We all want Russia and the other former Soviet states as peaceful and content members of this community, and we also want what is best for NATO and the Russians alike, a safe and secure Central Europe.

And there are opportunities in Asia that are equally great. No region of the world was more violent or more scarred by the bipolar confrontation of the past. But unlike Europe, where the Cold War brought even the staunchest of traditional enemies together into common camps, Asia's historical distrusts remained entrenched and palpable.

Now, as this entire region is pulsing with economic growth, it is being propelled toward a different, and a far more hopeful future, a future where Asia's economies are becoming more and more integrated, where Asia's factories and markets seem poised to become the most powerful engines of global economic growth in the next century. But here also, progress depends on a stable security structure, one that preserves the security of our allies, but also one that integrates China's growing power as a constructive force, and that integrates Russia's power and influence equally constructively.

And just as we are looking for ways to keep Europe from splitting again into camps, we must work toward the integration of Asian security, creating an order built on trust and cooperation, and mutual interests, and interdependencies, rather than on ancient competitions, and old scars.

Here in this hemisphere, every nation save one is now a democracy practicing free market economics. And that is an extraordinary evolution, one that opens up a commonality of interests that has never existed in the past.

A new world is shaping to our south, and we must all understand that this will dramatically transform this hemisphere in the next century. The nation with the fastest growing economy in the world is in Latin America. And there are several others not far behind it, even as there are others joining the queue.

Or you can look to the Middle East where, for forty years, we expended enormous diplomatic capital in an effort to negotiate a region-wide peace, but with only very limited success. In the past few years, we have helped achieve a stream of successes, and the last few steps to a broader, more enduring solution, seem realizable, perhaps, even near at hand. We must sustain this commitment. We must never forget, that peace in the Middle East is of vital importance to our nation. And it could become a landmark of the next century.

Finally, there is one other critical region, and that is the troubled Gulf, which will remain the oil reservoir needed to lubricate the economies of the industrialized nations for the foreseeable future. While the situation in that region remains divided and tense today, we must sustain the long-term commitment that convinces those who would wish to destabilize the Gulf that this is both a self-defeating and, ultimately, a hopeless quest.

And today we have a strong base of friends and allies, both within the region and from outside of the region who are equally committed to this common purpose. And that is far more than we thought we could rely on in the later years of the Cold War.

None of these are short-term propositions. Some of them may require decades. And they will require imagination in addition to perseverance. Nor do they come without risk. But these are the opportunities we struggled to create through the long years of the Cold War. It is a more complex purpose than containment ever was. It is more ambitious. But it is just as necessary and vital to our security.

And, of course, none of this will come to fruition without American commitment and leadership. And while we must continue to do the Bosnias and the Rwandas, when our interests are affected, we must always keep in mind that our purpose and the implications are much larger than the event itself.

Our purpose is the creation of a much more peaceful and stable world order than the one we have known in this century. And that will be determined by how successful we are in Europe, in Asia, in this hemisphere, and in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. For in these regions lie the powerful economies that are the engines of global prosperity. And in these regions lie much of the material and human resources upon which these engines depend. Our purpose is to re-integrate those nations that for nearly half a century we so successfully contained, for the world will be safer and more prosperous if they are engaged constructively. And we do not want a return to the past.

I am very envious of you sitting here today. And I say this from the bottom of my heart. When I was sitting in your seats 25 years ago, our challenge was to protect the status quo, to ensure containment, to restore a military balance that we felt was eroding, for a struggle that we were convinced was going to last beyond our lifetimes. We measured our accomplishments as reducing the risks in a global confrontation. Your generation, on the other hand, confronts an extraordinary array of opportunities that are so much more tangible, and so much bolder. Your accomplishments will be measured in much grander terms than ours.

If you can safely usher in the dozens of nations, and the billions of producers and consumers who are trying to convert to democracy and free markets, you will be creating the conditions that will lead to what may be the greatest explosion of prosperity the world has witnessed.

If you can create the stable regional security orders that I spoke of, you will make the world much safer than it has been in our lifetimes. While the accomplishments of this century have been measured in wars won, yours will be measured in wars averted and nuclear stockpiles diminished.

But for this to come to pass, our military must remain the very finest in the world, for ultimately our nation's influence and our leadership rest on our military excellence. Nor should there ever be any doubt that the most vital purpose for our forces will remain that of fighting and winning our nation's wars. The security of our most vital interests, and our allies, depend on this.

But this cannot be the only task we are willing to undertake, nor the limit of our military excellence. We must be selective. We must always be cognizant that the main events of the world, the truly vital challenges that require the greatest energy and power to overcome, can only be accomplished by our continuous commitment. But when our interests are affected, or our leadership is at stake, we must be just as adroit at humanitarian or peacekeeping operations as we are on the battlefield. For it is a fact, that once our forces are committed to an operation, and our people are at risk, our interests grow immediately, and so do the stakes.

And as I close, I must tell you that I am very confident that we will realize the opportunities that I have spoken of. I am confident that the American people have the wisdom and will to sustain the commitment that is needed. And I am confident in our allies, that they also have the wisdom and the commitment.

But I am most confident in our Armed Forces, in the men and women who wear our nation's uniform. When I look back on all that our forces have accomplished since the Cold War ended, from the Gulf War, to Haiti, from Somalia to Rwanda, from Korea, to last week's rescue of Scott O'Grady, it is impossible not to be confident.

And I also know that you are part of the finest, the best trained, and the most experienced corps of military leaders in the world. I know that you are up to the challenges of this era, and of keeping our forces the very finest. Although I know that the Narragansett Bay behind me is a grand sight, I must tell you that the sight from this stage is much grander, and much more inspiring. In hands such as yours, it is impossible not to be optimistic about our future. Now, once again, I want to congratulate each of you, and wish you luck in your next assignments. I know you will do them superbly. God Bless all of you, and God Bless America.

***Joint Force Quarterly* Magazine**
"A Word from the Chairman"
Summer 1995

The First World War was the last time that any nation equated war with glory. What caused the war remains debatable today because the quarrels that ignited it were questionable and shallow even then. But once the spark was lit and Europe's armies began marching, there was, throughout Europe, a mood of euphoria, an anticipation of romance and adventure. When the fighting finally ground to an end, when its fighters were drowning in mud, stupefied and exhausted by its unending slaughters, when the full, staggering toll of the Marne, Ypres, Verdun, the Somme, Mons, and Gallipoli were finally totaled, the world was stunned. The efficiency of the industrial age had reached the battlefield. Whatever false vestige of glory had been there at the beginning had long since been extinguished by the murderous fires of machine guns, by the mangling fury of modern artillery, by the suffocating barbarism of poison gas, and by the strategy of attrition — the general's incomprehensible response to these new tools. When it was over, the only way to confront the carnage was to label it the war to end all wars.

The Second World War was in so many respects even worse than the First. Many more millions perished. But in the most primary sense it was different; it was not senseless. Its causes were genuine, compelling, terrifying. For hundreds of millions it was a battle for survival, a desperate struggle between good and bad. Its causes were forged in the angry, raw mind of a murderous maniac, and in response, it brought out the best in most of us. Unlike the First World War, when this war was over, when the death camps were opened for the whole world to see, when the corpses of thousands of innocents were unearthed from the killing fields of Nanking, when the survivors of Manila finally finished counting the women and children murdered in the last vengeful rampage of its conquerors, any last lingering doubts about why we fought were washed away. Eisenhower had been right. It was a crusade and a very righteous crusade at that.

If there is a sense of fondness about this war that is why. If it spawned legions of heroes, that is because their courage and prowess went to such a noble purpose. If there is a special place in our hearts for its veterans, that is because we are so certain that their cause was just.

But, in so many ways, we would never be the same. Just as WW I wiped away our innocence about the horrors of battle, WW II eliminated any shard of innocence about man's potential for barbarity, about the ruthless motives of dangerous nations, about the price of naiveté, about the costs of appeasement. Nobody emerged from this war murmuring foolishly that it was a war to end all wars.

We learned a lot about others. We saw firsthand the astonishing character of the British people, watching for two years as Britain refused to succumb when even its staunchest admirers conceded that it's cause was hopeless. We developed an infatuation with Churchill that continues to this day. He seemed so quintessentially English; delightfully wise and principled, dogged, urbane, courageous without limits. We watched the British stoically endure night after night of terror bombing, devastating losses on land and at sea, and one military setback after another, never giving in to the slightest doubt or hesitation. We fought beside their soldiers, so very different from our own with their nonchalant valor and dry acceptance of success and failure alike.

We saw France humbled more terribly than ever before in its history, swiftly defeated by a kind of war it had drastically failed to anticipate. Yet there sat in exile this stubborn, irascible colonel, one of the few French soldiers who had seen what was coming, who predicted it and tried valiantly to get his country to listen, who then led his forces in their last battle with great courage, which many did, but also with great skill, which all too few did. That was DeGaulle, the epitome of French character; noble, proud, unyielding, a patriot whose all-consuming faith in his people was com-

pletely untainted by their defeat or the shameful collaboration by their Vichy leaders. As he argued so vehemently and so often during his years of exile, the defeat was only a temporary setback; within France were millions of patriots who would resist with all their might; and once France was free, he passionately argued, France would bounce back completely, its pride and power more intact than ever before.

We watched the Soviets begin the war in league with the Nazis, cutting bargains for their own selfish gains. Then we saw their shock when Hitler betrayed them, and the terrible price they paid for having so foolishly made a deal with that particular devil. But once that episode passed, we could only admire them, the mystical devotion of this tough people who accepted the worst punishment the Nazis could offer them, accepting millions, then tens of millions of casualties, until we wondered if there would be any Soviets left to fight back. But fight back they did. They swallowed one Nazi division after another, destroying each with whatever was at hand, the harshness of their winters, with tides of poorly armed but courageous men and women, and soon enough, with battle toughened, well led units armed with thousands of tanks and cannons. And several months after Europe found peace, the same skillful forces attacked Manchuria hurtling Japan's forces backward in a lightning attack. Sadly, no sooner had the war ended, then the Soviets returned to the same selfish designs that brought them into the war in the first place.

Then, of course, there were Germany and Italy and Japan, our enemies during those terrible years. While we were fighting we convinced ourselves they were inhuman. But when we became their occupiers, watching them struggle to survive the miseries of defeat, living in the wreckage of cities and towns pounded into rubble, trying to care for their refugees and families torn apart by the war, all the while enduring severe impoverishment and scarcities with courage and sacrifice, we were reminded that they were very human with a great capacity for goodness, indeed that it had been their very human failings that had carried them to such a terrible fate. Soon new leaders and new faiths took root that brought forward the best in them as well. In fact, as we watched them recover and rebuild we gained precious insights about their strengths, about their very formidable qualities. Soon all three were among our closest allies, nations we could and proudly did serve beside.

But we learned a lot about ourselves, as well. And we had our own quintessential leader, FDR, whose magnificently broad grin, characteristic aplomb, and unforgettable rhetoric all together captured our minds and our hearts. He had such a vision for this nation, and for this world. He was a Brahmin but he loved the common man and he loved democracy with all his heart, and it was these two passions that were the cornerstones of his vision. That is where he differed from Europe's leaders who were schooled to think about the world with their minds, not their hearts. And that is precisely why our alliance was such a great marriage, combining the old and the new, practicality and idealism, barnyard common sense and ivy league intellectualism. It took all of this to win, and it took all of this to prevail so successfully after the war.

This is the second issue of JFQ devoted to the Second World War. Truthfully we could devote many more and still fail to do credit to all that we learned and experienced. It was an outsized war fought by outsized personalities. At one time or another, either during or after the war, it really did bring out the best in all of us. We need to remember the remarkable character of the nations we today call our allies. They are magnificent in adversity. And we need also to renew our faith in ourselves. Neither we nor our allies have changed a wit. Were another war like it to erupt today, we would be just as persevering, just as valiant, just as noble. That is our strength.

Annual Convention of the American Legion
Indianapolis, Indiana
6 September 1995

I have just returned from Hawaii and the 50th commemoration of the end of the Second World War. And what a moving and inspirational occasion that was. Just like being here with all of you it makes your heart beat faster.

And it was particularly thrilling to have been in Hawaii among so many thousands of veterans from that war; men and women like you who served our nation in a time of extreme peril and performed so magnificently.

In fact as you know the American Legion was there in full force, proudly filling the ranks at each and every event of that moving commemoration.

Those proud veterans there and the World War Two veterans here this morning, you are the living monuments of a remarkable moment in our history. But unquestionably the most moving event of all was the remembrance ceremony in the Cemetery of the Pacific a few days ago. You know when you stand among the hundreds of rows of gray silent tombstones, each one marking the resting place of an American patriot, one thought cries out for all Americans to hear;

it is the same stark imperative we have learned time and again in our history, and it is that, "We must keep our defenses strong," we must never again allow our military to become weak or unready.

Standing here this morning and looking at your faces I know that you, you above all others, understand that lesson well. After all you were and still are the true guardians of America's security; you are great patriots all.

I knew that if there was one place in America that I could come to where there are men and women who appreciate the need to keep our defense strong, men and women who have observed this lesson firsthand, it is right here! That's why it is so great to be among you.

But there is another group of men and women who understand this as well. And they are the men and women who are following in your footsteps those who so proudly wear our country's uniform today.

As I travel around the world to visit them, no matter where they are, from the DMZ in Korea where they are still standing guard over the nation so many of you fought to keep free, to Haiti, or to Kuwait, or to Germany, wherever they are I see the same thing again and again. I see courage and spirit and toughness. They are by any measure our most precious asset.

There are one and half million of them following in your footsteps and carrying on the march that you started. For after all, it was you here in this hall who fought and bled to protect our freedom and to give us our hope for the future and we will, we must not let it slip through our fingers. And I know you would be proud to see the job they are doing. For I must tell you from one soldier to another they are magnificent!

And it is on their behalf that I wanted to talk to you today about our future challenges.

It was not long ago that many Americans were talking about peace dividends and the need to cut our forces deeper. But we were fortunate. There were many cooler heads and certainly the American Legion was at the head of that list, who were arguing that the days ahead could prove turbulent and that we must at all costs preserve our military strength.

And you were right! For you have only to look at the past month to make that judgment. We began the month by deploying combat forces to Kuwait the moment that we learned that Saddam Hussein was planning to attack that country again and possibly Saudi Arabia as well. And we ended the month with our aircraft flying combat missions over Bosnia as they still are today!

When you add to that our people serving in places like Haiti, Macedonia, and Korea, and Germany, and mention to them the words "peace dividend," you get a hearty chuckle. They like you know that if you want peace, you must pay for it.

The nation must pay for it by keeping our Armed Forces the very best in the world. And our men and women in uniform must pay for it with their dedication, with their skill, with their courage, and if need be even with their very lives. They know what you know that there is only one peace dividend and that is peace itself.

So we have after all found ourselves in an era of great challenges. The Cold War may be over, but what has taken its place is anything but the well-ordered and peaceful world that some imagined would come about. And it is long past time for us to be looking backward and wondering what we can afford to cut. Rather it is time for us to be looking forward to the future and asking ourselves what we must build.

I am convinced that there are two great challenges that we must meet if we are to protect all that you here fought so hard to gain for our country. The first of these is the global challenge posed by the disintegration of the Soviet Empire, the challenge of managing the enormous changes unleashed by the end of the Cold War. And the second challenge is to reshape our Armed Forces to ensure that we have the right force with all of the right capabilities to confront the uncertainties of the next century and to protect America's worldwide interests.

Certainly the end of the Cold War set in motion a wholly new era in world affairs. For 45 years we lived in a world that was tense and divided. Over time we grew used to that struggle, we understood it and its twists and turns, even settled into a reasonably predictable pattern.

All of that has now changed. We have been cast into a surging sea of great change and uncertainty. Just think in the past few years we have created more new countries and more international boundaries have been changed than even as a result of the end of World War Two.

We have already seen enough of this era to appreciate the measure of our challenge. We have seen first that it is far more complex and dangerous than many thought. You have only to look back on the list of military operations we have been engaged in to understand that.

Second we have seen that this new world is filled with great unpredictability. You never know when or where the next Saddam Hussein will raise his head. But I guarantee you that he is out there lurking amidst the uncertainty and that it is only a matter of time before he will challenge us. We must stay ready!

But third, it is also an era filled with incredible opportunities, opportunities that can make the next century so much more peaceful and stable than the bloody century we are leaving behind.

Just think over two billion new citizens are laboring to try to join the global free marketplace, a huge expansion that if it succeeds will make America vastly more prosperous in the next century.

As well dozens of nations are enmeshed in dramatic political reforms. They are struggling to shed old habits of tyranny and to embrace democracy and to join the ranks of democratic allies that you built after the Second World War.

Just imagine what it will mean if these hopes are met. Think back to the end of World War Two when you struggled to help our former enemies recover and rebuild and eventually organized a single global market that encompassed some one billion of the world's people. Look what that accomplishment has given us over the past 50 years. But the opportunity at our feet today, to reach out beyond the old walls of containment, the opportunity to bring several billion former adversaries into the community of democratic nations with free and open markets is so much greater by comparison.

If we succeed for our children and our grandchildren just imagine what their world will be like.

And I am convinced that there is only one key that will unlock these hopes. That key is American leadership. We must be the architects of the next century. But leadership demands strength. You cannot lead from weakness. After all it has been our strength that created these opportunities and it must be our leadership that seizes them. And while we cannot be the world's policemen only we have the resources the power and the reach to help mold a better world. To shape the world of tomorrow thus demands that we stay engaged in the world today.

You here in this room set this example for us. You did not shrink from your challenges we will not shrink from ours.

We must always stay focused on the future even as we are tending to the challenges of today. While today's challenges might be in Bosnia and in North Korea ... and in Iraq or even in Haiti, the future is being shaped in places like Moscow, Beijing, and Tokyo.

And while today's challenges deserve our attention and at times our intervention we cannot ignore the main events that could directly threaten our vital national interests.

And we must never, never lose sight that the fundamental purpose of our Armed Forces is to fight and win our nation's wars. We must not let events drive us but we must have the vision and the strength to shape events. We owe that to our children.

And that leads me to the second challenge. That challenge is to shape our Armed Forces to ensure they are prepared to meet the challenges of the next century, a century that is only a short five years away. We must make sure that our forces remain unequaled by any other in the world.

And that means that we must avoid the rueful cycle of this century, the same cycle we followed after the First World War and after the Second and after Korea and yet again after Vietnam, when we thought our struggles were behind us and as a result we allowed our strength to atrophy; we neglected to modernize; we permitted our readiness to dry up; and in the end we paid dearly for our mistakes. We must not allow that to happen again.

For it is a fact that in the history of this country's Armed Forces no man or woman in uniform has ever completed a 20-year career that was not marked by American involvement in armed conflict.

And the force we build must be powerful enough to protect our worldwide interests even if a dictator were to challenge us in a place like Korea; we must be strong enough to simultaneously stop another dictator half way around the world.

Certainly our experience in the past two years has validated the need for a force with this capability. In June of last year we were reinforcing our forces in Korea when the tensions over North Korea's nuclear programs became so serious that it could have led to conflict.

And by October, only weeks after our forces began entering Haiti, we had to dispatch yet another force to Kuwait after we detected several of Saddam's Republican Guard divisions bolting south toward our ally's border.

In light of this experience, anything less ignores the world we are already in much less the world that may develop out of the uncertainty of the future. You, the ranks of the American Legion, can attest that you do not build a military force on wishful thinking; you build it on reality.

With the ending of the Cold War, our military budget has been reduced by nearly 40 percent. And I say enough is enough. This nation's security demands that we cut no more.

For this nation's security requires that we replace our equipment as it wears out and that we modernize even as we protect our near-term readiness. For that is the seed corn of future readiness.

I believe that our experiences of the past two years has shown that the quality of our men and women has remained

every bit as high as it has ever been. You can see this everywhere that our men and women have been in the superb way that they have handled the many missions we have sent them to perform.

You can see this in Haiti where for a year now they have performed magnificently and where results today have exceeded our most optimistic expectations.

And you just saw it two months ago when a young Air Force pilot named Scott O'Grady was shot down while helping to enforce the no-fly regime over Bosnia. From the moment his plane went down his comrades mounted an around the clock effort to find him. For nearly a week, Captain O'Grady eluded capture using the first class training he had received and through an extraordinary amount of pluck and courage.

And the moment he was found a textbook rescue operation was executed, one that flew through dangerous skies to pull this young hero to safety.

Or you could see it just five months ago, off the shores of Somalia where our marines led an international force to ensure the safe departure of the last of the United Nations contingent still in that troubled land. It was a very dangerous and risky operation, but it was performed so flawlessly and in such a textbook fashion that the entire departure was accomplished without the loss of a single allied or United Nations soldier. Just as importantly, we showed by this action that we stand by our commitments.

It is these men and women who have been and are performing these missions who make our Armed Forces the very finest in the world.

And if we wish to keep them in uniform and continue to recruit more like them then we must protect their pay and their benefits, and the quality of life that they and their families so richly deserve. I like to say that they are a Super Bowl team but without Super Bowl wages. And the last place to look for savings is in their paychecks and in their benefits. No High-1s for them!

Let me close by noting that since the start of the Second World War, it was our nation that has been the architect of this past century. Many of you here in this hall you were the builders. You produced the victories upon which our freedoms were secured and upon which the Cold War was won.

The challenge today is to ensure that our nation is the architect for the next century as well. If we are to do so then we have to continue to lead and we are going to need men and women in uniform every bit as good as you have been.

And today they are. If you go to Aviano Air Base and watch them launch plane after plane into the skies over Bosnia, if you see the cool determination in their eyes and the silent courage of those performing that dangerous mission, it gives you the confidence that we will meet all of our challenges.

As I said earlier they are a Super Bowl team. And we must never allow that to change. But if we are to keep our defense strong we need your support and assistance. And that is what I have come here to ask of you. We need you, our country's veterans, to continue to maintain your stand for a strong national defense. You must continue to be our people's standard bearer on this message. Nothing less than a strong defense will do.

And we also need your help in finding and attracting young men and women with your outstanding qualities who are willing to spend a few years or even a career serving our country. Spread the word through your communities: Uncle Sam is hiring; your country needs you; and the rewards are beyond measure.

Now on behalf of the men and women of the Armed Forces I salute you, and I again thank you for the remarkable service you have given to our country. In our times of trial you were there. And thank God you were. God Bless you and God Bless the United States of America.

Marshall Center
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany
14 September 1995

Although you have already been here for a month, let me begin by welcoming all of you to the Marshall Center. The fact that you are here attests to the confidence of each of your nations in your abilities and so I congratulate you. This center is a most special enterprise, something unique in the history of Europe. Among other things it is a melting pot for ideas and views because all of our nations are contending with a wholly new Europe and none of us have a monopoly on wisdom or experience.

When I was the NATO commander, I was honored to have had a role in the establishment of this center. And it was with no small sense of irony and delight that we converted a center once used to train intelligence officers into a center for building cooperation and understanding among our European community.

I know that Minister Ruhe spoke at your class opening about George Marshall's vast contributions to Europe. While I do not wish to repeat what he said, I would be remiss if I did not add my own footnotes on why it is so fitting that we gave his name to this center.

It was not so much because Marshall was a remarkable wartime leader, which he certainly was, but more so because he proved to be such a remarkable leader in peace. Marshall was without question one of the great generals of the Second World War but he was one among many great generals from all of our nations. Had that been his singular contribution, we would still remember him fondly, but I don't believe we would be idolizing him.

It was in his role as the architect of recovery here in Europe that he rose above the other great generals and above nearly all of the great statesmen of his era. For winning a war is one thing, but building a peace out of the ashes of a world war and preventing future wars — therein lies his genius.

He was a visionary a man who cast his gaze far into the future, who saw beyond the trials and tribulations of his day, one who saw the opportunities to build a far better world than the bloody one he had known; a more peaceful and prosperous world for the generations to come.

Although it is often remembered differently, it is useful to remember that in his time, the Marshall Plan was a matter of great controversy. It had strong opponents those who argued that our former adversaries needed to be punished. But it was Marshall who argued that we must put the past behind us and that we must build for the future.

As the passage of time has shown Marshall's was the enlightened foresight. So it comes as no surprise that today many want a second Marshall Plan, a second reconstruction of Europe that re-weaves the eastern half of this European tapestry of nations just like Marshall did for its western half 45 years ago. I am convinced that the foundation for that has already been laid. And it is up to us today to make it work. That is the great opportunity we have been given.

We have great challenges but we also have vast opportunities, opportunities unparalleled since Marshall's time, and if we are to build throughout all of Europe the peace and security that we have known throughout NATO, then we must embrace Marshall's spirit.

If we do this right, then 45 or 50 years from today future generations will look back on our accomplishments with the same admiration and awe that we reserve for Marshall and his generation. And I want to charge you here, when you return to your countries after this course is over, to pursue this vision. Each one of us has a part to play in spreading Marshall's vision and spirit no matter how small we think our part might be.

And there are three pillars upon which we are building a new Europe: the pillars of security; stability; and of democracy. At the base of all three of these pillars there is a very vital role for all of us in uniform or who are associated with our nation's security.

The very basis for all future progress is the creation of a transformed security architecture for the European continent. For without peace nothing else is possible. As Minister Ruhe said at your class opening, there is a radical restructuring in progress; an effort to shape a new European-wide security arrangement to replace the one that had been in being for most of our lifetimes. Under the old structure, Europe was like a pair of distrustful Siamese twins armed against each other. There was no way to separate, but to strike a blow meant devastating injury for both. Survival depended on a line etched through the heart of Europe. Today there are no more lines nor does any nation wish to see any new lines drawn in the future.

The foundations of the new security order have already been laid a structure that integrates rather than divides. The building blocks are a reinvigorated North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Partnership for Peace, and a strategic partnership between Russia and NATO.

Let me start with the first. In 1991, at the Rome Summit, the NATO members revised the alliance's strategic concept for the first time since 1967. Before 1991, NATO was not an alliance prone to swift or dramatic changes. However the changes made in Rome were more dramatic than any in NATO's history. They were designed to reverse Containment.

From my perspective as a member of the U.S. delegation in that meeting at Rome, Marshall's spirit carried the day. Recognizing that the Cold War was over, the alliance made a pact with the future. The leaders of the alliance nations gave us a clear mandate to use the alliance to build cooperation with our former adversaries, cooperation built on outreach and on dialogue. Recognizing that military forces cannot operate without an understanding of the threat, our political leaders told us to put the past behind us and to focus on a new threat, the threat of instability.

And in keeping with this challenge they recognized that new skills, practices, and a new military structure would be needed. So they told NATO's militaries to develop the skills and practices that would allow us to manage crises even beyond NATO's national borders. That was only four years ago. And NATO is today a vastly different alliance then the one that I knew before 1991.

The second building block of the new security architecture is the Partnership for Peace, which has already proven much more successful than even our most optimistic expectations. This initiative provides the most effective means to develop patterns of cooperation between the militaries of the alliance and our new partners, thus helping to build a safer and more secure continent and for those interested, it provides an important stepping stone to eventual NATO membership. Judging by its large ranks, which now include some 26 nations, it has received an overwhelming vote of confidence. And so it should.

And there are practical benefits already. If you go to Yugoslavia today, there are soldiers from most of our nations on the ground side by side performing the same mission together. But if you were to look back to 1991, when the unraveling of Yugoslavia began, I think it is clear that we were all of us as the European community institutionally unprepared for a challenge of that nature. That only underscores how vitally important it is that we use the Partnership for Peace to expand our ability to work together and to manage common security challenges together.

And again the Partnership for Peace carries the spirit of Marshall. It is a coalition of the willing. We invite your participation and we need it. For it is in this partnership that we practice the routine involvement between the militaries of this continent that creates the kinds of cooperation that we will need in a crisis.

You have only to go back to the Gulf War to see how successful that can be. Although that conflict occurred outside of Europe, we looked upon it as a NATO operation using the relationships we had built over the previous 40 years, even using the NATO infrastructure, but also using the alliance doctrines and procedures. It could not have been more successful.

The third building block of the new security architecture is the strategic partnership between NATO and Russia. Having such a partnership recognizes Russia's power and the key role it must play in Europe.

As we have already seen on issues such as Bosnia and NATO enlargement, there are going to be differences in outlook between NATO and Russia. That is a natural consequence of differences in our history culture and geography.

For that matter, over the 40 odd years of NATO's existence there have often been differences in view and outlook between the United States and between many of the European members of NATO.

Our habit for this past half century has not been to dictate to one another but to instead work on what we can agree and to minimize our differences. And that must be the pragmatic spirit of the partnership between NATO and Russia as well. For peace and stability in Europe must be built with Russia not against Russia.

That brings me to the pillar of stability. For 45 years we existed in one kind of stability. It was a terrifying kind of stability because we all knew what could have occurred at the first instance of instability. Europe was like a dry forest in a long hot summer. We can only be thankful that nobody lit a match. It would have been like grabbing each others' hands and walking off a cliff together.

Now we have one conflict raging in the very heart of Europe and fires breaking out throughout the former Soviet states. It is a strange pass. In one half of Europe, people are seeking to erase the lines that separate them. In the other half, some are fighting to do just the opposite. One half is seeking integration while the other half faces threat after threat of disintegration. The challenge these ethnic and nationalistic passions present is twofold. How do we keep these hatreds from spreading, from intoxicating others, and how do we as the community of Europe as responsible and moral nations contribute to defusing or ending the kinds of conflicts that may result?

Part of the answer is economic, for poverty breeds hatred, where prosperity can cure many ills. And part of the answer lies in the third pillar, or democracy, where no matter the race or religion everybody has a voice and a vote. Clearly the other part of the answer lies in the security framework of cooperation and integration.

But there is another half to enhancing stability and that half is carrying out the arms control agreements that came about at the end of the Cold War, both the conventional arms control agreements and the nuclear arms control agreements. None of these agreements was designed to leave us disarmed or vulnerable, but instead they were designed to eliminate instabilities such as START II's agreement to eliminate the last of the land-based ICBMs with multiple independently targeted warheads, because these systems are inherently vulnerable to destruction by an adversary's first strike. In a crisis, the vulnerability of these systems pressures the owner to use them first or risk losing them. And that is a terrible shadow that hangs over our heads still today.

The same may be said for the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty that increases transparency and reduces and repositions our conventional forces so that all sides feel secure that they cannot be overrun by a surprise attack. When these agreements were reached right at the end of 45 years of hostility, the fears of the preceding 45 years were still fresh in all of our minds and we all breathed a great sigh of relief. We cannot afford to lose the sense of urgency concerning the importance of these agreements. If we fail to eliminate these instabilities while we have a chance, it would be like leaving a loaded gun around a house filled with children. We owe this to future generations.

And the third pillar of the future Europe is that of democracy. It was Winston Churchill who observed that democracy is the worst form of government, except for any other forms of government that have so far been tried.

Not only is that true for the contentment of people within a nation, it is equally true for international peace. For it is a fact that democracies have a habit of resolving their disputes peacefully.

When you take the decision of whether to go to war out of the hands of a few and put it into the hands of the many, into the hands of those whose sons and daughters will be sent to fight, then war is so much less likely to result. The record of the Western European democracies since the end of the Second World War makes that point very handsomely.

But producing democracy is no easy task as even those who have lived under democracy for centuries will admit. And the most common ailment that has unhinged democracies are military forces that trespass into the politics of the nation. Notwithstanding that their motives are very often paternalistic, to try to set straight what they perceive to be poor governing, they inevitably inflict ruinous damage on their nations. The very strength of a democracy is that its people will make needed challenges at the ballot.

Perhaps the greatest challenge of all, the one that overarches all of these, is having the patience and forbearance to see them through.

I was a boy living in Germany when the Marshall Plan was instituted. It took a decade before the fruits of that wonderful scheme really began to materialize. Throughout Western Europe there were severe housing shortages, food shortages, islands of poverty, and tremendous economic uncertainty. Germany still had severe housing shortages for 15 years and its legendary economic miracle, or the Wirtschaftswunder that pulled it out of the depths of poverty, its benefits did not truly appear until the late fifties. The great recoveries of Italy, Germany, and France — these were the result of long and very tenuous struggles that were measured in decades not years.

And even as late as the sixties, there were many in Germany and elsewhere who openly wondered whether democracy was firmly rooted in their country or whether it was a phenomena that had worked only because the "Grand Old Man," Chancellor Konrad Adenhauer, had headed the German government until 1962.

So the path ahead of us is perhaps longer and rockier than some anticipated. But we must build on these three pillars of security, stability, and democracy. Between all of our nations we have great strengths to put into the effort. Not the least of these is that we share the memory of this past century a time torn by two world wars and half a century of cold war.

I will end by telling you a final story. I left Europe for America in 1952. At that time, it was still a continent very much in ruins from the war and filled with great uncertainty about the future. When I returned as a captain in the American Army, ten years or so later, Western Europe had been transformed. And each time that I returned afterward I have marveled at the progress that has continued to this very day. But what an opportunity we now have before us. We cannot let this pass through our fingers. And so I charge each of you to take from this center all that you can and then hurry back to your countries and let's get to the business of rebuilding Europe for our children and our grandchildren, so that their lives will be richer and safer than ours have been.

Re-Confirmation Hearing
Senate Armed Services Committee
Washington, DC
21 September 1995

Let me begin by thanking all of you for your unwavering support to keep America's military the very finest and the strongest in the world and for the care you have shown for our men and women in uniform. And let me thank you as well for your support and counsel during my past two years as Chairman. For our military this period has been a succession of crises and difficult military operations.

I was sworn in as Chairman only a few weeks after that tragic firefight in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993, and our first task was to stabilize the situation and to organize an orderly and measured disengagement of American forces from Somalia. The commanders on the ground accomplished that superbly and without precipitating a collapse of the humanitarian effort.

When tragedy struck Rwanda, a tragedy that quickly overwhelmed the capability of civilian humanitarian organizations, our military moved in quickly and within days helped to dramatically reduce the death toll and when the specific tasks were done, departed ahead of schedule.

And since last September, our Armed Forces have been performing equally well in Haiti, where everyone who has

visited them from the first day to today, has had nothing but the highest praise for their performance. The same is true for those who have performed so magnificently handling the difficult Cuban migrant situation at sea and on Guantanamo.

And when last October three of Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard divisions bolted for Kuwait, our troops responded rapidly and decisively and within days, Saddam Hussein recognized the futility of his efforts and turned back. Still today, combat forces remain in the Gulf to make it clear that we are not distracted by other crises.

And of course throughout this period American forces have been operating in and around former Yugoslavia, where at last there is the possibility that we along with our NATO allies have helped create conditions that might lead to a settlement.

Whatever our individual views are on this tragedy, I think we stand united in our praise for the skill and bravery with which our service men and women have carried on this mission and all of the many other difficult missions of the past two years. Not once have our men and women in uniform failed to accomplish all that we asked of them and I am proud to represent them before you.

The experience of the past two years has highlighted a number of important lessons:

The first is that we were correct in our earlier decision to reshape our Armed Forces to be able to fight and win nearly simultaneously against two major adversaries. What better reminder than last year when in June, in anticipation of potential hostilities on the Korean peninsula, we began to deploy forces to the Pacific. In September we deployed to Haiti and in October found ourselves rushing troops to Kuwait to stop Saddam Hussein who apparently thought that he could take advantage of our preoccupation elsewhere.

That sequence of events should have dispelled any last thoughts about whether preserving this capability is a luxury or a need. Our global interests demand no less.

Second, we learned that the demands upon our forces these last two years have reinforced the wisdom of putting readiness first. And with your help, near-term readiness today remains at historic highs. This must continue.

But now it is time as well to focus on future readiness by more fully resourcing needed modernization and by more vigorously replacing equipment as it wears out, and I thank this committee for your support in this critical area.

At the same time, these last two years have shown us once again that the main source of our military excellence is our people. And if we wish to retain them and to recruit more like them, then taking care of them and their families must remain a top priority. And here too, I owe you our appreciation.

The last lesson I wish to emphasize concerns the wisdom of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The unmistakable pattern of superb military performances since 1986, from Panama and the Gulf War through the different tasks of these past two years, both large and small, has demonstrated that Goldwater-Nichols has it right.

Now we must ensure that the spirit of that act is firmly institutionalized. And that is the process we have begun in the past several years by creating joint doctrine, by strengthening joint training, and exercises by imbedding jointness into our force planning and materiel development processes, by adding new facilities such as the Joint Warfighting Center, and by continuing to expand the influence of warfighting CINCs.

But let me assure you that in our pursuit of jointness, we have not nor ever intend to turn the Joint Staff into a General Staff. Those who are concerned otherwise must recognize the neither the Joint Staff nor I can exercise command authority.

The role of the Joint Staff is to provide advice and make recommendations to me, so that I in turn can best advise our civilian leaders on military matters. That is a carefully and wisely crafted law that fully prevents the Joint Staff from ever evolving into a General Staff.

In each of these lessons there is a challenge. We have today, by any measure, the finest and most ready Armed Forces in the world. They have met the threats and needs of this post-Cold War era head on and have performed superbly. And as we look to the future we must all remember that the foundation of this force was laid many years before.

One set of challenges today is to use wisely and well the excellent force we have. But there is a second set of challenges, to prepare for the threats and needs of the next century as well. That includes making the right decisions today about caring for our people and their families, about investing in the right technologies, about modernization, about building our force for future threats, and about continuing to shape our force in the wisdom of Goldwater-Nichols. And if I am confirmed with your help I intend to make these challenges the guiding purpose of my next two years.

With that Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to thank you for giving me this opportunity to make these brief remarks and I look forward to your questions.

Poland National Defense Academy
Remberton, Poland
29 September 1995

Let me begin by telling you what a great pleasure it is to return to Poland and to have this chance to share some views with you here at the National Defense Academy. As a son of Poland, there is no sight more grand than to see the country of my birth again free and independent. Through two world wars and a long cold war, there is no nation that has struggled more fiercely and stubbornly nor one that paid more dearly for its freedom. Never again can we allow Poland to lose what cost so very much to gain.

I often tell people who are still bewildered that the Cold War ended so peacefully that the cause of that miracle was here in Poland. It began in the shipyards of Gdansk, where Polish courage and resistance began unraveling the world's most powerful dictatorship. It was here in Poland, where the world learned that 45 years of terror and repression had failed dismally to extinguish the love for freedom that beats so strongly in the breasts of the Polish people.

It was Polish courage and passion that led us peacefully out of the Cold War. It was the irrepressible spirit of Poland's people that signaled to those in the Kremlin that change was inevitable. I would tell you here that it was the events in the shipyards and factories of Gdansk that paved the way for Boris Yeltsin to one day stand on a tank and declare that the Soviet Union existed no more.

And that same Polish leadership and courage are needed today to help guide Europe through the era we are now in, an era filled with great challenges certainly but also with vast opportunities, opportunities far greater than any this continent has known in the bloody century now behind us.

For those of us here in this room, the Europe that we have known for most of our lives has been like a pair of angry Siamese twins, each with a hammer poised in their hands ready to strike the other. It was impossible to separate, but if either of them actually struck the other it would have meant devastating harm to them both.

For 45 years we managed to survive an era that was like a dry forest in a long hot summer. We should all be thankful that nobody was foolish enough to light a match. It would have been like grabbing each other's hands and walking off a cliff together.

Today we have the opportunity to create a new Europe, the same kind of opportunity that existed when the Second World War ended but this time the opportunity is even grander. We can reweave the entire tapestry of European nations along the same lines that we did so very effectively to the Western half of Europe 45 years ago.

I am convinced that we are already on the right path to accomplish this vision and that today we must have steady perseverance and firm leadership if we are to reach that goal. And you here in this academy and the people of Poland have a pivotal role to play if we are to get there.

And it is that, which I would like to spend the next minutes discussing with you.

The path ahead must be built on three pillars: the pillars of democracy; stability; and security. These are the three pillars upon which we raised Western Europe from the ashes of the Second World War; they are the very basis of the integration enjoyed in the West, and they are the three pillars which we must extend across all of Europe.

If you look at the NATO alliance today, what is most striking is not just that our alliance has survived intact for so extraordinarily long but that every member of the alliance shares one virtue. All are democracies. It is that single feature that has made this alliance so successful and lasting.

It is one of the peculiarities of history that democracies seem to have a habit of resolving their disputes peacefully. Thus the institutionalization of democracy in Western Europe has brought a longer reign of peace to that half of Europe than ever before in its history. But secondly, the fact that every NATO nation is a democracy rallies its members to a common moral purpose upon which to commit to one another.

So that is one pillar of the future continent the protection and nurturing of the new democracies that sprang out of the Cold War.

The second is the pillar of stability. For 45 years we all grew used to one kind of stability. But it was a devilishly dangerous form of stability, one that teetered on a line drawn through the heart of this continent and that succeeded only because the first instance of instability would have been catastrophic for us all. I know of no nation that wishes to recapture that form of stability.

Yet today, as we see the terrible events that have unfolded in the shattered nation that used to be Yugoslavia or the fires that have erupted around the borders of the former Soviet Union, these are the evidence that we must build the bulwark for future stability.

In part the answer lies in economic progress for nations that are impoverished and are poor gardens from which to

grow peace or stability. And the signs of economic progress are already becoming evident, certainly here in Poland, which has experienced nearly continuous economic growth for the past few years and in a number of other reforming economies as well.

But I would caution that nobody should expect an instantaneous leap from the inefficiencies and troubles that beset the former communist economies to become like the modern prosperous economies that exist in the Western half of Europe. Remember that their prosperity was not built in a year or even a decade. The prosperity you see in those nations today was the work of a generation. And that progress could not have been achieved in the absence of peace and stability.

And that leads to the third pillar that of security. It is the construction of this pillar that depends so heavily on the efforts of you here in this room and others like you in war colleges around Europe and America. This was the challenge that was given to us with the end of the Cold War the challenge of building from the old to create a new security order for this continent. That challenge itself relies on three building blocks, each of which has already been laid.

These three blocks are a reinvigorated NATO alliance, the Partnership for Peace, and a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia. Let me start with the first. In 1991, NATO's political leaders met in Rome and they ordered a complete reorientation of the military features of the alliance.

The changes made in that Rome conference were more dramatic than any in NATO's history. They were designed to reverse containment NATO's strategy from the beginning of its existence.

From my perspective as a member of the U.S. delegation in that meeting at Rome the alliance made a pact with the future. The political leaders of the alliance nations gave us a clear mandate to use the alliance to build cooperation with our former adversaries cooperation built on outreach and dialogue. They told us to put the past behind us and to focus on a new threat the threat of instability.

In keeping with this challenge, they recognized that the alliance would need new skills and practices that would allow us to manage new forms of crises even beyond NATO's borders. That was only four years ago. And NATO is already today a vastly different alliance then the one I knew before 1991.

And the alliance leaders have met since then and made equally profound decisions that will bear on the security architecture of this continent. They decided to set in motion the process of enlarging the alliance of accepting new members from Central Europe. Without a doubt leading the charge for NATO to make this decision was Poland.

Let me be very clear on this point the alliance is definitely going to expand. The NATO study outlining the criteria for expansion was briefed to partner nations in Brussels just yesterday.

It is significant to note that this process will not be made in blocks or groups but rather, it will be on a country-by-country basis. And let me assure you, NO country outside of NATO shall, in any way, have a veto in this process.

I am well aware of the frustration of those who feel membership should be immediate. However, it is important to realize that the reason for the alliance's success has been that each member has developed specific attributes which make it a viable and valuable partner.

For example, all NATO members must be willing and able to defend the alliance. Likewise, they must be willing to seek consensus even on the most difficult issues.

Membership also requires that in the development of plans and budgets and in the acquisition of equipment NATO doctrine and procedures must play an integral role.

That is where Partnership For Peace comes in. It is through PFP that participants learn the hundreds of standard operating procedures that are a necessary part of successful NATO operations. I saw first hand how this works when I visited the Cooperative Nugget Exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana. There were many procedural lessons learned from all participants including current NATO members.

But I hardly need mention the importance of the Partnership for Peace to Poland, for no nation has embraced this vital initiative more energetically. Poland has been unmatched in its support and enthusiastic participation in Partnership for Peace exercises. But it is important for us all to recognize that the Partnership for Peace is far more than an exercise program.

For 45 years the militaries of the two halves of Europe developed on very different patterns. We evolved different doctrines about how to fight and how to operate.

Our weapons systems, our communications systems, and nearly every implement of our military forces were designed and built quite intentionally to be different from another. We stared at one another distrustfully and to the degree that we sought to understand one another it was through espionage work to learn about each other's plans and capabilities in the event that we might one day have to meet in battle.

The spirit underlying the Partnership for Peace is to eliminate the vestiges of that old distrust and confrontation to put the past behind us and through a partnership of the willing to create together a new future for all of Europe.

I would point to two examples to show why it is so very vital that we take these actions. If you look back to 1991 when the unraveling of Yugoslavia first began I think it is clear that we were, all of us, the European community and NATO alike, institutionally unprepared for a challenge of that nature.

Had we been better prepared had we had a universal understanding that our moral and pragmatic sensibilities would eventually demand action the years since may have been very different. That only underscores how vitally important it is that we use the Partnership for Peace to expand our ability to work together and to manage common security challenges together.

But the second example I would underscore was the Gulf War that was fought in the deserts of Southwest Asia. Although that conflict occurred outside of Europe we looked upon it as a NATO operation using the relationships we had built over the previous 40 years even using the NATO military infrastructure and also the NATO doctrines and interoperability procedures. It could not have been more successful.

There also is a vital purpose for the Partnership for Peace for those of us in our nation's military forces to be prepared to operate together to be able to communicate smoothly to share logistics to cover each others flanks to refuel each other's planes to join our ships in fleet operations and to take orders from one another.

All of this is much more than a matter of military exercises. It is the product of ever-enlarging contacts between our forces, of learning new forms of cooperation, and of educating each other about the ways that we operate.

It is also a process of building trust, for the Partnership will ensure that no nation feels excluded from having a voice or a role in the future of Europe whether they are a member of NATO or not.

Finally, there is this third block to our security that I mentioned and that is a partnership between NATO and Russia. You will remember that at the end of the First World War all of our statesmen made a crucial mistake, a mistake that was terribly repaid only two decades later with the outbreak of another even more catastrophic war. When the terms of peace were created their minds and emotions were on the past and they sought to punish and isolate their former enemies.

When the Second World War ended Western Europeans did not repeat the same mistake. They thought of the future and they built a security structure that integrated their former enemies.

And this must be the spirit with which we approach Russia today and tomorrow. The Cold War is over and good riddance to it. We must now help the Russians to forge a new more integrated role on this continent. It is to all of our benefits to integrate Russia in our community of nations and that requires a partnership between our alliance and Russia.

And that I am convinced is key to the security of Poland and to the other nations of Central Europe as well for the alternative would be to simply slide the old division of Europe a little bit to the east and to build a new line of confrontation perhaps on Poland's eastern border. Certainly I do not think that any of us would wish to see that happen.

Now I have probably already spoken too long and really I would like to hear about your concerns and questions. But before I close I would like to tell you what a wonderful event it is for me to return here and to have this chance to visit with you to share with you my views on what lies ahead.

I left Europe for the United States in 1952. When I left, Western Europe still lay in shambles from the war, its nations were poor and hungry, its cities still lay in ruins with millions of homeless, and its people were grappling with the uncertainties of trying to adapt to the trials of democracy. It was more than a decade after that, that I returned to Europe again and it had taken that long before the seeds that were sown right after the war had finally taken firm roots, that prosperity had finally started to return, and those nations trying democracy for the first time had finally evolved to the point that it was firmly imbedded.

We should all of us be aware that the new Europe we are building will not be fully realized for some time to come. It will require a decade or more of tending before the same kind of garden that now exists in the west shows its flowers here in the center of Europe. But it will come. And I envy you sitting here for you will be the ones who tend to this growth so that Poland's future children shall know only freedom liberty and security. And as I look at the faces and into the eyes in this room today there is no doubt in my mind that this will come to pass.

Now I again thank you for this wonderful opportunity and I look forward to any questions that you may have.

German Federal Armed Forces Commander's Conference
Munich, Germany
17 November 1995

Let me begin by telling you what a great pleasure it is for me to join you here and to have this chance to share some thoughts with you about this very special relationship between the United States and Germany. Let me add as well that I am deeply honored to be only the second foreign military chief to have this opportunity to address this conference.

But then I feel not in the least uncomfortable, for I am among so many old friends and comrades here in this room.

As you know, although not born here, Germany was the land of my childhood. When my family was uprooted by the communist takeover of eastern Europe it was here where we came. It was here where I began my schooling and where I formed my first childhood friends. Here among the German people, we found a new home and lasting friendships as well.

And of course the United States is the land of my adulthood, the country I chose as my final destination. As I have told General Naumann before, it has been the great fortune of my life that I have been able to spend my military career protecting both of these nations that I care for so deeply.

Yet still, when General Naumann suggested that I come here today and that I might wish to touch on the topic of German-American relations, I thought surely everyone in this room has heard enough about German-American relations during their careers to fill libraries. I have always thought of this very special relationship between our countries like an old beloved house that we have lived in together for a very long time; we know every room and corner; we each have our favorites chairs at the dinner table; and we have chosen our furnishings to match and complement one another's tastes.

Is our special relationship unhealthy or troubled today? Certainly not! In fact it has just been strengthened and enlarged by the unification of Germany and by the end of the Cold War. At the same time it has weathered the withdrawal of two-thirds of American forces here and it has risen and adapted to the new kinds of trials and perils of these past few years. If you think about it, these have been very severe and trying tests for our partnership. Yet we have passed each of them with flying colors. Indeed as you look back, you appreciate that this very special relationship has been extraordinarily durable and expansive long outliving and outgrowing the very narrow designs that its inventors initially intended.

I think back to the Cold War years at all of the times that some were predicting that we would split, usually as a result of some crisis in our larger alliance, that so many Trans-Atlantic experts made their livelihoods writing about.

For some, there was always a distrust that America's commitment to Europe was conditioned by a weather vane that as long as the weather was fair so was America's commitment. But that the moment the weather turned truly nasty, that were we ever to face the peak of strategic brinkmanship, at that moment of decision the United States would peer over the edge and experience a change of heart. For some that distrust was always there throughout every decade of the Cold War.

Yet among Americans we always knew that the Germans understood. We and you — we always knew better. When DeGaulle challenged the rest of the NATO alliance to forgo their strategic trust in the United States, Germany was foremost among those arguing otherwise.

When the nights of the Cold War grew chilliest, our two nations every time responded by making the NATO alliance stronger and by improving our defenses. When the Korean War erupted in 1950 and all of our nations believed it was a Soviet diversion to make Europe vulnerable to attack, it was the United States that rushed in some 180,000 reinforcements and it was Germany that gave them bases. When the Berlin crisis erupted nearly ten years later, the United States brought in another 46,000 reinforcements and again Germany opened her arms and gave them housing and bases. Then once again after the Vietnam War ended and we all grew alarmed at the expansion and modernization of the Warsaw Pact forces, again the United States brought in more forces even as the German Armed Forces expanded as well and again Germany offered more housing and facilities. From a constabulary force that in 1949 numbered only some 65,000 soldiers, through to the end of the Cold War when American strength in Europe had grown to 356,000, never once did the United States flinch from its commitment to Europe and never once did Germany deviate from its commitment to Europe. Indeed, at the moments of greatest crisis it was very often the same critics who doubted American resolve who suddenly began warning that the United States was too aggressive and too unrelenting.

Yet the prospect of nuclear confrontation here in Europe was so menacing that the doubters never disappeared. No amount of confidence building could stave them off. Some here in Europe continued to believe until the very end of the Cold War that the Atlantic Ocean was an insurmountable crack in the solidarity of the alliance, that when the critical

brink was reached the United States would recoil and would leave its allies stranded and ruined. But never here never in Germany were those doubts embraced.

How ironic it is that today, even after the threat that was the very source of the accusations for so many decades has now become no more than a chapter in the history books, we find there are still those who are saying that America's commitment to Europe is limited. More ironic still, the doubts come from the same dubious voices who were proven so wrong during the Cold War. They have merely turned their old discredited arguments on their head.

Now they are saying that America's commitment to Europe has been weakened by the very absence of a powerful threat. Now those same voices are arguing that America has stronger interests elsewhere and that our interests in Europe will continue to wane and that we will further withdraw our forces.

Those who would say so do not understand how Americans view their security as permanently and inextricably linked to stability and security here in Europe. The doubters fail to comprehend how deeply or universally this understanding runs in the American people that it has been consistently reaffirmed every time that the American electorate has been measured. We are first and foremost a European nation, even as we claim to be a Pacific nation as well. Nor do the doubters seem to want to appreciate the fact that our continuing commitment of some 100,000 forces forward-stationed here in Europe — every one of whom is a volunteer — that this makes ours the eighth largest standing military force on this continent. And of course backing up these 100,000 are the full might and capabilities of the rest of the American military. This is a firm commitment that has been reaffirmed time and again. It is not going to recede.

