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A great author, Victor Hugo, once said, "The future has several names. For the weak it is the impossible. For the fainthearted it is the unknown. For the thoughtful and valiant it is the ideal."

And as I stand here with you today, I am struck by the enormity of your courage as a nation and as a people. Just seven short years ago, you were a nation bound by the chains of oppression, and the world watched as you broke those chains and you marched forth into the future. For Romania, the future was never the impossible, never the unknown.

And today, Romania and all of Europe stands on the brink of a new era, an era of democracy, prosperity, and security. And if we manage the process well, if the right decisions are made, if we refuse to be sidetracked along our way, we can forge a future for our children and theirs that will be so much safer and so much brighter than the past that we are leaving behind.

For 45 years, Europe was like a dry forest during a long hot summer. Had someone been foolish enough to light a match the fire would have consumed the entire world.

Today's Europe is no longer dry and brittle, but vibrant and fertile. And today we have a rare and precious opportunity to create a new Europe, to weave together the entire tapestry of European nations.

I am convinced that we are already on the right path to accomplish this vision. And I am convinced that you here today and the people of Romania, have an important role to play if we are to get there. And it is that that I would like to spend the next few minutes discussing with you before I answer your questions.

The path ahead must be built on three pillars: the pillars of democracy; stability; and security. These are the three pillars upon which Western Europe was raised from the ashes of the Second World War, they are the very basis of the integration enjoyed in the West, and they are the three pillars which we must extend to support all of Europe.

If you look at the NATO alliance today, what is most striking is not just that our alliance has survived intact for so extraordinarily long, but that every member of the alliance shares one virtue — democracy. It is that single feature that has made this alliance so successful and so enduring.

First, it is one of the peculiarities of history that democracies seem to have a habit of resolving their disputes peacefully. Certainly democracy has brought a longer reign of peace to that part of the continent than ever before. But also the very fact that every NATO nation is a democracy rallies its members to a common moral purpose, a purpose to which they can commit themselves and to each other. So that is one pillar of the future continent, the protection and nurturing of the new democracies that sprang out of the Cold War.

The second pillar is stability. For 45 years we all grew used to one kind of stability. But it was a devilishly dangerous form of stability, one that teetered on a line drawn through the heart of this continent. I know of no nation that wishes to recapture that form of stability. And today as we see the terrible events that have unfolded in the shattered nations on your western border or the fires that have erupted around the borders of the former Soviet Union, these are the evidence that we must build the foundation for future stability.

I know that you and that all Romanians understand how important this is and recognize that ethnic hatreds, whether between two countries or within one state, must be confronted and must be overcome. We all know that when there are ethnic divisions, we can either opt for understanding and go the way of Western Europe or we can choose hatred and go the way of Bosnia.

In part, the road to harmony is also paved by economic progress, for nations that are impoverished are poor gardens in which to grow peace or stability. And the signs of economic progress are already becoming evident, certainly here in Romania and in a number of other reforming economies as well.

But I would caution that no one should expect an instantaneous leap from the inefficiencies and troubles that beset the former communist systems, to become modern prosperous economies. Prosperity in Western Europe was not built in one year or even one decade. It was the work of a generation and could not have been achieved in the absence of peace and stability.

And that leads us to the third pillar that of security. It is the construction of this pillar that depends so heavily on the efforts of you here in this room and others like you in both Europe and America. This was the challenge that was presented to us with the end of the Cold War, to provide a sense of security that enveloped all of Europe.

Our first steps were to reaffirm NATO and to redefine NATO's relationship with Russia. In 1991, NATO's political

leaders met in Rome and they decided on a complete reorientation of the military features of the alliance. The changes made in that Rome conference were more dramatic than any in NATO's history. They were designed to reverse containment, NATO's strategy from the beginning of its existence.

Those changes also provided a fresh foundation for a new relationship between NATO and Russia. You will remember that at the end of the First World War, all of our statesmen made a crucial mistake, a mistake that was terribly repaid only two decades later with the outbreak of another even more catastrophic war. When the terms of peace were created, their minds and emotions were on the past.

When the Second World War ended, Western Europeans did not repeat that mistake. They thought of the future and they built a security structure that integrated their former adversaries. This must be the spirit with which we approach this task: reconciliation towards all, confrontation with none. The Cold War is over and good riddance to it. We must now help all to include Russia, to forge a new more integrated role on this continent. And that requires a special partnership between the alliance and Russia. Hopefully our work together in Bosnia can help pave the way towards that kind of NATO-Russia partnership.

And that, I am convinced, is key to the security of Romania and to the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe as well, for the alternative would be to simply slide the old division of Europe a little bit farther east and to build a new line of confrontation. Certainly I do not think that any of us would wish to see that happen.

Since that meeting in Rome in 1991, the alliance leaders have made equally profound decisions that will bear on the security architecture of this continent. They decided to set in motion the process of enlarging the alliance of accepting new members. Let me be very clear on this point, the alliance will open its doors to new members. Furthermore, the process of expansion will not be made in blocks or groups but rather it will be on a country-by-country basis. And no country outside of NATO shall in any way have a veto in this process. I am well aware of the frustration of those who feel membership should be immediate. However it is important to realize that the reason for the alliance's success has been that each member has developed specific attributes which make it a viable and valuable partner.

For example, all NATO members must be willing and able to defend the alliance. Likewise, they must be willing to seek consensus even on the most difficult issues. Membership also requires that in the development of plans and budgets and in the acquisition of equipment, NATO doctrine and procedures must play an integral role.

And that is where Partnership for Peace comes in. As you know so well, it is through PFP that participants learn the hundreds of standard operating procedures that are a necessary part of successful NATO operations. My host and friend General Cioflina and I both saw first hand how this works when we visited the Cooperative Nugget Exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana. There were many procedural lessons learned from all participants including current NATO members.

But I hardly need mention the importance of the Partnership for Peace to Romania, for you gave it impetus and you have been a valued participant ever since. But it is important for us all to recognize that the Partnership for Peace is far more than a series of exercises.

For 45 years the militaries of the two halves of Europe developed on very different patterns. We evolved different warfighting doctrines and methods of operation. Our weapons systems, our communications systems, nearly every implement of our military forces were designed and built quite intentionally to be different from another.

We stared at one another distrustfully and to the degree that we sought to understand one another, it was through the work of espionage that we learned about each other's plans and capabilities in the event that we might one day have to meet in battle.

The spirit underlying the Partnership for Peace is to eliminate the vestiges of that old distrust and confrontation, to put the past behind us, and through a partnership of the willing, to create together a new future for all of Europe.

Sadly, it is easy enough to show why it is so very vital that we take these actions. If you look back to 1991 when the unraveling of Yugoslavia first began, I think it is clear that we all of us were institutionally unprepared for a challenge of that nature.

Had we been better prepared, had we a universal understanding that our moral and pragmatic sensibilities would eventually demand action, the years since may have been very different. That only underscores how vitally important it is that we expand our ability to work together and to manage common security challenges together.

There is also a vital purpose for the Partnership for Peace, for those of us in our nation's military forces, to be prepared to operate together, to be able to communicate smoothly, to share logistics, to cover each others flanks, and to refuel each other's planes.

All of this is much more than a matter of military exercises. It is the product of ever-enlarging contacts between our forces, of learning new forms of cooperation, and of educating each other about the ways that we operate. It is also a

process of building trust for the Partnership to ensure that no nation feels excluded from having a voice or a role in the future of Europe whether they are a member of NATO or not.

Now, I have probably already spoken too long and I would like to hear about your concerns and questions. But before I close, let me remind you that we should all of us be aware that the new Europe we are building will not be fully realized for some time to come. It will require a decade or more of tending before the same kind of garden that now exists in the west shows its flowers here. But it has certainly taken root here in Romania and it will come.

And I envy you sitting here, for you will be the ones who tend to this growth so that Romania's future children shall know only freedom and liberty and security. And as I look at the faces and into the eyes in this room today there is no doubt in my mind that this will come to pass.

With that I thank you it has been a great pleasure to be with you and I look forward to any questions you may have.

Annual Posture Statement
Washington, DC
5 March 1996

It is a great pleasure and a great honor to be here today representing America's men and women in uniform. It seems that each time I've come before you for these hearings, I've begun my testimony with a description of how very busy the past year has been for our forces and how very well they've performed. Today will be no different.

OPERATIONS

While continuing to reduce our troop strengths, our forces have remained engaged in a sizable number of simultaneous operations spread across the globe. Today, there are approximately 54,000 of our men and women in uniform and around 1,300 defense civilians committed to overseas contingencies. For those who've been deployed for these missions, and for their families, it has been often stressful, arduous and demanding. Yet they have, and they continue, to perform superbly. We owe them our gratitude for, despite an extremely high operations tempo, the readiness of our units and the morale and enthusiasm of the troops have stayed very high. They make it impossible to look back at this year without feeling an enormous sense of pride.

Among the past year's efforts, there were two particularly notable milestones. Two months ago, I attended the formal closing ceremony for Joint Task Force 160 — the same unit that for the previous 20 months handled the refugees that poured out of the dictatorships in Haiti and Cuba; that plucked over 60,000 men, women and children out of the dangerous Caribbean waters; that built 15 huge camps to house, feed, and care for them; and that provided safe and humane conditions until the refugees were either allowed to enter the United States or returned to their homelands. I could not be more proud of the way our men and women performed this long and uniquely difficult mission. They handled these many thousands of refugees with compassion and understanding while administering to their needs with unequaled efficiency. Today, their mission completed, the camps have been closed, and the men and women of the Task Force have returned home.

The other milestone occurred this past month when, for the first time in history, the second democratically-elected President of Haiti took office, and shortly thereafter we began the redeployment of our forces — right on schedule. We entered Haiti in September 1994 with a sound military plan, we followed that plan, and we accomplished all that was asked of us. The rapid introduction of American military forces stopped the cycle of violence, halted the flow of refugees, and created a secure and stable environment which made possible the legislative and Presidential election process. By 31 March 1995, the recruitment and training of a new police force had so stabilized the situation that American forces could be greatly reduced, and the Haitian operation was turned over to the United Nations.

Despite some initial problems, legislative and presidential elections were conducted and, on 7 February, for the first time in Haiti's history, an elected president turned over his office to another freely elected president. While a small United Nations presence will remain in Haiti a while longer, American units will continue to return home and will be out of Haiti by 15 April of this year. All that will remain will be small, periodic, engineer exercises, like those we conduct with a number of our other Southern neighbors.

Starting in December, we became actively engaged in the NATO operation in Bosnia. Over the course of two months, we deployed nearly 20,000 active and reserve military personnel into Bosnia to join a coalition of some 30

other countries to help carry out the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accord. Additionally, nearly 8,000 support forces were deployed to the countries around Bosnia.

Now, nearly 80 days into the operation, our presence has been pivotal in forging the coalition that is helping to manage the peace and in brokering the on-the-ground implementation of the Accord: withdrawal of the warring factions from the zones of separation; the release of prisoners of war; the separation of military forces; and the withdrawal from territory to be transferred. While there are still problems to be overcome, such as small, remaining pockets of banned foreign forces, and occasional intransigence by Bosnian Serbs, overall compliance has been relatively good.

As I have witnessed on each of my three trips to Bosnia, our troops are performing extremely well and morale is high. Much of this is due to outstanding leadership, diligent preparation, and the impressive strides being made in the quality of life for our forces through extensive base camp preparation, the opening of AAFES outlets, and routine mail and Stars and Stripes deliveries. From the beginning, we correctly perceived that mines, the lone sniper, and severe weather and road conditions would be our major enemies. We were correct, and the combination of smart precautions and good training have gone a long way to minimizing the numbers of casualties that could have resulted.

Our forces operating in Bosnia were very well prepared and rehearsed before they were allowed to deploy. Their mission and rules of engagement have been properly proscribed, and they have established a strong, controlling presence between the former warring parties. More than that, they have also been instrumental in forging an historic coalition. Just a few years ago, few would have imagined that it would have been possible to cobble together a force including NATO nations, Central Europeans, and Russians, striving to achieve a common purpose. Here again, sound preparation on the part of our forces has paid off well.

Our challenge now is to remember that we still have over 9 months to go, and that we must ensure that our force is as ready, alert, and resolute on the last day of this mission as it was on the first. That is the greatest guarantee for success of the mission and the safety of the force.

But these have not been the only operations involving our forces. We have over 23,000 service men and women deployed in the Arabian Gulf region to preserve regional peace and stability, to enforce U.N.-ordered sanctions against Iraq, and to deter further Iraqi aggression. We have added prepositioned equipment to the region to support brigade-sized units; we have periodically deployed an Army mechanized task force for training, and for the first time ever, we conducted a no-notice deployment into the region, of an Air Expeditionary Force. We are maintaining a very active joint and multinational exercise program which includes participation from carrier battle groups, special forces and amphibious ready groups operating in the region. Farther north in Turkey, we continue to work with our coalition partners to enforce the no-fly zone and to oversee the humanitarian aid program in Northern Iraq.

In addition to this, the Army continued to provide forces in support of the 11-nation Multinational Force and Observers on the Sinai Peninsula, as specified in the Camp David Accord. Currently, nearly 1,000 U.S. service members are deployed as part of the Infantry Battalion Task Force or Logistics Support Element. Of note, the last infantry battalion rotation for 1995 was formed, for the first time, as a composite unit of Active Duty and Reserve Component personnel. This initiative proved highly successful and will be considered for future rotations.

In Korea, some 36,000 U.S. forces remain ready as political, cultural, and economic conditions continue to deteriorate in the North. The increasing instability in North Korea, fueled by severe food and energy problems, requires constant vigilance and further complicates our indications and warning capability. Force modernization efforts continue to focus on increasing interoperability between ROK and U.S. forces and increasing the theater's counter-battery fire capability. As well, all armored elements of the Korean Prepositioning Brigade set are in. My recent visits to Seoul and the DMZ have shown me that our efforts of the last two years to strengthen our defensive posture have been timely and most effective.

In the Southern Hemisphere, U.S. forces were engaged in defusing one conflict while, simultaneously, supporting efforts to reduce the traffic of drugs. Hostilities erupted in January 1995 in the region along the Peruvian/Ecuadorian border and in March 1995, four countries — Argentine, Brazil, Chile and the U.S. — responded to a request to provide military observers to assist in the monitoring of a cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces. We presently have 61 U.S. military personnel and 4 helicopters participating in this mission. There have been no cease-fire violations since September 1995, while Peru and Ecuador continue to pursue a diplomatic solution to the border dispute.

While the Peru/Ecuador dispute was on-going, USSOUTHCOM organized and initiated the most extensive counterdrug surge operation ever aimed against the narco-traffickers air bridge between Peru and Colombia. In cooperation with allied nations and law enforcement agencies, we focused our detection and monitoring assets on disrupting and hindering drug trafficking air operations. The results were impressive — overall air activity decreased significantly and cooperation between allied nations as well as the interagency improved noticeably. The successes were significant

enough to warrant USSOUTHCOM to plan a follow on operation aimed simultaneously at riverine, maritime, land, as well as air drug traffickers.

READINESS

Our success in these many recent military operations is a testament to the readiness of our forces. When I became Chairman, I asked to make and keep readiness our number one priority. This has been done and the benefits have been, and remain evident in every one of these operations. That said, I ask that you continue your support for the readiness of the force, even as the Chiefs and I are redoubling our efforts to ensure that potential lapses in readiness are detected before they become problems.

