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MR. LEVON: Welcome to Worldnet's Dialogue. I'm Neil Levon. Today we present a live, unedited news conference with General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. Joining us from the Pentagon, General Shalikashvili will discuss the upcoming NATO summit, the Partnership for Peace initiative, and other global security issues with participants in Poland, Germany, France, and the Czech Republic. Welcome to Worldnet, General.

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: Thank you very much. It' s good to be here.

MR. LEVON: General, before serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you held the top job in NATO. With your background in that organization, what can we expect from the upcoming summit?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: Well, I think it's fair to say that all summits are terribly important. But it's equally fair to say that this summit perhaps is more important than any other one since 1949, when we launched the Alliance. We all know that the Alliance today, and Europe itself, is very much in a transition, and we know the reasons for it. But as a result of this transition, what we find today is that there are lingering questions about the continued relevance of the Alliance, the Alliance's ability to deal with those nagging security issues that plague Europe. There is also continuing doubt about the staying power of the United States as far the Alliance is concerned, and questions are being asked whether in fact there is an enduring nature to our commitment to the Trans-Atlantic Alliance, or whether we're just in Europe until things go well in Russia or if we're just in Europe until the Maastricht process in fact runs its course. And it's terribly important that the Summit comes to grips with those issues.

There's the further issue of how the Alliance will tackle the issue of expansion to the East, of outreach to the East. And it is for those reasons that I think that the NATO Allies welcome so very much President Clinton's call for a summit that will occur here now on the 10th of this month because this summit will give us the opportunity first of all I think, to reaffirm once again the centrality of the Alliance. I think it is important that we understand that there are other institutions, security institutions other than the Alliance. But that this must be a cooperative effort and not a confrontational effort, and that the Alliance must in fact stay as a central institution where we bring our security concerns, as far as the transatlantic region is concerned.

Secondly, and perhaps just as important, this summit will give us the opportunity to squarely reaffirm once again the enduring nature of these Trans-Atlantic linkages, that the United States is in fact in Europe to stay, because it is in the security interests of the United States to do so. And of course it gives us the opportunity to come to grips with the issue of the outreach to the East, and that's where of course President Clinton's proposal for the Partnership for Peace comes in.

At the same time, it gives us the opportunity to reach agreement also on how the Alliance can best deal with Europe itself, with the European security identity, how the Alliance itself can become more flexible to deal with command and control arrangements to allow it to operate out of area, in such operations should it ever become necessary to move, for instance, into Bosnia to help implement whatever peace plan that might eventually be developed.

So, for those reasons, I think it is time to make a significant strategic redirection as far as the Alliance is concerned. And that's why I think this summit is absolutely crucial to all of us who are members of the Alliance, and all of us who are in the rest of Europe, looking at the Alliance and seeing how the Alliance will develop.

Q: (Inaudible) — Czech Television. General, don't you think NATO should distinguish between Russia and Central European states, at least for their historical experience and higher level of democracy in these states?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: I think we clearly distinguish. But when you ask me what the approach in the near term should be, I think this approach is exactly right when we suggested that the next step in this evolution needs to be something that we call the Partnership For Peace. Any other approach, I think stands in danger of establishing a new division in Europe. And, after all, we have spent — I don't know, 40 years trying to break down divisions in Europe. And what a shame it would be if all of a sudden we would now be rebuilding divisions. I think for the moment the best course of action is in fact something like the Partnership for Peace that does not establish divisions. But that is something different than saying that we consider Russia or East and Central European countries differently. Clearly they have a different history, and we look upon them differently.

Q: Jolanta Deinkowska — Television, Warsaw. General, it seems like the Partnership for Peace seems to be a big issue in Poland. Most of the politicians here say that this is the way to show that you do something without doing anything. Could you give us at least one argument that this is a good thing for Poland?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: Oh, certainly. First of all, I absolutely reject the argument that this is just simply some sort of a facade. The Partnership for Peace for is a qualitative step forward in the relationship between our cooperation partners and other European nations that would want to join the Partnership and the Alliance. It brings us a significant step closer together as we deal in bringing our militaries closer together as we deal in very practical things such as exercises, joint planning, and joint operations. It gives us an opportunity to break down any transparency issues between us, and it brings our militaries, if we pursue this correctly, so much closer together. So when the day comes when we wish to speak about extending membership, our militaries will already have the joint procedures, the joint operating experience, the joint training experiences that are absolutely vital to making an alliance like NATO work. So I reject the notion that this is a facade. I think this is an extraordinarily important and meaningful step forward in our relationship.

Q: (inaudible). General, the initiative Partnership for Peace is sometimes called the other half of the George C. Marshall vision for Europe. That plan took several years to realize. My first question, what is in your opinion the time line for the full realization of this Partnership for Peace?

The second question. The Eastern European countries were excluded from the Marshall Plan due to the — (inaudible). Do you think that now Russia itself will in fact — (inaudible) — especially now after the Zhirinovsky successes in the election?

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: I think those are two extraordinarily good questions. On the first one, I think it is up to countries in Central and Eastern Europe to drive the pace how quickly we progress. And that is the beauty of the Partnership for Peace. It is not up to the Alliance to set the pace, but it is really up to our partners to set the pace. And those that want to move very quickly should do so, and we would be standing by, be as supportive as we possibly can. Others who want to move more slowly will move at their pace.

I think there is no reason why early 1994 we should not see the first positive results of the Partnership for Peace. When it is completed, I don't know, because how far we go will be up to you and us and principally up to you how far you wish to carry that process. But I think we ought to spend little time talking, lots of time doing. I think those are the sort of tangible results that both your people and our people are looking for.

As far as Russia is concerned, I am very, very hopeful that Russia will be supportive of the Partnership for Peace. After all, the Partnership for Peace ought to serve Russia every bit as much as it serves the Alliance. So I must tell you that as I sit here I am very, very hopeful and very encouraged that Russia will in fact find it's a positive move and will be very much supportive of that, despite election results, or maybe ...

Q: (Inaudible) — for Central European News in Prague. General, you talked a lot about the Partnership for Peace and a long-term best-case scenario. I was wondering whether you could say something about the shorter worst-case scenario. I come from a country that on numerous occasions throughout history surrendered its fate to more powerful neighbors. Now, I don't know how you review the reform process in Russia, but generally people here seem to regard the Russian reform process as all but dysfunctional. In the event that the situation deteriorates rapidly there, what are you prepared to offer the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarians, as far as security measures go? If not a NATO Partnership for Peace, then what in the immediate future? We're not talking years down the road; we're talking weeks, months.

GEN SHALIKASHVILI: Hall, let me be clear then. For those who argued that we should offer immediate security guarantees, you must understand that the offering of security guarantees to one country or another is not an overnight process, unless you think of security guarantees as purely empty political statements, which I hope the Alliance will never fall victim to. Those are never meaningful commitments, and therefore take quite a bit of time to institute. Just look at how long it has taken other members that have joined the Alliance to go through that process. So if not Partnership for Peace but immediate security guarantees, first of all, it is not done overnight.

Secondly, I submit that it would fuel such tensions that it would be more counterproductive to the countries of Central Europe than the Partnership for Peace. I think the best assurance that you can have from the United States, and the thing that I would look for from the United States in this period immediately ahead, and long range, is that we do everything possible to assist those in Russia, that are the reformists, that are driving Russia in a direction of strengthened democratic institutions and market economies, and that that will do more to assure your safety than setting up new divisions between you and Russia or some other country. So I think we are embarked on a course that in a short-term and in a long-term would yield much more benefits for your country and the other countries of Central Europe.

National Defense University
"Strategy for the 90's: Building on the Past – Looking to the Future"
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I'm delighted to be able to spend the next hour with you. And having just recently sat through an hour long State of the Union message, I promise to be nowhere near that long, and to leave you plenty of time for questions on any subject you might wish to choose.

The purpose of this series of speeches that I've been asked to participate in is to explore the question of what should be America's strategy in fact for the 90's. Well I guess that's the proverbial 64 thousand dollar question and I hope that I'm not going to startle any of you here when I tell you that I don't expect to walk out of this door at the conclusion of this speech with the prize.

But I do hope that you all understand that we are at a very extraordinary crossroads where the world is changing of course very rapidly and I won't belabor that, since you all have taken part in it and you read the newspapers as well as I do. But you also understand that we therefore as a nation are trying to rediscover our strategic footing. And so what I would like to offer you today are just a very few thoughts of how we might proceed along that road.

First if you will permit me though, I am going to take the liberty of pushing our focus well beyond the 90's and into the next century. Because I believe that at this stage in our history we have to look deep into the future to decide what we want and what we want the world to look like, because this is where we need to place the lodestone that will lead us through the rest of this century. I think this was the secret of our success over the past 40 to 50 years and it must remain the guiding thrust of our national strategy.

Secondly, I will tell you that we need to remind ourselves that we are not redefining our strategy from a blank slate. Times have changed but the world has not been completely turned over. There are historical tracks that have brought us to this juncture in history and we need to stay on some of the very same tracks that we have been on, and I'll explain that in a minute.

Over the course of the past 50 years, we evolved a fabulously successful national strategy that guided us through the tempestuous decades of the Cold War. It was a strategy, as you well know, built on the blocks of containment, of coalition building, of deterrence through flexible response, and of American leadership. We saw ourselves involved in an extended clash between our own political and economic systems and those of our former adversary, the Soviet Union.

The containment leg of our strategy was originated on the premise that our free market and democratic systems would prevail if we could keep communism bottled up. Throughout, we clung to a conviction that communism would prove too frail to survive the weight of its own burdens and its own contradictions. If we could prevent the struggle from being resolved by force of arms. In time, we believed, the Soviets would face a stark choice between outright failure or the necessity to change.

This effort to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union had broad geostrategic dimensions. It made us extend our defenses outward as close to Soviet borders as possible. It made us yank ourselves free from the isolationist grip of our heritage. On occasion it even caused us to go to war.

But it finally succeeded. To our very great relief, Gorbachev rose to power, saw that his nation was sliding toward a catastrophic failure, and began the process of change. So containment worked just as its authors had predicted some 50 years ago.

The second leg of our strategy was coalition building. This flowed rather naturally from containment because our coalitions formed the ring around the Soviet Union needed to stop its expansion. But there was another side to this element of our strategy.

Many years ago, I remember questioning one of the senior officers who had a key role in the military occupation and reconstruction of Japan. I asked him what was going through their minds as they helped to rebuild a nation that had been such a bitter enemy of ours only a few years before. To my great surprise, he never once mentioned the Soviet Union in his response.

And I'd like to recount what he said, because it shows the extraordinary foresight and wisdom of his generation of officers and statesmen. He began by explaining to me that when the Second World War ended, the American economy was around some 55 percent of the world's gross national product. Despite the fact that Americans were less than 5 percent of the world's population, our economy produced over half the world's wealth. Nearly every other economy in the world was crushed flat by the devastation of the war. Hundreds of millions were starving, homeless, and without

hope. Only America lay untouched. For us the war had rejuvenated our economy, pulling us out of the depression and exploding our productive capacity.

Recognizing that most wars find their roots in economics, his generation felt it was absolutely essential to correct this dangerous imbalance in the economic systems I just described.

Partly what was needed was to design and structure a new world order, one based on the principles of fair and open trade, on stable currencies, and on healthy economic competition. But there was another side as well. Unless we helped others to recover, unless we shared our great wealth, unless we lent a hand to get them get back on their feet, then the peace we had just won was destined to be frail and, of course, very, very short-lasting.

Then he told me of another of the factors that motivated their thinking. He said they realized that unless our nation helped develop prosperous and democratic partners, then Americans would be forced to carry the burdens of the world alone. Quite remarkably, they foresaw that the seeds they were planting in East Asia and Western Europe would grow eventually into a future generation of American allies and partners, other nations willing and able to share our interests, as well as our burdens.

I am recalling this conversation because it exemplifies the constructive element of our strategy. It also signifies the complexity, the depth of thought that went into the creation of our strategy. It intertwined economic, political, and security considerations and instruments together into a single framework. Comprehending that economic issues are the most common cause of wars, that how a nation's politics are structured can make it more or less prone to aggression, its framework crossed every dimension of national existence.

Its larger purpose was to find a way to stop the spiral of world wars; a cycle of conflicts driven by nationalism, colonialism, economic competition, and political chaos. Even as we were containing Soviet expansion this leg of our strategy progressed miraculously. We designed and built a new global economic order based on fair trade, on a stable monetary order, and on integrated economies. We encouraged the growth of democracy, principally through our own example, but also by extending protection to those nations willing to be ruled by the convictions of the ballot box.

We helped to reconstruct Europe from the ravages of war. Through the Marshall Plan we provided the solvency that Europeans needed to rebuild, to stabilize their currencies, and to trade with one another. In East Asia we did the same for Japan and South Korea. Forty years after the war ended, we and our allies have indeed become the richest, the most prosperous, and the most democratic nations in the world.

The third leg of our strategy was deterrence through Flexible Response. We arrived at this leg rather later than the others, because Flexible Response was terribly expensive to maintain.

Under Eisenhower we tested what he and his administration felt would be a less expensive and more effective strategy that we called Massive Retaliation. But, by the beginning of the sixties, Kennedy's theorists recognized that it was actually a very dangerous doctrine because it was too incredible a deterrent threat to protect many of our interests, and because it eliminated any threshold whatsoever between the first shot and nuclear annihilation. Kennedy's advisors recognized that its lack of credibility might contribute to aggression by the other side, whereas its promise of instant escalation was an invitation to the other side to escalate first.

Our paramount objective was deterrence. Although Flexible Response did, in fact, prove very expensive, it also proved to be a very effective and credible deterrent. And in the long run it was vastly less expensive than the all-out war that it was designed to prevent.

The effectiveness of our deterrent strategy became more and more evident as our principal adversary was prevented from attacking our most important interests and allies, turning more and more to indirect strategies of aggression, nearly always using surrogates rather than risk direct confrontation. It thus marginalized their ambitions.

The fourth leg of our strategy, of course, was American leadership. Again because of our isolationist heritage it was an element that made Americans perpetually uncomfortable. But the vast disparity in national wealth and power created by the war left us as the only nation capable of doing so and taking on this role.

In fact, American leadership has been enormously effective. Without it, there is no doubt the world today would look quite different in ways that no one would be happy with.

By now, of course, most of you must be wondering why I am dwelling on history when I am supposed to be looking toward the future. It is because, while there are elements of our strategy that we need to change, there are also elements we need to preserve.

First, I think we need to preserve the centrality of the core doctrine that motivated our strategy. Simply stated, democracy and free markets create prosperity and contentment, and these lead to peace. It is a proven doctrine. It has kept Western Europe at peace for the longest period in its modern history, it is changing the face of Asia, and it has led the nations of South and Central America away from their long flirtation with dictatorships.

But this doctrine is facing a new challenge, a challenge that in some ways is similar to what we experienced at the end of the Second World War, but in other ways, is quite different. With the end of the cold war, we saw that billions of new converts came to this belief in democracy and market economies. Most of these people are impoverished, they are economically insecure, and they are torn between the past they knew and a future that may look very frighteningly uncertain to them.

We therefore have to find ways to rapidly give them the knowledge and the skills to help them refit and modernize their infrastructures, to find and develop markets for their goods, to take them up the first steps of the ladder to prosperity. We have to dampen their fears and to build their confidence. Our National Security Advisor Tony Lake calls this element of our strategy "enlargement." It is the successor to what we were doing during the Cold War and it remains central to our new strategy.

I might note, for example, that of the flurry of new conflicts that have erupted like measles in these last few years, none have occurred between those states that have stable, well-established democratic institutions, which are prosperous. In fact, the more quickly these doctrines become embedded in Eastern Europe, in the nations of the former Soviet Union, in East Asia, and in other regions of the world, the safer the world will become.

But we and they have to realize that there will be no overnight miracles. It took Western Europe and Japan decades to recover their economies after the war. For the people of East Europe, in the former Soviet states, and in East Asia, it will be a long steady climb with plenty of rocks on the way.

The Cold War threw up barriers that divided nations, that divided neighbors, and that divided continents. Our most important objective is to prevent these divisions from growing back, or from merely shifting them to other places. We must simply resist the temptation to make a line of division, from one side of Poland, to another. That is, I think, why it was so important that President Clinton just last month at Prague, and at NATO, resisted the more popular course of action which called for the admittance of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic into NATO now. It would have simply moved that line further east, but the line would have been re-established. Such a course would have once again started that process of dividing Europe, of creating new tensions, of creating new divisions. I think, he chose instead the wiser course. He chose the course of a "Partnership for Peace," an inclusive concept, a concept which can bring all of Europe together for the first time in European history, a concept which gives every nation in Europe a choice.

As you know, the President sent Ambassador Albright and myself to the Visegrad states in advance of the NATO summit, as I just mentioned, and I will tell you that from the meetings with Presidents Walesa, Havel, and others, it was clear to me just how deeply they care for their own security.

But, you have to understand that if the question were asked, if we were to admit some other state but you into NATO, that their feelings of anxiety would be extraordinarily high. And the same would have been true had we done this just for the Visegrad states. This would have had the same effect on Romania, Bulgaria, and other states that would have been left out as a result. And while the press focused very much on the issue of how this effects the relationship between Russia and NATO, the bigger issue was really how it would effect the rest of Eastern Europe that would have been excluded as a result of such a proposal. And, therefore, I think we must await the time when we can re-look the face of Europe, but in the interim, we have to insist on a policy that, in fact, is inclusive.

The end of the Cold War also removed the imminent nuclear threat to our nation's survival. For the first time, I guess, in nearly half a century, we no longer fear two massive armies clashing along the inter-German border. But there are threats that survived this era, although their complexities and complexions have changed. For instance, the regimes of Iran and Iraq, North Korea, Cuba, and Libya have all outlived the Cold War without fundamentally changing their stripes. The difference is that these threats are now disassociated, far-flung, and independent. There is no hidden hand any longer tying them together, supplying them with arms, coordinating, or limiting their actions.

But they are nonetheless serious. Each of these nations could throw their regions into instability, turmoil, and war. And there are new threats peering out of the wreckage of the empire.

We have already witnessed the chaos that swept Yugoslavia off the map and are keenly aware of the battles raging in many of the former Soviet republics. We are watching old hatreds and crimes ignite the birth of new insecurities and anxieties, and they simply cannot be ignored.

The implication for us is that we need a new approach to our global strategy. We no longer need a global war plan to defeat a single threat. For that matter, the entire organization of our global strategy must be different. It is now an integrated collection of regional strategies, each tailored uniquely to the interests, objectives, and threats and dynamics in the regions to which they pertain.

But, I think that there are other central elements of our strategy that need to be maintained as well. Our emphasis on

deterrence and deterrent strategies makes timeless sense. It is always preferable to prevent an act of aggression rather than have to defeat it. It is, however, not enough for us to have a warfighting strategy, a warfighting posture, and warfighting capabilities alone. We need to factor our deterrent requirements into our defense calculations; we need to keep our forces stationed appropriately, and to tailor our regional strategies to achieve this deterrent effect.

But how we achieve deterrence will be different. The role of nuclear weapons, for example, has already changed. When President Bush made his dramatic November 1991 declaration that withdrew our land- and sea-based nuclear weapons, and stood down our CONUS-based bombers, it was both an implicit acceptance of this fact, and it helped activate this change.

The complexion and balance of deterrence, today, rests much more strongly on conventional forces. To go a step further, it rests much more on our readiness to fight and to win decisively using conventional force.

I believe, as well, that containment has a life after the Cold War, although in an entirely different sense than we over thought of it before. It is now our most viable solution to managing many of the regional threats that I mentioned earlier. It is no longer a global construct, instead it is a selective or even a situational response that we tailor to hem in aggressive regimes, to keep regional stability and peace, and to protect our allies. In practice, it is the strategy that we are already employing toward North Korea, toward Iran and Iraq, and toward Cuba. It is also the strategy we are using to limit the spread and the damage of the Yugoslav war. So it has grown into something quite different than the application that we used it for during the Cold War.

But, you know, enlargement won't work unless we are able to contain these regional threats, to isolate whatever eruptions do occur. After all, democracy and prosperity grow much faster in secure environments than in insecure ones. The title we have given to this part of our strategy is engagement, which we have divided into two principal thrusts. The first is prevention and the second is partnerships.