Happily or unhappily, it has not just been the United States that has born the brunt of those who doubt for a living. We had a partner and that partner was Germany. Throughout the Cold War for many there was this uncomfortable paradox of the two Germanys, a nation of Siamese twins sharing a common heart but ruled by two different heads, separated by misfortune but obviously still joined. There were always some who believed that Germany's yearning for unification would outweigh its other loyalties and perhaps damage or compromise our alliance.

And just as America always found that German faith in us was unyielding so too did you find that America's faith in Germany was unbreakable. Never in America was there any doubt about Germany's ultimate unification nor that this would be best for the Trans-Atlantic community. Never was this a problem. And how proud we were to have had the opportunity to be the first nation to have had the opportunity to applaud and endorse your unification.

Now that unification has been achieved, you find just as we have, that the old doubts have been replaced by new ones. Now there are some who predict that Germany's interests and loyalties will shift from the west to the east. Now there are those who worry that Germany will acquire new habits of unilateralism or unwelcome assertiveness or that you may lose your appetite for a communitarian vision for Europe.

So it seems to me that we share this common ailment that no matter what our nations do, no matter how steady our course, that it is our common fate to give birth to misgivings in others. I am not sure if we can ever dispel this ailment of ours, this extraordinary ability to make others worry and fret; but I know that the strongest medicine as it has been over these past fifty years is the close and binding relationship our two nations share and the unyielding faith and trust we have always shared toward each other.

And so it is that I found myself agreeing with General Naumann that we should devote our time and attention to this very special relationship that exists between us. Unquestionably we are living in a new era and it is necessary for us to ensure that we are preserving our bonds and that we are continually building the basis for future generations to enjoy that which has meant so very much to us. And this does take introspection and vision.

Just as it was the role of the generation that survived the Second World War to create this remarkable relationship in the first place, it is our role today to ensure that it will still be there vigorous and intact tomorrow and that it will shape Europe in the 21st Century every bit as powerfully and productively as it has shaped the last half of this century.

And I think that means that we must continually examine our relationship and friendship at all three levels where our nations have great external roles: here within the Trans-Atlantic alliance, to see what we must do together to ensure stability and peace on this continent; on a larger global level, where Germany's role is enlarging; and then at the very core of our relations at the bilateral level.

On the Trans-Atlantic level, I think we face three great challenges. First there is today a debate about the future of our alliance. The French have spoken of altering our alliance and carving it into two distinct pillars, one a European pillar that manages the day-to-day challenges of European security and stability and the other half an American pillar that joins with the European half only in the event that there is a direct threat to NATO territory.

There is great danger in this vision. Even if it could work, and it can't, it would ultimately lead to America's disengagement from this continent. I am convinced that if America started to play a part-time role in the affairs of Europe, that if we accepted a division of labor no matter how appealing and logical, some might find that arrangement

would become a recipe for fragmentation and the re-nationalization of our security policies. I don't believe that the American Congress and people could sustain our involvement here unless we remain fully engaged in the day-to-day security issues of Europe. So this alternative vision is a siren's song. For a marriage to be successful, the partners must live together and share their daily chores. Separation is the first step to divorce.

But for Germany this opposing vision presents unique problems. Since the Second World War, the heart of German foreign economic and defense policies has been the formation of two equally indispensable grand partnerships, those with the United States and with France. Among the many interlocking bilateral partnerships that form our larger alliance this triangle, with Germany at its base, has always been vital to European stability and today it lies at the heart of Europe's security political and economic architecture. The Franco-German partnership has been the engine that has driven European integration and the economic vitality of this continent. At the same time Germany is the host for American participation in Europe.

Germany's challenge is to strike a balance between these two grand partnerships. Neither can be allowed to slip away or to disintegrate. Both are vital to the intricate balance of this continent and of NATO. Certainly you recognize this need, for I am sure it is no coincidence that Admiral Lanxade and I have been the first two foreign defense chiefs to speak in this distinguished forum.

Germany is the hinge that must keep both the United States and France energetically involved in managing the security environment of Europe. I could not imagine how European security would work if the Trans-Atlantic partnership were severed, but neither can I imagine not having France's irrepressible wisdom, courage, and vitality for our most difficult challenges.

But there is a second challenge as well in which Germany is already playing and must continue to exert a strong leading role. That challenge is to broaden the integration of Europe to eliminate the vestiges of the curtain that hung from Stettin to Trieste by helping to spread our institutions, those of democracy, of economic prosperity, of stability, and security, into the eastern half of this continent.

This is a great task and one that will require great perseverance, wisdom, resources, and energy. You know this better than any from the miracle that the German people have accomplished in unification. Germany has also provided the intellectual spark for the enlargement of NATO and you have helped convince the rest of the alliance that this step must be taken.

But I think that we must all recognize several imperatives. First, it will not be possible to just throw a blanket over all of Eastern Europe, simultaneously giving to these nations what it took us decades of trial, turmoil, and struggle, to plant and harvest for ourselves. It will be by necessity an incremental evolution country by country. We should fully anticipate that there will be successes and there will be failures. We cannot be discouraged and we must not take a short view.

Second, Germany deserves great credit for leading Europe and the world in offering these new nations economic assistance, investment, and economic partnership and America deserves credit for being the second greatest contributor. But we must be careful. We must also work hard to encourage the larger European Union into incorporating the new eastern economies into this larger satellite. If only one or two nations develop substantial economic interests and relations in the east, then the bond between east and west will be frail and vulnerable.

The third great Trans-Atlantic challenge is managing a Russian nation that is still reforming and still in search of its new identity here in Europe. The importance of this task certainly doesn't need to be underscored to anyone in this room. And Germany and the United States, both individually and as members of the larger alliance, have perhaps the most influential roles in helping to guide the evolution of new security relations with Russia. It is vital that we two do so in harmony.

Then there is this second level where our special relationship has such a vital role and that is at the international level. In the past this interaction has been more or less limited to the diplomatic and economic planes. But we must all recognize that your recent constitutional rulings open a new era for Germany certainly on the continent but also internationally. I am convinced that this is the right direction. And just as America had no doubts or hesitations about unification, similarly we welcome Germany to as large a role as the German people want for themselves. That is why the United States has placed its enthusiastic support behind a U.N. Security Council seat for Germany.

Indeed in Italy and Bosnia today, where there are already 1,500 German military serving superbly, we are finding that the very strengths of partnership that we developed here in the past half-century are of course transferring to that operation. And I applaud the recent decision by the German cabinet to approve sending another 3,000 forces in the event of a NATO implementation force. Among soldiers there is no greater compliment than to say that you are

welcome on my flank. And certainly among American commanders there is no more reassuring sight than to see a German unit on their flank or a German fighter on their wing.

I also anticipate that as Germany's international security involvement grows that the special relationship between us will gain a new dimension that will cause it to further grow and broaden and that it will become even more valuable to both of us. In fact that process has already begun and among the points I wish to make today is to offer my appreciation to Generals Reinhardt and Bagger for offering the assistance and support of the Central Region in the event that American forces must deploy to Bosnia. It is an offer that is as appreciated as it is needed. Thank you.

And this leads to the third level of our special relationship and that is the bilateral level. It was this level that we could always take for granted in years past that it would always stay healthy and vigorous. A few years ago when I served as the American commander here in Europe, there were some 356,000 forces that were part of my command, a quarter of a million of whom lived here in Germany. When you added their families to the list there were nearly three-quarters of a million Americans living in Germany. Throughout the years of the Cold War well over 10 million American service men and women lived here in Germany and with their families that number grew to perhaps 20 million. Our presence was unmistakable, distinct, and omnipresent.

There were never enough American quarters to fully house our people, so large numbers of American families lived in German homes, shopped in German stores, learned German culture, and a little bit of the German language, and along the way acquired a deep and lasting affection for the German people. I have never met an American service man or woman who served here who did not carry away the fondest of memories.

There was no other in country in the world Americans knew so well or so intimately. In no other nation could you find such vast numbers of Americans not just visiting but actually living among the German people.

The withdrawal complete today, there are some 100,000 American service men and women living here. With the drawdown we were able to keep as much American housing as we needed and the result is that a vastly larger percentage of American families now live in American housing areas here in Germany. And the strength of the Deutchmark restricts their activities off-base. There was a time when you could not drive 10 minutes on an autobahn without seeing an American forces license plate. Now I suppose you can drive for hours.

This presents us with a special challenge. We must not allow that closeness that was there between our forces and the local German communities nor between our units and yours to wither or erode. We must find ways to energize and invigorate the programs and activities that have kept our bonds so very strong in the past. We must be constantly looking for new initiatives to accomplish this. Because there are less of us we must work more at German-American relations.

And the same holds true for our military contacts. At the senior ranks of our military we meet frequently. But we must all of us work hard to ensure that our younger people are involved in German-American organizations and friendship activities. Through constant interaction we want them to see what we have found out about each other. We must look for every opportunity to train together, not just as the high levels but also at the lower unit levels.

Some of these initiatives are already taking place. When the German 4th Corps held a series of briefings for USARAEUR in which they discussed their experiences with forging a force with easterners and westerners, it added greatly to our understanding of and our appreciation for what you have accomplished. When the German II Corps was kind enough to include the U.S. 1st Armored Division in the Proud Lion Exercise, that was an excellent chance for the American unit leaders to see how the German Army conducts its large-scale exercises. For you and I, for officers of our generation, that may not sound unique but to our younger officers it was very unique. And even such a small contribution as having a German OPFOR company at Hohenfehls, helping to train and prepare our forces for Bosnia, has had a far larger impact than perhaps many of us appreciate. Aside from the admiration that unit has earned it is also a vital contribution to our preparation.

Let me add that there are today some 3,000 German military men and women stationed in the United States. Soon a complete Air Wing will be established, building on the base of a squadron that is already there. And I am very pleased with this development and I hope that the German forces stationed in America are getting the same benefit and hospitality that Americans have enjoyed here so very much.

Actually, I am very encouraged at the health of this very special relationship between us. It is evolving and responding to the changes surrounding it and in response to the changes internal to our own nations. This is not to say that there are not disagreements, misunderstandings, and tensions. Yet it has always been my view toward partnerships that it is precisely when they have grown quiet, tranquil, and completely untroubled — that is when they are in greatest danger. Those are the surest symptoms that it has either grown stagnant and moribund or that its purposes must have become very narrow and unimportant.

I would remind you of the words of Helmut Schmidt, who remained a steadfast supporter of our relationship even after his own political fortunes were harmed by his staunch efforts to support his American partner. He was once asked to comment on what seemed to some Germans to be incomprehensible and unpredictable behavior on the part of the United States. He answered with a heavy sigh and said, "They are what they are. But they are the only Americans we have."

Today our two nations are the largest in NATO. Within our two borders live nearly half of the citizens of this alliance. We are the alliance's largest stockholders. We have before us great challenges and grand purposes. We must for the sake of our combined futures ensure that we hand this very special partnership, which has been such a treasure to our generations, fully intact, still vibrating with warmth, with tension, with vitality, and with great purpose, on to the next generation.

And now let me close and thank you for this very great honor and the opportunity to share my views with you.

***Armed Forces Journal International* Magazine**
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November 1995

Ten years ago, a group of military historians published a book titled "America's First Battles: 1776-1965." After studying the opening fights of ten different conflicts that involved America's Armed Forces, the authors demonstrated that in between wars our nation had a very sad record of keeping our forces ready to fight. In every one of our first battles, from the Revolution through Vietnam, American forces came to their first fight unprepared. It had become a terrible tradition.

Not until the early 1980's was the tradition shattered. First in Panama and then in the Gulf War, American forces fought so superbly that the first battle became the last battle. In both of these victories, very clearly, our forces were ready to fight from the first shot.

There was an incident in the Gulf War when an M-1 tank crew in the heat of battle roared over a hill and found itself right in the middle of four Iraqi tanks arrayed in an ambush. The tank commander was a young sergeant. The moment he sensed his predicament he gave the order for his driver to accelerate. Within a split second he then traversed the turret to lay it on the first Iraqi tank, which the gunner then destroyed. As soon as this was done the tank commander spun the turret and acquired another target, the gunner reloaded, and a second tank was destroyed. By this time nearly out of the ambush, the tank commander and the gunner repeated the same drill, destroying a third Iraqi tank with an engagement over the rear deck, just as the M-1 cleared the enemy's kill zone. All of this took less than half a minute.

Thinking about this incident there were four variables in favor of that remarkable tank crew; outstanding leadership, superbly oiled teamwork, the best equipment fully operational, and the kind of instinctive, split-second reactions that come only from constant, demanding training. In short, remarkable people and readiness.

By 1999, the defense budget is scheduled to shrink to less than half of what we paid for defense in 1985. But our force will be only one third smaller. This is not an encouraging equation. Our problems become even more severe when you look at all of the operations our forces are prosecuting in so many corners of the world. Operationally, we are doing far more than we were in 1985.

If we are to maintain our readiness, we are going to have to make some difficult choices and we are going to have to make some bold changes in the ways we have been doing business; in the management of our forces; by innovative approaches to equipment development and procurement; by carrying jointness into our requirements process and how we support and school and train our forces; and by making whatever changes in roles and missions that make sense operationally.

In the next few years we are going to have to break some china. But if broken china protects our readiness, then it is worth the cost.

In the history of our nation there has never been a twenty-year period uninterrupted by conflict. There will be other first battles. We must build on the new tradition established in Panama and the Gulf — the cost of failing to do so is too high.

1996

Academy of Higher Military Studies of Romania
Bucharest, Romania
8 February 1996

A great author, Victor Hugo, once said, "The future has several names. For the weak it is the impossible. For the fainthearted it is the unknown. For the thoughtful and valiant it is the ideal."

And as I stand here with you today, I am struck by the enormity of your courage as a nation and as a people. Just seven short years ago, you were a nation bound by the chains of oppression, and the world watched as you broke those chains and you marched forth into the future. For Romania, the future was never the impossible, never the unknown.

And today, Romania and all of Europe stands on the brink of a new era, an era of democracy, prosperity, and security. And if we manage the process well, if the right decisions are made, if we refuse to be sidetracked along our way, we can forge a future for our children and theirs that will be so much safer and so much brighter than the past that we are leaving behind.

For 45 years, Europe was like a dry forest during a long hot summer. Had someone been foolish enough to light a match the fire would have consumed the entire world.

Today's Europe is no longer dry and brittle, but vibrant and fertile. And today we have a rare and precious opportunity to create a new Europe, to weave together the entire tapestry of European nations.

I am convinced that we are already on the right path to accomplish this vision. And I am convinced that you here today and the people of Romania, have an important role to play if we are to get there. And it is that that I would like to spend the next few minutes discussing with you before I answer your questions.

The path ahead must be built on three pillars: the pillars of democracy; stability; and security. These are the three pillars upon which Western Europe was raised from the ashes of the Second World War, they are the very basis of the integration enjoyed in the West, and they are the three pillars which we must extend to support all of Europe.

If you look at the NATO alliance today, what is most striking is not just that our alliance has survived intact for so extraordinarily long, but that every member of the alliance shares one virtue — democracy. It is that single feature that has made this alliance so successful and so enduring.

First, it is one of the peculiarities of history that democracies seem to have a habit of resolving their disputes peacefully. Certainly democracy has brought a longer reign of peace to that part of the continent than ever before. But also the very fact that every NATO nation is a democracy rallies its members to a common moral purpose, a purpose to which they can commit themselves and to each other. So that is one pillar of the future continent, the protection and nurturing of the new democracies that sprang out of the Cold War.

The second pillar is stability. For 45 years we all grew used to one kind of stability. But it was a devilishly dangerous form of stability, one that teetered on a line drawn through the heart of this continent. I know of no nation that wishes to recapture that form of stability. And today as we see the terrible events that have unfolded in the shattered nations on your western border or the fires that have erupted around the borders of the former Soviet Union, these are the evidence that we must build the foundation for future stability.

I know that you and that all Romanians understand how important this is and recognize that ethnic hatreds, whether between two countries or within one state, must be confronted and must be overcome. We all know that when there are ethnic divisions, we can either opt for understanding and go the way of Western Europe or we can choose hatred and go the way of Bosnia.

In part, the road to harmony is also paved by economic progress, for nations that are impoverished are poor gardens in which to grow peace or stability. And the signs of economic progress are already becoming evident, certainly here in Romania and in a number of other reforming economies as well.

But I would caution that no one should expect an instantaneous leap from the inefficiencies and troubles that beset the former communist systems, to become modern prosperous economies. Prosperity in Western Europe was not built in one year or even one decade. It was the work of a generation and could not have been achieved in the absence of peace and stability.

And that leads us to the third pillar that of security. It is the construction of this pillar that depends so heavily on the efforts of you here in this room and others like you in both Europe and America. This was the challenge that was presented to us with the end of the Cold War, to provide a sense of security that enveloped all of Europe.

Our first steps were to reaffirm NATO and to redefine NATO's relationship with Russia. In 1991, NATO's political

leaders met in Rome and they decided on a complete reorientation of the military features of the alliance. The changes made in that Rome conference were more dramatic than any in NATO's history. They were designed to reverse containment, NATO's strategy from the beginning of its existence.

Those changes also provided a fresh foundation for a new relationship between NATO and Russia. You will remember that at the end of the First World War, all of our statesmen made a crucial mistake, a mistake that was terribly repaid only two decades later with the outbreak of another even more catastrophic war. When the terms of peace were created, their minds and emotions were on the past.

When the Second World War ended, Western Europeans did not repeat that mistake. They thought of the future and they built a security structure that integrated their former adversaries. This must be the spirit with which we approach this task: reconciliation towards all, confrontation with none. The Cold War is over and good riddance to it. We must now help all to include Russia, to forge a new more integrated role on this continent. And that requires a special partnership between the alliance and Russia. Hopefully our work together in Bosnia can help pave the way towards that kind of NATO-Russia partnership.

And that, I am convinced, is key to the security of Romania and to the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe as well, for the alternative would be to simply slide the old division of Europe a little bit farther east and to build a new line of confrontation. Certainly I do not think that any of us would wish to see that happen.

Since that meeting in Rome in 1991, the alliance leaders have made equally profound decisions that will bear on the security architecture of this continent. They decided to set in motion the process of enlarging the alliance of accepting new members. Let me be very clear on this point, the alliance will open its doors to new members. Furthermore, the process of expansion will not be made in blocks or groups but rather it will be on a country-by-country basis. And no country outside of NATO shall in any way have a veto in this process. I am well aware of the frustration of those who feel membership should be immediate. However it is important to realize that the reason for the alliance's success has been that each member has developed specific attributes which make it a viable and valuable partner.

For example, all NATO members must be willing and able to defend the alliance. Likewise, they must be willing to seek consensus even on the most difficult issues. Membership also requires that in the development of plans and budgets and in the acquisition of equipment, NATO doctrine and procedures must play an integral role.

And that is where Partnership for Peace comes in. As you know so well, it is through PFP that participants learn the hundreds of standard operating procedures that are a necessary part of successful NATO operations. My host and friend General Cioflina and I both saw first hand how this works when we visited the Cooperative Nugget Exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana. There were many procedural lessons learned from all participants including current NATO members.

But I hardly need mention the importance of the Partnership for Peace to Romania, for you gave it impetus and you have been a valued participant ever since. But it is important for us all to recognize that the Partnership for Peace is far more than a series of exercises.

For 45 years the militaries of the two halves of Europe developed on very different patterns. We evolved different warfighting doctrines and methods of operation. Our weapons systems, our communications systems, nearly every implement of our military forces were designed and built quite intentionally to be different from another.

We stared at one another distrustfully and to the degree that we sought to understand one another, it was through the work of espionage that we learned about each other's plans and capabilities in the event that we might one day have to meet in battle.

The spirit underlying the Partnership for Peace is to eliminate the vestiges of that old distrust and confrontation, to put the past behind us, and through a partnership of the willing, to create together a new future for all of Europe.

Sadly, it is easy enough to show why it is so very vital that we take these actions. If you look back to 1991 when the unraveling of Yugoslavia first began, I think it is clear that we all of us were institutionally unprepared for a challenge of that nature.

Had we been better prepared, had we a universal understanding that our moral and pragmatic sensibilities would eventually demand action, the years since may have been very different. That only underscores how vitally important it is that we expand our ability to work together and to manage common security challenges together.

There is also a vital purpose for the Partnership for Peace, for those of us in our nation's military forces, to be prepared to operate together, to be able to communicate smoothly, to share logistics, to cover each others flanks, and to refuel each other's planes.

All of this is much more than a matter of military exercises. It is the product of ever-enlarging contacts between our forces, of learning new forms of cooperation, and of educating each other about the ways that we operate. It is also a

process of building trust for the Partnership to ensure that no nation feels excluded from having a voice or a role in the future of Europe whether they are a member of NATO or not.

Now, I have probably already spoken too long and I would like to hear about your concerns and questions. But before I close, let me remind you that we should all of us be aware that the new Europe we are building will not be fully realized for some time to come. It will require a decade or more of tending before the same kind of garden that now exists in the west shows its flowers here. But it has certainly taken root here in Romania and it will come.

And I envy you sitting here, for you will be the ones who tend to this growth so that Romania's future children shall know only freedom and liberty and security. And as I look at the faces and into the eyes in this room today there is no doubt in my mind that this will come to pass.

With that I thank you it has been a great pleasure to be with you and I look forward to any questions you may have.

Annual Posture Statement
Washington, DC
5 March 1996

It is a great pleasure and a great honor to be here today representing America's men and women in uniform. It seems that each time I've come before you for these hearings, I've begun my testimony with a description of how very busy the past year has been for our forces and how very well they've performed. Today will be no different.

OPERATIONS

While continuing to reduce our troop strengths, our forces have remained engaged in a sizable number of simultaneous operations spread across the globe. Today, there are approximately 54,000 of our men and women in uniform and around 1,300 defense civilians committed to overseas contingencies. For those who've been deployed for these missions, and for their families, it has been often stressful, arduous and demanding. Yet they have, and they continue, to perform superbly. We owe them our gratitude for, despite an extremely high operations tempo, the readiness of our units and the morale and enthusiasm of the troops have stayed very high. They make it impossible to look back at this year without feeling an enormous sense of pride.

Among the past year's efforts, there were two particularly notable milestones. Two months ago, I attended the formal closing ceremony for Joint Task Force 160 — the same unit that for the previous 20 months handled the refugees that poured out of the dictatorships in Haiti and Cuba; that plucked over 60,000 men, women and children out of the dangerous Caribbean waters; that built 15 huge camps to house, feed, and care for them; and that provided safe and humane conditions until the refugees were either allowed to enter the United States or returned to their homelands. I could not be more proud of the way our men and women performed this long and uniquely difficult mission. They handled these many thousands of refugees with compassion and understanding while administering to their needs with unequaled efficiency. Today, their mission completed, the camps have been closed, and the men and women of the Task Force have returned home.

The other milestone occurred this past month when, for the first time in history, the second democratically-elected President of Haiti took office, and shortly thereafter we began the redeployment of our forces — right on schedule. We entered Haiti in September 1994 with a sound military plan, we followed that plan, and we accomplished all that was asked of us. The rapid introduction of American military forces stopped the cycle of violence, halted the flow of refugees, and created a secure and stable environment which made possible the legislative and Presidential election process. By 31 March 1995, the recruitment and training of a new police force had so stabilized the situation that American forces could be greatly reduced, and the Haitian operation was turned over to the United Nations.

Despite some initial problems, legislative and presidential elections were conducted and, on 7 February, for the first time in Haiti's history, an elected president turned over his office to another freely elected president. While a small United Nations presence will remain in Haiti a while longer, American units will continue to return home and will be out of Haiti by 15 April of this year. All that will remain will be small, periodic, engineer exercises, like those we conduct with a number of our other Southern neighbors.

Starting in December, we became actively engaged in the NATO operation in Bosnia. Over the course of two months, we deployed nearly 20,000 active and reserve military personnel into Bosnia to join a coalition of some 30

other countries to help carry out the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord. Additionally, nearly 8,000 support forces were deployed to the countries around Bosnia.

Now, nearly 80 days into the operation, our presence has been pivotal in forging the coalition that is helping to manage the peace and in brokering the on-the-ground implementation of the Accord: withdrawal of the warring factions from the zones of separation; the release of prisoners of war; the separation of military forces; and the withdrawal from territory to be transferred. While there are still problems to be overcome, such as small, remaining pockets of banned foreign forces, and occasional intransigence by Bosnian Serbs, overall compliance has been relatively good.

As I have witnessed on each of my three trips to Bosnia, our troops are performing extremely well and morale is high. Much of this is due to outstanding leadership, diligent preparation, and the impressive strides being made in the quality of life for our forces through extensive base camp preparation, the opening of AAFES outlets, and routine mail and Stars and Stripes deliveries. From the beginning, we correctly perceived that mines, the lone sniper, and severe weather and road conditions would be our major enemies. We were correct, and the combination of smart precautions and good training have gone a long way to minimizing the numbers of casualties that could have resulted.

Our forces operating in Bosnia were very well prepared and rehearsed before they were allowed to deploy. Their mission and rules of engagement have been properly proscribed, and they have established a strong, controlling presence between the former warring parties. More than that, they have also been instrumental in forging an historic coalition. Just a few years ago, few would have imagined that it would have been possible to cobble together a force including NATO nations, Central Europeans, and Russians, striving to achieve a common purpose. Here again, sound preparation on the part of our forces has paid off well.

Our challenge now is to remember that we still have over 9 months to go, and that we must ensure that our force is as ready, alert, and resolute on the last day of this mission as it was on the first. That is the greatest guarantee for success of the mission and the safety of the force.

But these have not been the only operations involving our forces. We have over 23,000 service men and women deployed in the Arabian Gulf region to preserve regional peace and stability, to enforce U.N.-ordered sanctions against Iraq, and to deter further Iraqi aggression. We have added prepositioned equipment to the region to support brigade-sized units; we have periodically deployed an Army mechanized task force for training, and for the first time ever, we conducted a no-notice deployment into the region, of an Air Expeditionary Force. We are maintaining a very active joint and multinational exercise program which includes participation from carrier battle groups, special forces and amphibious ready groups operating in the region. Farther north in Turkey, we continue to work with our coalition partners to enforce the no-fly zone and to oversee the humanitarian aid program in Northern Iraq.

In addition to this, the Army continued to provide forces in support of the 11-nation Multinational Force and Observers on the Sinai Peninsula, as specified in the Camp David Accord. Currently, nearly 1,000 U.S. service members are deployed as part of the Infantry Battalion Task Force or Logistics Support Element. Of note, the last infantry battalion rotation for 1995 was formed, for the first time, as a composite unit of Active Duty and Reserve Component personnel. This initiative proved highly successful and will be considered for future rotations.

In Korea, some 36,000 U.S. forces remain ready as political, cultural, and economic conditions continue to deteriorate in the North. The increasing instability in North Korea, fueled by severe food and energy problems, requires constant vigilance and further complicates our indications and warning capability. Force modernization efforts continue to focus on increasing interoperability between ROK and U.S. forces and increasing the theater's counter-battery fire capability. As well, all armored elements of the Korean Prepositioning Brigade set are in. My recent visits to Seoul and the DMZ have shown me that our efforts of the last two years to strengthen our defensive posture have been timely and most effective.

In the Southern Hemisphere, U.S. forces were engaged in defusing one conflict while, simultaneously, supporting efforts to reduce the traffic of drugs. Hostilities erupted in January 1995 in the region along the Peruvian/Ecuadorian border and in March 1995, four countries — Argentine, Brazil, Chile and the U.S. — responded to a request to provide military observers to assist in the monitoring of a cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces. We presently have 61 U.S. military personnel and 4 helicopters participating in this mission. There have been no cease-fire violations since September 1995, while Peru and Ecuador continue to pursue a diplomatic solution to the border dispute.

While the Peru/Ecuador dispute was on-going, USSOUTHCOM organized and initiated the most extensive counterdrug surge operation ever aimed against the narco-traffickers air bridge between Peru and Colombia. In cooperation with allied nations and law enforcement agencies, we focused our detection and monitoring assets on disrupting and hindering drug trafficking air operations. The results were impressive — overall air activity decreased significantly and cooperation between allied nations as well as the interagency improved noticeably. The successes were significant

enough to warrant USSOUTHCOM to plan a follow on operation aimed simultaneously at riverine, maritime, land, as well as air drug traffickers.

READINESS

Our success in these many recent military operations is a testament to the readiness of our forces. When I became Chairman, I asked to make and keep readiness our number one priority. This has been done and the benefits have been, and remain evident in every one of these operations. That said, I ask that you continue your support for the readiness of the force, even as the Chiefs and I are redoubling our efforts to ensure that potential lapses in readiness are detected before they become problems.

We have added a new way of looking at readiness. It includes the traditional measures that ensure individual battalions and squadrons and ships are manned, trained and equipped for mission success. But, in addition to that, we have added a critical link to how we look at joint readiness — the theater commander's ability to integrate and synchronize their forces and capabilities into an effective and cohesive fighting team.

The system by which we look at unit and joint readiness centers on a monthly report by Services, Unified Commands, and Department of Defense Combat Support Agencies. We ask them to assess their readiness to conduct day-to-day operations as well as the most demanding aspects of executing our National Military Strategy. Participants also forecast their readiness over the next 12 months. In addition to looking at specific units, we assess broad functional areas like mobility, intelligence, communications, and logistics.

This Joint Monthly Readiness Review has been up and running for a little over a year. To complement this, I have directed the development of a comprehensive readiness information management system to integrate the existing and developing readiness tools of the Services and CINCs. It will provide easily accessible and timely information for all users over the newly-activated Global Command and Control System.

Our Joint Exercise and Training program continues to be a readiness multiplier. Joint simulation efforts are providing innovative opportunities to stress our battle staffs while enhancing the overall utility of joint exercises for every participant. I am continuing to work with the CINCs to further focus our joint training efforts on key readiness challenges, while taking advantage of opportunities to leverage technology to conserve our training resources. This emphasis on readiness helps ensure that the men and women who have dedicated their lives to our nation's defense have the resources and training they need to do the job. It also ensures that their commanders can raise red flags and take quick action when called for.

We are also continuing to enhance our long-term readiness through our education system. Joint education now starts before officers are commissioned and continues throughout their careers. Increased emphasis on joint doctrine, multinational operations, and systems integration provides the CINCs a more capable, adaptive force.

Finally, the new reporting systems provide us the vital readiness information needed to make timely decisions on resource allocation and force commitment. All these efforts, and others, have helped keep readiness at the consistently high levels shown on the chart below.

Although readiness trends remain strong, we must maintain a vigilant watch. A major challenge to near-term readiness is how to use the unique capabilities of the Armed Forces to advance our national interests in peacetime while maintaining our readiness to fight and win this nation's wars. We are getting much smarter at this and at anticipating areas of stress before they become readiness problems. To that end, we are incorporating better the significant capabilities that reside in our reserve forces. We are continually looking for ways to conduct wartime mission training even while our forces are deployed to real-world operations. We are closely managing those low density, high leverage capabilities — including intelligence, mobility, and support assets — needed to execute the full range of our military missions.

I must point out, however, that readiness is a fragile commodity. Once the intricate processes of manning with quality personnel, and equipping and training units are disrupted, recovery often requires significant time and resources. That is why maintaining readiness is critically dependent on timely and full reimbursement of costs associated with unplanned contingency operations.

Thanks to your support, and the unyielding care and concern and support of the American people, I can report to you that ours is the most ready force in the world today. Which leads to the true source of our successes over the past year — great people and our strong and continued commitment to them and their families. Readiness is inextricably tied to the quality of life we provide for these outstanding men and women in uniform and their families.

PEOPLE

With regard to quality of life, the Joint Chiefs, CINCs, and I have revalidated the central importance of our "Top Four" priorities in support of our people, elaborated in the chart shown below.

Adequate and fair compensation, a stable retirement system, steady and dependable level of medical benefits, and adequate housing, especially outside CONUS, each require special attention. The recent trend of full funding for the maximum allowable pay raises has minimized the growth of the pay gap. The Secretary's decision to increase funding for military housing, including efforts to increase barracks support, pursue housing privatization initiatives, and boost Basic Allowance for Quarters, when coupled with other policies in support of our "Top Four," are helping to maintain the quality of life of our personnel and their families.

As we continue to adjust our military medical infrastructure and personnel, we must ensure that we preserve affordable, accessible health benefits with no surcharge for active duty members and their families. We must also keep faith with our military retirees, and so I urge you to help bring about Medicare Subvention, which would allow many retirees to remain in the military medical care system by reimbursing DoD for the treatment of Medicare-eligible military retirees.

The quality of recruits in our four Services remains high. Last year, 96 percent of our recruits were high school graduates. We must continue to keep this high standard even as we face increasing recruitment challenges in the years ahead; thus, your support of the Services' recruiting budgets is essential. It goes without saying that protecting the "Top Four" Quality of Life priorities also greatly enhances our recruiting and retention efforts.

FORCE STRUCTURE

As the above chart shows, the drawdown which has been ongoing since the end of the Cold War is nearly complete. The manner in which this drawdown has been managed and executed is a real success story. We've stayed on a steady, controlled glidepath, adjusting where we had to, and ensured that those measures most critical to the health of our force were properly protected. Every important indicator of military excellence remains strong — readiness is high, the quality of our people and their morale remains superb, and our force structure, despite deep cuts, has been reduced with minimum instability and turbulence.

We have broken the cycle of military decline that has followed every conflict in this century. Making this success all the more impressive is that we accomplished this drawdown without missing a beat, while at the same time engaging in a wide range of contingencies and operations.

The experience of these past few years has fortified our confidence that the force structure we will have at the end of the drawdown will be what we will continue to require during the remainder of this decade and into the next century. Our enduring force structure requirements are based primarily on our tasks: to prevent threats to our interests from arising; to deter those threats that do emerge; and to defeat those threats by military force, should deterrence fail.

The United States is a global power, with far-flung, vital security interests in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and important interests on nearly every continent. Day-to-day military engagement with our friends and allies through a combination of forward deployed and overseas-based U.S. forces in exercises, exchanges, visits, and force presence worldwide will remain an essential element of our national military strategy.

Ultimately, protecting our interests will remain dependent on preserving sufficiently strong deterrent capabilities to handle both today's known, near-term threats and those that could materialize from a more uncertain and rapidly changing world than we have known for many decades. Managing that uncertainty has led us to discard our Cold War approach of maintaining a threat-based force, towards a capability-based approach that ensures we protect the balance to handle today's real threats, as well as tomorrow's equally real possibilities.

First and foremost, that means we must preserve a modern, well maintained, robust triad of nuclear forces — the backbone of deterrence. Currently our nuclear forces are within START I limits, but we have planned our future nuclear force to achieve START II limits, in the event the treaty is ratified and implemented by the Russians. The shape of the remainder of our forces is based on the need to fight and win two, nearly simultaneous regional conflicts. Just looking back at the past few years, when we have several times nearly found ourselves in conflicts with North Korea and Iraq, our need to preserve this capability could not have been more clearly shown.

But it would be a mistake to think of this capability as contingent on contemporary threats alone. It is based, instead, on a longer-range calculation of our extensive global interests and the corresponding necessity to ensure that we never find ourselves in the vicarious predicament of committing our forces to one conflict, knowing that we will

expose our other vital interests as a result. If we were to discard half of this two-MRC capability or allow it to decay, it would take many years to rebuild a force of comparable excellence. In today's turbulent international environment, where the future posture of so many powerful nations remains precarious, we could find ourselves with too little, too late. As long as we remain a global power with vital international interests and allies whom we are committed to help defend, we must preserve our capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.

The force structure we have designed for this purpose is as lean as the calculus of risk will afford. This is the force structure we must retain.

REPLACEMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND MODERNIZATION

While the '97 budget protects the quality of life for our people, our force structure and readiness, I am concerned that we are not procuring equipment and weapon systems at the rate necessary to recapitalize the force. Accordingly we must turn our attention in earnest to this challenge or risk the future combat readiness of the U.S. military. Procurement has continued to pay the bill for readiness and force structure over the past decade and now hovers at a post-World War II low of about $40 billion. For the past two years, I have testified that we could sustain this procurement hiatus temporarily, but not indefinitely. It was the proper course of action at a time when, because we were reducing our forces, through a combination of discarding our oldest equipment, and preserving and redistributing only our newest and most modern equipment, the average age of our remaining arsenal was younger than any time in recent decades. With downsizing coming to an end, we must now increase our procurement accounts.

For if we fail to do that, we may well wear out our weapons systems and equipment before they can be modernized or replaced.

To recapitalize this force, we must face head-on some rather difficult decisions. I firmly believe that we must commit ourselves to the adequate recapitalization of our force structure — that will require a procurement goal of approximately $60 billion annually. It will take tough management decisions, innovation, and even revolutionary approaches, as well as your support to adequately recapitalize our force within our current budget top line projections.

One answer lies in aggressively pursuing institutional and business opportunities. We must continue to pursue with all energy, acquisition reforms, commercial off-the-shelf opportunities, privatization, outsourcing of non-core activities, and further reductions of our infrastructure. The sum of all of these initiatives must be reinvested into our procurement accounts. Just as important, we must strive to gain greater efficiencies in warfighting, and we have already started this process through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).

EVOLUTION OF THE JOINT PROCESS

Over the past two years, the Joint Chiefs, the CINCs, and I have built a new process to better assess our joint warfighting needs and provide sound, joint programmatic advice. As you know, before the passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the programmatic influence, role, and responsibilities of the Chairman were by design narrow and tightly circumscribed. We've worked to institutionalize the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols to create new joint mechanisms and systems so we can provide the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Congress with a joint view on programmatic and budgetary issues.

As the engine for this process, the responsibilities of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) have been expanded to produce this joint view. Although the JROC has been in existence for over a decade, the Vice Chairman and I have broadened its mandate and made it a focal point for addressing our joint warfighting needs and making specific programmatic recommendations that will lead to an increased joint warfighting capability, increased interoperability between systems, and a reduction in unnecessary redundancies and marginally effective systems, all within existing budget levels. Those of you who remember the very limited and constrained influence that jointness suffered in the way business was done in the past will recognize the seachange presented by this new charter.

I appreciate the support of Congress for recently including the JROC in Title 10, and codifying both its membership and its charter. This body has already proven itself and its value will only increase further over time.

To provide the analyses needed to support this effort, we've also created the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process as detailed above. This is our primary vehicle for obtaining a capabilities-based assessment of broad mission areas across Service and Defense agency lines. JWCA teams, each sponsored by a Joint Staff directorate, examine key relationships and interactions among joint warfighting capabilities and identify opportunities for improved effectiveness. The assessments are continuous and lend insight into issues involving requirements, readiness, and plans

for recapitalizing joint military capabilities. The JROC oversees the JWCA process and provides its findings to the CINCs and the JCS.

One of the more important provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was the requirement for me to submit to the Secretary of Defense an annual Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), a document that independently assesses the joint adequacy of programs, which I provide to the SECDEF for his consideration during his budgetary deliberations. I have found the JWCA process extraordinarily helpful in providing me the analysis and insights to craft the recommendations I offer in the CPA. As this process has evolved we have also found it useful to use the JWCA products in developing a front-end recommendation, the Chairman's Program Recommendations (CPR). The CPR is provided to the SECDEF for his use in developing the Defense Planning Guidance, the key document that guides the Services in the development of their budgets.

JOINT VISION

The difficult choices to be made require strong processes, but they also require a strategic vision, a template to provide a common direction for our Services in developing their unique capabilities. To meet this need, I will approve for release this month a document entitled *Joint Vision 2010.*

Joint Vision 2010 provides an operationally based framework for the further development of the U.S. Armed Forces. It recognizes as the basis for our future the significant institutional achievements and the outstanding men and women of our Armed Forces which have brought us today's high quality force. Then, examining the strategic environment, the missions we face, and the implications of modern technology, it develops new joint operational concepts from which our future military requirements can be derived.

The objective of this vision is to achieve what we term Full Spectrum Dominance — the capability of our Armed Forces to dominate any opponent across the range of military operations. We can achieve this objective by leveraging today's high quality forces and force structure with leading-edge technology to attain better command, control and intelligence and to implement new operational concepts — dominant maneuver, precision strike, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. It is these new joint operational concepts, and the improved command, control and intelligence which will make them possible, that will focus the strengths of each of our Services and guide the evolution of joint doctrine, education, and training to bring us Full Spectrum Dominance.

CONCLUSION

This past year the men and women of our Armed Forces have given us any number of reasons to be proud. We have called on them often to go and perform difficult missions, from Korea to Bosnia, from Haiti to Kuwait. They are performing at levels of excellence unsurpassed by any other time in our country's history. Wherever we send them, they go with pride and determination.

Americans are rightfully proud of the men and women who serve our country so ably and well. For me, it is a great honor to represent them and to come before you today. On their behalf I thank you for your unwavering support.

Electronic Industries Association
Washington, DC
19 March 1996

First let me tell you all what a great pleasure it is to be here with you this evening. I asked Peter why it is that this speech comes before dinner rather than after, as is normally the case. And he informed me that this was a tradition that the Association adopted after a study had shown that orators speaking on an empty stomach tend to speak on average 15 minutes less than those who speak after the meal has been ingested. Since I have a 15-minute speech I intended to give after dinner, perhaps under these circumstances I should just sit down.

But let me throw caution to the wind and take my allotted 15 minutes.

As I thought about what I might speak about tonight, I came to what many of you might find an odd conclusion. I realized that those of you who are part of this great association are really revolutionaries. Certainly if you look around the room, particularly tonight so all dressed up, you don't look like revolutionaries; at least as most people might imagine them to look like wild-haired, disheveled, and unconventional. But you certainly are revolutionaries.

For you are the leaders of the information revolution that is transforming the very world around us, everything — our economy, the very ways that we work, entertain, and care for our families. Simply everything! You are creating a crest of change that will make life in the next century so very different than life as we have known it.

I noticed that in this past year Newt Gingrich spoke at the Government/Industry dinner. And certainly he has been a very forceful and articulate advocate of this revolution that you here in this room are keeping in such fast motion.

And like so many revolutions I imagine that most of you would admit that you can't really say exactly where it will carry us; that like the splitting of the atom, there is apt to be both great good and perhaps not so good to come from the advances that are being made in our laboratories. But what is certain is that if we want the full benefits that will arise then we must lead this revolution.

And we in the military have an enormous stake in the revolution that you lead. For it is the success of this revolution that offers the greatest promise to keep our Armed Forces the dominant Armed Forces against any future foe in any form of conflict. Meanwhile those of us in uniform today are contending with yet another revolution. This one is a revolution in world affairs that was set in motion when the Berlin Wall came tumbling down and that was spun even more furiously on the day that Boris Yeltsin jumped on a tank in front of the Russian White House and condemned to the annals of history the artifice known as the Soviet Union.

With that event, not only in our own country but all around the world, a lot of old certainties suddenly fell by the wayside to be replaced by new doubts and new uncertainties. Here in the midst of the presidential primary season it could hardly be more clear that a lot of the old shibboleths that have guided us for nearly five decades, no longer possess the religious ring that they once had.

We are seeing debated a lot of questions, that had they been mentioned ten years ago, would have been seen as outrageously heretical. What is our role in the world and how should we fulfill this role? Are we or should we still be the shining beacon on the hill or has our nation become so riddled with internal problems that we must drop the onerous burdens of world leadership to concentrate on the drugs, the crime, the schools, and the ills infecting our very streets? Are we still the nation where the world's downtrodden can come to create new lives or should we hang out a "not welcome" sign and insulate ourselves, husbanding our resources for our own citizens?

I imagine that you here in this room know more about the answers to these questions than do most. And I ask that you do your best to help shape the new consensus that we as a nation must have if this revolution in world affairs is to carry us toward a new century that will be safer and more prosperous for our country than the one we are happily leaving behind.

You know for certain that we can neither pull back from the world nor relinquish the leadership that we have exercised so well and to such extraordinary effect since the Second World War. After all we tried insulating ourselves from the world's problems throughout the early half of this century and for that, we found ourselves in two world wars.

We tried to build barriers to insulate ourselves from the unevenness and frustrations of international trade, and for that, we found ourselves drawn into the most miserable depression in our history.

These were not the solutions then and they are even less the solutions for today and for tomorrow. As late as the seventies, only around a tenth of our gross national product involved imports and exports. Today it is closer to a third. In fact, one of the great opportunities brought about by the end of the Cold War was that some two to three billion people from formerly communist economies are now scrambling to make a place for themselves in the international free market. That is two to three billion new producers and two to three billion new consumers.

And that opens possibilities for our nation that we could not have dreamed of during the Cold War. Does it today make sense to back away from these possibilities?

Can we stop exercising our international leadership at this critical juncture in history? We never stopped leading nor blanched from the tough choices during all those years when the other side threatened us with thousands of nuclear weapons. What is there about the world today that is so terrible that it should deter us from the mantle of international leadership?

Some argue that we are too exhausted from the travails of the Cold War to continue bearing the burdens of our leadership. Fifty years ago, a generation that had just fought World War Two, that had endured the cost of keeping one out of every ten American citizens in uniform, that had for three years spent over half of our gross national product on defense, and that just endured 300,000 dead and many hundreds of thousands more wounded didn't feel so exhausted and depleted that they would have withdrawn from Europe and Asia or that they would have left the fate of the world to the designs of a man named Stalin.

Thank God that they didn't or the world we inherited from them would have looked very different indeed.

Even during the most expensive years of the Reagan defense build-up, we never spent even a fifteenth of our gross

national product on defense and never were there more than one out of every one hundred and thirty Americans in uniform. And while there were casualties during the Cold War, certainly they were never on a scale with that earlier generation. We hardly have the excuse of exhaustion to fall back on.

No, I am sure that you and I here in this room know that we must stay engaged and that we must not let the challenges of a new era dissuade us from our responsibility to lead. Even if we were exhausted we would have to ask ourselves who but us would we want to have the most persuasive role in the world today. If we won't lead someone else will. That's a law of physics nature abhors vacuums. If not us, who?

Certainly, there is no other nation that has our vast resources to exercise international power. We may not be as economically strong as we were in the years right after the Second World War but we still produce nearly a quarter of the world's output, which is wholly out of proportion to the fact that Americans are less then five percent of the world's population.

We are still by far the wealthiest nation on earth and we will remain so far into the 21st Century. And culturally and socially, despite our drugs and our crime and whatever problems you might want to add to the list, we are still the world's most studied and admired nation and the one place where so many dream of one day immigrating to.

But to be able to lead we must preserve our military strength, for that is the backdrop that makes our diplomats the first among equals and that is the sword that is so implacably crucial to peace and stability in the world in regions where our interests remain great — in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East, and for our own security.

And I believe that despite the steep budget reductions and personnel drawdown of the past seven or eight years, that we have protected our military excellence. We kept readiness our highest priority and the benefits of that have been shown from the Gulf War, through the many dozens of contingencies and operations performed since then, just as it is on display today in Bosnia where our men and women are performing a tough and dangerous mission simply superbly.

We have reached the point where we send our forces out again and again never doubting that they will be ready to go on a moment's notice and never doubting that they will accomplish their mission no matter how tough.

Today we have the finest military in the world bar none; better trained and more ready than any other.

We have retained that excellence despite the fact that we have reduced our force by over a third and our defense budget by some 40 percent. 700,000 men and women who served this nation proudly and were all volunteers were asked to trade their uniforms for civilian clothes.

We have made the most dramatic reductions since the end of Vietnam and our forces are now the smallest since the Korean War, and the percentage of our national wealth we are spending on defense is the lowest it has been since Pearl Harbor.

Yes, we are the world's best, but if we are to protect our nation's interests wherever they might be challenged we cannot and we must not go any lower. We must preserve what we have and we must ensure that we sustain our excellence. We owe that to our children.

Look at how very often in the past few years we have called on our forces. And look around the world today — North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Haiti, Bosnia, Cuba, and terrorism. We must not reduce our forces any further.

But we must also continue to prepare this force for the challenges of the next century. It isn't enough to insure this force is ready today. We must also insure it will be ready tomorrow. And that means that we must replace aging equipment before it becomes too old and unreliable for use. And we must have a prudent modernization program.

You here in this room know better than any, that advances in electronics are rushing forward at breath-taking speed and as they do are transforming old notions and practices, certainly in the workplace and marketplace, but also on the battlefield. This revolution that you here are shepherding has the possibility of upending and significantly changing the way our future forces will operate and fight.

If we want to ensure that our excellence remains intact in the next century we in the military must capture the promise your industry holds before us. For the revolution in electronics is the essential ingredient of the revolution in military affairs just ahead of us. You and your industry must help us realize that marriage and help us attain the kinds of capabilities that will allow us to view and command the battlefield better than any potential adversary and maintain the superiority that our nation has come to expect and most certainly deserves from its Armed Forces.

At the same time we must protect the true source of our military excellence, and that is the remarkable men and women who wear America's uniform. They are as well educated, as proud, as dedicated, and as skilled as any force America has ever fielded. If we wish to keep them and continue to recruit more like them, then we must protect their pay and their benefits. I know of no wiser investment for this nation.

Now, I have probably already spoken long enough and I see the waiters gathering in the back and looking at their watches. So let me conclude by thanking you for this chance to share these thoughts.

Today we stand at the brink of a new era an era that promises to be safer and more secure and more prosperous than any that has come before. But only if America is willing and able to lead. To turn inward would be a mistake and a great disservice to those who have worked so hard and given so much to preserve our nation's guiding role in shaping the world.

But to remain strong requires strong armed forces and that in turn depends to a very large extent on you and I, your industry, and our Armed Forces working hand in hand to help keep our Armed Forces on the cutting edge of technology. Working together isn't just good business; it is essential for the security of our nation.

Again thank you so very much for your time and attention and I wish you all Godspeed.

Statement on the Chemical Weapon Convention
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
28 March 1996

I am pleased to be here today with the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State to testify on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and address the Convention's impact on the U.S. military. As I testified previously, the CWC represents a significant milestone in arms control in that it bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. The potential benefits of the Chemical Weapons Convention will have a positive impact on the lives of our service people and how the U.S. military fulfills its responsibility to national security.

Since I last testified, the Joint Staff has played an integral part in continuing negotiations in the Preparatory Commission concerning the specifics of the Convention's implementation. As such, I am well acquainted with the relative advantages and shortcomings of the Convention and its implications for the U.S. fighting force.

ADVANTAGES OF THE CWC

The most significant advantage derived from the Convention is the potential elimination of chemical weapons by state parties. Upon the Convention's entry into force, all state parties will be obligated to destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles. Currently, regardless of whether the CWC enters into force, the U.S. Army is required by national law (Public Law 99-145) to destroy the vast majority of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile by 2004. In fact we have currently destroyed 1,000 tons of CW on Johnston Island. The U.S. is presently the only state that is systematically conducting an ongoing chemical weapons destruction program. The Convention's imposition of an internationally recognizable legal obligation to destroy all chemical weapons will place all other CW capable state parties on equal footing with the U.S.

Nearly two-thirds of the countries believed to have chemical weapons programs are signatories to the Convention. While this does not imply that they will all ultimately become parties to the Convention, it does indicate a near universal acceptance of the Convention's objectives. The list of signatories includes the Russian Federation, which possesses the world's largest declared chemical weapons stockpile. The eventual destruction of approximately 40,000 tons of declared Russian chemical weapons will significantly reduce the chemical threat faced.

Another advantage of the Convention is a verification regime that allows the international Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to routinely monitor a state party's compliance. While no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, the CWC is effectively verifiable. It provides for complementary and overlapping verification requirements that help deter CW violations. The CWC does this through the most intrusive verification provisions of any arms control regime to date. This verification regime consists of declarations, routine inspections of declared facilities, and short notice challenge inspection of any facility. Of note, some of the convention's imperfection was intentional in order to protect our military interests. The regime allows military commanders to protect classified information, equipment, and facilities unrelated to the Convention.

The Convention is both an arms control agreement and a nonproliferation regime that restricts trade in specified chemicals to member states. Because of the Convention's trade restrictions and provisions, would-be proliferators will find it increasingly difficult to acquire the chemical precursors essential to building a chemical weapons stockpile. Signed by 160 states, and currently ratified by 47 states, including the major industrialized states, the Convention will help to defuse regional instability by reducing every state's ability to acquire a chemical weapons stockpile.

IMPACT OF CWC IMPLEMENTATION

While the Convention's verification provisions allow for compliance monitoring by the OPCW, its national implementation will require a significant effort by the U.S. military. First, all chemical weapons related facilities will be subject to routine declaration and verification. These include storage facilities in 10 geographic areas, former production facilities in 5 geographic areas, 3 existing destruction facilities, and those destruction facilities yet to be built.