We have added a new way of looking at readiness. It includes the traditional measures that ensure individual battalions and squadrons and ships are manned, trained and equipped for mission success. But, in addition to that, we have added a critical link to how we look at joint readiness — the theater commander's ability to integrate and synchronize their forces and capabilities into an effective and cohesive fighting team.

The system by which we look at unit and joint readiness centers on a monthly report by Services, Unified Commands, and Department of Defense Combat Support Agencies. We ask them to assess their readiness to conduct day-to-day operations as well as the most demanding aspects of executing our National Military Strategy. Participants also forecast their readiness over the next 12 months. In addition to looking at specific units, we assess broad functional areas like mobility, intelligence, communications, and logistics.

This Joint Monthly Readiness Review has been up and running for a little over a year. To complement this, I have directed the development of a comprehensive readiness information management system to integrate the existing and developing readiness tools of the Services and CINCs. It will provide easily accessible and timely information for all users over the newly-activated Global Command and Control System.

Our Joint Exercise and Training program continues to be a readiness multiplier. Joint simulation efforts are providing innovative opportunities to stress our battle staffs while enhancing the overall utility of joint exercises for every participant. I am continuing to work with the CINCs to further focus our joint training efforts on key readiness challenges, while taking advantage of opportunities to leverage technology to conserve our training resources. This emphasis on readiness helps ensure that the men and women who have dedicated their lives to our nation's defense have the resources and training they need to do the job. It also ensures that their commanders can raise red flags and take quick action when called for.

We are also continuing to enhance our long-term readiness through our education system. Joint education now starts before officers are commissioned and continues throughout their careers. Increased emphasis on joint doctrine, multinational operations, and systems integration provides the CINCs a more capable, adaptive force.

Finally, the new reporting systems provide us the vital readiness information needed to make timely decisions on resource allocation and force commitment. All these efforts, and others, have helped keep readiness at the consistently high levels shown on the chart below.

Although readiness trends remain strong, we must maintain a vigilant watch. A major challenge to near-term readiness is how to use the unique capabilities of the Armed Forces to advance our national interests in peacetime while maintaining our readiness to fight and win this nation's wars. We are getting much smarter at this and at anticipating areas of stress before they become readiness problems. To that end, we are incorporating better the significant capabilities that reside in our reserve forces. We are continually looking for ways to conduct wartime mission training even while our forces are deployed to real-world operations. We are closely managing those low density, high leverage capabilities — including intelligence, mobility, and support assets — needed to execute the full range of our military missions.

I must point out, however, that readiness is a fragile commodity. Once the intricate processes of manning with quality personnel, and equipping and training units are disrupted, recovery often requires significant time and resources. That is why maintaining readiness is critically dependent on timely and full reimbursement of costs associated with unplanned contingency operations.

Thanks to your support, and the unyielding care and concern and support of the American people, I can report to you that ours is the most ready force in the world today. Which leads to the true source of our successes over the past year — great people and our strong and continued commitment to them and their families. Readiness is inextricably tied to the quality of life we provide for these outstanding men and women in uniform and their families.

PEOPLE

With regard to quality of life, the Joint Chiefs, CINCs, and I have revalidated the central importance of our "Top Four" priorities in support of our people, elaborated in the chart shown below.

Adequate and fair compensation, a stable retirement system, steady and dependable level of medical benefits, and adequate housing, especially outside CONUS, each require special attention. The recent trend of full funding for the maximum allowable pay raises has minimized the growth of the pay gap. The Secretary's decision to increase funding for military housing, including efforts to increase barracks support, pursue housing privatization initiatives, and boost Basic Allowance for Quarters, when coupled with other policies in support of our "Top Four," are helping to maintain the quality of life of our personnel and their families.

As we continue to adjust our military medical infrastructure and personnel, we must ensure that we preserve affordable, accessible health benefits with no surcharge for active duty members and their families. We must also keep faith with our military retirees, and so I urge you to help bring about Medicare Subvention, which would allow many retirees to remain in the military medical care system by reimbursing DoD for the treatment of Medicare-eligible military retirees.

The quality of recruits in our four Services remains high. Last year, 96 percent of our recruits were high school graduates. We must continue to keep this high standard even as we face increasing recruitment challenges in the years ahead; thus, your support of the Services' recruiting budgets is essential. It goes without saying that protecting the "Top Four" Quality of Life priorities also greatly enhances our recruiting and retention efforts.

FORCE STRUCTURE

As the above chart shows, the drawdown which has been ongoing since the end of the Cold War is nearly complete. The manner in which this drawdown has been managed and executed is a real success story. We've stayed on a steady, controlled glidepath, adjusting where we had to, and ensured that those measures most critical to the health of our force were properly protected. Every important indicator of military excellence remains strong — readiness is high, the quality of our people and their morale remains superb, and our force structure, despite deep cuts, has been reduced with minimum instability and turbulence.

We have broken the cycle of military decline that has followed every conflict in this century. Making this success all the more impressive is that we accomplished this drawdown without missing a beat, while at the same time engaging in a wide range of contingencies and operations.

The experience of these past few years has fortified our confidence that the force structure we will have at the end of the drawdown will be what we will continue to require during the remainder of this decade and into the next century. Our enduring force structure requirements are based primarily on our tasks: to prevent threats to our interests from arising; to deter those threats that do emerge; and to defeat those threats by military force, should deterrence fail.

The United States is a global power, with far-flung, vital security interests in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and important interests on nearly every continent. Day-to-day military engagement with our friends and allies through a combination of forward deployed and overseas-based U.S. forces in exercises, exchanges, visits, and force presence worldwide will remain an essential element of our national military strategy.

Ultimately, protecting our interests will remain dependent on preserving sufficiently strong deterrent capabilities to handle both today's known, near-term threats and those that could materialize from a more uncertain and rapidly changing world than we have known for many decades. Managing that uncertainty has led us to discard our Cold War approach of maintaining a threat-based force, towards a capability-based approach that ensures we protect the balance to handle today's real threats, as well as tomorrow's equally real possibilities.

First and foremost, that means we must preserve a modern, well maintained, robust triad of nuclear forces — the backbone of deterrence. Currently our nuclear forces are within START I limits, but we have planned our future nuclear force to achieve START II limits, in the event the treaty is ratified and implemented by the Russians. The shape of the remainder of our forces is based on the need to fight and win two, nearly simultaneous regional conflicts. Just looking back at the past few years, when we have several times nearly found ourselves in conflicts with North Korea and Iraq, our need to preserve this capability could not have been more clearly shown.

But it would be a mistake to think of this capability as contingent on contemporary threats alone. It is based, instead, on a longer-range calculation of our extensive global interests and the corresponding necessity to ensure that we never find ourselves in the vicarious predicament of committing our forces to one conflict, knowing that we will

expose our other vital interests as a result. If we were to discard half of this two-MRC capability or allow it to decay, it would take many years to rebuild a force of comparable excellence. In today's turbulent international environment, where the future posture of so many powerful nations remains precarious, we could find ourselves with too little, too late. As long as we remain a global power with vital international interests and allies whom we are committed to help defend, we must preserve our capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts.

The force structure we have designed for this purpose is as lean as the calculus of risk will afford. This is the force structure we must retain.

REPLACEMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND MODERNIZATION

While the '97 budget protects the quality of life for our people, our force structure and readiness, I am concerned that we are not procuring equipment and weapon systems at the rate necessary to recapitalize the force. Accordingly we must turn our attention in earnest to this challenge or risk the future combat readiness of the U.S. military. Procurement has continued to pay the bill for readiness and force structure over the past decade and now hovers at a post-World War II low of about $40 billion. For the past two years, I have testified that we could sustain this procurement hiatus temporarily, but not indefinitely. It was the proper course of action at a time when, because we were reducing our forces, through a combination of discarding our oldest equipment, and preserving and redistributing only our newest and most modern equipment, the average age of our remaining arsenal was younger than any time in recent decades. With downsizing coming to an end, we must now increase our procurement accounts.

For if we fail to do that, we may well wear out our weapons systems and equipment before they can be modernized or replaced.

To recapitalize this force, we must face head-on some rather difficult decisions. I firmly believe that we must commit ourselves to the adequate recapitalization of our force structure — that will require a procurement goal of approximately $60 billion annually. It will take tough management decisions, innovation, and even revolutionary approaches, as well as your support to adequately recapitalize our force within our current budget top line projections.

One answer lies in aggressively pursuing institutional and business opportunities. We must continue to pursue with all energy, acquisition reforms, commercial off-the-shelf opportunities, privatization, outsourcing of non-core activities, and further reductions of our infrastructure. The sum of all of these initiatives must be reinvested into our procurement accounts. Just as important, we must strive to gain greater efficiencies in warfighting, and we have already started this process through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).

EVOLUTION OF THE JOINT PROCESS

Over the past two years, the Joint Chiefs, the CINCs, and I have built a new process to better assess our joint warfighting needs and provide sound, joint programmatic advice. As you know, before the passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the programmatic influence, role, and responsibilities of the Chairman were by design narrow and tightly circumscribed. We've worked to institutionalize the spirit of Goldwater-Nichols to create new joint mechanisms and systems so we can provide the Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Congress with a joint view on programmatic and budgetary issues.

As the engine for this process, the responsibilities of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) have been expanded to produce this joint view. Although the JROC has been in existence for over a decade, the Vice Chairman and I have broadened its mandate and made it a focal point for addressing our joint warfighting needs and making specific programmatic recommendations that will lead to an increased joint warfighting capability, increased interoperability between systems, and a reduction in unnecessary redundancies and marginally effective systems, all within existing budget levels. Those of you who remember the very limited and constrained influence that jointness suffered in the way business was done in the past will recognize the seachange presented by this new charter.

I appreciate the support of Congress for recently including the JROC in Title 10, and codifying both its membership and its charter. This body has already proven itself and its value will only increase further over time.

To provide the analyses needed to support this effort, we've also created the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process as detailed above. This is our primary vehicle for obtaining a capabilities-based assessment of broad mission areas across Service and Defense agency lines. JWCA teams, each sponsored by a Joint Staff directorate, examine key relationships and interactions among joint warfighting capabilities and identify opportunities for improved effectiveness. The assessments are continuous and lend insight into issues involving requirements, readiness, and plans

for recapitalizing joint military capabilities. The JROC oversees the JWCA process and provides its findings to the CINCs and the JCS.

One of the more important provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was the requirement for me to submit to the Secretary of Defense an annual Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), a document that independently assesses the joint adequacy of programs, which I provide to the SECDEF for his consideration during his budgetary deliberations. I have found the JWCA process extraordinarily helpful in providing me the analysis and insights to craft the recommendations I offer in the CPA. As this process has evolved we have also found it useful to use the JWCA products in developing a front-end recommendation, the Chairman's Program Recommendations (CPR). The CPR is provided to the SECDEF for his use in developing the Defense Planning Guidance, the key document that guides the Services in the development of their budgets.

JOINT VISION

The difficult choices to be made require strong processes, but they also require a strategic vision, a template to provide a common direction for our Services in developing their unique capabilities. To meet this need, I will approve for release this month a document entitled *Joint Vision 2010.*

Joint Vision 2010 provides an operationally based framework for the further development of the U.S. Armed Forces. It recognizes as the basis for our future the significant institutional achievements and the outstanding men and women of our Armed Forces which have brought us today's high quality force. Then, examining the strategic environment, the missions we face, and the implications of modern technology, it develops new joint operational concepts from which our future military requirements can be derived.

The objective of this vision is to achieve what we term Full Spectrum Dominance — the capability of our Armed Forces to dominate any opponent across the range of military operations. We can achieve this objective by leveraging today's high quality forces and force structure with leading-edge technology to attain better command, control and intelligence and to implement new operational concepts — dominant maneuver, precision strike, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. It is these new joint operational concepts, and the improved command, control and intelligence which will make them possible, that will focus the strengths of each of our Services and guide the evolution of joint doctrine, education, and training to bring us Full Spectrum Dominance.

CONCLUSION

This past year the men and women of our Armed Forces have given us any number of reasons to be proud. We have called on them often to go and perform difficult missions, from Korea to Bosnia, from Haiti to Kuwait. They are performing at levels of excellence unsurpassed by any other time in our country's history. Wherever we send them, they go with pride and determination.

Americans are rightfully proud of the men and women who serve our country so ably and well. For me, it is a great honor to represent them and to come before you today. On their behalf I thank you for your unwavering support.

Electronic Industries Association
Washington, DC
19 March 1996

First let me tell you all what a great pleasure it is to be here with you this evening. I asked Peter why it is that this speech comes before dinner rather than after, as is normally the case. And he informed me that this was a tradition that the Association adopted after a study had shown that orators speaking on an empty stomach tend to speak on average 15 minutes less than those who speak after the meal has been ingested. Since I have a 15-minute speech I intended to give after dinner, perhaps under these circumstances I should just sit down.

But let me throw caution to the wind and take my allotted 15 minutes.

As I thought about what I might speak about tonight, I came to what many of you might find an odd conclusion. I realized that those of you who are part of this great association are really revolutionaries. Certainly if you look around the room, particularly tonight so all dressed up, you don't look like revolutionaries; at least as most people might imagine them to look like wild-haired, disheveled, and unconventional. But you certainly are revolutionaries.

For you are the leaders of the information revolution that is transforming the very world around us, everything — our economy, the very ways that we work, entertain, and care for our families. Simply everything! You are creating a crest of change that will make life in the next century so very different than life as we have known it.

I noticed that in this past year Newt Gingrich spoke at the Government/Industry dinner. And certainly he has been a very forceful and articulate advocate of this revolution that you here in this room are keeping in such fast motion.

And like so many revolutions I imagine that most of you would admit that you can't really say exactly where it will carry us; that like the splitting of the atom, there is apt to be both great good and perhaps not so good to come from the advances that are being made in our laboratories. But what is certain is that if we want the full benefits that will arise then we must lead this revolution.

And we in the military have an enormous stake in the revolution that you lead. For it is the success of this revolution that offers the greatest promise to keep our Armed Forces the dominant Armed Forces against any future foe in any form of conflict. Meanwhile those of us in uniform today are contending with yet another revolution. This one is a revolution in world affairs that was set in motion when the Berlin Wall came tumbling down and that was spun even more furiously on the day that Boris Yeltsin jumped on a tank in front of the Russian White House and condemned to the annals of history the artifice known as the Soviet Union.

With that event, not only in our own country but all around the world, a lot of old certainties suddenly fell by the wayside to be replaced by new doubts and new uncertainties. Here in the midst of the presidential primary season it could hardly be more clear that a lot of the old shibboleths that have guided us for nearly five decades, no longer possess the religious ring that they once had.

We are seeing debated a lot of questions, that had they been mentioned ten years ago, would have been seen as outrageously heretical. What is our role in the world and how should we fulfill this role? Are we or should we still be the shining beacon on the hill or has our nation become so riddled with internal problems that we must drop the onerous burdens of world leadership to concentrate on the drugs, the crime, the schools, and the ills infecting our very streets? Are we still the nation where the world's downtrodden can come to create new lives or should we hang out a "not welcome" sign and insulate ourselves, husbanding our resources for our own citizens?