Prevention is obviously helping to create conditions that allow enlargement to succeed. It is one of the elements that gives our strategy a proactive bent, that makes it a driving force for change, rather than a series of reactive responses to external initiatives. It is partially the promotion of the ideals that are the heart of enlargement, and partially protecting the conditions of stability and peace that are the ripe soil for enlargement.

We have identified the long-term dangers to our interests and to the success of enlargement and through prevention we try to block or control these dangers. Partnership, on the other hand, builds off the traditional element of our strategy that we cannot go it alone. Although logically, our alliances and our coalitions must remain a central element of our strategy. Over the past half-century we have grown rich together, we have evolved common political systems, and we have developed and matured very common outlooks and interests. Our coalitions and alliances are the greatest source of stability and security in a world reeling from so much change in so short a time. They are also our greatest deterrent to a return to global conflict.

But we need to reshape them, to give them new missions and strategies, and adapt them to contemporary and future challenges. Just as they have been the foundation of our strength in the difficult years we have passed through together, they must remain our foundation for our future. This evolution has already begun in Europe, in Southwest Asia, and here in this hemisphere. But it must be broadened to other regions as well. We have to move at a pace that all are comfortable with, but we need to continue to pressure our allies to adjust to new realties and to expand their imagination.

There will be several kinds of rings in partnership. We will sustain our traditional alliances and coalitions. But we will also build other kinds of relationships, such as the Partnership for Peace in Europe. Or we may construct cooperative security relationships in regions where this seems most appropriate. But again, the thrust of partnership is to be proactive, to create regional frameworks that help to maintain stability and peace, and to help foster enlargement.

We also must stay in our role as the world's leading nation. We are still its wealthiest and most powerful state, and we are still its only remaining superpower. I emphasize this because all of us have heard a different argument, one that says that the burdens of leadership are sapping our material and our spiritual strength, that we have to force others to lead in our place. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The fact that we are the free world's leading nation has made us much richer, much more prosperous, and much better off. It has given us the influence to design the world's economic order in a manner conducive to our own economic systems and requirements. It has allowed us to shape the international community's responses to these threats that we talked about. For our own good, I submit, we must remain the leading nation. Well then, these are some of the thoughts that I have to offer you as we ponder how to reshape our strategy for the future.

First, we have to look far into the future, extending our vision well into the next century. Second, we do not want to throw the baby out with the bath water. There are a number of elements of the strategy we've been pursuing that we

need to carry into the future. Third, there are adjustments we need to make, modifying our global strategy, reorienting our alliances and coalitions, and yes, reducing our defense expenditures. And last, we must stay engaged in the world as its leading nation. This is vital to protect our interests, as well as the interests of our friends and allies, and our new friends.

As we look to the future, we need to take our inspiration from the generation of Americans that won the Second World War. They saw their world for what it was, but they refused to be discouraged by the magnitude of what needed to be done. They understood how economics, politics, and security are all part of a whole, that our strategy had to tie all three together. And, they had a great sense of imagination and self-confidence. They understood that great changes take decades to mold, to shape, and to bring to fruition. So, they extended their ambitions far into the future and reshaped the world. And, now, I think it's fair to say that it's up to us to show the same wisdom, and the same courage, that those before us showed in such very rich measure.

And that is, I guess, why I am so very pleased you have chosen this topic for this series of lectures. Many of you in this place will still be leading our armed forces, or the armed forces of your nations, well into the next century. Whatever choices we make now, will define what our world will look like, and what resources you will have available to meet your tasks. If we choose wrong, it could be a more difficult world and certainly a more dangerous world. If we choose well, it will put us on the path of creating a world that I think our grandchildren would be very happy to inherit.

But of this I'm sure. The process will be long and we will need your best efforts to shape this strategy for the next century. So I guess the advice I have for you is hurry, study, graduate, come work with us, because you know the next century is, what, less than six years away.

And with that, thank you very much and what are your questions?

Scientists' Institute for Public Information
Washington, DC
3 February 1994

I am really pleased to be here tonight and I thank all of you for this wonderful meal. And, now I suppose it is time me for to sing for my supper. I have not been as available as I would have liked for the past couple of months and I am most apologetic. I hope that you all understand this is not because I have been avoiding you. It is because it has been an extraordinarily busy period.

What has kept me busy are the same headlines that you have been writing and talking about. But before I turn to offer you a few observations on those headlines, I would like to explain my caution whenever I read any headline. For example, please let me quote for you the headlines from the forerunner to the modern Parisian newspaper, Le Monde, written during the short period after Napoleon broke out of his exile at Elba.

When Napoleon first broke out, on the day after he landed on French soil, the newspaper's headline screamed out in bold letters, "The Corsican ogre invades France at Antibes."

Ten days later the headline read, "General Bonaparte reaches Lyons."

Then only fifteen days later it read, "His majesty the emperor, the great Bonaparte, enters his palace at the Tuleries."

I think that when you look back at our own headlines and editorials over the past few years, you might find that history has repeated itself to some degree.

The sense of jubilation that occurred when the Berlin Wall came down and when Boris Yeltsin stood on top of a tank, literally facing down the Russian revanchists, has turned today into a much more sober, and in some quarters, an entirely pessimistic view.

The great enthusiasm for an omnipotent United Nations, one that could act with force and dispatch, one we thought was capable of managing the world's problems in our stead, has evaporated. In its place is a general lack of confidence in the institution and a growing movement, that we should never again place our forces under any form of foreign control.

In 1990, we were writing about the ascending unification of Western Europe and we were beginning to become frightened about what this integration would mean for us, that we might find ourselves excluded from Europe economically and politically. Today we are alarmed at how to manage the growing divisions in Europe.

I could go on, but I think this makes the point. The world is changing very quickly and we need to understand how it is changing, and how to keep our strategic footing. What would be most dangerous, because of our unique position in the world, is if we exhibit an unbreakable habit of vacillating from one extreme to the next, careening across a variety of

different approaches and objectives. We have to remember the old saying that if you don't know where you are going, you are just liable to end up there.

We have a strategy and we know in general terms what we want to achieve, but we have to learn how to make this relevant to a new era. What I'd like to spend the next few minutes addressing is how we see this taking shape.

In discussing our central purpose, Tony Lake expressed it as enlargement. It is a natural follow-on to containment because it is built on the same central doctrine that democracy as a form of government, makes nations less prone to aggression and that free markets create prosperity, and this in turn helps create peace. Over the past forty-five years we have seen it work in Western Europe, in East Asia, and it is beginning to work here in this hemisphere.

Enlargement is not like Cold War containment. It is not a forced doctrine. In fact, the greatest challenge of enlargement is accommodating the many billions of ex-communists who want immediate entry into Western markets, who want our prosperity overnight, and who want the full benefits of democracy but who are afraid of the growing pains and the insecurities that are necessary parts of their transformation.

It will take a long time to replicate the sorts of economic miracles that took place in Western Europe, Japan, and in South Korea. It may take a generation, or even two or three generations. And it will not go smoothly everywhere at once. If you look in Eastern Europe today, you can see this differentiation in pace quite plainly.

So we are not talking about a near-term strategy, one that will deliver peace and stability in our time. Instead we have to look far down the road just as we did at the outset of the Cold War, recognizing that great changes, changes that affect hundreds of millions or billions of people take decades or longer to bake before they are ready to come out of the oven. We are also talking about a strategy that combines economic, political, and military objectives and instruments. Again this is not unlike the Cold War.

What then is the role of Armed Forces? I think first and foremost it is to create and to mold the security environment that will allow enlargement to proceed. This means an environment that is stable and is as peaceful as we can make it. To do this, we have to maintain our preeminent focus on deterrence as an objective, as a motivating force in our strategies, and as a mental calculus in how we size and position our forces.

We need to keep our alliances and coalitions intact and we need to gradually reorient them toward evolving and future challenges. You have already seen this process at work in NATO with last month's approval of the Partnership for Peace concept, with its current out of area operations around the remnants of Yugoslavia, and with the restructuring of the NATO command arrangements, changes that will make its military forces more capable of operating out of area and of accepting force contributions from nations that are not in NATO's military command structure.

I am aware of the criticism that NATO is not moving fast enough, that it is failing to respond to the challenges in Bosnia, and that by refusing to take in new East European members right away, that it is creating a security vacuum in Central Europe and perhaps consigning itself to another Yalta.

As I think all of you know, I don't agree with any of these criticisms. The alliance has responded to the horrors in Yugoslavia. It just has not responded in ways that you or I might believe is best. But I would remind you that last year, the press was predicting that tens perhaps even hundreds of thousands of deaths would occur this winter unless the fighting was stopped. Well those deaths have not occurred and I think much of the credit belongs to NATO. It has contained the conflict it is working to keep it from spreading beyond current borders and it is providing humanitarian support that has saved countless lives. It is also pressuring the combatants to end the fighting. Again you might want NATO to do more but remember the alliance can do no more than the sum of what its democratic governments believe their people are willing to commit to.

And, I think the Partnership for Peace is designed to reverse Yalta. The sin of Yalta was that it created divisions, that it recognized the Soviets had a right to a sphere of influence outside its borders, one extending throughout Central Europe, and thereby Yalta selected which nations would stay in the west and which would go to the Soviets. The Partnership for Peace moves in the opposite direction, it is inclusive not exclusive. But if our first move had been to select a very few nations from Central Europe, perhaps from among the Visegrad states, and to have given them entry into NATO we would have created new divisions. I don't think any East or Central European nation would have appreciated the new environment we would certainly have created.

In other words, we need to reorient our alliances but we need to move cautiously. Our changes should contribute to stability, not cause instability. And they must move at a pace that democratic governments are comfortable with. We have to remember that security commitments are more than political promises. Only give security promises when you are willing to live with them.

This same process of change has to be applied to East Asia, where regional economic relationships have far outpaced security relationships, and to this hemisphere where the recent passage of NAFTA and the sudden popularity of

democracy and free market economics is increasing the sense of commonality between us and the nations south of us. I might add that eventually a regional coalition of some form will also be necessary for peace and stability in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

In the Bottom Up Review we talked of the four dangers that are long-term threats to our interests and we recommended a force package built on the ability to handle two nearly simultaneous regional contingencies. I am convinced that this is the right approach and that the size and mix of forces are adequate. But I'd like to caveat this affirmation.

The size and mix are right if and only if, we build the enhancements that are also part of the force package. This means the expansion in strategic lift, improved C4I, continued modernization of our systems, and the continued emphasis on research and development. Put simply, we can afford to move to lower numbers if we make the overall force more capable. And of course we have to protect readiness in all its various dimensions.

If we go down to the numbers recommended in the review and we do not follow through on the enhancements, then we have a problem. If we allow readiness to lapse again, we have a problem. If we fail to continue to attract the kinds of remarkable men and women we have in uniform today for whatever reasons, then again we have a problem.

We have to keep adequate numbers of forces stationed overseas and we have to keep presence in those regions where we have our strongest interests. We have to convince our allies and our potential enemies that we are still the strongest military power on earth and that we have the will to protect our interests.

Now, what I've tried to offer you as quickly as I could, is an explanation of our strategy and how American armed forces fit into its framework. I think it's important that you share this higher understanding, because it is what gives relevance to the daily headlines and the daily editorials. I think its very important that all of you gathered here in this room appreciate the long-term tasks ahead of us and that you are able to help the public discriminate the daily chaff from the long-term winds.

With that I've probably spoken longer than any of you wished. Harry told me that part of your tradition in these dinners is to force the guest to cede the floor early so that you could get down to the real business of asking direct questions and getting direct answers. So, I will be pleased to take whatever questions you have.

Military Order of the Purple Heart
Arlington, Virginia
12 February 1994

I guess it's hard for me to put into words how much I appreciate and how deeply honored I am to be able to spend this evening with all of you. I don't think there are too many here in Washington tonight, on this snowy, icy evening, that can say that they've spent the evening with a room full of genuine heroes, a room full of those who, at the risk of being melodramatic, gave their blood to ensure that our country would remain the "Home of the Brave and the Free." And I give you my very, very special salute.

And I have to tell you that driving over here this evening I was trying to figure out what it is that I could possibly and profitably talk to you about this evening. Like most of you here, I have been attending formal functions such as these, black tie and all, for all of my military career. In my case that's some 35 years of formal functions and 35 years of after-dinner remarks.

And no matter how hard I tried to recall, I couldn't remember a single one, despite the fact that I attended one just the other day, and despite the fact that most of them were given by people who are probably the most distinguished military leaders of my generation. And so I guess the only thing that you can conclude is that to have a memorable evening like this, the after-dinner remarks, at the very least, have to be very forgettable! And so, whatever else they might be, I can assure you that my remarks will be forgettable, which is, however, in very sharp contrast with what your deeds are all about. Your contributions, your sacrifices to our nation and to our Armed Forces are anything but something we're going to forget anytime soon.

After all as we just heard, the conditions for which "America's first Medal" could be awarded might have changed somewhat since President Washington devised the "Badge of Military Merit" back in 1782. Those conditions might have changed somewhat, but in fact the one condition that has remained constant has been that of "sacrifice."

And as recipients of the Purple Heart it's that sacrifice, that spilling of blood that sets you apart from the rest, and earns for you the admiration of those of us in uniform. And I think it is not an exaggeration when I tell you that you have a special place in the heart of every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine, because when we see you, we see the men and

women who spilled their own blood in the fight for freedom. And I know that embarrasses some of you to hear that, but that is the truth.

You have risked it all and by your determination you have given life to what Thomas Jefferson once said when he remarked that, "One man with courage is a majority." You have demonstrated that we are a nation of great courage, of great spirit. You are a living inspiration to those who still wear this country's uniform, and you have shown that we are a nation that won't accept defeat. You have shown that freedom is the greatest prize of all.

Today through the Military Order of the Purple Heart you continue to give and you continue to sacrifice. And I think if you think about it for a minute, it is through your combined efforts that you do more for veterans and their families than probably any other organization that I could think of.

Last year alone, you did such things as sponsoring scholarships to grandsons and granddaughters of Purple Heart recipients. Your national headquarters' mobile van shifted from assisting the hurricane victims of Southern Florida and is now still helping veterans in Iowa to get relief from the flood that ravaged the Midwest this past summer. Through your efforts in the national service program this year alone, you recovered more millions of dollars in veterans benefits for those who deserve them the most.

This year under the command of Commander Tomsey you will participate in the World Veterans Association Conference in Lisbon and you will sponsor the 50th Anniversary of D-Day with a month long reunion in Normandy. And I must tell you that I look forward to that historic event and I look forward to seeing many of you here and many of your colleagues there later on this year!

But most importantly, I think, your spirit is embodied in tonight's guest of honor, Commander Mike Tomsey. You all have a program and so you've glanced through but let me just remind you that it was on the 22d of September 1968, when he, as an 18-year old Marine from Tiffin, Ohio, came under fire and his life changed dramatically. Despite numerous setbacks, his life in service to the Nation took on a very different dimension. He became a hero of a very special type. He came and became the rock that other veterans could lean on when they needed help most of all.

He worked with juvenile offenders while going to college and in 1977, after several years in the private sector, he joined the Military Order of the Purple Heart. Soon afterwards in 1978, Mike began working for the Federal Government and since that time he has been deeply committed to the care and well being of veterans and their families. From juvenile offenders to Boy Scouts to Vietnam Veterans, Mike, you have given new meaning to the phrase "Public Service." I know as sure as we are here today that under your leadership, the Military Order of the Purple Heart will continue to be a source of great service and benefit to this nation's veterans and to their families.

And it seems fitting that a man whose life has been dedicated to giving to others is elected as the national commander of a group of people each of whom has been recognized for the sacrifices they have made and to an organization whose purpose it is to continue giving. Thank you, Mike. My very warmest congratulations to you.

Now with that, let me turn for a just few moments if you would permit me, to the future veterans, the young men and women in uniform that this organization spends so much time protecting.

Since becoming chairman some 3 1/2 months ago I have visited them in places like Somalia, in Korea, in Hawaii, in Europe, and of course here in the United States. Despite what you might read in some newspapers, they continue to be as outstanding a military force as ever wore America's uniform.

You can talk to the pilots who brave the skies over Iraq enforcing the "no-fly" zone, north and south. You can talk to the soldiers and marines in and around Mogadishu or the AC-130 pilots guarding the skies overhead over that city, or you can visit with our soldiers standing guard in Macedonia or running the finest hospital in all of former Yugoslavia in Zagreb, or watch the AWACS airplane crews, ABCCC, F-14s, F-18s, F-16s, tanker crews, all of them operating over the skies of Bosnia, together with the C-130 crews, day-in and day-out dropping supplies or air-landing MREs into former Yugoslavia. Their effort, by the way, those who deliver food to Sarajevo and airdrop food into eastern Bosnia has now exceeded in time and in amount that which we did during the Berlin Airlift. On the other end of the world you can meet with members of Task Force "Full Accounting" as they comb the jungles of Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia to leave no stone unturned to locate our comrades, or you can stand this winter with our brave young soldiers staring into north Korea just like you and I have done now for the last 40 years.

Well, you can't do any of that without walking away full of pride, full of admiration, full of awe for our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines for they remain, I assure you, the best trained, the best equipped, the best led, the most motivated and yes, the most confident that we have ever asked to do our Nation's work. And they are doing more than ever, more than even during the Cold War, but they are doing that with dramatically reduced numbers and considerably less resources.

And we don't know where the next conflict will be. Neither your nor my crystal ball are clear enough for that but

we know one thing: never in the history of this Nation has a soldier spent twenty years in the military without having to fight one of this Nation's conflicts. And there's no reason to think it will be otherwise from now on. So downsizing or not, we must stand ready.

But in order to preserve such a ready force, we need to view our military organization as a living organism, as a living force. It needs a continual supply of talented people, men and women of the same remarkable quality we have today, the same kind of wonderful patriots we saw in the Gulf War and we see in Mogadishu today and we see in Vietnam today and we see in Korea. And we need to continue to modernize and to harness the technology to make sure that our soldiers continue to have the critical edge in battle in the days to come.

The challenge of maintaining our forces is greater today than in a long, long time. We don't have an ogre knocking at our door and breathing down our necks, reminding us everyday that our survival is at stake. Those days are gone. But we have, through the hindsight of history, the lesson we have learned time and time again: that there will be one such ogre in the future.

The military we have today which we inherited from our predecessors, from you, is the most outstanding military force in the world. And there's no doubt about that. And the reductions that we will be dealing with in the remaining years will change the structure of our military.

But what we can't afford, what I refuse to allow, is for these challenges, for these reductions in any way to lessen the abilities of our fighting forces or to lessen the spirit of our war fighters.

We have each served, you and I. You have been on the front lines. You have helped make the military what it is today. We owe it to you, our predecessors, and to our successors to make our forces smaller but better and stronger. You are a large part of that effort.

I won't deny that the times ahead will be tough. But I refuse to believe they are impossible. Even as we reduce our forces we have to protect their readiness and to continue to make improvements to modernize where necessary. For every pound that we shed in weight we have to make the force stronger, more capable and quicker. We intend to see that through and we intend to make sure that each of you and your organization help us do that.

When you talk to talented young people today please remind them that the Armed Forces are still hiring. We are looking for new young leaders to carry our Armed Forces into the future. Tell them it is an exciting life, a life of great challenges and opportunities, but most importantly, it is today as it was for you, a meaningful life, a very noble life.

When these young folks enter the military, when they agree to make the sacrifices that can only be asked of fighting people, the sacrifices each of you and many who couldn't be here tonight have made, we owe them a special debt of gratitude. We owe them the hopes of rehabilitation when they need it. We owe them the possibility of an education to help them become as productive as their potential will carry them to be. We owe them help. We owe them the kind of services provided by the national service program. We owe them the kind of services provided by the organizations that you support and that exist only because you care enough. We owe them all that and we owe them more. Above all, we owe them as we owe you, our thanks.

Being here with you and talking about our great young men and women reminds me of what the legendary coach of the Green Bay Packers, Vince Lombardi, once said. When he was talking to his team, he reminded them that, "After the cheers have died and the stadium is empty, after the headlines have been written and after you are back in the quiet of your own room, and after you've put aside the Super Bowl ring and all the pomp and fanfare have faded, the enduring things that are left," he said, "are the dedication to excellence, the dedication to victory and the dedication to doing with our lives the very best we can to make the world a better place to live."