Second, all military facilities will be susceptible, both within the U.S. and overseas, to short notice challenge inspections. All the Services, with On Site Inspection Agency assistance, have been preparing their facilities for these chemical weapons inspections. We have conducted site assistance visits, tabletop exercises and mock inspections to assist the CINCs, major commands and installation commanders in understanding their CWC inspection obligations.

Additionally, since I last testified we have successfully concluded a series of similar inspections conducted bilaterally with the Russians as "confidence building measures" associated with the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). These bilateral inspections, both routine and challenge, provided valuable information on how such inspections will be conducted and give us confidence that we will be able to successfully implement this intrusive multilateral inspection regime with little difficulty. While the preparations for these bilateral and potential CWC inspections have been costly in terms of personnel and resources, we are confident that U.S. facilities will be able to protect themselves against the disclosure of national security information and information on sensitive equipment and facilities through managed access.

Another critical element of CWC implementation is CW data declarations. Data declarations were prepared by the Services and Joint Staff and exchanged with Russia in compliance with the Wyoming MOU. Compiling these declarations provided the Services an excellent opportunity to develop the expertise and the databases required to comply with the Convention's declaration requirements. Previously this data was compiled using paper forms and long hand. This process is now being automated and we are confident we will be able to provide a real-time status of our declaration requirements.

DETERRENCE AND RETALIATION

U.S. forces are the best-equipped and trained forces in the world. The Defense Department maintains and is committed to maintaining a robust Chemical Biological Defense program. The program seeks to protect U.S. forces during all phases of the operational spectrum.

Even if chemical weapons are not introduced onto the battlefield, their threat of use impacts upon our military. Operating in a potential chemical environment affects both operational and logistical planning. Protective equipment displaces other commodities on cargo carriers and NBC defense units replace combat units in deployment plans. Protective equipment worn by military personnel for prolonged periods in a hot environment can degrade their performance.

The U.S. military's ability to deter chemical weapons in a post CWC world will be predicated upon both a robust CW defense capability, and the ability to rapidly bring to bear superior and overwhelming military force in retaliation to a chemical attack.

A robust chemical weapons defense program is essential not only to protect U.S. forces but also to ensure their combat effectiveness in a chemical environment. A well-trained and protected force will help deter any would be aggressor when contemplating the employment of chemical weapons against U.S. forces.

While U.S. forces will forego CW retaliation in kind we will retain a retaliatory capability second to none. Should deterrence fail, a chemical attack against U.S. forces would be regarded as an extremely grave action subject to an appropriate non-chemical response of our choosing. The U.S. will rely on the full range of military capabilities to deter CW use, and if need be retaliate, including the application of superior military force complemented by our robust CW defense program.

RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

In earlier testimony to the Committee on Armed Services both the DEPSECDEF and I were repeatedly questioned on the issue of Riot Control Agents. I would like to note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff met on 19 July 1995 and

reaffirmed our earlier position that "although we would have preferred to preserve all four options in EO 11850, we agreed with the administration that the benefits of the treaty outweighed the importance of preserving the two disputed options."

CWC IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST

From a military perspective, the Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly in our national interest. The Convention's advantages outweigh its shortcomings. The U.S. and all other CW capable state parties incur the same obligation to destroy their chemical weapons stockpile. While less than perfect, the verification regime allows for intrusive inspections while protecting national security concerns. The nonproliferation aspects of the Convention will retard the spread of chemical weapons, and in so doing, reduce the probability that U.S. forces may encounter chemical weapons in a regional conflict. Finally, while foregoing the ability to retaliate in kind, the U.S. military retains the wherewithal to deter and defend against a chemical weapons attack. I strongly support this convention and respectfully request your consent to ratification.

***Joint Force Quarterly* Magazine**
"A Word from the Chairman"
Spring 1996

The articles in the JFQ Forum provide a useful primer on the challenges of hemispheric security and the U.S. relationship with Latin America in the future. The pace of change and the salience of our interests here in our own backyard rival those of East Asia or Europe. However, absent significant threats or instabilities, they have drawn far less comment than either of those regions. In the future, we cannot afford to take this dynamic region for granted; it demands greater attention.

Latin America is a region of vast size and remarkable potential, a vibrant blend of the New World and the Old, a rich tapestry of ancient cultures and modern peoples. It is a geographic term for an amalgam of 450 million people, in 33 extremely diverse states, each with a unique sense of history and national purpose. To the United States, Latin America and the insular nations of the Caribbean are partners in three distinct but interactive ways: in the development of democracy, in trade and commerce, and in the creation of hemispheric security.

In the past decade, Latin America has been the site of extensive political development. A mere 10 years ago, the region was politically troubled, with half the states having authoritarian regimes, which repressed their people and mismanaged their economies. Central America in particular was a hotbed of instability, much of which emanated from the now out-of-office Sandinistas in Nicaragua or the destabilizing activities of Manuel Noriega in Panama. Most of the instability has passed. For the first time in history, every nation in Latin America, except Cuba, is a democracy, each one determined to foster representative institutions, respect human rights, and incorporate themselves into a wider world. The nations of Latin America today are striving to meet the ultimate standard of Simon Bolivar, La Liberator: "to be free under the auspices of liberal laws, emanating from the most sacred spring, which is the will of the people."

While much economic development work remains to be done, Latin America has jumped into the mainstream of the world economy. Many Latin American economies are surging and several now rank among the fastest growing in the world. This has allowed U.S. exports to Latin America in recent years to grow at an average annual rate of 21%, twice the rate of our export growth to the European Union. By the end of the century, U.S. trade with Latin America will likely exceed our trade with Europe.

Moreover, as the peoples of Latin America have achieved this impressive growth, they have avoided potentially ruinous regional arms races. Of all the regions in the world, Latin America today puts the least into military expenditures and has the fewest uniformed personnel per capita. Gone too are the once dominant notions that, for prosperity in Latin America, the economic pie in the hemisphere had to be redivided. We now live in an era where the nations of the hemisphere are working together to make the pie bigger, growing the Latin American economy to $2 trillion dollars by the turn of the century.

Our cooperation in the search for hemispheric security has made admirable progress. While we have worked together on improving the military's performance in our respective nations, we have also witnessed growing joint cooperation in the suppression of narcotics traffic, and in multilateral operations throughout the hemisphere. As old adversaries find new democratic partners, multinational training in Latin America is becoming commonplace. A total of

ten Latin American nations are also participating today in 13 peacekeeping operations around the world, including one on the border between Peru and Ecuador.

Most notable among the recent peace operations has been Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. There, under the UN banner, 24 nations, including 12 Latin American and Caribbean Basin states participated in the well planned operation that stabilized that beleaguered nation. Much work remains to be done in Haiti, but it clearly stands as a high water mark for hemispheric security cooperation. As Secretary Perry noted: "Peacekeeping in the Americas, in support of conflict resolution and democracy, is more than a principle — it is a reality."

In 1995, military cooperation in the hemisphere reached an all-time high when the defense ministers of 33 nations met to discuss ways to further defense cooperation. They agreed to support openness and transparency to lower threat perceptions, to subordinate their military forces to democratically elected leaders, and to resolve outstanding disputes through negotiated settlements. Because of this conference, cooperation between our defense forces, in support of their legally constituted functions, is at an all time high.

While much has been accomplished, much remains to be done for hemispheric security. In particular, in the years ahead, working with our democratic neighbors, the United States looks forward to:

- Increasing cooperation and broadening regional successes against drug traffic, a major threat to U.S. security and to the health of the economy and society in many Latin American countries;
- Improving our controls over immigration in the region;
- Deepening our military-to-military contacts and furthering our multinational training opportunities; and
- Restructuring our command and control organization to accommodate modern conditions in the region, including the movement in 1997 of SOUTHCOM headquarters to Miami.

While Latin America will remain a very active region in the future, our military activity there takes place at a very low cost to the United States. Given the low threat from extra-regional powers and the proliferation of democracy throughout the region, we have achieved a very high level of security in the hemisphere at the cost of only a small fraction of a percent of the U.S. defense budget and at less than 5 percent of our worldwide security assistance expenditures. From these facts, a classical strategist might conclude that for the United States, with its global interests and commitments, Latin America is an important region, but one that is also an economy of force area. That is true, and with continued emphasis on democracy, the market economy, and collective security in the region, Latin America will happily remain so in the future.

World Affairs Council
Boston, Massachusetts
4 April 1996
U.S. National Security: Into The Next Century

The World Affairs Council and its related organizations are performing a very important public service, educating their communities on defense and foreign affairs. I am happy to be part of your program, especially on the odd spring day in Boston when it is not snowing.

Mark Twain once said that, "tonight I appear for the first time before a [typical] Boston audience – 4,000 critics!" I am twice luckier than Twain, because 1) there's only 200 Bostonians here today and 2) your President assures me that I am among friends or at least constructive critics!

It is a pleasure to be here or any other place than the Pentagon. It is such a hectic place that we say: "A day away from the Pentagon is a day of leave." So, thanks for the vacation and the chance to come here to talk to you about national security.

As the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense on military affairs, I have a wide range of responsibilities, chief of which is to ensure that, above all else, our military remains strong enough to fight and win our nation's wars, and that in peace, our military is ready to provide the muscle behind our diplomacy. Not surprisingly then, a good deal of my energy is devoted to overseeing today's force, where operational issues and readiness predominate; and insuring that tomorrow's force will be structured, sized, manned and equipped to protect our interests, well into the next century. And so, I thought that I would give you a report about today's force, and tell you what I see, as we move down the road to build tomorrow's force.

CHANGES IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

For both today's force and tomorrow's, what's past is prologue! Today, choking on change, we often fixate on the uncertainties, the instabilities and the conflicts of a world grown all too complex, crowded, and contentious. However, in all this talk about the dangerous world around us, it is all too easy to overlook the fact that, today, the United States and its Allies are much safer than we were in the dark days of the Cold War.

Just ten years ago, we were locked in a global struggle with the Soviet Union. Thousands of nuclear weapons were pointed at our homes. And massive armies stared at each other across a line, drawn through the heart of Central Europe. Out of necessity, we designed and sized our forces primarily for one, apocalyptic, worse case scenario: global war against the Soviet Union. And, in large measure, because we did, we never had a third world war. But let us not forget that the Cold War wasn't always cold. We spent trillions of dollars to make sure the Soviet Union would never attack us. But we also lost 95,000 valiant Americans in limited conflicts of the Cold War, conflicts which were fought in the hope that World War III would never come. Like all wars, the Cold War finally ended.

While it is true, as George Kennan had predicted in 1947, that the Soviet Union ultimately collapsed under the weight of its own inefficient and inhumane system, it is equally important to remember that our resolute foreign and defense policy, our strength, and the vitality of our Allies, created the preconditions for victory in the Cold War. Like the two previous earthquakes this century, World War I and World War II, the end of the Cold War produced changes of earthquake proportions. The landscape has changed dramatically, and the aftershocks will be with us for a long time to come.

It is important to remember that we are living in a time of transitions and that we cannot yet clearly see the contours of the post-Cold War world. And, until we do, it will be wise to remain prepared for the unexpected. The end of the Cold War was neither the end of history, nor was it the end of the need for a strong national defense, because, while we are in fact safer today than we were during the Cold War, there remain very valid reasons why we must maintain a strong defense, today, and into the future.

The first reason to maintain our strength is the possibility of regional conflicts in areas of vital interest to us: in Europe; East Asia; and in the Middle East. Since DESERT STORM, our ability to deal successfully with two major regional contingencies, MRCs in the language of the Pentagon, occurring nearly simultaneously, has become the bedrock on which we have built our forces. Moreover, our need to project power, and to do so as part of a coalition, means that we must also maintain a significant peacetime presence overseas, to deter conflict, reassure our allies and facilitate power projection.

These facts are not difficult to understand, but increasingly these common sense notions have come under fire. This is a critical issue. We must keep a "two MRC" force. This is critical for us especially for plans concerning Korea and the Middle East. But there are other reasons too. A two contingency force will give us a larger margin of safety in our essentially unpredictable world. Also, a "one MRC" force or even a "one and one-half MRC" force, whatever that is, would tempt aggressors to move in other theaters, once U.S. forces had been committed. Finally, we may find that major peacekeeping operations detract from the amount of forces available for contingency missions. We will do our best to plan around that becoming a problem, but in military affairs, you can't live on the margin. In short, a "one MRC" force is not a sufficient capability for a global power.

Moving on, a second reason for maintaining a strong defense is the need to prevent or deal with the effects of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We will, of course, continue to maintain a nuclear deterrent, today, consistent with START I limits, and, hopefully, in the not too distant future, reduced to our START II obligations. The U.S. and its allies will also have to continue our work on missile defenses.

Finally, we must also maintain the strength and flexibility to contend with the instabilities, the crises, and unrest, stemming from the 30-odd conflicts that are on-going in the world today. It is not our job to resolve all of these conflicts, but, prudently and selectively, we will have to deal with some of them, when our major interests are at stake.

We are today the sole dominant power in the world, with global interests to protect, and a responsibility to lead. The American people have a great stake in peace and stability around the world. Today, business and commerce are global activities. A third of America's national product depends on trade. We are and will remain, for the foreseeable future, the richest and most powerful nation on earth, in large measure due to our global commerce.

Thus, a strong military, in the service of a prudent, leadership-oriented foreign policy, makes sense for America today, and it will make sense well into the future. Without American leadership, international security would suffer, and so ultimately would the welfare and prosperity of all Americans. True, we must continue to press International Organizations and our allies to do more, within their limitations. But we must never forget that, overall America puts the most

into international security, because America gets the most out of a secure and stable international system. When all is said and done, we can neither pull back from the world, nor relinquish the leadership that we have exercised so well, and to such extraordinary effect since the end of World War II. After all, we tried insulating ourselves from the world's problems throughout the first half of this century. And, for that, we found ourselves in two world wars!

Today, in our troubled world, in an Information Age, where global communications and international commerce have dramatically shrunk the globe, can we turn our backs on the world, hunker down in Fortress America, and let fate take its course? We must be clear. Today, and in the future, the United States must lead, and, to do so, it must maintain a strong military and a vibrant overseas presence. Still, the passing of the Cold War has enabled us to make significant cuts in our defense establishment.

HOW TODAY'S ARMED FORCES ARE COPING WITH CHANGE

One of the great strategic benefits from the end of the Cold War is that we have been able to safely cut our forces. Let me give you a few examples of how dramatic these cuts have been.

Since 1989, we have reduced our forces by 700,000 men and women in uniform, about a third of the force. We are now smaller, in terms of active duty personnel, than we were before the Korean War. The Army went from 18 active divisions to 10, a reduction of 45 percent. The Navy went from 546 ships to 357, a reduction of 35 percent. The Air Force went from 36 to 20 fighter wings, a reduction of 45 percent. The defense budget has been reduced by 40 percent in real terms, since 1985, its Cold War high. We now spend less of a percentage of our national wealth on defense, only 3.2 percent, than at any time since before World War II.

Overall, through hard work in the Armed Forces, sound leadership in the field, and a high degree of support from the Administration and Congress, we have been able to manage this huge drawdown superbly, and create a much smaller yet fully capable force, one that is as capable and as ready as any force in the world today, and one that is better tailored to this new strategic environment. Yet, throughout the drawdown, this smaller force has been engaged in an unprecedented number of contingencies around the world, all of which have been accomplished superbly.

Our Armed Forces have indeed been very busy in a wide range of operations from Panama to DESERT STORM, to Somalia, to Haiti, and to Bosnia. Today, some 50,000 men and women are participating in 11 separate operations around the globe. By the way, our participation in the operation in Haiti ended last month on schedule. There are only a handful of U.S. troops there now. For the first time in Haiti's history, an elected president has turned over power peacefully to another elected president. That in itself is a historic milestone.

While some might wish to debate the merits of our going to Haiti, one cannot fail to appreciate the outstanding performance of our military there. They did all that they were asked to do and did it superbly. We know that Haiti still faces a tough developmental challenge. However, we know that we have helped that beleaguered nation take a step toward democracy and development. In the process, we have also helped our Gulf Coast states by lessening the horrendous burden of thousands more Haitian refugees.

Now our major effort is in Bosnia, where some 20,000 service men and women are performing their military tasks with great expertise and professionalism. Like Haiti, where coordination between diplomacy and military force proved so very effective and established a benchmark for such coordination in the future, the coordination on the Bosnia issue between the diplomat and the soldier reached a new height during the negotiations, that lead to the Dayton agreement. For the first time, those who would be charged with the implementation of the military aspects of the agreement were there, not just as advisors, but as actual negotiators.

To a large extent because of this, but also because of sound planning, thorough preparation and planning, and solid leadership, the military aspects of the Bosnia operation are going quite well. However, what is badly needed is a redoubled civilian effort. While nine months still remain until NATO's IFOR withdraws, we must not let more time to slip through our fingers. That is true, not only for those helping the warring factions, but it is also true for the Muslims and Croats who make up the federation, as well as for the Bosnian Serbs. It requires a total compliance with the terms of the Dayton agreement and a total commitment to peace and to the rebuilding of a multiethnic nation. If the commitment is there, one year will be long enough for IFOR. If the commitment isn't there, then staying longer than the year won't help.

We should be clear in our minds about one thing: IFOR can help by peace enforcement in Bosnia, but only the Bosnians themselves — Muslims, Croats, and Serbs — can make a lasting peace in that troubled land. Meanwhile, U.S. forces in IFOR will continue with the implementation of the military tasks, will assist the civilian effort where it can without interfering with the military tasks, or getting themselves drawn into tasks which are more appropriate for

civilian organizations. Through their presence, our forces will continue to improve the security climate, and further freedom of movement.

Our service men and women serve with equal distinction worldwide. Just as in Bosnia, they are performing superbly in the Middle East, where some 23,000 overall serve as observers on the border between Israel and Egypt, where they enforce the no-fly zones in Iraq to help protect the Kurds and the Shiias, and where they enforce the sanctions against Iraq.

Others keep the peace on the border between Peru and Ecuador, while still others have been keeping a watchful eye over the recent tensions in the Taiwan Straits. Finally, some 34,000 stand guard on the Korean peninsula, where tensions are always high, and where miscalculation is always a possibility.

In short, today's force is much smaller but even busier than its Cold War predecessor. It has high quality people, first-rate equipment, and the training and readiness that have brought about a string of operational successes that we all can be proud of. Today's force has set a high standard for the kind of force that we will need in the future.

THE FUTURE

Let me say a few words about the future, its challenges, and the force that we have begun to develop to meet them.

First, no one knows what the future security environment will be like. We currently believe that it will be at least as challenging as the present one. In potential regional hotspots, for example, we will almost certainly witness drastic changes in the leadership and the nature of the regimes. In North Korea and Cuba, as well as a few potentially hostile states in the Middle East, there will undoubtedly be destabilizing change. These transitions will likely entail additional risks, risks that will require the U.S. and its allies to maintain strong defenses.

In addition to the threats we've talked about, we have to be prepared for strategic surprises, hard-to-predict phenomena, such as hostile, nuclear-capable, regional adversaries, or even the renewal of great power competition. How information technologies will affect each region and the various types of warfare is another area where surprises may come. In all, we have to keep our eye on what's important. In particular, the long-range future will be determined much more by developments in Moscow, Beijing, Tokyo, and in West Europe than it will be in the smaller hot spots where we are engaged in peace operations today.

With that as a given, three key tasks stand out as mandatory for peace and stability in the future.

First, the U.S. must nurture and maintain its current, major alliances in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East. This will preserve the possibility for collective action and also keep our increasingly rich allies from having to seek security on their own. Former allies can become competitors; current allies will not, unless we prove feckless or fickle.

Secondly, we must, as a top priority, continue to engage Moscow and Beijing and encourage them to move toward democracy and free market economies. This will be a long and rough road in each of these nations. However, continuous engagement today will be much cheaper and far more effective than containment in the future. In the long term, we may not be wholly successful but clearly, we should give engagement every chance to succeed.

Third, we must ensure that our strength remains commensurate with our international obligations, now and into the future. On the military side, we have spent a lot of time in the Pentagon working on a new study, *Joint Vision 2010*, which aims to match our quality people with advanced technology in order to give U.S. forces dominance across the full range of future military operations. We are not ready to unveil this study, but, in thinking about future capabilities, we kept coming back to the need to match up our quality people with first-class equipment and creative training. Let me start where the future begins, and that's with our men and women in uniform.

We have inspiring men and women in the Armed Forces today. They are well led, and well trained, not just for warfighting tasks, but also for the specific missions that they have been given. They are and will remain the most essential aspect of our military power in the future. And we have to think of the future, not just in terms of technology, but also in terms of people and leader development, that lengthy process of training, education, and experience that it takes to get leaders ready to bear the burdens they will have to carry. To prepare for the future means we must think about how we train and educate our leaders and sustain their abilities.

For example, the battalion commanders and ship captains of the year 2010 are ROTC and Service Academy cadets today. Their brigade commanders are 25 years old and have just risen to the rank of captain or naval lieutenant. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the year 2010 is waiting today (probably a bit impatiently) to be promoted to lieutenant colonel or commander in the Navy. These leaders and the other men and women of the Armed Forces, and the families who support them, must be nurtured, supported, and treasured. And that, of course, will take a lot of the

nation's treasure, today and into the future! Quality people are the key to operational success. We must not let funding for people or leader development in the Armed Forces become the bill payer for budget cuts.

In the end, the quality of life for our troops also means that we must maintain force levels that match the tasks and the peacetime operating tempo of our units. We cannot have all of our troops deployed on operations all of the time. We must have backup units, replacements, and reserves. Some redundancy in the force is good. All of the Chiefs agree with me on one point: today's force structure is the minimum essential force that we need.

Each of the service Chiefs of Staff has his own set of examples which depict how much stress the force is under. For example, the Army tells us that the average soldier was deployed 138 days away from his or her home station last year. In the Air Force, 7 major aircraft, their crews, and their immediate support personnel were away from their home station on the average of 120 days. Sailors and marines have too little time between deployments.

If you shrink the force structure but you continue to stress it, what will happen to quality of life? What will happen to retention? What will happen to readiness? Today we have the minimum essential force for the challenging set of missions that it is carrying out. Barring unforeseen gains in efficiency, I cannot imagine our force structure in the future getting much smaller without a deep cut in our capabilities or the tempo of our operations. Again, this means that, tomorrow we will have to spend a lot of money on maintaining a force similar in size, structure and capabilities to today's force. Just as important, we will have to make sure that we have the wherewithal to retain the best service men and women in the force. Again, this won't be cheap!

I must tell you, as I did the Congress a few weeks ago, that our high levels of readiness and fast-paced operations in today's force have not been without serious costs for both tomorrow's force. Spending on current operations and readiness has caused us to cut back on buying replacement equipment and have slowed the development of new systems. Our procurement spending, about $40 billion now, is, in real terms, lower than it was before the Korean War.

As I told the Congress, I have recommended that the Armed Forces commit themselves to the adequate recapitalization of our force structure. This will require procurement spending of approximately $60 billion annually, within our current budget projections. This will take tough management decisions, innovation, and even revolutionary approaches, as well as the continued bipartisan support of the Congress, to accomplish this task.

To accomplish this radical change, we are going to have to work harder, but even more importantly, we are going to have to work smarter. The alternative is a rusty force with outmoded equipment. One essential measure to help us make this radical shift is to develop joint war fighting requirements that will enable all of the Services, together, to harness the power of their people to the best available technologies and war fighting concepts. Joint effort will be the key to developing a force that is both affordable and potent enough to dominate its opponents across the full spectrum of military operations. This is what we attempted to do in our new study, *Joint Vision 2010*.

Let me leave you with my thanks and that of all of the people in uniform for your support. We couldn't have had success with today's force without the support of the people and the Congress. We will need your support in the future, if the force tomorrow is to maintain the level of success that today's force has had. While we are keenly aware of how expensive the Armed Forces is, we know that the only thing more expensive than a good force, is not having the right one, trained and ready, when you need it.

Thank you and God bless you.

Graduation Speech
United States Naval Academy
Annapolis, Maryland
24 May 1996

I am delighted to be here today to congratulate you and to convey to you the special trust and confidence of the President as you begin your service to our nation and its great Naval Services. I am filled with joy for you on this great day.

But today, I am mindful as well that only on Tuesday this week, we had gathered under the vaulted ceilings of our Nation's majestic cathedral to pay proper tribute to a great naval captain, my friend, Admiral Mike Boorda. It was a fitting service for a man who did so much to keep our Navy the finest in the world.

Admiral Boorda loved the Navy and was convinced that the greatness of our Navy was rooted in the magnificence of its sailors and its officers.

He liked to come here to Annapolis to talk to you. And if Admiral Boorda were here today, he would let you know

how proud he was of the Class of '96 and its accomplishments. I know his thoughts about this subject because one of the last times I spoke to him, we talked at length about Annapolis and this very graduation ceremony. Today, I will, as I have in the past, heed my friend's wise counsel.

And so as he suggested, I want to celebrate the achievements of the class and assure you of my confidence in you to grasp the opportunities that lie ahead and to meet head-on the challenges that await you.

Above all else, I want to remind the Class of '96 about how great our Navy and our Marine Corps really are. Yes, what needs fixing will be fixed, but the Navy and Marine Corps that you join today — that is the "A Team;" make no mistake about it.

The Navy and Marine Corps that you join today have served our nation well and faithfully for more than two centuries. Look around you at the battles whose names appear on the walls of this stadium. Midway, Iwo Jima, Normandy, Inchon, Mekong Delta, DESERT STORM. They read like the history of America and that's because the Naval Services have played such a large role in the history of America.

For over two hundred and twenty years, our Naval Services have gone in harm's way first to build and then to safeguard our nation. And beginning today, you will have the privilege to help lead them into the twenty-first century.

But you didn't reach today all by yourself. So many people have helped you and encouraged you over these four years here at Annapolis. First among your supporters have been your parents.

So before I go any further, I would ask all the parents now to rise, and I would ask the Class of '96 and everyone else here to please join with me in a round a applause for the parents of the Class of 1996. I share your pride in your sons and daughters. They are America's future and our future looks very good indeed.

While I am happy to be in the front rank of those congratulating you, there is yet another reason why I wanted to join with you today. This great institution, its leadership, and its midshipmen have all come under criticism of late.

Those of us who choose to wear America's uniform choose as well to live by a higher code of conduct and to surrender ourselves to public scrutiny. And that is entirely proper, for America entrusts the lives of its sons and daughters into our care and America has the right to demand a full accounting of our stewardship.

Eighty years ago, President Woodrow Wilson stood here at Annapolis and explained why public scrutiny of our Armed Forces was and remains to this day so intense. He reminded the Class of 1916 that, "You cannot indulge yourselves in weaknesses ... You cannot forget your duty for a moment, because there might come a time when that weak spot in you should affect you in the midst of a great engagement and then the whole history of the world might be changed by what you did not do or did wrong."

One year later the Class of 1916 was in war.

So the stakes are enormous and you must remember that constructive criticism when honestly and wisely sifted will make us stronger. Learn from criticism, stay open, grow stronger, and don't fall into the trap of becoming defensive of circling your wagons against imaginary enemies outside. That will only weaken you.

But critics also have responsibilities — to be balanced, to be objective, and to look at all the facts. And while they scrutinize the problems of the few, they must also today celebrate the accomplishments of the many. In that regard I hope all the critics can see in its totality how magnificent the Class of '96 really is.

You volunteered to come here, you made it through a blistering plebe year, you tackled one of the most rigorous academic programs in the nation, you succeeded in one of the toughest four-year leadership laboratories ever devised, and you excelled against fierce athletic competition.

You have proven your mettle: in the classroom; on patrol boats with the fleet; at "Leatherneck;" and on the athletic field. And you didn't just make the grade at the Academy, you made a mark.

With intensity, intelligence, and integrity you have earned the rank that you will wear today. I am proud and America is blessed to have you, the Naval Academy Class of 1996, in the United States Armed Forces. For in today's complex, crowded, and contentious world, America needs your talents, your energy, and your optimism.

You see, on the one hand we are safer today now that the Cold War has passed into the pages of history. But on the other hand, the world is awash in failed states, regional conflicts, and the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The old Chinese curse has come alive – we live in interesting times.

While the end of the Cold War allowed us to drawdown our military, this paradoxical world demanded that we keep this small force potent and fully ready. And that high readiness is essential, for our forces have stayed very busy these past 5 years and have been very successful in over 40 operations in peace and war wherever America's interests are at stake and America's leadership was needed.

And the Naval Services have always, always, done their part superbly. When we needed to send a strong message in the Taiwan Straits, when we needed to rescue a pilot downed over Bosnia, when suddenly we had to rush to a chaotic

place called Liberia to evacuate American citizens, or today to do the same thing in the Central African Republic, or when the need arose to deter some renegade dictator from attacking his neighbor time after time, the Naval Services have been the vanguard of our nation's power.

Recently Secretary Perry told the Congress what all of our Allies believe, what every dictator fears, and what every potential aggressor knows: "America has the best damned Navy in the world and no one should ever forget that."

And that Navy will be a key part of our security in the years to come. We don't know what the twenty-first century will bring. But we are sure that it will be every bit as challenging and exciting as the current era.

So we will have to remain strong, we will have to remain ready, and we the United States we will have to continue to lead. To do that requires that we maintain the best military in the world and from this day forward we have your best efforts as the new generation of leaders. And your development as leaders is why you were here these past four years.

Annapolis, for more than 150 years, has been a well spring of great military leaders. Today under the leadership of Admiral Chuck Larson and under the guidance of a first-rate faculty that has educated and trained you, that great tradition of leadership continues.

And today you become the heirs to the legacy of John Paul Jones, of Lejeune, of Nimitz, and of Burke. You start out no different than did the Great Captains, officers like Medal of Honor winner Vice Admiral Johnny Bulkeley, who led his PT boats through a blockade around the Philippines, saved the life of Douglas MacArthur, and who later commanded a flotilla of boats in the fight for the Normandy beaches.

They made a movie about Johnny Bulkeley and his wartime exploits. It was called: "They Were Expendable." It was a great film about heroism, but its title was way off the mark. Leaders like Johnny Bulkeley, officers of courage and integrity, are never expendable — they are indispensable. They aren't part of naval history — they are naval history.

And today, the legacy of the Great Captains of old lives on all over the Navy and Marine Corps. Our Naval Services are the world standard. And the thing that makes that so is leadership. So what must you do to be a good leader?

There is no simple answer to that question. Leadership like all things human is one part situation, one part mystery. It is not physics, it is somewhere between poetry and chemistry — human chemistry.

But in my nearly 40 years of experience the great leaders whom I have known, from Petty Officer to Admiral, have all had three attributes in common: competence; care; and character.

Competence is the cornerstone of leadership. You must be an expert in your field today and tomorrow. Sailors and marines will not follow you if you don't know your business. The President can commission you an officer, but you must develop the competence that will make you a leader.

We in the Armed Forces put a special premium on competence. In business, if you falter the firm may lose money. In the military if you falter, sailors and marines may die, a battle may be lost, a national interest forfeited. We must be competent and competent under the most trying of conditions.

And competence does not just mean being good at your job today. Competence also means preparing yourself for tomorrow's challenges, looking ahead, studying, and gaining an appreciation for the "big picture."

To be competent in the challenging future that you will face, you will have to continue your education in the classroom, on the carriers, and in your communities. Because of the enormous weight of your responsibilities, you will have to achieve a broader perspective than is normally associated with any single profession. And you must apply the insights of your broad-gauged learning to your profession.

And while you are thinking about your profession as you continue to learn about it in the days and months and years ahead, you will, time and again come back to the centrality of caring for the sailors and marines entrusted to you.

Caring must be a constant. When your sailors or marines have a problem you have a problem. Their families are part of your family. And in every measure their successes or their failures will be yours as well.

The best leaders are those who care the most for their subordinates. As in all human relationships, the care that you demonstrate for the sailors and marines entrusted to you will be returned tenfold.

Caring doesn't mean coddling. If you care for your subordinates you will first and foremost make sure that they are ready mentally, physically, and spiritually for the rigors of modern combat.

Caring also means persistence, especially persistence in fighting for justice for the men and women in your charge. Who could not be moved by the recently published story of the World War II officer who fought for 52 years to make sure that a black sergeant in his unit, killed in an act of heroism but denied the Medal of Honor because of racism, was given his just dues?

In May of this year, the name of Staff Sergeant Ruben Rivers of the Company A 761st Tank Battalion was for-

warded to the President and to Congress to receive the nation's highest award. This came after 52 years of effort by his old Company Commander, Captain David Williams. That's persistence, that's caring, that's leadership.

And the final aspect of leadership, its essence, is character. One can debate its constituent parts for hours but clearly the core element of character is integrity — knowing what's right and then acting on it.

Integrity is our anchor in the stormy sea of temptation, manipulation, and moral relativism. For us integrity is both morally right and militarily practical. We believe Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale who, in reflecting on his seven and a half years of experience as a POW in Vietnam, said that, "When supported by education, one's integrity can give a person something to rely on when perspective seems to blur, when rules and principles seem to waver, and when faced with a hard choice of right and wrong. To urge people to develop it is not a statement of piety but of practical advice."

As an officer, your word must be your bond and you must be true to yourself. You can not for long fool the sailors or marines under your command. If you are dishonest with them they will know it. But if you are honest with them, if you are fair, if you look out for them when the chips are down, their trust, their belief in you will mean the difference between victory and defeat.

You must be a beacon of integrity. Your personal integrity will become the basis for the integrity of your crew or unit and the cornerstone of its ethical climate. Good ethics catches on bad ethics spreads like wildfire. Remember the words of General Lejeune, the legendary Marine Commandant, "You [must] never forget the power of example."

I could regale you here with inspirational stories of integrity. There are many such anecdotes, but instead let me leave you with a question, an ethical acid test used by someone well known to you, Admiral Chuck Larson.

When confronted with moral quandaries ask yourself, "Would I be proud to tell my family what I did today?" If you can answer "yes" to that question you will stay on the right path.

In a few moments you will take the oath "to support and defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic." Nowhere in that sacred oath does it remind you that you must be competent, nowhere does it remind you that you must deeply care for the sailors and marines entrusted to your charge, and nowhere does it remind you that you must be a beacon of integrity.

Indeed, the framers of this oath no doubt presumed that if you could "well and faithfully discharge the duties" of your office that you would know these things. They presumed that if you qualified to take this sacred oath, you would already understand and live by President Wilson's admonition to the Class of 1916: Remember in all things "yours is the honor of the United States" of America.

And America today, from this day forward, is better off because you the Class of '96 bring to our Armed Forces your splendid education, your hopes, your vision, and your leadership. From this day forward as you face the challenges of leadership in the twenty-first century, you will stand with the best and the bravest of the Navy and the Marine Corps.

And from this day forward, the world will see what Admiral Mike Boorda told me about you just the other day: that you are well-prepared, that you are able, and that you are ready to lead.

God bless you the Class of '96 and God bless this great institution, the United States Naval Academy.

Constitution Day — Citizenship Day
National Archives
Washington, DC
17 September 1996

I am delighted to be here for Constitution Week, the commemoration of the Constitutional Convention's adoption of the U.S. Constitution in 1787. The 17th of September honors the day when an amazing group of citizens ended their long debate and finally approved the document you see before you.

209 years ago, 55 men made their way to Philadelphia. They came by horse across rugged fields, on boats down the rivers, and along the shores in buggies on dirt roads forever marked with the ruts of revolutionary cannon. They planned to arrive on the 14th of May 1787, but travel was so difficult that after 2 weeks only 29 members were in place. It would be a few weeks more before all 55 took their seats at the convention.

Thanks to the papers of James Madison, we know that for four months the delegates vigorously debated every sentence of this great document. They argued about how states should be represented in Congress; some wanted representation based on their wealth while others preferred state population. They wondered if the new western states that might emerge should have as much influence as the original thirteen states. They argued about how the President

should be elected. At one point Alexander Hamilton tried to convince the Convention that we needed a king — elected for life. Jacob Broom of Delaware suggested the President serve as long as he maintained "good behavior." Wouldn't that have changed American history!

Others, strongly objected to the printing of paper money by the United States, preferred to pay in gold or silver coin. Madison, afraid the currency would be worthless, suggested the treasury back our currency with something valuable — like wheat.

Afraid of a military dictatorship, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts warned that a standing army in peacetime "would be dangerous to liberty and unnecessary."

They also expressed concerns about immigrants. Not about whether the United States should allow immigration, since many of the members like you were foreign born, but rather about how long one should be a citizen before being allowed to run for Congress.

As an interesting fact, did you know that today, two Senators and nine members of the House of Representatives were born in foreign countries?

Finally, on Saturday the 15th of September, George Washington called for a voice vote of the delegates to agree to the Constitution. By this time, only 42 of the original 55 members remained. Some left to attend to business and others left in disgust because they believed the states had lost too much power. But the draft of the constitution passed that day.

Today, the 17th of September, is also celebrated as Citizenship Day in honor of immigrants like you that choose to become a part of this great nation.

My own "Citizenship Day" is not in September, but rather in May. For it was in May of 1958 in Peoria, Illinois, that my father, mother, and I marched down to the courthouse and together, with a whole host of others, raised our hands like you just did. And like you became citizens of the United States of America.

It was a simple ceremony; no band, no V.I.P.s, and no long-winded guest speaker. The presiding Judge spoke and the one line I remember the best was, "In our great land it doesn't matter on which boat we came to this country, because now we are all in the same boat."

The day might have been simple, but it was still the most important day of my life. Because for the very first time I was a citizen of a nation. Not just any nation, but the world's greatest nation, the United States of America.

You see, I came here as a refugee — my parents had been without a country. When I was born, we stayed stateless until we came to this great land. And they came here with a dream for themselves and for their children. A dream not unlike the dream that has brought you to this magnificent hall. The dream, I suspect, that every man and woman that came to this shore has had in common with us.

I once heard someone ask, "What's the difference between the American Dream and everybody else's dream?" The answer is that, "Everybody else's dream is to come to America." That's the dream to come to America that binds us all together.

So in 1952 we fulfilled my parents dream to come to this magical place called America. A country, where if you worked hard, you could become anything you wanted to be: a cowboy; a banker; or even Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

When I first arrived in the United States as a 16 year old, I spoke little English, probably just enough to say "yes," "no," and "thank you." I found that the words "thank you" would go a long way but not enough to get me through school.

And so my parents insisted that within days of arriving in our new home, that I go to school and learn English, perhaps like many of your parents, so that I could succeed in school and enjoy all that America had to offer. I graduated from high school and went on to college.

And then in May 1958, I had a most exciting month. That month I finally became a citizen of this country. Later that month I graduated from college as a new engineer. Within days, I was drafted into the United States Army. Aren't you glad we stopped the draft?

I certainly did not intend to make the military my profession. But in time, the excitement of military duty and deep satisfaction of serving my new country convinced me that the Army is where I belonged. That is now 38 years ago and I could not have had a more marvelous life, playing a small role in defending my parents' dream.

And to all of us today, America is still the New World, a world with unlimited opportunities for those who work hard to realize their dreams. Our success as a nation is based on the fact that although we come from so many different lands, we share a common set of beliefs about freedom and the dignity of man.

For you, today is the dawn of a new day.

It doesn't matter how old or young you are, not whether you're big or small, a man or a woman, for today you are

Americans. Members of the greatest democracy in the history of civilization, champions of individual rights, and defenders of freedom.

And for this honor, a distinction that is the envy of the world, our fellow citizens ask we immigrants join them in assuming the responsibilities of citizenship. That we respect and defend the Constitution of the United States — this wonderful document we honor this week. That we become productive members of our new country, using our talents, whatever they may be, to strengthen our neighborhoods, improve our communities, and enhance the workings of government. That we exercise our rights as citizens to participate in the election of our representatives. That we obey the laws of the land, and finally, that we respect the rights of others.

Since the first settlers set foot on this continent, America has been the land of opportunity or as one author called it a "golden door." We are, as President Lyndon Johnson once said, "...not a nation ... but a nation of nations." Never before have we been so diverse and so rich for the contributions of our new citizens in the fields of science, engineering, government, medicine, the arts, and so many other endeavors.

America is an orchard. Every day new rootstock is planted from foreign lands in the soils of freedom. From this rootstock grow new family trees with blossoms pollinated with the responsibility of citizenship. Trees that bear new varieties of fruit with names like Scalia, Iacocca, Powell, Chu, and Adolfo. These trees enrich the environment in which we live. They produce the oxygen we need to continue, they bear fruit of enviable quality, and they drop the seeds we need to survive. Once you leave this place of honor today it is up to you whether the orchard thrives or fails.

Today, you join the ranks of those that must jealously guard our freedom. It is not an easy task, but a task that must be done if the next generation of Americans is to prosper. One of my officers told me of the day he attended the funeral of his grandmother a few years ago. As he stood at the graveside he was moved not so much by the eulogy for his grandmother but by what he saw on a nearby headstone. There honoring a man with a distinctly East European name, his children had engraved the following words, "Thanks for bringing us to America Dad."

"Thanks for bringing us to America;" six simple words that will be said by every new generation of Americans those with the names Berry, Yee, Jared, Tran, Santa Cruz, and all the rest of you sitting here today.

I congratulate you on this "your" Citizenship Day. God Bless you and God Bless America.

Congressional Testimony on General Downing Report
On Khobar Towers Bombing
Washington, DC
18 September 1996

Before I elaborate on some of the major initiatives we have undertaken following the terrorist attack on Khobar Towers, I would first like to again express my deep condolences to the families of those 24 brave airmen who so tragically lost their lives to terrorists on the Arabian Peninsula in the last 10 months.

I would also like to briefly reflect on the magnitude and complexity of the missions of Central Command as well as on the dedication, professionalism, and heroism of the men and women of that command. Since 1992, CENTCOM has flawlessly executed so many diverse missions, the most widely known of which is Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Southern Iraq. This mission alone requires on the average over 2,300 air sorties per month.

But this is only the beginning. Within the last two years, CENTCOM also conducted continuous Maritime Intercept Operations as well as five major contingency operations, including most recently the air strikes in the southern no-fly zone. All of this was accomplished over lines of communication stretching more than 12,000 sea miles between the United States and the Gulf.

CENTCOM has not just been busy, they have also been highly effective at getting the job done; certainly starting with ejecting Saddam from Kuwait, but year after year then deterring further attacks against our allies and the region's oil supply as well as enforcing U.N. Security Council Resolutions. In short, protecting America's vital interests. And until recently, as Secretary Perry mentioned CENTCOM's demanding military operations could safely be its primary focus.

However, in November 1995, when a bomb exploded near a U.S. security assistance facility in Riyadh their focus needed to be broadened. Terrorism in Saudi Arabia became a high priority security issue. And in the Gulf ... we aggressively began to improve our posture against terrorism.

In Saudi Arabia, force protection improvements were most extensive. In the half-year after the November bomb-

ing, CENTCOM personnel conducted security reviews at nearly every installation in the region. At Khobar Towers alone, CENTCOM personnel completed more than 130 antiterrorist improvements. Indeed I am convinced some of these measures, notably barriers, sentries, and roving patrols, and extremely effective entry control kept the terrorists from penetrating the compound and undoubtedly saved dozens of lives.

After the attack at Khobar Towers, more lives were saved by the sentries who risked their lives to alert the occupants, by the buddy teams who attended to others before themselves, by the physicians and medical technicians who were flown in within hours, and by the dedicated people all along the evacuation route — through Europe to the United States. And don't forget, after this tragedy, CENTCOM's Joint Task Force Southwest Asia was back flying again over the skies of Iraq within 48 hours after they suffered the attack. That's professionalism.

But this command is now operating in a radically different environment. After the bombing at Khobar Towers, it was clear that terrorism, and especially terrorism in the Persian Gulf region, had in fact reached a new level of destructiveness and sophistication. And to meet this challenge requires we change the way we go about the business of force protection. So let me highlight some major areas that are elaborated on in the Secretary's report to help us meet this new challenge. Let me begin with unity of effort.

As Secretary Perry mentioned three days ago, he directed that I, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, assume the duties as his principal advisor and the Department's focal point for all force protection matters. In turn, I am establishing a permanent office within the Joint Staff under the direction of a general officer to deal with all matters of combating terrorism. I will also draw on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the JROC, existing combat support agencies, and others in and out of government to help in the effort. Among its many tasks the new office will help me assist field commanders to ensure that force protection considerations are included in every aspect of our activities worldwide. To do this, we will focus on force protection doctrine, standards, training, and requirements, as well as force protection programs and levels of funding. We will pursue innovative technologies and work closely with our allies who face many of the same threats that we do.

To ensure better coordination overseas and in agreement with the Secretary of State, CINCCENT has been given force protection responsibility and authority for all Department of Defense activities on the Arabian Peninsula, other than those that are an integral element of the U.S. Ambassador's Country Team. Just yesterday, when I met with the Unified Commanders, I asked them to examine whether this agreement might not also be a prototype for the force protection arrangements in their regions as well.

Along with improving our unity of effort, Command and Control is a critical consideration in the organization of every Joint Task Force. As an immediate step we have given the commander of the Joint Task Force in Southwest Asia the specific authority and responsibility for force protection, for all combatant units in the region operating in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. As a further step, we will investigate the feasibility and advisability of establishing a forward headquarters Central Command Forward that would be large enough and could assume Force Protection responsibility for all forces on the Arabian Peninsula.

To achieve key leader stability and to reduce turbulence and to improve continuity for our units on the Arabian Peninsula, we have lengthened the tours of senior leaders and we are taking action to minimize the short-term rotations of individuals as well as units.

To strengthen our posture further we require viable force protection standards, sound force protection doctrine, and appropriate force protection training. While we had advisory force protection standards, we have now reissued them as a directive and I will be further refining these standards to ensure that they fully address the new terrorist threat. Let me give you some examples of current efforts to improve doctrine development and training.

First, we will be reviewing our extensive joint and service doctrine publications to ensure that they also address the new threat and that we have common guidance, procedures, and standards at all levels of command.

Second, we will also review our force protection training to ensure that our schools and training centers teach the right material and that we have force protection training requirements that are specifically tailored to the individual needs of each regional command.

Third, we have learned a great deal about specialized pre-deployment training from our efforts last year to prepare our forces for deployment to Bosnia. Drawing on that experience, the U.S. Atlantic Command in conjunction with the Services and the other Unified Commands has developed a draft antiterrorism training plan to ensure that we provide theater specific training to individuals, as well as units, before they deploy to a theater.

Finally, I have directed the National Defense University to review the status of antiterrorism instruction in our professional military education system, to include risk assessment management training for our leaders.

The last area I would like to address is intelligence.

Despite our best efforts some important improvements in tactical intelligence are obviously warranted. Our intelligence goal must be to preempt and disrupt terrorist cells before they can plan and carry out acts of terrorism against our forces. Thus the collection, analysis, and dissemination of timely and predictive tactical intelligence on the plans, methods, and intentions of terrorists is of the utmost importance. This requires the use of all types of intelligence assets including technical intelligence and human intelligence to accomplish all source intelligence analysis on antiterrorism matters. We have already increased the number of analysts who are working in antiterrorism cells at every level, from the Pentagon down to the Joint Task Force. Most of these cells are on a 24-hour watch. Our primary concern today is to make sure we have enough analysts who are properly trained in terrorism-related issues assigned to these critical analytical positions.

At the user level, we must continue to ensure that the intelligence we acquire about terrorists can be "sanitized" and then quickly passed at the lowest classification possible to the individuals who must act on it to protect our men and women in uniform.

Overall, we must take action to increase the emphasis on terrorist related intelligence and improve intelligence sharing with host nations. The Department and the DCI are working in unison to determine what further improvements in our intelligence are made.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, we will neither be deterred from pursuing our interests nor will we be prevented from protecting our forces. While future terrorist acts are certain, just as certain must be our resolve to protect the lives of our men and women in uniform and Americans everywhere from terrorist attacks. To ensure that this indeed happens, we are moving out with considerable dispatch on the initiatives outlined in Secretary Perry's Force Protection Report.

Council on Foreign Relations
New York City, New York
7 November 1996

It's certainly a pleasure to be back here. For 75 years, senior officials have come to the Council not only to talk, but also to listen to its members about foreign policy issues. And I look forward to listening to your views and your concerns. And I am happy to be back here because I feel that I owe you one! In a parody of our rapidly changing times, the last time I was here to speak I arrived here at the Pratt House, and we were about to sit down to lunch when I was suddenly called away by the President to go to Dayton, and so we never had a chance to talk.

Nearly 40 years ago in basic training, a Drill Sergeant told me that every soldier must "expect the unexpected." I'm not sure that my case was what he had in mind, but it was good advice. In fact in the seven years (almost to the day) since the fall of the Berlin Wall, "expect the unexpected" has become the watchword for the American Armed Forces. In our volatile world, our Armed Forces time after time have overcome the unexpected and, I might add, performed superbly. Not only have they successfully upheld and advanced our interests, but in the process they have created a new world standard for military excellence. And there is absolutely no doubt that today, ours are the best and most capable Armed Forces in the world, bar none.

And to convince you of that I would like to offer *you*, our "stockholders," a prospectus on our Armed Forces and to discuss what we will have to do to maintain the readiness and strength of our forces well into the 21st Century. But at the start, let me be clear: amidst all of the talk about today's dangerous world, it is all too easy to overlook the fact that today the United States and our Allies are much safer than we were in the dark days of the Cold War.

And one of the great strategic benefits from the end of the Cold War is that we have been able to safely cut our forces. Since 1989, we have reduced our active all-volunteer forces by 700,000 people — about a third of the active force. How big is a cut of 700,000 people? The force we cut is more than the number of troops in the British, the German, the Dutch, and the Danish armed forces *combined*. Or, put another way, the force we cut is 200,000 people *more* than all of the autoworkers in the United States. Today, our Armed Forces are smaller than they were since before the Korean War. In terms of combat structure, the Navy went from 566 ships to 354, a reduction of 38 percent. The Air Force went from 36 to 20 fighter wings, a reduction of 45 percent. And the Army went from 18 active divisions to 10, a reduction of 45 percent as well. Meanwhile, the defense budget has been reduced by 40 percent in real terms. And we now spend less of a percentage of our national wealth, only 3.2 percent, on defense than at any time since before the Second World War.

All these are dramatic reductions. Reductions which in the past have always resulted in a nose dive in our capability and readiness. That's what happened after the First World War, the Second, the Korean, and the Vietnam War. But

not this time, not after the Cold War. With hard work, sound leadership in the field, and a high degree of support from two Administrations and the Congress, we have, for the first time in our history, been able to manage a huge postwar drawdown, creating a much smaller but pound-for-pound an even more capable and more ready force. That in itself is a remarkable success story yet to be told.

And it's a good thing that we stayed ready because in the wake of the Cold War came not peace and stability, but ethnic conflicts, failed states, the disorders of democratization, and that old reliable, naked aggression. Today's force has successfully engaged in over 40 contingency operations since Operation DESERT STORM. This week some 55,000 service men and women are participating in 14 separate operations around the globe. That makes it about an average week for the 3 years that I've been Chairman.

A recently concluded operation in Liberia was in many ways typical of these operations. With almost no notice the United States, responding to a call to evacuate American citizens, formed a joint task force from our units in Italy, in the Adriatic, in Germany, in the U.K., and in the United States. The first units were on their way in hours. And in short order, our joint task force, with all of the Services participating, evacuated 2,400 citizens from 68 countries. Although there was lots of gunfire and more than a few close calls, the evacuees and the Task Force returned safely.

Typically, few people in the United States even took notice of this highly complex operation, for the area was so remote, that not even Christiane Amanpour could get there with CNN. But the American people have simply come to expect such skill and professionalism from our Armed Forces. What this operation demonstrates is that no other nation possesses the global reach that would allow them to mount such a joint operation in such remote corners of the world.

But not all of our operations receive so little scrutiny. Today, one of our most closely followed military efforts is in Bosnia, where nearly 17,000 service men and women are performing their military tasks, and are doing so with great expertise and professionalism as part of a 34-nation peace implementation force. Whether in the end the three factions will agree to live together and peace will be able to prevail in Bosnia is still very much in question. However there is no question about the success of IFOR's part of the operation. And so, it is useful to understand why IFOR succeeded where UNPROFOR failed.

The first reason is the close coordination between the diplomat and the soldier, which reached a new height during the crucial negotiations that led to the Dayton Agreement. For the first time, those who would be charged with the implementation of the military aspects of the agreement were there not just as advisors, but as actual negotiators. The second reason is that unlike UNPROFOR, IFOR was given a very clear mission, including specific tasks to be performed, as well as tasks to be specifically excluded. That is exactly what is needed to keep a peacekeeping force from sliding into mission creep. Finally, IFOR has a straightforward chain of command, robust rules of engagement, and sufficient force to get the job done, as well as intimidate those who would wish it ill.