I imagine that you here in this room know more about the answers to these questions than do most. And I ask that you do your best to help shape the new consensus that we as a nation must have if this revolution in world affairs is to carry us toward a new century that will be safer and more prosperous for our country than the one we are happily leaving behind.

You know for certain that we can neither pull back from the world nor relinquish the leadership that we have exercised so well and to such extraordinary effect since the Second World War. After all we tried insulating ourselves from the world's problems throughout the early half of this century and for that, we found ourselves in two world wars.

We tried to build barriers to insulate ourselves from the unevenness and frustrations of international trade, and for that, we found ourselves drawn into the most miserable depression in our history.

These were not the solutions then and they are even less the solutions for today and for tomorrow. As late as the seventies, only around a tenth of our gross national product involved imports and exports. Today it is closer to a third. In fact, one of the great opportunities brought about by the end of the Cold War was that some two to three billion people from formerly communist economies are now scrambling to make a place for themselves in the international free market. That is two to three billion new producers and two to three billion new consumers.

And that opens possibilities for our nation that we could not have dreamed of during the Cold War. Does it today make sense to back away from these possibilities?

Can we stop exercising our international leadership at this critical juncture in history? We never stopped leading nor blanched from the tough choices during all those years when the other side threatened us with thousands of nuclear weapons. What is there about the world today that is so terrible that it should deter us from the mantle of international leadership?

Some argue that we are too exhausted from the travails of the Cold War to continue bearing the burdens of our leadership. Fifty years ago, a generation that had just fought World War Two, that had endured the cost of keeping one out of every ten American citizens in uniform, that had for three years spent over half of our gross national product on defense, and that just endured 300,000 dead and many hundreds of thousands more wounded didn't feel so exhausted and depleted that they would have withdrawn from Europe and Asia or that they would have left the fate of the world to the designs of a man named Stalin.

Thank God that they didn't or the world we inherited from them would have looked very different indeed.

Even during the most expensive years of the Reagan defense build-up, we never spent even a fifteenth of our gross

national product on defense and never were there more than one out of every one hundred and thirty Americans in uniform. And while there were casualties during the Cold War, certainly they were never on a scale with that earlier generation. We hardly have the excuse of exhaustion to fall back on.

No, I am sure that you and I here in this room know that we must stay engaged and that we must not let the challenges of a new era dissuade us from our responsibility to lead. Even if we were exhausted we would have to ask ourselves who but us would we want to have the most persuasive role in the world today. If we won't lead someone else will. That's a law of physics nature abhors vacuums. If not us, who?

Certainly, there is no other nation that has our vast resources to exercise international power. We may not be as economically strong as we were in the years right after the Second World War but we still produce nearly a quarter of the world's output, which is wholly out of proportion to the fact that Americans are less then five percent of the world's population.

We are still by far the wealthiest nation on earth and we will remain so far into the 21st Century. And culturally and socially, despite our drugs and our crime and whatever problems you might want to add to the list, we are still the world's most studied and admired nation and the one place where so many dream of one day immigrating to.

But to be able to lead we must preserve our military strength, for that is the backdrop that makes our diplomats the first among equals and that is the sword that is so implacably crucial to peace and stability in the world in regions where our interests remain great — in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East, and for our own security.

And I believe that despite the steep budget reductions and personnel drawdown of the past seven or eight years, that we have protected our military excellence. We kept readiness our highest priority and the benefits of that have been shown from the Gulf War, through the many dozens of contingencies and operations performed since then, just as it is on display today in Bosnia where our men and women are performing a tough and dangerous mission simply superbly.

We have reached the point where we send our forces out again and again never doubting that they will be ready to go on a moment's notice and never doubting that they will accomplish their mission no matter how tough.

Today we have the finest military in the world bar none; better trained and more ready than any other.

We have retained that excellence despite the fact that we have reduced our force by over a third and our defense budget by some 40 percent. 700,000 men and women who served this nation proudly and were all volunteers were asked to trade their uniforms for civilian clothes.

We have made the most dramatic reductions since the end of Vietnam and our forces are now the smallest since the Korean War, and the percentage of our national wealth we are spending on defense is the lowest it has been since Pearl Harbor.

Yes, we are the world's best, but if we are to protect our nation's interests wherever they might be challenged we cannot and we must not go any lower. We must preserve what we have and we must ensure that we sustain our excellence. We owe that to our children.

Look at how very often in the past few years we have called on our forces. And look around the world today — North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Haiti, Bosnia, Cuba, and terrorism. We must not reduce our forces any further.

But we must also continue to prepare this force for the challenges of the next century. It isn't enough to insure this force is ready today. We must also insure it will be ready tomorrow. And that means that we must replace aging equipment before it becomes too old and unreliable for use. And we must have a prudent modernization program.

You here in this room know better than any, that advances in electronics are rushing forward at breath-taking speed and as they do are transforming old notions and practices, certainly in the workplace and marketplace, but also on the battlefield. This revolution that you here are shepherding has the possibility of upending and significantly changing the way our future forces will operate and fight.

If we want to ensure that our excellence remains intact in the next century we in the military must capture the promise your industry holds before us. For the revolution in electronics is the essential ingredient of the revolution in military affairs just ahead of us. You and your industry must help us realize that marriage and help us attain the kinds of capabilities that will allow us to view and command the battlefield better than any potential adversary and maintain the superiority that our nation has come to expect and most certainly deserves from its Armed Forces.

At the same time we must protect the true source of our military excellence, and that is the remarkable men and women who wear America's uniform. They are as well educated, as proud, as dedicated, and as skilled as any force America has ever fielded. If we wish to keep them and continue to recruit more like them, then we must protect their pay and their benefits. I know of no wiser investment for this nation.

Now, I have probably already spoken long enough and I see the waiters gathering in the back and looking at their watches. So let me conclude by thanking you for this chance to share these thoughts.

Today we stand at the brink of a new era an era that promises to be safer and more secure and more prosperous than any that has come before. But only if America is willing and able to lead. To turn inward would be a mistake and a great disservice to those who have worked so hard and given so much to preserve our nation's guiding role in shaping the world.

But to remain strong requires strong armed forces and that in turn depends to a very large extent on you and I, your industry, and our Armed Forces working hand in hand to help keep our Armed Forces on the cutting edge of technology. Working together isn't just good business; it is essential for the security of our nation.

Again thank you so very much for your time and attention and I wish you all Godspeed.

Statement on the Chemical Weapon Convention
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
28 March 1996

I am pleased to be here today with the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State to testify on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and address the Convention's impact on the U.S. military. As I testified previously, the CWC represents a significant milestone in arms control in that it bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. The potential benefits of the Chemical Weapons Convention will have a positive impact on the lives of our service people and how the U.S. military fulfills its responsibility to national security.

Since I last testified, the Joint Staff has played an integral part in continuing negotiations in the Preparatory Commission concerning the specifics of the Convention's implementation. As such, I am well acquainted with the relative advantages and shortcomings of the Convention and its implications for the U.S. fighting force.

ADVANTAGES OF THE CWC

The most significant advantage derived from the Convention is the potential elimination of chemical weapons by state parties. Upon the Convention's entry into force, all state parties will be obligated to destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles. Currently, regardless of whether the CWC enters into force, the U.S. Army is required by national law (Public Law 99-145) to destroy the vast majority of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile by 2004. In fact we have currently destroyed 1,000 tons of CW on Johnston Island. The U.S. is presently the only state that is systematically conducting an ongoing chemical weapons destruction program. The Convention's imposition of an internationally recognizable legal obligation to destroy all chemical weapons will place all other CW capable state parties on equal footing with the U.S.

Nearly two-thirds of the countries believed to have chemical weapons programs are signatories to the Convention. While this does not imply that they will all ultimately become parties to the Convention, it does indicate a near universal acceptance of the Convention's objectives. The list of signatories includes the Russian Federation, which possesses the world's largest declared chemical weapons stockpile. The eventual destruction of approximately 40,000 tons of declared Russian chemical weapons will significantly reduce the chemical threat faced.

Another advantage of the Convention is a verification regime that allows the international Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to routinely monitor a state party's compliance. While no treaty is 100 percent verifiable, the CWC is effectively verifiable. It provides for complementary and overlapping verification requirements that help deter CW violations. The CWC does this through the most intrusive verification provisions of any arms control regime to date. This verification regime consists of declarations, routine inspections of declared facilities, and short notice challenge inspection of any facility. Of note, some of the convention's imperfection was intentional in order to protect our military interests. The regime allows military commanders to protect classified information, equipment, and facilities unrelated to the Convention.

The Convention is both an arms control agreement and a nonproliferation regime that restricts trade in specified chemicals to member states. Because of the Convention's trade restrictions and provisions, would-be proliferators will find it increasingly difficult to acquire the chemical precursors essential to building a chemical weapons stockpile. Signed by 160 states, and currently ratified by 47 states, including the major industrialized states, the Convention will help to defuse regional instability by reducing every state's ability to acquire a chemical weapons stockpile.

IMPACT OF CWC IMPLEMENTATION

While the Convention's verification provisions allow for compliance monitoring by the OPCW, its national implementation will require a significant effort by the U.S. military. First, all chemical weapons related facilities will be subject to routine declaration and verification. These include storage facilities in 10 geographic areas, former production facilities in 5 geographic areas, 3 existing destruction facilities, and those destruction facilities yet to be built.

Second, all military facilities will be susceptible, both within the U.S. and overseas, to short notice challenge inspections. All the Services, with On Site Inspection Agency assistance, have been preparing their facilities for these chemical weapons inspections. We have conducted site assistance visits, tabletop exercises and mock inspections to assist the CINCs, major commands and installation commanders in understanding their CWC inspection obligations.

Additionally, since I last testified we have successfully concluded a series of similar inspections conducted bilaterally with the Russians as "confidence building measures" associated with the 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). These bilateral inspections, both routine and challenge, provided valuable information on how such inspections will be conducted and give us confidence that we will be able to successfully implement this intrusive multilateral inspection regime with little difficulty. While the preparations for these bilateral and potential CWC inspections have been costly in terms of personnel and resources, we are confident that U.S. facilities will be able to protect themselves against the disclosure of national security information and information on sensitive equipment and facilities through managed access.

Another critical element of CWC implementation is CW data declarations. Data declarations were prepared by the Services and Joint Staff and exchanged with Russia in compliance with the Wyoming MOU. Compiling these declarations provided the Services an excellent opportunity to develop the expertise and the databases required to comply with the Convention's declaration requirements. Previously this data was compiled using paper forms and long hand. This process is now being automated and we are confident we will be able to provide a real-time status of our declaration requirements.

DETERRENCE AND RETALIATION

U.S. forces are the best-equipped and trained forces in the world. The Defense Department maintains and is committed to maintaining a robust Chemical Biological Defense program. The program seeks to protect U.S. forces during all phases of the operational spectrum.

Even if chemical weapons are not introduced onto the battlefield, their threat of use impacts upon our military. Operating in a potential chemical environment affects both operational and logistical planning. Protective equipment displaces other commodities on cargo carriers and NBC defense units replace combat units in deployment plans. Protective equipment worn by military personnel for prolonged periods in a hot environment can degrade their performance.

The U.S. military's ability to deter chemical weapons in a post CWC world will be predicated upon both a robust CW defense capability, and the ability to rapidly bring to bear superior and overwhelming military force in retaliation to a chemical attack.

A robust chemical weapons defense program is essential not only to protect U.S. forces but also to ensure their combat effectiveness in a chemical environment. A well-trained and protected force will help deter any would be aggressor when contemplating the employment of chemical weapons against U.S. forces.

While U.S. forces will forego CW retaliation in kind we will retain a retaliatory capability second to none. Should deterrence fail, a chemical attack against U.S. forces would be regarded as an extremely grave action subject to an appropriate non-chemical response of our choosing. The U.S. will rely on the full range of military capabilities to deter CW use, and if need be retaliate, including the application of superior military force complemented by our robust CW defense program.

RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

In earlier testimony to the Committee on Armed Services both the DEPSECDEF and I were repeatedly questioned on the issue of Riot Control Agents. I would like to note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff met on 19 July 1995 and

reaffirmed our earlier position that "although we would have preferred to preserve all four options in EO 11850, we agreed with the administration that the benefits of the treaty outweighed the importance of preserving the two disputed options."

CWC IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST

From a military perspective, the Chemical Weapons Convention is clearly in our national interest. The Convention's advantages outweigh its shortcomings. The U.S. and all other CW capable state parties incur the same obligation to destroy their chemical weapons stockpile. While less than perfect, the verification regime allows for intrusive inspections while protecting national security concerns. The nonproliferation aspects of the Convention will retard the spread of chemical weapons, and in so doing, reduce the probability that U.S. forces may encounter chemical weapons in a regional conflict. Finally, while foregoing the ability to retaliate in kind, the U.S. military retains the wherewithal to deter and defend against a chemical weapons attack. I strongly support this convention and respectfully request your consent to ratification.

***Joint Force Quarterly* Magazine**
"A Word from the Chairman"
Spring 1996

The articles in the JFQ Forum provide a useful primer on the challenges of hemispheric security and the U.S. relationship with Latin America in the future. The pace of change and the salience of our interests here in our own backyard rival those of East Asia or Europe. However, absent significant threats or instabilities, they have drawn far less comment than either of those regions. In the future, we cannot afford to take this dynamic region for granted; it demands greater attention.

Latin America is a region of vast size and remarkable potential, a vibrant blend of the New World and the Old, a rich tapestry of ancient cultures and modern peoples. It is a geographic term for an amalgam of 450 million people, in 33 extremely diverse states, each with a unique sense of history and national purpose. To the United States, Latin America and the insular nations of the Caribbean are partners in three distinct but interactive ways: in the development of democracy, in trade and commerce, and in the creation of hemispheric security.

In the past decade, Latin America has been the site of extensive political development. A mere 10 years ago, the region was politically troubled, with half the states having authoritarian regimes, which repressed their people and mismanaged their economies. Central America in particular was a hotbed of instability, much of which emanated from the now out-of-office Sandinistas in Nicaragua or the destabilizing activities of Manuel Noriega in Panama. Most of the instability has passed. For the first time in history, every nation in Latin America, except Cuba, is a democracy, each one determined to foster representative institutions, respect human rights, and incorporate themselves into a wider world. The nations of Latin America today are striving to meet the ultimate standard of Simon Bolivar, La Liberator: "to be free under the auspices of liberal laws, emanating from the most sacred spring, which is the will of the people."

While much economic development work remains to be done, Latin America has jumped into the mainstream of the world economy. Many Latin American economies are surging and several now rank among the fastest growing in the world. This has allowed U.S. exports to Latin America in recent years to grow at an average annual rate of 21%, twice the rate of our export growth to the European Union. By the end of the century, U.S. trade with Latin America will likely exceed our trade with Europe.

Moreover, as the peoples of Latin America have achieved this impressive growth, they have avoided potentially ruinous regional arms races. Of all the regions in the world, Latin America today puts the least into military expenditures and has the fewest uniformed personnel per capita. Gone too are the once dominant notions that, for prosperity in Latin America, the economic pie in the hemisphere had to be redivided. We now live in an era where the nations of the hemisphere are working together to make the pie bigger, growing the Latin American economy to $2 trillion dollars by the turn of the century.