Mike, you, yourself, and the members of your great organization, typify so well the words of that great coach. You have established a tradition within the Military Order of the Purple Heart a determination to excel, a determination to win for the veterans of this nation, and you have done much to ensure that the world is a better place for those of us who follow you.

Thank you for this great dinner, for your time, and to all of you, thank you from the bottom of my heart for your continued service.

By 21 February 1994, the NATO ultimatum issued to Bosnian-Serbs was 36 hours old and appeared to be working. This was a briefing by the SECDEF and CJCS. Only the CJCS portion is included.

DoD Special Briefing - CJCS Statement
The Pentagon
Washington, DC
21 February 1994

I know that you are very anxious to ask questions, so I won't take very long. But let me just use a few slides here, or charts here, to tell you where I think we have been and where we are today. This first slide just simply shows you the history of the shelling of Sarajevo over the last 60 days, from a high of some 1,744 rounds in one day — just before Christmas, to, on your right hand side of the chart, eight days, zero shelling.

It might be also useful to remind ourselves that during the time that Sarajevo has been under siege during this war, since the beginning of this war, I'm told that over 9,000 people in Sarajevo have died — have been killed, and over 57,000 have been wounded, many of those children. And, I think, viewed in that light, those eight zeros on the right hand — lower right hand side of the chart assume a very special meaning.

This next slide shows you what we saw on the 9th of February, the day of the NATO decision. We were at that time tracking some 26 heavy weapons sites from both factions. Each one of the containing a multiple number of weapons. As you can see, all of them were within a circle of about 20 kilometers or 12.5 miles. And it is for that reason that NATO established that as the zone or the circle from which all weapons had to be withdrawn or, if they could not be withdrawn, would be turned over under NATO control.

This next chart will show you the 11 sites that the U.N. established into which those weapons would be brought in, and they're shown here as those blue squares with the NATO — with the U.N. symbol on them, and the round circles are those locations from which the weapons were either moved into these containment areas or from which they were moved outside of the circle.

Let me show you more importantly, the results, as we now know them. And please understand that this is the information we have right now. It will probably change in the next few days as they're catalogued better and so on. But what we know now is that in those 11 sites that had been established for the control of weapons, the Bosnian Serb Army has now moved 250 weapons, and the Muslims some 46 weapons.

Now, in addition to these weapons that the U.N. now controls, the next chart will show you an additional 18 locations where there are weapons still out in the countryside. Sixteen of those sites, marked by the blue symbol, are where right now there are U.N. personnel controlling those weapons. By the way, those are 45 additional weapons that are under U.N. control, in addition to those that I have shown you earlier. There are two sites which, at the time that we were meeting here, we still did not have U.N. personnel there. But those are weapons at two sites, containing seven weapons that have been turned over to us by the Serbs. We just have not been able to get there yet because of the heavy snow and the location where they are. We know where they are, and the U.N. teams are making their way over there to take control of those seven weapons and those two sites marked here in red.

The final chart that we wanted to show you sort of reinforces what Secretary Perry had said earlier, that we, on the military side, are very well aware that this is not the end yet, and that we have to remain vigilant, that we have to very carefully continue to monitor compliance with the NATO decision — and that is, that no weapons are brought back into the 20 kilometer circle, and that any shelling of Sarajevo is effectively dealt with. To that effect, NATO aircrews remain ready to continue — remain ready to strike, if that would be called for. As an example, just today, over 150 sorties have flown over that area.

And finally, I would say that military personnel continue to be involved in the humanitarian effort — many of our NATO colleagues on the ground in providing security to convoys; we in the United States military principally in participating in the airlift into Sarajevo, and the air drop that still is on going.

Annual Posture Statement
Washington, DC
22 February 1994

This nation is blessed with the finest and the most remarkable armed forces in the world. So, I am extremely proud to represent them before you today and to offer my judgment on the direction of our Armed Forces and the challenges that lie ahead.

Perhaps one of the most important contributions I can offer at the outset is to reflect very briefly on the human dimension of what we are talking about today, because it is hard to get this sense from the dry, lifeless columns of numbers and line items that appear before us in our budget books.

In the past few months, I have been privileged to visit our forces in South Korea, in Somalia and in Europe. In spite of the daily hardships of their duties, and in several cases the omnipresent dangers they face in some truly inhospitable places in the world, what I saw in these men and women made me thoroughly proud to wear this uniform and to be an American. Our men and women in uniform are out there, tough, determined and resolute. They are very proud of their accomplishments because they know theirs is a noble effort. We owe them our heartfelt thanks and every bit of the pride that I know Americans feel for our men and women in uniform. And of course, as all of you gathered here know all too well, they expect us to be just as determined and resolute, and to make the right choices as we decide the future of our Armed Forces.

This leads in to my larger purpose for being here today. I am here to give an explanation of what the Joint Chiefs, the Combatant Commanders, and I believe are the requirements we need to fulfill our missions and objectives.

Over the past five years, we were forced by circumstances to take a dual approach as we made these recommendations. On the one hand, when we realized over successive stages that the Soviet threat was changing complexion, then ultimately disintegrating, we were searching to discover what parts of our arsenal could be reduced. This part was a divestment strategy, pure and simple. We looked for all those units and capabilities that were becoming excessive to our needs.

But, at the same time, we were struggling to come to grips with what we would need for the future. As events unfolded we came closer to answering that question, and the direction of our budget moved accordingly.

The 1995 budget is part of the re-creation of our forces for the future. There is still some divestment, as there will be for a number of years. But it is vital to understand that the heart of this budget is an investment in a reorientation of our strategy, our forces, and our capabilities for the future. It is not a simple remodeling of the old; it is new construction that will carry us into the next century. We have a strategy, we are confident it is the correct strategy, and we know what forces and capabilities we need to pursue that strategy.

What we are recommending is not a flabby force. It is as lean as we dared make it if we are to retain our ability to execute two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. There is very little, if any room for miscalculation. We haven't provided a hedge of an extra division here or an extra fighter wing there.

I think we all know there are two critical schools of thought and two distinctly different moods dominating the public debate about our armed forces. Some believe we have not cut nearly enough, and that in the process, we are perpetrating an indefensible drain on our national treasury and contributing to our debt. Others believe that we are cutting far too much, far too quickly, and are thereby exposing our country to greater and greater dangers and risks; on the other hand, I believe that we have it right.

I hope that the series of hearings you are beginning today will convince those who think we haven't cut enough that they are wrong. I could point to the fact that our Armed Forces have been used in 29 different major operations just since the Cold War ended, including fighting in two wars. Or, I could talk of the many new dangers we see lurking around us. But, ultimately the best way to judge whether this budget is the right size is to look to the future, not the past.

For those who think we are cutting too much, I want to emphasize up front two of the principal corollaries of our thinking. This structure is adequate if, and only if, we stick with two linchpins: we must improve our capabilities and we must improve and maintain our readiness.

The first of these linchpins is based on simple logic. We can reduce our structure to the size and mix we are recommending, but only if in growing down, we improve by adding the capabilities required in our plans. That is why I used the questionable oxymoron of growing down. Our forces must grow in capability even as they become smaller.

If George Patton had just one of our modern armor divisions when he joined Eisenhower's forces at Normandy, he probably would have broken through to Germany in less than a week. If Jimmy Doolittle had flown his famous raid over

Tokyo in any of our modern bombers, he would have achieved his mission without losses, and then have been able to return all the way to the United States. If we could take modern Tomahawk-capable ships, and send them back in time, assigning them to Admiral Nimitz in World War Two, they would have had a dramatic affect on the Japanese mainland early in the war, thus saving thousands of casualties during the Pacific campaign. This is what I mean about improving the capabilities of our forces.

But, allow me to give this a more contemporary flavor. When we transition from the M1A1 tank to the M1A2 tank, we estimate that it increases a tank company's lethality by 18 percent. This nearly one-fifth increase in capability compensates for some of the reductions in armor forces we are making. Whereas it previously took one or more bombers for each target, new weapons will allow the B-2 to attack up to 16 high-value targets on one sortie and the B-1 up to 24 targets — a tremendous increase in capability. And we estimate that, if the C-17 had been available for Operation RESTORE HOPE, we could have nearly doubled throughput per day to Mogadishu, Somalia. I don't need to paint the picture for you of what that will do to our lagging airlift capability. Similarly, our Navy is restructuring its fleets to emphasize littoral operations and take full advantage of improvements in sensor and weapon technology. The net effect is an increase in the number of air sorties and firepower the Navy can offer a theater ground or air commander. This kind of logic must typify our approach across all of our forces of the future.

In the Gulf War we enjoyed a genuine superiority over Iraqi forces. It was this superiority and our knowledge of how to use this mismatch to every possible advantage that led to the extraordinary outcome of that conflict. But, one of warfare's most remorseless rules is that any nation too captivated by past successes is doomed to future failure. History books are full of woeful tales of militaries that were looking backward when they should have been looking forward.

Our improvement in capability must come from a number of sources. The Congress is going to have to fund a fair number of them. But we in the Armed Forces are also going to have to search for innovative ways to make our force more efficient, better trained, and more effective. We cannot and will not allow any sacred cows or gold watches to get in our way, to impede our progress, or to block our imagination. All must be open to change as long as it is an improvement.

The second linchpin of our thinking is that we will protect the vital readiness of our forces. I don't think anyone contests this point, but I'm not sure everybody is clear about what this means, about all that it involves, and about what it costs.

In 1945, our armed forces were 12 million strong. They were extraordinarily well trained, equipped and prepared, so much so that they defeated two of the world's major military powers. Five years later, what was left of this spectacular force was battered about the battlefield by a North Korean force that had been formed, equipped, and trained in a little less than two years.

Tragically, nobody had noticed how deeply our readiness had declined in such an amazingly short time. What did we do wrong? We built down much too fast. We did not grow down; we fell down. The pace was so furious that we lost track of vital capabilities. In the rush to convert defense industries to meet booming domestic needs, vital industrial mobilization capabilities were eliminated. In our rush to demobilize units and decommission equipment, our morale, our cohesion, and our training suffered. And, of course, the steep decline in the defense budget, a decline intended to rectify the great debts left behind by the war and to help restore our economy to a sound footing, forced the armed services to balance and rebalance their needs, to continuously compromise one measure of readiness after another. It took a war and terrible losses to expose the seriousness and the depth of our decline.

We have not made the same mistakes yet. But, not only must we keep our readiness from declining, we actually have to improve it. Our Cold War strategy and our robust structure allowed us to stairstep our readiness. It was a larger force; therefore, we didn't need to keep all our units fully ready to deploy and fight. We accepted tiers in our readiness that could be fleshed out in the event of a contingency. Our smaller future forces won't have this slack.

Now, having emphasized the two corollaries driving our thinking, I'd like to explain more fully why this is the right force for our strategy and what areas we need to emphasize.

FORCE ARCHITECTURE

I will begin by repeating for you some points you have heard, but they are still worth repeating and thinking about. The world today and the world we expect to see for the foreseeable future is a more uncertain, and in some ways, a more dangerous environment than we have known for decades. This uncertainty is an enemy in two respects: it diffuses our focus and it makes us too near-sighted.

If someone had asked us five years ago if we were planning to go to Kuwait, or to Somalia, or to contain the violent

disintegration of a nation in the heart of Europe, I think we would have looked at them strangely. It should make all of us wonder what's next? Where next?

Large expansions in the size and capabilities of our Armed Forces are the product of many years of effort. A new equipment program often takes fifteen to twenty years to go from the drawing board through production and fielding. Creating a new air wing, a new division, or a new Carrier Battle Group, even using existing technologies, could take between five to ten years, assuming the industrial base exists in the first place.

Our problem is that we just don't know what the global security environment will look like in another six, or ten, or twenty years. What we do know is that great changes are sweeping across the globe far more quickly than was the case in the preceding forty years. Any world globe selling in a store today that is over three years old is already an antique. We may be delighted to find that the future is more peaceful and tranquil than today. Or, we may find that it is far more violent and frightening.

This lack of clairvoyance does not preclude sound planning, but it surely makes it more difficult. The force we are building must take into account these effects of uncertainty.

The forces we are recommending are the proper response for this kind of uncertain world. Our core-sizing requirement has been described as keeping enough forces to respond to two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRC) and to prevail in both, as well as maintain our strategic deterrent posture. The aggregate FY 95 force list to accomplish this follows.

But, let me dwell for a moment on what we expect this force to accomplish, because our calculations are based on a lot more than the sizing scenario implies.

Our highest objective is still deterrence. The importance of deterrence was not washed away by the events of the past four or five years. What has changed is who and what we are deterring. There are still identifiable regional threats like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and others. But we also have to deter less precise threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And, in a larger sense, we have to keep the new fears and insecurities that are being unleashed from breeding new threats, and from undermining the great achievements and opportunities that we sacrificed for during the past forty-five years.

One point is clear — we must keep sufficient forces stationed overseas where our interests dictate, like Europe and East Asia. Our alliances and coalitions are our strongest bastions for stability and order in the world that is unfolding around us. Whatever savings we might reap by withdrawing our forces will seem foolishly inconsequential to our children who will inherit the damage this would certainly cause. Twice in this century we have made the mistake of divorcing ourselves from what was occurring in Europe or Asia. Both times it has led to disaster for them and for us. We cannot afford to make this mistake again. In fact, we need to build on our alliances, changing their focus to combat new threats and using our combined power to keep new fissures and new tensions from overturning our achievements.

We also have to be prepared to execute operations other than traditional warfighting. Being prepared for wars is our highest calling, one that we cannot and will not marginalize. However, when you look into the future, you cannot avoid the conclusion that our forces will be used more frequently for other types of missions and against other types of crises. Even today our forces are operating in Somalia, Iraq and the waters off Haiti; they are helping to contain the conflict in former Yugoslav states; they are supporting counter-drug operations; and they are bringing humanitarian relief to the earthquake victims in Southern California.

We are demanding and we will get a great deal more security from this two-MRC force than the title implies.

PEOPLE

No single investment we make is more important than our people. The Gulf War brought to the nation's attention something those of us serving in the Armed Forces have known for quite some time — that the men and women who are serving today are absolutely magnificent. They are bright, highly motivated, extremely well trained, courageous, and totally dedicated. It took a long time to get to this point after the demoralizing years of what historians term the Vietnam era, but, it would not take nearly as long to go the other way.

Our economy is now recovering from the longest and deepest recession in our post-war history. Our men and women in uniform are aware of this, and they are also aware that they possess skills and talents that businesses value just as highly as we do. As a matter of simple economics, we will have to compete even more tenaciously to attract and retain our high-quality people.

But, for the past four years we have been separating career people in large numbers. I think we have gone about it properly, and I applaud the Congress for "softening the landing" of all those whose careers have been unexpectedly cut

short. But, we would be blind if we ignored the reverberations these cuts have sent throughout our forces, or the message they have sent to the young people we are trying to attract into national service.

It boils down, again, to simple logic. We will not continue to attract quality young people if incentives and benefits subside. We have to take care of the welfare of our people in uniform, our civilians, and our families, or we will not retain the career professionals we will need to lead our forces into the next century.

It is an old and proven axiom that men and women do not choose military careers to pursue riches. Nearly all do so because they are intensely patriotic, because they are dedicated, and because they enjoy the great fulfillment of military life. But, there is an invisible bottom line that must be met if they and their families are to stay in the Service through one tough assignment after another, being asked repeatedly to put their lives in danger, and often being separated from loved ones for long periods.

We are asking our sailors and marines to endure a career of six-month cruises, year after year of living in austere quarters, moving about the world from one danger zone to the next. Some of our soldiers and marines have missed more than one Christmas away from their families in the past three or four years. For some, two of these warm, memorable holidays were spent in war zones or in Somalia. We are getting what we expect from our people, and we owe it to them to compensate them for their contribution.

The Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) contains a number of items geared to our ability to recruit and retain quality people. Pay raises, funding for programs that offset special demands of military life, money for recruiting resources and advertising, dollars for reenlistment incentives, and health and educational benefits are all vitally important to our people and our families. Not covered in the DoD budget, but equally vital to the future of our forces, are the retirement benefits of our veterans. The men and women who serve today, and those who contemplate future service, watch closely how we honor our commitments to those who have served. All of these programs face constant scrutiny but are not areas in which to cut corners or find savings.

In the last six months alone, there have been two attempted assaults on the pay and benefits we have promised our people. Thankfully, this Congress fought off both of them, and I hope that, for the health and the future of our Armed Forces, we continue to resist future temptations to save dollars at the cost of the welfare of our men and women in uniform.

READINESS

In the past few years, I think all of us at one time or another have spoken of the need to protect readiness. I think there is a solid consensus behind this point. But, as I mentioned earlier, I'm not sure that everyone shares a complete grasp of all this entails.

Readiness equals the ability of our Armed Forces to achieve their specified wartime objectives.

There is a great deal that goes into this equation. Steaming days, flight hours, and operating tempo are just a few considerations. Each of the Services has its own models for measuring and assessing unit readiness that account for any number of variables, from whether there is sufficient equipment on hand and whether that equipment is adequately maintained and fully operable, through personnel manning levels and whether a unit has experienced enough training to accomplish its missions. And each Service gives credence to a commander's assessment based on his or her intuitive experience and judgment of whether the unit is ready for its assigned missions.

That judgment recognizes that people are essential to maintaining readiness. Morale and esprit cannot be measured on a scale, but they can undo a unit's readiness more terribly than any other factor. This is an area we have to watch very closely during this era of reductions.

To some degree, time and money in, equals readiness out. But this is clearly only a partial answer. There are too many hidden or indirect siphons that can detract from it. For example, although readiness accounts may be fully funded, if base operations accounts are under funded, then commanders are confronted with a delicate dilemma. They are forced to take funds away from their operations accounts and divert them to keep the lights on at their installations and to keep the heat on in their child-care centers.

Alternatively, I think all of us are aware of the potentially dangerous tactic we have practiced for too long of demanding that the services spend their carefully programmed moneys to fund actual contingencies. Even if the Services are repaid for these unexpected diversions at a later date, over the near term it forces them to put one unit into a state of readiness malnutrition in order to feed the growing costs of a deployed unit. If the amounts of diversion are small, the problem is manageable. But if we involve our forces in more and larger contingencies, readiness malnutrition migrates to more and more of the force, and the force could starve.

There is one more hidden siphon that disturbs field commanders, and this is the large backlogs that result when we underfund depot maintenance. In the long run, this underfunding is a guarantee of future readiness problems and possibly delayed modernization.

I think all of us would have difficulty explaining how we measure the readiness of our industrial base, which is crucial to our ability to sustain ourselves in prolonged major operations. This has been a problem throughout this century; and we have been shocked time and again to discover that when we most need to mobilize, vital areas are paralyzed or have atrophied so far that we have to rebuild from a dead start. I think we are going about it smarter this time, because we are identifying and protecting vital industrial centers, but it is an area we all need to watch.

The services all have good systems for measuring unit readiness, and we are improving our joint readiness assessment systems so that we can do a better job at assessing our ability to deploy and fight jointly. Our joint commands have evolved to the point where I think such a system is possible, and we are now making our first efforts to measure our joint warfighting capabilities. I hope to report on continuous progress in this area in future testimony.

What all this adds up to is that we need to do two things if we are going to protect our readiness. The first of these is that we are going to have to get better at how we measure all the various components that affect readiness. And, second, we are going to rely on your support to spend whatever is required to keep our readiness at adequate levels.

Over the coming months, you will hear from each of the Service Chiefs and from each of the combatant commanders. I am confident you will ask each of them to offer his assessment of the readiness of his forces. You will find, in general, that we all agree we are still above the waterline, but there are whirlpools and eddies that could suck us under. We are advancing carefully and all of us would be more confident if we avoided some of the bad habits I spoke of earlier. We will keep our eyes on the horizon; and if we see a problem looming in the future, we will ask for your help before we sink.

STRATEGIC AGILITY

Before the end of this century, we will have the smallest number of troops stationed abroad since 1950, when the war in Korea and the spiral of events and tensions in Europe finally convinced us that we could not return to the illusory comforts of isolationism, as we had tried to do twenty years before.