Because of these conditions and because of sound planning, thorough training, and solid leadership, the military aspects of the Bosnia operation have gone so well. And these are lessons that we must not forget in whatever subsequent operations might come our way.

However, regrettably, many of our other expectations have not been met. While successful national and regional elections have been held, municipal elections had to be postponed. And civil reconstruction has lagged badly, as has the building of political structures and the establishment of law and order. Certainly, ethnic hatred and related disputes still dominate life there. And so the possibility of interethnic violence, regrettably, remains a real possibility.

That said, today, IFOR, its military tasks completed and municipal elections pushed off into the spring or later, has begun to withdraw. Barring unforeseen circumstances, American forces in Bosnia should be down to approximately 10,000, or maybe even 7,500, by the time IFOR's mission ends around the 20th of December. The question being discussed now is *not* whether IFOR will remain; *it will not*. The question is whether there might be a need for some other follow-on force to deter a renewed outbreak of hostilities and to protect our significant investment there to date.

To answer this question NATO's military authorities will report to the North Atlantic Council on four options that include: complete withdrawal after the 20 December "end-of-mission;" a follow-on force, stationed either inside or outside of Bosnia, whose sole function would be deterrence of the outbreak of new fighting; a beefed up deterrent force, which could provide on-scene stability as well; and finally, a force similar to IFOR which would be able to provide all of these functions along with wider civil support.

Based on the results of this study, the NAC will then decide whether or not there should be a post-IFOR military force, what its mission and specific tasks should be, what the size of such a force would have to be, and how long such a force would have to stay. NATO nations, including the United States, as well as other non-NATO participants in IFOR, in turn, will have to decide whether they would wish to participate in such a follow-on force.

Clearly, IFOR gave the people of Bosnia a year without war. And perhaps the people must be given some more

time. But about one thing we must be clear: only the Bosnians themselves, Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, can make a lasting peace in that land. But the stakes are high. For this is not only about peace and stability in Bosnia, but also about the future of NATO and thus, as well, the contours of a future Europe and the continued strength of the Trans-Atlantic link.

And along the way these last few years, we have seen how difficult it is to protect our interests abroad from our barracks at home. And also how in international affairs, as in battle, you can only lead from the front. Because America's leadership is so important and because we are, as President Clinton states, that "indispensable nation," our men and women in uniform today serve with great distinction, not just in Europe, but in other parts of the world where our interests are important: enforcing the no-fly zones in Iraq; dampening conflict in the Taiwan Straits; deterring aggression in Korea; and helping to stem the flow of illegal drugs from Latin America. Our active engagement would not be possible without the superb men and women in uniform today, our unmatched military capabilities, and our high levels of readiness.

But now, the question before us is whether we can maintain this readiness into the future. To that end, we have begun to work on a Quadrennial Defense Review with the goal of completing it next spring. In preparation for this soup-to-nuts review, the first task was to look at the future security environment out some 10 to 15 years.

Certainly, predictions are problematical. Everyone from Cassandra to Yogi Berra knows that. Given the power of historical accidents, the gaps between good data, useable information, and accurate predictions, remain very wide. But even with this caveat, some predictions are relatively safe. And they suggest a range of policy choices that are similarly prudent.

In our internal review, we concluded that for the U.S. Armed Forces, the world between now and the year 2010 will be at least as challenging as the present one. While we can take comfort from the absence of superpower competition, the growth of the world economy, and the progress of democracy around the world, we will also have many security-related concerns. In the next 15 years, we see the further development of a complex world of many asymmetrical powers, a world marked by ethnic and religious-based conflicts, and influenced considerably by non-state actors. Adding to the soup, there will undoubtedly be significant leadership and regime changes in North Korea, Cuba, China, and many countries in the Middle East. The effects of these transitions will add to the unpredictability of our world.

Demographically, we see world population growing by 25 to 35 percent, with particularly rapid growth in the developing countries. Economic growth in some of those countries will be negated by population growth. Mass migrations from developing to developed countries will also continue. At the same time in the developed world, the population will age, putting greater strains on pension systems and entitlement programs, creating downward pressure on budgets for foreign and defense policy.

Economically, we see greater interdependence and a growing world economy, but increasing competition for resources. Continued urbanization will exacerbate social problems in both the developed and developing world.

Technologically, we see dangers related to the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the vulnerability of our information and data processing infrastructure, and the growing sophistication of terrorist movements. And our military will be influenced by what some call a "Revolution in Military Affairs," the term that describes the rapid and profound progress in the marriage between information technologies and precision strike capabilities.

The good news is that we are on the leading edge of that revolution. The bad news is that the entry barriers to this revolution are relatively low, and in this century, no leader in military technology has ever gone unchallenged for very long. So out to 2010, our forces in the field are likely to face a range of threats, from terrorists, to rogue states with weapons of mass destruction, to potent regional powers, or toward the end of that period, even emerging peer competitors. It is sad but probably true, that in the next 15 years, disorder, conflict, and war, especially on the low end of the spectrum, will likely remain a growth industry.

With that as a given, our forces in the future must remain able to prevent threats from arising by shaping the strategic environment; deter threats, if they emerge; and, if conflict prevention and deterrence fail, use force to defeat these threats whenever and wherever our important interests are at stake.

To be ready, it seems to me, three key tasks must be accomplished. First, the U.S. must maintain its current major alliances in Europe, Asia, and its coalition in the Middle East. Our cornerstone alliance in the west is NATO. Contrary to all of the experts of a few years back, it is not disappearing. Rather, it is getting stronger, reaching out to other nations through the Partnership for Peace, and opening up to new members. Unlike all of us in this room, NATO is not getting older, it's getting better, and indeed more relevant. The basic decision to enlarge that Alliance was made some time ago and reconfirmed at the Bergen ministerial in September. It is no longer an issue of "if" but of "when" and "who."

But NATO enlargement must also be seen in relationship to a second major task for future U.S. national security

policy: engagement with the great powers. Russia today is fraught with challenges and is still in the early stages of transition to democracy and a market economy. But some of our engagement activities are quite intense. Here, we must make a special note of our cooperation on the control of nuclear weapons and materials and our ground-breaking cooperation in Bosnia.

Earlier this week, I visited my counterpart in Moscow, and had a fruitful day discussing how far we have come just in the last few years. Who could have imagined ten years ago (or even five years ago) that a Russian brigade, a solid fighting unit by the way, would be working side-by-side with a U.S. armored division as part of a NATO-led operation helping to bring peace to a troubled country in the Balkans? The joint patrols of Americans and Russians have done a lot for IFOR's reputation for evenhandedness among the former belligerents. And this kind of engagement will also help to break down the barriers between us and between Russia and NATO.

Soon, NATO and the Russian armed forces will open liaison offices at each other's headquarters. The Secretary of State has proposed formalizing the relations between NATO and Russia with a charter that would create standing arrangements for consultation and for joint action. In that, while we intend to open NATO to new members, our aim is to build stability and security in Europe not *against* Russia but *with* Russia.

In a similar vein, peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region will be strongly influenced by U.S. - Chinese relations. The United States is firmly committed to continuing its policy of engagement with China. While trade has become, and will remain, a significant factor in our bilateral relationship, China's vast population, rapidly growing economy, and modernizing military, make it the major actor on the Asian security scene.

Engagement on security matters will be difficult. While we have many shared interests in the region, China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, its policy toward weapons of mass destruction, and its fractious relations with Taiwan, and its differing views on human rights issues, will make engagement with Beijing potentially the most complex challenge that we face in the year ahead.

However, as Secretary Perry has noted, military-to-military relations must be part and parcel of our policy toward China. Contact between our military and China's may have a positive influence on the Chinese military — a key player in Chinese politics. But even if that hope is frustrated, contacts between our militaries will improve mutual understanding and reduce the effects of misperceptions.

Overall, while protecting our interests, we must maximize our engagement with China. We may not succeed at helping China to become more democratic, but common sense and our long-term interests demand that we continue to try. And such a policy is supported by all of our friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region.

As a third major task, we must ensure that our military strength remains commensurate with our worldwide interests and international obligations well into the future. This strength depends on three factors: the willingness to invest in readiness; making the right force structure decisions; and making prudent investments in modernization.

The great issues of defense planning for an uncertain world have often been reduced to one simple question: How much is enough? On force structure, this issue is particularly tough to decide when there is no overarching central threat. During the Cold War the prospect of war with the U.S.S.R. determined the force levels against which we had to size our own forces. After the Cold War, first in the Base Force and then in the Bottom Up Review, we sized against two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, one in the Persian Gulf and one in Korea.

Critics of this force have noted that a one-conflict force or a reinforced one-conflict force is all that is needed or supportable in the future. Others have noted that savings from force structure cuts could be put toward modernization to keep the force up-to-date. But these critics ignore how hard the present force is working to meet the requirements of lesser contingencies, such as Bosnia, of our military-to-military outreach programs, of our forward presence requirements, and the rest. They also ignore the strategic utility of a multiple contingency force.

Last year, for example, soldiers and marines deployed for around 140 days on the average. On any given day over half of our Navy's ships are underway, with more than a third of the total forward deployed. The Air Force, with a third less people than during the Cold War, has more than quadrupled the number it habitually deploys on operations. These facts all support one conclusion: the force structure today is being worked to its capacity, especially when we consider the requirements for training that precede or come after lengthy operations or engagement activities.

Our best estimates are that our forces will be at least as busy in the mid to long-term as they are today. Moreover, much of what we do for engagement or on the low end of the operational spectrum is more manpower intensive than we originally thought. But our peacetime requirements challenging as they may be are not the most important reason to maintain a robust, highly capable force. The capability to fight *and* win major contingencies is the most important reason.

I am not talking about conceptual requirements here. In my tour as Chairman, we have faced multiple contingen-

cies. For just one example, in the fall of 1994, in response to heightened threats we deployed deterrent forces to both Korea and Kuwait. Remarkably, just a few weeks before those deployments, we had dispatched a humanitarian mission to Rwanda, and while that was still going on, a force of some 21,000 personnel to Haiti to restore democracy to that troubled island.

As we begin to size the force of tomorrow, it is important to understand that the size of our force today is not a luxury but a practical requirement. We are today as busy as we've ever been short of a major war. And as we try to determine that force for tomorrow, we must also resist the tempting notions that somehow, somewhere, there is some undiscovered answer that will allow us to do more with less. Yes, farther out in the long-term future, there are promising technologies that may allow us to maintain the same capabilities with a smaller force. And that brings us to the issue of modernization, the bedrock of tomorrow's readiness.

Modernization presents us with a very big challenge. In a restrictive budget environment, we must now turn to replacing old equipment and sustaining a prudent modernization program. We must also leverage new technology to develop the capabilities that we will need to stay ahead in the out years.

During the downsizing, we were able to hold back on buying new equipment and hold back on modernization because sufficient equipment had been freed up from units that were being deactivated. Now this windfall has passed, and we face the demanding task of modernizing our force.

Today our procurement spending is in real terms lower than it was before the Korean War. I told Congress last winter that to ensure the readiness of tomorrow's force, we would have to increase procurement spending by approximately 15 to 20 billion dollars annually.

To accomplish this, will take revolutionary new management approaches. Additionally, more bases will have to be closed, more functions privatized, and more equipment and services purchased off-the-shelf. Where possible, without reducing force structure, we will have to trim manpower. We must also continue the restructuring of our reserve forces to bring them into line with our strategic requirements. And certainly to make the force more efficient, we must continue to build on the great strides that we have made in joint doctrine, joint training, joint education, and in joint operations.

A few months ago we made a bold leap into the future by publishing *Joint Vision 2010,* a conceptual template for, and approved by, all of the Services and joint commands. When it is fully implemented, *JV 2010* will change the way the uniformed services and the joint commands do business in the long-term. In the past, each Service created a vision of future warfare that emphasized its own competencies. The end result was wasted resources and unnecessary duplication of effort.

Without hobbling the Service's core competencies, *Joint Vision 2010* will move the entire Armed Forces, jointly, into the 21st Century. It will provide us a foundation to bring together emerging technologies, high quality people, and outstanding training, with the aim of achieving dominance across the full spectrum of operations that we might face.

For the first time in our history, all the Services and all of the joint commands will work from a common vision of future operations. Using key operational concepts as a "mark on the wall," this common vision will enable us to make better resource and acquisition decisions by asking one probing question: what is the value of this proposal for the joint fight?

In the final analysis, *Joint Vision 2010* keeps us ready, and makes us more efficient.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a law written somewhere, in some important book, that a long speech must have a short conclusion.

As I said earlier, President Clinton laid out the challenge when he said that the United States is, and must remain, the world's "indispensable nation." For the Joint Chiefs, that means that our challenge now, is to design a force for tomorrow that is structured, modernized, and ready, to keep us persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict. A force for tomorrow, that will enable some future Chairman to stand before you, and say as confidently as I can, that ours is the best and most capable military in the world.

Goldwater-Nichols Symposium
National Defense University
Goldwater-Nichols: Ten Years From Now
Washington, DC
3 December 1996

I am delighted to be with you to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, to share with you my views on how well we have done in fulfilling the promise of that Act, and perhaps to suggest what further reforms we might consider, as we look ahead to the 20th Anniversary of the Act.

But before I begin, let me point out that we are just a few days away from another very important joint operation. In Philadelphia, on Saturday, the 97th Army-Navy game will be played, and I am very proud to be the Chairman in a year when these two Service academies have a combined record of 17-3 and are both ranked in the top 30 in the nation. Somehow, I am certain that this had something to do with Goldwater-Nichols.

Seriously, I think the last time that happened, George Marshall was the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Ernest King was the Chief of Naval Operations. And what is so remarkable, is that, back in 1945, they accomplished this feat without the guiding hand of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff!

By the way, I don't want anyone to think that jointness means I'm going to cheer equally for both sides. Believe me, the "next level of jointness" doesn't extend that far. We all know that Yogi Berra had it right about the Army-Navy game, when he said, "This game isn't about life or death. It's a lot more important than that." And that, ladies and gentlemen, is also how I feel about the subject of defense reorganization and Goldwater-Nichols.

It is said that we see what lies ahead by first understanding the past. So tonight, I will first try to give you my perspective on our progress in implementing Goldwater-Nichols by looking at some of the key areas in the legislation to see how we have measured up to the intent of the Act.

Let me begin in 1986. It was the peak year of defense spending in the Cold War era. We were moving smoothly toward our Active Component goals of 18 divisions in the Army, 600 ships in the Navy, 26 tactical fighter wings in the Air Force, 3 divisions in the Marine Corps, and strong Reserve Component forces, as well. The threat was very real and unambiguous. It was the Soviet Union. We faced them around the world with a global strategy of containment and deterrence. It was in every sense a bipolar world.

In 1986, Chernobyl melted down, foreshadowing the implosion of the Soviet Union. President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev met in Reykjavik, and the debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative was at its peak.

Caspar Weinberger was the Secretary of Defense and my friend, Bill Crowe, was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The position of the Vice Chairman didn't exist at all, and John Shali was a "baby brigadier" in the 1st Armored Division in Europe, deeply involved in a Cold War that seemed as though it would go on forever.

Two recent military operations, although ultimately successful, had been accomplished in ways that suggested the need for better defense organization. They were the Libyan air strikes, Operation EL DORADO CANYON, and the rescue of American medical students from the island of Grenada, Operation URGENT FURY. In both cases, there was a clear need for improvement in the integration and organization of our armed forces, a persistent theme of military reformers going all the way back to 1947. The need for those improvements inspired the legislation that we celebrate today, and Goldwater-Nichols was, as it turns out, a truly visionary piece of work.

I know that you have already heard a great deal about the Goldwater-Nichols Act from a wide variety of speakers. But tonight, I would like to give you a Chairman's Report Card on how well I think we've done so far in implementing this Act. But before I give out my grades, let me first give out some "extra credit." Collectively, we must give credit to the role played by the Services in making Goldwater-Nichols successful. Although there was some initial resistance, as there was across much of the defense establishment, I am very pleased with the role ultimately played by the Services in making the cultural changes necessary to successfully move our Armed Forces to a new level of jointness.

Now, how well did we do in implementing the Act?

The first objective was "to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department." Generally, the provisions of the act in this regard have been implemented quite well, particularly through the Secretary's Defense Planning Guidance and his Contingency Planning Guidance. As we continue to work at smoothing the integration of these documents into the broader budget and strategic planning cycles, there is much room for better coordination and direction. So, on balance, I would grade this area a high "B."

Our second objective was "to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." I think this part of the Act is an important success story. Through the increased respon-

sibilities and authority given to the Chairman and the assignment of the Joint Staff to his direct support, we have broken free from the "lowest common denominator" recommendation that so often plagued us in the past. We have been able to provide far better, more focused advice. I would grade this portion of the Act a solid "A."

The third and fourth objectives are interrelated and I will grade them together. These two objectives enhanced the authority of our unified commanders over their forces and clarified their responsibilities, making them fully responsible for accomplishing the missions of their commands. The best proof of their success is where it matters most: in warfighting. General Powell said recently that, "the invasion and liberation of Panama in December 1989 was the first full test of Goldwater-Nichols in a combat situation. It was something of a shakedown cruise for what we would be doing in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM a year later." And since DESERT STORM, in many different joint and combined operations, we have proven, again and again, the validity of these reforms. And the portions of the Act involving the CINCs have been a key reason for these successes.

In addition to operational improvements, the CINCs today have a far more influential voice in the resource and procurement process and in the execution of joint training, both key goals of Goldwater-Nichols. Overall, this Act, by providing both the responsibility and the authority needed by the CINCs, has made the Combatant Commanders vastly more capable of fulfilling their warfighting role. It is a success story by any measure, rating a solid "A."

The fifth objective was "to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning." We've improved a great deal here. Our national security and national military strategies are both very good, but not perfect. We are also closing in on the full integration of our CINC plans at the highest level. As a matter of fact, I believe that our major war plans, today, are the best I have seen in all the years that I've been reviewing such documents. On balance, I would assign a very high "B," since we still have some room for further improvement.

A sixth objective was "to provide for more efficient use of defense resources." Overall, I think we've done fairly well here. A key part of our success in this area was in creating the position of Vice Chairman. The four great men who've served as "the Vice," Bob Herres, Dave Jeremiah, Bill Owens, and now Joe Ralston, have enabled us to pay far greater attention to requirements to integrate them better and to influence programmatic issues at the highest levels of the Department of Defense.

Under the leadership of our Vice Chairmen, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has progressed from an acorn to a pretty good-sized oak tree. The joint perspective gained through the maturation of the JROC process and its allied Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments have made a key difference. In a real sense, the JROC has become the collective voice of the warfighting CINCs in the programmatic world.

The JROC's input into the budgeting process, the Chairman's Program Assessment and the Chairman's Program Recommendations have also had great impact. As Bill Owens and Jim Blaker noted, "the JROC represents the first major revision of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System since Secretary Robert McNamara put it in place more than three decades ago." I fully agree with that and applaud Bill Owens's pioneering work in this area. In the end, I would assign a high "B" in this area, since I'm convinced that we can and will make further progress along the lines envisioned by Bill Owens and Joe Ralston.

The seventh objective was "to improve joint officer management policies." The Director for Manpower and Personnel on the Joint Staff, Admiral Ronnie Froman, will talk to you tomorrow. But let me just observe that while we can celebrate some notable successes in this area, we must also register the need for still more improvements. For example, as Ronnie Froman will explain, we've made terrific progress, particularly in the quality of officers assigned to joint staffs worldwide. There is absolutely no comparison with the way it was before Goldwater-Nichols, or even just a few years ago. All you have to do is spend a little time with the action officers on the Joint Staff to understand why so many consider it the premier military staff.

On the other hand, when you look at the difficulties we are continuing to experience in getting our promotion statistics right and look at how many waivers are still required for many aspects of joint officer management, you realize that we still have a ways to go. On balance, we are between a "B" and a "C" in this area, and we are going to have to work this a little harder.

Our eighth and final objective was "to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense." This was a very broad objective, one that captures what might be termed the "cultural" elements of jointness: education; doctrine; training; and readiness assessment. Let me grade each of those separately.

Joint education, again stimulated by Goldwater-Nichols and the subsequent work done by Congressman Ike Skelton and his colleagues, is a major success story. We now have a Joint Professional Military Education structure, which provides for joint education throughout an officer's career. Our pre-commissioning programs are currently providing a

greater focus on jointness, while our intermediate and senior Service and Joint schools have already passed a rigorous joint accreditation process.

I have stressed that teaching joint skills and teamwork must not crowd out the first importance of Service core competencies. Rather, joint skills and teamwork must be built upon Service core competencies, as we equip our future leaders for the challenges of joint and combined operations that have become our way of life. We are well on our way to accomplishing this objective and I would give us a solid "B" in Joint Education.

Joint Doctrine has emerged as a central organizing force in our military operations. The Services, the CINCs, the Defense Agencies, and the Joint Staff have teamed with our Joint Warfighting Center to create a body of authoritative joint doctrine — our "play book" — which allows joint forces to operate together in a predictable and concerted fashion.

Today, the bulk of our joint doctrine is now in place. And we now have an effective system to achieve closure on remaining doctrinal issues and to update our doctrine as required. The effectiveness and practical value of this joint doctrine has been demonstrated numerous times in joint and combined operations around the globe. Our joint doctrine is a vibrant and growing body of knowledge, a very successful aspect of Goldwater-Nichols. I give us an "A" in this area.

Next is Joint Training. Our Joint Staff, assisted by the Joint Warfighting Center, has developed a comprehensive Joint Training System which the CINCs and Services are using to achieve better focus and balance in our worldwide joint training program. This requirements-based Joint Training System focuses scarce resources on our most important joint mission essential tasks, allowing us to be good stewards and good trainers at the same time. Additionally, the pioneering work of USACOM as a Joint Force Trainer and Integrator has been critical to the development of our superb joint warfighting capabilities. As an aside, let me add that USACOM's Joint Task Force Training equals the best of our service training opportunities. Overall, I am very pleased with our progress in Joint Training and I know this progress will continue, especially with further advances in the use of innovative training technologies. This is certainly a high "B."

In the area of Joint Readiness Assessment, we have improved a great deal, particularly in our ability to correctly evaluate the ability of the CINCs to execute their missions. We still have a way to go in this area particularly in refining our ability to use readiness data to predict future trends. But I'm confident we'll continue to improve. I think we rate a "B" in Joint Readiness Assessment overall.

So with 4 "As," 6 "Bs,", and only one "C," what's ahead for us? As we project ourselves out to the 20th anniversary of Goldwater-Nichols, what must we do to continue to improve our organization for national security?

Frankly, the odds are good that ten years from now, I will be running a hardware store somewhere. But with some luck, and the help of my nurse, and an invitation from NDU, I may be able to attend a future celebration like this one. But a decade from now, what will we be celebrating?

I hope that, first and foremost, we will be celebrating the full and complete implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, with a Chairman's Report Card that reflects straight A's across the board. I have no doubt that this is doable.

However, I would like to focus, tonight, more specifically on three key ideas that may find some resonance with all of you. I hope the first thing that we might celebrate will be progress toward the achievement of the core capabilities and interoperability needed by all of the Services and Unified Commands, that will enable our Armed Forces to be dominant across the spectrum of conflict in the year 2010 and beyond.

Up to a short time ago, the Services each had a different vision for the future. But today, due in some measure to the influence of Goldwater-Nichols and the Commission on Roles and Missions, we have a common vision, *Joint Vision 2010*, that lays out a common direction for all of the Armed Forces. *JV2010* is the beginning of a process. It is the alpha, not the omega. It will certainly change over time, but I think, ten years from now, we shall celebrate the success of that vision.

Already we see concerted efforts by the Services to align their respective visions with *Joint Vision 2010*. We also see the positive involvement by the CINCs, as we wrestle with the implementation challenges ahead. I know *JV2010* will continue to evolve and develop. In fact, we will soon publish an ambitious implementation plan. *Joint Vision 2010* is our bridge to the next level of jointness, a conceptual template for the conduct of future joint operations, and the link between Goldwater-Nichols and the 21st century military.

The second broad area of future effort, that I hope we will be celebrating ten years from now, is further improvement in how we organize and staff the senior staffs in the Department of Defense. One key issue here is the appropriate role for the OSD staff. There are those who suggest OSD should focus strictly on policy, remaining "a level above" any operational concerns. Others see operations and certain management functions as clearly within the purview of OSD.

I don't think it is a question of "either/or." We need to look at this complex issue, building on the suggestions of John White's Commission on Roles and Missions, and find in every issue area the appropriate level of involvement for OSD in operations and management, balancing that with their role in the development of overarching policy.

Another question is how best to create efficiencies between the Service staffs and the Military Secretariat staffs. As the Commission on Roles and Missions Report points out, there are areas of existing duplication, opportunities for consolidation of several staff functions, and the chance to improve the Service headquarters management processes.

A final staff-related idea, and one frequently discussed, involves the size of the defense bureaucracy. While I agree with the general proposition that the defense headquarters bureaucracy is too large, I think we need to be clear about something very fundamental: there is no free lunch!

If we significantly shrink staff sizes, we simply won't be able to do all that we are required to do today. Only by shedding functions will we be able to make our defense bureaucracy significantly smaller. But, again, efforts to shrink the bureaucracy are certainly worth pursuing. I hope that in ten years we will be able to celebrate the harvest of these efficiencies in these organizational areas, building on the fine and continuing work by John White, Sam Nunn, and other influential and energetic advocates of continuing defense reform, many of whom are in this room tonight.

The third, and, in my view, most important area for improvement that I hope we can celebrate ten years from now is the emergence of a broad reform movement, focusing on our national security structure, and taking into account to the entire interagency process. I believe that is the next logical step.

Secretary Perry has often pointed out the major challenges our 21st century CINCs will face in the emerging global environment. He has also recently developed a new concept to describe our efforts to shape the security environment. He calls it "preventive defense." His belief is that the positive engagement of our forces in this dangerous and volatile world will create the conditions that support peace, make war less likely, and make deterrence less necessary. This concept of "preventive defense" will be in effect our first line of defense.

I agree completely. We have the ability and the obligation to help shape the future global security environment. But my belief is that all of our national security assets — economic, political, cultural, and not just military — are important in this process.

Preventive defense is very complex. It will require new levels of cooperation between those of us in the Department of Defense and the rest of the interagency. A strong, well understood linkage between the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Commerce, and indeed among the entire interagency will be vital. Look at many of the most recent challenges to U.S. national interests around the world: Rwanda and Zaire; Bosnia; Haiti; the Arabian Gulf. In every one of these operations, success required the involvement of a wide variety of interagency participants.

The good news is that, in all these operations, there have been fine examples of interagency cooperation. Certainly, the best recent example of this process of leveraging military force in support of diplomacy was our success in the Dayton accords. For the first time, those who would be charged with the implementation of the military aspects of the agreement were there, not just as advisors but as actual negotiators. Likewise, we had great success in Haiti, where coordination between diplomacy and the threat of the use of military force proved so effective that it negated the need to storm the beaches.

But despite these successes, there is clearly considerable room for improvement. Problems in the interagency today remind me very much of the relationship among the Services in 1986. We need an agreed on, written-down, exercised organization and set of procedures to bring the full capability of the Department of Defense and all of the other relevant government departments and agencies to bear on the complex crises to which future Presidents might commit us. Haiti and Bosnia are, on the one level, examples of progress made, but they are even better examples of how much further we can get, if we set our minds to it.

The key will be making sure that the military, which has vast resources for undertaking many of the tasks associated with these international crises, is an integrated part of a larger comprehensive national plan, and not in itself the main plan, or even worse, the only developed and exercised plan.

Over the next decade, there is no major peer competitor threatening the national survival of the United States. World War Three is not looming before us, and the Cold War is finally over. We have an opportunity, a rare and precious opportunity, to shape the global environment. As President Roosevelt said, "We seek not only an end to war but an end to the beginning of wars." That's even more true today than it was when he spoke those words.

If we can take the ideas and spirit of Goldwater-Nichols, a desire to reorganize and restructure in the name of efficiency and national security, and apply them to the entire interagency, we will make great gains in our nation's power. And, at the 20th anniversary of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, we will be able to say, not only that ours is the best

organized, most ready, and most effective military in the world, but we will also be able to add, that ours is the most effective national security structure, as well.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, there is a very important law, written in a book somewhere, that a long speech should have a short ending.

So here it is — this symposium has been a celebration of a great success. And I'd like to close by saying "thank you" to the visionaries who gave us the Goldwater-Nichols Act. I offer all of them, and especially all those here tonight, our collective thanks for a job exceedingly well done. Without a doubt, Goldwater-Nichols has helped make ours the very best military in the world, bar none. And that truly is cause to celebrate.

1997

Medal of Honor Society
Arlington, Virginia
19 January 1997

What a remarkable week this has been!

It began with an inspiring Medal of Honor ceremony at the White House adding the names of seven extraordinary heroes to your rolls. Then on Friday the President honored Bob Dole, a great American hero by any measure, with the Medal of Freedom—and then unveiled the plans for a World War II memorial to honor all who participated in that mighty struggle that defeated tyranny, preserved freedom, and as the president so aptly stated, saw America come of age.

This is a city of monuments to America's struggle to build and to preserve this nation. In granite and in stone we celebrate our victories and remember our heroes. We build these monuments, for we know well that a nation that forgets its heroes cannot itself long remain remembered.

So it is only right for me and for my fellow Joint Chiefs, at the beginning of a week when America honors its democratic roots and inaugurates its president, to be with you and honor you. For you are our finest monuments to highest heroism and noblest sacrifice.

This morning in a special memorial service at our National Cemetery you paid tribute to your comrades who fell in battle or passed away over the years. But on this occasion the Chiefs and I wish to honor you who are here with us.

Surely yours is the most select fraternity on earth. There are no associate members, no honorary or guest memberships. Membership is not measured by influence or rank or civic accomplishment. Membership in your Society comes only to those who "were touched with fire," who went above and beyond the call of duty and who offered up their lives for comrades and country — without reservation or regret.

That is why in the hearts of every American your Society is the most honored congregation in the world.

Your numbers are few, for few survive the consequences of such gallantry. Of the three thousand four hundred and twenty Americans who went above and beyond the call of duty and were awarded the Medal of Honor, only 150 of you are still with us. Still with us to share your legacy of valor, still with us to remind the nation of its roots, still with us to inspire new generations with the "contagion of your courage."

Winston Churchill once said that of all the human qualities, courage comes first because it is the quality, which guarantees all others. The courage that you have handed down to our men and women in uniform has, for more than 200 years, guaranteed our freedom, our security, and our prosperity.

Since the last time you gathered here in Washington, sixteen members of your Society have been laid to rest. But last week in that moving ceremony at the White House, President Clinton honored seven African-American heroes of World War II and added their names to your most select roster.

Six Medals of Honor were awarded posthumously: to Staff Sergeant Edward A. Carter, Jr.; Staff Sergeant Ruben Rivers; Staff Sergeant Leonard E. Dowden; First Lieutenant John R. Fox; Private First Class Willy F. James, Jr.; and First Lieutenant Robert J. Peagler. One living WWII veteran, First Lieutenant Vernon J. Baker, was present to receive the Medal that the President said was "as richly deserved as it was long overdue."

While I cannot do justice to the deeds of all of these men, Lieutenant Baker's story captures the essence of their heroism. While his deeds are more than fifty years old, his valor is now a part of our future — new threads, woven in red, white and blue into the tapestry that is the living spirit of America.

From now on the tale of his heroism will be there for all to see, a monument to human courage and an inspiration to thousands of Americans, citizens and soldiers alike.

On the 5th of April in 1945, Lieutenant Vernon Baker was an infantry platoon leader, fighting with the 92d Infantry Division in Italy. On that day in a critical advance over mountainous terrain, he personally attacked and destroyed three machine gun positions and one observation post, killing nine enemy soldiers at close quarters.

Lieutenant Baker then, without regard for his own safety, purposely drew the enemy fire on himself so his battered unit, in which two out of every three had been hit, could evacuate its wounded. True to his own motto of "keep moving," the next night Lieutenant Baker led an attack through an enemy minefield that was covered by heavy enemy fire.

Vernon Baker's exploits, added to yours, are now a special part of an American history of extraordinary gallantry. Your courage, your spirit and your dedication to comrades and country are the inspiration for today's men and women

in uniform — in Korea, in the Med, in the skies over Iraq, in every service, and in every operation, from Sarajevo, to the Straits of Hormuz, and to Somalia.

And it was in Somalia that two American warriors, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart, joined your ranks.

These men earned the Medal of Honor while serving with Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu on the third of October 1993. From an orbiting helicopter they saw their sister ship go down, saw movement amid the wreckage, and saw the streets quickly fill with Somali gunmen advancing toward the crash site and their injured comrade.

At their own insistence they "fast roped" down in the midst of scores of hostile militiamen. For long minutes they fought savagely to protect the one pilot who had survived the crash. In the end, their ammunition exhausted, wounded, and fighting only with their pistols, they were cut down by the intense enemy fire. Though Gordon and Shughart did not survive, Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant, their injured friend, did.

The President of the United States awarded Medals of Honor to both of these heroes posthumously. On that memorable day, General Gordon Sullivan, then the Army Chief of Staff, read the words of another soldier — William Tecumseh Sherman — about the bonds of trust between comrades under fire. In a letter to Ulysses Grant, General Sherman wrote, "Throughout the war you were always in my mind. I always knew if I were in trouble, and you were still alive, you would come to my assistance."

Those words are the soldier's creed, and they in turn brought these words from Sergeant Gordon's wife, Carmen, in a very special and tender letter to her children.

"One night," she wrote, "before you were born, your father and I had a funny little talk about dying. I teased that I would not know where to bury him. Very quietly he said, 'Up home in Maine, in my uniform.'"

She goes on to say, "Your dad never liked to wear a uniform [home on leave], and Maine was so far away from us. Only after he was laid to rest, in a tiny flag-filled graveyard in Lincoln, Maine, did I understand."

"His parents, burying their only son, could come tomorrow and the day after that. You and I would not have to pass his grave on our way to the grocery store, to Little League games or ballet recitals. Our lives would go on."

"And to the men he loved and died for, the uniform was a silent salute, a final repeat of his vows."

"Once again," she concluded, "he had taken care of all of us."

Like Baker, like Gordon, like Shughart, you here have taken care of all of us. And we shall never forget.

But my tribute today would not be complete without recognition of your immediate families who also gave so much to our nation. Theirs has not been a light or easy burden. They also risked everything, their fathers, their brothers, or their husbands. And today the Joint Chiefs and I honor them as well, and pledge to you — the members of the Society — that we will hold fast to our memories of what you did for us so that our future too can have its heroes.

With that, God Bless you, thank you for what you did and what you are, and God Bless America.

West Point Society
Washington, DC Chapter
22 January 1997

It is a real pleasure to be here today, especially in light of this season's memorable Army-Navy classic. I suspect that had Army not staged another heroic 4th Quarter stand you would still be grumpy, and my task today would be that much harder. I think we can all be terribly proud of what those young men accomplished this year, not only in Philadelphia but also against Auburn in the Independence Bowl. At my age, I should probably give up watching Army football; I'm not sure my heart can stand it!

In a more serious vein, we can all be very proud of the continuing vitality and importance of the U.S. Military Academy and its sister academies. There's a saying that, "At West Point much of the history we teach was made by the people we taught." And there's a lot of truth in that.

From building railroads to guarding the frontier to fighting our biggest wars, West Point graduates have made an immeasurable contribution to the growth and security of this great Nation. Along the way, West Point produced Presidents, astronauts, business leaders, ambassadors and thousands of graduates whose leadership in and out of uniform have meant so much to this country and its people.

So I was thrilled to receive an invitation from my old boss, Butch Saint, to meet with you today to offer my perspective on the challenges and opportunities facing our Armed Forces as we approach a new century.

These next few months will be busy ones. We will have a new Secretary with big shoes to fill. We will soon go to

the Hill to fight the annual budget campaign. And this spring we'll hold the QDR, which by May promises to light the path to the force of the future.

Amid all this, lots of things will continue to keep us awake at night: elections in Bosnia; the health of Boris Yeltsin and Russian democracy; the threat of international terrorism; China and Hong Kong; and tension in Korea. Abroad, the only constant will be change — and so we're sure of one more thing: we have to be ready for surprises and a wide array of challenges.

After more than 38 years in uniform, I think I can safely say that not since periods of major war have we been so ready to face so many different challenges. Time after time, our military has met new challenges, and I might add, performed superbly. Not only have they successfully upheld and advanced our interests, but in the process they have created a new world standard for military excellence.

Today I would like to offer you a report card on our Armed Forces, and discuss some of the topics that interest you: security challenges; readiness; and modernization.

It is all too easy to overlook the fact that today the United States and our Allies are much safer than we were in the dark days of the Cold War. And one of the great strategic benefits from the end of the Cold War is that we been able to safely cut our forces. Since 1989 we have reduced our active all-volunteer forces by some 700,000 people, about a third of the active force. Our cuts were larger than the British, the German, the Dutch, and the Danish armed forces put together! Or all the doctors and dentists in the United States, or all the bartenders and bus drivers in the United States, the two professions that keep Washington DC moving!

In terms of combat structure the Army went from 18 active divisions to 10, a reduction of 45 percent. The Navy went from 566 ships to 354, a reduction of 38 percent. And the Air Force went from 36 to 20 fighter wings, a reduction of 45 percent. The defense budget has been reduced by 40 percent in real terms. We now spend less of a percentage of our national wealth — only 3.2 percent — on defense than at any time since before the Second World War. All these are dramatic reductions, reductions which in the past have always resulted in a nosedive in our capability and readiness. But not this time.

With hard work, sound leadership in the field and a high degree of support from two Administrations and the Congress, we have for the first time in our history been able to manage a huge postwar drawdown. We've created a much smaller but highly capable and highly ready force. Pound for pound, man for man, woman for woman, I believe we are more capable than we were during DESERT STORM. In fact we are spending more on readiness now than during the Reagan years.

This is a remarkable success story. And it's a good thing that we stayed ready because in the wake of the Cold War came not peace but all types of conflict and disorder. Today's force has successfully engaged in over 50 contingency operations since Operation DESERT STORM. On a typical week over 40,000 service men and women are participating in 15 separate operations around the globe.

Last spring's Noncombatant Evacuation in Liberia is typical of these operations. With almost no notice the United States, responding to a call to evacuate American citizens, formed a joint task force from units in Italy, in the Adriatic, in Germany, in the U.K., and in the United States. The first units were on their way in hours. Our joint task force — Navy Seals, Army paratroopers and Special Forces, an armada of ships and transport planes — evacuated 2,300 citizens from 68 countries. Although there was lots of gunfire and more than a few close calls, the evacuees and the Task Force returned safely.

Few people in the United States even took notice of this highly complex operation. The American people have simply come to expect such skill and professionalism from our Armed Forces.

We have done some missions so well, most of you have completely forgotten about them.

Take the mission in the Sinai for example. There we have had nearly 1,000 troops assigned since 1982, and we rotate these individuals every six months. That means that more than 30,000 Americans have served in the Sinai. But have you ever heard of a single incident?

Today one of our most closely followed military efforts is in Bosnia, where nearly 18,000 service men and women perform their military tasks as part of a 32-nation peace implementation force. There is no question about the success of IFOR. And so it is useful to understand why it is that IFOR succeeded where UNPROFOR failed.

The first reason is the close coordination between the diplomat and the soldier during the crucial negotiations. The second reason is that, unlike UNPROFOR, IFOR had a very clear mission to include specific tasks to be performed. That is exactly what is needed to keep a force from sliding into mission creep. Finally, IFOR had a straightforward chain of command, robust rules of engagement and sufficient force to get the job done.

These are lessons that we must not forget in all our subsequent operations. However, many problems remain.

While national and regional elections have been held municipal elections had to be postponed. Civilian tasks have not kept pace with the military tasks, especially building of political structures and the establishment of law and order. Civil reconstruction has lagged. The possibility of interethnic violence in Bosnia was, is, and will continue to be, significant.

Overcoming this hatred engendered by a savage civil war will be a tough task. Probably the best thing we can do is get their minds off the violence and get them involved in rebuilding their country.

As you all know we have replaced the Implementation Force in Bosnia with a new force and a new commander to support a new mission in Bosnia. We call this a stabilizing force, or SFOR, designed to ensure the right conditions exist for political and economic initiatives to proceed. The stabilization force contains about 31,000 multi-national forces, with 5,000 operational reserves nearby and 1,000 support personnel out-of-area. The U.S. contribution is 8,500 inside Bosnia, with logistics support outside Bosnia, air support from Aviano, and a Carrier Battle Group.

In approximately one year we hope to replace the 31,000 with a force of 13,500, with a U.S. contribution of approximately 5,000 Americans. Its primary mission will be to deter, with a June 1998 target date for wrap-up. Throughout the whole process we will continually reassess our progress to ensure we are achieving objectives and determine if we can transition to lower force levels sooner. The stakes are high! Finding the right answer will not only decide peace and stability in Bosnia but will influence the future strength of NATO and thus the contours of a future Europe.

The situation in the Middle East also remains problematic. Saddam Hussein continues to pose a serious threat, though not on the same scale as in 1990. Our operations in Iraq require substantial resources, not only from the U.S. but from our partners in the area as well. These include hundreds of flights a day, thousands a year, from fixed bases and carriers. In Southern Iraq alone we've flown over 120,000 sorties to date. And we've conducted three major deployments of ground troops to the region since the end of DESERT STORM. Because of our vital interests in Southwest Asia and the Gulf area, a strong presence will be needed for some time to come.

And because America's leadership is so important our service men and women today serve with great distinction, not just in Europe and the Middle East, but in other parts of the world where our interests are important; whether dampening conflict in the Taiwan Straits, deterring aggression in Korea or helping to fight the drug war in Latin America. None of this would be possible without our unmatched military capabilities and our high levels of readiness.

But now the question before us is whether we can maintain this readiness in the future? That will depend on the future security environment, its challenges and our estimate of the force that we will need to meet the challenges ahead. To that end we have already begun to work on the Quadrennial Defense Review with the goal of completing it this spring.

In preparation for this soup-to-nuts review, the first task was to look at the future security environment out to nearly 15 years to the year 2010. In our internal review we concluded that for the U.S. Armed Forces, the world between now and then will be at least as challenging as the present one.

While we can take comfort from the absence of superpower competition we will also have many security-related concerns. In the next 15 years we see the further development of a complex world of many asymmetrical powers, a world marked by ethnic and religious-based conflicts and influenced strongly by non-state actors.

Adding to the soup, there will undoubtedly be significant leadership and regime changes in North Korea, Cuba, China and many countries in the Middle East. At the same time, in the developed world the population will age, putting greater strains on pension systems and entitlement programs and creating downward pressure on budgets for foreign and defense policy. Technologically we see dangers related to the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the vulnerability of our data processing infrastructure, and the growing sophistication of terrorist movements.

And our military will be influenced by what some call a "Revolution in Military Affairs" — rapid and profound progress in the marriage between information technologies and precision strike capabilities. The good news is that we are on the leading edge of that revolution. The bad news is that the entry barriers to this revolution are relatively low, and in this century no leader in military technology has ever gone unchallenged. In the final analysis, out to 2010, our forces in the field are likely to face a range of threats, from terrorists to rogue states with weapons of mass destruction to potent regional powers, or even emerging peer competitors.

With that as a given our forces in the future must be able to prevent threats from arising by shaping the strategic environment; to deter threats if they emerge; and if necessary to use force to defeat these threats whenever and wherever important interests are at stake.

To meet this challenge three key tasks must be accomplished. First the U.S. must maintain its current major alliances in Europe, Asia, and its coalition in the Middle East. These alliances ensure the benefit of collective action. Our cornerstone alliance in the west is NATO. Contrary to all of the experts of a few years back it is not disappearing.

Rather it is getting stronger, enlarging its membership and reaching out to other nations through the Partnership for Peace.

The basic decision to enlarge that Alliance was made some time ago and reconfirmed at the Bergen ministerial in September. It is no longer an issue of "if" but of "when" and "who." A key challenge is to ensure that NATO enlargement is not seen as a measure taken against any state but rather a measure taken for peace and security on the continent.

At the same time we need to ensure we do not allow the Partnership for Peace program to "die on the vine." As NATO enlargement begins the rest of program may atrophy. PFP was supposed to create patterns of behavior by offering incentives so we could go forward with enlargement. It is important to have a process to ensure qualitative advances in relationships continue for those who don't join in the first or second round.

We must have something to offer, some advantage to continuing friendly, productive relationships. But NATO enlargement must also be seen in relationship to a second major task for future U.S. national security policy: engagement with the great powers. Russia today is fraught with problems, mostly economic. The Russian military is unhappy and unstable due to wage arrears and underfunding for readiness. The influence of organized crime encourages government corruption. We need to help their transition to a market economy and democratization so we don't end up with an adversarial relationship.

Our engagement activities with Russia are key to the continued building of trust between our nations. Our cooperation on the control of nuclear weapons and materials is a very successful initiative. And who could have imagined ten years ago that a Russian brigade would work side-by-side with a U.S. armored division as part of a NATO-led operation in Bosnia?

The joint patrols of Americans and Russians have done a lot for IFOR's reputation. And this kind of engagement will also help to break down the barriers between us and between Russia and NATO. Soon I hope, NATO and the Russian armed forces will open liaison offices at each other's headquarters. The Secretary of State has proposed formalizing the relations between NATO and Russia with a charter that would create standing arrangements for consultation and for joint action.

In all, while we intend to enlarge NATO we also intend to build security in Europe, not against Russia, but with Russia.

In a similar vein, peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region will be strongly influenced by U.S.-Chinese relations.

The United States is firmly committed to continuing its policy of engagement with China. Engagement on security matters will be difficult. China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, its policy toward weapons of mass destruction, and its fractious relations with Taiwan will make engagement challenging.

However, as Secretary Perry has noted, military-to-military relations are central to our policy of engagement with China. Contact between our military and China's may have a positive influence on the Chinese military — a key player in Chinese politics.

As a third major task we must ensure that our strength and our readiness match our worldwide interests. The readiness of our force will depend on many factors. Let me mention just two of them: force structure and modernization.

The issue of defense planning can be reduced to one simple question: How much is enough? This could be tough to decide when there is no overarching central threat.

During the Cold War the U.S.S.R. determined the force levels. After the Cold War, first in the Base Force and then in the Bottom Up Review, we sized against two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. Critics of this force have noted that a one-contingency force or a reinforced one-contingency force is all that is needed in the future. But these critics ignore how hard the present force is working to meet the requirements of lesser contingencies.

Last year, for example, on the average soldiers and marines deployed for around 140 days. On any given day over half of our Navy's ships are underway with more than a third of the total forward deployed. The Air Force, with a third less people than during the Cold War, has more than quadrupled the number it habitually deploys on operations.

These facts all support one conclusion: the force structure today is being worked to its capacity. Readiness for multiple contingencies is the most important reason to maintain a strong force structure. I am not talking about conceptual requirements here. For example, in the fall of 1994, in response to heightened threats, we deployed deterrent forces to both Korea and Iraq. Remarkably, just a few weeks before those deployments we had dispatched a humanitarian mission to Rwanda, and while that was still going on, a force of some 21,000 personnel to Haiti.

The size of our force today is not a luxury but a practical requirement. Farther out in the long-term future there are

promising technologies that will allow us to maintain the same capabilities with a smaller force. And that brings us to the issue of modernization.

Today's modernization program will be the bedrock of tomorrow's readiness. But modernization presents us with a very big challenge — one area where we have to give ourselves an incomplete.

In a restrictive budget environment we must now turn to replacing old equipment and sustaining a prudent modernization program. During the downsizing we were able to hold back on buying new equipment and hold back on modernization because sufficient equipment had been freed up from units that were being deactivated.

Now this windfall has passed and many of the remaining systems, most purchased during the Reagan years, are slated to reach the end of their service lives over the next 10 years. Today our procurement spending is, in real terms, lower than it was before the Korean War. I told Congress last winter that to ensure the readiness of tomorrow's force we would have to increase procurement spending by approximately 15 to 20 billion dollars annually.

And this will have to be done without increasing our "top line." To accomplish this will take revolutionary new management techniques, outsourcing and acquisition reform. Additionally, more bases will have to be closed, more functions privatized and more equipment and services purchased off-the-shelf. Without reducing force structure we will have to trim manpower. We must also continue the restructuring of our reserve forces to bring them into line with our strategic requirements.

It seems clear to me that the ball is in our court. If we are to achieve our vision of maintaining our position as the world's premier fighting force we need to become as innovative as American industry.

Let me close by what I hope amounts to preaching to the choir.

The American people have a great stake in peace and stability around the world. A third of America's national product depends on international trade. And we are, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the richest and most powerful nation on earth.

Without American leadership, international security would suffer. And in the long run more trouble abroad means more trouble at home. We will continue to press international organizations and our allies to do more in the name of international security. But overall, we must never forget that America puts the most into international security because America gets the most out of a more secure and a more stable international system.

Tomorrow and into the future, the United States must continue to lead, and to do that we must continue to support and maintain a strong and ready military, with let me add, strong and productive service academies.

For almost two hundred years, West Point graduates have ensured our ability to do just that. And I have great confidence that your future contributions as leaders of character who serve the common defense will more than live up to West Point's great legacy from the past.

Defense Special Weapons Agency
McLean, Virginia
7 February 1997

Not too long ago, I was the guest speaker at a luncheon of 300 military spouses from the Washington area, and for the very first time my wife did the introduction. But instead of the standard introduction, she proceeded to tell everyone about all the skeletons in my closet. So I was looking forward to Gary's introduction, because I thought he would stick to a straight military introduction, so I could give him an "A" for judgment.

Let me begin with a very obvious and very pleasant thing, and that is to say "congratulations" to the Defense Special Weapons Agency on 50 years of outstanding service to our nation.

But as we all know, the Special Weapons Agency like the "Pentagon," isn't an entity. So when I talk about this Agency, I am really talking about the efforts of some 1,000 super Americans who have contributed to this success story. A group of very dedicated professionals from a wide variety of disciplines that come together for the purpose of contributing to National Defense and maintaining stewardship of some our nation's most important programs and capabilities. And what an outstanding job you have done. On behalf of the Joint Chiefs I applaud your outstanding success.

Now, today's symposium focuses on the lessons of the past 50 years and on the challenges of the 21st Century. I know that Dr. Wickner has already talked about DSWA's history so I will make an effort not to duplicate his remarks. I discovered a long time ago that it is probably prudent not to anger anyone who might actually know how to make a nuclear bomb. For this insight, I give myself an "A" for judgment.

Rather today, let me offer you my perspective on the changing nature of the strategic landscape and the enduring challenges to our National security.

The 19th century author Ambrose Bierce wrote about the future with tongue-in-cheek when he defined it as, "That period of time in which our affairs prosper, our friends are true, and our happiness is assured." And I think you will agree that this in a way, was our perception of the future after the collapse of communism.

It is safe to say that most of us, military and civilian alike, anticipated a relatively benign post Cold War environment. We can all remember the discussions about the peace dividend, the spread of democracy, and the anticipated growth of free market economies. And just as they had in the past, many of the experts heralded a new phase of international cooperation that some argued would negate the need for large militaries and outdated alliances like NATO; remember?

This general euphoria, once again, led some people to believe that arms control agreements would replace force structure, international organizations like the United Nations would peacefully settle all manner of disputes, and economic interdependence would temper hostilities. But you know as well as most that this is not the environment that emerged.

So while the optimists were celebrating the end of the Cold War and trying to convince us that "our happiness was assured," let's remember a useful definition, "An optimist is a person who has never had much experience." After 39 years in uniform and lots of experience, I can tell you that tougher challenges lay ahead and our best information and estimates of the years just ahead continue to support that judgment.

For as we look out at the strategic landscape for the next 15 years, we see a world being shaped by today's readily identifiable trends in demographics, economics, politics, culture and technology.

In a broad sense, I would characterize the world we expect in 2010 as more multi-polar with new centers of power and influence, but none besides the U.S. with the status of a true global power.

Attempting to pursue coherent U.S. policies in the new environment will continue to be particularly challenging. Because instead of uniting around common political ideologies or geography, the unifying factor between new coalitions may be religion, ethnicity, natural resources, economics or any number of future issues.

In addition to having to deal with individual states, the U.S. will find itself dealing with a large number of different international groups who also seek to influence global security issues. From multi-national corporations on one extreme to international organized crime on the other, new coalitions will arise, making pursuit of foreign policy much more difficult. The spread of information and communication technologies will most certainly increase interaction across national borders, coalescing large groups of people with common interests and serving to strengthen new "virtual" power centers.

In some regions of the world, global economic growth will propel some nations into a new era of prosperity. New wealth will provide these developed states with distinct choices between funding investment in infrastructure, social welfare, or new military capabilities. But if things are looking up in the developed world, I am not as optimistic about the developing world.