Our cooperation in the search for hemispheric security has made admirable progress. While we have worked together on improving the military's performance in our respective nations, we have also witnessed growing joint cooperation in the suppression of narcotics traffic, and in multilateral operations throughout the hemisphere. As old adversaries find new democratic partners, multinational training in Latin America is becoming commonplace. A total of

ten Latin American nations are also participating today in 13 peacekeeping operations around the world, including one on the border between Peru and Ecuador.

Most notable among the recent peace operations has been Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. There, under the UN banner, 24 nations, including 12 Latin American and Caribbean Basin states participated in the well planned operation that stabilized that beleaguered nation. Much work remains to be done in Haiti, but it clearly stands as a high water mark for hemispheric security cooperation. As Secretary Perry noted: "Peacekeeping in the Americas, in support of conflict resolution and democracy, is more than a principle — it is a reality."

In 1995, military cooperation in the hemisphere reached an all-time high when the defense ministers of 33 nations met to discuss ways to further defense cooperation. They agreed to support openness and transparency to lower threat perceptions, to subordinate their military forces to democratically elected leaders, and to resolve outstanding disputes through negotiated settlements. Because of this conference, cooperation between our defense forces, in support of their legally constituted functions, is at an all time high.

While much has been accomplished, much remains to be done for hemispheric security. In particular, in the years ahead, working with our democratic neighbors, the United States looks forward to:

- Increasing cooperation and broadening regional successes against drug traffic, a major threat to U.S. security and to the health of the economy and society in many Latin American countries;
- Improving our controls over immigration in the region;
- Deepening our military-to-military contacts and furthering our multinational training opportunities; and
- Restructuring our command and control organization to accommodate modern conditions in the region, including the movement in 1997 of SOUTHCOM headquarters to Miami.

While Latin America will remain a very active region in the future, our military activity there takes place at a very low cost to the United States. Given the low threat from extra-regional powers and the proliferation of democracy throughout the region, we have achieved a very high level of security in the hemisphere at the cost of only a small fraction of a percent of the U.S. defense budget and at less than 5 percent of our worldwide security assistance expenditures. From these facts, a classical strategist might conclude that for the United States, with its global interests and commitments, Latin America is an important region, but one that is also an economy of force area. That is true, and with continued emphasis on democracy, the market economy, and collective security in the region, Latin America will happily remain so in the future.

World Affairs Council
Boston, Massachusetts
4 April 1996
U.S. National Security: Into The Next Century

The World Affairs Council and its related organizations are performing a very important public service, educating their communities on defense and foreign affairs. I am happy to be part of your program, especially on the odd spring day in Boston when it is not snowing.

Mark Twain once said that, "tonight I appear for the first time before a [typical] Boston audience – 4,000 critics!" I am twice luckier than Twain, because 1) there's only 200 Bostonians here today and 2) your President assures me that I am among friends or at least constructive critics!

It is a pleasure to be here or any other place than the Pentagon. It is such a hectic place that we say: "A day away from the Pentagon is a day of leave." So, thanks for the vacation and the chance to come here to talk to you about national security.

As the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense on military affairs, I have a wide range of responsibilities, chief of which is to ensure that, above all else, our military remains strong enough to fight and win our nation's wars, and that in peace, our military is ready to provide the muscle behind our diplomacy. Not surprisingly then, a good deal of my energy is devoted to overseeing today's force, where operational issues and readiness predominate; and insuring that tomorrow's force will be structured, sized, manned and equipped to protect our interests, well into the next century. And so, I thought that I would give you a report about today's force, and tell you what I see, as we move down the road to build tomorrow's force.

CHANGES IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

For both today's force and tomorrow's, what's past is prologue! Today, choking on change, we often fixate on the uncertainties, the instabilities and the conflicts of a world grown all too complex, crowded, and contentious. However, in all this talk about the dangerous world around us, it is all too easy to overlook the fact that, today, the United States and its Allies are much safer than we were in the dark days of the Cold War.

Just ten years ago, we were locked in a global struggle with the Soviet Union. Thousands of nuclear weapons were pointed at our homes. And massive armies stared at each other across a line, drawn through the heart of Central Europe. Out of necessity, we designed and sized our forces primarily for one, apocalyptic, worse case scenario: global war against the Soviet Union. And, in large measure, because we did, we never had a third world war. But let us not forget that the Cold War wasn't always cold. We spent trillions of dollars to make sure the Soviet Union would never attack us. But we also lost 95,000 valiant Americans in limited conflicts of the Cold War, conflicts which were fought in the hope that World War III would never come. Like all wars, the Cold War finally ended.

While it is true, as George Kennan had predicted in 1947, that the Soviet Union ultimately collapsed under the weight of its own inefficient and inhumane system, it is equally important to remember that our resolute foreign and defense policy, our strength, and the vitality of our Allies, created the preconditions for victory in the Cold War. Like the two previous earthquakes this century, World War I and World War II, the end of the Cold War produced changes of earthquake proportions. The landscape has changed dramatically, and the aftershocks will be with us for a long time to come.

It is important to remember that we are living in a time of transitions and that we cannot yet clearly see the contours of the post-Cold War world. And, until we do, it will be wise to remain prepared for the unexpected. The end of the Cold War was neither the end of history, nor was it the end of the need for a strong national defense, because, while we are in fact safer today than we were during the Cold War, there remain very valid reasons why we must maintain a strong defense, today, and into the future.

The first reason to maintain our strength is the possibility of regional conflicts in areas of vital interest to us: in Europe; East Asia; and in the Middle East. Since DESERT STORM, our ability to deal successfully with two major regional contingencies, MRCs in the language of the Pentagon, occurring nearly simultaneously, has become the bedrock on which we have built our forces. Moreover, our need to project power, and to do so as part of a coalition, means that we must also maintain a significant peacetime presence overseas, to deter conflict, reassure our allies and facilitate power projection.

These facts are not difficult to understand, but increasingly these common sense notions have come under fire. This is a critical issue. We must keep a "two MRC" force. This is critical for us especially for plans concerning Korea and the Middle East. But there are other reasons too. A two contingency force will give us a larger margin of safety in our essentially unpredictable world. Also, a "one MRC" force or even a "one and one-half MRC" force, whatever that is, would tempt aggressors to move in other theaters, once U.S. forces had been committed. Finally, we may find that major peacekeeping operations detract from the amount of forces available for contingency missions. We will do our best to plan around that becoming a problem, but in military affairs, you can't live on the margin. In short, a "one MRC" force is not a sufficient capability for a global power.

Moving on, a second reason for maintaining a strong defense is the need to prevent or deal with the effects of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We will, of course, continue to maintain a nuclear deterrent, today, consistent with START I limits, and, hopefully, in the not too distant future, reduced to our START II obligations. The U.S. and its allies will also have to continue our work on missile defenses.

Finally, we must also maintain the strength and flexibility to contend with the instabilities, the crises, and unrest, stemming from the 30-odd conflicts that are on-going in the world today. It is not our job to resolve all of these conflicts, but, prudently and selectively, we will have to deal with some of them, when our major interests are at stake.

We are today the sole dominant power in the world, with global interests to protect, and a responsibility to lead. The American people have a great stake in peace and stability around the world. Today, business and commerce are global activities. A third of America's national product depends on trade. We are and will remain, for the foreseeable future, the richest and most powerful nation on earth, in large measure due to our global commerce.

Thus, a strong military, in the service of a prudent, leadership-oriented foreign policy, makes sense for America today, and it will make sense well into the future. Without American leadership, international security would suffer, and so ultimately would the welfare and prosperity of all Americans. True, we must continue to press International Organizations and our allies to do more, within their limitations. But we must never forget that, overall America puts the most

into international security, because America gets the most out of a secure and stable international system. When all is said and done, we can neither pull back from the world, nor relinquish the leadership that we have exercised so well, and to such extraordinary effect since the end of World War II. After all, we tried insulating ourselves from the world's problems throughout the first half of this century. And, for that, we found ourselves in two world wars!

Today, in our troubled world, in an Information Age, where global communications and international commerce have dramatically shrunk the globe, can we turn our backs on the world, hunker down in Fortress America, and let fate take its course? We must be clear. Today, and in the future, the United States must lead, and, to do so, it must maintain a strong military and a vibrant overseas presence. Still, the passing of the Cold War has enabled us to make significant cuts in our defense establishment.

HOW TODAY'S ARMED FORCES ARE COPING WITH CHANGE

One of the great strategic benefits from the end of the Cold War is that we have been able to safely cut our forces. Let me give you a few examples of how dramatic these cuts have been.

Since 1989, we have reduced our forces by 700,000 men and women in uniform, about a third of the force. We are now smaller, in terms of active duty personnel, than we were before the Korean War. The Army went from 18 active divisions to 10, a reduction of 45 percent. The Navy went from 546 ships to 357, a reduction of 35 percent. The Air Force went from 36 to 20 fighter wings, a reduction of 45 percent. The defense budget has been reduced by 40 percent in real terms, since 1985, its Cold War high. We now spend less of a percentage of our national wealth on defense, only 3.2 percent, than at any time since before World War II.

Overall, through hard work in the Armed Forces, sound leadership in the field, and a high degree of support from the Administration and Congress, we have been able to manage this huge drawdown superbly, and create a much smaller yet fully capable force, one that is as capable and as ready as any force in the world today, and one that is better tailored to this new strategic environment. Yet, throughout the drawdown, this smaller force has been engaged in an unprecedented number of contingencies around the world, all of which have been accomplished superbly.

Our Armed Forces have indeed been very busy in a wide range of operations from Panama to DESERT STORM, to Somalia, to Haiti, and to Bosnia. Today, some 50,000 men and women are participating in 11 separate operations around the globe. By the way, our participation in the operation in Haiti ended last month on schedule. There are only a handful of U.S. troops there now. For the first time in Haiti's history, an elected president has turned over power peacefully to another elected president. That in itself is a historic milestone.

While some might wish to debate the merits of our going to Haiti, one cannot fail to appreciate the outstanding performance of our military there. They did all that they were asked to do and did it superbly. We know that Haiti still faces a tough developmental challenge. However, we know that we have helped that beleaguered nation take a step toward democracy and development. In the process, we have also helped our Gulf Coast states by lessening the horrendous burden of thousands more Haitian refugees.

Now our major effort is in Bosnia, where some 20,000 service men and women are performing their military tasks with great expertise and professionalism. Like Haiti, where coordination between diplomacy and military force proved so very effective and established a benchmark for such coordination in the future, the coordination on the Bosnia issue between the diplomat and the soldier reached a new height during the negotiations, that lead to the Dayton agreement. For the first time, those who would be charged with the implementation of the military aspects of the agreement were there, not just as advisors, but as actual negotiators.

To a large extent because of this, but also because of sound planning, thorough preparation and planning, and solid leadership, the military aspects of the Bosnia operation are going quite well. However, what is badly needed is a redoubled civilian effort. While nine months still remain until NATO's IFOR withdraws, we must not let more time to slip through our fingers. That is true, not only for those helping the warring factions, but it is also true for the Muslims and Croats who make up the federation, as well as for the Bosnian Serbs. It requires a total compliance with the terms of the Dayton agreement and a total commitment to peace and to the rebuilding of a multiethnic nation. If the commitment is there, one year will be long enough for IFOR. If the commitment isn't there, then staying longer than the year won't help.

We should be clear in our minds about one thing: IFOR can help by peace enforcement in Bosnia, but only the Bosnians themselves — Muslims, Croats, and Serbs — can make a lasting peace in that troubled land. Meanwhile, U.S. forces in IFOR will continue with the implementation of the military tasks, will assist the civilian effort where it can without interfering with the military tasks, or getting themselves drawn into tasks which are more appropriate for

civilian organizations. Through their presence, our forces will continue to improve the security climate, and further freedom of movement.

Our service men and women serve with equal distinction worldwide. Just as in Bosnia, they are performing superbly in the Middle East, where some 23,000 overall serve as observers on the border between Israel and Egypt, where they enforce the no-fly zones in Iraq to help protect the Kurds and the Shiias, and where they enforce the sanctions against Iraq.

Others keep the peace on the border between Peru and Ecuador, while still others have been keeping a watchful eye over the recent tensions in the Taiwan Straits. Finally, some 34,000 stand guard on the Korean peninsula, where tensions are always high, and where miscalculation is always a possibility.

In short, today's force is much smaller but even busier than its Cold War predecessor. It has high quality people, first-rate equipment, and the training and readiness that have brought about a string of operational successes that we all can be proud of. Today's force has set a high standard for the kind of force that we will need in the future.

THE FUTURE

Let me say a few words about the future, its challenges, and the force that we have begun to develop to meet them.

First, no one knows what the future security environment will be like. We currently believe that it will be at least as challenging as the present one. In potential regional hotspots, for example, we will almost certainly witness drastic changes in the leadership and the nature of the regimes. In North Korea and Cuba, as well as a few potentially hostile states in the Middle East, there will undoubtedly be destabilizing change. These transitions will likely entail additional risks, risks that will require the U.S. and its allies to maintain strong defenses.

In addition to the threats we've talked about, we have to be prepared for strategic surprises, hard-to-predict phenomena, such as hostile, nuclear-capable, regional adversaries, or even the renewal of great power competition. How information technologies will affect each region and the various types of warfare is another area where surprises may come. In all, we have to keep our eye on what's important. In particular, the long-range future will be determined much more by developments in Moscow, Beijing, Tokyo, and in West Europe than it will be in the smaller hot spots where we are engaged in peace operations today.

With that as a given, three key tasks stand out as mandatory for peace and stability in the future.

First, the U.S. must nurture and maintain its current, major alliances in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East. This will preserve the possibility for collective action and also keep our increasingly rich allies from having to seek security on their own. Former allies can become competitors; current allies will not, unless we prove feckless or fickle.

Secondly, we must, as a top priority, continue to engage Moscow and Beijing and encourage them to move toward democracy and free market economies. This will be a long and rough road in each of these nations. However, continuous engagement today will be much cheaper and far more effective than containment in the future. In the long term, we may not be wholly successful but clearly, we should give engagement every chance to succeed.

Third, we must ensure that our strength remains commensurate with our international obligations, now and into the future. On the military side, we have spent a lot of time in the Pentagon working on a new study, *Joint Vision 2010*, which aims to match our quality people with advanced technology in order to give U.S. forces dominance across the full range of future military operations. We are not ready to unveil this study, but, in thinking about future capabilities, we kept coming back to the need to match up our quality people with first-class equipment and creative training. Let me start where the future begins, and that's with our men and women in uniform.

We have inspiring men and women in the Armed Forces today. They are well led, and well trained, not just for warfighting tasks, but also for the specific missions that they have been given. They are and will remain the most essential aspect of our military power in the future. And we have to think of the future, not just in terms of technology, but also in terms of people and leader development, that lengthy process of training, education, and experience that it takes to get leaders ready to bear the burdens they will have to carry. To prepare for the future means we must think about how we train and educate our leaders and sustain their abilities.

For example, the battalion commanders and ship captains of the year 2010 are ROTC and Service Academy cadets today. Their brigade commanders are 25 years old and have just risen to the rank of captain or naval lieutenant. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the year 2010 is waiting today (probably a bit impatiently) to be promoted to lieutenant colonel or commander in the Navy. These leaders and the other men and women of the Armed Forces, and the families who support them, must be nurtured, supported, and treasured. And that, of course, will take a lot of the

nation's treasure, today and into the future! Quality people are the key to operational success. We must not let funding for people or leader development in the Armed Forces become the bill payer for budget cuts.