We have reduced our forces in the Pacific and the reductions in Europe are proceeding. When they are done, our remaining strength will be about two-thirds less than the numbers we stationed in Europe during the later years of the Cold War.

We are becoming far more dependent on our ability to project power from the United States to effect deterrence or respond to crises in these regions. But, we haven't significantly improved our ability to do so. One of the reasons we kept such large numbers overseas in the past was because our strategic lift was so insufficient. Because we are bringing so many of our forces home, we can no longer afford to casually accept the glaring shortfalls that still exist in our strategic power projection capabilities.

In the past, we approached our strategic lift shortfalls much like the Soviets treated their five-year economic plans. Time and again, we gathered great fervor and intensity behind our intention to correct these shortfalls, we drew up ambitious timetables and schedules, and then, with each succeeding year, we slipped these schedules as we failed to accomplish one objective after another, as projected increases in air tonnage and sea tonnage failed to materialize — until we finally succumbed to the old trick of modifying our original requirements, reducing them to levels that made us appear successful, when, in fact, we remained far short of our original goals. Then, a few years later, some coalescing event would cause us to repeat the same cycle again.

This budget is part of another of those five-year plans, but this time we have much more on the line than in the past. Because we have reduced our forward-deployed forces so deeply, we are a great deal more reliant on our ability to reinforce them.

Just as important, the shift in our strategy demands that we globalize our deployment capability. During the latter years of the Cold War, we focused primarily on Europe and our commitment to have ten divisions in place within ten days. During the eighties, we improved our capacity to move military forces to Southwest Asia, as well.

We are now in the process of dispersing this concentration and refocusing it to give us a global orientation so that we can respond with much greater acceleration to contingencies in Europe, in Southwest Asia, or throughout the Pacific.

The risk is this. Right now, we have enough lift to move small numbers of forces to any theater in the world very quickly. But, we don't have enough to rapidly expand this flow into a torrent bringing in more and more forces,

equipment and munitions at rates with which any of us should feel comfortable. The delays in time will be measured quite horribly in lives and territory lost.

A famous Civil War general disclosed the secret of his battlefield successes as the ability to "Get there the firstest, with the mostest." We have to get better at getting there the firstest. Our belief that we will is a critical assumption we accepted when we measured the size of our projected force.

The means to do this are the prepositioning programs and the lift expansion programs, both included in the FYDP. But, we also have to ensure the lift we currently possess is maintained and modernized. We do not want to rediscover, as we did in our deployment to the Gulf War, that some of the assets we are counting on are not nearly as ready as we believe.

MODERNIZATION

A difficult by-product of this new era is that we have lost the impetus that used to drive our modernization needs. How do we determine if we need a completely new piece of equipment, whether it is enough to simply modify an existing platform, or indeed, whether we need to add any improvements at all? For decades, it was our habit to make these decisions based on our analysis of Soviet developments and what we needed to counter them.

The risk we run today is that we will become complacent, that we will cancel one modernization program after another because we don't have a terrifying ogre knocking on our door. Alternatively, we know that we can't afford to invest in every modernization possibility that becomes available. So just how should we approach modernization?

In this budget we have steered our investments very carefully into those programs that will have the most dramatic affect on our capabilities for the investment, that will demonstrate the greatest payoff on the battlefield, and that will increase the survivability of our forces.

We have divided our modernization alternatives into two categories: those that can be achieved through inexpensive evolutionary modifications to existing equipment and those which require leading-edge technology that only revolutionary modernization can bring. The aggregate of these programs is a vital part of the capability we will need to field a capable force in the next century. From a technological standpoint, we will remain superior to any force that any other nation can field. We will enjoy new advantages in stealth, in standoff precision weaponry, in sophisticated ground and space battlefield sensors, in night vision capabilities, and in tactical ballistic missile defenses.

On the other hand, hidden from sight are the large numbers of programs we terminated, some of which we felt were important but unaffordable in this more austere environment. Many of these program terminations were painful, to our defense industries and to communities that depend on defense procurements. But, they were necessary.

But, we cannot relent on modernization. Two vital considerations rest on it. First, modernization is the key to future readiness; and second, it is the only way to provide our next generation with a viable defense.

We have to view our Armed Forces as a living mechanism, much like San Francisco views its famous Golden Gate Bridge. That bridge is continuously being repainted. As soon as the painters have reached one end of the bridge, they turn around and start over at the other end. If they do not, they will fall behind and the bridge will lose its famous color, it will begin to rust, and the city will have to hire more painters and spend even more money to catch up.

In a similar vein, we have to continue 'painting' our forces. If we fail to continue to modernize, we are merely creating a massive problem down the line for a future generation of military leaders, for future congressional leaders, and for future taxpayers. No piece of equipment or system lasts forever. We have to keep replenishing our stocks through a combination of continued fielding, rebuilding, modifications, or modernization. As I stated, we are asking you to modernize only the systems that will make a dramatic difference to our capabilities.

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND INTELLIGENCE (C4I)

During the Grenada invasion only ten years ago, we were shocked to discover that soldiers on the ground could not talk directly to Navy ships lying just offshore to coordinate vital gunfire support. During the Gulf War, only three years ago, we discovered interoperability problems in passing air tasking orders between different services. And, when the conflict ended, General Schwarzkopf noted that he didn't feel that he had access to strategic intelligence in a timely enough manner, nor was this intelligence being distributed to frontline fighting commanders in time to be properly used. These lapses did not cause catastrophic problems. But, in other conflicts and under other conditions, if they recur, they could cause disaster. We need to follow through right away on the problems we discovered in the Gulf War.

But, we have to do more than just correct problems we have already discovered. We have to harness the spiral of

innovations occurring in computers, in electronics, in software, and in communications technologies in our laboratories, and we have to adapt these innovations to improve our strategic C4I architecture and our ability to cut through the fog of war on the battlefield.

Key to this is protecting and improving our ability to stay inside any opponent's decision cycle. Doing so requires two capabilities. We must have the ability to see the battlefield with such depth and acuity that we know what an opponent's forces are doing even before they know. Then, all of our forces — air, land, and sea — must be able to act with such speed and joint precision that our opponents will be overwhelmed, frozen, and incapable of responding.

In each of the two world wars of this century, new technologies debuted that revolutionized the way we fought. In the First World War, it was the machine gun, barbed wire, and finding a new application for an age-old soldier's tool, using the shovel to dig trenches. In the Second World War, it was the radio, radar, airpower, and armored forces. The revolution occurring today is in C4I.

CONCLUSION

In these uncertain times, we must protect our readiness, we must keep our force structure at the right size to be able to respond to major contingencies in two regions nearly simultaneously, and we must ensure that these forces grow in capability even as they come down in size. But, even this will not be enough if we do not keep the same remarkable quality of people in our force as we have today.

Our strategy is right. And, the forces we are recommending are sufficient if we follow through on the enhancements contained in this budget. If we do so, we will be more capable of executing two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies than we are today.

We must be able to move our forces and our supplies to threatened theaters faster and in larger and larger quantities. For an embattled theater commander, this alone has dramatic and nearly immeasurable battlefield consequences. From a warfighting perspective, I think any theater commander would far prefer four divisions and seven wings within a month after they are asked for, than twice that number three months afterwards. And, the forces we send must have more raw battlefield capability than any we could put into the air or on a ship today.

We also have to be alert against complacence. For the time being, we are fortunate not to have a compelling danger that threatens our very existence. But, we must maintain our forces and our readiness, we must modernize, and we have to build and expand the vitality of our alliances. We have to do these things today, not because we have a gun at our heads, but because we want to keep anyone from putting a gun at our heads, or ten years down the road, from doing so to our children.

As a nation, we have learned to view our environment and our debt with an eye to the future. We are disciplining ourselves to be more responsible about the state of the treasury and the atmosphere our children and our grandchildren are going to inherit. We need to carry the same outlook over to how we view our Armed Forces.

Today, America's Armed Forces are as good as we ever had. When we call upon them, as we have been doing quite often, they respond brilliantly. I ask your support in helping to maintain this edge tomorrow, and into the next century.

Veterans of Foreign Wars
Washington, DC
28 February 1994

I walk out on this podium with a great feeling, for I know that I am among friends, that I am with a fraternity of men and women and their wives and husbands who share many of my experiences, many of my outlooks, and many of my convictions. But the very first thing I want to do before I say another word is to say "thank you."

"Thank you" for your outstanding service to this great country. "Thank you" for fighting America's wars and for keeping this nation and its principles safe. "Thank you" for creating a tradition of great courage, of service and of sacrifice to our country, a living tradition, a tradition that inspires every man and woman serving in uniform today. And "thank you" for fighting to make a world full of vast opportunities for our nation.

Five months ago President Clinton notified me that I was to be nominated to succeed as the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my good friend and great American hero, General Colin Powell.

It was the second greatest honor of my life. The first, was the day back in 1958 when I became an American citizen. But I also look back now very fondly on another great day in my life, also in 1958, the day I put on the uniform of a

private in the United States Army. It seemed to me then, as it does to this very day, that wearing this country's uniform is one of the greatest privileges for any American.

Now you must remember, that I was growing up in Europe when some of you here were fighting over there. Because of that fortuitous accident of history, perhaps more than most, I gained a first-hand appreciation for what Americans fight for and how very important it is that when we do fight, we win.

Throughout my career, and I am sure this was true for all of you who have known military life, I always found my greatest satisfaction from working with the terrific men and women of the profession of arms. Each time that I was promoted, it came as a most pleasant surprise, for it meant I could continue doing that which I enjoyed the most. But the President's call was more than a surprise, it was a shock. Once I got over the shock, I spent some time thinking about where we are headed as a nation and what our Armed Forces must do if we are to get there.

The first thing I thought of was the very great changes that have swept the world in the past six years. We don't wake up every morning worried about a nuclear holocaust. We don't debate whether this conflict or that conflict is another Soviet challenge, another move in a serpentine strategy to conquer the world. And we don't have this huge enemy on the other side of the world, an ogre that forces us to spend higher and higher amounts of our tax dollars on military forces.

So we are relieved from this sense of daily dread, this terrible sense of insecurity that we have known most of our adult years. But in its place is a new risk for our country one that I believe you in this audience appreciate better than most. The new risk is complacency.

It is the same kind of complacency that we experienced when our troops returned home victorious from the trenches of the First World War, the conflict they labeled "the war to end all wars." And what a terrible and tragic mistake that turned out to be.

Then, after many of you returned home from the victorious battles for Europe and the Pacific, after you destroyed the dictators who grew so powerful while our nation was complacent, it happened again. Once again, we had to pay the terrible price of this complacency in the opening days of the Korean War. So once again our soldiers, our airmen, our sailors, and our marines went out to fight another dictator, Kim Il Sung, and to save another nation, South Korea and another region.

Then many of us went to Vietnam, where we bled once again. And as we fought this long battle, we gave hundreds of millions of people in Indonesia, in Thailand, in Malaysia, and in Singapore protection to build their own nations and to become the democracies they are today. But when we returned home from this fight it happened again.

By the late seventies, our Armed Forces were hollow. We had ships that couldn't deploy, planes that could not be safely flown, and divisions that lacked the parts and the training to perform their missions. Thinking that Détente meant peace, we shrank our arsenals and we allowed our forces to atrophy once again. But then after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and our embassy was seized and our people were imprisoned by the Iranians, we finally shook off the complacency and began to rebuild our forces.

And it was a good thing that we did. In Grenada, then in Panama, we saw our forces grow stronger and stronger and then three years ago in the Gulf War, we saw our men and women execute an extraordinary military feat. DESERT STORM became the high point of our military high tech excellence.

So there has been this cycle throughout this century, a cycle of enormous and costly exertion followed by a false sense of relief, a delusion that we had done our part and that it was time to rest and collect the dividends of our efforts.

Well, this time around we have to, we must resist the dangerous embrace of complacence.

Let me remind you of a fact of American history. Since our nation was founded, we have never experienced a twenty-year period of uninterrupted peace. Put another way, no soldier in this country's history has ever completed a military career when our nation did not engage in armed conflict at least once. This is the reality that underscores our need to remain ready. But there is another reason to reject complacency and embrace military readiness. Today we are the world's most powerful nation we are its richest nation and we are its leading nation.

Recently some have suggested that we can't shoulder this leadership any longer, that the price of leadership is too high, that if we continue to pay this price we will soon exhaust and impoverish ourselves. Actually just the opposite is true. It is our leadership that has kept us the world's most democratic and most prosperous people.

Give it up, give up our leadership and it will be the beginning of the end of our greatness. It's as simple as that. You can't stand still. You either go forward with confidence or you slip backwards in self-doubt. But you can't stand still.

Those of you who took part in the occupations of Japan and Germany, who rebuilt Western Europe from the ravages of war, and who defended South Korea and kept it safe for forty years, and who stemmed the tide of the communist onslaught into Southeast Asia, you laid the foundation for the freedom and prosperity we are enjoying today.

You built the markets that have made us collectively, the three richest and most democratic regions in the world. You also created the democratic allies who helped us to defeat the many threats that emerged after the war. They were beside us, taking the same risks and the same stands throughout the Cold War. And they were there with us in nearly every conflict we have had to fight, from Korea to Vietnam to the Gulf.

Now there are new possibilities and opportunities in Eastern Europe, in the states of the former Soviet Union, and in China and Southeast Asia. So there is a new challenge for American leadership and new opportunities for this generation of young men and women. And we have to grasp these opportunities. We can't stand still.

These were the thoughts that were running through my head after the President called me. Because like you, I fought to create these possibilities and like you, I want our children to inherit a better and a safer world. So what does this mean for our forces today and into the future?

You know that we have been reducing large numbers of men and women from our ranks, that the dollars we spend on defense have been steadily declining, and that we are becoming more and more concerned about our readiness. And there are reports around that the old disease of complacency has once again returned.

Since I became Chairman some four months ago, I have visited our forces here and overseas in Korea, in Somalia, in Hawaii, in Panama, and in Europe just last week, when Secretary Perry and I visited our pilots flying daily over Bosnia-Herzegovina. I want to report to you that they remain ready and they continue doing a simply magnificent job. They are guarding our nation and our allies and are accomplishing the many missions we have assigned them with every bit of the courage, the skill, and the enthusiasm that you showed and that Americans have come to expect from our Armed Forces.

Last November in South Korea, as I stood with our soldiers along the DMZ, watching them as they watch North Korea, you know that our men and women are ready. Talking to our commander there, General Gary Luck, a great soldier, as I did just this Saturday, you know that were a conflict to break out once again on that peninsula, our men and women together with our South Korean allies, would prevail, they would win decisively. They are quietly confident of that for they are ready.

In December I went to see our forces in Somalia. Even though the memory of the early October fight, a sharp violent fight in which they had lost 18 of their comrades and another 75 were wounded, was still very much with them, they knew they had fought well. In that same short fight they had inflicted nearly a thousand casualties and they knew they were ready. There was that same quiet confidence I had seen in Korea, a confidence that comes from knowing you are the best.

But there was more to that confidence that I experienced in Mogadishu. Our young men and women there knew that they had come to Somalia not to fight battles, although they were ready to fight if they had to, but they had come to Somalia to stop the misery and the dying. And when I talked to them in small groups, they understood that because they had come, hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of children and old people are alive today.

Like a doctor, they stemmed Somalia's catastrophic slide into starvation and slaughter, they resuscitated that country, and they gave it a chance for life. Our terrific young men and women gave Somalia a chance, but now it is up to the Somali people. We will be gone by the 31st of March and we can't be sure what will happen after we leave. But we are sure that today, there are these hundreds of thousands alive who surely would have been dead without us. We are as sure as we can be, that our men and women who went over there were part of an extraordinarily noble undertaking. Nothing, nothing that happens after we leave can take that away. I know that you share my pride in what they did as you also share in my sorrow for the price that so many had to pay.

And although the Gulf War is now long over, our forces continue to patrol the skies over southern and northern Iraq, enforcing protective no-fly zones over the Kurds, and our ships continue to enforce U.N. sanctions against Iraq. And throughout the region, our men and women are providing a powerful counterweight to Iraq's and Iran's ambitions. They are doing dangerous work in a dangerous part of the world but they are doing it proudly. And they are ready as they have been countless times when challenged by Iraqi pilots or air defenses.

Two weeks ago, I went to Panama to visit our United States Southern Command. This is the command that, over the past 10 years, helped block the spread of communism in this region and helped usher in a new unprecedented era of democracy; one that has spread throughout South and Central America. And only four and half years ago, these were the same men and women who took down Noriega in Operation Just Cause. Today, they are waging a fierce fight to stop the flow of drugs into our streets and working with our regional allies to maintain peace and stability throughout this hemisphere.

And just last week, Secretary of Defense Perry and I went to Aviano, Italy to visit our aircrews and to check their preparations to conduct air strikes to stop the shelling of Sarajevo. Even though these pilots and the crews, who knew

they were only hours away from a decision to strike, were coolly and professionally going about their preparations. They had studied their targets, they were confident of their skills and their aircraft, and they were as ready as any aircrews we ever send into harm's way. And they understood as well the purpose of their mission. Their task was not to bomb one side or another to the conference table; airpower can't do that. Their task wasn't to stop the fighting in Bosnia. Airpower can't stop the hatreds that have fueled nearly two years of war.

Theirs was a much narrower purpose. It was to enforce NATO's ultimatum that the Serbs and Muslims stop shelling the innocent civilians in Sarajevo, and that the heavy weapons that have brought so much death and destruction to this city, a city that not many years ago so proudly hosted a Winter Olympics, that these weapons be placed under U.N. control or moved 12 1/2 miles beyond the city's limits or be subject to air strikes by NATO attack aircraft. They understood the narrow limits of their tasks and felt very confident in their abilities to carry them out.

Apparently the Serbs and the Muslims as well understood the readiness of our aircrews, for the city has now gone 18 days free from the horror of artillery or mortar shelling.

To know what this means to the people of Sarajevo, it is useful to recall that just in the past 60 days, we had many days when well over 1,000 shells a day would hit that city, and that since conflict started over there, over 9,000 people have been killed and over 57,000 have been wounded in Sarajevo alone. If the readiness of our aircrews helped give the people of Sarajevo 18 days of peace, our men and women who are responsible, have something to be very proud about.

But they know full well that peace will not come unless it is achieved at the negotiating table. That is why President Clinton has redoubled America's involvement in the negotiating process and that is why correctly that is where our emphasis is being placed.

Our forces are performing these missions I spoke about and a great deal more; from serving in Macedonia, keeping the conflict in Bosnia from spilling over; to enforcing the Camp David Accord in the Sinai; to combing the countryside in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos recovering the remains of our missing comrades; to responding to humanitarian missions such as the recent earthquake in California. And our forces are doing these multiple tasks magnificently.

When you think about these various operations I just described, you realize that we are in a totally new era, and our armed forces are asked to perform an extraordinary variety of tough demanding missions. They are asked to do that with a lesser number of forces than we have had in decades. But when you get so lean as we are getting, it becomes doubly important that we keep our readiness up and we keep our emphasis on people. For that reason, Secretary Perry has directed that the readiness of our forces be our highest priority, and he has, even while the force is shrinking, actually increased the readiness accounts in our budget now before Congress.

But our people are just as important, for they are the very foundation of our military excellence, our ability to fight and win wars. I cannot emphasize strongly enough what great men and women we have in our ranks today. They are remarkable in every sense of the word. When you look at what they are doing around the world in all the places I named, it is astounding.

When you think of their courage, the hardships they endure, the tough and demanding lifestyles that accompany military life, and the sacrifices they and their families willingly make for this country, it is humbling. They are talented and dedicated and if we want to retain them and continue to recruit more like them, then we have to take care of their welfare and the welfare of their families. They are a Super Bowl team but without Super Bowl wages. The very last place we should look for more savings is in their paychecks and in what we provide for their quality of life programs.

Once in while we have to remind ourselves how long it took and how very expensive and difficult it was to build this outstanding military force we have today. Frankly I depend very heavily on you, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, to help us. You are the great patriots who can speak to Americans about why we cannot grow complacent again about how critical it is to keep our Armed Forces strong. And I know that you are doing this. Just as you did when you were on duty you, are all still standing up to be counted, telling our leaders in Washington that the surest path to peace, in fact the only path to peace, is a strong defense.