The experts tell us that by 2010, the global population will grow by 25 percent, with by far the largest increase occurring in the developing world. In a world with more than 7 billion people, we expect to see increased migration to urban areas in developing states as many of these people try to compete for limited jobs and a share of scarce resources.

Experience tells us that several things can happen when states cannot provide for their own people. The fragile society may collapse into political chaos, providing a ripe environment for internal conflict; the citizens might begin migrating to other states, leading to additional strains on neighboring economies; or the leadership might attempt to divert attention away from internal problems by rallying the population against a fictitious "enemy of the state." Any of these situations may result in humanitarian disaster or conflict that potentially affect American interests.

But even in this difficult new world, a world where clear distinctions between threats to our security from beyond our borders and the challenges to our security from within our borders are blurred, some things remain constant, and those constants are our vital national interests.

As President Clinton stated in the National Security Strategy, "Protecting our nation's security our people, our territory, and our way of life is still our foremost mission and constitutional duty." And nothing will be more challenging to the protection of our citizens, soldiers, and our way of life than the threats of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

The fact is that nuclear weapons will remain very much a part of the "real world" of 2010, because this is not a problem with an easy solution. For the past 30 years, every administration has pursued the same dream, the safe and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons from worldwide arsenals. And we are making progress.

From a Cold War high of more than 20,000 U.S. nuclear warheads, the U.S. has dismantled thousands of tactical nuclear warheads, destroyed hundreds of strategic delivery systems, and eliminated 90 percent of its theater nuclear weapons. From the Euro-strategic Pershing II missiles to the nuclear shells for howitzers, the vestiges of the Cold War have vanished into the night. No one knows this better than those of you sitting in this audience today, because the Defense Special Weapons Agency has been heavily involved in supporting the process.

We have worked diligently with Russia to achieve mutually beneficial reductions in our respective arsenals. The foundation for this effort was codified in the Treaty on Nuclear Nonproliferation, demonstrated the first concrete results in the INF Treaty and START I, and today, continues in START II.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program undertaken with Russia and some states of the Former Soviet Union has facilitated the return to Russia of over 3,000 warheads from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. This included the removal of 1,027 former Soviet missiles from their launchers and elimination of more than 800 strategic launchers and bomber aircraft. The trick now is to get Russia to ratify START II so we can quickly move on to START III.

But at the same time, we must remember that we are not the only nuclear-armed nations in the world. Others already possess nuclear weapons or are devoting significant resources to acquiring a nuclear capability.

Nuclear mythology has taught these nations that like Jason's quest for the "golden fleece," the "atomic fleece" confers certain powers upon those willing to endure the odyssey. Unfortunately, after watching the Titans duel for 50 years, they have learned the wrong lessons and demonstrated they have short memories. Because as one American novelist once noted, "What has kept the world safe from the bomb since 1945 has been the memory of what happened at Hiroshima." But that memory is fading.

So in addition to an unwillingness to participate in the arms control process, some nuclear-armed countries condone through their actions the proliferation of nuclear materials and equipment to potentially dangerous states. Given the potential for a nuclear-armed Iran, for example, looming on the horizon, I prefer a national security strategy that offers America a reasonable opportunity to deter and if necessary, retaliate against the use of nuclear weapons. From my perspective, nuclear proliferation is a clear and present danger to our society now and in the future. A danger that cannot simply be "wished away."

Many of us look forward to the time when the United States no longer has to worry about nuclear dangers. But until that moment, the United States must continue to pursue a safe and verifiable arms reduction program while maintaining a suitable defense. Until someone can convince me that deterring the use of weapons of mass destruction is no longer a valid component of the National Security Strategy of the United States, I stand behind the safe and thoughtful arms control strategy established by the President.

The challenge for this great Agency is to ensure that as we begin to focus on further reductions in our nuclear stockpiles that you never lose sight of the awesome responsibilities associated with our collective stewardship. After all, whether you are responsible for 27,000 weapons, 10,000 weapons, or just a thousand weapons, the safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear arsenal demands the same attention to detail as it has for the past 50 years.

Since the dawn of the atomic age the American people and the military have relied on you for the safe stewardship of our nuclear stockpile, critical research, and operational support. These core missions of DSWA will endure for quite some time.

But perhaps even more challenging than the danger of nuclear proliferation, is the problem of chemical and biological weapons, especially when they are mated to sophisticated delivery systems or placed in the hands of terrorists.

While the critical components required for the assembly of nuclear weapons are controlled by a few select nations, almost anyone with the desire and a few hundred thousand dollars can begin the production of chemical and biological agents. By one estimate, nearly 50,000 different facilities around the world could potentially produce at least one type of chemical weapon agent. Not only does this make international policing of such programs difficult, but it dramatically increases the odds that our forces will face chemical or biological agents in future operations.

Chemical and biological weapons have often been described as the "poor man's" nuclear bomb. In the future, some nations will use these weapons not only as cheaper alternatives to nuclear programs, but as ways to further complicate U.S. military operations. This is a very real threat.

The key to effective planning for the operational challenges posed by weapons of mass destruction begins with a good analysis of the threat and its implications for our future strategy. As a result of close cooperation between the Joint Staff and the CINCs, we have established a priority list of capabilities required by military forces.

At the top of the list are improvements to chemical and biological detection equipment and ballistic missile defense, followed by improved capabilities to identify and destroy both underground and above ground WMD targets. This Agency's mission of helping the warfighter achieve high confidence kills of WMD targets on the ground is impor-

tant to our counter-proliferation mission. I salute the progress being made in this area and urge you to continue innovating.

When taken together the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is quite a challenge. This is why President Clinton has worked hard to establish the groundwork for building a new consensus within the United States and with our allies on counter-proliferation policies and objectives.

Counter-proliferation affects virtually every aspect of the defense mission and requires a broad range of capabilities in order to effectively respond to the threat. In Fiscal Year 1997, the Department of Defense invested just under $4.3 billion in counter-proliferation related programs. These funds are important contributions to our coordinated national investment strategy for counter-proliferation. A bipartisan commission of Congress recently reaffirmed the importance of this program when at the top of its list of vital national interests, it placed "Preventing and deterring the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons attacks on the United States."

Finally, let me say a few words about the last challenge impacting the future of military operations and DSWA. Of course I'm referring to the problem of terrorism.

Thirty years ago, if some political zealots wanted to use terror to influence U.S. policy or achieve some limited objective they had a relatively few, unsophisticated tools at their disposal. Today the problem of terrorism and the issue of force protection are much more complex.

Those out to do us harm are no longer just crackpots with a couple of Molotov cocktails. These are people with access to very sophisticated information and technology. They are using the Internet and cellular phones as enabling technologies. They have the knowledge and resources to construct bombs of immense destructive power, like those we saw in Oklahoma City, the World Trade Towers, and Khobar Towers. As I mentioned earlier, these hostile groups are increasingly operating more globally in well-connected networks.

Adding to the danger and the growing effectiveness of terrorists is the level of financial support many of these groups are receiving from private sources and hostile states. Unable to compete with the United States militarily, nations like Iran are spending millions of dollars each year in an attempt to counter U.S. influence. These states try to achieve their policy objectives by finding small groups to do the dirty work for them. This is a trend that will continue.

What these rogue states fail to understand is that in the history of the United States, these types of events have only served to strengthen American resolve and determination.

I travel all over the world talking about our joint warfighting team and what it means to the security of America. Combating terrorism must also be a team effort, but the team has got to be much larger than just the Services. If we truly intend to defeat those that want to do us harm then we need to enlist the help not only of the Services, but of Congress, law enforcement agencies, industry, and proven performers like the Special Weapons Agency.

A good example of the type of cooperation we need can be seen in the relationship between J-34, the new Combating Terrorism organization on the Joint Staff, and those of you here at the Defense Special Weapons Agency. Working together, we are establishing a regular schedule of assistance visits for our facility commanders by your Agency's assessment teams.

These assessment teams will provide commanders with feedback on the effectiveness of force protection measures at their installations. But this isn't all they will do. Helping our commanders solve problems will be the most important part of their job. Whether it is understanding what kind of new protection systems are available, or getting help with pushing requests through the chain of command, these teams must be dedicated to providing the best support possible to our forces.

So to those of you involved in this effort, let me say that nothing you will do in your careers may be as important as the task at hand. We cannot leave ourselves vulnerable to terrorist threats. We owe it to all our great people around the world and their families, to ensure we have done everything feasible to provide for their safety.

I can't think of any better group of people to help us tackle this problem than those of you here at DSWA.

And in this regard here is a new challenge for DSWA. Right now, if someone wants to talk to the experts on maneuver warfare, aerial combat, or naval warfare, they come here to the United States. If they want to buy the best information technologies or most effective weapon systems, they come to the United States. But when they want to learn about force protection and anti-terrorism where do they go? Well to Israel and perhaps the United Kingdom. My challenge to you is to help us change this state of affairs.

In the future, when someone is interested in talking to the experts about force protection, I want them to first think about the United States military and DSWA; team members in perhaps the most important battle we will face for some time. This is my challenge to you here today.

So where does all this leave us?

The bottom line is that we undoubtedly face a more complex and even more dangerous world in 2010 than we face today. It will be a world where the United States could be confronted with a wide array of non-traditional challenges while some current threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism will endure.

But let me be clear about one thing. Amidst all of the talk about tomorrow's dangerous world, it is all too easy to overlook the fact that today the United States and our Allies are much safer than we were in the days of the Cold War. As Winston Churchill once remarked, "These are not dark days, these are great days. The greatest days our country has ever lived."

Right now the United States finds itself in something of a "strategic pause." Without a monolithic threat to the national security, we have a unique opportunity to position ourselves for the future. The Special Weapons Agency must be a key player in helping us prepare for the uncertainties we face, and will face in the years ahead.

We are who we are today because of choices we made yesterday. Likewise tomorrow will become the result of today's choices.

When I was drafted in 1958 and sent to Alaska for my first assignment, I soon found out that there were only two seasons — winter and July. As the backroads began to thaw, they would become muddy and vehicles traveling through the backcountry would leave deep ruts. The ground would freeze hard during the winter months and the highway ruts became part of the traveling challenge.

I'll never forget a sign I once saw my first winter that read, "Driver — please choose carefully which rut you drive in, because you'll be in it for the next 20 miles."

Today we must choose carefully the path we are about to take. For our choice will control us for the next 20 years.

Let me once again congratulate all of you from the Defense Special Weapons Agency on the indispensable role you and your predecessors have played the past fifty years in helping our forces achieve new levels of combat capability and safeguarding America's nuclear deterrent. Your new challenge is to not lose sight of the importance of your historical mission while helping us achieve the new capabilities we require as America begins the 21st Century.

Good luck in all your endeavors and once again thank you for your contributions. I look forward to another 50 years of excellence.

Annual Posture Statement
Washington, DC
12 February 1997

I am proud to report to you that the United States' military remains the finest military force on earth. Time and again this past year, the 3.1 million members of the Total Force performed superbly in a variety of challenges around the globe. Success was due in large measure to the strong support of Congress, the Administration, and the American people. But more importantly, the force succeeded because of quality people, outstanding unit leadership, and its unique ability to adapt and persevere in an environment characterized by change and uncertainty.

As busy as the force has been and with all of the talk about today's dangerous world and the difficulties Americans have faced, it is too easy to overlook the fact that today the United States and its Allies are much safer than they were in the dark days of the Cold War. This "strategic pause," where the United States has no adversaries who are global powers, is providing us with the time to regroup, reflect on the challenges ahead, and prepare America's forces for the next millennium.

One of the strategic consequences of the post Cold War period is that the U.S. has been able to reduce military force levels. Since 1989, the active all-volunteer force has been reduced by 700,000 people — about a third of the active force. The Army has gone from 18 active divisions to 10, a 45 percent reduction; the Navy from 566 ships to 352, a 38 percent decline; and the Air Force, from 36 to 20 fighter wings, down 45 percent. These are the lowest force levels since before the Korean War. The Defense Budget has also been cut by about 40 percent since 1985. In FY98, it will represent only 3.0 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, the lowest since before World War II.

The force drawdown these past few years has not been an easy experience for military members. Many outstanding Americans were asked to leave the service of their country, thousands of whom had hoped to make the military a career. But through all this, the great people in uniform have persevered and once again confirmed the importance of American leadership in a number of contingencies around the globe.

OPERATIONS

America's military today is performing more missions, in more places than it did during the Cold War, and is doing so with significantly fewer personnel. Yet our men and women have performed brilliantly from one end of the world to the other, with Bosnia standing as a prime example.

BALKANS

Fifteen months ago in many Bosnian towns and cities, artillery fire was killing men and women in their homes and snipers often shot children playing in the streets. Atrocities were nearly a daily occurrence. U.S. forces went into Bosnia with the Implementation Force (IFOR), the NATO force tasked to accomplish the military tasks assigned in the Dayton Accords. It was a heavy force, involving nearly 20,000 U.S. military members who participated in keeping the factions separated, demobilizing forces, and achieving the other military goals of the Dayton accords.

The situation has changed dramatically since then. Today there are no weapons firing into towns and children once again play in the streets. The absence of war brought by IFOR offers a ray of hope for the future. On 20 December 1996, U.S. forces reached a milestone with the successful transition from the Implementation Force to a Stabilization Force (SFOR).

SFOR continues to build on the success of IFOR by providing time and an environment that will permit civilian initiatives to proceed. Up to approximately 8,500 U.S. personnel in Bosnia and an additional 5,000 in neighboring countries are supporting the Stabilization Force. SFOR is a mobile force that will concentrate on providing a safe and secure environment for civilian implementation of Dayton accords. The Commander, Stabilization Force (COMSFOR), is supported by an air operation built on the foundation of the successful Operation DENY FLIGHT; 1,800 U.S. personnel are involved in this facet of operations.

Our forces will be in place for 18 months. Every six months, a review of the security situation and civil initiatives will be conducted with the goal of moving to a deterrent force of reduced size.

Equally important to regional stability in the Balkans was Operation ABLE SENTRY. ABLE SENTRY is the U.S. contribution to the United Nations Preventative Deployment operation in Macedonia. 500 U.S. personnel joined 500 troops from other nations to ensure containment of the crisis in Bosnia.

MIDDLE EAST

Operations in the Middle East remained key to the preservation of regional peace and stability during 1996. Nowhere was this more evident than in efforts to deter additional Iraqi aggression and enforce U.N.-ordered sanctions and resolutions.

With the closing of the Military Coordination Center last year, the Secretary of Defense approved a modification of the mission in Northern Iraq. Since 1991, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT had provided humanitarian assistance to the Kurds and enforcement of the northern no-fly zone. The new Operation NORTHERN WATCH will focus exclusively on enforcement of the no-fly zone. Approximately 1,100 U.S. personnel support these efforts along with personnel and aircraft from the U.K. and Turkey.

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH remained in effect throughout 1996, tasked with ensuring compliance with United Nations' Security Council Resolution 949 and the 1994 U.S. demarche prohibiting the build-up of Iraqi ground forces south of the 32d parallel. SOUTHERN WATCH remains a multinational operation with participants from the U.K., France, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

Arabian Gulf maritime intercept operations continued to monitor shipping to ensure compliance with pertinent U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Although the U.S. assumed the bulk of responsibility for operations, during 1996, the U.K., Netherlands, Australia, Belgium, Italy, and France also participated.

In spite of international efforts to maintain the peace and force compliance with U.N. resolutions, Iraq still conducted military operations against its Kurdish population in the North. Operation DESERT STRIKE was the U.S. response to this aggression. Designed to deter Iraq from further offensive operations, U.S. forces struck military targets in Southern Iraq and expanded the no-fly zone in the South, further constraining Iraq's military.

The attack on the Kurdish population made it clear that the coalition could no longer guarantee the safety of civilians that had been working with the United States and international relief organizations to secure the peace. Operation PACIFIC HAVEN was initiated to evacuate and relocate former U.S. Government employees, political refugees,

and their families. Using facilities on Guam, the DoD in cooperation with the Department of State and other agencies, airlifted approximately 6,500 Kurds from Iraq to the island of Guam. 1,540 service members and 150 civilians supported this operation on Guam.

All these operations were in addition to on-going participation in the Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) missions in the Sinai. Nearly 1,000 U.S. forces man outposts in the Sinai. Since 1982, these troops have performed monitoring duties in accordance with the provisions of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN BASIN

The United States participated in a wide range of operations the past year in Latin America.

In Haiti, Exercise FAIRWINDS continues to help promote the building of a safe and stable environment. Approximately 500 U.S. medical, engineering, and security personnel currently are in Haiti. Together with monthly port calls from Navy and Coast Guard vessels, our forces perform select humanitarian projects designed to restore the devastated infrastructure and provide hope for the population struggling to emerge from this crisis.

Counter-drug operations continued in cooperation with regional governments in Operation LASER STRIKE. Working to support host nation counter-drug operations, LASER STRIKE focused on data collection and interdicting air and sea movement of illegal drugs. More than 500 U.S. personnel are making significant contributions to the development of a more comprehensive regional approach to counter-drug operations.

In Honduras, Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) continued its 12th year of operations designed to promote cooperative security and regional stability. The 500 members of JTF-B conduct medical training, engineering operations, disaster relief, counter-drug operations, and CJCS-sponsored military exercises.

Another operation is SAFE BORDER, the U.S. contribution to monitoring the cease-fire along the Ecuador-Peru border. Established by the Rio Treaty, 60 U.S. personnel joined observers from Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to mitigate the conflict.

Finally, U.S. forces continued support to migrant operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Only a few cases remain to be resolved after more than 58,000 Haitian and Cuban refugees transited the base between 1994 and early 1996.

But these were by no means the only operations U.S. forces participated in during 1996. In Southeast Asia, America continues to seek resolution of those missing in action through Joint Task Force Full Accounting. In less than 48 hours, our forces successfully evacuated 2,400 non-combatants from 68 countries in Liberia. In the Pacific, when tensions flared between China and Taiwan, U.S. forces quickly responded by diverting two carrier battle groups to the region to limit the chances of escalation. This kind of mobility and response acts to stifle any potential misperceptions about our ability to show resolve in areas where U.S. interests are at stake.

In support of domestic requests, men and women in uniform deployed to support the 1996 Olympic Games, fought fires in the West, provided flood relief in the Northwest, and assisted in clearing transportation routes during a particularly difficult winter in the Dakotas.

Today, over 40,000 men and women in uniform are deployed on 14 different operations. On an average day during the past year, 50,000 military professionals participated in deployed operations, and an average of 1,700 defense civilians also deployed to support the uniformed Services.

These numbers do not necessarily include the more than 250,000 forces forward stationed or routinely deployed at sea, that are in addition to the hundreds of local unit training deployments and Joint or multinational exercises that occur on a routine basis.

In Korea, for example, 36,000 U.S. forces stand ready with 600,000 troops from the Republic of Korea to ensure peace on the peninsula against 1.8 million North Korean forces. The instability in North Korea remains a concern as economic problems, food shortages, and energy deficiencies continue to worsen. Kim Jong Il's repressive regime and brittle ideology cannot address the current crisis. Thus it is imperative that our forces stand guard to protect a fragile peace.

During the past year, the importance of selected reserve component contributions to operations around the world also continued to remain key. Reserve units and individuals possess many of the capabilities needed for regional contingencies and crises, exercise support, and peacetime augmentation.

The Services continue to leverage the cost-effective contributions of the reserve components to compensate for a smaller Total Force. Support is funded by taking advantage of scheduled routine training periods, or through the Active component funding Reserve active duty days to meet surge requirements. As a practical example, last year, nearly 145

Guard and Reserve units activated to support operations in Bosnia. They have proudly met the challenge. The active force fully appreciates the contributions of America's citizen-soldiers.

The Services continue to take action to avoid unbudgeted costs of non-routine operations from absorbing funds required for readiness and modernization. In FY97 Congress appropriated $1.3 billion to cover military operations anticipated at the time. Two unanticipated operations resulted in $2.0 billion in unbudgeted FY97 costs: Iraq's provocation in the North and the President's approval of SFOR in Bosnia. To cover these costs, the Administration is requesting a FY97 $2.0 billion supplemental appropriation.

The FY98 President's Budget requests $1.5 billion in the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Account to complete operations in Bosnia, and an additional $700 million for operations in Southwest Asia. This funding is important for the sustainment of critical operations and continued success in two regions.

Looking back on the operations this past year, it is gratifying to count the large number of successes. Key military determinants of success included: early involvement of military leaders in establishing a clear mission and achievable objectives; a clear chain of command; robust Rules of Engagement for operations and force protection; sufficient assets to achieve the objectives; outstanding pre-deployment training; and great people. These operations demonstrate both the importance to our nation's security of Peacetime Engagement, Conflict Prevention, and Forward Presence, as well as the necessity for our military forces to have the ability to conduct successful operations across the full spectrum of challenges.

As an integral part of a framework for success, commanders and planners must also give priority consideration to protecting our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.

FORCE PROTECTION AND COMBATING TERRORISM

Few challenges loom as large as that of terrorism. The problem of terrorism and the issue of force protection are much more complex than they were 20 years ago. But terrorism isn't a new problem; it is simply an old problem getting worse. And so today, the Combatant Commanders and the Services are redoubling their efforts to provide America's men and women with the best possible force protection measures available.

Those out to do us harm are no longer just political zealots with a few sticks of dynamite. These are determined operatives, with access to very sophisticated information and technology. They construct bombs of immense destructive power like those used at the World Trade Center and Khobar Towers.

Equally challenging is the problem of chemical and biological weapons in the hands of terrorists or rogue states, dangers that U.S. forces may face in future operations. The Chemical Weapons Convention is an important step in implementing comprehensive measures to address this particular problem. I strongly urge your support for its expeditious ratification so that the U.S. has a strong voice in the control regime.

Adding to the danger is the increasing level of financial support these groups receive from private sources and hostile states. Unable to confront or compete with the United States militarily, rogue nations are spending millions of dollars each year in an attempt to counter U.S. influence. These states try to achieve their policy objectives by exploiting small groups to do the dirty work for them.

The Secretary of Defense commissioned the Downing Assessment Task Force to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the Khobar Towers bombing. In response to the Downing Task Force, the Secretary designated me as his principal advisor and the Department's focal point for all matters related to force protection.

The Downing Report addressed 26 findings and 81 recommendations, 79 of which have been implemented. The actions taken in response to the Downing Report include organizational changes, policy changes, intelligence emphasis, increased use of technology, and additional physical security funding. The remaining two recommendations yet to be implemented involve contract deliveries for vehicle armor kits and personnel body armor which should be completed by 1 April 1997. The SECDEF determined one finding, dealing with the number of ambulances available in CENTCOM's area of responsibility, was faulty.

Organizational changes were made in the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Services. I established a new Deputy Director for Operations for combating terrorism (J-34) that is now the focal point for coordinating the combating terrorism program among the Services and combatant commands. The Services and combatant commands also established focal points to ensure force protection is addressed in all daily operations and is a consideration during long range planning and funding.

Policy changes were codified in DoD Directive 2000.12, "DoD Combating Terrorism Program." This directive establishes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on antiterrorism force

protection matters. Additionally, it establishes new responsibilities for the Services, combatant commands, defense agencies, and OSD staff. These responsibilities range from implementation to assessment of antiterrorism programs.

A major policy change resulting from the Downing Report is the delineation of force protection responsibilities between the DoD and the Department of State. In the future, force protection for overseas DoD personnel will be provided by the department which is most able to provide the best security. Currently the Joint Staff and DoD are in the process of finalizing specific country-by-country agreements between DoD and the Department of State for the Arabian Peninsula. Similar agreements are being considered for the other overseas commands. In addition, DoD Directive 2000.12 also implemented DoD Handbook O-2000.12H, as the standard for antiterrorism force protection. The handbook establishes threat assessment, education and training, physical security, personnel protection, and weapons of mass destruction related standards for all of the Department of Defense.

Force protection training for DoD personnel and assessing the physical security of the installations on which they work are two critical areas of our overall personnel security program. Through the Services and CINCs, I have implemented a four-tiered program which includes individual, unit, commander, and senior executive level training.

Individual training is conducted by the Services upon entry into the military and throughout an individual's career in conjunction with various formal training courses. Unit level training is conducted by the individual organization. This includes formal training for the unit antiterrorism force protection instructors. Commander training is provided during the Services' pre-command training programs. This training focuses on the commander's force protection responsibilities as outlined in DoD Directives, Joint, and Service publications. Professional Military Education will also incorporate force protection into its curriculum. The final level of training is the executive level seminar for commanders involved in force protection planning and execution. Executive training culminates with a force protection wargame.

The Joint Chiefs are committed to ensuring the best available force protection equipment is available to U.S. forces. During several fora, military leaders noted the lack of "state of the art" anti-terrorism protection devices and challenged industry to draw on their extensive expertise to fulfill requirements. The response has been encouraging. But, before America procures new equipment, commanders must have a firm understanding of potential vulnerabilities and requirements.

This is where a new program of vulnerability assessment plays a key role. J-34, in close cooperation with the Defense Special Weapons Agency (the executive agent), is forming a number of assessment teams that will visit more that 650 facilities and installations on a prioritized schedule. Approximately fifty assessments are scheduled in 1997. Once the teams reach full strength they will complete 100 assessments per year. These teams will not only provide commanders with vulnerability assessments and recommendations, but most importantly will educate commanders on the types of force protection capabilities available to address shortfalls.

Timely intelligence information available at the appropriate level is a key factor in successfully combating terrorism at all levels of command. We have worked with the Defense Intelligence Agency to prioritize collection efforts in order to improve analysis of terrorist related events, both at the national and theater levels. At the national level, the Defense Intelligence Agency created the Office of Counterterrorism Analysis to provide support to the Joint Staff and combatant commands. Additional improvements were made by integrating the Deputy Director for Operation for combating terrorism (J-34) with the Defense Intelligence Agencies' Transnational Warfare Counterterrorism Office. This fusion of intelligence and operations functions improved both the analysis and dissemination of threat information to the Combatant Commanders. In addition, an Antiterrorism Watch Cell has been established which supports the National Military Command Center Watch Teams in the event of a terrorist incident.

Despite recent improvements in policy, procedures, and intelligence DoD's best efforts will not prevent every terrorist incident. Therefore, OSD initiated an effort to infuse technology improvements into force protection programs. Currently OSD has three programs; the Counterterrorism Technical Support, Physical Security Equipment Action Group, and Commercial-Off-The-Shelf Technology Insertion Program to address force protection technology improvements

As the SECDEF's principal advisor, I play a strong role in this process. In November 1996, the Joint Staff sponsored a force protection symposium to discuss force protection requirements with industry. Industry is providing DoD with technological solutions and equipment to improve force protection. Evaluations of both off-the-shelf and emerging technologies are underway.

As the priority for force protection is raised we need to ensure it is also given a high budget priority. We initiated a review of future funding for force protection and have designated force protection as a major issue for the FY 1998-2003 program review. In the near term, a Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund was authorized in direct support of a Downing Report recommendation to fund emergency or high priority antiterrorism requirements.

This effort was possible only because of the exceptional cooperation between the Services, Unified Commands, DoD and other government agencies, and commanders at all levels. The ultimate goal is make the U.S. military the premier anti-terrorism force in the world.

QUALITY PEOPLE — THE KEY TO SUCCESS

The ability of the United States military to sustain its record of operational success into the next century is based first and foremost on our ability to recruit and retain highly capable men and women. This is the reason my number one priority remains people — their recruitment and retention through strong support of the issues important to service members.

During the last fiscal year, the DoD met 101 percent of the recruitment goals. 96 percent of new recruits have high school diplomas as compared to 1974, when that rate was only 61 percent. 70 percent of these young people scored in the top three categories of the mental aptitude test. Twenty years ago in 1977, 32 percent of new recruits scored in the lowest recruiting category. Today it is less than 1 percent (0.3 percent).

However, emerging trends are cause for concern. The Services anticipate an increase in the number of new recruits they will need to sustain the force now that the drawdown is nearing completion. Moreover, the Services are going to continue to find themselves competing more with private industry for the best and brightest young people. This is especially true given that the soldier of the 21st century, just as the worker of the 21st century, will most likely require greater math, computer, and language skills.

But recruiting is only part of the picture. The Services must concern themselves with retaining these outstanding Americans once they enlist. Overall retention rates have increased the past year. The retention rate for DoD was the highest it has been during the past seven years. The Army and Marine Corps maintained retention rates near 83 percent, the Navy increased by 2 percentage points to 85 percent, and the Air Force increased 3 percentage points above last year, from 86 percent to 89 percent. This stability provides evidence of the dividends paid by investment in quality of life programs for America's service men and women, and reinforces the focus on these issues in the coming years.

QUALITY OF LIFE PROGRAMS

Looking out on the horizon, military operations will continue to demand great sacrifice and dedication from U.S. forces. It is important to reaffirm the importance of the top five "people" priorities: compensation; retirement; medical benefits; housing; and personal dignity.

Congress deserves much credit for supporting the 1997 pay increase and the additions to the Basic Allowance for Quarters. The FY98 budget funds a 2.8 percent pay increase and 3.0 percent in the out-years. But, it is bothersome that so many of the young enlisted men and women still have difficulties making ends meet.

When Congress made the decision to move away from the draft to an all-volunteer force, the demographics of the force changed as more people viewed service as a professional career. Forty-three percent of the force is now below 26 years of age. The Services now attract more young married couples, as opposed to the single draftees of years past. 61 percent of the active force is married, and together have more than 1.3 million children. Since the military reflects society in general, it should come as no surprise that 5 percent of the force are single parents, with all the challenges that accompany such status.

Congress and DoD should jointly explore solutions to the problem of adequate compensation for these young Americans. The arduous life style and devotion to duty asked of young men and women deserve a fair recognition of their efforts through adequate compensation.

Congress should resist pressures to make additional changes to the existing 20-year retirement compensation system. The foundation of the military pay system has historically been based on the concept of delayed compensation. The 20-year retirement system provides an incentive for members to make the Services a career. Reforms this past decade have already cut by over 20 percent the value of retirement for a member leaving at 20 years. The greatly reduced force levels of today will eventually result in savings in this area in the out-years. Any additional changes made now may have unanticipated consequences in terms of force retention, recruitment, and force composition down the road.

In light of decreasing military medical assets, maintaining an adequate level of health care for Service members, dependents, and retirees is a critical quality of life issue. With the drawdown and restructuring initiatives occurring throughout the Services, access to military medical facilities could become more difficult, especially for dual-eligible

retirees (those over 65 and Medicare eligible). Medicare subvention will allow retirees to enroll in TRICARE and have appropriate access to military facilities. Congress should support a subvention test as a means to maintain the good faith promise to retirees and validate cost estimates. The military's peacetime health care system maintains wartime readiness and is a key retention issue.

Again this year, the Services request your support for the continued improvement of military quarters and family support. In FY98, quality of life funding is continued in such areas as barracks and family housing, child-care, family support programs, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) activities. The planned FY98 funding for replacement or refurbishment of 5,900 family housing units and 11,000 barracks living spaces is a program worthy of unanimous support.

But adequate pay, medical, and retirement benefits alone will not attract or retain the quality people we must have to sustain our armed services. We must create an environment that fosters an atmosphere of trust and respect for personal dignity.

The recent incidents of sexual harassment at training centers and hazing are particularly troubling because these events are not consistent with our values of integrity, moral courage, trust and confidence. Moreover, sexual harassment and hazing destroy teamwork, a key element of combat success. We have an absolute responsibility to ensure these events do not occur. The Chiefs and I reaffirm our zero-tolerance policy for discrimination, harassment, and all actions contrary to our core values.

Ours must be a military that any American can be proud to serve in. America's parents must be able to trust in our commitment to treat their children fairly and justly and provide them a safe, harassment-free environment.

READINESS

The ability to respond to national crises requires that readiness remain the Services' next priority. Today's force is among the busiest in our history. This fact presupposes a high level of readiness, but it also makes maintaining readiness a more complex task.

The Services made a determined effort to heed the warnings about a hollow force. Resolved to avoid the mistakes of the past, readiness accounts received top priority funding. This strategy paid big dividends in terms of mission success. However, readiness requires our constant attention as the tension between modernization, personnel programs, operations, and training becomes more acute.

OPERATIONS/PERSONNEL TEMPO

America's professional force maintained readiness the past year even with an increased level of tasking. The high OPTEMPO stressed our Operations and Maintenance accounts (O&M), as forces required additional supplies, maintenance, and training in preparation for impending taskings and exercises. In the budget, O&M receives a justified increase from $92.9 billion in FY97 to $93.7 billion in FY98. Each military Service is working to sustain high levels of readiness while implementing new initiatives to reduce costs.

The rotational nature of operations such as SFOR in Bosnia and the enforcement of the no-fly zones in Iraq challenged the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). The regional CINCs and the Services continue to deftly manage these key issues to maintain the quality of the force. However, the increased time away from home brought on by frequent training events as well as actual operations can erode the quality of life and family unity of Service members.

Several processes and tracking mechanisms are being put into place in order to monitor the pulse of PERSTEMPO and attempt to alleviate hardships. As problems are identified, the Joint Monthly Readiness Review provides a forum for bringing them to the attention of the Services, OSD, and me for action. Initiatives are also underway to monitor those individuals in critical jobs that seem to get tasked more often than others. Prior to issuing deployment orders, the Joint Staff (J-3) in conjunction with the Service and CINC staffs, now discuss the impacts on PERSTEMPO and explore potential alternatives as required.

The Navy has defined and developed OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO programs aimed at meeting both DoD directed requirements and ensuring reasonable conditions for Navy families. PERSTEMPO exceptions are personally approved by the Chief of Naval Operations; last year there were only five. PERSTEMPO rose only slightly above the Navy goal of 50 percent of the time in home port, due primarily to meeting CINC requirements and unforeseen contingency operations.

Today's Air Force is very much an expeditionary force. It is 36 percent smaller, 66 percent less forward based, and has nearly five times more airmen deployed today than in 1989. Yet careful management has resulted in less than 3 percent of Air Force personnel exceeding the Chief of Staff's PERSTEMPO goal of 120 days per year away from home.

The Marine Corps deployment tempo (DEPTEMPO) for the past year once again demonstrated an ability to provide initial response to unanticipated contingencies, such as the crises in Liberia and the Central African Republic, while sustaining forward presence. All this despite a 12 percent decrease in force structure since 1989. On an average day, the Marine Corps has approximately 25 percent of the operating force deployed. Marine Corps EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft are good examples of assets in high demand around the globe. These units are carefully managed to ensure they meet both the Commandant's DEPTEMPO guidelines and the requirements of our Global Military Force Policy.

Last year, the Army remained a resilient quality force which deployed on an average day, over 34,000 soldiers, not including many soldiers already forward deployed in countries such as Panama, Italy, South Korea, and Germany. The average yearly deployment rate rose by more than 2 percent last year.

Although the Services carefully monitor the effects of increased PERSTEMPO, the adverse effects may not appear immediately. This is one reason the Joint Staff aggressively pursues PERSTEMPO measurement initiatives.

Family oriented programs are another area in which the Services are very aggressive. During on-going operations in Bosnia, family service centers setup counseling services in schools attended by children of deployed Service members. Additionally, American forces have access to on-line e-mail, morale calls to home, and Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) support facilities throughout the area of responsibility (AOR). Chaplain support during the Bosnia operations is particularly strong to both families and deployed members.

Readiness of the force is based on several components, but an important new element the past several years has been jointness.

JOINTNESS: TEN YEARS AFTER GOLDWATER-NICHOLS

The changes brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act have had a positive effect on our readiness and have become a major source of what we refer to as "jointness." The tenth anniversary of Goldwater-Nichols was celebrated with a symposium at the National Defense University. Several panels of distinguished speakers offered unique insights into the both the process and progress of Goldwater-Nichols implementation. The symposium was an opportunity to take a historical look at Goldwater-Nichols, the improvements in jointness that it brought about, and what remains to be accomplished.

Much has been accomplished. Jointness cannot be measured by the number of joint publications produced or by listing the new Joint Centers and organizations. Jointness is out in the field, in the air, and on the oceans. One only has to compare the inadequate level of air-ground cooperation in Grenada with the outstanding efforts in Haiti, where an Army light division deployed from an aircraft carrier, or look at Bosnia, where two successive commanders on the ground were admirals.

The effort to improve the military advice provided to the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council is an important success story. The roles of the Chairman and Vice Chairman are well established and have produced tangible results. Additionally, the added voice in the resource allocation process that Goldwater-Nichols provided the CINCs has proven most beneficial.

Following Goldwater-Nichols, the Department of Defense revised its acquisition directives, thus helping ensure military requirements and mission needs are met responsively through cost-effective modernization programs. OSD has initiated very important acquisition reforms this year which will help us field the warfighting capabilities postulated in 2010.

Increasing the number of senior leaders who have significant Joint duty experience is still key to improving the process. A process is now in place to assess all joint manpower positions to ensure a particular manpower position provides sufficient joint expertise to be included on the Joint Duty List. An oversight board composed of eight Flag Officers or civilian equivalents has validated the process. The results of these Initiatives are being codified in a DoD manual covering the Joint Officer Management Program.

Joint doctrine has emerged as a central organizing force. Without establishing the basic beliefs about the best way to fight the Joint war, operations were in danger of falling victim to "doctrine du jour," the tendency to adopt ad hoc procedures. Developing Joint doctrine has not been an easy process by any stretch of the imagination. Nevertheless, the Services, CINCs, DoD Agencies, Joint Staff, and the Joint Warfighting Center have teamed to produce a large body

of authoritative Joint doctrine to enhance operational effectiveness. To date, 76 Joint doctrine manuals are in place and the body of approved Joint doctrine continues to evolve. The value of Joint doctrine has been demonstrated numerous times in deployed operations around the globe.

Joint education continues as a pillar of force readiness. The National Military Strategy requires an educated officer corps capable of coping with a broad range of operations while simultaneously shaping the strategic environment. Continued improvements to joint education programs will prove to be future force multipliers.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) continues to evolve into one of the most useful tools available to the SECDEF, the Chairman, the Services, and CINCs. The JROC has grown from an acorn to a sizable oak tree in terms of responsibility and effectiveness. Now the JROC tree must grow to full maturity.

Within the context of strategic planning, the JROC has expanded its scope and focus dramatically over the past three years. It now plays an increasingly central role in two areas, one associated with the validation of mission needs for the acquisition process, and one related to the assessment of Joint warfighting capabilities. In both these roles, the JROC supports me in executing one of my important Title 10 responsibilities — to advise the Secretary of Defense on requirement priorities, assess military requirements for Defense Acquisition Programs, and provide the SECDEF with alternative program recommendations to achieve greater conformance with the priorities established.

Codifying the JROC and Chairman's role in the last Defense Authorization Bill, was an important step in the process. As Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (and the only military member of that board) and my designated Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the Vice Chairman now plays a pivotal role in ensuring that we achieve the optimal military capability, at the right time.

The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCAs) have provided an analytical foundation for JROC deliberations. The JROC oversees the JWCA process, directing assessments of specific Joint military areas. Through improvements in the JWCA process, the JROC has further increased the interaction with CINCs and the Services on warfighting capabilities and requirements issues. Additionally, the Joint Staff has been able to further integrate the JROC and JWCA process with the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). This process continues to mature and gain relevance, facilitating consensus among the JROC, CINCs, and the JCS on military planning and requirements.

Readiness to conduct effective operations is also tied very closely to improvements in Joint training. This is where an aggressive program of Joint training and education initiatives is so important. These initiatives combine the teachings of Joint doctrine and Joint operations to fully utilize all aspects of Service capabilities as a Joint force. Professional Military Education programs have made great progress in educating officers about each Service's capabilities and the contributions that each brings to the full range of Joint operations. These programs provide a unique environment which allows future leaders to critically assess the status today, and think "out of the box" about the future. But the theoretical must be reinforced with the practical. During the past year, the Joint Staff continued efforts to fully integrate new modeling and simulation efforts. Additionally, the staff has taken steps that enable training efficiencies by matching training requirements to the exercise program. The feedback from the theater CINCs is positive and results from the Joint Exercise Program are encouraging.

Jointness is moving into the future, building on the core competencies of each of the Services. Continued cooperation will allow realization of the operational goal to achieve full spectrum dominance in the near term and out into the challenging future.

MODERNIZATION — EQUIPPING THE FORCE FOR THE 21st CENTURY

The most challenging aspect of modernization remains the continuing underfunding of our acquisition accounts. In my last two reports to you, I have stressed the need to raise procurement funding to a steady state of about $60 billion per year. This is still an operative goal although the Quadrennial Review may adjust it to meet the dictates of a new or modified force structure.

This budget does not reach the target level of funding until 2001. While this is later than I think is optimal, I am encouraged that at least it is now accepted as a realistic, achievable goal. If we are to achieve this goal, as a minimum, we will have to cut out excesses and learn to work smarter.

As difficult as it is politically we will have to further reduce our infrastructure. The BRAC process reduced our base infrastructure by some 18 percent and should provide a net cost avoidance of $14 billion between 1990 and the year 2001. But at the same time, while we cut these bases by a little less than a fifth, we also reduced the force by a third, and reduced our combat structure even more than that. The result is that we perhaps have more excess infrastructure

today than we did when the BRAC process started. In the short run, we need to close more facilities, as painful and as expensive as it is.

We also must change how we do business, relying more on outsourcing, privatization, and the procurement of off-the-shelf equipment and services. Where possible, we will also have to trim personnel end strength especially where technological changes such as improved weapons systems, afford us the possibility to consider fewer or smaller units.

During the last year, the Joint Chiefs and Unified Commanders established a common vision of future capabilities that will lead us in a common direction towards future warfighting concepts and complementary interoperable capabilities. In tandem with the great work being done by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, *Joint Vision 2010* provides the Services and Unified Commands the conceptual template to achieve dominance across the full spectrum of future operations. The implementation plan for *Joint Vision 2010* is already well underway and will ensure that the vision is turned into reality.

As the Joint Chiefs look to the future vision and requirements, the Chiefs also recognize that new technology is not the answer to all operational challenges. Some missions will still require forces to engage in many of the same activities they have had for the past 200 years. The Services remain committed to improving capabilities across the full spectrum of combat capabilities, not just on the high end.

Future modernization plans will be rooted in one of four key operational concepts contained in *Joint Vision 2010*: focused logistics; precision engagement; full dimensional protection; and dominant maneuver. Looking to the future, a few key areas require increased emphasis and wider support. DoD has already begun a number of initiatives to make these capabilities more affordable.

A top priority remains strategic lift, a substantial pillar of America's military strategy. The C-17 Globemaster III is an increasingly important component of America's strategic mobility fleet and today the program is in good shape. The C-17 program is executing a seven-year procurement for a total of 120 aircraft by 2003 (last C-17 delivered by 2004), saving approximately $1 billion compared to annual lot buys. The C-17 program remains necessary to replace the aging C-141 fleet.

Strategic sealift is critical and requires additional attention. Over 95 percent of the equipment deployed during a major conflict will be lifted on ships. The Mobility Requirements Study/Bottom Up Review Update (MRS BURU) validated a need for 10 million square feet of surge capacity to move the forces for one Major Regional Conflict (MRC). This is the minimum surge sealift required for a single MRC, and it would be recycled for a second conflict.

In order to ensure appropriate types of vessels required, primarily Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) ships, DoD embarked on an ambitious acquisition plan of organic sealift. The nineteen Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) vessels which DoD will acquire by FY01 will be the centerpiece of America's strategic sealift capability. Upon delivery of the last ship, five million square feet of capacity will have been added to the fleet, three million square feet for surge and two million square feet for pre-positioned equipment. This program has enjoyed strong support from Congress in the past and is funded in the Navy budget. Keeping this program on track for a FY01 completion is essential and a top strategic lift priority.

In addition to the LMSRs, the study identified a need to add 19 smaller RO/RO ships to the Ready Reserve Force (RRF). This piece of the surge requirement has proved to be more difficult. Although we've added 14 of the 19 RO/ROs to the RRF since 1992, it is unlikely the Mobility Requirements Study/Bottom Up Review Update (MRS BURU) completion goal of FY98 for these ships can be met. The Joint, TRANSCOM, and Navy Staffs are looking at all options, including evaluation of commercial U.S. flag programs, not available at the time of the BURU, in order to fill surge requirements, to reach a capacity goal of 10 million square feet. DoD had been converting foreign built vessels in the absence of suitable U.S. built vessels. The requirement for five more RO/ROs, or an additional 550,000 square feet, remains today, but Congress has not authorized RO/RO acquisition the past two years. We need to remain committed to reaching the Ready Reserve Force capacity goal in order to close the gap.

My next priority focuses on providing U.S. forces with systems that enhance situational and battlefield awareness, and command and control. Several technologies will enhance both the ability to maneuver and engage precisely.

First, the exploitation of emerging Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) technologies offers the potential of becoming great force multipliers. The JROC has done an enormous amount of work appraising UAV programs and manned platforms in order to provide recommendations regarding the reconnaissance force structure necessary to support CINC requirements. Warfighters have a requirement for a tactical UAV and my top UAV priority is a system to support the ground commanders.

The JROC-chartered UAV Special Study Group is reviewing UAV programs to assess the proper funding priority for UAV programs. Once the Services establish that UAVs can carry the necessary sensors and meet mission require-

ments in anticipated weather conditions, DoD should move swiftly to evaluate the cost-saving tradeoffs between manned and UAV reconnaissance systems. I remain committed to fielding a UAV force that is interoperable among all Services as an important enhancement to warfighting capability.

Next, the ability to ensure precision engagement and dominant maneuver as described in *Joint Vision 2010* depends on providing an effective mix of both offensive and defensive information infrastructures. The fusion of all-source intelligence with the effective integration of platforms, command organizations, sensors, and logistics support will be what distinguishes the U.S. from second-rate military forces.

The Services have come a long way in this area the past ten years. The lack of interoperability between the Services' disparate command, control, communications, and computer (C4) systems was a major theme of the 1970s and 1980s. Compare this with the recent successes in Joint Task Force (JTF) operations across the globe, particularly in supporting the Implementation Force in Bosnia where the U.S. established a communications and information architecture that integrated hundreds of different systems from 32 different nations. The progress made in C4 coordination was as much a miracle as the successes in transportation and enforcement. In the future, Joint Task Force integration becomes even more dependent on information superiority and new communications solutions.

However, with technology advancing so rapidly, acquisition and budgeting processes may be inadequate to address C4 needs with the speed required. Potential opponents can buy state of the art C4 systems right off the shelf, but DoD requirements go through a lengthy acquisition and budgeting processes. This delay results in the warfighter often receiving "old" technology. The Services cannot afford the long lead-time of the system given the rapidly advancing status of C4 technologies. It seems prudent that where significant capabilities are commercially available in the open market, particularly when these capabilities are essential to the future vision, DoD could have a more responsive acquisition and budgeting process. This is an area that needs a hard look.

The military is also facing a new challenge from the commercial and international sectors over an issue no one anticipated 20 years ago: availability of the frequency spectrum. In the rush to provide "bandwidth" for the myriad of new communications and information systems flooding the worldwide market, governments are selling-off portions of the frequency spectrum. It is critical that future spectrum sales take the impact on defense systems into account. There is potentially a significant dollar impact involved in this issue. If DoD has to yield portions of the spectrum to new commerce, existing military equipment operating within these frequencies must be replaced with systems that can operate on other portions of the spectrum.

As the United States continues to improve its combat information and communication systems, an important consideration is the impact such modernization will have on friends and allies.

The United States is the world's leader in the exploitation of information technologies. This is evident in every facet of American life and is particularly true with respect to the military. Information dominance is the common thread running throughout the fabric of future operational concepts. As a result, the Services are making key investments in new information technologies, investments that will produce significant combat multipliers in the next century. Unfortunately, friends and allies are not proceeding at the same pace or with the same levels of interest.

The United States must ensure key information systems remain interoperable and complementary with allies. This is particularly important to the success of multinational operations. America's strategy must envision information architectures that avoid the same compatibility pitfalls encountered within our own Services in the 1970s and early 1980s.

Additional enhancements to the operational concepts of precision strike and full dimensional protection center on the recapitalization of our tactical aviation programs. The Joint Chiefs supported transitioning the Joint Advanced Strike Technology effort into an acquisition program.

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is the benchmark for future Joint weapon system efforts. The JSF program will provide the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force with a critical, survivable, lethal, and highly interoperable multirole strike capability. The efficiencies associated with this cooperative, Joint Service development approach are substantial and deserve support from Congress and the Administration. Additional aviation modernization programs and technology upgrades will be needed to ensure voids in capabilities do not occur in the next century.

Stealth technologies have provided America with an unmatched combat capability in the F-117 fighter and B-2 bomber. Low observable technologies will eventually be exploited in a wider array of combat systems including the F-22, naval vessels, tanks, ground vehicles, and the JSF. Both DoD and Congress should fully support leveraging this technology through continued investment. However, funding for additional B-2s is not in the best interest of the force. The limited procurement budgets can be put to better use on higher priorities.

One of those advancing priorities key to protecting our force is the development of effective Theater Missile

Defenses (TMD) for deployed forces. U.S. forces face danger from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their associated delivery systems. The JROC is monitoring progress in the TMD area and is taking the prudent course in relation to concerns about the priority of the National Missile Defense Program. For example, in FY 96, JROC actions prioritized funding for lower tier systems to address the near-term ballistic missile threat. Recently (24 Jan 97), the Navy Area Defense System successfully intercepted a ballistic missile in the first test of its new infrared seeker at the White Sands Missile Range. The Patriot Advanced Capability 3 system is scheduled to conduct its first test by this summer. Additionally, earlier this fiscal year, DoD increased funding for upper tier programs. This will accelerate the fielding of the Theater High Altitude Air Defense System (THAAD) and provide for additional risk mitigation testing of the Navy Theater Wide Defense System.

The NMD Deployment Readiness Program optimizes the potential for an effective National Missile Defense System. If the decision is made to deploy a NMD system in the near-term, then the system fielded would provide a very limited capability. If deploying a system in the near-term can be avoided, DoD can continue to enhance the technology base and the commensurate capability of the NMD system that could be fielded on a later deployment schedule. The objective here is to be in a position to be three years away from deployment, so America can respond to the emergence of a threat. This approach fields the most cost-effective capability that is available at the time the threat emerges.

The FY98 budget authority requested for ballistic missile defense is $3.5 billion. During FY99-03, an additional $17.9 billion is planned. Beginning with the FY 1998 budget, funding for Theater Missile Defense programs are in the appropriate Service accounts.

THE QDR

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) does not start with a clean slate, rather it begins with the fact that the U.S. currently has the best force in the world. America's military is the envy of the world because of what it can accomplish on a daily basis. It is not just the equipment that other nations admire. It is the organization, leadership, training, and the great people. Thus, the QDR must ensure that tomorrow's force is every bit as capable to protect America's interests as is today's force.

The QDR is a serious effort to examine strategies, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plans, management, and other elements. It will highlight what is right and those areas where change is required. If there is an opportunity to restructure ourselves to be better prepared to protect America's interests, then we will respond appropriately.

However, when the nation's security is at stake, changes have to be made carefully. American forces must have the capability to prevent future conflicts by shaping the strategic environment, deter conventional and nuclear war, and when necessary, fight and win the nation's wars.

These tasks underscore the need to maintain well-balanced forces to prevent conflict through engagement, deter conflicts before they start, or fight and decisively win those that do. In short, America must maintain a military capable of dominating an opponent across the full range of military operations. Mobility and forward deployment will be essential characteristics of the force.

Like mobility, forward deployment provides military commanders with several advantages. The ability to forward deploy forces, whether permanently, rotationally, or temporarily in the Pacific, the Middle East, and Europe dramatically reassures allies of America's commitment, reduces the response time to regional crises, signals a commitment to defend American interests, and moderates potential aggressiveness directed at friends and allies.

Prepositioning of equipment is a facet of overseas presence that demonstrates to allies the U.S. commitment to come to their aid if threatened or attacked. Prepositioning also gives the U.S. the ability to respond faster to a developing crisis and increases the ability to deter war.

The capabilities of forward-deployed units must be sufficient to quickly and decisively prevail across a wide range of potential operations. In the future, success or failure of operations may be determined by America's response in the first few hours or days of a crisis.

Forward deployment provides significant side benefits as well. A continuing program of engagement relying on military-to-military contacts, multinational exercises, and joint training opportunities provides the regional Combatant Commanders with the building blocks necessary for effective operations. The complex political demographics unique to each AOR are carefully considered in developing a proper level of joint and multinational exercises to support each CINCs engagement strategy. These programs enhance levels of trust between regional friends, strengthen command relationships, promote doctrinal and tactical awareness, and enhance the mission of conflict prevention.