In the end, the quality of life for our troops also means that we must maintain force levels that match the tasks and the peacetime operating tempo of our units. We cannot have all of our troops deployed on operations all of the time. We must have backup units, replacements, and reserves. Some redundancy in the force is good. All of the Chiefs agree with me on one point: today's force structure is the minimum essential force that we need.

Each of the service Chiefs of Staff has his own set of examples which depict how much stress the force is under. For example, the Army tells us that the average soldier was deployed 138 days away from his or her home station last year. In the Air Force, 7 major aircraft, their crews, and their immediate support personnel were away from their home station on the average of 120 days. Sailors and marines have too little time between deployments.

If you shrink the force structure but you continue to stress it, what will happen to quality of life? What will happen to retention? What will happen to readiness? Today we have the minimum essential force for the challenging set of missions that it is carrying out. Barring unforeseen gains in efficiency, I cannot imagine our force structure in the future getting much smaller without a deep cut in our capabilities or the tempo of our operations. Again, this means that, tomorrow we will have to spend a lot of money on maintaining a force similar in size, structure and capabilities to today's force. Just as important, we will have to make sure that we have the wherewithal to retain the best service men and women in the force. Again, this won't be cheap!

I must tell you, as I did the Congress a few weeks ago, that our high levels of readiness and fast-paced operations in today's force have not been without serious costs for both tomorrow's force. Spending on current operations and readiness has caused us to cut back on buying replacement equipment and have slowed the development of new systems. Our procurement spending, about $40 billion now, is, in real terms, lower than it was before the Korean War.

As I told the Congress, I have recommended that the Armed Forces commit themselves to the adequate recapitalization of our force structure. This will require procurement spending of approximately $60 billion annually, within our current budget projections. This will take tough management decisions, innovation, and even revolutionary approaches, as well as the continued bipartisan support of the Congress, to accomplish this task.

To accomplish this radical change, we are going to have to work harder, but even more importantly, we are going to have to work smarter. The alternative is a rusty force with outmoded equipment. One essential measure to help us make this radical shift is to develop joint war fighting requirements that will enable all of the Services, together, to harness the power of their people to the best available technologies and war fighting concepts. Joint effort will be the key to developing a force that is both affordable and potent enough to dominate its opponents across the full spectrum of military operations. This is what we attempted to do in our new study, *Joint Vision 2010*.

Let me leave you with my thanks and that of all of the people in uniform for your support. We couldn't have had success with today's force without the support of the people and the Congress. We will need your support in the future, if the force tomorrow is to maintain the level of success that today's force has had. While we are keenly aware of how expensive the Armed Forces is, we know that the only thing more expensive than a good force, is not having the right one, trained and ready, when you need it.

Thank you and God bless you.

Graduation Speech
United States Naval Academy
Annapolis, Maryland
24 May 1996

I am delighted to be here today to congratulate you and to convey to you the special trust and confidence of the President as you begin your service to our nation and its great Naval Services. I am filled with joy for you on this great day.

But today, I am mindful as well that only on Tuesday this week, we had gathered under the vaulted ceilings of our Nation's majestic cathedral to pay proper tribute to a great naval captain, my friend, Admiral Mike Boorda. It was a fitting service for a man who did so much to keep our Navy the finest in the world.

Admiral Boorda loved the Navy and was convinced that the greatness of our Navy was rooted in the magnificence of its sailors and its officers.

He liked to come here to Annapolis to talk to you. And if Admiral Boorda were here today, he would let you know

how proud he was of the Class of '96 and its accomplishments. I know his thoughts about this subject because one of the last times I spoke to him, we talked at length about Annapolis and this very graduation ceremony. Today, I will, as I have in the past, heed my friend's wise counsel.

And so as he suggested, I want to celebrate the achievements of the class and assure you of my confidence in you to grasp the opportunities that lie ahead and to meet head-on the challenges that await you.

Above all else, I want to remind the Class of '96 about how great our Navy and our Marine Corps really are. Yes, what needs fixing will be fixed, but the Navy and Marine Corps that you join today — that is the "A Team;" make no mistake about it.

The Navy and Marine Corps that you join today have served our nation well and faithfully for more than two centuries. Look around you at the battles whose names appear on the walls of this stadium. Midway, Iwo Jima, Normandy, Inchon, Mekong Delta, DESERT STORM. They read like the history of America and that's because the Naval Services have played such a large role in the history of America.

For over two hundred and twenty years, our Naval Services have gone in harm's way first to build and then to safeguard our nation. And beginning today, you will have the privilege to help lead them into the twenty-first century.

But you didn't reach today all by yourself. So many people have helped you and encouraged you over these four years here at Annapolis. First among your supporters have been your parents.

So before I go any further, I would ask all the parents now to rise, and I would ask the Class of '96 and everyone else here to please join with me in a round a applause for the parents of the Class of 1996. I share your pride in your sons and daughters. They are America's future and our future looks very good indeed.

While I am happy to be in the front rank of those congratulating you, there is yet another reason why I wanted to join with you today. This great institution, its leadership, and its midshipmen have all come under criticism of late.

Those of us who choose to wear America's uniform choose as well to live by a higher code of conduct and to surrender ourselves to public scrutiny. And that is entirely proper, for America entrusts the lives of its sons and daughters into our care and America has the right to demand a full accounting of our stewardship.

Eighty years ago, President Woodrow Wilson stood here at Annapolis and explained why public scrutiny of our Armed Forces was and remains to this day so intense. He reminded the Class of 1916 that, "You cannot indulge yourselves in weaknesses ... You cannot forget your duty for a moment, because there might come a time when that weak spot in you should affect you in the midst of a great engagement and then the whole history of the world might be changed by what you did not do or did wrong."

One year later the Class of 1916 was in war.

So the stakes are enormous and you must remember that constructive criticism when honestly and wisely sifted will make us stronger. Learn from criticism, stay open, grow stronger, and don't fall into the trap of becoming defensive of circling your wagons against imaginary enemies outside. That will only weaken you.

But critics also have responsibilities — to be balanced, to be objective, and to look at all the facts. And while they scrutinize the problems of the few, they must also today celebrate the accomplishments of the many. In that regard I hope all the critics can see in its totality how magnificent the Class of '96 really is.

You volunteered to come here, you made it through a blistering plebe year, you tackled one of the most rigorous academic programs in the nation, you succeeded in one of the toughest four-year leadership laboratories ever devised, and you excelled against fierce athletic competition.

You have proven your mettle: in the classroom; on patrol boats with the fleet; at "Leatherneck;" and on the athletic field. And you didn't just make the grade at the Academy, you made a mark.

With intensity, intelligence, and integrity you have earned the rank that you will wear today. I am proud and America is blessed to have you, the Naval Academy Class of 1996, in the United States Armed Forces. For in today's complex, crowded, and contentious world, America needs your talents, your energy, and your optimism.

You see, on the one hand we are safer today now that the Cold War has passed into the pages of history. But on the other hand, the world is awash in failed states, regional conflicts, and the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The old Chinese curse has come alive – we live in interesting times.

While the end of the Cold War allowed us to drawdown our military, this paradoxical world demanded that we keep this small force potent and fully ready. And that high readiness is essential, for our forces have stayed very busy these past 5 years and have been very successful in over 40 operations in peace and war wherever America's interests are at stake and America's leadership was needed.

And the Naval Services have always, always, done their part superbly. When we needed to send a strong message in the Taiwan Straits, when we needed to rescue a pilot downed over Bosnia, when suddenly we had to rush to a chaotic

place called Liberia to evacuate American citizens, or today to do the same thing in the Central African Republic, or when the need arose to deter some renegade dictator from attacking his neighbor time after time, the Naval Services have been the vanguard of our nation's power.

Recently Secretary Perry told the Congress what all of our Allies believe, what every dictator fears, and what every potential aggressor knows: "America has the best damned Navy in the world and no one should ever forget that."

And that Navy will be a key part of our security in the years to come. We don't know what the twenty-first century will bring. But we are sure that it will be every bit as challenging and exciting as the current era.

So we will have to remain strong, we will have to remain ready, and we the United States we will have to continue to lead. To do that requires that we maintain the best military in the world and from this day forward we have your best efforts as the new generation of leaders. And your development as leaders is why you were here these past four years.

Annapolis, for more than 150 years, has been a well spring of great military leaders. Today under the leadership of Admiral Chuck Larson and under the guidance of a first-rate faculty that has educated and trained you, that great tradition of leadership continues.

And today you become the heirs to the legacy of John Paul Jones, of Lejeune, of Nimitz, and of Burke. You start out no different than did the Great Captains, officers like Medal of Honor winner Vice Admiral Johnny Bulkeley, who led his PT boats through a blockade around the Philippines, saved the life of Douglas MacArthur, and who later commanded a flotilla of boats in the fight for the Normandy beaches.

They made a movie about Johnny Bulkeley and his wartime exploits. It was called: "They Were Expendable." It was a great film about heroism, but its title was way off the mark. Leaders like Johnny Bulkeley, officers of courage and integrity, are never expendable — they are indispensable. They aren't part of naval history — they are naval history.

And today, the legacy of the Great Captains of old lives on all over the Navy and Marine Corps. Our Naval Services are the world standard. And the thing that makes that so is leadership. So what must you do to be a good leader?

There is no simple answer to that question. Leadership like all things human is one part situation, one part mystery. It is not physics, it is somewhere between poetry and chemistry — human chemistry.

But in my nearly 40 years of experience the great leaders whom I have known, from Petty Officer to Admiral, have all had three attributes in common: competence; care; and character.

Competence is the cornerstone of leadership. You must be an expert in your field today and tomorrow. Sailors and marines will not follow you if you don't know your business. The President can commission you an officer, but you must develop the competence that will make you a leader.

We in the Armed Forces put a special premium on competence. In business, if you falter the firm may lose money. In the military if you falter, sailors and marines may die, a battle may be lost, a national interest forfeited. We must be competent and competent under the most trying of conditions.

And competence does not just mean being good at your job today. Competence also means preparing yourself for tomorrow's challenges, looking ahead, studying, and gaining an appreciation for the "big picture."

To be competent in the challenging future that you will face, you will have to continue your education in the classroom, on the carriers, and in your communities. Because of the enormous weight of your responsibilities, you will have to achieve a broader perspective than is normally associated with any single profession. And you must apply the insights of your broad-gauged learning to your profession.

And while you are thinking about your profession as you continue to learn about it in the days and months and years ahead, you will, time and again come back to the centrality of caring for the sailors and marines entrusted to you.

Caring must be a constant. When your sailors or marines have a problem you have a problem. Their families are part of your family. And in every measure their successes or their failures will be yours as well.

The best leaders are those who care the most for their subordinates. As in all human relationships, the care that you demonstrate for the sailors and marines entrusted to you will be returned tenfold.

Caring doesn't mean coddling. If you care for your subordinates you will first and foremost make sure that they are ready mentally, physically, and spiritually for the rigors of modern combat.

Caring also means persistence, especially persistence in fighting for justice for the men and women in your charge. Who could not be moved by the recently published story of the World War II officer who fought for 52 years to make sure that a black sergeant in his unit, killed in an act of heroism but denied the Medal of Honor because of racism, was given his just dues?

In May of this year, the name of Staff Sergeant Ruben Rivers of the Company A 761st Tank Battalion was for-

warded to the President and to Congress to receive the nation's highest award. This came after 52 years of effort by his old Company Commander, Captain David Williams. That's persistence, that's caring, that's leadership.

And the final aspect of leadership, its essence, is character. One can debate its constituent parts for hours but clearly the core element of character is integrity — knowing what's right and then acting on it.

Integrity is our anchor in the stormy sea of temptation, manipulation, and moral relativism. For us integrity is both morally right and militarily practical. We believe Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale who, in reflecting on his seven and a half years of experience as a POW in Vietnam, said that, "When supported by education, one's integrity can give a person something to rely on when perspective seems to blur, when rules and principles seem to waver, and when faced with a hard choice of right and wrong. To urge people to develop it is not a statement of piety but of practical advice."

As an officer, your word must be your bond and you must be true to yourself. You can not for long fool the sailors or marines under your command. If you are dishonest with them they will know it. But if you are honest with them, if you are fair, if you look out for them when the chips are down, their trust, their belief in you will mean the difference between victory and defeat.

You must be a beacon of integrity. Your personal integrity will become the basis for the integrity of your crew or unit and the cornerstone of its ethical climate. Good ethics catches on bad ethics spreads like wildfire. Remember the words of General Lejeune, the legendary Marine Commandant, "You [must] never forget the power of example."

I could regale you here with inspirational stories of integrity. There are many such anecdotes, but instead let me leave you with a question, an ethical acid test used by someone well known to you, Admiral Chuck Larson.

When confronted with moral quandaries ask yourself, "Would I be proud to tell my family what I did today?" If you can answer "yes" to that question you will stay on the right path.

In a few moments you will take the oath "to support and defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic." Nowhere in that sacred oath does it remind you that you must be competent, nowhere does it remind you that you must deeply care for the sailors and marines entrusted to your charge, and nowhere does it remind you that you must be a beacon of integrity.

Indeed, the framers of this oath no doubt presumed that if you could "well and faithfully discharge the duties" of your office that you would know these things. They presumed that if you qualified to take this sacred oath, you would already understand and live by President Wilson's admonition to the Class of 1916: Remember in all things "yours is the honor of the United States" of America.

And America today, from this day forward, is better off because you the Class of '96 bring to our Armed Forces your splendid education, your hopes, your vision, and your leadership. From this day forward as you face the challenges of leadership in the twenty-first century, you will stand with the best and the bravest of the Navy and the Marine Corps.

And from this day forward, the world will see what Admiral Mike Boorda told me about you just the other day: that you are well-prepared, that you are able, and that you are ready to lead.

God bless you the Class of '96 and God bless this great institution, the United States Naval Academy.

Constitution Day — Citizenship Day
National Archives
Washington, DC
17 September 1996

I am delighted to be here for Constitution Week, the commemoration of the Constitutional Convention's adoption of the U.S. Constitution in 1787. The 17th of September honors the day when an amazing group of citizens ended their long debate and finally approved the document you see before you.

209 years ago, 55 men made their way to Philadelphia. They came by horse across rugged fields, on boats down the rivers, and along the shores in buggies on dirt roads forever marked with the ruts of revolutionary cannon. They planned to arrive on the 14th of May 1787, but travel was so difficult that after 2 weeks only 29 members were in place. It would be a few weeks more before all 55 took their seats at the convention.

Thanks to the papers of James Madison, we know that for four months the delegates vigorously debated every sentence of this great document. They argued about how states should be represented in Congress; some wanted representation based on their wealth while others preferred state population. They wondered if the new western states that might emerge should have as much influence as the original thirteen states. They argued about how the President

should be elected. At one point Alexander Hamilton tried to convince the Convention that we needed a king — elected for life. Jacob Broom of Delaware suggested the President serve as long as he maintained "good behavior." Wouldn't that have changed American history!

Others, strongly objected to the printing of paper money by the United States, preferred to pay in gold or silver coin. Madison, afraid the currency would be worthless, suggested the treasury back our currency with something valuable — like wheat.