Now, I want to close by telling you again, "Thank You." Looking at all of you gathered here, I feel enormously proud; proud to be an American, proud to represent our great Armed Forces, and very proud to spend this time with so many men and women who have done so much for our country.

God Bless you all and God Bless the United States of America.

Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
Washington, DC
4 April 1994

Generally I use every chance I can get to speak of the need for Americans to retain a strong defense. But I decided not to do that tonight.

I decided not to do that because you, after all, already support a strong defense. And I am very well aware there are a heck-of-a-lot more defense experts sitting in the audience tonight than there are behind this microphone.

But the main reason why I thought I would forgo speaking about the need for a strong defense is that just earlier today, I returned from a trip to Europe and a visit to Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Skopje.

And so with that visit very fresh in my mind, I thought it might be of interest if I relayed to you some of my impressions of that visit and address what could very well turn out to be the next commitment facing our forces.

I arrived in Zagreb after having first gone to Italy to visit with our U.S. and NATO commanders responsible for all of NATO's air operations over Bosnia. Having earlier visited with the pilots who fly these missions, to include the two young captains who not long ago shot down the four Serbian Galebs, you walk away with a feeling of supreme confidence, confidence in the expertise of our aircrews our commanders and in NATO's military capabilities.

These Dutch, British, French, Turkish, and American pilots have no doubts and hold no debates about NATO's military capabilities or relevance in managing post-Cold War crises. They have quietly taken NATO out-of-area and into the first real operation, to include the first combat engagements in NATO's history. And you sense no crisis in confidence when you're among them.

In Zagreb I teamed up with Ambassador Albright and together we met with UNPROFOR's new commander, French General de Lapresle, and later with President Tudjman, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign and Defense Ministers, and the Croatian Chief of Defense.

Earlier that day, the Croats and Serbs of the Krajina had signed a long awaited cease-fire agreement that if it stands, will help defuse one of the most ignitable tinderboxes in that disintegrated nation.

That cease-fire agreement together with what has been termed as a "rolling peace" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that began with NATO's ultimatum for all sides to either withdraw or place all heavy weapons in and around Sarajevo under U.N. control, and America's leading role in the peace process that has led to the agreements to establish a Bosnian federation composed so far of Muslims and Bosnian Croats, has established a momentum that is sparking considerable hope even among the most cynical and pessimistic Yugoslav watchers. Certainly none of us know if the momentum will continue. We all learned long ago that the Balkans have a way of making fools out of most optimists.

Nevertheless, whether in discussions with General de Lapresle or President Tudjman, I sensed more optimism than on any previous visit.

General de Lapresle urged that more troops be sent to Croatia and Bosnia, to include American troops, to allow him to supervise the numerous cease-fires that are being negotiated. I, in turn, reminded him of President Clinton's decision not to send American ground forces until there is an overall peace agreement. And President Tudjman urged us to more quickly engage the Serbs in our peace negotiations before the momentum is lost and the window of opportunity closes. But his real worry was that the Muslims would stall further negotiations in the hope of first gaining more territory in the battlefield. There was a clear feeling that that would prove fatal to the peace process. However overall the mood was clearly upbeat.

From Zagreb, Ambassador Albright and I went to Sarajevo both to inspect the conditions in the aftermath of the NATO imposed ultimatum and to meet with General Rose, the very energetic new British commander of U.N. forces in Bosnia, and with President Izetbegovic, Prime Minister Silajdzic, the Foreign and Defense Ministers and Army commander General Delic.

Those of you who have recently visited Sarajevo know that large portions of the city are a very sobering sight. Ruined buildings, one block after another of shell pocked high rises left windowless and burned out from months of heavy artillery fire. In many ways it looks worse than it appears on television.

But the people of Sarajevo are back out on the streets for the first time in a year and half and everywhere you drive, there are hundreds of people out walking in the spring air with relief evident on their faces, just to be out of their basements and shelters and to be free from the daily dangers of artillery poundings and sniper fire. And in the ruins of what used to be beautiful parks, children are once again playing in the sunshine.

Yet despite these first fragile signs of rebirth of a war torn city there remain some dark and worrisome signs.

Cross through a military checkpoint from the Muslim part of Sarajevo to the Serbian side and you have the same feeling you used to have when crossing through Checkpoint Charlie from West to East Berlin.

You had the feeling then in Berlin that you were walking through a curtain of hatred and you have the same feeling now. And it is a sobering reminder of how difficult it will be to bring real peace to that city much less to that land. When I asked the Serb sentry manning the checkpoint whether he would ever wish to visit the Muslim side he spat out a single word: "Never."

In our meeting with President Izetbegovic, we were informed of the Republic Assembly's ratification of the U.S.-brokered Federation constitution. At the same time, Izetbegovic sought our support for a just agreement with the Bosnian Serbs that would "preserve the country as a unity" and called for the deployment of at least a small contingent of U.S. troops now, as "moral support for those who want peace." We in turn stressed the need to not allow the peace process to stall and the need to understand the limitations on American ground forces until a peace agreement is in place.

What was most striking about the meeting however, were not the words but the atmosphere of the meeting which on their part verged on the euphoric. I am certain that this mood was based in no small measure on the recent string of successes: NATO's ultimatum over Sarajevo; the shootdown of the four Serb jets; the Washington Accords; and a more effective UNPROFOR under General Rose.

Nevertheless, in this meeting and much more forcefully in a later meeting with General Delic and Bosnian Croat General Rosso, it became clear that the Muslims had much higher territorial expectations than one could ever expect the Serbs to agree to. When pressed on that point, Delic made no bones about the fact that he was prepared to continue fighting unless they could get a "just" agreement. I walked away from that meeting persuaded that Delic at least had not yet come face-to-face with the fact that he could gain more at the negotiating table than on the battlefield and that until he does we are facing very hard and potentially lengthy negotiations.

But two things were made very clear to us in discussions in Zagreb, Sarajevo, and later in my talks with President Gligorov in Skopje. First they believe none of the successes so far, no matter how limited, could have been possible without America's lead in the diplomatic process. And secondly, they all felt that America's involvement in helping them implement the peace agreements is absolutely essential if the peace process is to be carried out to its successful conclusion.

This second point of course brings us to the crux of the issue: the involvement of America's ground forces in the implementation of a Bosnia peace agreement.

Of course any such suggestion brings to mind a number of confusing and contradictory images.

There is the image of a region of ancient hatreds, religious intolerance, and unspeakable cruelty. A region torn against itself where lasting peace is but an illusion unless enforced with the iron fist of another Tito.

It is this dark region so well described in a book now making the rounds, a book so aptly titled: "Balkan Ghosts."

And there is that image of that young Serbian soldier standing guard among the burned out ruins of a once vibrant city, staring with hatred from the Serbian side to the Muslim sector of Sarajevo far from ready to reach out the hand of friendship. His young eyes as unforgiving as those of old men who had suffered for a lifetime.

But there is also the image of children playing in the dirt that was once a green neighborhood park, of a lone trolley car once again lumbering along what only a short time ago was known as "sniper alley." The laughter from a just opened outdoor café, if two chairs and an old table set up on a torn up sidewalk can be called an outdoor cafe.

And there is also the vision of Somalia, of 3 October in Mogadishu, of 18 American soldiers dead, of the body of an American soldier dragged through the dirt by a crowd intoxicated on anti-American slogans.

No one will deny that what happened on 3 October in Somalia sent a jarring shock of disillusionment across our country and will cast a heavy shadow on whether we should send our forces into Bosnia.

The question we have wrestled with ever since is how to contain that disillusionment. Because neither Americans nor the world can afford for that disillusionment to be a turning point that makes America over-cautious, ambivalent, or mute to its responsibilities. But on the other hand we cannot ignore the need to take measure of what our role should be in a world that has changed so very remarkably in the past six years.

As many of you know for many months, the administration has been drafting a Presidential Review Directive, whose purpose it is to form policy guidelines for when we should engage in multilateral peace operations and when we do under what terms and how we will engage our forces.

We must recognize that in this new era our country will face a whole host of security challenges. And our policy must be clear that our foremost requirement is to protect our warfighting capabilities.

While we might engage in other kinds of operations, we must not allow any diminishment or erosion of our un-

equaled capability to fight and win wars, either unilaterally or in coalitions, because this must remain the centerpiece of our national security strategy and the core safeguard of our country's security.

But we cannot ignore the cumulative effect of the many ethnic struggles, religious conflicts, civil disputes, and human disasters that are erupting like measles in many regions of the world today. And the vast majority of these kinds of problems cannot be resolved by dispatching American forces to fight and win. They require other kinds of solutions from humanitarian support through peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

So when and how should we decide when one of these problems requires American involvement and participation and how do we proceed once we decide that our involvement is necessary? We know that we cannot be the world's policemen, but we also sense that we cannot just hang a sign outside the Pentagon that says, "we only do the big ones."

Our policy should recognize that it would be imprudent to try to devise a set of rigid rules for making these decisions.

While it would perhaps be convenient to have a set of ironclad rules, the world is just too complex for such a Cartesian approach to national security decision making. We will have to continue to rely on our case-by-case judgment and political leadership for these decisions. But there are a series of factors that I believe should be considered.

The first set is for determining whether we should vote for or against a new U.N. operation or to extend an existing mandate. It reflects what President Clinton said last September that the U.N. needs to learn to say "no" more frequently. Among these considerations should be whether the situation represents a threat to international peace and security, whether there are clear objectives and a defined scope of operations, whether there is enough multilateral interest so that the burden of action and resources can be spread, that conditions for success exist, that sufficient financial and human resources are available, and that there is an identifiable endpoint.

The second set of factors should be used to determine whether the proposed operation advances U.S. interests, whether U.S. participation is necessary for success, whether we have sufficient personnel funds and resources available, and whether Rules of Engagement and Command and Control arrangements are acceptable.

But if the operation in question is a U.N. Charter Chapter 7 operation that is a peace enforcement operation, where there is a high likelihood of active combat, we should consider a third set of factors such as our ability to commit sufficient forces to achieve our clearly defined objectives, and once committed, that we have the mechanism to continually reassess the relationship between our objectives and the composition and mission of our forces.

Ultimately America's forces should be committed to war or to peace operations if there is support for such a commitment among the American people and our Congress, or if as a minimum there is a high expectation that such support can be garnered.

And it is in the context of this requirement that those images I spoke of earlier, and particularly Somalia, will play such a decisive role.

In fact, only a few weeks ago as I visited Mogadishu to thank our troops for their noble accomplishments and wish them a safe journey home, the dominant question from the press was whether our experience in Somalia should warn us to stay out of Bosnia. There is no doubt that the press was merely reflecting what is on many people's minds all across the country.

I would begin by paraphrasing then-Senator Benson: "I knew Somalia and Bosnia is not Somalia."

We should not make the mistake of confusing the two. We have very legitimate and very important stakes in what is happening today in Bosnia and in what could happen tomorrow. Our only stake in Somalia was our conscience. But in Bosnia we confront both our heart and the future of Europe.

Today, as all of you know, we and our European friends are trying to shape a new Europe. With the disintegration of the Soviet empire we suddenly have the opportunities we could only dream of during the Cold War.

For the first time in our adult lives the nuclear threshold is down and we can keep it down. For the first time since my childhood, there is no powerful empire casting a dark shadow across the European continent. And for the first time since the Second World War Europe is not divided by walls of armies.

The question that has bothered us since the end of the Cold War is nearly answered. Is there a life for NATO outside of the Cold War?

If we didn't know the answer to that question ourselves, the Central and East Europeans provided that answer when one after another they asked to join NATO and until that becomes a possibility, to anchor themselves to the alliance through the "Partnership for Peace." In their minds NATO is the very basis for stability in Europe. And America and American leadership is the anchor of that stability. Only we have the power the credibility and the trust to perform this role.

We have a deep interest in a stable and prosperous Europe. A Europe at peace with itself. Not just Western Europe but Central and Eastern Europe as well.

We have a continuing deep interest in a strong relevant NATO serving as the anchor of stability for our Trans-Atlantic region.

And we have a deep interest in preventing the widening of the conflict in Bosnia.

All three of these interests are threatened by continued conflict in Bosnia.

Surely continued war in the Balkans threatens the very stability of Europe and no one will argue that the United States was correct to redouble its diplomatic efforts to try to bring the conflict to as speedy an end as possible.

And if it becomes possible to successfully implement an eventual peace agreement using only the U.N. forces already there, without the need for American forces on the ground, then that would be a very good outcome.

But that will most probably not be the case. Commanders on the ground tell us that more forces will be needed and more importantly more quality forces will be needed as contrasted with those from most third world nations. Those quality forces if they have to come can come only from the United States.

Whether we like it or not our participation will most probably be asked of us as it is already being asked today.

So we will have to be very clear not only about the consequences of participation, but be just as clear about the consequences of refusing to participate.

If fighting were to continue or a peace were to unravel because of a lack of quality soldiers to adequately implement a peace agreement, then as a minimum European stability would be endangered, America's continued willingness to share in the day-to-day risks with its European partners would be thrown in doubt, and thus America's ability to lead in Europe would be weakened.

If NATO were asked to help implement the peace plan and NATO had to refuse because of American non-participation, some would argue NATO would be severely wounded. With NATO thus weakened, the adverse impact on the long-term developments in Central and Eastern Europe would be most significant.

Finally if the fighting continues or were to resume after a failed peace, the prospect for widening of the conflict would increase considerably.

While much of the talk has centered on the geographic widening of the conflict into Kosovo or into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, we must realize there could be an even more dangerous widening of the conflict, one in which outside nations get drawn into the conflict as active participants on opposite sides of the dispute; Turkey and Greece, Russia and the West, and perhaps to a lesser extent the United States and Western Europe over such disagreements as the lifting of the arms embargo. We must recognize such a widening of the conflict as the true nightmare of the Balkan wars.

No, Bosnia is not Somalia. In Bosnia we have much more at stake than just our heart.

Continued conflict in Bosnia threatens our very core interests. Bosnia is about our ability to shape a future Europe, it is about preserving NATO as our premier security alliance of the extended Trans-Atlantic family of nations, and it is about bringing this Balkan War to an end before it is allowed to tear at the fabric of Europe as previous Balkan Wars have done so tragically.

But if these are some possible consequences of inaction, we must however be clear as well about the risks of American involvement.

There must be no doubt that the risk to our servicemen and women would be extensive. Bosnia to date and Somalia have made that clear. Any military operation carries with it risks to life and limb and one in the land of the "Balkan Ghosts" surely doubly so.

We can somewhat reduce the risks by insisting we go in only after there is an overall peace agreement, after we have seen that it is holding, that we go in sufficient numbers to protect ourselves, that we insist on robust Rules of Engagement so no one can intimidate us or push us around, and that we operate under a chain of command that is experienced and which holds our trust. In other words that we participate only as part of NATO.

We most probably have a way to go yet until a peace agreement is in our grasp. And as today's news from Gorazde reminds us peace will not come easily. In the end peace might even elude us despite our best efforts.

But we cannot wait until peace is here to begin the debate about what part America should play in implementing an eventual peace in Bosnia. We, the public, the Congress, need to understand now what is at stake.

With that let me thank you and if I haven't already overwhelmed your sensibilities I will take whatever questions you might have.

Army and Air Force Mutual Aid Association
Fort Myer, Virginia
12 April 1994

I must tell you how very, very pleased I am to have this chance to share some thoughts with so many old friends and comrades. As Dutch remarked, I have been a member of the Army and Air Force Mutual Aid Association for 30 years. And I must admit to all of you, what a great relief it is each month to pay my dues, because I find the alternative so very unappealing. And I want to assure you, Dutch, that while I know the association's service is superb, I really am in no particular hurry for my wife to find out firsthand. Let's keep her guessing.

Now, I thought for quite some time about what I wanted to say to you, because I am addressing probably the most difficult audience for a man in my position, a room full of strong defense advocates during a period of steep defense cuts. And I know that one of your greatest concerns today is what we are doing with our Armed Forces.

Let me start with the raw numbers. By next year, our defense budget will be 40 percent smaller than it was in 1985. By 1999, our budget will shrink in real terms, by another 11 percent. And the Army will shrink to 10 Divisions, the Navy to 12 Carriers, and a total of 340 combat ships, and the Air Force to 20 Tactical Fighter Wing Equivalents and 160 Bombers.

Our total manpower will be reduced from slightly over 2 million men and women in 1990 ... to 1.4 million. We are cutting our force by nearly 700,000 people. In fact, we are already over 80 percent complete with these manpower reductions and we are continuing to reduce by nearly 11,000 people a month.

If Dutch Kerwin were to give as bleak a report as this, all of us would be heading for a new insurance company. These are dramatic numbers to anybody's ears. And when you hear them, it raises hackles up the back of your neck and understandably, makes you wonder about the future security of our country.

So in the next few minutes, let me give you a picture of all that our forces are doing and then address the forces and capabilities we will need for our future.

Let me start in Europe, for it is there that we face great challenges, but also significant opportunities: to help promote a democratic Russia and to realize the dream of European unity.

And it is in our European Command that we have undergone the greatest military changes. Five years ago, when the Cold War was still in earnest, we had 321,000 men and women assigned in Europe. Today there are 147,000 and by the end of 1996, we will be down to approximately 100,000, a dramatic reduction of over two-thirds, but sufficient I believe, to the new tasks.

But the magnitude of change is better captured by what our forces are doing. During the Cold War our forces, together with those of our NATO allies, were there to deter and if deterrence failed, to defend NATO territory.

They were a shield behind which alliance nations could grow and prosper into one of the richest and most democratic regions in the world and one of our strongest supporters, and best trading partners.

Today, our forces in Europe no longer stare across the Fulda Gap nor patrol a no longer existing inter-German border.

Today, our forces, as part of a new NATO, must be prepared to reach out to the East in a "Partnership for Peace" that will grow into an anchor of stability behind which Central and Eastern Europeans can build their own robust economies and democratic institutions that are so essential to fulfilling the dream of European unity.

As the leading nation of NATO, our forces must be prepared to participate with the Alliance in reducing tensions and managing crises such as the tragedy in former Yugoslavia, and for the time being, they must remain strong, credible guardians in the event of a reversal of the democratic process in the former Soviet Union. Recent events in Russia only underscore the importance of that part of NATO's mission. Finally, our European based forces must be prepared to deploy quickly in support of America's interests anywhere in that part of the world.

What does this mean in actual practice? Well today, our service men and women can be found in Warsaw, in Prague, in Budapest, in Bratislava, in fact in every Central and East European capital, engaged in very robust and most successful military-to-military contact programs doing their very important part in our outreach to the East.

Before the next year is over, our soldiers will be in Russia participating in a first ever U.S.-Russian ground force exercise.

At the same time, some 7,500 of our personnel, operating from airbases in Italy and from our Carrier Battle Group in the Adriatic, are providing some of the 160 tactical aircraft, enforcing the NATO "Heavy Weapons Ban" around Sarajevo; a ban that has now given that city 57 days free from artillery and mortar shells. They also are enforcing the U.N. mandated "No-Fly Zone" and last month shot down four aircraft that were bombing targets in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

And they fly combat air patrols over Bosnia, ready to provide Close Air Support to UNPROFOR forces as they did this weekend, and again yesterday when our F-16s and F-18s engaged targets around Gorazde.

Approximately 2,300 of our sailors, airmen, and marines are participating in Operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic, enforcing the maritime economic sanctions against Serbia. And by now, over 27,000 ships have been challenged and some 2,000 have been stopped or boarded in this most successful NATO operation.

Some 500 of our personnel under UNPROFOR are operating a field hospital in Zagreb and supporting other U.N. humanitarian efforts, while some 324 soldiers are in Macedonia supporting the Nordic Brigade in the UNPROFOR mission to prevent the conflict in Bosnia from spilling over into that country.

And over 1,100 of our pilots, riggers, and maintenance personnel work around the clock to fly in badly needed food and humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and airdrop these supplies into areas that can not be reached by ground convoys.

In all, some 12,000 of our military personnel are involved in one way or another in these operations. But they all know that the conflict won't end, unless there is an agreement at the negotiating table and it is in recognition of that, that the United States has redoubled its support for a negotiated settlement that so far has yielded the Muslim-Croat federation and that hopefully will, in the not too distant future, also result in an agreement between that new federation and the Bosnian Serbs.