The array of bilateral and multinational cooperative efforts this past year reinforces the importance of the alliances and partnerships that grow out of engagement programs. Nowhere is this more evident than in the cooperation between a rejuvenated NATO and members of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. America's active and reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are establishing the ties so critical to ensuring a lasting peace on the European continent.

Today, the United States has the best military in the world. With continued support from Congress and key investments in quality people, readiness, and modernization, America's forces will remain preeminent in the year 2010 and beyond.

97th Battle Standard Dinner
U.S. Merchant Marine Academy
Kings Point, New York
21 February 1997

I want to thank Admiral Matteson and Midshipman Stout for their kind introductions and your warm reception. Listening to you I wasn't sure that you were talking about me. You made me sound so good.

A few months ago my wife Joannie wasn't so easy on me. I was invited to talk to a group of 300 or 400 military wives at an annual luncheon. And much to my surprise, my wife did the introduction, something she had never done before, nor ever will do again. For instead of talking about my military career, she started to tell all these strangers how I lost an academic scholarship in college because I couldn't maintain the minimum required grade point average. Now before I get in trouble with the Superintendent, I don't want any of you to think that the best way to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is to go on academic probation.

That aside, it's wonderful to be here to be able to spend this time with the future leaders of our maritime industry.

It is wonderful to be away from Washington even if only for a few hours. One of the reasons I'm so glad to be here is that last year my wife and I were attending an annual conference of the American Academy of Achievement, where each year we honored a group of outstanding young high school students. As we were looking for a place to sit down a young man invited us to join him: Midshipman Sam Stout. Never in my 39 years in the Service had I talked to anyone more excited about coming to an academy. I made up my mind right then and there that I was going to have to come to Kings Point and see just what kind of a place could get such an outstanding young man like Sam so excited about getting seasick and having his head shaved!

But after today after visiting Kings Point I understand.

Since the academy was first founded in 1943 it has grown majestically as building after building has been added. But as impressive and elegant as these buildings are, they are no more than piles of brick and concrete. They are but the places that hold the real treasure of this academy. The treasure that makes Kings Point such a center of excellence is its remarkable staff and faculty. It is they who pass on to each class their great gifts of knowledge and experience.

And speaking of passing on knowledge, I had the opportunity to read the "Bearings Book." Apparently this is "must reading" for all the plebes. I had just enough time to memorize the two most important sentences: "Go Mariners!" and "Beat Coast Guard!" I'm told that the basketball team successfully thrashed the Coast Guard this year once again driving home the point to Admiral Matteson that he had made a big mistake in choosing to attend a second-ranked school so many years ago.

I can't help but admire each and every one of you for the decision you made to by-pass the comforts of a normal university to attend one of the most challenging schools in our nation. And at the very same moment, each of you made an enormous and very noble commitment to serve our nation as a member of the merchant marine and naval reserve. I salute you all. So I can't imagine a finer way to end my visit here today than to spend a little time with the graduating class.

But before I talk about what's on my mind tonight, let me give my unconditional support to the mission of the United States Merchant Marine Academy and to all its graduates who have served this nation faithfully since 1943. These are difficult times for all the branches of the Government, not just the military Services, as our leaders try to delicately balance the demands on our dwindling resources.

But from my perspective, it does not seem prudent to make sweeping and dramatic changes to either the funding or the mission of the United States Merchant Marine Academy. It's is just too important. Let me put the importance of the merchant marine into perspective.

Think back to the days of Commander Decatur when America was a young and growing nation. American mer-

chant shipping vessels were being stopped in the Mediterranean and preyed upon by the Barbary Pirates, sailing from Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. They attacked our merchant seamen, took hostages, and stole the ships and their cargo. The United States was so outraged, that we expanded our Navy several-fold to protect our merchant marine, because we recognized that America's future was forever tied to the free movement of American shipping on the high seas.

And today, after two centuries, our merchant marine is every bit as important and every bit as vital to the commerce and defense of our nation as it ever has been. In addition to America's commercial interests, which included the movement of more than 900 million long tons last year, the United States military depends on sealift to move 95 percent of the material required for a major regional contingency.

In DESERT STORM some 500 merchant mariners and 152 cadet midshipmen were called to duty to crew vessels that helped move 95 percent of the cargo required for our operations. And ask those here tonight from the Class of 1967 if the U.S. Merchant Marine is important to our operations.

These "Kings Pointers" were graduated six months early so that they could fill critical shortages in merchant marine billets on ships required to move material to Vietnam. We simply cannot overstate the vital contributions of our U.S. Merchant Marine. Our National Security Strategy depends on its vitality.

And to me the great success of our merchant marine is due in large measure to its dynamic and steadfast commitment to developing outstanding leaders. So tonight I thought I might share with you a word or two about leadership, a perspective gained over 39 years in uniform.

In a few months, when a number of you step aboard your first ship, you will look into the eyes of eighteen-year old seamen and the older more seasoned eyes of forty-year old chiefs. Because you wear an ensign's bar, they will follow your orders and do what you ask of them. By pinning on your rank we make you an officer, but that's all we do. Only the men and women under your command can make you a leader.

Now the true source of great strength in the sea services is not the money we spend on our equipment. It is not the fact that we have the fastest submarines or the most powerful ships. The real essence of our strength is the excellence of our people and the leadership abilities of those chosen to "take the helm."

I know that during your years here at Kings Point you have had the opportunity to read about many great leaders and debate their philosophies of leadership. It's very useful and you should continue to study the great captains. But it is also useful once in awhile to remember what Mark Twain said, "I have never let my schooling interfere with my education." That's so because sometimes the greatest lessons of leadership do not come from books but rather from observing those around you.

Over the years, watching many gifted leaders from Petty Officer to Admiral, from Sergeant to General, I've concluded that they all have three things in common: competence; caring; and character.

Competence — cornerstone of leadership; it is something you just cannot fake. It is also something that doesn't come automatically with an officer's braid. It's plain hard work. It's studying; it's practicing until you're confident that you know more than those whom you command. Leaders must know a great deal about their people, their profession, and their environment. Lack of knowledge is never an excuse for a leader's failure.

You all know this.

Think back to your semesters at sea with the crews of active vessels. What you saw was that every officer relied on the abilities of each seaman under his command. And what you also should have recognized was that the safe operation of the ship depended on each seaman trusting the professional abilities and judgment of the officers. The success of any civilian enterprise or military operation depends on the competence of a whole host of people up AND down the line. As Thucydides said in the 5th Century B.C., "A collision at sea can ruin your entire day."

But competence doesn't mean just being good at your job today.

Competence also means preparing yourself for tomorrow's challenges, looking ahead, and gaining an appreciation for the "big picture" and what is approaching from over-the-horizon. Yes, it takes hard work and an unquenchable thirst to know more, for a leader to earn the confidence of his crew. In a letter to Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee wrote, "No matter what may be the ability of the officer, if he loses the confidence of his troops disaster must sooner or later ensue." You must each continually improve your knowledge and your skills. You have a responsibility to become the master of your profession.

As you begin to get more comfortable in your jobs and more confident in your abilities, you will soon begin to understand the distinction between real leaders and people who are in leadership positions. Real leaders earn the willing trust of those they lead, because they believe the leader genuinely cares about them, their safety, and their future.

Admiral Hyman Rickover, the father of the nuclear Navy, demonstrated his concern for his sailors in a very unusual way. Most Americans don't know that Admiral Rickover went on the trial dive of every nuclear submarine the Navy

ever built. He knew it wasn't enough to just sign a piece of paper certifying to the vessel's safety. If sailors were going to trust their lives to an untested submarine he would go with them.

Caring for your subordinates also means challenging them, disciplining them fairly, and setting high standards. Our most demanding officers may well be the ones who care the most.

Enforcing high standards helps your sailors achieve their personal goals and gain their confidence. That confidence quickly translates into mission success.

But don't confuse high standards with harshness. Caring leaders are genuinely concerned for the welfare of their subordinates. Who is not moved by the recent story of the World War II officer who fought for 52 years to make sure that a black sergeant in his unit, killed in an act of heroism but denied the Medal of Honor because of racism, was given his just reward? I had the pleasure of recently attending the ceremony where Staff Sergeant Ruben Rivers posthumously received the Medal of Honor. This after 52 years of effort by his old Company Commander. That's caring. That's leadership.

Character or integrity, is the final trait and perhaps the most important.

You cannot be a leader unless you are a person of strong moral and ethical character. You must have a clear understanding of what is right and what is wrong. It was John Paul Jones who said, "It is by no means enough that an officer of the Navy should be a capable mariner. He must be that of course but also a great deal more. He should be as well a gentleman with the highest sense of personal honor."

Each of our Services have developed a set of common core values or moral standards upon which they base their service to the nation. The Navy and Marine Corps stress the values of honor, courage, and commitment. But for these values to take root they can't be imposed — they need to be assimilated over time into our daily habits. Values, after all, aren't taught — they're caught.

Character education is accomplished through the spirit and atmosphere of the unit and its codes of conduct. But most of all it is accomplished through its leaders and the quality of their example. What sort of ethical signals do we give when we prepare our units for inspection exercises and missions? How do we handle bad news from subordinates? Are we fair in the treatment of subordinates?

I am of the view that there is nothing you will do as a leader that will not in some way or another contribute to the ethical foundation of your unit. There is an old saying that people listen to 10 percent of what you say but watch 100 percent of what you do. Your words and actions must fit together and they must be beyond reproach. I can't say this strongly enough.

The first time you give your crew reason to doubt your integrity you will have lost them. The people in your charge must be able to have complete faith in everything you say and in everything that you do. It is just that simple.

I can best convey that thought by using the words of that World War II British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery. "The first thing a young officer must do," Monty said, "is to fight a battle and that battle is for the hearts of his men. If he wins that battle his men will follow him anywhere. If he loses he will never do any real good."

The reality is that there are hundreds of great leaders out there with every bit as much character, caring, and competence as Admiral Rickover and John Paul Jones. Your challenge is to seek out these great leaders and learn their great lessons.

But I will also offer a caution.

Don't just busy yourself trying to discover what made these Generals or Admirals great. Try to discover as well what makes a great Ensign. Because in a few short months when you pin on your gold bars, no one is going to ask you to breathe life back into a nation, command a fleet, or restructure the Merchant Marine. Instead some of you will be asked to assume responsibilities of an Ensign, for leading America's sons and daughters, guiding them, teaching them, caring for each of them, and ensuring their welfare.

The future of our armed forces and the merchant marine depends on your ability to fulfill those tasks. And the true judges of your success in this endeavor will be those very men and women whom our nation has entrusted to your care. Your motto, "Deeds not Words," is an excellent beacon for the challenges ahead. Let it be the lighthouse of your soul.

After 39 years of service in the Army, I wish I could change places with you because I am sure that you will find that your graduation will mark the start of the greatest adventure of your life. If there is something that I wish I could pass on to you this evening, it would be my sense of excitement at the opportunities I know await you all as our nation prepares to begin the 21st Century.

What you will be asked to do will be difficult as challenging as you can imagine and as exciting as you could possibly hope for. But also understand that everything that will be asked of you in the service to our nation will require every ounce of your energy every bit of your experience and every scrap of your courage.

No one understood this better than the 142 Kings Point graduates whose names are forever etched on the Role of Honor in the Mariner's Chapel and whose memory we honor tonight.

I wish you all the best of luck and salute your dedication to this great nation.

***Joint Force Quarterly* Magazine**
"A Word from the Chairman"
Winter 1996-1997

Since I last addressed *Joint Vision 2010* in these pages (*JFQ*, Summer 1996), it has stimulated much discussion and healthy debate. I am particularly heartened by the spirited professional dialogue which is helping us achieve a better understanding of service and joint capabilities, now and into the future. This edition of *Joint Force Quarterly,* which focuses on doctrine, enlarges that debate and provides us an opportunity to reexamine *JV 2010's* basic precepts, as well as its implementation.

I would like to offer my perspective on a few of the issues which have emerged from these discussions. First, *JV 2010's* key operational concepts are not limited to mid- or high-intensity conflict. They apply across the full range of military operations, from peacekeeping to war at the highest levels of intensity. "Full spectrum dominance" — from the high end to the low — is essential if we are to remain the world's dominant fighting force. Second, no Service or Unified Command should think of itself primarily in terms of any one of the key operational concepts. The operational concepts in *JV 2010* require the synergistic effects of all services at all levels. Third, technological advancements are key to *JV 2010's* operational concepts, but they must share center stage with our dedicated, high quality people.

Full Spectrum Dominance

Two years ago, when we began developing *JV 2010,* our discussions centered on the premise that technological change could dramatically alter the conduct of war. That point was made in many sources, including the 1994 Joint Strategy Review (JSR). I have just approved and released the 1996 version of this classified report.

JSR 96, which provides an updated analysis of the trends that are shaping our likely future strategic environment, posits that out to 2010 the United States will continue to face dangerous opposition from more than one regional power. Our forces will face a range of threats: from terrorists, to rogue states with weapons of mass destruction, to potent regional powers. And out beyond 2010, we may even have to worry about emerging peer competitors or new global powers. In all, the future security environment will be at least as challenging in the future as it is today. And, it will continue to be as important to prevent and deter conflict, as it is to be ready to fight and win our Nation's wars.

JV 2010 complements JSR 96. While the JSR describes the likely future strategic environment, *Joint Vision 2010* describes the key operational concepts: *dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection,* and *focused logistics.* These concepts will enable joint forces in the future to successfully accomplish any mission that the strategic environment presents. The future operational concepts posited in *JV 2010* are applicable across the spectrum of operations which the JSR describes.

Bosnia is both a good example of these emerging concepts and a good illustration of how capabilities for one strategic need can be adapted to meet another. We deployed a force which was prepared to execute its high intensity wartime tasks. And it is our conventional combat power which became, and remains, the backbone of our peacekeeping efforts there. The Implementation Force controlled the situation there because widely dispersed units controlled the battlespace, including key terrain, airspace, and the surrounding waters. This is a good example of the emerging concept of dominant maneuver.

Empowered by information superiority, forces were positioned in a manner which enabled them to respond rapidly to real-time crises anywhere in the area of operations. Clearly, our robust intelligence system, with advanced systems such as Predator and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), ensured a high level of shared situational awareness and early warning to operational and tactical commanders.

Similarly, the emerging concept of precision engagement was evident in Bosnia. Commanders were able to employ the right force to achieve the necessary effect. Whether they threatened the use of high technology weapons systems, or applied non-lethal capabilities such as military police, civil affairs and psychological operations units, the desired effect was the same: they convinced the opposing factions to end the violence or risk decisive defeat.

Overall in Bosnia, unified joint forces achieved full spectrum dominance by massing effects from widely dispersed

elements of all services. Furthermore, despite the fact that our forces were originally trained and equipped to conduct large scale combat operations, their skilled leaders and highly trained men and women displayed great agility by rapidly adjusting training, organization, and tactics to meet the demands of the environment. They performed magnificently, showing clearly that *JV 2010's* key operational concepts will be applicable to future conflict at the lower end of the spectrum.

Our tremendous success in Bosnia is in large part a result of our agility, a product of quality people, superb leadership, and tough mission-oriented training. As we take further advantage of emerging technologies, especially information technologies, we will greatly enhance our agility, simultaneously improving our ability to fight as a coherent joint force, while rapidly adapting our capabilities for use across the full spectrum of operations.

Our success in Bosnia is also in large measure a result of our close cooperation with our international partners. More so than ever, we must continue to place a high priority on our ability to function as a member of a coalition force. Just as we have witnessed in Bosnia, future crises will be best countered by a response from all nations who have a stake in the outcome. The effectiveness of any future combined force will be a direct reflection of the seamless integration of its national components.

As we have clarified our understanding of full spectrum dominance, we have also gained insights into the nature of force development in our rapidly changing world. We cannot have a force structure oriented on a single threat or a single level of operational intensity. Today, our force structure must be capabilities-based, and those capabilities must be focused on achieving the over-arching operational concepts in *JV 2010*.

The Services, The CINCs, and The Operational Concepts

All of the key operational concepts are the province of each of the Services. They are concepts that our joint forces must achieve together by empowering our people and managing change wisely. *Joint Vision 2010* builds on the core competencies, institutional values, and cultures of our Services, while recognizing that each Service has unique capabilities for which there are no substitutes. It links the Services as elements of a unified joint team through the shared situational awareness and common communications of information superiority and these common operational concepts. By accomplishing that, the Unified Commanders will be able to employ forces using these new concepts.

The evolution of joint doctrine illustrates one example of the requirement to integrate service efforts to produce viable joint capabilities. In the past, joint doctrine was based on existing Service doctrine. It integrated existing doctrine to meet specific joint warfighting requirements. However, Service doctrine did not always address the full complexity of joint operations, and it left the Services and Unified Commands to develop ad hoc solutions where gaps in doctrine existed.

Over the past several years, we have made great strides in providing our warfighters with significantly improved joint doctrine. That has been accomplished only as a result of the hard work and close coordination of all the services, the combatant commands, and the Joint Staff. With the development of *Joint Vision 2010*, we have spelled out the basic capabilities required of our future joint force, providing the conceptual template to guide future joint doctrine development. At the same time, *JV 2010* will allow each Service to focus more closely on its contributions to joint doctrine.

In the coming months, the Services, CINCs, Defense agencies, and other experts, working in close collaboration with the Joint Warfighting Center, will continue to refine the *Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO)*. This important document amplifies the four operational concepts and provides the initial basis for a variety of assessment activities. It is the next, logical step in transforming key *JV 2010* ideas into actual joint force capabilities.

The CFJO is the first *JV 2010* implementation concept document and it will provide a means by which the Services, the Unified Commands, and the Joint Staff can debate and assess the nature of future joint operations across the full spectrum of operations. Our continued progress in the effective implementation of *JV 2010* depends on an understanding that the *JV 2010* concepts apply to all Services and how they operate together as a joint team.

Advanced Technology and the Role of People

JV 2010 emphasizes the critical importance of information superiority and other technological innovations. Together, they offer the potential to lessen the impact of the fog of war by giving us an advantage in gathering, exploiting, and protecting information. They also enable us to derive the most combat power from our available manpower, offsetting a potential adversary's advantages in mass, proximity, niche technologies, or weapons of mass destruction.

However, our commitment to advanced warfighting is neither a substitute for quality people nor a technical pana-

cea for future military challenges. Future technological advances will not make war less arduous or dangerous, nor will they make most missions less demanding on our people. In 2010, as in 1997, the human element will remain the most critical ingredient of operational success.

The scope and breadth of operations in the future will require decision makers at all levels, from headquarters to the smallest of units, who can respond more rapidly and accurately to operational demands than ever before. While decision-making processes and operational capabilities will be supported by advances in technology, success will ultimately be determined by the quality of our people, their training, and their leaders.

It is not a question of people *or* technology, but rather a question of how the strengths of both are integrated to give this Nation the best possible military capability. As the implementation of *JV 2010* moves forward, it will have to address both how quality people can best use modern technology and how technology can be leveraged to improve training and education, those things that make good people better.

JV 2010 aptly describes the vital role of people:

> *We cannot expect risk-free, push-button style operations in the future. Military operations will continue to demand extraordinary dedication and sacrifice under the most adverse conditions. Some military operations will require close combat on the ground, at sea, or in the air. The courage and heart of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines will remain the foundation of all that our Armed Forces must do.*

In all, *Joint Vision 2010* is not so much a document, as it is a living body of ideas about joint warfare, and a deliberate, iterative process of evolutionary change that will help the Services and Unified Commands march into the future together. In the world of 2010, to successfully accomplish a wide range of missions, we must achieve an effective, balanced integration of our Services' core competencies. By working together as a joint team, *JV 2010* will help us do that. Today and into the future, our Armed Forces must remain "persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict."

Salute to the Military Ball
Coronado, California
15 March 1997

Thank you Coronado for your warm welcome to this beautiful city and to this historic hotel and to your celebration of "Stars and Stripes and Songs." Joannie and I appreciate your small-town hospitality as well as your big-city class.

And thanks as well to that sharp color guard, the superb band, and those wonderful singers. Please join me in a well-deserved round of applause for these fine young Americans.

Before I begin let me offer a sincere "Happy Birthday" to tonight's sponsor, the Chamber of Commerce, as they celebrate their 60th birthday this year. I can tell you from first-hand experience, a 60th birthday is a scary thing. My cake looked like an eerie torch light procession. The heat was so intense it almost set the sprinklers off. And to help me blow out the candles and launch into another year I had to do what aircraft carriers do, that is, turn into the wind. But seriously, I wish the Chamber many, many years of continued support to this grand community. So would you please join me in a round of applause for the Chamber of Commerce and for everyone who worked so hard to make this celebration so special.

It's great to be here among so many old friends, especially so many old Navy friends. I have often wondered where Navy admirals go when they retire. Now I know.

And one of the Army guys on my staff must have known that because he asked me if I was worried about going to an island which is inhabited by so many "navalists!" I told him I wouldn't be alone, Bruce Williams and George Styer are holding down the fort for me here. And besides, Coronado has a great reputation for protecting endangered species, especially when their days as Chairman are numbered.

But I must say I have always enjoyed the Navy's camaraderie, especially at celebrations such as this. As we celebrate together, let me offer you a few of my thoughts about this wonderful land of ours and about our nation's treasure, our men and women in uniform.

Our nation's might, I suggest to you, is a reflection of our national character, our great people in uniform, and the caring communities that nurture them. When Francis Scott Key was asked what inspired him to write the words to the "Star Spangled Banner," he said, "Does not such a country with such brave defenders deserve such a song?"

It was September 13, 1814, and every American's heart was filled with outrage; outrage at the burning of America's capital just days before. But despite the gloomy prospects, thousands had rushed from all over the region to defend the port of Baltimore, which now was the one hope left of tilting the war in America's favor.

The next day, after 25 hours of bloody bombardment, the stormy darkness gave way to a clear star-lit dawn over Fort McHenry. There, framed by the heavens, our flag — the Stars and Stripes — gave proof that the American ideal was the lasting heart and soul of a proud nation.

It's easy to imagine how Francis Scott Key felt as he witnessed the raw courage, the selfless sacrifice, and the unwavering commitment of the men and women who risked all for God and country. But I submit to you the history of our Stars and Stripes and the history of our nation is a living story a story of evolution, not just a story of a creation.

We have withstood challenge after challenge. And with each challenge our flag has steadily grown in stature throughout the world, quietly rendering living testimony to America's past, its present, and its future, and bearing witness to our history of sacrifice, selfless service, and undiminished hope. And today, our patriots in uniform are still standing watch and still providing the courage and sacrifices which inspire us all as well as people all over the globe.

Year after year, in the most remote corners of the world you will find the Stars and Stripes and America's Armed Forces, performing absolutely magnificently and sacrificing their personal interests to protect our national interests and bring hope to those less fortunate. And so often on the tip of our nation's arrow are the naval services.

George Washington once said, "Without a decisive naval force we can do nothing definitive and with it everything great and glorious." You know that he was right.

The battles are forever etched in our memories: places like Coral Sea; Midway; the Philippines Sea; Inchon; Yankee Station; and the Persian Gulf. Uncommon valor in Nimitz's words was a common virtue.

It's true the Navy and the Marine Corps have been the vanguard of our nation's hopes and dreams. And today, rarely noticed in the news, you will see sailors and marines, shoulder to shoulder with soldiers, airmen, and coastguardsmen, serving all around the globe with distinction, asking for little and doing what Americans have simply come to expect of them; being skilled professionals taking care of America's interests — whether guarding the DMZ in Korea, patrolling the skies in Iraq, keeping war from re-igniting in Bosnia, or even tonight, rescuing our citizens from the chaos in Albania.

Tonight, as we celebrate in this impressive hall, 42,000 magnificent men and women are participating in 13 separate actual operations around the world. And few across America will take note when in less than three weeks the CONSTELLATION deploys from Coronado for six months to replace the KITTY HAWK in the Persian Gulf. And whatever challenges arise for them here, at home, or at sea, nothing will stop them from accomplishing their mission or caring for each other. To the crew of the CONSTELLATION I wish fair winds and following seas and to the crew of the KITTY HAWK, I say BRAVO ZULU, well done!

But the sailing of CONSTELLATION is just one deployment of the countless we have witnessed in recent years.

We are busier today than we were during most of the Cold War. As a matter of fact, I asked one lieutenant where home was and he said, "Home is wherever I am between deployments."

But I see our men and women willingly sacrifice time with their families, the comforts of home, and sometimes even sacrifice their lives. And they make those sacrifices because they know they have your support and that you, the people of Coronado and others like you across this land, will sacrifice for them were that ever necessary.

During World War II, I am told your city became known as the "BOQ" because you poured out your hearts and everything you had to support our service men and women. And today, just as in World War II, Coronado is the "anchor for our forces afloat in the Pacific."

Coronado's legacy is a legacy of community support, selfless service, and heroic figures who thought of themselves as ordinary people. People like George Cooksey and Morey Wax whom you honored tonight. Both of them were great patriots who influenced more lives than we will ever know. Their loss will be long felt by Coronado and by those they touched.

People like Admiral Jim Stockdale, who earned our nation's highest decoration for valor, the Medal of Honor.

People like Admiral Harry T. Jenkins, whose sacrifices and contributions set high standards for the awards you presented earlier.

Because of the sacrifices of people like these and of all of our men and women in uniform, and the unwavering support from communities like Coronado, we have maintained our leadership around the globe.

And tomorrow, the world will look to America as it has in the past, as a beacon of hope and as an island of strength and decency. One hundred and eighty-three years after Fort McHenry, the American qualities which inspired Francis Scott Key remain the bedrock of hope for the world. And so it is in the Pacific region, our commitments and our

presence will remain vital to our future, for we are by any measure a mighty Pacific nation. And our neighbors in the Pacific, with their diverse cultures, booming economies, and fledgling democracies each look to America for peace, for presence, and for prosperity.

America's future is inextricably linked with that of our Pacific neighbors. And our Navy and the people of Coronado will play a key role in our policy toward Asia and the Pacific! And by the way, I was very happy to hear that later this month, and for the first time in history, three Chinese military ships will conduct a visit to Coronado.

So tonight as we salute the millions of American service men and women who have contributed so selflessly to the living legacy of our Stars and Stripes, we also pay tribute to the unwavering commitment of the caring communities like Coronado who support them.

Even when the very existence of our nation was threatened as it was at Fort McHenry, or when our nation was torn by a devastating Civil War, the thoughts and the actions of every American were anchored in a singleness of purpose: " ... to preserve one nation indivisible with liberty and justice for all."

So tonight's celebration is a celebration of the extraordinary achievements of our nation, her people, her armed forces, and her communities and of the hope of a brighter future for us and for our children. We, you, me, the people of Coronado, the Navy, and all of the services remain dedicated to the ideals which are so simply yet so profoundly alive in our Stars and Stripes and in the spirit of our songs. And on that thought let me end.

Before dinner I asked Chuck, "How long should I speak?" He said, "Take as long as you like but we start dancing at exactly 9:40." And I knew you would rather resume dancing than listen.

So thank you for all that you have done, and for this grand evening and may God Bless you and may God Bless the United States of America.

PLA National Defense University
Beijing, China
14 May 1997

I am delighted to be in China and honored to be here at your National Defense University. Being here this morning brings to mind my visit to China ten years ago in the company of the then-Army Chief of Staff, General John Wickham, Jr. We were very impressed then, but I must tell you that the effects of your rapid economic growth and the massive amounts of construction in China are breathtaking, but not quite as breathtaking as the change in our political relations.

It has been twenty-five years now since President Nixon journeyed to China, where he and Premier Zhou Enlai approved the Shanghai Communiqué, breaking a quarter century of hostility and misunderstanding and laying the foundation for a more fruitful bilateral relationship. Later on, both of our countries came to owe a special debt of gratitude to the late Deng Xiaoping, whose pragmatism and vision provided the foundation for the rapid economic development of China as well as the rapid expansion of cooperation between our two countries.

Today, one statistic speaks volumes about the level of our interaction. Today, there are more than 40,000 Chinese students in American universities and schools. Who would have imagined that 25 years ago? But now, following diplomatic gains, student exchanges, and our many business ventures, our two nations are pursuing military-to-military ties to improve communications, reduce potential misunderstandings, and carry out mutually beneficial activities. Some of these military to military contacts will be symbolically important, but relatively simple affairs, like the visit of two Chinese destroyers and an oiler to Pearl Harbor and to San Diego California in March of this year. By the way, I am happy to report that while the U.S. won in basketball, we played soccer to a hard-fought tie. But I have to tell you our naval commanders were worried that they might have to face a Chinese team in gymnastics or ping-pong!

But at the same time there are aspects of our military-to-military ties that are more substantive. As you know, then-Defense Secretary William Perry visited China in 1994 and General Chi visited the United States last December and spoke at our National Defense University. While he was there, General Chi neatly summarized why he came to America and indeed why I am here today. General Chi said, "... so long as we make concerted efforts in the spirit of equality and consultation, our military-to-military ties will continue to move forward and give positive impetus to the improvement and growth of relations between two countries."

So with improving our military to military contacts in mind, I would like to discuss with you United States National Security policy, how our Armed Forces are organized to protect our interests, and the importance of the Asia-Pacific region, where as General Chi noted, both the United States and China are "major powers."

To begin, U.S. Security Strategy, the strategy that guides our diplomatic, economic, and defense policy, has changed

considerably since 1989. With the end of the Cold War and a significant decline in the threat from the former Soviet Union, we have developed a new National Security Strategy. Our new strategy is called the Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement; engagement with old friends and old adversaries alike, and enlargement, which refers to enlarging the community of free-market democracies, a truly global phenomenon.

The goals of our strategy are to enhance our security with effective diplomatic representation abroad; deter war, but should deterrence fail, to be ready with military forces that are prepared to fight and win; bolster America's economic revitalization primarily by means of free and open trade; and promote democracy abroad.

Our new national strategy and a declining threat have enabled us to cut our military personnel by one-third; that's a reduction of 700,000 high quality volunteers, the soul of our Armed Forces and the real source of our military power. Today, worldwide, the United States has less than 1.5 million people in its active forces. In terms of combat formations, we have reduced Army divisions and Air Force wings by 45 percent and Navy ships by 38 percent. Our defense budget has been reduced by 40 percent over its high point in the Cold War. And as some of you may know, we will soon announce the results of a major defense review, one that most likely will result in further modest cuts to our Armed Forces.

In the interest of transparency, I have asked the staff here to distribute some charts which show the current location and status of all of our forces worldwide. These charts are from the detailed "Department of Defense Annual Report," a few copies of which I will give your Commandant for your library. I will also leave behind a series of publications that detail the characteristics of nearly every major American weapons system as well as other pieces of equipment. But data on our force structure doesn't tell the whole story of the U.S. Armed Forces after the Cold War.

In America, many observers noted with some irony that the Cold War was followed by a hot peace! After the Cold War we found ourselves faced with some new regional aggressors like Iraq, as well as some old ones like North Korea. Those were the greatest and most immediate threats to our interests. But after the Cold War we also found a world adrift in a sea of instability with disintegrating states, ethnic conflicts, the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the rise of sophisticated terrorist movements.

To protect our interests, U.S. forces, together with those of our friends and allies, have had to carry out a number of operations around the world in such places as Bosnia, Haiti, and the Middle East. Most of these operations have been peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, or operations to evacuate civilians, including on several occasions, Chinese citizens from war-torn areas. Interestingly, none of our major operations have taken place in the Asia-Pacific region, which compared to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, is an island of relative stability.

As you might suspect as the environment evolved and our appreciation for this "new world" evolved, so has our defense strategy. We abandoned the Cold War strategy of containment and the bilateral competition of the Cold War. While we cut back our forces, we re-oriented them on the need to respond to two nearly simultaneous major military contingencies such as we might face with Iraq or possibly North Korea. But over time, this "two major conflict" posture, as important as it was, failed to adequately describe the whole set of requirements that faced our Armed Forces.

As we struggled to build a strategy to guide our forces into the twenty-first century, we came to see our key tasks in a new light. For the future our Armed Forces worldwide will focus on three tasks.

First, we will seek to shape the strategic environment, hoping to prevent the conditions that cause war or at the very least deter war from breaking out. Along with diplomacy and trade, our forces can shape a more peaceful and stable environment by forward presence, security assistance to our friends and allies, and military-to-military contacts, which promote communications and help to reduce misunderstanding. But our attempts to shape the environment and to prevent conflict will not succeed everywhere all the time.

As a second major task, we believe that when deterrence fails we must be ready to respond across the full spectrum of crises when it is in our interest to do so. While we remain prepared for multiple major contingencies, we recognize that the most likely form of conflict that we will face will be smaller-scale contingency operations. Included in these operations are humanitarian assistance, non-combatant evacuations as we recently did in Albania, or limited strikes or interventions. Whatever the level of the intensity of the combat, we believe that we must also prepare for asymmetric threats such as terrorism, the use of chemical or biological weapons by an adversary, and even attacks on our information infrastructure abroad or in the United States.

As a final task, we believe that the U.S. Armed Forces must prepare now with a prudent modernization program to meet the challenges of an uncertain future, one that promises to be as challenging as today's environment. I tell my staff that modernization spending today is the foundation of readiness tomorrow. After a decade of limited investment the United States Armed Forces must have an investment program that unites our efforts to replace old and aging equipment

and adapt to the Revolution in Military Affairs with efficient acquisition and management techniques. In the next decade, our nation will probably not spend more on defense than we do at present.

To afford modernization, we will have to work harder and work smarter. And part of improving our forces in the future will come from harmonizing the force development efforts of all of our services and our unified commands. A year ago we published *Joint Vision 2010*, based on new operational concepts which will guide the development of our Armed Forces for the next 15 years. Everything — doctrine, training, senior officer education, requirements, procurement — all of these things hopefully will be influenced by *Joint Vision 2010* and its implementation documents. Again, in the interests of transparency I will leave copies of this document with your President.

So that is the essence of our new defense strategy: shape a peaceful and stable environment; respond to crises and conflicts as necessary; and prepare for the future with a balanced, sensible, coordinated, modernization program. How does all of this apply to our policies in the Asia-Pacific region?

Today in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States has vital security and economic interests, some of which have roots that are more than a century old. Because of its geography and its interests, the United States is and will remain a major power in the Asia-Pacific region.

First, geographically we are a Pacific nation just as China is a Pacific nation. The Pacific Ocean washes the coast of the continental United States and the states of Alaska and Hawaii. When I go home to the state of Washington on the west coast of the United States, I awake each day to the sounds of the Pacific Ocean. And the state of Hawaii and our territories extend thousands of miles into the Pacific. But we realize that we are not alone in the Asia-Pacific region. We realize that this vast region is an area where four great powers have overlapping interests. In this century, we have fought three wars in this region. And in the next century, we do not wish to repeat that.

Second, we have major allies and friends like Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, who also want our presence in the region as a force for peace and stability. In keeping with that, the United States ashore and afloat maintains about 100,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, among our friends and allies there is some misplaced anxiety that we may soon reduce our military presence in the region. On that issue, let me repeat what Secretary of Defense Cohen recently said. We have no plans to reduce our troop presence in the Asia-Pacific region. To reduce our troop presence could destabilize the region and could set off a heated arms race in the area. And thus we think the whole region, including China, benefits from our presence. But having allies presupposes that they see a common threat.

It is fair to ask what specific threats do the United States and our friends and allies see in the Asia-Pacific region? First and most threatening is the unpredictable regime in Pyongyang, which poses a major threat to peace on the Korean peninsula and in the surrounding area. This threat is magnified by the regime's current economic problems and its apparent inability to feed its population. This is a sad situation. Today, the security situation on the Korean peninsula is worse than it was 25 years ago when I served there as a military planner. Let me add that we continue to welcome China's active participation in the four power talks and its bilateral efforts to help reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula, and we appreciate China's efforts to help us keep nuclear weapons off of the Korean peninsula.

Other threats in the region may come in the form of nuclear, chemical, and missile technology proliferation, both in the region and coming from the region. We are in that light, very concerned about arms transfers by China to Pakistan and to Iran. In the region, there are also some significant territorial disputes concerning Japan's Northern Territories as well as islands in the South China Sea. And finally, drug trafficking and the ever-present potential for terrorism are both cause for concern. In addition to these specific well-known threats to peace and stability there are also uncertainties that concern every nation in the region.

Among these uncertainties is what will happen this summer with the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. As the clock in Tienamen Square counts down the hours, we hope that the reversion of this vibrant city to Chinese control takes place peacefully and with respect for the welfare and the human rights of the people involved.

On the issue of Taiwan, the United States remains committed to our policy of One China as defined in the three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. law on this issue. Again, we hope for the resolution of the issue, which is clearly a matter for the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits to resolve in a peaceful manner. But we are all also concerned with the peace and stability of the region and in the surrounding international waters.

I would be remiss if I did not add here that last March, we were concerned by the harsh rhetoric and some of the military actions in that area that may have had unpredictable consequences. We are pleased that this situation is beginning to move onto the more constructive path of rational dialogue. We hope, as I am sure you do, that future developments concerning Taiwan will take place peacefully with full respect for the welfare and human rights of the people involved as well as for freedom of navigation in the area.

A final reason why the United States will remain a major power in the Asia-Pacific region is that the U.S., like China, is a trading nation with one-third of our annual product tied to our exports and our imports. The Asia-Pacific region is not only the engine of world economic growth, but it is also home to five of America's "top ten" trading partners: Japan; China; Taiwan; South Korea; and Singapore. U.S. trade with East Asia alone surpasses 400 billion dollars annually, accounting for more than 3 million American jobs and 40 percent of our total trade. Thus for both economic and security reasons, we in the United States believe that peace prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific region are vital to our interests. And we know that to a large extent you share many of those same interests.

China is a Great Power and it is rapidly becoming a Greater Power. And believe me, we see your development as being in our interest. I am told that there are some here in China who believe that the United States seeks to contain China. Nothing could be further from the truth. Containment would have to include severe political, economic, and military policies, none of which are in evidence in our policy toward China. Our interests can only be served in the words of Secretary of State Madeline Albright, "by a China that is neither threatening nor threatened."

In the information age, at the dawn of the 21st century, our security and prosperity and your security and prosperity are inextricably linked. President Clinton said that we are anxious to see a China that is "stable politically and open economically, that respects human rights and the rule of law, and that becomes a full partner in building a secure international order." The mutual interests of China and the United States demand better understanding, clearer communications, greater confidence, and deeper cooperation. And military-to-military contacts must be an essential part of all that.

But these military-to-military contacts must not remain limited to occasional meetings between senior officers or routine troop or ship visits. To be a fruitful form of engagement, our military-to-military contacts must deepen and become more frequent more balanced and more developed. Our mutual goals are easy to understand. We, as two of the great powers in the Asia-Pacific region, both seek to decrease suspicion, further mutually beneficial military cooperation, and lessen the chances for miscalculation in a crisis. For our part, to accomplish these objectives, the United States wants a more equal exchange of information with the PLA; the development of confidence building measures to reduce further the possibility of miscalculations; military, academic, and functional exchanges; PLA participation in multinational military activities; and a regular dialogue between our senior military leaderships. We want these things for our own interests and we are sure that China has a similar list.

Let's compare our lists! Two items that should be on both of our lists are the agreement on Hong Kong port calls now well along in its development and the completion of the Military Maritime and Air Cooperation Agreement. This latter agreement will improve our protocols for communication at sea and in the air. And this agreement will create common expectations and lessen the possibility of miscalculation throughout the vast Pacific Ocean area. But we should not fool ourselves. Improving our military-to-military contacts will not be easy. And in order to earn big dividends we must make a big investment.

If we listen to the suspicious side of our military minds, if we don't pursue exchanges on a fair and equitable basis, if we lack openness, transparency, or reciprocity, if we hold back even routine information on our military forces, then we will fail. To succeed, we will have overcome our past and struggle up-hill against our suspicions to reach the point where together we can with greater confidence see a better future. But if we make that climb, if we get to the top, we will know the truth of the words spoken by Zhou Enlai to President Nixon, " ... on perilous peaks dwells beauty in its infinite variety."

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your attention. I am ready for your questions.

Harvey Mudd College
Commencement Address
Claremont, California
18 May 1997

President Strauss, distinguished guests, parents, families and friends, faculty and staff, and graduating students of Harvey Mudd. It is a great pleasure for me to be with you on this very special day for the class of 1997.

I am here not only as a senior military officer and as an engineer, but most personally, as the uncle of a member of the graduating class.

My niece finally confessed to me this morning ... that I was not really your first choice for commencement speaker, but she hoped, nevertheless, that I would be a suitable replacement for Bill Nye the Science Guy!

Now for you graduates, this is one of the pivotal events of your lives and I know I speak for everyone here in saying how very proud we are of what you have each accomplished.

Since its founding in 1955 Harvey Mudd has been one of our nation's most prestigious and demanding schools for science, math, and engineering. Your successful completion of Harvey Mudd's challenging curriculum, shows that you all possess the ability, the drive, and the determination required of our most successful leaders in the field of science and technology. You have finally pulled your final set of "all nighters," finally crossed all the rivers, climbed all the mountains, and slain all the dragons which a few years ago stood between you and a diploma.

I would particularly like to add my congratulations to all those computer scientists here today that earned Harvey Mudd the title of "Computing World Champion" in the 21st world championship, sponsored by the Association for Computing. As for me, I can't wait until the year 2000 ... when millions of computers will think zero zero, stands for the year 1900. For one shining moment, computers will be dumber than the rest of us!

Over the past four years it has been my pleasure to experience vicariously, through my niece, Liz Thompson, what it is like to be a MUDDER. I've heard about your preferred modes of transportation ... unicycles and skateboards ... reveled in the engineering competitions ... and laughed at the South Dorm jokes. I even shared Evan Goer's nightmare, duly recorded on Wendy Panero's door: "What would you do if we woke up tomorrow and discovered this was all a dream ... and you were all still freshmen?"

Well, somebody pinch Evan; this really is graduation day!

On the way over to today's ceremony I was reflecting on just how much our two generations have in common. I often see harsh criticism of our young people in the media and it brings back old memories.

You see, in the late 50s, our parents also questioned our morals, manners, and our music. But in the end it didn't matter, because we were proven right. Elvis Presley really was the King!

So I tend to discount much of what I hear about your generation because every day, I have the wonderful experience of watching thousands of young men and women of your generation, performing superbly on the most difficult missions around the globe. From Albania to Zaire, from Iraq to Korea, members of "generation X" are protecting the oppressed, providing new hope for troubled nations, and guarding the freedoms of Americans around the globe, wherever they might be. We wouldn't have the world's best and most powerful military without their dedication and outstanding professionalism.

To me, your generation is the single greatest source of my boundless optimism for the future and you, this class, from this college, will surely lead the way.

But on this day, in which we rightfully celebrate the achievements of the graduating class, we must also praise your parents.

Parents, where would we be without you? You provided encouragement when challenges arose, comfort when times were tough, nagging when nagging was called for, and prayer whenever it was needed.

Today is your day too.

Please join me in a round of applause ... for your terrific parents.

Thirty-nine years ago I also sat in an audience like this, a brand new engineering graduate of Bradley University. And as I think back and try to remember what was said at my graduation, I can't remember a single word nor even a thought from my commencement speaker. In fact, I can't even remember who he was. I remember only that he commenced and we eagerly awaited his finish. So I must be brief and race to the finish, but not before I say a word or two about your future.

Right now, some of you are feeling a real sense of accomplishment, others are feeling an equally satisfying sense of relief, and some of you may even be a bit uncertain about what lies ahead. That is only natural.

I am a good bit older and I must confess that I begin each day with much the same feelings: remembering good things from the past; relieved to have survived some of the more difficult challenges; and wondering what's coming next.

But I want to assure you that you are graduating at a time and into a world filled with greater hope and with more opportunities than any generation this century.

When I was your age the moon was little more than an inspiration to poets and to sweethearts and Popular Mechanics Magazine predicted that, "Computers in the future may one day weigh only one and one half tons."

By the time you are my age, the moon will be just another airport and computers, well, I have given up making bold predictions since they have already emerged as world champion chess players.

Today, you are on the threshold of opportunities that did not exist in my day, opportunities that you cannot even

imagine. But as you enter this "Brave New World," you will most certainly discover that opportunity rarely "knocks on your door" as the old saying suggested and if it does, it usually knocks so softly that you had better be listening closely.

Rather, your success will be determined by your ability to make your own opportunities by exploring new territory, tearing down old paradigms, and challenging the status quo. As John Rockefeller once said, "If you want to succeed you should strike out on new paths rather than travel on the worn paths of accepted success."

But I think Yogi Berra said it even better, "Don't always follow the crowd," he observed. "Nobody goes there anymore ... It's too crowded!"

So don't wait for opportunity to knock on your door, go out and meet it. But to go out the door and meet opportunity head-on, you'll need every ounce of courage you can muster. I'm not talking so much about physical courage. I am talking about having the courage to take chances and make mistakes, having the courage to believe in yourself, and having the courage to adapt and change when circumstances warrant.

Many years ago on an old television show, I remember Archie Bunker saying, "God don't make mistakes ... that's how he got to be God." But innovators do make mistakes, lots of them. That's how they learn.

Did you know that Thomas Edison once conducted 50,000 experiments trying to develop a new storage battery? Asked if it was frustrating to have so many failures, Edison answered, "What failures? .... I now know 50,000 things that don't work."

Sitting among you in this graduating class might be the next Edison, Buckminster Fuller, or Bill Gates. But it will take courage and confidence in your abilities to stay the course.

But having the courage to pursue make your own opportunities is not enough. I am convinced that you cannot be a great scientist, mathematician, or soldier for that matter ... unless you possess a strong ethical character.

We can debate the constituent part of character for hours, but clearly the core element of character is integrity; knowing what is right and then acting on it. While easier said than done, you must know what's right and then always, always do the right thing.

Benjamin Franklin hit the nail on the head when he said, "It is a grand mistake to think of being great ... without goodness."

In a similar vein, science has a special place in society and scientists and engineers have long known that the way to serve yourself is to serve others. This notion has been part and parcel of your education at Harvey Mudd and it is the reason why your alma mater requires more humanities courses than any other institution of science and technology in the United States.

Every educated person, and especially scientists and engineers, have a responsibility to see our world as it really is, imagine it as it ought to be, and then work to bridge the chasm between the two. If you adopt that ethic, you will become in Einstein's words, not just " ... a person of success," but also " ... a person of value."

In a speech at Harvard in 1943, Winston Churchill predicted that, "The empires of the future ... are the empires of the mind."

Today, more than ever before, the quality and character of our thinking is what separates success from failure, and excellence from mediocrity. The treasure that makes Harvey Mudd such a center of success and excellence, its remarkable staff and faculty, have passed on to your class their great gifts of knowledge and experience.

Now it is up to you. Remain true to yourselves and to your families and strive to live as men and women of value.

The generations of Americans that have preceded you this century fought tyranny, opposed aggression, and struggled against intolerance. They dared to dream great dreams and they worked hard to turn those dreams into reality long before you had even heard of Harvey Mudd.

Today, you are the beneficiaries of their struggles and their crowning triumph, an America that is strong and free, and still the richest, most vibrant, and most productive nation on this earth. We are rich with educated citizens, caring families, and innovative leaders. But more importantly, we are rich in ideas and rich in principles, and rich in you, the most promising generation in our history — the generation that will lead America into the twenty-first century.

At some point in the distant future, many of you in the Class of 1997 will once again find yourselves sitting at a commencement, but this time for your children.

I hope that you will look back to this day and remember that your commencement speaker was a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who spoke not of war, not of the defense budget, or of the threats to national security, but rather who shared your joy and your hopes, and spoke about the unprecedented opportunities which are waiting for you, and of the courage and character it will require to reap the harvest of your labors.

And decades hence, as you sit proudly at your children's commencement, I hope you sit there not only as successful

scientists, engineers, and mathematicians, but also as loving parents, proud of the example you have set and the children of value that you have raised under your thoughtful guidance.

If you accomplish all that, you will then understand how your parents feel today.

We all wish you that day, but meanwhile, today is a wonderful day, the first day of your new life. So go out and celebrate, you deserve it.

Good luck to you all and may God Bless you and may God Bless the United States of America

Quadrennial Defense Review Testimony
Senate Armed Services Committee
Washington, DC
20 May 1997

I welcome the opportunity to be here today with Secretary Cohen to discuss with you the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review and to endorse the results of the challenging and vitally important process you placed into law last year.

Let me begin by outlining just how extensive has been the involvement of the Service Chiefs, the Combatant Commanders, their staffs, as well as the OSD and Joint Staffs, in this Defense Review. In fact, the level of CINC and Service Chief involvement in this process has been unprecedented and has been a major strength of this review. In dozens of briefings and scores of meetings, their insights and perspectives bolstered our analysis at every step.

From the beginning we were determined to conduct a strategy driven defense review and we've just done that.

ASSESSMENT PROCESS

We learned much during the last 4 years. We learned that the strategy required us to look at more than just major theater wars beginning from a cold start. So we undertook an assessment across the entire spectrum of anticipated operations, from the specific military tasks to do the shaping, through small-scale contingencies, to major theater wars.

We used a broad array of different analytical tools, from seminars, war games, and computer modeling, to intensive sessions with senior civilian and military leaders, involving hundreds of people over a period of four months.

We brought in CINC War Planners and Service War Planners, as well as other experts; more than 200 professionals to wargame the forces necessary to meet future requirements, then we met face-to-face with the deputy CINCs to validate our findings.

We understand well what demands are placed on our force. The force is working hard to protect American interests and prevent regional crises from escalating.

We reconfirmed what parts of the force are busier than others and we learned where we might thin the force. And we drew upon the exhaustive analyses conducted by the CINCs' staffs in preparing their Major Theater War Plans that have been developed over the last four years.

Based on the strategy and this rigorous and comprehensive examination, the Joint Chiefs, the CINCs, and I believe that the force you see depicted here is the force America needs to protect and advance our interests as we enter the 21st Century.

- While maintaining a 10 division Force Structure, the Army will accelerate its Force XXI modernization plan. Also, a reduction of some 15,000 active duty personnel will be carried out by deactivation, consolidation, and realignment of headquarters and support facilities.

- The Army will also restructure its Reserve component. It will shed some guard combat structure that provided for strategic depth during the Cold War but which is now excess. It will also accelerate conversion of some units from combat, to combat support roles, relieving an important warfighting shortfall. These adjustments will result in a Reserve and Guard end strength reduction of some 45,000 personnel.

- The Navy will retain 12 Carrier Battle Groups and 12 Amphibious Ready Groups but will reduce the number of surface combatants in the fleet from 128 to 116 to reflect the more capable ships now coming on line. We revalidated that our submarine force can be reduced from 73 to 50 boats.

- These fleet reductions, combined with streamlining of overseas infrastructure, and the transfer of some combat logistics functions to the Military Sealift Command will allow the Navy to reduce active and Reserve end strength by 18,000 and 4,100 personnel, respectively.

- The Air Force will maintain 20 fighter wings but will consolidate fighter and bomber units to streamline its command structure. This will result in a force structure of just over 12 active fighter wings and 8 reserve wings. The Air Force will pursue an aggressive outsourcing plan. It will reduce its force structure for continental air defense and handle the U.S. air sovereignty missions with other forces. These initiatives will allow the Air Force to realize a reduction of approximately 27,000 active duty personnel.

- The Marine Corps will maintain a three Marine Expeditionary Force capability to support the strategy but will take modest reductions in end strength through restructuring.

We also examined our nuclear force posture. Until START II is ratified by the Duma, the law mandates maintaining the START I Force. However, we remain committed to START II and a possible START III and could use savings from these reductions to further our National Missile Defense program.

This next slide provides a summary of our end strength adjustments. The total active duty end strength will be adjusted down 36 percent from 1989, Reserve forces down 29 percent from 1989, Civilian personnel down 42 percent from 1989. We believe we can make these reductions and still support the strategy. Let me point out that while these reductions are essential if we are to meet our modernization goals, they will not be easy. And these are not "positions" or "spaces," they are people. Every man and woman who leaves the service is a unique story in his or her own right.

To keep faith with our people, our most precious resource, we must offer a wide range of programs and services as we did during previous drawdowns. These programs, instituted by Congress, should include early retirement and voluntary separation programs, selected continuation of benefits for separated members, and comprehensive transition support assistance. Some of these tools will expire at the end of FY99 and we will ask Congress that they be continued beyond then so we can implement these reductions fairly and compassionately.

Our major strength is our men and women, they and their families must remain our highest priority and we must continue to provide for their quality of life.

From the beginning of this process we were conscious that we must balance the requirement to invest in the force of tomorrow with the requirement to field a trained and ready force today. It would make little sense to break today's force to pay for tomorrow's.

As we all know, readiness in today's force is already challenged by the high operating tempo we face in every service. But we believe we can reduce the stress on the force in a number of ways to improve time at home for our service members with their families and still maintain a high level of operational readiness.