Afraid of a military dictatorship, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts warned that a standing army in peacetime "would be dangerous to liberty and unnecessary."

They also expressed concerns about immigrants. Not about whether the United States should allow immigration, since many of the members like you were foreign born, but rather about how long one should be a citizen before being allowed to run for Congress.

As an interesting fact, did you know that today, two Senators and nine members of the House of Representatives were born in foreign countries?

Finally, on Saturday the 15th of September, George Washington called for a voice vote of the delegates to agree to the Constitution. By this time, only 42 of the original 55 members remained. Some left to attend to business and others left in disgust because they believed the states had lost too much power. But the draft of the constitution passed that day.

Today, the 17th of September, is also celebrated as Citizenship Day in honor of immigrants like you that choose to become a part of this great nation.

My own "Citizenship Day" is not in September, but rather in May. For it was in May of 1958 in Peoria, Illinois, that my father, mother, and I marched down to the courthouse and together, with a whole host of others, raised our hands like you just did. And like you became citizens of the United States of America.

It was a simple ceremony; no band, no V.I.P.s, and no long-winded guest speaker. The presiding Judge spoke and the one line I remember the best was, "In our great land it doesn't matter on which boat we came to this country, because now we are all in the same boat."

The day might have been simple, but it was still the most important day of my life. Because for the very first time I was a citizen of a nation. Not just any nation, but the world's greatest nation, the United States of America.

You see, I came here as a refugee — my parents had been without a country. When I was born, we stayed stateless until we came to this great land. And they came here with a dream for themselves and for their children. A dream not unlike the dream that has brought you to this magnificent hall. The dream, I suspect, that every man and woman that came to this shore has had in common with us.

I once heard someone ask, "What's the difference between the American Dream and everybody else's dream?" The answer is that, "Everybody else's dream is to come to America." That's the dream to come to America that binds us all together.

So in 1952 we fulfilled my parents dream to come to this magical place called America. A country, where if you worked hard, you could become anything you wanted to be: a cowboy; a banker; or even Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

When I first arrived in the United States as a 16 year old, I spoke little English, probably just enough to say "yes," "no," and "thank you." I found that the words "thank you" would go a long way but not enough to get me through school.

And so my parents insisted that within days of arriving in our new home, that I go to school and learn English, perhaps like many of your parents, so that I could succeed in school and enjoy all that America had to offer. I graduated from high school and went on to college.

And then in May 1958, I had a most exciting month. That month I finally became a citizen of this country. Later that month I graduated from college as a new engineer. Within days, I was drafted into the United States Army. Aren't you glad we stopped the draft?

I certainly did not intend to make the military my profession. But in time, the excitement of military duty and deep satisfaction of serving my new country convinced me that the Army is where I belonged. That is now 38 years ago and I could not have had a more marvelous life, playing a small role in defending my parents' dream.

And to all of us today, America is still the New World, a world with unlimited opportunities for those who work hard to realize their dreams. Our success as a nation is based on the fact that although we come from so many different lands, we share a common set of beliefs about freedom and the dignity of man.

For you, today is the dawn of a new day.

It doesn't matter how old or young you are, not whether you're big or small, a man or a woman, for today you are

Americans. Members of the greatest democracy in the history of civilization, champions of individual rights, and defenders of freedom.

And for this honor, a distinction that is the envy of the world, our fellow citizens ask we immigrants join them in assuming the responsibilities of citizenship. That we respect and defend the Constitution of the United States — this wonderful document we honor this week. That we become productive members of our new country, using our talents, whatever they may be, to strengthen our neighborhoods, improve our communities, and enhance the workings of government. That we exercise our rights as citizens to participate in the election of our representatives. That we obey the laws of the land, and finally, that we respect the rights of others.

Since the first settlers set foot on this continent, America has been the land of opportunity or as one author called it a "golden door." We are, as President Lyndon Johnson once said, "...not a nation ... but a nation of nations." Never before have we been so diverse and so rich for the contributions of our new citizens in the fields of science, engineering, government, medicine, the arts, and so many other endeavors.

America is an orchard. Every day new rootstock is planted from foreign lands in the soils of freedom. From this rootstock grow new family trees with blossoms pollinated with the responsibility of citizenship. Trees that bear new varieties of fruit with names like Scalia, Iacocca, Powell, Chu, and Adolfo. These trees enrich the environment in which we live. They produce the oxygen we need to continue, they bear fruit of enviable quality, and they drop the seeds we need to survive. Once you leave this place of honor today it is up to you whether the orchard thrives or fails.

Today, you join the ranks of those that must jealously guard our freedom. It is not an easy task, but a task that must be done if the next generation of Americans is to prosper. One of my officers told me of the day he attended the funeral of his grandmother a few years ago. As he stood at the graveside he was moved not so much by the eulogy for his grandmother but by what he saw on a nearby headstone. There honoring a man with a distinctly East European name, his children had engraved the following words, "Thanks for bringing us to America Dad."

"Thanks for bringing us to America;" six simple words that will be said by every new generation of Americans those with the names Berry, Yee, Jared, Tran, Santa Cruz, and all the rest of you sitting here today.

I congratulate you on this "your" Citizenship Day. God Bless you and God Bless America.

Congressional Testimony on General Downing Report
On Khobar Towers Bombing
Washington, DC
18 September 1996

Before I elaborate on some of the major initiatives we have undertaken following the terrorist attack on Khobar Towers, I would first like to again express my deep condolences to the families of those 24 brave airmen who so tragically lost their lives to terrorists on the Arabian Peninsula in the last 10 months.

I would also like to briefly reflect on the magnitude and complexity of the missions of Central Command as well as on the dedication, professionalism, and heroism of the men and women of that command. Since 1992, CENTCOM has flawlessly executed so many diverse missions, the most widely known of which is Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Southern Iraq. This mission alone requires on the average over 2,300 air sorties per month.

But this is only the beginning. Within the last two years, CENTCOM also conducted continuous Maritime Intercept Operations as well as five major contingency operations, including most recently the air strikes in the southern no-fly zone. All of this was accomplished over lines of communication stretching more than 12,000 sea miles between the United States and the Gulf.

CENTCOM has not just been busy, they have also been highly effective at getting the job done; certainly starting with ejecting Saddam from Kuwait, but year after year then deterring further attacks against our allies and the region's oil supply as well as enforcing U.N. Security Council Resolutions. In short, protecting America's vital interests. And until recently, as Secretary Perry mentioned CENTCOM's demanding military operations could safely be its primary focus.

However, in November 1995, when a bomb exploded near a U.S. security assistance facility in Riyadh their focus needed to be broadened. Terrorism in Saudi Arabia became a high priority security issue. And in the Gulf ... we aggressively began to improve our posture against terrorism.

In Saudi Arabia, force protection improvements were most extensive. In the half-year after the November bomb-

ing, CENTCOM personnel conducted security reviews at nearly every installation in the region. At Khobar Towers alone, CENTCOM personnel completed more than 130 antiterrorist improvements. Indeed I am convinced some of these measures, notably barriers, sentries, and roving patrols, and extremely effective entry control kept the terrorists from penetrating the compound and undoubtedly saved dozens of lives.

After the attack at Khobar Towers, more lives were saved by the sentries who risked their lives to alert the occupants, by the buddy teams who attended to others before themselves, by the physicians and medical technicians who were flown in within hours, and by the dedicated people all along the evacuation route — through Europe to the United States. And don't forget, after this tragedy, CENTCOM's Joint Task Force Southwest Asia was back flying again over the skies of Iraq within 48 hours after they suffered the attack. That's professionalism.

But this command is now operating in a radically different environment. After the bombing at Khobar Towers, it was clear that terrorism, and especially terrorism in the Persian Gulf region, had in fact reached a new level of destructiveness and sophistication. And to meet this challenge requires we change the way we go about the business of force protection. So let me highlight some major areas that are elaborated on in the Secretary's report to help us meet this new challenge. Let me begin with unity of effort.

As Secretary Perry mentioned three days ago, he directed that I, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, assume the duties as his principal advisor and the Department's focal point for all force protection matters. In turn, I am establishing a permanent office within the Joint Staff under the direction of a general officer to deal with all matters of combating terrorism. I will also draw on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the JROC, existing combat support agencies, and others in and out of government to help in the effort. Among its many tasks the new office will help me assist field commanders to ensure that force protection considerations are included in every aspect of our activities worldwide. To do this, we will focus on force protection doctrine, standards, training, and requirements, as well as force protection programs and levels of funding. We will pursue innovative technologies and work closely with our allies who face many of the same threats that we do.

To ensure better coordination overseas and in agreement with the Secretary of State, CINCCENT has been given force protection responsibility and authority for all Department of Defense activities on the Arabian Peninsula, other than those that are an integral element of the U.S. Ambassador's Country Team. Just yesterday, when I met with the Unified Commanders, I asked them to examine whether this agreement might not also be a prototype for the force protection arrangements in their regions as well.

Along with improving our unity of effort, Command and Control is a critical consideration in the organization of every Joint Task Force. As an immediate step we have given the commander of the Joint Task Force in Southwest Asia the specific authority and responsibility for force protection, for all combatant units in the region operating in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. As a further step, we will investigate the feasibility and advisability of establishing a forward headquarters Central Command Forward that would be large enough and could assume Force Protection responsibility for all forces on the Arabian Peninsula.

To achieve key leader stability and to reduce turbulence and to improve continuity for our units on the Arabian Peninsula, we have lengthened the tours of senior leaders and we are taking action to minimize the short-term rotations of individuals as well as units.

To strengthen our posture further we require viable force protection standards, sound force protection doctrine, and appropriate force protection training. While we had advisory force protection standards, we have now reissued them as a directive and I will be further refining these standards to ensure that they fully address the new terrorist threat. Let me give you some examples of current efforts to improve doctrine development and training.

First, we will be reviewing our extensive joint and service doctrine publications to ensure that they also address the new threat and that we have common guidance, procedures, and standards at all levels of command.

Second, we will also review our force protection training to ensure that our schools and training centers teach the right material and that we have force protection training requirements that are specifically tailored to the individual needs of each regional command.

Third, we have learned a great deal about specialized pre-deployment training from our efforts last year to prepare our forces for deployment to Bosnia. Drawing on that experience, the U.S. Atlantic Command in conjunction with the Services and the other Unified Commands has developed a draft antiterrorism training plan to ensure that we provide theater specific training to individuals, as well as units, before they deploy to a theater.

Finally, I have directed the National Defense University to review the status of antiterrorism instruction in our professional military education system, to include risk assessment management training for our leaders.

The last area I would like to address is intelligence.

Despite our best efforts some important improvements in tactical intelligence are obviously warranted. Our intelligence goal must be to preempt and disrupt terrorist cells before they can plan and carry out acts of terrorism against our forces. Thus the collection, analysis, and dissemination of timely and predictive tactical intelligence on the plans, methods, and intentions of terrorists is of the utmost importance. This requires the use of all types of intelligence assets including technical intelligence and human intelligence to accomplish all source intelligence analysis on antiterrorism matters. We have already increased the number of analysts who are working in antiterrorism cells at every level, from the Pentagon down to the Joint Task Force. Most of these cells are on a 24-hour watch. Our primary concern today is to make sure we have enough analysts who are properly trained in terrorism-related issues assigned to these critical analytical positions.

At the user level, we must continue to ensure that the intelligence we acquire about terrorists can be "sanitized" and then quickly passed at the lowest classification possible to the individuals who must act on it to protect our men and women in uniform.

Overall, we must take action to increase the emphasis on terrorist related intelligence and improve intelligence sharing with host nations. The Department and the DCI are working in unison to determine what further improvements in our intelligence are made.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, we will neither be deterred from pursuing our interests nor will we be prevented from protecting our forces. While future terrorist acts are certain, just as certain must be our resolve to protect the lives of our men and women in uniform and Americans everywhere from terrorist attacks. To ensure that this indeed happens, we are moving out with considerable dispatch on the initiatives outlined in Secretary Perry's Force Protection Report.

Council on Foreign Relations
New York City, New York
7 November 1996

It's certainly a pleasure to be back here. For 75 years, senior officials have come to the Council not only to talk, but also to listen to its members about foreign policy issues. And I look forward to listening to your views and your concerns. And I am happy to be back here because I feel that I owe you one! In a parody of our rapidly changing times, the last time I was here to speak I arrived here at the Pratt House, and we were about to sit down to lunch when I was suddenly called away by the President to go to Dayton, and so we never had a chance to talk.

Nearly 40 years ago in basic training, a Drill Sergeant told me that every soldier must "expect the unexpected." I'm not sure that my case was what he had in mind, but it was good advice. In fact in the seven years (almost to the day) since the fall of the Berlin Wall, "expect the unexpected" has become the watchword for the American Armed Forces. In our volatile world, our Armed Forces time after time have overcome the unexpected and, I might add, performed superbly. Not only have they successfully upheld and advanced our interests, but in the process they have created a new world standard for military excellence. And there is absolutely no doubt that today, ours are the best and most capable Armed Forces in the world, bar none.

And to convince you of that I would like to offer *you*, our "stockholders," a prospectus on our Armed Forces and to discuss what we will have to do to maintain the readiness and strength of our forces well into the 21st Century. But at the start, let me be clear: amidst all of the talk about today's dangerous world, it is all too easy to overlook the fact that today the United States and our Allies are much safer than we were in the dark days of the Cold War.

And one of the great strategic benefits from the end of the Cold War is that we have been able to safely cut our forces. Since 1989, we have reduced our active all-volunteer forces by 700,000 people — about a third of the active force. How big is a cut of 700,000 people? The force we cut is more than the number of troops in the British, the German, the Dutch, and the Danish armed forces *combined*. Or, put another way, the force we cut is 200,000 people *more* than all of the autoworkers in the United States. Today, our Armed Forces are smaller than they were since before the Korean War. In terms of combat structure, the Navy went from 566 ships to 354, a reduction of 38 percent. The Air Force went from 36 to 20 fighter wings, a reduction of 45 percent. And the Army went from 18 active divisions to 10, a reduction of 45 percent as well. Meanwhile, the defense budget has been reduced by 40 percent in real terms. And we now spend less of a percentage of our national wealth, only 3.2 percent, on defense than at any time since before the Second World War.

All these are dramatic reductions. Reductions which in the past have always resulted in a nose dive in our capability and readiness. That's what happened after the First World War, the Second, the Korean, and the Vietnam War. But

not this time, not after the Cold War. With hard work, sound leadership in the field, and a high degree of support from two Administrations and the Congress, we have, for the first time in our history, been able to manage a huge postwar drawdown, creating a much smaller but pound-for-pound an even more capable and more ready force. That in itself is a remarkable success story yet to be told.

And it's a good thing that we stayed ready because in the wake of the Cold War came not peace and stability, but ethnic conflicts, failed states, the disorders of democratization, and that old reliable, naked aggression. Today's force has successfully engaged in over 40 contingency operations since Operation DESERT STORM. This week some 55,000 service men and women are participating in 14 separate operations around the globe. That makes it about an average week for the 3 years that I've been Chairman.