Only time will tell whether this current renewal of fighting will unravel what has so far been achieved or whether peace will finally come to the troubled Balkans.

Now let me turn to the Pacific and to Asia. While in Europe our greatest challenge and opportunity is Russia, the result of the collapse of a superpower, in Asia we are facing the rebirth of a great new power, China. There too, strong military-to-military contacts in the days ahead will do much to build constructive ties with that very important nation.

However, the near-term focus of our attention in this region for the past several years quite correctly, has been on North Korea, both because of its alarming conventional threat and the nearly certain possibility that it is developing a nuclear weapon.

We have stabilized our military presence in Korea, postponing any more force reductions until North Korea makes acceptable progress on the nuclear issue.

I know that all of you are fully aware of where we are in regard to our stalemated nuclear negotiations with Kim Il Sung's regime. But I do want to point out that the nuclear issue is only one side of the equation. The other side is a million-man, highly mobile military force, an artillery-heavy army that is burrowed into the hills and mountains within close proximity to the DMZ.

Really since 1980, we have watched this force grow in size and capability and we watched more and more units and heavy weapons edge closer and closer to the DMZ.

This has been a matter of growing concern for it is destabilizing and eats away the amount of warning time we might have to react.

In the interim, our 37,000 men and women in Korea train very closely with our South Korean allies and stay very vigilant. There is no doubt at all that should North Korea attack, the United States would stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our South Korean allies. And while the conflict would cause untold damage and devastation, I am very confident that North Korea would be decisively defeated.

But of course managing North Korea is not all that our forces in the Pacific are doing. We still have some 45,000 men and women in Japan and nearly 44,000 in Hawaii, which gives us a strong, stabilizing presence in this part of the world that is experiencing unprecedented economic growth.

And it is, like Europe, a traditional arena of great power competition, one whose stability teeters on events in China and Russia, two great nations that are hurtling through vast economic and political changes.

As well, our Pacific forces are maintaining nearly constant presence in Southeast Asia where they are engaging in operations as diverse as exercises with regional allies, to continuing the searches in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos that will bring us closer to a full accounting of our comrades still missing from the Vietnam conflict.

Now, let me turn to our Central Command and its area of responsibility. The Gulf War crystallized what President Carter enunciated in 1978, that Southwest Asia is a crucial region for the free world. And there are two nations that remain of immediate concern.

Of most immediate concern is Iraq. There, we are participating with coalition forces in maintaining U.N. sanctions and enforcing the no-fly zone, designed to prevent the Iraqis from using their air force to slaughter Shias and the Kurds.

At the same time, we are countering Iran's ambition to expand its influence and destabilize governments in the region. This is partly a function of our forward presence and in an equal measure, our continuing efforts to help our regional friends build their own defenses and their own regional defensive alliances.

And the Central Command is also the headquarters that up to some two weeks ago has been supporting the United Nations operations in Somalia. Except for a small number required to support the U.S. Liaison Office in Mogadishu and a handful of advisors to the UNOSOM headquarters, all our ashore military personnel, that at one time numbered some 21,000, departed prior to the 31st of March.

And I would just like to take a moment to tell you how very, very proud I am of what our service men and women there have accomplished.

Today, there are thousands upon thousands of Somali women, children, and old men alive because of our men and women who went there to help. And nothing, nothing that might happen now that we are gone, can take away from that noble undertaking.

You can debate how Washington or the U.N. ran the operation, but there must be no debate about the bravery, and commitment, and competence of our service men and women.

I know you share my pride in what they did, as you share in my sorrow for the price so many had to pay.

Finally I would like to bring you back to this hemisphere. For if there is an untold success story of the past decade, it is the spread of democracy that has swept through Latin America. And this is inciting something that is long overdue, an economic recovery in South and Central America. It is occurring nation by nation as one after another tames inflation and restores the balance between its debts and its ability to produce and sell products.

But there are threats remaining. There remain some local insurgencies and there are the drug lords. Our Armed Forces are heavily engaged in the fight on drugs. But we have learned just how difficult it is to achieve progress.

The geostrategic breadth of our interests and the number of regions critical to our interests, whose stability and security depend so much on the commitment of our forces, make it clear that we need to maintain the ability to respond to two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies.

Were we to become involved in a major response to aggression in any one of these regions, it is entirely possible that another of these nations would be tempted to attack its neighbors if it believed the U.S. too weak to deal with two simultaneous contingencies. So this is the core-sizing requirement of our strategy.

The forces and capabilities that the Bottom Up Review has recommended are lean, in fact very, very lean. But I believe this smaller structure can do the job with an acceptable risk, if but only if we meet two assumptions.

The first is that we protect and improve the readiness of our forces. The second is that we continue to improve their capabilities.

All of you know what we went through after WW II, after Korea, and again after Vietnam. It was a cycle of declines followed by disasters that we cannot and will not repeat.

The Operation and Maintenance account needs to be increased, and steaming days, training hours, and flight hours, must be funded at levels that military commanders believe are essential. While the President's budget now before Congress does these things, I am very concerned about what will eventually emerge from Congress.

Now, let me return to our need to grow in capabilities as we reduce our structure.

This increase in capabilities must come from a number of sources. It will require a degree of modernization. It will require the enhancements that are recommended in the Bottom Up Review.

And it will require those of us in the Department of Defense, particularly those of us in the Armed Forces, to be bolder in challenging how we do our business and to be relentless in finding and implementing ways to make our forces more and more effective on the battlefield.

What specifically am I talking about?

When you go from the M1A1 tank to the M1A2 tank, it increases the lethality of a tank company by nearly 20 percent. If we had had the C-17 for use in our deployment to Somalia it would have doubled the cargo we were able to bring through the airfield at Mogadishu.

When we bring our Navy in closer to the shoreline, which is a core thrust of its new littoral doctrine, we increase the air sorties and the fire support available to the warfighting commanders.

The Bottom Up Review listed a number of enhancements that will make our forces more capable — strategically, operationally, and tactically. It is imperative that we maintain support for them from R&D through funding.

This means we have to continue to make our investments in expanded strategic lift and prepositioning of stocks in locations that will increase our global agility.

And, as I pointed out earlier, we have to make continuing, albeit selective investments in modernization. We must make sure that our smaller forces remain capable of defeating any two regional adversaries.

Now there is one last point about this future force and that is our people, the very foundation of our military excellence, our ability to fight and win.

I cannot emphasize strongly enough what great men and women we have in our ranks today. When you look at what they are doing around the world in all the places I have named, it is astounding.

They are talented and dedicated, and if we want to retain them and continue to recruit more like them, then we have to take care of their welfare and the welfare of their families. They are a Super Bowl team, but without Super Bowl wages.

The very last place to look for more savings is in their paychecks and in what we provide in our quality of life programs.

Now I would like to conclude with one or two observations. The first is a fact of American history. Since our nation was founded, we have never experienced a twenty-year period of uninterrupted peace. Put another way, no soldier in this country's history has ever completed a full military career when the nation did not engage in armed conflict at least once.

This is the reality that underscores our need to remain ready. My second observation is simply a reminder, a reminder of how long it took and how very expensive and difficult it was to build this outstanding military force we have today.

Nearly all of you here in Ceremonial Hall today, have had a hand in one way or another in its construction and I know you feel a sense of proprietary anxiety about what is happening to your force.

These reminders underscore our need to continue to shape and equip our forces for the future. In the past, we were on a roller coaster of declines followed by expensive surges, followed by another decline. We simply must put ourselves on a steady line, through which we maintain our balance in every critical measure of our Armed Forces.

We have a strategy. And, we have determined the leanest force structure capable of fulfilling that strategy. But in order to fit that very lean structure to the strategy, it is going to have to grow in capabilities. There are three factors that will make the difference; readiness, prudent modernization, and people.

I assure you that my focus will remain on these three areas.

And I ask that you too, keep them in your field of vision, for we are going to need your support to keep the American people and the Congress aware that too many peace dividends can very quickly become tragic regrets.

With that, thank you very much for this chance to share these thoughts with you. It has been great to escape the Pentagon and to be with so many great friends.

Thank you and God Bless.

Annual Military Appreciation Dinner
Fairbanks, Alaska
16 April 1994

Governor and Mrs. Hickel, Senator Stevens, Mayor and Mrs. Hayes, Mayor and Mrs. Cunningham, Mayor and Mrs. Sampson, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. Senator Stevens, thank you for that very kind introduction.

Now, standing here before you, I find it impossible to repress my memory of a famous story about Joe Namath when he played for Alabama, and his legendary coach, Bear Bryant. In Namath's senior year, Bear Bryant stood up to give the team his traditional talk on the standards that he expected of his team.

In his usual blunt style, he said, "I expect all of you to be neat and tidy. I expect you to keep your hair cut and your shoes shined and your pants creased."

"Further, I expect you to go to class, to study hard, and to get good grades. There will be no dummies on this team" he growled. Then, to see that his point got through, he challenged the team. "I expect each and every one of you to live up to these standards, but if you want to be a dummy, I want to know now so stand up."

At this point Joe Namath, his star quarterback stood up. Visibly surprised, Bryant asked him, "Joe, what are you doing standing up? You're no dummy." To which Namath smiled and replied, "Yeah, I know coach, but I hate like the devil for you to be standing all by yourself."

So you can just imagine what it feels like to be standing up here all alone. But if the truth were known, it is actually a terrific feeling to be standing here before you: for I know that men and women in uniform never had better friends than you, the members of the Fairbanks Chamber of Commerce. So before I say another word, let me say "Thank you."

Thank you, Margo Goodhew, thank you Jim Merser, thank you Gary Wilken, and thank you to each and every member of the Chamber of Commerce. And how about all of us in uniform giving them a great big hand?

And thank you as well, to all the service men and women here tonight. Just look at you! You are the finest who ever wore America's uniform. You are the guardians of our country's future. And so, how about if we give all of them a hand?

Yes, it is great standing here before you, for it brings back nothing but the fondest memories of the days back in 1959, when I arrived here in Fairbanks as a brand new green lieutenant. Much has changed since those years so long ago, but what has not changed is the caring support of the people in the state, for the thousands upon thousands of service men and women who have had the privilege to serve in the great state of Alaska. So "thank you" for that, Governor Hickel.

By the way, I believe that there are nearly 23,000 uniformed men and women stationed in Alaska today and that their family members add another 29,000. So there is a very large number of military folks who live, who train, and who thrive here in Alaska.

And one thing you might find interesting: for each of the 23,000 men and women in uniform you have accepted into your communities, there is a permanent citizen of Alaska serving today in our Armed Forces. That means 23,000 Alaskans are spread across the globe, serving in uniform.

And I want to assure you that they, like the men and women here tonight, are accomplishing the many missions we have assigned them whether here in Alaska, in Korea, in Europe, in Hawaii, in Panama, or the lower 48 with every bit of the courage, the skill, and the tenacity that Americans have grown to expect from their Armed Forces.

They are part of the 37,000 sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines standing constant vigil at the North Korean border as our military has been doing for over 40 years.

And they were part of the difficult and challenging operation in Somalia where they performed superbly and saved hundreds of thousands of Somali children, old men and women, from certain starvation. And because our men and women went to help, thousands upon thousands of Somalis are alive today. And now that we are out of Somalia, nothing, nothing that happens there in the weeks and months ahead can take away from that. And while we can debate what Washington should or should not have done, there must be no debate about the bravery and the sacrifice of those who serve as part of that noble undertaking.

And Alaskan service men and women serve as well as part of the operations in Italy, in Macedonia, in Croatia, and in Bosnia, where they are standing side by side with other U.N. and NATO forces trying to control the intensity of this civil war, and to keep the violence from spreading to neighboring countries and to broker a peace accord as soon as possible.

Our men and women are part of the air operation enforcing the no-fly ban over Bosnia and the U.N. mandate to stop the shelling of Sarajevo. These are the same air forces that just a few weeks ago shot down the four Serbian Galebs that violated the no-fly zone, and just last week, supported General Rose's order to protect U.N. forces by attacking Serbian positions firing upon U.N. observers. And today's reports from Sarajevo and Gorazde are a clear indication just how tough that job can be.

As an aside, while I was in Italy, I met with the two Air Force captains who shot down the Galebs that violated the no-fly zone and I saw the same steely confidence, that what they are doing is right, that they are the best trained, the best equipped and the best led fighting force in the world.

And these are just a few of the many places around the globe you will find proud Alaskan men and women, your sons and daughters, performing difficult and often dangerous missions for our Nation.

And tragic accidents, like Wednesday's downing of two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters over Northern Iraq, stand as a grim reminder of just how dangerous military life can be. While we still don't know all of the facts, I know each of you here tonight share in my sorrow. Because each of you understand as well as anyone, how very valuable each of these men and women are to their families and to their country. This is indeed a terrible loss.

But what about the future?

Well, the geostrategic breadth of our interests and the number of regions critical to our interests, make it imperative that we maintain the ability to respond to two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. Were we to become involved in a major response to aggression in any one of these regions, it is entirely possible that another of these nations would be tempted to attack its neighbors if it believed the U.S. is too weak to deal with two simultaneous contingencies. So this is the core-sizing requirement of our strategy.

But the forces and capabilities recommended in the Bottom Up Review to meet this core-sizing requirement are lean, in fact very, very lean. But I believe this smaller structure can do the job with an acceptable level of risk, if and only if, we meet two assumptions.

The first is that we protect and improve the readiness of our forces. The second is that we continue to improve the capabilities of our forces.

Readiness of our force must remain our central focus. All of you know what we went through after World War Two, after Korea, and again after Vietnam. It was a cycle of declines followed by disasters that we cannot, and will not, repeat.

And so, Operation and Maintenance accounts must be increased and we must fully fund the steaming days, the training hours, and the flight hours at levels that military commanders believe are essential.

And, as I said, we must grow in capabilities as we reduce our structure.

This increase in capabilities must come from a number of sources. It will require a degree of modernization. It will require the enhancements to our forces recommended in the Bottom Up Review. And it will require those of us in the Department of Defense, to be bolder in challenging how we do our business and to be relentless in finding and implementing ways to make our forces more and more effective on the battlefield.

What specifically am I talking about?

When you go from the M1A1 tank to the M1A2 tank, it increases the lethality of a tank company by nearly 20 percent. If we had had the C-17 for use in our deployment to Somalia, it would have doubled the cargo we would have been able to bring through the airfield of Mogadishu.

When we bring our Navy in closer to the shoreline, which is a core thrust of its new doctrine, we increase the air sorties and the naval support available to the warfighting commanders.

The Bottom Up Review listed a number of enhancements that will make our forces more capable; strategically, operationally, and tactically. It is imperative that we maintain support for them from R&D through fielding, in this and in out-year budgets.

We must improve our strategic lift so we can get to the crisis in time. We must increase our tank killing and smart munitions stocks and we must improve our command and control and intelligence systems. We need to do these things if this smaller force is to remain capable of defeating any two regional adversaries.

Now there is one last point about this future force, and that is our people, the very foundation of our military excellence, our ability to fight and win.

I cannot emphasize strongly enough what great men and women we have in our ranks today. When you look at what they are doing around the world, in all the places I have named, it is astounding.

They are talented and dedicated and if we want to retain them, and continue to recruit more like them, then we have to take care of their welfare and the welfare of their families. They are a Super Bowl team, but without Super Bowl wages.

The very last place to look for more savings is in their paychecks and in what we provide in our quality of life programs.

Let me make one or two observations. The first is a fact of American history. Since our nation was founded, we have never experienced a twenty-year period of uninterrupted peace. Put another way, no soldier in this country's history has ever completed a full military career when the nation did not engage in armed conflict at least once.

This is the reality that underscores our need to remain ready. We must remain prepared for the unexpected.

My second observation is simply a reminder, a reminder of how long it took and how very expensive and difficult it was to build this outstanding military force we have today.

It is wise to remember the great defense debate of our very first Congress in 1787, right after we had won our freedom. That debate started when a representative named Elbridge Gerry, who subsequently became Governor of Massachusetts and then Vice President under James Madison, introduced a resolution to permanently limit the size of our country's Armed Forces to 10,000 men.

Since in the minds of the members of our new Congress, there was a healthy distrust for large militaries, Gerry's resolution drew considerable support. In fact, the resolution was poised to be passed by a substantial majority until another representative, a man named George Washington, who had earned quite a reputation for himself during the Revolutionary War, remarked to the larger body, "It is a very good idea" he said. "And while we are at it, let us also limit by law, the size of any invading force to five thousand men."

Washington's reminder is as wise today as it was in 1787. We cannot legislate away our threats or our responsibilities. We have involved our military forces in more operations in the last few years than throughout the entire Cold War period and I expect that we have not yet seen the end.

So this smaller, leaner force must be more capable and more ready. But to be so, we will continue to need the strong will, the strong support, of people like you all across the country, of our President, and of our Congress.

The people of Alaska are well known for their stalwart support of the Armed Forces of this nation and that is certainly obvious tonight at this great gathering. And we will need your support even more in the coming years.

Make no mistake, without your dedication and commitment to the men and women in uniform sitting here among you, we will not be able to sustain this splendid force.

And so with that, let me close by once again thanking you for this evening and for caring so well for these outstanding men and women in uniform here tonight. God Bless you all, and God Bless the United States of America.

Memorial Service Honoring Victims of Friendly Fire Incident In Iraq
Fort Myer, Virginia
25 April 1994

Mr. President, Secretary Perry, members of the coalition armed forces, members of the foreign service, friends and families, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

We have come here to render last honors to the men and women who lost their lives on April 14th in northern Iraq. Their efforts were selfless. Their service was valiant. Their cause was noble.

We live in a dangerous world. From the policeman who walks our streets, to the fireman, to the soldier, sailor, airman, and marine, the dangers are real and tragedy is imminent. Yet our type of service and the nation's calling, demand that some will enter into harm's way to preserve the lives of people who are victims of aggression or natural tragedy. We are a nation of people that does this willingly and selflessly.

Twelve days ago, these heroes climbed into two Blackhawk helicopters and began an important mission, the same type that had been repeated many times over northern Iraq, the type that is repeated over and over around the world wherever our troops serve. But a terrible tragedy occurred, and now these men and women have come home for the last time.

To the family and friends — we grieve with you. Your loss is our loss. They were your sons and daughters, your parents your friends. They were our comrades in arms, fellow soldiers and airmen. I will not presume to say I know your hurt. I only know that part of me hurts when any of our service men and women you have given into my charge, falls in combat or suffers accidental death. Each of us here is aware of the dangers inherent with the missions we perform in foreign service in the air or on the sea. Troops don't talk about it openly but they and their families understand the dangers all too well.

What makes this loss doubly tragic is this particular mission. They were not fighting, they were providing care. They were saving lives protecting people from ruthless aggression. As much as each of us desire to alter the events of 14 April, sadly we cannot. We can only grieve the losses and take great solace and great pride in the work they were doing for others.

The scriptures talk about "Greater love hath no person than when they lay down their life for a friend." Feeding starving children, protecting people from aggression, they sacrificed their lives to ensure that others might live. What they were doing was valiant, and good, and right. To the Kurdish people of northern Iraq, to each of us here today, and to millions of people around the world they are truly heroes. No one understands that better or more clearly than the very people these men and women were protecting.

And in the dusty streets of Zakho, in Northern Iraq, the people have hung hundreds of banners in remembrance of these heroes, your family members, your friends and colleagues. One banner in particular stands out: "We mourn the loss of our heroes. God Bless their souls and God be with their families."

A proud nation honors your sons and daughters.

God Bless you and God Bless America.

Erskine Lecture Series
U.S. Marine Corps Foundation
Quantico, Virginia
10 May 1994

Thank you for the chance to be out of Washington for a while and to be here with you in Marine country, together with this country's senior Marine General, Carl Mundy. How about a hand for this great Marine and the Marine Corps's First Lady.

Now, I've been asked to spend a few moments talking to you about "Operations other than War," that is, peace operations ranging from humanitarian, to peacekeeping, to peacemaking operations. Frankly, I can't think of a more topical subject. Pick-up today's paper and the headlines will tell you why that is today's topic. Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq, and SOUTHERN WATCH in Southern Iraq, and the list goes on. And the stories behind the headlines will tell you just how far we have yet to go before we begin to understand, and begin to feel comfortable with our role in such operations. I cannot think of a better topic for the Erskine Lecture Series than "Operations other than War."