First, we will continue to fully fund current readiness. Next, we must look more closely at how we employ units which are in high demand such as our Patriot air defense units, and electronic warfare aircraft, or air and military police just to name a few. We will also make prudent man-year reductions in major service and joint exercises. Our business is all about making tough choices about who goes where, when, and for how long, and the overall impact on readiness and quality of life is a big factor in those decisions.

But as much as we emphasized today's readiness, our eye was always on the future and on a vision to guide our modernization efforts to assure our military's excellence well into the 21st century. Last year we introduced *Joint Vision 2010*, our unifying vision based upon Revolution in Military Affairs technologies and on new operational concepts as shown on the chart.

Dominant Maneuver will emphasize mobile and agile organizations to rapidly and decisively employ widely dispersed forces to attack enemy weak points throughout the full depth of the battlefield. Precision Engagement will enable our forces to better locate the targets that count and to strike with decisive results and with minimum effort. Full Dimensional Protection will rely on active and passive measures to protect our forces and Focused Logistics will feature fusing information transportation and other logistics technologies to allow the precise, on-time delivery of support.

Undergirding these concepts is information superiority, the ability to collect process and distribute vast amounts of information to our forces while denying that same capability to a potential enemy. In effect, *JV2010* captures the RMA and it is the umbrella concept for bringing together Service visions and experiments that will lead to our force for the 21st Century.

To realize our vision of the future we must take steps to free resources for investment in modernization. Our challenge is to capture this potential for tomorrow while preserving a healthy force today. We believe the QDR balances these competing requirements. For the near-term the QDR concludes that we can move towards a leaner force by reorganizing headquarters, trimming support functions, improving our ability to manage OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO, and re-aligning reserve forces. Implicit in this effort must be additional base closures. As unpleasant as this may be, I do not see how we can get there from here without closing bases we don't need.

This will require sustained, genuine collaboration and cooperation among the Department, the Services, and the Congress. Along the way we must never lose sight of our bedrock commitment to our people, both uniformed and civilian. Keeping faith with them is good policy and it is the right thing to do.

The QDR provides a rational, prudent, and well thought out approach to keep our Armed Forces strong and American interests protected for many years to come. Most important, it set as its standard whether the recommendations would lead to a better, more effective joint force best suited over the near-, mid-, and long-term to protect America's interests and I support its recommendations.

Dinner Remarks
Military Survivors/Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors (TAPS)
24 May 1997

Thank you very much for asking Joannie and I to come and share this time with you. I just thought I'd talk to you and I will be the first one to find out what I'm going to say — and you'll be the second one!

It is true that Joannie found out about TAPS about a year and a half ago and shortly thereafter she told me about it. And it's also fair to say that anyone who hears about it — anyone in my business — stands sort of surprised that it has taken so many years to create something like TAPS. But you stand in absolute awe of what it is you're doing — absolute awe. And when you trace back the wars that we have had, and the service men and women we have lost, in the times between the wars and accidents and so forth, how thankful I am that Bonnie and the rest of you would band together and do this.

I asked Bonnie earlier when you were sitting here how large your family now is, and how wide your net is cast. Because it would be shame on all of us if we did not try to get the word out faster and further, so that others may benefit from what you do for each other.

So let me tell you I'm amazed at what you do, I'm so thankful that you all thought of this, and I'm particularly thankful that you have all banded together to help each other like this. I know we are in the mood of applauding people, so let me applaud all of you.

Bonnie mentioned in my bio that I am the military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council, and so as you can well imagine I often testify before Congress and talk to them about our strategy and why it is that our service men and women serve all over the world. I testify before them about the needs of our military: why we should be a certain size; and what weapon systems we ought to have; and what programs we should have. We talk an awful lot about what this force of ours does, and what demands we put upon our men and women and their families.

It is extraordinary to me as I travel from one part of the world to the other, and meet with our service men and women — in the last few months Joannie and I went to Saudi Arabia, and the Sinai, and Korea, and Japan, and the East and West Coast, and Panama — no matter where you go, you are struck by how extraordinarily well we do and in what high esteem our armed forces are held.

Because I think we are without any doubt the best military in the world — bar none. I think we are because when I go and talk to my counterparts, it is clear, in the envy they express, that they would like to be like us. As a matter of fact, Joannie and I just came back from China on Sunday, and even there when I talked to my counterpart and when I talked to the other military — we went to visit an airborne division — everywhere you go people talk to us about wanting to be like us and wanting to duplicate us.

I could tell you about the trips I've taken to Russia and the same thing is true. While they're not quite sure yet whether they should be or want to be our friends, they do know that they want to be like us. They want to be as professional, they want to be as competent, they want to be as STRAC as the U.S. military.

But you know what comes through very loud and clear? We are not envied because we have the best nuclear

submarines; we are not envied because our aircraft carriers are mightier than anyone else's; or because our airplanes or our tanks are any better - they are, they're all better, no doubt about it.

But that's not why we're envied. We're envied for one simple reason — because those men and women who wear America's uniform are so absolutely remarkable. I am sometimes amazed. We send them to the far corners of the world, to places like Bosnia, to places like Zaire, where we've just had some 200 marines — and we were just able to issue them deployment orders to come home — standing by there to rescue American citizens. They just finished that kind of job in Albania. Not long ago that same group was in a place you never hear of — Rwanda — in a town called Kigali.

Others are in the Sinai, and have been there ever since President Carter signed the Camp David Accords and agreed that the U.S. military would send some thousand men and women to the middle of the Sinai to establish a line between the Egyptians and the Israelis. And they have been there for well over a decade. And it goes like clockwork. If any of you would have seen it you would be absolutely amazed.

There is a string of outposts throughout the desert in the Sinai, eight or ten men to an outpost, run by a sergeant, and yet for all these years (they rotate the units every six months) have you ever heard of an embarrassment or a problem? Name me just one military that could do that.

Or, not so many months ago, when shooting broke out in a place called Liberia, we received an urgent call to send someone there to help Americans, because the embassy was under fire. Within 24 hours men from the Air Force, men and women from the Navy, from the Marine Corps, from the Army and Special Forces were on the way, and in less than 24 hours the first people were being assembled and picked up to be taken to safety.

Before this group of some 2,000 people was finished, they had rescued well over 3,000 noncombatants from 60 different countries, mostly under fire. No one was injured, no one was scratched, and when they came home did you ever read about it in the Washington Post or your local newspaper? Not at all. And that's because people have already assumed that that's how the U.S. military would work — it's become routine.

I tell you all that because I take such enormous pride in the competence of our men and women, in the caring that they have for each another. We don't go out into the middle of the Sinai alone. We take care of each other. We're all part of a family and we take care of each other. That's what makes this military so great.

I would also tell you that despite the occasional scandal, these are men and women of extraordinary character — extraordinary character. They're patriots, first and foremost, that care about each other, and that care about what is right and wrong. The vast, vast majority do the harder right.

And I will tell you, without having met them, that your spouses carried that same color of the United States military like the people I just spoke of. They were the world's best. Whatever your feelings are inside, you all must individually decide, but you've got to know that what they did and how they did it is just unequaled.

And the outfit they belonged to, whether it's the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, or Coast Guard, is one first class outfit. That will stay with you and in the memories of your children for the rest of your lives and nothing anyone can say or do can ever erase that.

So when I testify before Congress and talk about those things, I remind them that we ought to worry less about the tanks and ships and planes we buy. We ought to worry more about keeping those remarkable men and women and their families, because they are America's treasure. You have to remember, and those young men and women that I talk to all over the world remind me, they don't ask much of us.

Just like your husbands and wives didn't ask much of you. They don't ask much of us at all. First and foremost they want an opportunity to just how good they are. They want an opportunity for a job where they can grow and produce. They want an opportunity to raise their children, and to take care of their families — not lavishly, or they wouldn't be in this business. They wouldn't be wearing uniforms.

But they do know they don't want their time wasted. They do know that they want to be the best, whether he or she is an infantryman or a clerk typist or a cook or a medic. They want to have the feeling inside that we trained them right and have given them the opportunity to become the very best.

And they want to know that when send them on these gosh awful deployments, as we do entirely too often, that there's some system back here that will take care of them and their families. That there's decent housing. That there's a school for the kids. That there's a clinic or hospital where they can take a child if the child is sick. So these warriors that we send out don't have to look over their shoulders and worry all the time whether the family's being taken care of.

And so taking care of our men and women and their families is really a readiness issue. It's a very selfish readiness issue on my part, because otherwise they will worry more about what's happening back home, or worry more about whether they're good enough for the job or not, than about doing the job they've been trained to do.

I think that ultimately, Congress sometimes has difficulty understanding that because there are such enormous pressures to buy weapons systems, because they mean jobs. So you all also have a responsibility, at every opportunity, to make clear that what you really ought to be worrying about is that we create the conditions — so that young men and women who are in our force today are willing to stay with us, and that we've created the right conditions so we can recruit more like them.

Sometimes, however, we need more than that. Because as you all so painfully, painfully know, there comes a moment when you lose someone you've loved very dearly. And that brings us full circle back to TAPS. I have been thinking since I heard about TAPS, why is it that the military never created something like that? And then it became patently clear to me that there's no way to organize something like that in the military.

What would we do? Have lieutenant so-and-so, or sergeant so-and-so call you and talk to you? A young man or woman who simply cannot share your experience? It can't be done. It can only be done by people who have walked this very difficult road before you, and who are now willing to devote their energies and their caring and their heart, to pick up your hand and say, "Hey, walk with me, I can help you."

We cannot do this. We can do it as individuals but not as an organization. I only wish that you grow, that you cast your net further. I will help you with that, with somehow getting you the resources so that you can reach more and help more.

Some time ago, a long time ago, there was a young man whose wife died. That young man wrote home and said, "I know that tomorrow, and the next day, the sun will rise again. But for me I don't think it will shine as brightly. And I know I will laugh again, but I'm not sure there'll be as much joy in my laughter ever again."

How wrong that young man was! There's something absolutely wonderful about time. Time doesn't allow us to forget those things about which we really care. But time casts them in a different light. Life really does go on. That young man today, having grown older, looks at the sunshine and the sunshine is as bright as it ever was. The laughter around him is just as joyous as it ever could have been.

There's something very special about time. Remember that. For each of you it will be different. For some it takes longer, for some not. There's no easy formula. But it works.

Last Sunday, Joannie and I were returning from China and we stopped off in California where I was to give a commissioning address at one of the universities there. Beforehand there was an ROTC commissioning. One of the young officers that I was commissioning was the brother of an Air Force captain who died last December in an aircraft accident. He had been an instructor pilot.

I had been told that he really wanted to be there as his younger brother was commissioned. I looked at the mother who was sitting there. It was not yet time to see the sun as brightly as she had seen it before. The laughter, I am sure, wasn't as joyful as it was before her oldest son had died. But I am sure that she was there because she knew that through her younger son, through that experience and that life that he was going to take on, and by being there and by watching her younger son being commissioned as a second lieutenant in the United States Air Force, she too was going towards that day when the sun would be just as bright as ever, and laughter would be just as joyful. That's what TAPS is all about, isn't it?

I wish you all the very best. God Bless you all, and thank you for what your husbands and wives did. And thank you very much for what you are doing. God Bless you.

Conference of Presidents of
Major Jewish Organizations
New York, New York
27 May 1997

It is a pleasure to be here, finally. This luncheon on this important topic has been a long time coming. For the nation's military leadership, the last year has been a whirlwind: dozens of operations; Bosnia; terrorism; problems with Iraq; and lately, the Quadrennial Defense Review. On top of this, travel to Europe, Asia, and the Middle East has kept me hopping.

It has been difficult to escape the gravity field of the Pentagon and reach "Planet Reality," which on my map is anywhere outside the Washington Beltway. Even the island of Manhattan qualifies for that status!

I would like to address for you today, two very important subjects, both related, but each important in its own right: first, our new strategy and how it came about; and secondly, our overall strategy in the Middle East with an emphasis on

the role that the Department of Defense plays in that strategy. I also want to leave at least half of the time for your questions.

But permit me first to backtrack over some familiar terrain.

While many expected better times, the Cold War was followed by a Hot Peace, where the relative stability of the Superpower standoff gave way to a world dominated by ethnic conflict, disintegrating states, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and in the Middle East, that old standby, naked aggression.

Our force — a third smaller than it was during the Cold War — has been busier than any non-wartime force in our history. After the Cold War, we structured our force to be ready to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, one in the Middle East, the other against our old and still dangerous nemesis in Northeast Asia.

But as we began our Quadrennial Review in August of 1996, we questioned whether the "two conflict" approach was the only suitable focus for the Armed Forces. To answer this question, we first looked at the environment and found that out to the year 2010, we faced the same kinds of challenges that we have today, but only more so. For example, alongside the need to be able to deal with regional conflicts, we have to prepare for asymmetrical threats, like more sophisticated terrorism, the use of chemical or even biological weapons, or attacks on our information infrastructure. We also found that out beyond 2010, there was a possibility that a new peer competitor might emerge.

Rather than simply reacting to overseas crises, we based our new strategy on three elements — first, shaping the environment to prepare or deter wars before they start, using such tools as security assistance, peacekeeping, forward presence, and military-to-military contacts.

Second, maintaining the capability to respond to two major theater wars, as well as smaller contingencies. For shaping the environment and responding to crises, we decided in the QDR to cut very little of our overworked combat "teeth," but to make cuts in the infrastructure "tail" of all our forces.

And finally, the last element of our new defense strategy is preparing now for a future beyond the year 2010 that could be significantly more challenging than today's environment. Simply stated, this means we must reinvigorate our modernization program, fund it in a steady manner, and take advantage of what has been called the Revolution in Military Affairs. To afford this at a time when defense resources will remain constant or even shrink, we will have to become more efficient, reducing our basing infrastructure, and relying more on privatization and outsourcing.

Now, how does this global strategy apply to the Middle East?

Our new National Security Strategy, signed less than two weeks ago by President Clinton, describes three specific and familiar U.S. interests in the region: advance the peace process among Israel and its neighbors; help Israel to maintain its security and its qualitative edge; and maintain access to Persian Gulf oil, which also requires us to help our Arab friends in that critical region.

Let's look at each of these three interests in turn.

Today, we may take the peace process for granted. But seven years ago, peace in the Middle East was a dream, a fantasy. The region was frozen in hatred, and Israel's recently concluded war in Lebanon was then still an open wound. There were no Arab-Israeli negotiations. But as David Ben-Gurion said, in Israel, in order to be a realist, you must believe in miracles. And what a miracle took place! None other than Saddam Hussein provided the catalyst for change!

After our stunning victory in the Gulf War, the hard-line states and some of the non-state actors realized that they were losing their base of support. The miracle of peace became the only realistic alternative. Together with help from the United States and lots of creative diplomacy, Israel, Egypt, the Palestinians, and Jordan have all made great inroads toward that peace. But there are still significant challenges to a comprehensive peace settlement — agreements need to be made between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon to name just two.

For our part, I think that the United States has played a significant role. We have attempted to mediate the dispute, but we have always maintained that the parties must be willing to make peace among themselves. On my end, we provided the military advice to Ambassador Ross and his delegation. My most senior Assistants, the latest of which has been Lieutenant General Dick Myers, have been on the case since 1991. Our most important contribution has been in advising Ambassador Ross on the military aspects of security issues related to Israel and Syria. In fact, we actually participated in the Israel-Syria negotiations that took place at the Wye Plantation in 1996. That track is now stalled, but if Israel and the Palestinians return to the table, there is some hope that Israel and Syria will again find their way clear to engage in negotiations.

We will also look to Israel's other neighbors to play a strong role in the search for peace. President Mubarak and I have discussed this many times, and I know that he feels very deeply about achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace. Likewise, King Hussein believes and has demonstrated that peace is not just a series of agreements, but that peace is also something that must be made between peoples. Reconciliation in his view is crucial, if peace is to flourish.

The United States will continue to work with both of these nations to strengthen their economies, as well as their security. But as Abba Ebban told us, we must not only judge diplomacy by what it does, but we must also judge it by what it prevents. And we have been active in preventing conflict in the Middle East, as well.

Since 1982, pursuant to the Camp David Accords, we have stationed nearly 1,000 U.S. soldiers in the Sinai to serve as part of a multinational peacekeeping force on the Israeli-Egyptian border. This means that we have contributed over 15,000 U.S. man-years worth of effort to keeping the peace there. In my view, this force has done great work and that work will continue for the foreseeable future.

But our actions to prevent war are not limited to diplomacy or peacekeeping operations. Sadly, we live in a world where, just as in the days of the Roman Empire, if you want peace, you must prepare for war. Preventing war also means supporting your allies and maintaining your readiness for war, which is still the best deterrent.

Our second major objective is to help Israel maintain its security and its qualitative edge of military superiority. And to do this, we have established a highly effective military-to-military relationship. Over the past decade, our relationship has reached an extent that it rivals any of the relationships that we have with even our closest NATO allies. Permit me to read just a handful of the most important indicators of the scale of our efforts.

First, in the area of financing, we have kept Israeli economic and military aid at three billion dollars per year, roughly 54 percent of all U.S. foreign assistance. U.S. contributions, including grant military aid, represent about 30 percent of the Israeli defense budget and provide the main support for the Arrow Theater Missile Defense system, as well as many other programs.

Second, in the equipment area, we have provided Israel some of the best equipment in the world including this year: the F-15 strike fighter; the Apache helicopter; and the Multiple Launch Rocket System.

Third, in the area of training, we are training 500 Israeli officers per year in U.S. military courses. Add to all of this, our comprehensive intelligence exchanges, our liaison officers, our joint war reserve stockpiles, our 10 large-scale joint exercises each year, our 60 or so naval ship visits each year, and you have one of the most intense military relationships in the world, and it is one I am personally very proud of.

One other aspect of this relationship, a personal one for me, is the relationship between the Israeli and American high commands. It is an intense and fruitful relationship. For example, I visited my counterpart, General Ammon Shahak, in January 1997, and he will visit me in the Pentagon for two days next week. Given all that I have told you that we have in common, I think you can see that we will have plenty to talk about.

In summary, let me say this about our strategic relationship.

The strategic relationship between the U.S. and Israel is deep. And the strategic benefits and the practical advantage of things like intelligence exchanges are considerable, and this intense, defense relationship clearly remains in the U.S. national interest.

Our third major interest is to maintain access to Persian Gulf oil and to work for stability in the region. This objective, quite obviously, has significant components that are not military. But let me stick to the military aspects of it. Also, let me narrow the focus here, and talk mainly about Iran and Iraq.

The only good news here is that they dislike each other with a visceral passion that will, for the foreseeable future, prevent them from any sort of significant coordinated action. They are both radical states but each offers a different type of the threat. Iraq is a conventional military threat to its neighbors, but, after DESERT STORM, much less of one. Their capacity for mischief in the region, however, remains significant. Iran's current threat to our interests is one that centers on international subversion and terrorism. But, in the long run, its international connections and its assets make it a more significant threat.

Let me add here, that Iran's military is becoming increasingly potent. Their power projection assets in the form of ballistic missiles, cruise missile boats, submarines and mining assets are especially worrisome. And I can tell you, that we are speaking very frankly to the nations who are selling Iran those weapons. For example, I was in China last week, and I frequently brought up our views about their arms sales to Iran in my discussions with their military leaders. We have discussed this issue with Russia, as well.

Our overall policy toward Iran and Iraq is one of dual containment. I know that many of you saw the recent *Foreign Affairs* article by Brzezinski and Scowcroft, which criticized in very measured terms this policy of dual containment. In truth, it is a difficult policy and a fractious one at home and abroad, especially in Europe. Still, dual containment is the right policy, and given the unaltered hostility of both of these states and the lack of more beneficial alternatives, dual containment is also the best policy.

In support of our policy, our operations on and around the Arabian Peninsula are extensive. The U.S., along with Britain and France, maintain a NORTHERN WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH air operation to patrol the no-fly

zones in Iraq. These are extensive operations, which have entailed over 125 thousand sorties since they began in August 1992. We also maintain a Maritime Intercept Operation in the Gulf to help prevent smuggling and violations of the U.N. resolutions. And finally, we have also prepositioned a brigade's worth of equipment in Kuwait, and we also maintain a very active land-air exercise program there. On any given day, we have around 20,000 U.S. military personnel on or around the Arabian peninsula.

Let me end my discussion of the Gulf region by noting that especially after the tragedy last summer at Khobar Towers in Dhahran, we have redoubled our efforts against terrorism.

Because United States is so strong, our enemies worldwide favor the use of terrorism, which in many cases is the only weapon they can use against us.

Today, terrorism itself is better funded and much more sophisticated than it was a decade ago. We are working much harder against terrorism on the national level, and we have redoubled our efforts in the Pentagon at Force Protection. I have told my staff that we must make the U.S. Armed Forces the world's acknowledged leader in force protection and dealing with terrorism. The way nations come to us to learn about submarines or jet fighters, I want them to come here to learn how to combat terrorism. We are also exchanging information with nations like Israel and Great Britain, which have great antiterrorist experience. We have a long way to go reach our goal, but we are working furiously to get there. We know that the lives of our men and women in uniform depend on it!

Well, I have gone on too long.

In summary, let me say that I think we have an effective Middle East policy. On U.S.-Israel relations, I personally and thoroughly agree with my good friend Madeline Albright, who said ten days ago that, "The U.S. relationship with Israel is an especially close one. It is based on shared interests, the closest cultural ties, and a shared desire for peace in the Middle East. This Administration's support for the security and well-being of Israel is without parallel."

I also believe that our policy in the Gulf is the right one and especially that our forces there are doing a great job deterring Saddam and serving too as a visible symbol of our commitment and a positive force for stability in the region. Overall, while much remains to be done in the region, much has been accomplished. We are on the right path.

Brazilian War College
Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
22 July 1997

It is a great pleasure for me to be back in Brazil and to have the opportunity to speak once again to the future leaders of Brazil's Armed Forces.

During my four years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have found that I always learn more by taking your questions and listening to your comments than you typically learn by hearing me give a long speech. So what I would like to do today is talk for a little while, but leave enough time to hear what you have to say.

If the Commandant will allow me, I will take the liberty of asking the junior officer in the audience to wave his hat when he feels I have talked too long. Although I must tell you that when I tried this at the U.S. Army War College, 200 officers started waving their hats after only five minutes!

As a result of my visits to Brazil, my contacts with your superb forces, and during meetings and conversations with General Leonel, I have developed a special place in my heart for Brazil because in many ways it reminds me so very much of the United States. Brazil, like the United States, is a country so large and diverse that little can be called typically Brazilian. From the pine forests of the south, to the tropical cities along the equator, to the excitement of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil is a collage of many cultures and many landscapes, just as is the United States. But no picture is as bright as one snapshot of Brazil's Armed Forces.

The important role you have assumed in a large number of United Nations and regional peacekeeping operations, from El Salvador to Rwanda, from Bosnia to Angola, has served as an excellent example of international responsibility. I salute Brazil's dedication and commitment to the world in the name of democracy and freedom and peace. But now, as most of you realize, it is time for our countries to prepare for the new century.

And after thinking long and hard about what I should talk to you all about, it occurred to me that the best use of my time today is to talk to you about all the changes taking place in America's military, strategy, and force structure, as we prepare for the challenges looming on the horizon. But the challenges we face are not unique to the United States. These are topics facing many countries around the world including Brazil.

After nearly eight years of operating in the post Cold War environment, it became clear that we faced in the United

States three facts of life. And it also became obvious that how we responded to these issues would have dramatic effects on what military capabilities we would have and how well we will be able to protect America's vital interests in the future.

The first fact of life for America's armed forces is that much of our equipment and our weapon systems will soon be reaching the end of their useful service lives and will have to be replaced. We were very lucky during the early 1980s. It was a period of greatly increased defense spending, spending that allowed us to modernize and equip our forces with the latest in military technologies. You saw many of these systems used during the Gulf War weapon systems like stealth fighters, the M1-A2 tank, F-15 strike eagles, precision munitions, and Aegis cruisers. But now more than 20 years after many of these systems were purchased, our aircraft, ships, computer systems, and combat vehicles are becoming very expensive to repair and maintain in combat ready condition.

Additionally, a fair percentage of our equipment is simply wearing out as a result of our high operations and exercise tempo. It is clear that we must begin replacing the old systems and equipment. In business they call this "re-capitalization," that is making the necessary capital investments in equipment and inventory to keep you competitive in the marketplace. And the estimated cost of re-capitalizing our force is approximately twenty-five percent more than we currently spend each year on new procurement.

The second fact we must face is that the American defense budget is not going to get any larger. The defense budget has already been reduced by some 40 percent just since 1989. But there are tremendous pressures on the President and our Congress to balance the national budget. At best, we can expect U.S. defense spending to level out at the current rate; thus, unless we change the way we do business, we will not have enough money to replace and to modernize our equipment.

The third fact of life, and one that makes this such a complicated problem to solve, is that in the midst of our shrinking budget and the need to modernize our force, we find that our forces have never been busier. I think it would be safe to say our operations tempo has been the busiest we have ever seen during a time of peace.

Just since I became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, American forces have participated in dozens of military operations and Joint Task Force deployments around the world, protecting a variety of American interests and supporting United Nations objectives. Everything from Non-Combatant Evacuations in places like Albania, Rwanda, and Liberia, where on that one mission alone we evacuated 2,300 citizens of some 60 nations; to the enforcement of U.N. sanctions against Iraq and the Military Observer Mission on the Peru-Ecuador border; an operation you are all intimately familiar with, to the NATO deployment in Bosnia, our largest operation since DESERT STORM. Some of these missions we have been doing so long that most Americans have completely forgot about them. Our observer mission in the Sinai Desert for example, has been watching the peace between Egypt and Israel since 1982.

So the difficulty facing America is how do we continue to protect our vital and important interests around the world and still accomplish the modernization we require for the next century? Before we could begin to develop a strategy that could effectively address these issues, it was important to first understand what the world would look like in the near-, mid-, and long-term and what security challenges we might face. After a lengthy review by many military and civilian experts in and outside the Department of Defense, we found a number of key characteristics of the future security environment.

First, the good news is that America is not likely to face a peer competitor, that is, a nation capable of successfully threatening our vital national interests with conventional forces, at least not until the year 2010 or beyond. But this doesn't mean we can take it easy. Because the experts also agree that although America would not see a major competitor emerge, we would continue to face a large number of crises and potential conflicts resulting from the "growing pains" of the post Cold War period and many of these crises and conflicts could have a very serious effect on important American worldwide interests if left unattended.

There are many, many lingering disputes remaining and anyone of these minor crises could potentially erupt into a larger regional conflict that might affect America's economic interests, endanger the lives of our citizens abroad, threaten our friends or allies, or demand humanitarian assistance. Brazilian forces have seen these contentious problems erupt into conflict during your peacekeeping operations in such places as Mozambique, the former Yugoslavia, and Angola, and you also have come to understand there is almost an endless number of ethnic, ideological, and political disputes that are greatly complicating efforts to maintain a peaceful and secure environment.

It was also the consensus of the experts that America will need to continue to maintain the capability to prosecute two near simultaneous major theater wars, potentially in the Middle East and in the Pacific, as long as Iran and Iraq continued to threaten the stability of the Middle East and the situation on the Korean Peninsula remained as unstable as it is today.

But there are also those who would wish the United States harm but cannot compete militarily with our forces. So alongside the need to be able to deal with regional conflicts, we have to prepare for asymmetrical threats, like more sophisticated terrorism utilizing chemical or even biological weapons or attacks on our information infrastructure.

Once we understood the security environment we would face well into the next century, we brought together the best strategic thinkers to help develop a defense strategy best suited to advance and protect America's worldwide interests well into the next century. Three words best describe our new defense strategy: shape; respond; and prepare.

First, we will focus on shaping the environment to advance peace and stability, deter wars, and prevent crises from escalating using such tools as security assistance forward presence and peacekeeping operations.

Second, we will maintain the capability to respond to crises, should they occur. For America this means everything from two major theater wars to the many smaller contingencies we see today as well.

The third element of our new defense strategy is preparing now for a future beyond the year 2010 that could be significantly more challenging than today's environment.

Simply stated this means we must reinvigorate our modernization programs with the new information, stealth, and precision strike technologies that used together will produce a revolution in military affairs, that in time will keep American armed forces the strongest in the world.

To afford a comprehensive modernization program at a time when defense resources will remain constant or even shrink, we will have to make radical changes in the way we do business. We will have to further cut some of our bases, further reduce and realign our force size, significantly reduce the number of people in higher headquarters, and move more towards privatization and outsourcing and in some instances, buy fewer numbers of some weapon systems than originally planned.

You will notice that I have said that the United States will have to cut more of its bases and accomplish additional reductions in the total number of people in our armed forces.

Since 1989, we have already cut thirty-three percent or approximately 700,000 people from our armed forces. If you want to know how many people that is you can take all the active military forces of the United Kingdom, add to them the forces of Germany, and for good measure add those of the Netherlands and Denmark. Even then you still don't reach 700,000.

Many of the personnel reductions made the past few years have come from our deployable combat units. Because we envision being so busy the next few years, the next series of cuts will have to come from non-deploying support personnel and functions. But while we have cut our people by one-third, we have only cut our infrastructure, which includes such things as our maintenance depots, support facilities, and laboratories, by only about twenty-one percent. So clearly there is some excess support capacity that we can eliminate in order to save money for modernization and also pay the bills for our very high readiness.

The good news is that we have learned to be more efficient in many of our support areas by looking at how private businesses operate. Not only are we adopting new business practices, but we are relying on the creative ideas of our people to innovate and find new ways to do their jobs smarter and less expensively.

But the bad news is that closing additional military bases in the United States is a very difficult political problem. If you are a Congressman and have a base in your district, you will probably not be willing to give up the jobs and economic benefits that come to local communities by having a military installation close by.

Another major component of our plan to save money in the support areas involves the transfer of many non-combat support functions to civilian businesses. Those of you who have attended pilot training in the United States, for example, may have noticed that aircraft maintenance for our training aircraft and simulator training and maintenance is largely done by private contractors.

So what type of American military will you see in the next century and what are the implications for Brazil?

In the long term, by the period 2010-2015, you will see a slightly smaller but very more lethal U.S. force on the battlefield, in the air, and on the seas. It will be more mobile, be stealthier, and be able to deliver munitions with great precision and will see the battlefield and command forces with greater effectiveness than ever before.

Many of the challenges posing dangers to the peace, continued democratization, and stability of the world are not challenges that concern only us or that we can handle alone. All across the globe, women and children are dying from starvation, disease, ethnic cleansing, and stray bullets brought on by those with no regard for humanity or the international norms of behavior. There must a new level of involvement, a new sense of caring, and a new understanding of international responsibility if we are to make the 21st century a century of peace and not another century of war.

I know that Brazil has these qualities and has demonstrated its capacity for leadership on a number of important United Nations and regional missions, particularly since 1991. I would ask that we work together as partners, along

with the other caring nations of the world, in helping address these serious issues and making the world a better place for our children.

Since I see several hats waving in the back of the auditorium please allow me a few words before I take your questions.

The history of relations between the United States and the nations of the Americas, including Brazil, this past century has been dotted with political, economic, and diplomatic difficulties and I will be the first to admit this.

But we are standing on the threshold of a new century and we have a chance for a fresh beginning and a new partnership based on new levels of trust and confidence, particularly between those of us who wear uniforms.

I ask that you never forget that it was Brazil that stood side by side with American soldiers on the bloody battlefields of a World War that threatened the peace of the world. It was the forces of Brazil integrated into the U.S. Fifth Army that fought a difficult and deadly battle at Monte Castello in Italy. And it was your forces that after three months of fierce fighting with the Germans finally managed to take the rugged hills. It was also the Brazilian division which at Fornovo moved rapidly to cut off the withdrawal of the 148th German division and remnants of two other divisions capturing two German generals 800 officers and more than 14,000 German soldiers.

The past two years we have once again stood together in the interests of peace along the Ecuador-Peru border.

We have a friendship and camaraderie that comes from dodging the same bullets and fighting for the same causes. This relationship must be cherished and nurtured and we must never allow trivial matters to affect this special bond between our forces.

Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention
Salt Lake City, Utah
18 August 1997

Ladies and gentlemen, it is certainly a great honor to receive the Veterans of Foreign Wars' Dwight David Eisenhower Award. And of course, it's also great to be out here with you in Salt Lake City, because, among other things, that means that I am not back there in the Pentagon!

You know, after the war, General Eisenhower was called back from Europe to serve in the Pentagon. But for Ike, coming to grips with the size of this monstrous building was a particular challenge. In later years, Ike was fond of telling his friends the tale of the hapless Army Air Corps Captain, who came to the Pentagon right after it opened in 1943. The poor Captain got so lost that, by the time he reached his destination, he found out that he had been promoted to Bird Colonel.

But even today, there are lots of jokes about the Pentagon and how many people work there. A former Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, when asked how many people work in the Pentagon, used to reply, "about a third." Perhaps closer to the mark, a former Secretary of the Navy used to say that the Pentagon reminded him of a log floating rapidly downstream, covered with 20,000 ants, each of them convinced that he was steering.

With all that, you will understand why I think it is so great to be away from the Pentagon and out here in God's country and among so many friends and heroes.

And my friends, let me say that as a man who came to our great country as a teenage refugee from war-torn Europe, it is a special thrill to receive a medal named for General Eisenhower, the leader of our "Crusade in Europe," a great soldier, and a great President. It is also a great honor because the VFW's two million members, standing shoulder to shoulder with our Armed Forces, epitomize patriotism, sacrifice, and all that's good about America. And so, this prestigious award from this great organization is a very special honor for me indeed.

But if Ike were here today, he would remind us that a General must only accept such an award in the name of the men and women under his charge. And so, with all humility, I accept this great honor on behalf of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines — active, guard, and reserve — who everyday lay it on the line for the greatest country in the world.

And for the next few minutes, I would like to tell you about your Armed Forces and those outstanding men and women who are its life's blood.

But let me start with a bit of recent history.

Since the end of the Cold War, we have been able to safely cut our forces by 700,000 people, about a third of the active force. How big is 700,000? The force we cut is more than all of the troops in the British, German, Dutch, and Danish armed forces put together. Or put another way, the force we cut is 200,000 people more than all of the autoworkers

in the United States. In terms of combat structure, we cut active Army divisions from 18 to 10; and Air Force tactical fighter wings from 36 to 20; and the number of ships in the Navy were reduced by nearly 40 percent.

The defense budget has gone down 40 percent, as well. And today we spend less of a percentage of our nation's wealth on defense than at any time since before the Second World War.

In the past, the deep cuts that followed every war have always meant a drastic downturn in the quality and the readiness of our forces. But this time, with sound leadership in the field, the support of the Congress, and the hard work of two different Administrations, we have successfully managed the huge post-Cold War drawdown, creating a smaller but, pound-for-pound, an even more capable force.

And it is a good thing that we did.

Today, as we are painfully aware, we live in a world traumatized by ethnic conflicts, failed states, and outbreaks of that rare but deadly virus, naked aggression. As a result, today's force has been one of the busiest in our peacetime history. In just the four years that I have been Chairman, our forces have conducted 50 different operations, some you hardly ever hear about, and others as well known as Bosnia.

I just returned from a trip to Bosnia a few days ago. Thanks to our 8,000 troops there, and the forces of our allies and partners, which include, by the way, a very effective Russian brigade, thanks to all of them, we have stopped the killing, which had made that country a living hell. And more importantly, today, because of our troops, there is relatively little risk that a war will break out in the Balkans.

And I'm sure all of you here tonight, especially you veterans of World War II, remember that for America, when it comes to wars in Europe, an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure. By that standard, our force in Bosnia has been a great investment.

And let me pause here a moment to say thank you to the VFW for supporting our troops in Bosnia and the Middle East, especially with the phone cards that you provided as part of your "Operation Uplink." I cannot overstate how much they mean to the troops and to their families. Thank you all, very much.

But today Bosnia is just one of our key operations. Today, we are also in strength in the Persian Gulf, where we keep a powerful naval battle group, and in the skies over Iraq, where our valiant airmen enforce the U.N. sanctions against Saddam Hussein's regime and keep him from threatening his neighbors and the world's oil supply.

And just recently our Marines, God Bless 'em, have finished another major non-combatant evacuation in troubled West Africa.

We also have at all times about 100,000 personnel in the European theater and another 100,000 in the Pacific. And our friends and allies in those regions want our forces to stay for two key reasons. First and most obvious is our power.

Thanks in large measure to your sacrifice in years gone by, we are a global power with global interests to protect. And while we stay overseas to protect our interests, wherever we are, we are also a positive force for peace and stability. Our friends know that, our former adversaries know that, and the outlaw nations and the terrorists, who wish us ill, they know it too.

But the second reason that our friends and allies value our presence overseas is our men and women in uniform. When foreign generals come to the Pentagon to visit me, they speak with admiration of our equipment, but they are in awe of our people, especially our young NCOs.

And if you could come with me on my travels and see the professionalism of these young men and women, you would be extraordinarily proud. One look into their eyes makes you proud to be an American.

I have seen that look, just a few nights ago, in the eyes of the remarkable sailors on the flight deck of an aircraft carrier, named aptly enough, the USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. Not long ago, I saw it in the eyes of the young Marines, who had just rescued a downed pilot. And I have seen it, just this past week, in the compassion of Army National Guardsmen from the state of Georgia, who were repairing an orphanage in the far away Republic of Georgia in the former Soviet Union.

And it is no mystery what inspires, what sets apart our men and women in uniform. Along with their own professionalism and patriotism, it is your accomplishments, your example, and your legacy that inspire our men and women in uniform.

As President Clinton so aptly said, today's men and women in uniform are the sons and daughters of your sacrifice. They are what makes ours the best damned Armed Forces in the world, bar none!

But that said, it doesn't mean that everything in the Armed Forces today is perfect. It never was, and today is no exception. We have all read and heard about various problems — some acts of hazing, concerns over gender integration, and sexual misconduct.

The media loves these stories, and, in fact, for some weeks there, it was hard to tell the difference between news

stories about the Armed Forces and the network soap operas. Well, certainly these things are serious problems, but they are not epidemics.

But even though these social problems occur less in the military than in the civilian world, they are especially worrisome to our military. They destroy the dignity of the individual, damage morale, inhibit teamwork, and thus blunt our combat readiness. They are flat wrong, and we will not tolerate them.

We will continue to address each wrong speedily, openly, fairly, protecting the rights of the person wronged and those of the accused. But while we do that, we will get on with the job at hand, protecting American interests, wherever they might be challenged.

And that's why readiness is of equal concern to me. While our readiness in the near term is fine, we are beginning to see some early cracks, which if not fixed, could spell trouble. With a booming economy, enlistments are beginning to show signs of falling off and recruiting is becoming more difficult. Our men and women in uniform and their families are finding it more challenging to keep up with the demanding tempo of rigorous training, frequent deployments, and numerous on-going operations.

We have some good plans to right this situation, but readiness is one area where we will have to be especially watchful.

This past spring, we completed the Quadrennial Defense Review, an exhaustive study of the future and the kind of force that we will need in the challenging years ahead.

All indicators are, that for the next 10 to 15 years, our forces in the field are likely to face the same wide range of threats that they face today from terrorists, to rogue states equipped with weapons of mass destruction, to dangerous regional powers, like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Sometime beyond that, they may even face an emerging global power.

To deal with such a world, our Armed Forces must help shape the international environment by promoting regional stability, preventing conflicts, and deterring aggression in key regions of the world. But if we fail to prevent conflicts, we must then be ready, alone or with partners, to respond quickly, and to fight and win our nation's wars. And finally, we will have to prepare our forces to deal with the security challenges of an unpredictable future. And that means that tomorrow's force must have the new weapons and equipment that it will need to give it the qualitative edge on any future battlefield, against any future adversary.

All of this is a very tall order. And we know that we will need your help to get the job done.

First and foremost, we need the VFW to keep doing what it does so well: fighting for our veterans. Not long after the founding of the VFW, Teddy Roosevelt said that, "A man, who is good enough to shed his blood for his country, is good enough to be given a square deal afterwards." We must never settle for anything less.

Our young service members watch very carefully what is happening to retiree and veterans' benefits. If you want to keep good people in the military today it is important to give a "square deal" to those who served in the past.

Another way that the VFW can help the Armed Forces is in education.

Veterans are a wise but an aging breed. The median age of the World War II vets is nearly 75; the median age for Korean War vets is over 65; and those young whippersnappers of the Vietnam War era, their median age is over 50. In effect, our population is losing military experience and the wisdom that comes along with it. If we are to have the best decision-making possible, organizations like the VFW need to redouble their considerable efforts at educating the American people on national security issues.

And that brings me to a third area where we need your help. We need you to continue to speak out about the importance of military preparedness and the importance of a strong Armed Forces.

The VFW has been a very sane and influential voice on national security issues, to include, most recently, NATO enlargement and on our policy on land mines. But with our population of vets getting smaller, your voice must get louder.

Some of you out there have paid in blood for our lack of preparedness in the past. We can't let that happen ever again. And for tomorrow, the key to keeping our force well prepared is people, quality men and women, the resources to train them, and the experienced well-educated leaders to make them all that they can be. In the urge to save money, we can't balance the budget on the backs of our young men and women in uniform or on the backs of their families.

To remain strong, to remain the best military in the world, we need the continued help of veterans, the cooperation of the Congress, and the support of the American people. I know I can count on the VFW.

Ladies and gentlemen, our nation approaches the twenty-first century from a position of great strength. And we will never forget that it was you, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, who helped to make us the best and the strongest nation on earth.

Because of you, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, we stand on the threshold of the second American century. Thanks for a magnificent job.

And as for me, my time in uniform grows short. But in the months I have left, and in the years to come, I will look back on this day with great pride. I will remember it as a day, when standing here among old friends, that I could conclude my time as a soldier and begin my time as a proud veteran.

My fellow veterans, I salute you. Thank you for this great honor. May God Bless you, God Bless the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and God Bless this great country of ours.

American Legion Annual Convention
Orlando, Florida
3 September 1997

Let me tell you what a real pleasure it is to once again address this marvelous convention and to be here in Florida among so many friends and heroes. Of course my staff is constantly reminding me that after 39 years in the Army, it's probably great to be anywhere.

I must confess that I'm always just a little hesitant whenever I'm asked to speak to a large group of our outstanding veterans. Because according to the laws of probability, one of these days sitting in the audience there is going to be someone that knew me at basic training way back in 1958 and he's going to tell you all those embarrassing stories that I've managed to keep hidden for the last 39 years. And after hearing the stories, you'll all probably wonder how I ever made it beyond the rank of Private, let alone to the rank of General.

I just returned from a couple of weeks of leave getting my new home in order and I've got to tell you all a short story. As most of you know when you finally get away for a vacation it's real hard to get out of your normal everyday routine. So after a few days of just wandering around the house early in the morning, I started doing my exercise, then eating breakfast at a little pancake house just a few blocks away from our new retirement home. Every time I went in there, sitting in a booth was the same group of "locals" always watching me eat breakfast.

Finally after a few days one of them turned around in the booth and asked me if I was new in town. I told them that I was and had stayed in a house just down the road from this cafe. So he turned around to his friends and said, "I told you so." Then he looked at me real hard and said, "You're retiring aren't you?" And I told him yes and he turned back around to his buddies once more and with a big smile on his face told them, "See I told you so." Now his confidence was really up so he said, "I'll bet you're in the Army aren't you?" I said, "Yes," and once again he looked at his pals and said, "See, I'm right again!" Finally he asked me what rank I was and I said if I told you, you wouldn't believe me. And right away he turned to his buddies and said, "See I told you he was a sergeant major!"

I got quite a chuckle out of that little exchange. Because it was clear that my new neighbor thought a lot more of NCOs then he did of generals and if he only knew how good and how busy the average sergeant is today he would think even more of them.

Even as we gather here today at this grand convention, some 40,000 of our great men and women in uniform, some of them your sons and daughters or grandchildren, are deployed on 10 major operations around the globe. This is in addition to the 100,000 we have permanently deployed in Europe and the 100,000 forward deployed in various areas of the Pacific. And as you might expect they are performing superbly, continuing the high standards that men like Bob Dole, who the convention will honor later, and you our great veterans have set for them.

They are the best military in the world today bar none! There are none like them in the world and no other military force could have accomplished all that our men and women have done these past four years.

It is truly amazing to realize that just within the last 12 months our forces have participated in operations along the Peru-Ecuador border, guarded the no-fly zones over Iraq, intercepted clandestine shipping in the Arabian Gulf and the Mediterranean, evacuated non-combatants from four countries during crises, searched the jungles of Southeast Asia for fallen comrades, worked hard to stem the flow of drugs, stopped the killing of women and children in Bosnia, and for the 15th year participated in the observer mission in the Sinai cautiously watching the peace between Egypt and Israel.

And this has occurred even as we have been maintaining our very significant commitments in the rest of the world, in Korea, Japan, and as we build new partnerships in Central and Eastern Europe.

Throughout these busy times, perhaps the busiest in our peacetime history, the American Legion has been there shoulder to shoulder in body and spirit supporting our great forces. And I cannot overstate how much your support means to our troops and to their families. Thank you all so very much.

Let me assure you that like those of you who liberated Europe and rescued the nations of the Pacific, everywhere our forces go in the name of peace they are making a difference in the lives of those they touch.

I still remember as a young boy seeing you, the world's finest military, march into Europe and put an end to the bloodshed and devastation that had taken so many innocent lives and so many of my friends. You touched my life in a way you'll never fully realize and I stand here today as a tribute to your generosity, your caring, and your compassion.

So it should come as no surprise that our sons and daughters who wear the uniform continue in the grandest American tradition to make a difference in the lives of others as they continue their missions around the globe. From the starving refugees they helped feed in Rwanda, to the people plucked from rafts in the middle of the ocean desperately fleeing Castro's Cuba, to the nearly 2,000 foreign nationals from more than 60 countries rescued from Liberia in the midst of crisis, all, all have benefited from contact with our great forces.

And if you want to know just how much of an effect we have on those we help consider the case of Adisa Dubica, a young Muslim woman in Bosnia.

In August 1994, she along with her mother and 50 other Bosnian Muslims, were rounded-up in the middle of the night. They were forced to stand at the edge of trench that undoubtedly was intended to be their grave. It was reported that just as the men raised their guns a loud voice came from the trees that said, "Stop you are surrounded. Put down your arms. We're the United States Marines." The men did as they were told and out walked just two Marines who just happened to be walking by and who surely prevented a mass murder.

Adisa Dubica thanks America's Armed Forces for giving her back her life and her confidence, just as you all did in so many far away lands before, and she hopes that someday she too can make a difference. And she undoubtedly will have the chance, because today she is a private first class in the United States Marine Corps having recently completed training at Camp Lejeune.

When all is said and done, it's our people who are the backbone of our military excellence and it is your example, your patriotism, and your accomplishments that inspire them.

It is their capacity to meet the toughest challenges and to bring life and order and hope to millions of people who have no hope that helps make America great. That is why we must preserve the outstanding quality of men and women in our forces. This means providing them with fair pay, good housing, access to effective medical care, and all those other things that contribute to their "quality of life."

But equally important, we need to provide them with a working environment that allows each man and woman to grow and flourish and to reach their full potential as soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen.

We have all read and heard about the various problems — hazing, acts of undiscipline, concerns over gender integration, and sexual misconduct. The media loves these stories and in fact for some weeks there it was hard to tell the difference between news stories about the Armed Forces and the network soap operas.

Well, certainly these things are problems, serious problems, but they are not epidemics. But even though these social problems occur less in the military than in the civilian world, they are especially worrisome to our military. For they destroy the dignity of the individual, damage morale, inhibit teamwork, and thus blunt our combat readiness.

They are flat wrong and we will not tolerate them.

But for me, readiness is an equally serious concern. We are beginning to see some early indicators that, if not corrected, will adversely affect future readiness. With a booming economy, enlistments as well are beginning to show signs of falling off and recruiting is becoming more difficult. Our units in the field, and more to the point, our men and women in uniform and their families, are finding it more challenging to keep up with the demanding tempo of rigorous training, frequent deployments, and numerous on-going operations. In short, today's hard-working force is showing some signs of wear. We have some good plans to right this situation but this is one area where we will have to be especially vigilant in the future.

Recently, Comic strip philosophers Calvin and Hobbes also discussed the importance of looking out for the future. Calvin was talking to Hobbes and said, "You could step in the road tomorrow and WHAM! Get hit by a cement truck! That's why my motto is live for the moment." Then he turned to his pal and asked, "What's your motto?" Answered Hobbes, "My motto is look down the road."

The importance of "looking down the road" is why this past spring we completed the Quadrennial Defense Review, an exhaustive study of the future and the kind of force that we will need in the challenging years ahead.

All indications are that for the next 10 to 15 years, our forces in the field are likely to face a wide range of threats, from terrorists to rogue states equipped with weapons of mass destruction to potent regional powers. And sometime beyond we may even face an emerging global power. Thus our challenge is to prepare our forces to deal with these security challenges of a future that by all indications, will remain as unpredictable as it is today. Clearly that means that

tomorrow's force must have the new weapons and equipment that it will need to give it the qualitative edge on any future battlefield.

But we must also live up to the promises we make to those who gave faithful service to our nation. We cannot ask our people to dedicate their lives to the defense of this great nation and then turn "a blind eye" towards them after they leave. So equally aggressive must be our commitment to the educational, medical, and financial benefits promised to not only our active duty members, but to our retirees and all our great veterans of military service.

As Teddy Roosevelt once said, "A man who is good enough to shed his blood for his country is good enough to be given a square deal afterwards."

The American Legion has helped us so many times, like drafting one of the most successful government programs ever devised in the history of our nation, the GI Bill.

And now we need your help again for so many other worthwhile programs such as transition assistance for members leaving active duty, access to military medical care for veterans over 65, helping those taken ill as a result of Gulf War service, accounting for our POWs/MIAs, and ensuring Congress continues to support our existing retirement program and job hiring preferences for Veterans.

If America's armed forces are to continue to be the force of change, of peace, and of stability in the next century, truly there is much to be done. And it will take the efforts of the entire team: our active force, the reserves and guard, our outstanding DoD civilians, and most importantly, you our veterans who helped make us the best, the strongest nation on earth.

You have a story to tell and it must be told more often much louder and with greater vigor than ever before. Because today, from the halls of Congress to the streets of Orlando, Florida, fewer and fewer Americans share your experiences as veterans of military service and guardians of America's freedom. The median age of the World War II vets, I'm told, is nearly 75, the median age for Korean War vets is over 65, and those "young whippersnappers" of the Vietnam War era, their median age is over 50. In effect our population is losing military experience and the wisdom that comes along with it.

We need you now more than ever before to help us educate our youth and advise our citizens and civilian leaders so that they can make informed decisions on these very key issues.

I have been privileged to live in this nation during a very great period. I have watched our nation use its tremendous power and talents to wise and enormous effect.

From the day that I put on this uniform I have been proud to be a part of that effort and proud to have served with those of you in this audience.

Now as we stand on the threshold of a new century, a second American century, I am confident that for all we have accomplished this past fifty years we will accomplish even more in the next fifty.

Once again thank you for your support sacrifice and service to our great nation.

You can be extremely proud of what our men and women in uniform are accomplishing these days for our nation. I promise you that they will remain ferocious and insurmountable in war, extraordinarily noble in peace, and they will jealously guard your legacy.

God Bless you all and God Bless America.

***Joint Forces Quarterly* Magazine**
"A Word from the Chairman"
General Shalikashvili's CJCS Farewell
Autumn/Winter 1997

While packing for the last PCS move of my 39-year career, I rediscovered several earlier editions of Joint Force Quarterly on the shelves in my professional library. The Autumn 1993 issue caught my attention because it was the edition published on the eve of my assuming the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The issue began appropriately enough with a farewell from my predecessor, General Colin Powell, who made an interesting but perhaps unnoticed comment. He challenged all of us to safely manage force reductions " ... without losing the high quality that has become the hallmark of America's military." In retrospect, this challenge truly characterizes one of the major efforts of the past four years.

Thanks to the dedicated efforts of every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine our margin of superiority over potential foes is arguably greater that it has ever been.

With an operations tempo that included more than 40 major operations and Joint Task Force deployments during my tenure, leaders at every level, from the front line NCO to our most senior flag officer, ensured we remained focused on the mission and on our combat readiness.

But there is a pitfall in focusing so sharply on current events that we become distracted to the point where we do not put enough thought and energy into preparing for the potential dangers looming over the horizon. Concentrating all of our precious resources on handling near-term challenges results in the assumption of significant risk in the long-term; risk that could potentially place our men and women in greater danger during future conflict. So now a new challenge lies before us.