A recently concluded operation in Liberia was in many ways typical of these operations. With almost no notice the United States, responding to a call to evacuate American citizens, formed a joint task force from our units in Italy, in the Adriatic, in Germany, in the U.K., and in the United States. The first units were on their way in hours. And in short order, our joint task force, with all of the Services participating, evacuated 2,400 citizens from 68 countries. Although there was lots of gunfire and more than a few close calls, the evacuees and the Task Force returned safely.

Typically, few people in the United States even took notice of this highly complex operation, for the area was so remote, that not even Christiane Amanpour could get there with CNN. But the American people have simply come to expect such skill and professionalism from our Armed Forces. What this operation demonstrates is that no other nation possesses the global reach that would allow them to mount such a joint operation in such remote corners of the world.

But not all of our operations receive so little scrutiny. Today, one of our most closely followed military efforts is in Bosnia, where nearly 17,000 service men and women are performing their military tasks, and are doing so with great expertise and professionalism as part of a 34-nation peace implementation force. Whether in the end the three factions will agree to live together and peace will be able to prevail in Bosnia is still very much in question. However there is no question about the success of IFOR's part of the operation. And so, it is useful to understand why IFOR succeeded where UNPROFOR failed.

The first reason is the close coordination between the diplomat and the soldier, which reached a new height during the crucial negotiations that led to the Dayton Agreement. For the first time, those who would be charged with the implementation of the military aspects of the agreement were there not just as advisors, but as actual negotiators. The second reason is that unlike UNPROFOR, IFOR was given a very clear mission, including specific tasks to be performed, as well as tasks to be specifically excluded. That is exactly what is needed to keep a peacekeeping force from sliding into mission creep. Finally, IFOR has a straightforward chain of command, robust rules of engagement, and sufficient force to get the job done, as well as intimidate those who would wish it ill.

Because of these conditions and because of sound planning, thorough training, and solid leadership, the military aspects of the Bosnia operation have gone so well. And these are lessons that we must not forget in whatever subsequent operations might come our way.

However, regrettably, many of our other expectations have not been met. While successful national and regional elections have been held, municipal elections had to be postponed. And civil reconstruction has lagged badly, as has the building of political structures and the establishment of law and order. Certainly, ethnic hatred and related disputes still dominate life there. And so the possibility of interethnic violence, regrettably, remains a real possibility.

That said, today, IFOR, its military tasks completed and municipal elections pushed off into the spring or later, has begun to withdraw. Barring unforeseen circumstances, American forces in Bosnia should be down to approximately 10,000, or maybe even 7,500, by the time IFOR's mission ends around the 20th of December. The question being discussed now is *not* whether IFOR will remain; *it will not*. The question is whether there might be a need for some other follow-on force to deter a renewed outbreak of hostilities and to protect our significant investment there to date.

To answer this question NATO's military authorities will report to the North Atlantic Council on four options that include: complete withdrawal after the 20 December "end-of-mission;" a follow-on force, stationed either inside or outside of Bosnia, whose sole function would be deterrence of the outbreak of new fighting; a beefed up deterrent force, which could provide on-scene stability as well; and finally, a force similar to IFOR which would be able to provide all of these functions along with wider civil support.

Based on the results of this study, the NAC will then decide whether or not there should be a post-IFOR military force, what its mission and specific tasks should be, what the size of such a force would have to be, and how long such a force would have to stay. NATO nations, including the United States, as well as other non-NATO participants in IFOR, in turn, will have to decide whether they would wish to participate in such a follow-on force.

Clearly, IFOR gave the people of Bosnia a year without war. And perhaps the people must be given some more

time. But about one thing we must be clear: only the Bosnians themselves, Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, can make a lasting peace in that land. But the stakes are high. For this is not only about peace and stability in Bosnia, but also about the future of NATO and thus, as well, the contours of a future Europe and the continued strength of the Trans-Atlantic link.

And along the way these last few years, we have seen how difficult it is to protect our interests abroad from our barracks at home. And also how in international affairs, as in battle, you can only lead from the front. Because America's leadership is so important and because we are, as President Clinton states, that "indispensable nation," our men and women in uniform today serve with great distinction, not just in Europe, but in other parts of the world where our interests are important: enforcing the no-fly zones in Iraq; dampening conflict in the Taiwan Straits; deterring aggression in Korea; and helping to stem the flow of illegal drugs from Latin America. Our active engagement would not be possible without the superb men and women in uniform today, our unmatched military capabilities, and our high levels of readiness.

But now, the question before us is whether we can maintain this readiness into the future. To that end, we have begun to work on a Quadrennial Defense Review with the goal of completing it next spring. In preparation for this soup-to-nuts review, the first task was to look at the future security environment out some 10 to 15 years.

Certainly, predictions are problematical. Everyone from Cassandra to Yogi Berra knows that. Given the power of historical accidents, the gaps between good data, useable information, and accurate predictions, remain very wide. But even with this caveat, some predictions are relatively safe. And they suggest a range of policy choices that are similarly prudent.

In our internal review, we concluded that for the U.S. Armed Forces, the world between now and the year 2010 will be at least as challenging as the present one. While we can take comfort from the absence of superpower competition, the growth of the world economy, and the progress of democracy around the world, we will also have many security-related concerns. In the next 15 years, we see the further development of a complex world of many asymmetrical powers, a world marked by ethnic and religious-based conflicts, and influenced considerably by non-state actors. Adding to the soup, there will undoubtedly be significant leadership and regime changes in North Korea, Cuba, China, and many countries in the Middle East. The effects of these transitions will add to the unpredictability of our world.

Demographically, we see world population growing by 25 to 35 percent, with particularly rapid growth in the developing countries. Economic growth in some of those countries will be negated by population growth. Mass migrations from developing to developed countries will also continue. At the same time in the developed world, the population will age, putting greater strains on pension systems and entitlement programs, creating downward pressure on budgets for foreign and defense policy.

Economically, we see greater interdependence and a growing world economy, but increasing competition for resources. Continued urbanization will exacerbate social problems in both the developed and developing world.

Technologically, we see dangers related to the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the vulnerability of our information and data processing infrastructure, and the growing sophistication of terrorist movements. And our military will be influenced by what some call a "Revolution in Military Affairs," the term that describes the rapid and profound progress in the marriage between information technologies and precision strike capabilities.

The good news is that we are on the leading edge of that revolution. The bad news is that the entry barriers to this revolution are relatively low, and in this century, no leader in military technology has ever gone unchallenged for very long. So out to 2010, our forces in the field are likely to face a range of threats, from terrorists, to rogue states with weapons of mass destruction, to potent regional powers, or toward the end of that period, even emerging peer competitors. It is sad but probably true, that in the next 15 years, disorder, conflict, and war, especially on the low end of the spectrum, will likely remain a growth industry.

With that as a given, our forces in the future must remain able to prevent threats from arising by shaping the strategic environment; deter threats, if they emerge; and, if conflict prevention and deterrence fail, use force to defeat these threats whenever and wherever our important interests are at stake.

To be ready, it seems to me, three key tasks must be accomplished. First, the U.S. must maintain its current major alliances in Europe, Asia, and its coalition in the Middle East. Our cornerstone alliance in the west is NATO. Contrary to all of the experts of a few years back, it is not disappearing. Rather, it is getting stronger, reaching out to other nations through the Partnership for Peace, and opening up to new members. Unlike all of us in this room, NATO is not getting older, it's getting better, and indeed more relevant. The basic decision to enlarge that Alliance was made some time ago and reconfirmed at the Bergen ministerial in September. It is no longer an issue of "if" but of "when" and "who."

But NATO enlargement must also be seen in relationship to a second major task for future U.S. national security

policy: engagement with the great powers. Russia today is fraught with challenges and is still in the early stages of transition to democracy and a market economy. But some of our engagement activities are quite intense. Here, we must make a special note of our cooperation on the control of nuclear weapons and materials and our ground-breaking cooperation in Bosnia.

Earlier this week, I visited my counterpart in Moscow, and had a fruitful day discussing how far we have come just in the last few years. Who could have imagined ten years ago (or even five years ago) that a Russian brigade, a solid fighting unit by the way, would be working side-by-side with a U.S. armored division as part of a NATO-led operation helping to bring peace to a troubled country in the Balkans? The joint patrols of Americans and Russians have done a lot for IFOR's reputation for evenhandedness among the former belligerents. And this kind of engagement will also help to break down the barriers between us and between Russia and NATO.

Soon, NATO and the Russian armed forces will open liaison offices at each other's headquarters. The Secretary of State has proposed formalizing the relations between NATO and Russia with a charter that would create standing arrangements for consultation and for joint action. In that, while we intend to open NATO to new members, our aim is to build stability and security in Europe not *against* Russia but *with* Russia.

In a similar vein, peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region will be strongly influenced by U.S. - Chinese relations. The United States is firmly committed to continuing its policy of engagement with China. While trade has become, and will remain, a significant factor in our bilateral relationship, China's vast population, rapidly growing economy, and modernizing military, make it the major actor on the Asian security scene.

Engagement on security matters will be difficult. While we have many shared interests in the region, China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, its policy toward weapons of mass destruction, and its fractious relations with Taiwan, and its differing views on human rights issues, will make engagement with Beijing potentially the most complex challenge that we face in the year ahead.

However, as Secretary Perry has noted, military-to-military relations must be part and parcel of our policy toward China. Contact between our military and China's may have a positive influence on the Chinese military — a key player in Chinese politics. But even if that hope is frustrated, contacts between our militaries will improve mutual understanding and reduce the effects of misperceptions.

Overall, while protecting our interests, we must maximize our engagement with China. We may not succeed at helping China to become more democratic, but common sense and our long-term interests demand that we continue to try. And such a policy is supported by all of our friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region.

As a third major task, we must ensure that our military strength remains commensurate with our worldwide interests and international obligations well into the future. This strength depends on three factors: the willingness to invest in readiness; making the right force structure decisions; and making prudent investments in modernization.

The great issues of defense planning for an uncertain world have often been reduced to one simple question: How much is enough? On force structure, this issue is particularly tough to decide when there is no overarching central threat. During the Cold War the prospect of war with the U.S.S.R. determined the force levels against which we had to size our own forces. After the Cold War, first in the Base Force and then in the Bottom Up Review, we sized against two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, one in the Persian Gulf and one in Korea.

Critics of this force have noted that a one-conflict force or a reinforced one-conflict force is all that is needed or supportable in the future. Others have noted that savings from force structure cuts could be put toward modernization to keep the force up-to-date. But these critics ignore how hard the present force is working to meet the requirements of lesser contingencies, such as Bosnia, of our military-to-military outreach programs, of our forward presence requirements, and the rest. They also ignore the strategic utility of a multiple contingency force.

Last year, for example, soldiers and marines deployed for around 140 days on the average. On any given day over half of our Navy's ships are underway, with more than a third of the total forward deployed. The Air Force, with a third less people than during the Cold War, has more than quadrupled the number it habitually deploys on operations. These facts all support one conclusion: the force structure today is being worked to its capacity, especially when we consider the requirements for training that precede or come after lengthy operations or engagement activities.

Our best estimates are that our forces will be at least as busy in the mid to long-term as they are today. Moreover, much of what we do for engagement or on the low end of the operational spectrum is more manpower intensive than we originally thought. But our peacetime requirements challenging as they may be are not the most important reason to maintain a robust, highly capable force. The capability to fight *and* win major contingencies is the most important reason.

I am not talking about conceptual requirements here. In my tour as Chairman, we have faced multiple contingen-

cies. For just one example, in the fall of 1994, in response to heightened threats we deployed deterrent forces to both Korea and Kuwait. Remarkably, just a few weeks before those deployments, we had dispatched a humanitarian mission to Rwanda, and while that was still going on, a force of some 21,000 personnel to Haiti to restore democracy to that troubled island.

As we begin to size the force of tomorrow, it is important to understand that the size of our force today is not a luxury but a practical requirement. We are today as busy as we've ever been short of a major war. And as we try to determine that force for tomorrow, we must also resist the tempting notions that somehow, somewhere, there is some undiscovered answer that will allow us to do more with less. Yes, farther out in the long-term future, there are promising technologies that may allow us to maintain the same capabilities with a smaller force. And that brings us to the issue of modernization, the bedrock of tomorrow's readiness.

Modernization presents us with a very big challenge. In a restrictive budget environment, we must now turn to replacing old equipment and sustaining a prudent modernization program. We must also leverage new technology to develop the capabilities that we will need to stay ahead in the out years.

During the downsizing, we were able to hold back on buying new equipment and hold back on modernization because sufficient equipment had been freed up from units that were being deactivated. Now this windfall has passed, and we face the demanding task of modernizing our force.

Today our procurement spending is in real terms lower than it was before the Korean War. I told Congress last winter that to ensure the readiness of tomorrow's force, we would have to increase procurement spending by approximately 15 to 20 billion dollars annually.

To accomplish this, will take revolutionary new management approaches. Additionally, more bases will have to be closed, more functions privatized, and more equipment and services purchased off-the-shelf. Where possible, without reducing force structure, we will have to trim manpower. We must also continue the restructuring of our reserve forces to bring them into line with our strategic requirements. And certainly to make the force more efficient, we must continue to build on the great strides that we have made in joint doctrine, joint training, joint education, and in joint operations.

A few months ago we made a bold leap into the future by publishing *Joint Vision 2010,* a conceptual template for, and approved by, all of the Services and joint commands. When it is fully implemented, *JV 2010* will change the way the uniformed services and the joint commands do business in the long-term. In the past, each Service created a vision of future warfare that emphasized its own competencies. The end result was wasted resources and unnecessary duplication of effort.

Without hobbling the Service's core competencies, *Joint Vision 2010* will move the entire Armed Forces, jointly, into the 21st Century. It will provide us a foundation to bring together emerging technologies, high quality people, and outstanding training, with the aim of achieving dominance across the full spectrum of operations that we might face.

For the first time in our history, all the Services and all of the joint commands will work from a common vision of future operations. Using key operational concepts as a "mark on the wall," this common vision will enable us to make better resource and acquisition decisions by asking one probing question: what is the value of this proposal for the joint fight?

In the final analysis, *Joint Vision 2010* keeps us ready, and makes us more efficient.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a law written somewhere, in some important book, that a long speech must have a short conclusion.

As I said earlier, President Clinton laid out the challenge when he said that the United States is, and must remain, the world's "indispensable nation." For the Joint Chiefs, that means that our challenge now, is to design a force for tomorrow that is structured, modernized, and ready, to keep us persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict. A force for tomorrow, that will enable some future Chairman to stand before you, and say as confidently as I can, that ours is the best and most capable military in the world.

Goldwater-Nichols Symposium
National Defense University
Goldwater-Nichols: Ten Years From Now
Washington, DC
3 December 1996

I am delighted to be with you to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, to share with you my views on how well we have done in fulfilling the promise of that Act, and perhaps to suggest what further reforms we might consider, as we look ahead to the 20th Anniversary of the Act.

But before I begin, let me point out that we are just a few days away from another very important joint operation. In Philadelphia, on Saturday, the 97th Army-Navy game will be played, and I am very proud to be the Chairman in a year when these two Service academies have a combined record of 17-3 and are both ranked in the top 30 in the nation. Somehow, I am certain that this had something to do with Goldwater-Nichols.

Seriously, I think the last time that happened, George Marshall was the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Ernest King was the Chief of Naval Operations. And what is so remarkable, is that, back in 1945, they accomplished this feat without the guiding hand of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff!