Certainly when you look back at General Erskine's extraordinary career, you will find an officer unsurpassed in leading our forces brilliantly and valiantly through some of the toughest campaigns of the First and Second World Wars.

But if you look at his career a little more closely, you will discover that between these wars General Erskine also saw service in Haiti, Santo Domingo, Cuba, Nicaragua, and China where his duties carried him outside of the stream of traditional warfighting. And you will also find that his final assignment was as Director of Special Operations, which in those days was a position nearly synonymous with Operations other than War. So let me spend these next few moments sharing some random thoughts on this still very controversial subject.

I first came face-to-face with "Operations other than War" in April 1991, when I received a call from General Jack Galvin, then our Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, telling me that he wanted me to leave right away for eastern Turkey and northern Iraq, to take command of an operation to save hundreds of thousands of Kurds who had been brutalized by Saddam Hussein. To save themselves from the attacking Iraqi Army, they had fled into the harsh mountains of northern Iraq. The headlines that day made the urgency clear: well over a thousand were dying every day and President Bush ordered our military to move with all dispatch, to protect the Kurds and to stop the misery and dying.

My first thought was that I have never heard of the Kurdish people and now my country expected me to organize an operation to protect them. My second thought was to go to my footlocker, the same footlocker I suspect many of you keep. The one where you store all those hundreds of manuals our service schools are so fond of giving out that you don't ever open, until you get back out to the field and suddenly discover you are expected to know what is in those manuals. And I started looking for something titled, "Operations other than War." And of course there was no such manual.

I wish there had been, and I wish we had studied that subject in school, for I could have been of more help to my terrific chief of staff then Marine Corps Brigadier General Toni Zinni, or to the first troops to rush to the scene under then Marine Colonel, now Brigadier General Bob Jones. With their help and the help of others from 13 nations, we were able to save hundreds of thousands of Kurds and to return them in record time to their homes in the valleys of Northern Iraq.

And while this operation was going on, another Marine, LTG Hank Stackpole was commanding Operation SEA ANGEL, saving thousands upon thousands of Bangladeshis caught up in one of nature's most savage typhoons. Both of these were essentially humanitarian operations and both were completed successfully. Since then, we have had other sanction enforcement in the Red Sea, in the Adriatic, around Haiti, humanitarian flights into the former Soviet Union, into Sarajevo in the world's longest running airlift, and airdrops into Bosnia, a peacekeeping force in Macedonia, medical care in Croatia, and peace enforcement over the skies of Bosnia. Only the other day, we rescued Americans from certain death in Rwanda, and as we speak, we are still extracting our people from north Yemen.

In short, since the end of the Cold War your Armed Forces have been, and are today, and I suspect will continue for the foreseeable future, to be involved in the full range of "Operations other than War."

Tonight let me narrow the subject to what I think are the most controversial of these operations, multilateral peace operations. It exploded with controversy on a hot, dusty October day in the streets of Mogadishu, when Special Operations forces conducted a raid to try to capture Aideed and his chief lieutenants. This raid came on the heels of several months of growing discomfort here in America about the meandering course of our mission in Somalia, an operation that started as a straightforward humanitarian operation. Then with some sense of disquiet, we found ourselves being

dragged reluctantly into something much larger, a murky hybrid between peace enforcement, nation-building, and sustained humanitarian operations.

Then on 3 October, Americans turned on their television sets and saw the same grisly scene repeated again and again; the searing image of a dead American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by bands of Somalis intoxicated on anti-Americanism. For some of us in this room tonight, that image from Somalia bore the disturbing trace of another image, an image we saw twelve years earlier: the sight of 241 Marines killed in Beirut, the moving picture of teams of medics sifting through the wreckage of a bombed and still smoldering building, and dazed survivors with bloody bandages and torn limbs milling about, shocked by the sheer carnage, as stretcher after stretcher was carried from this scene of horror.

That early experience with multilateral peace operations left a bitter and tragic taste. Like Somalia, Lebanon started with a clear logical and politically supported mandate. But we allowed events and circumstances to change our mission, to muddle our sense of purpose, to cause us to experiment with the limited application of force until with unexpected fury, incoherence, led to tragedy. So we find ourselves today trying to see past these images, wondering whether, and how to participate in multilateral peace operations, because twice before, our participation proved so very painful and so very costly.

But I have to share with you my view that comes after six months of sitting behind the Chairman's desk, watching the swirl of actions that sweep through my in-box, and visiting with all of our regional commands.

First and foremost, we must be crystal clear about one thing: the primary mission of our fighting men and women has been, and must remain, to fight and win our nation's wars. And nothing we do must detract from our ability to be the best fighting force around.

During the Cold War, with few exceptions like Lebanon, the weight of the bipolar confrontation kept most disputes well suppressed. Thus we grew up with the notion that the Armed Forces of the United States were there to fight major wars only. We didn't think much about it, it was an article of faith, that it was so. But the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War began to bring us face-to-face with a new reality.

I think the place to begin to understand this new reality is in understanding the great changes that have swept the world over the last five years, the threats facing our nation and our interests in this new era, and then how these changes have affected America's role in the world — our leadership.

Let me start with the changes. Unquestionably the greatest change was the disintegration of a global empire, parts of which existed for centuries, but an empire that grew from a regional power to global proportions in the last fifty years; an empire that engulfed in one form or another nearly one third of the world's nations, and then with great suddenness, the empire completely collapsed. This great upheaval led to the creation of more new nations and changed more national boundaries than even the end of the Second World War. And its useful to remember that it took nearly a decade following World War Two, for events to finally settle out.

Without a doubt we have just lived through a global earthquake, one that has left in its wake dozens of tremors, aftershocks, and fissures. And I think all of us need to realize, that it will be a decade or longer before some condition of normalcy returns. As President Yeltsin has written in his memoirs, "There are more cataclysms in store for us ... The empire is exacting its revenge for being dissolved."

What we see right now today, are more conflicts raging around the world than at any time during the Cold War: conflicts in Africa; in Asia; in the Middle East and Southwest Asia; around the periphery of what used to be the Soviet Union; and even in the heart of Europe.

A fundamental question we have to ask ourselves is what will deflate this frenzy of conflicts? Because if we and the other nations of this shrinking world do not act, then the cumulative effects of these conflicts will be a great risk to all of our futures. At risk is the world's economic order and the rule of international law we built over the past forty-five years. Also at risk are the great opportunities that are the fruit of the end of the Cold War, spreading democratization, and an end to divided regions and a divided world.

Some of these conflicts will threaten American interests or the security of our allies, as we see in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. Some of these conflicts will be threats to international stability, perhaps even the birthing grounds for much larger conflicts, again a factor in Bosnia. Others of these conflicts, however morally reprehensible they might be, will touch neither our interests nor our sensibilities, like I suspect the ongoing tragedy in Rwanda.

All of this said, I think it really is quite simple. We are the world's leading nation. We are a U.N. Security Council member, clearly its most powerful member. We are the leading nation of NATO. We are the only nation in Europe with the strength to counterbalance Russia's great power. We are the leading nation of our Asian alliances, our Latin American alliances, and our Southwest Asian alliances. When conflicts erupt in these regions, our allies will turn to us for our

leadership, our power, our prestige, and our singular ability to coalesce the action of the world's other nations. When a conflict in one of these regions touches our core interest we must not stand by idly.

Surely circumstances have arisen, and will arise in the future, in which it will be in our interest to proceed in partnership with others to preserve maintain or restore the peace. And the United Nations properly strengthened can be an important instrument of such partnership.

Certainly participation in U.N. peace operations can never substitute for the necessity of fighting and winning our wars, nor as I said a moment ago, must we allow it to reduce our capability to meet that imperative. It can, however, serve in effect as a "force multiplier" in our efforts to promote peace and stability.

Now, Americans have a very clear understanding of when we have to go and fight. We showed this in the Gulf. If the need were to arise, we would be prepared to go and defend South Korea. America understands where its core interests lie and we are every bit as willing to fight to protect those interests today as we were yesterday.

But we don't have such a firm foundation when it comes to peace operations, whether it is peacekeeping, the role of committing our forces to monitor a peace agreement between parties that appear legitimately to want peace, or peace enforcement, which might involve the use of our forces in combat operations to actually impose an end to hostilities. We badly need such an understanding. Because anytime the cameras start rolling, transmitting into our living rooms the brutal and heartrending pictures of faraway people fighting, of innocent children, old men, and women caught in the terror of war, of cities rubbled and in flames, the conflict moves much closer to the American people; it tugs at our hearts, it arouses our moral outrage. The holocaust that occurred in World War Two had made us alert that clearly there are times when moral outrage must be enough to propel us into action.

But at just such moments, we must also have a practical policy, a policy to guide us toward a workable and sustainable course because moral outrage and humanitarian impulses are brittle passions and their half lives tend to shorten when our own sons and daughters start to become casualties. And so we must be very selective when it comes to endangering our sons and daughters.

Before we commit our forces, we must necessarily ask whether the peace operation advances America's interests. And we must ask whether there is a strong prospect that the operation will have popular support and political support in our Congress. We cannot put the lives of American fighting men and women at risk against the will of our people. And we need to ensure that the operation has clearly defined political and military objectives, and a chain of command, and rules of engagement that we are confident in, because experience has taught us that peace operations are just as dependent on Clausewitzian principles as fighting wars.

Finally we must ask whether there is an identifiable endpoint for American participation, so that we do not find ourselves trapped in a string of quagmires, our forces tied down in dozens of the world's Irelands and Cypruses. I think that if we ask ourselves these questions and treat them rigorously we will have learned from some of our past mistakes.

But let me dwell on three principles, core principles that go to the heart of our strategic and operational doctrine for peace operations. The first principle is perseverance.

Peace operations, by definition, have different objectives than wars. To achieve these objectives, very often inaction must replace action, negotiation must replace battle, and avoidance must replace the desire to close with and destroy. In peace operations, attempts to rush or to prod the progression to peace with force rarely succeed. Such actions ignite the passions of the fighters and invite retaliation and escalation. Like war itself, peace is ultimately a political act. In peace operations we must have the patience and the perseverance to hold force in abeyance and let the diplomats do their job.

The second principle is that we must always, always be prepared for the worst. We must send in a force that can handle the unexpected, because to do otherwise invites any ill-intended opportunist from exploiting our vulnerability. In practical terms, this means that whatever forces we send must be trained, equipped, and positioned to shift immediately from keeping the peace to fighting. We must send enough of a force to ensure self-protection and our ability to get the job done. More is better, less is not.

Third we must proceed with the clear intent of decisively defeating any attempt at escalation. If we are going to respond with force it must be decisive force. Over a century ago, that most brilliant strategist, Clausewitz, warned that any time you approach an opponent with no more than an ornamental rapier when he is armed with a sharp sword, then you are moving on a devious path where the God of War may catch you unaware.

As in warfare, we must understand the centers of gravity of our antagonists and we must be prepared to strike those centers of gravity with effective force. Again, this is a vital element of deterrence, to convince all sides that we are able and willing to punish and that attacking our forces will be foolish.

I'd like to leave you with a final thought. It has become very popular to argue that the American Armed Forces

cannot be the world's 911 number. And certainly I think all of us here in this room agree with this sentiment. But having said this, what number are we? Because we cannot just be the world's operator transferring one difficult call after another to some other party. The essence of international leadership is carrying the most difficult challenges, and this includes cases that touch our interests of sending our forces into multilateral peace operations.

Our nation must keep its position of international leadership so that we can maintain our influence in the world's economic order, its political order, and so that our beliefs and interests remain a dominant factor in shaping the world as we enter the next century. This challenge will not go away. Today we are facing the question of what to do about Bosnia. But long after Bosnia is settled and the fighting has stopped, there will be other conflicts that will threaten our interests. It is not a problem of President Clinton's making. It is the unwelcome fallout of the welcome collapse of the bipolar confrontation. And it will remain one of the major challenges faced by future administrations well into the 21st century.

And so your and my challenge is to master these "Operations other than War," to understand them as well as we understand our principal mission, that of fighting and winning our nation's wars.

Now let me leave with you with a tale about a marine chaplain who was assigned to the Marine peacekeeping forces in Nicaragua between the First and Second World Wars. This particular chaplain, who was quite hefty, was with an infantry unit that was deployed to guard posts throughout the countryside. His physical condition made the long treks to visit the troops at their various posts quite arduous. Finally one day, he struck on an idea and visited one of the local monasteries to see if he could purchase a mule. To his great fortune, one of the monks had the perfect animal for him, a large and powerful mule clearly capable of carrying his great weight. But as he bought the mule the monk warned him that the animal only responded to two commands. If you wanted the animal to move then you uttered the words, "Thank God." But if you wanted the mule to stop, you said, "Hail Mary." The chaplain thought this was wonderful. "Thank God" to get the beast moving, "Hail Mary" to make him stop.

The next day, he mounted his mule said the obligatory, "Thank God," and trotted off to visit his marines at their outposts. After he visited the third outpost, he realized that it was getting late and that he and his mule had to travel faster. Digging his heels into the mule's flanks he spurred him on to a trot and soon a full gallop. Suddenly he looked ahead and saw that he was galloping toward a cliff. In his fear he couldn't remember how to order the mule to stop. As the mule continued to gallop furiously toward the cliff, the chaplain bellowed out every religious phrase that came to his mind. Finally, just before the edge of the cliff, he remembered the magic words and screamed out, "Hail Mary."

As promised, the mule came to an abrupt stop right on the edge of the cliff. The chaplain leaned over the beast's head and looked down at what appeared to be a thousand-foot drop. Overcome with relief he looked up to the sky and uttered out, "Thank God."

This story reminds me that sometimes it is entirely possible to say too much. And I certainly hope that I haven't already made the same mistake as the chaplain. Thank you for this opportunity to share these thoughts with you. And now if I have not already exhausted your attention, I would be pleased to take some questions.

Mid-America Club
Chicago, Illinois
13 May 1994

It is a great pleasure to come here today to Chicago and to share some thoughts with this great club on some of the more pressing issues of our national defense.

Although I must be candid. When I read the list of past speakers: three former presidents; government ministers from around the world; President Gorbachev; Maggie Thatcher; and most recently Warren Christopher and Jim Woolsey; I began to feel like Michael Jordan playing for the White Sox. I am afraid my shortcomings are going to be all too evident.

In another month as all of you know, we will join with the nations of Western Europe to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the D-Day invasion. Then, throughout the next year, we will commemorate other great battles of the Second World War. For many of us here in this room like myself, a young child who found himself trapped between the crushing pincers of the vast armies that fought across Europe, these great events seem very fresh and very vivid. This is because these events, after all, shaped the world we were to live in throughout our adult lives.

And it makes me wonder, and I think it should make all of us wonder, what the young people today will look back on as the great events that shaped their adulthood?

What images will flicker through their minds when they look back?

Will they think of the image of delirious East and West Germans rushing to embrace each other on that chilly but heart-warming November night when the Berlin Wall came tumbling down? Or will they think about the great ticker-tape parades of our victorious forces returning from their very extraordinary victory over Saddam Hussein's army? Or will it be more painful images like the sight of a dead American soldier dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by a crowd of Somalians intoxicated on anti-Americanism?

Or perhaps the ghastly and barbaric sights of the war in a disintegrated Yugoslavia; a war of long-stemmed hatreds that has raged on and on in the very heart of Europe for over two years, withstanding the unyielding pressure of every power in Europe and America to try to force it to an end.

And I wonder if there will be any Yaltas in their memories; Yaltas not in the sense that we would sit at a table and bargain away nations and peoples leaving them to the domination of a harsh dictatorship, as we naively did after the Second World War, but other more subtle forms of compromise where we bargain away the security of future generations because we lack resolve or confidence in our strength.

I wonder about this because we are truly in a pivotal period a period of sweeping changes, a time of great challenges and also a time of enormous opportunities. It is a time of decisions, many decisions; decisions about what we want for the future, decisions about what we are willing to do to shape that future, and decisions about how and when to engage our still enormous power. And this is what I would like to discuss with you today, what we must do to meet these challenges and to seize these opportunities. Because very clearly if we try to ignore the challenges, either because they are too great or too expensive, then the opportunities, opportunities fought for on the beaches of Normandy, and opportunities we fought for again and again throughout the Cold War, will wither away and today's opportunities may become tomorrow's nightmares.

Now let me step back a little in time to two events.

When I became Chairman only six months ago, then-Secretary of Defense Aspin had only a few months before completed the Bottom Up Review.

As a result of that review he and the administration recommended that we shape and size our future forces to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. This review and its conclusions sparked a debate that continues to this day. Even though by 1999 our defense budget will shrink to less than half what we paid for defense in 1985, and even though the size of our Armed Forces will be reduced by about a third of their size only three years ago, there is still great pressure to cut deeper.

And even though the Bottom Up Review built what I am thoroughly convinced is a very strong and defensible strategic justification for our forces, the ability to fight and win two major regional contingencies this justification is still being hotly debated.

The other event that occurred shortly before I became Chairman was the tragic firefight in the streets of Mogadishu on 3 October (1993), where 18 of our soldiers were killed and another 80 were wounded.

Against the backdrop of a public mood that was already uneasy over multilateral peace operations, the tragedy in Mogadishu created a searing image an image that charged the atmosphere of our public debate over whether we have any business getting involved in multilateral peace operations.

In one way or another throughout these past months we have been dealing with these two events: one, the conclusions of the Bottom Up Review and the other, the need to formulate a new policy for when and how we should engage our power and our forces.

Let me explain this more fully. While a number of the ever restless pundits of Washington have been criticizing the over-generosity of the Bottom Up Review, American men and women in uniform have been sitting along the Demilitarized Zone in Korea staring vigilantly across a narrow strip of land at the fourth largest military force in the world today. When North Korea's delegate walked out of a meeting with his South Korean counterpart, threatening that Seoul would be engulfed in a sea of fire, none of these men and women felt that we have failed to cut enough.

And in Southwest Asia, where our naval and air and ground units are still there three years after the Gulf War ended, still enforcing the U.N. sanctions and the no-fly zone against Iraq, still there keeping the Iraqis from using airpower to slaughter the Shiites in southern Iraq and the Kurds in northern Iraq, there is no doubt in the minds of the forces performing these dangerous missions about our need to keep our forces strong.

If you are in either of these two locations, Korea or Southwest Asia, maintaining and improving our ability to fight and win two major regional conflicts sounds very, very reasonable and justifiable. In fact anything less sounds astoundingly unreasonable.

Nor are there any doubts in the minds of twenty thousand more Americans from our command in Europe involved

in the series of NATO and U.N. operations in former Yugoslavia. Every day they are watching a modern, and what we used to regard as a civilized European nation, tearing itself apart in a fierce war between neighbors; a war inflamed by historical hatreds, a war that would have no limits to its barbarity were it not for our efforts to contain it.

These American men and women around former Yugoslavia have a very unique and a very revealing perspective on what this post-Cold War world is like.

They sense that if it were not for their efforts, that the war in Yugoslavia could very well have spread beyond the borders of Bosnia dragging in more surrounding nations and inebriating more people with the passions and hatreds that have already caused so many deaths.

Some wise man noted that Bosnia has become a gruesome paraphrase of George Santayana's very famous warning because it shows that in this new era, very often it is those who remember history who are destined to repeat it. Sadly this is very true in very many places in this new era.

My past six months have been spent shuttling between the debating forums in Washington to visiting our forces in the field in Korea, Somalia, Panama, Italy, and Yugoslavia where the action is very, very real and very dangerous.

In Washington, I read the views of columnists who one day criticize the administration for failing to cut our forces deeper and the very next day, criticize the administration for staying out of the fighting in Bosnia, or for not sending in our forces to overturn the military government in Haiti. It strikes me as the height of irony that many of the same critics who want more and more of our forces shelved also want their own brigades of infantry that they can dispatch around the world. While I applaud their very sincere human compassion I also question where they think we need to be economical.

Let me tell you that the uniformed young men and women on the front lines of this new era are not debating whether the Bottom Up Review is too generous.

When they see a man like Zhironovsky, a blustering disturbingly popular nationalist who thinks he is the modern reincarnation of Nikita Khruschev, there aren't any doubts in their minds why we have to remain strong.