That challenge is to remain fully capable of over-matching any of today's potential adversaries, while at the same time channeling all of our enthusiasm, innovation, and sufficient resources into preparing for the future and ensuring America remains the world's finest fighting force.

Positioning ourselves for continued greatness in the 21st century is a complicated proposition that involves more than just purchasing new weapon systems. There are dimensions to the problem and the solution, requiring the thoughtful participation of professionals at all levels. Because the revolution in military affairs is not just about husbanding information age technologies, precision strike, and stealth. It is every bit as dependent on new organizational structures, new operational concepts, innovative approaches to old tactical problems, and the furtherance of joint teamwork.

The foundation for ensuring our ability to protect America's vital interests in the next century is now under construction. You see it being built day-by-day, brick-by- brick during every joint exercise, the publication of each new joint doctrine manual, and even during the often contentious, but productive inter-service debates on operational concepts. You are the architects and builders of our new military. As you continue this important project, never forget that America charges you with protecting this great democracy and that in your hands, it places the welfare of its sons and daughters and a legacy of excellence provided by millions of veterans.

I remain eternally grateful for your exceptional efforts and selfless dedication these past four years. Good luck in your careers and God bless you all.

Farewell Ceremony at
Fort Myer, Virginia
30 September 1997

What a great day to be a soldier despite these clouds!

Thank you, Secretary Cohen, and thank you, Mr. President for those very kind words. And thank you, Mr. President, for the award of the Medal of Freedom. I'm so deeply honored. And let me say as well, that it is a privilege to leave this office, knowing that I will be relieved by General Hugh Shelton, a friend, a combat veteran decorated for heroism, a true professional, and an inspired choice to lead our Armed Forces into the 21st Century.

And I thank you Mr. President, and I thank you too, Mr. Vice President, for all you have done these past four years to keep America's Armed Forces the very best in the world and for all your concern for the safety of our men and women, and their welfare, and the welfare of their families. Mr. President, it has been an honor to have served under your command.

A short while ago, I received a new set of orders, as I have so many times in the past. These orders, my retirement orders, contained a notation that reminded me that I have now served 39 years, 3 months, and 1 day on active duty. To some of you here, that must sound like a very, very long period of time. In my own life, if I were to measure the distance between my earliest memories of Warsaw, Poland, my birthplace, and this podium today, it might seem like a very long journey, indeed. But in truth, these 39 years have passed by in the wink of an eye.

For it seems like only yesterday that I, a brand new draftee from Peoria, Illinois, started my journey as a wide-eyed trainee in the green hills of Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; only yesterday, that I felt the biting cold of the Alaskan winter, while serving as a brand new lieutenant with the Manchus of the 1st Battle Group, 9th Infantry; only yesterday, that I experienced the stifling afternoon heat of the rice paddies and the jungles of Vietnam; or that in Germany at Grafenwoehr, I heard the roar of the guns of the 1st Armored Division; or bathed in the dust at Yakima with the motorized soldiers of the 9th Division; and only yesterday, in the mountains of Northern Iraq, I watched with pride as American soldiers and soldiers from a dozen different nations worked feverishly to give life back to hundreds of thousands of Kurds, who had been driven into these mountains by Saddam Hussein and left there to perish.

These experiences seem like only yesterday because, in the history of our nation and our military, they are but a

fleeting moment, a moment replayed day in and day out, on a thousand posts, camps, and stations from Kuwait to Kansas, from Pearl Harbor to the Persian Gulf, to Germany, to Korea.

For a peacetime era, these past four years have been a period of unprecedented military activity and unmatched operational excellence. Each time the call came, America's forces were ready, and each time they performed magnificently

Whether maintaining a strong deterrent against aggression on the Korean peninsula; ensuring Saddam Hussein remembers the penalty for turning his fury against his neighbors or his own people; providing humanitarian assistance for the dying in Rwanda; bringing an end to violence in Haiti; or extending the hand of friendship to former adversaries and new partners through NATO's Partnership for Peace; our men and women did all that America asked of them, and more. And in the process, they proved themselves, to friend and foe alike, the best military in the world, bar none.

Others might envy us our high technology equipment, but they stand in awe of our young men and women in uniform and the sergeants and petty officers who lead them.

To paraphrase the late General Abrams, people aren't in the Armed Forces, people are the Armed Forces. Not "personnel," but living, breathing people, tough people, ethical people, trained people, people working together to get the job done, worldwide, year after year, not just for 39 years, but for over two centuries. Our men and women in uniform were always, are now, and forever will be, the key to our operational excellence, and no technology is about to change that.

We must never forget their sacrifice; we must never underestimate their importance; and we must never cut back on our support for them or their families.

And just as people are the lifeblood of our Armed Forces, so they have been the joy of my years in uniform. I have worked for and served with the best.

From Sergeant Grice, who taught me how to care for soldiers, to General Lester L. Wheeler, who instilled in me the essence of being an officer, through thousands of others, all the way up to my friend Colin Powell, who mentored me on the responsibilities of being a Chairman.

And while Chairman, I have been blessed to work for three great Secretaries: the late Les Aspin; Bill Perry; and now Bill Cohen; all men of character, men of brilliance, and men dedicated to building a strong defense. No one could ask for better bosses, or more dedicated Americans to look after our men and women in uniform. I thank you.

And I have been blessed, and indeed America has been blessed, to have the great generals and admirals that we have had leading the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marines, and the Coast Guard during these very turbulent years. Denny, Jay, Ed, Chuck, and Bob, I thank you for your support, your wise counsel, and for your friendship.

And we have been blessed, as well, to have had such outstanding leaders as our unified commanders. I can't say enough to praise all of you and the great work that you have done to give America a joint force equal to her own greatness.

And to the Vice Chairman, General Joe Ralston, my dear friend, you are a consummate professional, and a model of selfless service. Every honor that I received today owes much to your wisdom, your tireless work, and your devotion to our nation.

And to the Joint Staff, you lead the way. You are the finest military staff, and much of our operational excellence springs from your unmatched professionalism.

But when all is said and done, it is my family to whom I owe the greatest debt of gratitude.

Joannie, these 30 years together have been a most wonderful journey, with you and I holding hands, every step of the way. How lucky I am to be married to my best friend, who shares my love for soldiers, and who has given so much to them and to their families. Joannie, we always said that together we could make it, for that's the kind of stuff we're made of. Well, Duck, we've made it. I love you.

And thank you Brant, for having put up with all of my absences from home while you were growing up, all the many moves, all the missed soccer games, and despite that, having become the fine young man that you are. Your mother and I are prouder of you than you will ever know.

Forty-five years ago, my parents, my brother Othar, my sister Gale, and I came to the shores of this great nation, and America took us in and opened its heart to us. In time, it allowed me to rise from private to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What a reflection on this grand land of opportunity! Only, only in America!

Now, let me close with a word to the soldiers with whom I shared this 39-year journey.

Many years ago, when he was asked what his last wish would be, Black Jack Pershing said that, "When the last bugle is sounded, I want to stand with my soldiers." When years hence, the last bugle sounds, I hope I stand with you as ramrod-straight and as proud, as you stand before us here today.

In the years to come, no matter what I do, no matter where I go, no matter what I will become, in my heart, I pray,

I will always remain one of you, a soldier.

Mr. President, it has been a great honor to wear the uniform of this great nation and to serve you. I thank you for that privilege.

May God Bless you, sir, and may God Bless this extraordinary land of ours.

Appendix A

Complete List of Speeches and Remarks

Speeches, Press Conferences, and Congressional Testimony
(listings in **BOLD** indicates transcript included in this volume)

1993

1 Aug 93	**Announcement remarks, The White House, Washington, DC**
11 Aug 93	President nominates General Shalikashvili as next Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
8 Sep 93	Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations
22 Sep 93	**Congressional Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, Confirmation Hearing, Washington, DC**
5 Oct 93	General Shalikashvili confirmed by the Senate
6 Oct 93	General Shalikashvili appointed by the President as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
25 Oct 93	Swearing-in ceremony held by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
29 Oct 93	Remarks, Reserve BGs Conference
3 Nov 93	**Official welcome ceremony, The Pentagon, Washington, DC**
3 Nov 93	Interview with *Pacific Stars and Stripes* and *KORUS* Magazine, Seoul, Korea
12 Nov 93	**Ceremony Honoring Vietnam Women Veterans, Fort Myer, Virginia**
13 Nov 93	Remarks at the SHAPE Alumni Banquet
19 Nov 93	Remarks to the Joint Armed Forces Officers Wives League Luncheon
2 Dec 93	1993 USO Christmas Celebration, Washington, DC
14 Dec 93	**DoD Press Briefing, The Pentagon, Washington, DC**
17 Dec 93	Interview with TIMES News Service, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
21 Dec 93	Press conference on Somalia trip, Andrews AFB, Maryland

1994

3 Jan 94	**WORLDNET Interview, The Pentagon, Washington, DC**
4 Jan 94	Remarks at special White House briefing, White House Press Room, Washington, DC
7 Jan 94	Joint Press Conference with Ambassador Albright, Warsaw, Poland
8 Jan 94	Joint Press Conference with Ambassador Albright, Budapest, Hungary

9 Jan 94	NBC "Meet the Press," Remote from Warsaw, Poland
9 Jan 94	Joint Press Conference with Ambassador Albright, Bratislava, Slovak Republic
10 Jan 94	Joint Press Conference with Ambassador, Prague, Czech Republic
11 Jan 94	Remarks to Army BG selectees and spouses
12 Jan 94	Press Briefing, CJCS Office, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
13 Jan 94	Japanese CHOD – GEN Nishimoto
14 Jan 94	Interview with *Parade Magazine*
18 Jan 94	Farewell dinner for SECDEF Les Aspin
21 Jan 94	Bradley University New York Alumni Reunion, Sardi's Restaurant, New York, New York
27 Jan 94	UK CHOD — Sir Peter Inge
31 Jan 94	Remarks at the Joint Flag Officers Warfighters Course
1 Feb 94	Remarks to the Senate Youth Program
2 Feb 94	**National Defense University, Distinguished Lecture Program 1993-94, "Strategy for the 90's: Building on the Past – Looking to the Future," National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, DC**
3 Feb 94	**Remarks to the Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Washington, DC**
4 Feb 94	Farewell Reception for Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Fort Myer Ceremonial Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia
8 Feb 94	Congressional Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on the DoD Budget, Washington, DC
12 Feb 94	**Military Order of the Purple Heart Testimonial, Crystal Gateway Marriott, Arlington, Virginia**
14 Feb 94	USSTRATCOM Change of Command, Offutt Air Base, Omaha, Nebraska
17 Feb 94	USSOUTHCOM Change of Command. Howard AFB, Panama
18 Feb 94	DoD Press Briefing – Readiness Task Force, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
18 Feb 94	Welcome Ceremony for Secretary of Defense William Perry, Fort Myer Ceremonial Hall, Arlington, Virginia
20 Feb 94	NBC "Meet the Press" interview, Aviano Air Base, Aviano, Italy
21 Feb 94	**DoD Special Briefing on Bosnia, Press Briefing Room, The Pentagon, Washington, DC**

22 Feb 94	**Congressional Testimony, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, Annual Posture Statement, Washington, DC**
25 Feb 94	Retirement ceremony for ADM David E. Jeremiah, Fort Myer Ceremonial Hall, Arlington, Virginia
28 Feb 94	**Veterans of Foreign Wars Annual Convention, Washington Sheraton Hotel, Washington, DC**
3 Mar 94	CJCS Receives George Washington University Distinguished Alumni Award, Washington, DC
8 Mar 94	Congressional Testimony, Senate Defense Subcommittee and Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC
9 Mar 94	Defense Writers Group, Westin Hotel, Washington, DC
9 Mar 94	Dinner hosted by Ambassador Ray of India
11 Mar 94	Press Briefing en route to Somalia
13 Mar 94	Press Briefing, Mogadishu, Somalia
13 Mar 94	Press Conference with GEN Montgomery, Somalia
15 Mar 94	Welcome home from Somalia for 10th Mountain Division
15 Mar 94	"Nightline" interview with Ted Koppel, Fort Drum Officers' Club, Fort Drum, New York
21 Mar 94	Remarks at the USAF BG Orientation Course
22 Mar 94	Interview with Armed Forces Radio and Television (AFRTS), The Pentagon, Washington, DC
25 Mar 94	Remarks at CAPSTONE, Washington, DC
28 Mar 94	Welcome Ceremony for MG Montgomery and Troops from Somalia
4 Apr 94	**Remarks at the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington, DC**
5 Apr 94	Press briefing upon return from Bosnia
6 Apr 94	Remarks to the Joint Staff Interns
7-8 Apr 94	6th Annual AFC/JCS Meetings
11 Apr 94	Remarks to the Naval War College Students
12 Apr 94	**115th Annual meeting of the Army and Air Force Mutual Aid Association, Ceremonial Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia**
12 Apr 94	Congressional Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, Executive Session, Washington, DC
13 Apr 94	Welcome Remarks to the NATO Defense College Students
14 Apr 94	Brazilian CHOD – ADM Leite Pericrra

14 Apr 94	Special DoD briefing, regarding helicopter incident in Northern Iraq, Press Briefing Room, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
15 Apr 94	Special DoD briefing, regarding helicopter incident in Northern Iraq, Press Briefing Room, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
15 Apr 94	**Annual Military Appreciation Dinner, Fairbanks Chamber of Commerce, Fairbanks, Alaska**
18 Apr 94	USAF BG Orientation Course Remarks
21 Apr 94	Remarks, National Military Families Association Luncheon
22 Apr 94	Ukrainian CHOD – GEN Lopata
23 Apr 94	ADM Kelso's retirement ceremony, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland
25 Apr 94	**Memorial Service to honor victims of friendly fire incident in Iraq, Fort Myer Memorial Chapel, Fort Myer, Virginia**
9 May 94	Remarks to USAF War College Students
10 May 94	**Erskine Lecture Series, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia**
13 May 94	**Mid-America Committee, Mid-America Club, Chicago, Illinois**
13 May 94	Chicago Tribune Editorial Board
14 May 94	**Bradley University Commencement, Robertson Memorial Field House, Bradley University, Peoria, Illinois**
14 May 94	ROTC Commissioning Ceremony, Bradley University
14 May 94	Veterans Memorial Park dedication, Peoria, Illinois
14 May 94	Remarks to the Peoria High School Class of '54 Reunion
14 May 94	Remarks at the Theta Chi Fraternity Banquet
18 May 94	Toast at the CINCs Conference
23 May 94	Medal of Honor Ceremony with President of the United States, Mrs. Shughart, Mrs. Gordon
27 May 94	Remarks to the Army War College Students
29 May 94	Remarks at the National Memorial Day Concert, Washington, DC
1 Jun 94	Remarks to the Defense Policy Board
6 Jun 94	Remarks at D-Day Observance, U.S. Cemetery, Colleville-sur-Mer, Normandy, France
13 Jun 94	Award Presented by Brazilian Ambassador
15 Jun 94	Remarks to the NDU Delegation

18 Jun 94	**American Academy of Achievement, Las Vegas, Nevada**
19 Jun 94	UK CHOD — FM Sir Peter Inge
21 Jun 94	Interview on BBC
23 Jun 94	Remarks to winners of the CJCS Strategy Essay Competition
27 Jun 94	Remarks at the Joint Staff Off-Site
4 Jul 94	CJCS Introduces Czech President Vaclav Havel
7 Jul 94	Remarks to the White House Fellows
13 Jul 94	**DoD press briefing on downing of U.S. helicopters over Iraq, Press Briefing Room, The Pentagon, Washington, DC**
14 Jul 94	Dutch CHOD — GEN Van der Vlis
20 Jul 94	Remarks to the Joint and Combined Warfighting School Students
22 Jul 94	White House briefing on Rwanda refugee situation, White House, Washington, DC
22 Jul 94	Interview with MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour (WETA), WETA Studio, Arlington, Virginia
24 Jul 94	ABC "This Week with David Brinkley," Washington, DC
25 Jul 94	Remarks at dedication of the General Colin L. Powell, USA (Ret) panel in the CJCS corridor, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
28 Jul 94	Interview with Pentagon print reporters, Chairman's Office, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
28 Jul 94	Remarks at the Navy Summer Pageant
29 Jul 94	Remarks to CAPSTONE, Washington, DC
29 Jul 94	White House Special Briefing on Rwanda, The White House, Washington, DC
1 Aug 94	**USCINCPAC Change of Command, Hickam AFB, Honolulu, Hawaii**
4 Aug 94	**Remarks at NSIA/ADPA Luncheon, Crystal City, Arlington, Virginia**
4 Aug 94	Congressional Testimony, House Appropriations Committee, Rwanda, Washington, DC
5 Aug 94	**USCENTCOM Change of Command, MacDill AFB, Florida**
11 Aug 94	Congressional Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, Chemical Weapon Convention, Washington, DC
17 Aug 94	Chinese GEN Ku
24 Aug 94	**Remarks to Jewish War Veterans of the USA, 99th Annual National Convention, Grand Kempinski, Dallas, Texas**

24 Aug 94	**Remarks to combined Navy League/AUSA/AMA/AFA/Air Power Council Dinner, Fort Worth Club, Fort Worth, Texas**
30 Aug 94	*USA Today* Editorial Board
1 Sep 94	Remarks to AUSA Land Warfare Forum breakfast, Ritz Carlton, Pentagon City, Arlington, Virginia
13 Sep 94	**USSPACECOM Change of Command Ceremony, Colorado Springs, Colorado**
15 Sep 94	CINCs Conference Dinner
18 Sep 94	NBC News "Meet the Press," NBC Studio, Washington, DC
18 Sep 94	White House Special Briefing regarding agreement reached in Haiti, White House Briefing Room, The White House, Washington, DC
19 Sep 94	CNN interview, "Show Down in Haiti," The Pentagon, Washington, DC
20 Sep 94	ABC "Good Morning America," The Pentagon, Washington, DC
20 Sep 94	NBC "Today Show," The Pentagon, Washington, DC
20 Sep 94	White House briefing, The White House Briefing Room, The White House, Washington, DC
20 Sep 94	ABC "Nightline," ABC-TV Studio, Washington, DC
24 Sep 94	News Conference, Port-au-Prince, Haiti
25 Sep 94	CBS "Face the Nation," CBS Studio, Washington, DC
26 Sep 94	Remarks to CAPSTONE, Washington, DC
26 Sep 94	Remarks at National Defense University Assumption of Command, Washington, DC
26 Sep 94	Recipient of Polish-American Man of the Year Award
26 Sep 94	Remarks, THIS
26 Sep 94	**Remarks, The Retired Officers' Association Dinner, Cincinnati, Ohio**
28 Sep 94	Indian CHOD — GEN Joshi
4 Oct 94	**DoD News Briefing regarding Haiti, The Pentagon, Washington, DC**
4 Oct 94	Remarks at the Joint Warfighting Center
5 Oct 94	Korean CHOD — GEN Lee
11 Oct 94	**DoD News Briefing regarding Kuwait, The Pentagon, Washington, DC**
12 Oct 94	Dinner in honor of CJCS hosted by Canadian Ambassador Chretien

13 Oct 94 Dinner and Award in honor of CJCS hosted by GEN Naumann

14 Oct 94 **Remarks, Gulf Coast Chamber of Commerce, Gulfport, Mississippi**

20 Oct 94 **50th Anniversary of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Hill 120 flag raising ceremony, Philippine Islands**

22 Oct 94 **Philippine WW II Memorial, Philippine Islands**

9 Nov 94 **Fuehrungsakademie (German General Staff College), Hamburg, Germany**

14 Nov 94 DoD Special Briefing on Quality of life initiatives for the military, The Pentagon, Washington, DC

16 Nov 94 **Georgetown Institute of Foreign Service, IDEN Lecture, Georgetown University, Washington, DC**

19 Nov 94 **Capital Cannoneers Chapter Ball, U.S. Field Artillery Association, Sheraton National Hotel, Arlington, Virginia**

30 Nov 94 **National Military Family Association Annual Luncheon, Sheraton National Hotel, Arlington, Virginia**

1 Dec 94 1994 USO Christmas Celebration, The Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, DC

15 Dec 94 **50th Anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge, St. Louis, Missouri**

1995

25 Jan 95 Congressional Testimony, House Appropriations Committee, National Security Subcommittee, On-Going Defense Operations, Washington, DC

27 Jan 95 Congressional Testimony, House National Security Committee, National Security Revitalization Act, Washington, DC

27 Jan 95 Remarks at Bradley University Alumni Chapter, Sardi's, New York, New York

1 Feb 95 CJCS introduces POTUS during CINC's Conference, The Pentagon, Washington, DC

1 Feb 95 Statement for media during CINC's Conference, The Pentagon, Washington, DC

8 Feb 95 **Congressional Testimony, House Committee on National Security, Annual Posture Statement, Washington, DC**

9 Feb 95 Congressional Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, DoD Authorization Requests for FY96, Washington, DC

10 Feb 95 Congressional Testimony, Senate Budget Committee, DoD Authorization Requests for FY96, Washington, DC

16 Feb 95 Haiti Awards Ceremony, Fort Drum, New York

17 Feb 95 Salute to African-American WW II veterans, Constitution Hall, Washington, DC

22 Feb 95	Larry King Live, CNN Studio, Washington, DC
28 Feb 95	Defense Writer's Group Breakfast, Washington, DC
Feb 95	***The Officer*** **Magazine, "The Guard, The Reserve, and The 21st Century"**
1 Mar 95	Testimony before the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, Washington, DC
1 Mar 95	**Congressional Testimony, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, START II, Washington, DC**
6 Mar 95	Press conference, The American Embassy, Brasilia, Brazil
7 Mar 95	**Remarks at the Superior War School, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil**
10 Mar 95	Press conference, Alvear Palace Hotel, Buenos Aires, Brazil
7 Apr 95	**Remarks at the Lancers Boys' Club, Baltimore, Maryland**
8 Apr 95	Remarks at the "Link-up at the Elbe" Commemoration, Arlington Cemetery, Washington, DC
12 Apr 95	Remarks, George C. Marshall ROTC Awards Seminar, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia
17 Apr 95	Remarks, Rotary Club, Atlanta, Georgia
2 May 95	Remarks, Wreath-laying and Commemorative Ceremony, 50th Anniversary of the Liberation of the Netherlands, Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia
4 May 95	**Remarks, Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, George Washington University, Washington, DC**
8 May 95	Remarks, National V-E Commemoration, Summerall Field, Fort Myer, Virginia
8 May 95	Remarks, V-E Day Commemoration, USS Intrepid, New York City, New York
9 May 95	Remarks, Annual Conference of Logistics Directors, (COLD 95), Leesburg, Virginia
9 May 95	Remarks, Joint Civilian Orientation Conference, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
11 May 95	**Remarks, Town Hall of California, Los Angeles, California**
13 May 95	Remarks, 1995 Commencement, Washington State University, Pullman, Washington
21 May 95	Remarks, Lucius Clay Award Ceremony, Wurzburg, Germany
25 May 95	Press Conference, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
4 Jun 95	**"This Week with David Brinkley," Remote Interview from Vienna, Austria**
7 Jun 95	**Congressional Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Involvement in Bosnia, Washington, DC**

7 Jun 95	Congressional Testimony, House National Security Committee, U.S. Policy in Bosnia, Washington, DC
12 Jun 95	Tribute to the rescue of Captain Scott O'Grady, River Entrance, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
13 Jun 95	Remarks, Memorial Service for Former SECDEF Les Aspin, Washington, DC
14 Jun 95	Congressional Testimony, House Appropriations Committee, National Security Subcommittee, Contingency Operations, Washington DC
16 Jun 95	**Remarks, Naval War College Graduation, Newport, Rhode Island**
28 Jun 95	Press Conference, American Embassy, London, England
11 Jul 95	Congressional Testimony, House National Security Committee, Downing of U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighter Over Bosnia, Washington, DC
15 Jul 95	American Council for Polish Culture, Aladdin Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada
19 Jul 95	Remarks, en route from Washington DC to London, Bosnia situation
28 Jul 95	Korean War Veterans Muster, The Washington Mall, Washington, DC
3 Aug 95	Interview with Internal Service Correspondents, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
18 Aug 95	Media Remarks, Exercise COOPERATIVE NUGGET, Fort Polk, Louisiana
18 Aug 95	ABC "Nightline" Interview, Exercise COOPERATIVE NUGGET, Fort Polk, Louisiana
Summer 95	***Joint Force Quarterly* Magazine, "A Word from the Chairman"**
19 Aug 95	Press Statement, Accident involving U.S. delegation in Bosnia
2 Sep 95	Remarks, Commemoration of V-J Day, Hawaii
6 Sep 95	**Remarks, Annual Convention of the American Legion, Indianapolis, Indiana**
14 Sep 95	**Speech, Marshall Center, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany**
21 Sep 95	**Congressional Testimony, Re-nomination for Second Term as CJCS, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC**
22 Sep 95	Remarks, American Red Cross WW II Commemoration Ceremony, Red Cross Headquarters, Washington, DC
25 Sep 95	Remarks, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Prague, Czech Republic
27 Sep 95	Press Conference, PFP/NATO Study, Budapest, Hungary
28 Sep 95	Statement, meeting with President Lech Walesa, Warsaw, Poland
29 Sep 95	**Remarks, Polish National Defense Academy, Remberton, Poland**

29 Sep 95	Q&A session, Polish National Defense Academy, Remberton, Poland
29 Sep 95	Press Conference, Warsaw, Poland
29 Sep 95	Senate Armed Services Committee voting on re-nomination of CJCS
11 Oct 95	Remarks, presentation of Award for Excellence in Military Medicine, Washington, DC
17 Oct 95	Congressional Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, Peace Process in Bosnia, Washington, DC
17 Oct 95	Congressional Testimony, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Peace Process in Bosnia, Washington, DC
18 Oct 95	Congressional Testimony, House International Relations Committee, Peace Process in Bosnia, Washington, DC
17 Nov 95	**German Federal Armed Forces Commanders' Conference, Munich, Germany**
27 Nov 95	Press Conference, Brussels, Belgium
30 Nov 95	Congressional Testimony, House International Relations Committee, U.S. Policy toward Bosnia, Washington, DC
30 Nov 95	Congressional Testimony, House National Security Committee, Bosnia Peacekeeping Operation, Washington, DC
Nov 95	***Armed Forces Journal International*** **Magazine, "Editorial"**
1 Dec 95	Congressional Testimony, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Ground Forces in Bosnia, Washington, DC
1 Dec 95	Congressional Testimony, Senate Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, DC
3 Dec 95	CBS "Face the Nation," with Bob Schieffer, U.S. Involvement in Bosnia, Washington, DC
3 Dec 95	CNN "Late Edition," U.S. Involvement in Bosnia, CNN Studio, Washington, DC
6 Dec 95	Congressional Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, Deployment of U.S. Troops to Bosnia, Washington, DC
21 Dec 95	Press Briefing, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR and U.S. Participation in Bosnia Peacekeeping, The Pentagon Press Briefing Room, Washington, DC
21 Dec 95	CNN World News
22 Dec 95	Remarks, ABC "Good Morning America" and CBS "This Morning"

1996

1 Jan 96	Interview en route to Aviano Air Base, Italy

2 Jan 96	Media Remarks, Aviano Air Base, Italy
2 Jan 96	Press Conference, Taszar Air Base, Hungary
3 Jan 96	Press Conference, Tuzla Air Base, Bosnia
5 Jan 96	Interview with Jim Lehrer News Hour, PBS Studio, Arlington, Virginia
1 Feb 96	National Prayer Breakfast, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC
8 Feb 96	Press Conference with General Dumitru Cioflina, Chief of the Romanian General Staff, Bucharest, Romania
8 Feb 96	**Academy of Higher Military Studies, Bucharest, Romania**
13 Feb 96	USPACOM Assumption of Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii
15 Feb 96	Defense Writer's Group, ANA Westin Hotel, Washington, DC
5 Mar 96	**Congressional Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, Annual Posture Statement, Washington, DC**
6 Mar 96	Congressional testimony, House National Security Committee, FY 1997 Defense Authorization Request, Washington, DC
7 Mar 96	Congressional testimony — continued, House National Security Committee, FY 1997 Defense Authorization Request, Washington, DC
12 Mar 96	Ceremony for U.S. participation in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Fort Polk, Louisiana
19 Mar 96	**Remarks, Electronic Industry Association, J.W. Marriott, Washington, DC**
23 Mar 96	Foreign Joint Services NCO Association 20th Anniversary Ball, Fort Myer, Virginia
28 Mar 96	**Congressional Testimony, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Chemical Weapons Convention, Washington, DC**
Spring 96	***Joint Force Quarterly* Magazine, "A Word from the Chairman"**
4 Apr 96	**Remarks, World Affairs Council of Boston, Boston, Massachusetts**
9 Apr 96	Press Conference, Cheyenne, Wyoming
10 Apr 96	Purdue University ROTC Convocation, West Lafayette, Indiana
23 Apr 96	Press Conference, U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels, Belgium
25 Apr 96	Press Conference, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina
10 May 96	CARE 50th Anniversary Symposium, French Embassy, Washington, DC
13 May 96	Press Conference, Singapore

18 May 96	Armed Forces Day Banquet, Albuquerque, New Mexico
21 May 96	Eulogy for Admiral Boorda, National Cathedral, Washington, DC
24 May 96	**United States Naval Academy Graduation, Annapolis, Maryland**
27 May 96	Press Conference, Kuwait
31 May 96	Media availability, Marka Airport, Amman, Jordan
12 Jun 96	News Briefing, Oslo, Norway
18 Jun 96	Center for the Study of the Presidency, J.W. Marriott, Washington, DC
27 Jun 96	Arrival of victims of Dhahran bombing, Dover AFB, Delaware
12 Jul 96	Farewell Ceremony for Senator Nunn, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
5 Sep 96	AUSA Land Warfare Breakfast, Crystal City Marriott, Arlington, Virginia
5 Sep 96	NBC "Meet the Press" with host Tim Russert, Washington, DC
11 Sep 96	Press Conference, Holiday Inn, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina
15 Sep 96	ABC "This Week with David Brinkley," Washington, DC
16 Sep 96	DoD Special Briefing, Force Protection Issues of Khobar Towers Bombing, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
17 Sep 96	**Speech, Constitution/Citizenship Day, National Archives, Washington, DC**
18 Sep 96	**Congressional Testimony, House National Security Committee, General Downing Report on Khobar Towers, Washington, DC**
18 Sep 96	Congressional Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, General Downing Report on Khobar Towers, Washington, DC
27 Sep 96	Remarks upon receiving Grand Cross of Military Merit, Lisbon, Portugal
27 Sep 96	Press Conference, Lisbon, Portugal
27 Sep 96	"Radio Nova" Interview, Lisbon, Portugal
3 Oct 96	Congressional Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Troops in Bosnia, Washington, DC
5 Nov 96	Press Conference, Moscow, Russia
7 Nov 96	**Speech, Council on Foreign Relations, Pratt House, New York, New York**
9 Nov 96	Christening of USS Decatur (DDG73), Bath, Maine
11 Nov 96	Veterans Day Appearance on CBS "This Morning"

11 Nov 96	Veterans Day Appearance on ABC "Good Morning America"
11 Nov 96	Veterans Day Appearance on NBC "Today"
11 Nov 96	Veterans Day Appearance on CNN "Early Edition"
13 Nov 96	Joint Armed Forces Officer's Wives Luncheon, Ritz-Carlton, Pentagon City, Arlington, Virginia
15 Nov 96	DoD News Briefing, Bosnia Follow-on Force, The Pentagon, Washington, DC
3 Dec 96	**National Defense University, Goldwater-Nichols Symposium, Washington, DC**
1 Dec 96	USA Today International Newsmaker Breakfast, Rosslyn, Virginia

1997

6 Jan 97	Press Conference, Presidential Palace, Cairo, Egypt
14 Jan 97	Farewell Ceremony, departing SECDEF William Perry, Fort Myer, Virginia
19 Jan 97	**Medal of Honor Society, Arlington, Virginia**
22 Jan 97	**West Point Society, Washington DC Chapter**
7 Feb 97	**Defense Special Weapons Agency 50th Anniversary Symposium, McLean, Virginia**
12 Feb 97	**Congressional Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, Annual Posture Statement, Washington, DC**
12 Feb 97	Congressional Testimony, House National Security Committee, Annual Posture Statement, Washington, DC
19 Feb 97	Creve Coeur, George Washington's Birthday Banquet, Peoria Convention Center, Peoria, Illinois
21 Feb 97	**97TH Battle Standard Dinner, U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York**
26 Feb 97	Congressional Testimony, House National Security Committee, Appropriations Subcommittee, Washington, DC
Winter 96-97	***Joint Force Quarterly* Magazine, "A Word from the Chairman"**
15 Mar 97	**Salute to the Military, Coronado, California**
26 Feb 97	The Kennedy Political Union, American University, Washington, DC
12 Apr 97	DoD News Briefing, Chemical Weapons Convention
17 Apr 97	White House press event, Chemical Weapons Convention
14 May 97	**Remarks, China Defense University, Beijing, China**
18 May 97	**Commencement Address, Harvey Mudd College, Claremont, California**

19 May 97 PBS Lehrer News Hour, Arlington, Virginia

20 May 97 Fox Morning News, The Pentagon, Washington, DC

20 May 97 **Congressional Testimony, Senate Armed Services Committee, Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC**

24 May 97 **Remarks, Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors (TAPS), Washington, DC**

27 May 97 **Conference of Presidents of Jewish Organizations, New York, New York**

10 Jun 97 Heidelberg High School Commencement, Stadthalle, Heidelberg, Germany

14 Jun 97 Interview — Professor Gordon Rudd

16 Jun 97 Interview on NATO enlargement — USA Today, Defense News, Jane's

18 Jun 97 Media Availability, USTRANSCOM, Scott AFB, Illinois

30 Jun 97 Remarks, Retirement Ceremony DEPSECDEF John White

2 Jul 97 Visit, COOPERATIVE NUGGET 97, Fort Polk, Louisiana

6 Jul 97 CNN "Late Edition" with Frank Sesno

9 Jul 97 Press availability, The Hague, Netherlands

10 Jul 97 EUCOM Change of Command

11 Jul 97 SHAPE Change of Command

13 Jul 97 USSOUTHCOM Relinquishment of Command

18 Jul 97 Retirement Ceremony, General George Joulwan

22 Jul 97 **Remarks, Brazilian War College, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil**

31 Jul 97 Press briefing, Accountability Report, Khobar Towers Bombing

6 Aug 97 Georgia Press Conference, U.S. Embassy, Tbilisi

7 Aug 97 Interview with Christine Amanpour, Tuzla, Herzegovina

11 Aug 97 Interview — Armed Forces Information Network

18 Aug 97 **Speech, VFW Convention, Salt Lake City, Utah**

3 Sep 97 **Speech, American Legion Convention, Orlando, Florida**

4 Sep 97 Remarks, Great Cross of Poland Award, Polish Embassy, Washington DC

8 Sep 97 Washington DC Eagle Scout Dinner

9-18 Sep 97	Fall CHOD Tour — Canada & USA
18 Sep 97	Army Farewell Ceremony, Fort Myer, Virginia
22 Sep 97	Enlisted Farewell, The Pentagon courtyard, Washington, DC
24 Sep 97	Congressional Farewell Reception in honor of CJCS
24 Sep 97	Speech, National Press Club
25 Sep 97	SOCOM Change of Command
26 Sep 97	Zach Fischer Birthday
Autumn/ Winter 97	***Joint Force Quarterly*** **Magazine, "A Word from the Chairman" (Farewell)**
30 Sep 97	**Farewell Ceremony – Fort Myer, Virginia**

Appendix B

Yearly Summaries

1993

General John M. Shalikashvili assumed the position of the 13th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 25 October 1993.

General Shalikashvili took the reins of the uniformed military as President Clinton was completing his first year as the Commander in Chief. The prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs* characterized President Clinton's first year as particularly challenging as the administration sought a guiding strategy and a clear sense of national interests; problems that had already led to difficulties in dealing with crises in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti.

The irony of this observation is that these same three crises, together with a number of other key events in 1993, shaped the nature of U.S. military operations for the remainder of General Shalikashvili's tenure. Ten of Facts on File's top news stories for 1993 would in many respects portend the challenges that lay ahead for America's 13th Chairman and highlight the difficulties of policy making in the post-Cold War world.

1. Mideast Peace accord
2. World trade events (North American Free Trade Agreement & General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
3. Turmoil in Russia
4. War in Bosnia-Herzegovina
5. Midwestern U.S. flooding
6. Peacekeeping efforts in Somalia
7. South Africa's transition to multi-racial democracy
8. The Branch Davidian raid in Waco, Texas
9. Terrorism, including the World Trade Center bombing
10. President Clinton's first year

To the list of stories of particular interest, two additional military topics deserve mention to further illustrate the climate under which General Shalikashvili assumed his new role. These were: Secretary Aspin's completion of the much awaited Defense strategy known as the Bottom Up Review; and the Presidential decision on gays and lesbians in the military, referred to as the "don't ask-don't tell" rule.

Although the challenges of operations in Bosnia, the emerging terrorist threat to the United States, and the re-emergence of crises in Africa would occupy much of the Chairman's time in years to come, it is useful to consider the immediate topics of interest as he prepared to assume the role of principal military adviser to the President.

It is enlightening to note that in President Clinton's nomination remarks on 11 August 1993, he selected General Shalikashvili, among other reasons, because he was a "leader in persuading NATO to consider missions outside traditional alliance boundaries." Reporters asked General Shalikashvili questions regarding the potential for U.S. military action in Bosnia and his views on inviting both Ukraine and Russia into NATO. In retrospect, both the President's remarks and the reporters' questions hit on key events of the two subsequent years: NATO's first out of area operation in Bosnia and NATO expansion.

General Shalikashvili completed 1993 and his first two months as Chairman with visits to forces stationed in Korea and Somalia. Press conferences following these visits as well as his first and most comprehensive press conference in the Pentagon on 14 December 1993, illustrated his thoughts on the challenge of North Korea, NATO's Partnership for Peace program, jointness, and his sincere commitment to quality of life issues for America's forces.

1994

This marked the first full year of General Shalikashvili's tenure. The Worldnet interview included as the first transcript summarizes the key themes for the year fairly well. Occurring on the eve of a trip to NATO summit, the Chairman stated that this summit would be particularly important " ... because of continuing questions about the relevance of the alliance and the alliance's ability to deal with those nagging security issues that plague Europe." His comment echoed the thoughts emerging in many editorial pieces in both the U.S. and Europe. The anxiety of both the Czech and Polish reporters is clearly evident in the Chairman's first interview of 1994 as he responds to questions about NATO expansion and the Partnership for Peace Program. Shortly after this interview he left for Eastern Europe with Ambassador Albright to discuss security issues with a number of nations.

1994 was also a time of growing frustration over the situation in Bosnia. In spite of U.N. efforts to temper hostilities, it was becoming clear their efforts were largely ineffective. Questions regarding the introduction of NATO forces, the use of airpower to attack heavy weapons, and the possible introduction of U.S. ground forces peppered many of the Chairman's press briefings and interviews. NATO eventually assumed operational control of the mission and issued an ultimatum on heavy weapons and by April, the Chairman was suggesting the U.S. should prepare for the introduction of forces.

During 1994, DoD was not preoccupied exclusively with European affairs. A number of other significant events transpired that demanded U.S. attention, either in a primary or supporting military role. The following are ten of 1994's top stories, according to Facts on File.

1. Mid-East Peace Process
2. War in Bosnia-Herzegovina
3. Haitian President Aristide returned to power
4. South African election; Nelson Mandela becomes President
5. Republicans win control of the U.S. Congress
6. Civil war in Rwanda
7. Arrest and trial of O.J. Simpson
8. World trade; NAFTA and GATT
9. Russia invades Chechnya
10. Peace process in Northern Ireland

The Middle East remained an area of concern during 1994, not only because the potential for a peace settlement was slowly emerging, but also because Saddam Hussein began massing forces for a potential push into Kuwait. Also in the Middle East, a tragedy unfolded as two American F-15s patrolling the northern no-fly zone shot down two American helicopters. The Chairman's comments following release of the accident report are included (13 Jul 94).

The missions in Iraq and Bosnia contributed to the continuing U.S. debate over the appropriate use of force in the growing number of smaller scale contingencies and humanitarian missions. The Chairman's most complete thoughts on the use of force are found in his address to the Jewish Institute for National Security affairs (4 Apr 94).

In Africa, the civil war in Rwanda necessitated relief to thousands of refugees, while elsewhere in Somalia, U.S. relief efforts ceased and other U.N. nations assumed control of the operation.

Closer to home, a military coup led by General Cedras in Haiti overthrew the lawful government. The U.S. initiated an aggressive diplomatic campaign to convince Cedras to reinstate President Aristide, but only when it became clear that U.S. forces were prepared to restore democracy did Cedras step down.

Finally, in one of the last statements of the year (9 Nov 94), the CJCS outlines what he believes are the three challenges faced by America's military: 1) taking a long view of the future; 2) preparing our forces for the next century; and 3) the challenge of how to deal with the growth of these operations like peacekeeping and humanitarian missions that fall in the crack between peace and war. These thoughts materialized again in 1997 as important parts of the Quadrennial Defense Review.

1995

1995 was a defining year for General Shalikashvili because several key events occurred whose impacts shaped the remainder of his tenure. Foremost among these was the decision by NATO to assume control of operations in Bosnia to stop the indiscriminate killing of noncombatants and create a suitable environment for civilian initiatives to take hold. Despite the risk of retaliation, NATO forces also conducted airstrikes against Bosnian Serb military targets because the Serbs failed to respond to an ultimatum to stop cease firing heavy weapons and to return heavy weapons to the Weapons Control Point (7 Jun 95). An F-16 patrolling the no-fly zone was shot down by a Bosnian Serb SA-6 surface-to-air missile; the pilot, Air Force Captain Scott O'Grady, evaded capture for several days and was rescued by a search and rescue team.

The introduction of U.S. forces into Bosnia as part of IFOR, the Implementation Force, was a controversial decision that caused many debates in the United States. Envisioned as a one-year mission, NATO forces rapidly achieved their military mission only to find civilian progress lagging. In December, The Dayton Peace Accord was signed and was historic because negotiations included not just diplomats, but also those who would be charged with implementing the military aspects of the agreement in Bosnia. The Chairman stated that anything less than a total commitment to compliance with the terms of the agreement by Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Serbs would stall the peace process. However, the slow pace of implementing civilian reform programs forced the administration to extend the stay of U.S. forces in Bosnia.

Several of Facts on File's top news stories of 1995 highlight the continuing challenges at home and abroad.

1. War and Peace in Bosnia
2. Oklahoma City bombing
3. O.J. Simpson acquitted
4. Yitzhak Rabin assassinated
5. Co-leaders of Cali drug cartel arrested in Colombia
6. Kobe earthquake
7. Mid-East peace process
8. 50th Anniversary of the United Nations
9. Russia's battles with Chechen rebels
10. Nerve gas attack in Japanese subways

Two of the top ten news items related to terrorist acts. The tragic bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the use of chemical agents against civilians in the Japanese subway system by a religious sect signaled an increase in worldwide terrorist activity. The following year, the Chairman would focus the entire Joint Staff and the Services on this critical issue and recommend new force protection initiatives as a result of further attacks on U.S. citizens.

General Shalikashvili continued to stress the realistic need for a two MRC size force, and the importance of balancing military capability without negatively impacting modernization and readiness. The latitude the military once enjoyed in budget, personnel, and planning had been eliminated through systematic downsizing of all the Services. He also articulated the need for the United States to maintain its role of international leadership, to be selective in which global impact conflicts the military becomes involved in, and to protect the unequaled excellence of our Armed Forces. He continued to champion for quality of life enhancements as a means of retaining troops.

The fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II was celebrated around the world, and these thoughts punctuated many of the Chairman's appearances. NATO expansion was another widely discussed topic. Key points in the Chairman's discussions were building the future on three pillars: democracy; stability; and security. He noted the challenges of creating and maintaining political and economic stability in Central Europe, Russia, NATO, and the Partnership for Peace countries were the same as Western Europe faced in the aftermath of World War II (29 Sep 95). European visits, especially to Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, underscored American commitment to orderly NATO expansion.

Also, General Shalikashvili was re-nominated and confirmed for a second term as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1996

Worldwide terrorism proceeded at a new level of sophistication, destructiveness, and determination in 1996, including the bombing of Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 American airmen. Force protection issues were raised frequently, as numerous deployments continued. Also, the bombing at Olympic Park during the Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta temporarily raised personal safety concerns.

In Bosnia, military operations in conjunction with the Dayton Peace Accord were prosecuted by IFOR, which successfully operated under robust rules of engagement and a straightforward chain of command. When the one-year period for its existence ended in December, IFOR was replaced by 31,000 NATO troops comprising the Stabilization Force (SFOR).

While some leaders around the world strengthened their positions, there were many substantial changes that shaped the rest of General Shalikashvili's tenure. President Clinton's reelection combined with Yeltsin's victory in a formal election and Netanyahu's election heightened each one's power and defined our interactions within their spheres of influence. Kofi Annan was elected Secretary General of the United Nations after the United States blocked the reelection of Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Also, on a tragic note, Admiral Boorda, the Chief of Naval Operations, committed suicide.

Ten of 1996's top stories, according to Facts on File, are listed below.

1. President Clinton reelected; Republicans maintain control of both chambers of Congress
2. Boris Yeltsin wins Russian presidential elections
3. Bosnian collective presidency established
4. Benjamin Netanyahu elected Israeli Prime Minister; vows to slow peace process
5. Lebed works out agreement to end 21-month long conflict in Chechnya; fired two months later by Yeltsin
6. Cuba shot down two unarmed planes belonging to Cuban exile group in waters between U.S. and Cuba
7. TWA Flight 800 airline crash
8. Khobar Towers bombing
9. Whitewater probe continues
10. Leftists in Peru stormed the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima, taking over 600 hostages

The Chairman stressed maintaining the high levels of readiness and operations tempo were beginning to show an effect on the forces of the future, that modernization expenditures had decreased and slowed purchases of replacement equipment and development of new systems. In addition, General Shalikashvili continued to stress the importance of remaining the world's foremost leader in international affairs. The need for a strong defense, especially a two MRC sized force, was reiterated in several of his appearances. American forces were prepared to meet the terms of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) which was ratified by the Senate; but as of 1998, the Russians have not ratified it.

Joint Vision 2010 was released this year. This document provided an operationally based framework for the further development of the U.S. Armed Forces. *JV 2010*'s objective was to build a road map to achieve Full Spectrum Dominance by leveraging high quality forces and force structure with leading edge technology to attain better command, control, and intelligence. Using the power of the people, the technology, and improved command, control, and intelligence, four new operational concepts were implemented from which future military requirements can be derived: dominant maneuver; precision strike; full dimensional protection; and focused logistics. These operational concepts were created to focus the strengths of the Services and guide the evolution of joint doctrine, education, and training to bring the U.S. military Full Spectrum Dominance.

1997

In many ways, the challenges General Shalikashvili faced during his final year as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, mirrored the previous years'. Troops were deployed in combat zones and humanitarian assistance missions around the world in areas such as the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Korea; these efforts continued to be in the news and at the forefront of military planning and operations.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), completed and presented to Congress (20 May 97), assessed the entire spectrum of anticipated operations, from specific tasks, through small-scale contingencies, to major theater wars. Using a broad array of analytical tools, including seminars, wargames, computer modeling, and intensive sessions with senior military and civilian leaders, the demands on the forces were carefully evaluated over a four-month period. Force structure, end strength, readiness, and modernization were key areas of discussion by the Department of Defense and Joint Staff, Service Chiefs, combatant commanders, and their staffs. *Joint Vision 2010* served as the unifying vision for determining future needs for the entire total force. In his testimony, the Chairman stressed the ability to move to a leaner force by reorganizing headquarters, trimming support functions, improving the ability to manage operations and personnel tempo, re-aligning reserve forces, and additional base closures.

The Chairman, as in previous years, was keenly aware of operations and personnel tempo issues and frequently spoke about the need and the cost of maintaining the high levels of readiness demanded by the often unstable world climate. He also continued to praise the quality, efforts, and dedication of the troops and campaign for increases in quality of life. Concerns about recruiting and retaining quality officers and enlisted members began to surface.

Facts on File's top stories for 1997 contain many areas of concern in the world environment.

1. Diana, Princess of Wales, dies in automobile crash
2. China regains sovereignty over Hong Kong
3. Pathfinder, an unmanned U.S. spacecraft, landed on Mars and began transmitting data
4. Iraq refuses to allow U.N. arms-inspection team members access to all sites, expels U.S. members of team
5. Clinton, Congress agree to a balanced federal budget plan, to be complete in 2002
6. Timothy McVeigh convicted of murder for masterminding Oklahoma City bombing, sentenced to death
7. Labour Party installs Tony Blair as Prime Minister of England
8. Asian economic woes affect world stock markets
9. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic invited to join NATO
10. Israeli-Palestinian talks at an impasse again

The masterful leadership during the post-Cold War transition period of the 13th Chairman shows his insight into the challenges of preparing a military for a future wrought with new demands and uncertainty. The impetus behind *Joint Vision 2010*, General Shali helped shape the joint operational concepts and the military forces for today and for the foreseeable future.

General Shalikashvili's legacy as a leader, commander, and Chairman is his dedication to people and the principles of democracy, freedom, and patriotism. He survived a war-torn childhood in Poland and immigrated to the United States. He quickly assimilated into his adopted home, completed school, graduated from Bradley University, became an American citizen, and then was called to serve in the Army. He rose from the rank of private to four-star general, and ultimately held the position of the highest-ranking military member in the Department of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His farewell remarks, shaped by his 39-year career, echo these sentiments (30 Sep 97).

Appendix C

Major Military Operations, 1993–1997

OPERATION NAME	DESCRIPTION
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai monitoring provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty
PROVIDE COMFORT	Humanitarian assistance to Iraqi Kurds
PROVIDE PROMISE	Joint/Combined operation to support humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina
SOUTHERN WATCH	Coalition force enforcement of the no-fly zone in southern Iraq
RESTORE HOPE	Establish security to facilitate humanitarian relief in Somalia
MARITIME GUARD	Enforcement of the United Nations sanctioned embargo against the former Yugoslavia
CONTINUE HOPE	Conducted under U.N. auspices to continue humanitarian relief to Somalia
DENY FLIGHT & DELIBERATE GUARD	Enforcement of the U.N. sanctioned no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina
SHARP GUARD	Enforcement of U.N. sanctioned embargo against the former Yugoslavia conducted in conjunction with Western European Union Forces
ABLE SENTRY	Combined/U.N. operation to observe sanctions violations along Serbian-Macedonian border
ABLE MANNER	Rescue of boat people off of Haiti
SUPPORT DEMOCRACY	Maritime interdiction of arms and oil off the cost of Haiti
DISTANT RUNNER	Evacuation of U.S. and Belgian noncombatants from Rwanda
SEA SIGNAL	JTF-160 established to support Haitian and Cuban migrant operations in Guantanamo, Cuba
SUPPORT HOPE	Humanitarian relief support operations to assist Rwandan refugees
ARABIAN GULF MIO	Enforcement of U.N. sanctions against Iraqi oil exports
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY	Multinational operation to restore democratically elected government in Haiti
SAFE HAVEN	Joint humanitarian Cuban migrant operations in Panama
VIGILANT WARRIOR	Defense of Kuwait against renewed Iraqi threat
UNITED SHIELD	Security support for withdrawal of U.N. Forces from Somalia
SAFE PASSAGE	Transfer of Cuban migrants from Operation SAFE HAVEN camps in Panama to Guantanamo, Cuba
SAFE BORDER	U.S. participation in the six-nation Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru to monitor the border
VIGILANT SENTINEL	U.S. strategic show of force operations in CENTCOM AOR to deter potential Iraqi aggressions
DELIBERATE FORCE	NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets
GREEN CLOVER	Counternarcotics surge operations in South America
DETERMINED GUARD	Combined maritime operation in support of Operation Joint Guard in Bosnia
JOINT GUARD	NATO stabilization force in Bosnia
LASER STRIKE	Counternarcotics surge operations in South America
ASSURED RESPONSE	Embassy security and noncombatant evacuation in Liberia
QUICK RESPONSE	Embassy security and noncombatant evacuation in Central African Republic
DESERT FOCUS	Relocation of U.S. service personnel and operations in Saudi Arabia
DESERT STRIKE	Missile strikes in response to Iraq's aggression against northern Kurds
PACIFIC HAVEN	Humanitarian assistance to Kurdish evacuees from Iraq to Guam
NORTHERN WATCH	Combined task force to enforce the no-fly zone in northern Iraq
SILVER WAKE	Embassy security and noncombatant evacuation in Albania
NOBLE OBELISK	Noncombatant evacuation in Sierra Leone