By the way, I don't want anyone to think that jointness means I'm going to cheer equally for both sides. Believe me, the "next level of jointness" doesn't extend that far. We all know that Yogi Berra had it right about the Army-Navy game, when he said, "This game isn't about life or death. It's a lot more important than that." And that, ladies and gentlemen, is also how I feel about the subject of defense reorganization and Goldwater-Nichols.

It is said that we see what lies ahead by first understanding the past. So tonight, I will first try to give you my perspective on our progress in implementing Goldwater-Nichols by looking at some of the key areas in the legislation to see how we have measured up to the intent of the Act.

Let me begin in 1986. It was the peak year of defense spending in the Cold War era. We were moving smoothly toward our Active Component goals of 18 divisions in the Army, 600 ships in the Navy, 26 tactical fighter wings in the Air Force, 3 divisions in the Marine Corps, and strong Reserve Component forces, as well. The threat was very real and unambiguous. It was the Soviet Union. We faced them around the world with a global strategy of containment and deterrence. It was in every sense a bipolar world.

In 1986, Chernobyl melted down, foreshadowing the implosion of the Soviet Union. President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev met in Reykjavik, and the debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative was at its peak.

Caspar Weinberger was the Secretary of Defense and my friend, Bill Crowe, was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The position of the Vice Chairman didn't exist at all, and John Shali was a "baby brigadier" in the 1st Armored Division in Europe, deeply involved in a Cold War that seemed as though it would go on forever.

Two recent military operations, although ultimately successful, had been accomplished in ways that suggested the need for better defense organization. They were the Libyan air strikes, Operation EL DORADO CANYON, and the rescue of American medical students from the island of Grenada, Operation URGENT FURY. In both cases, there was a clear need for improvement in the integration and organization of our armed forces, a persistent theme of military reformers going all the way back to 1947. The need for those improvements inspired the legislation that we celebrate today, and Goldwater-Nichols was, as it turns out, a truly visionary piece of work.

I know that you have already heard a great deal about the Goldwater-Nichols Act from a wide variety of speakers. But tonight, I would like to give you a Chairman's Report Card on how well I think we've done so far in implementing this Act. But before I give out my grades, let me first give out some "extra credit." Collectively, we must give credit to the role played by the Services in making Goldwater-Nichols successful. Although there was some initial resistance, as there was across much of the defense establishment, I am very pleased with the role ultimately played by the Services in making the cultural changes necessary to successfully move our Armed Forces to a new level of jointness.

Now, how well did we do in implementing the Act?

The first objective was "to reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department." Generally, the provisions of the act in this regard have been implemented quite well, particularly through the Secretary's Defense Planning Guidance and his Contingency Planning Guidance. As we continue to work at smoothing the integration of these documents into the broader budget and strategic planning cycles, there is much room for better coordination and direction. So, on balance, I would grade this area a high "B."

Our second objective was "to improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense." I think this part of the Act is an important success story. Through the increased respon-

sibilities and authority given to the Chairman and the assignment of the Joint Staff to his direct support, we have broken free from the "lowest common denominator" recommendation that so often plagued us in the past. We have been able to provide far better, more focused advice. I would grade this portion of the Act a solid "A."

The third and fourth objectives are interrelated and I will grade them together. These two objectives enhanced the authority of our unified commanders over their forces and clarified their responsibilities, making them fully responsible for accomplishing the missions of their commands. The best proof of their success is where it matters most: in warfighting. General Powell said recently that, "the invasion and liberation of Panama in December 1989 was the first full test of Goldwater-Nichols in a combat situation. It was something of a shakedown cruise for what we would be doing in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM a year later." And since DESERT STORM, in many different joint and combined operations, we have proven, again and again, the validity of these reforms. And the portions of the Act involving the CINCs have been a key reason for these successes.

In addition to operational improvements, the CINCs today have a far more influential voice in the resource and procurement process and in the execution of joint training, both key goals of Goldwater-Nichols. Overall, this Act, by providing both the responsibility and the authority needed by the CINCs, has made the Combatant Commanders vastly more capable of fulfilling their warfighting role. It is a success story by any measure, rating a solid "A."

The fifth objective was "to increase attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning." We've improved a great deal here. Our national security and national military strategies are both very good, but not perfect. We are also closing in on the full integration of our CINC plans at the highest level. As a matter of fact, I believe that our major war plans, today, are the best I have seen in all the years that I've been reviewing such documents. On balance, I would assign a very high "B," since we still have some room for further improvement.

A sixth objective was "to provide for more efficient use of defense resources." Overall, I think we've done fairly well here. A key part of our success in this area was in creating the position of Vice Chairman. The four great men who've served as "the Vice," Bob Herres, Dave Jeremiah, Bill Owens, and now Joe Ralston, have enabled us to pay far greater attention to requirements to integrate them better and to influence programmatic issues at the highest levels of the Department of Defense.

Under the leadership of our Vice Chairmen, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has progressed from an acorn to a pretty good-sized oak tree. The joint perspective gained through the maturation of the JROC process and its allied Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments have made a key difference. In a real sense, the JROC has become the collective voice of the warfighting CINCs in the programmatic world.

The JROC's input into the budgeting process, the Chairman's Program Assessment and the Chairman's Program Recommendations have also had great impact. As Bill Owens and Jim Blaker noted, "the JROC represents the first major revision of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System since Secretary Robert McNamara put it in place more than three decades ago." I fully agree with that and applaud Bill Owens's pioneering work in this area. In the end, I would assign a high "B" in this area, since I'm convinced that we can and will make further progress along the lines envisioned by Bill Owens and Joe Ralston.

The seventh objective was "to improve joint officer management policies." The Director for Manpower and Personnel on the Joint Staff, Admiral Ronnie Froman, will talk to you tomorrow. But let me just observe that while we can celebrate some notable successes in this area, we must also register the need for still more improvements. For example, as Ronnie Froman will explain, we've made terrific progress, particularly in the quality of officers assigned to joint staffs worldwide. There is absolutely no comparison with the way it was before Goldwater-Nichols, or even just a few years ago. All you have to do is spend a little time with the action officers on the Joint Staff to understand why so many consider it the premier military staff.

On the other hand, when you look at the difficulties we are continuing to experience in getting our promotion statistics right and look at how many waivers are still required for many aspects of joint officer management, you realize that we still have a ways to go. On balance, we are between a "B" and a "C" in this area, and we are going to have to work this a little harder.

Our eighth and final objective was "to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense." This was a very broad objective, one that captures what might be termed the "cultural" elements of jointness: education; doctrine; training; and readiness assessment. Let me grade each of those separately.

Joint education, again stimulated by Goldwater-Nichols and the subsequent work done by Congressman Ike Skelton and his colleagues, is a major success story. We now have a Joint Professional Military Education structure, which provides for joint education throughout an officer's career. Our pre-commissioning programs are currently providing a

greater focus on jointness, while our intermediate and senior Service and Joint schools have already passed a rigorous joint accreditation process.

I have stressed that teaching joint skills and teamwork must not crowd out the first importance of Service core competencies. Rather, joint skills and teamwork must be built upon Service core competencies, as we equip our future leaders for the challenges of joint and combined operations that have become our way of life. We are well on our way to accomplishing this objective and I would give us a solid "B" in Joint Education.

Joint Doctrine has emerged as a central organizing force in our military operations. The Services, the CINCs, the Defense Agencies, and the Joint Staff have teamed with our Joint Warfighting Center to create a body of authoritative joint doctrine — our "play book" — which allows joint forces to operate together in a predictable and concerted fashion.

Today, the bulk of our joint doctrine is now in place. And we now have an effective system to achieve closure on remaining doctrinal issues and to update our doctrine as required. The effectiveness and practical value of this joint doctrine has been demonstrated numerous times in joint and combined operations around the globe. Our joint doctrine is a vibrant and growing body of knowledge, a very successful aspect of Goldwater-Nichols. I give us an "A" in this area.

Next is Joint Training. Our Joint Staff, assisted by the Joint Warfighting Center, has developed a comprehensive Joint Training System which the CINCs and Services are using to achieve better focus and balance in our worldwide joint training program. This requirements-based Joint Training System focuses scarce resources on our most important joint mission essential tasks, allowing us to be good stewards and good trainers at the same time. Additionally, the pioneering work of USACOM as a Joint Force Trainer and Integrator has been critical to the development of our superb joint warfighting capabilities. As an aside, let me add that USACOM's Joint Task Force Training equals the best of our service training opportunities. Overall, I am very pleased with our progress in Joint Training and I know this progress will continue, especially with further advances in the use of innovative training technologies. This is certainly a high "B."

In the area of Joint Readiness Assessment, we have improved a great deal, particularly in our ability to correctly evaluate the ability of the CINCs to execute their missions. We still have a way to go in this area particularly in refining our ability to use readiness data to predict future trends. But I'm confident we'll continue to improve. I think we rate a "B" in Joint Readiness Assessment overall.

So with 4 "As," 6 "Bs,", and only one "C," what's ahead for us? As we project ourselves out to the 20th anniversary of Goldwater-Nichols, what must we do to continue to improve our organization for national security?

Frankly, the odds are good that ten years from now, I will be running a hardware store somewhere. But with some luck, and the help of my nurse, and an invitation from NDU, I may be able to attend a future celebration like this one. But a decade from now, what will we be celebrating?

I hope that, first and foremost, we will be celebrating the full and complete implementation of Goldwater-Nichols, with a Chairman's Report Card that reflects straight A's across the board. I have no doubt that this is doable.

However, I would like to focus, tonight, more specifically on three key ideas that may find some resonance with all of you. I hope the first thing that we might celebrate will be progress toward the achievement of the core capabilities and interoperability needed by all of the Services and Unified Commands, that will enable our Armed Forces to be dominant across the spectrum of conflict in the year 2010 and beyond.

Up to a short time ago, the Services each had a different vision for the future. But today, due in some measure to the influence of Goldwater-Nichols and the Commission on Roles and Missions, we have a common vision, *Joint Vision 2010*, that lays out a common direction for all of the Armed Forces. *JV2010* is the beginning of a process. It is the alpha, not the omega. It will certainly change over time, but I think, ten years from now, we shall celebrate the success of that vision.

Already we see concerted efforts by the Services to align their respective visions with *Joint Vision 2010*. We also see the positive involvement by the CINCs, as we wrestle with the implementation challenges ahead. I know *JV2010* will continue to evolve and develop. In fact, we will soon publish an ambitious implementation plan. *Joint Vision 2010* is our bridge to the next level of jointness, a conceptual template for the conduct of future joint operations, and the link between Goldwater-Nichols and the 21st century military.

The second broad area of future effort, that I hope we will be celebrating ten years from now, is further improvement in how we organize and staff the senior staffs in the Department of Defense. One key issue here is the appropriate role for the OSD staff. There are those who suggest OSD should focus strictly on policy, remaining "a level above" any operational concerns. Others see operations and certain management functions as clearly within the purview of OSD.

I don't think it is a question of "either/or." We need to look at this complex issue, building on the suggestions of John White's Commission on Roles and Missions, and find in every issue area the appropriate level of involvement for OSD in operations and management, balancing that with their role in the development of overarching policy.

Another question is how best to create efficiencies between the Service staffs and the Military Secretariat staffs. As the Commission on Roles and Missions Report points out, there are areas of existing duplication, opportunities for consolidation of several staff functions, and the chance to improve the Service headquarters management processes.

A final staff-related idea, and one frequently discussed, involves the size of the defense bureaucracy. While I agree with the general proposition that the defense headquarters bureaucracy is too large, I think we need to be clear about something very fundamental: there is no free lunch!

If we significantly shrink staff sizes, we simply won't be able to do all that we are required to do today. Only by shedding functions will we be able to make our defense bureaucracy significantly smaller. But, again, efforts to shrink the bureaucracy are certainly worth pursuing. I hope that in ten years we will be able to celebrate the harvest of these efficiencies in these organizational areas, building on the fine and continuing work by John White, Sam Nunn, and other influential and energetic advocates of continuing defense reform, many of whom are in this room tonight.

The third, and, in my view, most important area for improvement that I hope we can celebrate ten years from now is the emergence of a broad reform movement, focusing on our national security structure, and taking into account to the entire interagency process. I believe that is the next logical step.

Secretary Perry has often pointed out the major challenges our 21st century CINCs will face in the emerging global environment. He has also recently developed a new concept to describe our efforts to shape the security environment. He calls it "preventive defense." His belief is that the positive engagement of our forces in this dangerous and volatile world will create the conditions that support peace, make war less likely, and make deterrence less necessary. This concept of "preventive defense" will be in effect our first line of defense.

I agree completely. We have the ability and the obligation to help shape the future global security environment. But my belief is that all of our national security assets — economic, political, cultural, and not just military — are important in this process.

Preventive defense is very complex. It will require new levels of cooperation between those of us in the Department of Defense and the rest of the interagency. A strong, well understood linkage between the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Commerce, and indeed among the entire interagency will be vital. Look at many of the most recent challenges to U.S. national interests around the world: Rwanda and Zaire; Bosnia; Haiti; the Arabian Gulf. In every one of these operations, success required the involvement of a wide variety of interagency participants.

The good news is that, in all these operations, there have been fine examples of interagency cooperation. Certainly, the best recent example of this process of leveraging military force in support of diplomacy was our success in the Dayton accords. For the first time, those who would be charged with the implementation of the military aspects of the agreement were there, not just as advisors but as actual negotiators. Likewise, we had great success in Haiti, where coordination between diplomacy and the threat of the use of military force proved so effective that it negated the need to storm the beaches.

But despite these successes, there is clearly considerable room for improvement. Problems in the interagency today remind me very much of the relationship among the Services in 1986. We need an agreed on, written-down, exercised organization and set of procedures to bring the full capability of the Department of Defense and all of the other relevant government departments and agencies to bear on the complex crises to which future Presidents might commit us. Haiti and Bosnia are, on the one level, examples of progress made, but they are even better examples of how much further we can get, if we set our minds to it.

The key will be making sure that the military, which has vast resources for undertaking many of the tasks associated with these international crises, is an integrated part of a larger comprehensive national plan, and not in itself the main plan, or even worse, the only developed and exercised plan.

Over the next decade, there is no major peer competitor threatening the national survival of the United States. World War Three is not looming before us, and the Cold War is finally over. We have an opportunity, a rare and precious opportunity, to shape the global environment. As President Roosevelt said, "We seek not only an end to war but an end to the beginning of wars." That's even more true today than it was when he spoke those words.

If we can take the ideas and spirit of Goldwater-Nichols, a desire to reorganize and restructure in the name of efficiency and national security, and apply them to the entire interagency, we will make great gains in our nation's power. And, at the 20th anniversary of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, we will be able to say, not only that ours is the best

organized, most ready, and most effective military in the world, but we will also be able to add, that ours is the most effective national security structure, as well.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, there is a very important law, written in a book somewhere, that a long speech should have a short ending.

So here it is — this symposium has been a celebration of a great success. And I'd like to close by saying "thank you" to the visionaries who gave us the Goldwater-Nichols Act. I offer all of them, and especially all those here tonight, our collective thanks for a job exceedingly well done. Without a doubt, Goldwater-Nichols has helped make ours the very best military in the world, bar none. And that truly is cause to celebrate.