When they see the reemergence of nationalism in Russia they have no illusions about what this could mean for our future.

When they remember the great battle of the Gulf War and the evidence of the atrocities committed by Saddam's forces in Kuwait City before we drove them out, they have no doubts.

To me and to them, there is no doubt that we need to remain strong, that our forces need to stay ready, that we need to continue to modernize and to improve the capabilities of our forces.

But don't misunderstand me. Our forces can grow smaller. As small as the administration recommended but no smaller.

We can shrink our structure but only if we add to the capabilities of our smaller force. We need to expand our strategic lift our ability to move our forces very swiftly to the trouble spots of the world.

And we must have more of the spectacular technologies that made such a difference in the Gulf War like stealth aircraft and very long-range and very precise munitions that will allow us to destroy enemy forces before they can come close enough to our own forces to fire back. It is these systems that allow us to win our battles with our brains, our technological advantages, and our superior training, not with the deaths of many thousands of our courageous young men and women.

And there are two areas we have to watch very, very closely. The first of these is our people, the true source of our military excellence. Today we have the finest people in uniform any nation could ask for.

But if we want to retain these quality men and women we must protect their pay their benefits and their quality of life. When you look at what our men and women in uniform are doing around the world today and what we may need them to do tomorrow, it should eliminate any temptation to look for more savings from their paychecks. They are a Super Bowl team but they are not getting Super Bowl wages.

The second watchword is readiness. We must keep our forces ready. We must break the cycle that has occurred every other time in this century when after a major conflict, we have reduced our forces, a cycle of far too-rapid reductions that resulted in hollowness and that devastated readiness. With our smaller future force there is no question it must be a ready force.

We must do these things and more because if we don't improve the capabilities of our forces, keep our outstanding people, and protect our readiness then the future force structure recommended by this administration will prove too small and today's peace dividends will become tomorrow's irreversibly tragic regrets.

Now let me return to that second concern I mentioned earlier, our need for a tangible understanding of when and how to engage our military forces in multilateral peace operations. I remember back to the week when it was announced

that I was to replace my good friend Colin Powell and a popular weekly news magazine published a cover story with my picture under the dubious title of "Globocop."

Well if any of you have been reading the editorials over past weeks, you will see that both Bill Perry and I are now being charged with pacifist tendencies. Apparently in the past six months I have made a very long spiritual journey.

The topic that led to this accusation was the quandary over what to do to accelerate the peace process in Bosnia and the appropriate use of American military power to support the multilateral peace operation on the ground.

What makes this issue so difficult is that Bosnia is a new kind of challenge and a new form of military operation for America and its Armed Forces. And this the same kind of quandary that we found so wrenching throughout our commitment to Somalia.

Throughout the Cold War, whenever it came to multilateral peace operations, both superpowers were issued a red card that excluded either of us from participation.

American forces were called to fight time and again but not to separate belligerents, because it was nearly impossible to either claim or to maintain the neutrality that is the calling card of any effective peacekeeper. We were the Super Bowl team not the umpire.

But the great change in the global environment has made us eligible for these kinds of operations, humanitarian operations, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations.

In fact it has thrown us into the position where we must either participate or accept a lesser position in world affairs than is commensurate with our power, our stature, and our interests.

But before you accept this as a statement of fact let me explain why I make such a bold statement.

The end of the Cold War has led to the birth of more new nations and a greater shifting of international borders than occurred even at the end of the Second World War. And as all of you recall all too well, it took over ten years of conflict and civil wars and great turmoil before those changes settled out. As it was the great settling factor was the dynamic of the Cold War and the smothering competition between two great opposing blocs.

If you look around the world today at the fires that are smoldering or already burning around the periphery of the ex-Soviet Union, at the potent religious struggles bubbling very dangerously in Southwest Asia and South Asia, and at the inflammatory ethnic strains wracking the Balkans you realize that we are in another era of great turbulence. There are more conflicts raging today than at any time since the Second World War.

What this points toward is that we are going to have to decide what kind of a role America is going to take in combating this growing crop of conflicts. It is a difficult challenge for us because few of these conflicts will represent a direct and easily perceivable threat to our nation. Yet when you think about it, it is nearly axiomatic that a peace operation will involve something less than a clear threat to a compelling national interest.

Last week as you know, President Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive establishing our policy toward future involvement in multilateral peace operations. Among other elements, the new policy recognizes that peace operations are one of a number of ways in which we might engage our power, but never at the price of compromising our strategy of remaining prepared to fight and win two major regional conflicts.

The policy also detailed a series of factors we would consider before committing our forces to multilateral peace operations, such as whether the operation advances American interests, whether domestic and congressional support exists or can be marshaled, whether there are clear objectives and an identifiable endpoint for U.S. participation, and whether command and control arrangements are acceptable.

These factors apply to American participation in any peace operation, but more difficult questions arise when the peace operation entails the possibility of combat operations for our forces.

I think that when you review our experience in past peace operations, if you look back to Beirut or you look at more recent instances Somalia and Bosnia, you must necessarily ask how we will ensure that we don't repeat past mistakes.

Clausewitz probably said it best when he warned that any time you approach an opponent carrying no more than an ornamental rapier, when he is armed with a sharp sword, then you are moving on a devious path where the God of War may catch you unaware.

Whenever we send our forces into potentially dangerous operations we must send a force that can handle the unexpected. Whatever forces we send must be large enough and powerful enough to defend themselves and must be ready to shift from keeping the peace to fighting. And if we are going to respond with force it must be decisive force.

If we violate these principles, we place at risk both our forces and our objectives. The American people will not stand idly by while their uniformed men and women are hapless targets. And the American people know all too well that a slap on the face does not stop a boxer. It merely invites a punch.

But I also think that if we adhere to our new policy and we stand by the principles I just described, we will have

strong and effective guidelines for making the right judgments for future operations. Occasionally we are going to have to involve our forces in these types of operations. But we must be selective and when we do become involved we must do so effectively more effectively than the past.

Now before I finish speaking, you might be wondering why I grouped these two topics, the need to support the military force recommended by the administration in the Bottom Up Review and our policy for when and how to involve our forces in multilateral peace operations.

I combined these two in this speech because the first will determine the strength of our future military power and the second addresses our will to use our strength in what promises to be one of the greatest and the most recurring challenges of this new era. How the American people decide on these two issues will be the determinants of our ability to go strongly and confidently into the 21st Century.

All of you here know that the end of the Cold War does not mean we can take a vacation from our leadership. It has become cliche to argue that we cannot be the world's 911 number. I think all of us accept the sentiment underlying this now common warning. But if we are not the world's 911 number, then what number are we? Because we also cannot afford to be the world's operator forever transferring calls to others.

I spoke earlier of images and Yaltas wondering what our children would look back upon as the great events that shaped their lives. I think one Yalta we must avoid is leaving the next generation a gutted out defense, either because our military equipment is so antiquated or our national arsenal has shrunk so small and eroded to such a state of impotence, that America can no longer exert the influence to protect our vast interests or to exert the leadership that is commensurate with our power. Yet another would be the memory of an America too timid or too confused to effectively engage its forces to help shape and stabilize a world fraught with turmoil and conflict.

Today, America has the finest and the most powerful Armed Forces in the world. We are the world's greatest power. There is no challenge we cannot overcome. Let us keep it that way.

Thank you for this opportunity to share these views with you. I could not think of a better audience nor a more important group of people with whom to share my views on these very important topics and I am very, very appreciative for your attention.

Bradley University Commencement
Peoria, Illinois
14 May 1994

Distinguished guests, parents and families, faculty and staff, graduating students of Bradley University.

What a thrilling and splendid sight you are you — the graduating classes of Bradley University. I know that I speak for everyone gathered here in saying how very proud we are of what you have accomplished. You did it!

But your remarkable success has been made possible by a remarkable institution. And so this day is a triumph for that institution as well.

One of the many past speakers who came to this school reminded us that "after all, a school does not consist of stone and mortar nor of costly apparatus, but of human thought and love." It is the abundance of human thought and of love that makes Bradley such a great university, such a wellspring of learning and inspiration. And it is you the faculty and staff who add these qualities in such rich measure. Thank you.

And of course it is wonderful as well to see so many families and friends all gathered here to share in this joy and the accomplishments. Your presence makes this graduation that much more meaningful and memorable.

The last time I was in this field house was 36 years ago for my own graduation. Since then, some things on this campus have changed of course.

Back then the school mascot actually bore a striking resemblance to the name of our team, the Braves. This was even before Sully's Bar took the truly generous step of providing a bus shuttle service to and from the University.

In many ways Bradley was a more challenging school then. We had to walk to our favorite bars. Harder yet we had to find our way back afterward.

As I thought back and tried to remember what was said at my graduation, I found myself puzzled that I couldn't remember a word or even a thought from my graduation speaker. But as I look at many of you today, bleary-eyed, still thoroughly ravaged from the great strains of the Senior Walk, it is all very clear to me why I couldn't remember what was said.

So to ensure that not too much of what I have to say will be forgotten, I will be very brief. But I want to talk about the future, your future, and a little about the world that you are graduating into.

A few months ago, President Clinton sent me on a mission to Eastern Europe to meet with the leaders of the newly freed nations of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.

It was a strange sensation returning to the cities of my childhood. For me it was a visit filled with nostalgia, memories of slow walks with my mother through the parks of Warsaw. While much is changing, it was sad to see the blight still hanging over what were once some of the most beautiful capitals in Europe. There is a grayness, the residue of nearly four decades of communist rule that has yet to fully dissipate.

But the people are now truly proud and erect. For the first time in many, many decades, they have hope for a brighter and more fulfilling future.

And I recalled as we went first to Warsaw, then Budapest, then Prague, and finally Bratislava, that all four of these cities once hosted some of the finest universities in the world.

They were once the breeding grounds of great philosophers, world famous writers, artists and musicians, and of the skilled engineers and architects who built some of the world's most majestic cities; towering cities overlooking the great rivers that run through Europe.

Then World War II came along. Suddenly all of Europe became a battleground. One army after another swept through the beautiful cities of my childhood leaving in their path destruction broken societies pain and suffering. Even after the war ended, the destruction continued. The Soviet Union emerged from that war with an unquenchable thirst for expansion for power for suppressing other nations and their peoples.

It was the universities that were most rigorously and ruthlessly repressed, because it is in universities where men and women are taught to question, to explore, to discover, to reject certainties and uncertainties alike. Soon, the great universities of Eastern Europe were no more. They lay buried under the boots of tyrants. And the lights went out in Eastern Europe.

And as I went to these cities where I had spent my early childhood, I thought of the great education I received here in America here at Bradley.

I thought what a great thing it is indeed to be able to go to a university where intellectual growth has no limits, where fear is not the prevalent emotion, and where one was free to choose any path.

Now, you are sitting where I sat 36 years ago, as have so many thousands of others over the years, filled with mixed emotions, with ambition and uncertainty, with confidence and insecurity, with enormous curiosity about what you have to offer and what the world has to offer you. Let me tell you something of that world.

When I came to Bradley, few families had a television. Only the very rich had air conditioning. Landing on the moon was a very distant dream; commercial jets were still a couple of years away. The few computers that existed were monstrous and ungainly things. They filled entire rooms with thousands of gas-filled tubes all producing less than a thousandth of the computing power of the microchips we find today in children's toys.

Small Pox, polio, and massive famines wiped out millions every year. Cooking, cleaning, and caring for children still took nearly every waking hour. Few women worked outside their homes.

The year before I graduated, the Soviets launched a tiny space vehicle called Sputnik that sent a shudder of dread across America. Suddenly we realized that a nuclear warhead could be placed on a missile and sent around the world to demolish our cities and our civilization.

All of this was less than four decades ago. It is simply astounding to realize how very much our lives have been changing in so short a time. At no time in the history of mankind have the very foundations of human thought, knowledge, and existence itself been changing so swiftly and dramatically.

We are in a revolutionary era all at once; an age of invention, an age of enlightenment, an age of unprecedented social progress, but also an age of great danger. For the first time in modern memory there are no empires on the face of the earth. So many miracles are occurring in our laboratories that it dulls our senses to the vastness to the extraordinary magnificence of the forces that are altering the most fundamental aspects of our lives.

No disease, not cancer, not AIDS, nor even the common cold will long survive the onslaught of our medical research. Bio-genetics will explode our ability to produce food. We are creating machines that can think, robots that can work, and vehicles that we launch into space to explore the darkest reaches of the universe surrounding us.

Our entire approach to learning to giving birth to sustaining our health and vitality to protecting our environment to nearly every aspect of our lives is evolving progressing and improving. We continue to find better ways to make ourselves more and more productive to entertain ourselves to construct our homes our cities and our roads.

With the end of the Cold War, billions of the world's citizens most of whom have never known freedom are free

now to choose their own governments, to embrace the prosperity that comes from free markets, and to find new ways to create world peace. For the first time in my life the world is not divided into armed camps on the verge of a conflict that would threaten our very existence.

But also, it is still a world with vast numbers of nuclear weapons with the power still to destroy ourselves. And with all the other great advances we have made we still do not have a cure for the fiery, explosive passions such as we see in Bosnia, in Rwanda, around the periphery of what used to be the Soviet Union, and in too many other places; passions that ignite wars of intense hatred. Nor do we have a remedy for ruthless dictators such as Kim Il Sung or Saddam Hussein who terrorize and murder without remorse.

This is the world you are entering. It is a different world then the one my generation entered 36 years ago. And while dangers abound in nearly every way I can think of, it is a remarkably better and a more hopeful world than what we have known.

In the cities of my childhood and in very many other cities around the world, the lights of freedom have come back on. You will have the challenge of keeping these lights burning because from these lights will come the extraordinary miracles that will make life in the next century so very, very promising.

America is strong and free and powerful and still the richest most prosperous and most productive nation on our planet. We are rich with educated citizens, rich with inventive and innovative industries, and rich with powerful democratic allies to help us carry the burdens of global stability and peace. Most importantly we are also rich in ideas and in principles and in our willingness to work hard. You must help keep it this way.

Each of you are now inheriting the dreams of our Nation, of our society, and of the world we are trying to build. It falls on your shoulders to carry forward the great progress we have been making and to seize the many opportunities that lay before us.

And as I look at you I'm very envious. The age ahead, the rest of this decade and the new century beyond, hold out a promise of opportunities and possibilities undreamed of even today. In your lifetime man will match dream with reality like he could never do before.

But most of all I envy your generation, for I think you have the wisdom and the heart to set aside old hatreds and old prejudices and make yours the century in which every race and nationality, men and women of every walk of life, can rise to their full potential and live in peace.

Winston Churchill, England's great wartime leader, once remarked, "To every man there comes a time in his lifetime, that special moment when he is tapped on the shoulder and offered the chance to do a very special thing unique and fitting to his talents. What a tragedy if that moment finds him unprepared for the work that would be his finest hour."

Graduation from this distinguished university is a major step in your preparation for the opportunities you will face. In just a moment, President Brazil will hand you your diplomas. This piece of paper is the key to all of life's vast opportunities and possibilities. You have earned it. I encourage each of you to use it well.

And as you walk into tomorrow, believe in yourself; set your own course and reach for happiness for yourself and those around you. Godspeed to you all.

American Academy of Achievement
Las Vegas, Nevada
18 June 1994

Let me begin by telling you what a great pleasure and honor it is for me to be here with you today, and to have a chance to share some thoughts with you. Today you will be hearing the life stories of 20 or so very remarkable people, men and women who have accomplished truly extraordinary things in their lives. So I must warn you that my particular story is really quite unremarkable. As I tell you this story, I want to impress that point upon you. Mine really is an unremarkable story in this great nation of ours.

I was born in Poland in 1936. When I was three years old, Hitler and Stalin concluded a secret pact to attack Poland and divide it between their two expanding empires. When their armies attacked that spring, it started the Second World War, and my life changed.

For the next six years, until I was nine years old, one Army after another fought across Europe. They were truly terrible years. One beautiful city after another was destroyed and entire societies were shattered, as these armies left in

their path tremendous destruction and despair. All across Europe, well over twenty million died and many millions of others were left homeless.

But when the war ended, it was not followed by peace. Instead it led directly into a new kind of war, the start of the Cold War. As one European nation after another fell to the Soviet Union, Europe remained poor, divided, tense, sitting on the verge of another terribly destructive conflict.

At the age of 16, I left Europe with my family to come to America. I arrived as part of one of the very many waves of immigrants that have formed this country, filled with hope and anxiety, and trying to adjust to life in a new land.

We settled in the Midwest, where a local church and our neighbors helped us to adjust and learn how to become Americans. I finished high school and college and was then drafted into the Army.

I must admit to you that when I was drafted I did not have any great longing of making the military a career. I was very, very proud to serve, and I can still remember the tingles on the back of my neck when I took the oath of service that is repeated by everyone entering the service.

I understood, perhaps better than most, why Americans must serve. I knew what a wonderful country this is, and my childhood had taught me what happens when a country is not well defended.

That was 36 years ago. Obviously, I decided to stay in the military. And, as I think about it, there are really two forces that kept me in uniform.

The first is my love for this country. There truly is no other country in the world like it. Whether by birth or immigration, there is no greater privilege than to be an American.

And second, like most other military men, I fell in love with military life. I found the greatest fulfillment from working with dedicated young men and women who are performing the very noble task of defending America. And I have always been tremendously challenged in ways that I have found personally gratifying, whether that was running a missile site in Germany, or performing staff duty in Korea, or bringing humanitarian aid to the Kurds in northern Iraq.

So what are my personal lessons? You must believe that what you are doing with your life is meaningful. You don't have to be defending your country to do this, although I would certainly love to see any of you decide to join the Armed Forces, whether for a few years or for a career. And I thoroughly recommend it to you. But when you look at the other men and women who will speak to you today, you will see that there are really very many ways to serve your country and mankind.

And you must love what you are doing. Because only if you love your work, will you have any chance to excel. All of you have taken classes in subjects that were not very interesting to you. And you probably learned that it is more difficult and tedious to master those subjects than the ones you enjoyed more. The choice you make in choosing a career has the same effect.

And so, knowing that you will be hearing from 20 men and women today, I only hope that I have not already spoken too long. Do you have any questions?

Press Briefing — Investigation into friendly fire incident in Iraq
The Pentagon
Washington, DC
13 July 1994

On Thursday of last week, the 7th of July, I forwarded the accident investigation report to Secretary Perry with the recommendations of General Joulwan, our senior commander in Europe, for correcting the problems within the task force, and more broadly, within the European Command, as well as my own recommended actions to be applied to American forces worldwide.

As General Andrus' report describes, there were a shocking number of instances where individuals failed to do their jobs properly. This fact, I'm convinced, more than any other contributing cause, led to this tragedy. Had everyone involved been doing their job correctly, this tragic accident would not have happened.

Now that Secretary Perry has accepted the findings and recommendations of this accident report, it has been forwarded, as he earlier mentioned, to the appropriate four star commanders for their review and their legal investigation, and where warranted, appropriate disciplinary action.

Neither the Secretary nor I can expand on this legal process beyond what I just said, without the fact or the appearance of improper command influence.

As far as the corrective actions are concerned, our first priority was to correct that which had gone so very wrong

in northern Iraq. To that end, almost immediately after the accident, new rules of engagement were issued to our European Command that provide greater protection for helicopters. Within the task force, AWACS crews were directed to follow procedures that fully integrate the operation of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. Command and control arrangements were revised to provide more effective oversight and direction over the task force. Communications with the task force were simplified, and all aircraft were directed to monitor a common radio frequency so they could communicate directly with one another.

In addition, the European Command has taken other steps that include checks to ensure that AWACS and flight crews are fully qualified to perform their missions, as well as making revisions to the techniques used by aircraft to visually and electronically identify other aircraft.

However, while these corrective actions in our European command are on track, we felt very strongly that it would have been a mistake to assume that what happened on the 14th of April in northern Iraq could not happen elsewhere. Therefore, Secretary Perry and I also directed a series of corrective actions aimed at our forces deployed worldwide.

We publish guidance to all forces that established procedures and guidelines that form the very basis of how we operate together to perform our mission. In this case, our forces were operating under the guidelines that pertain to joint task forces. These guidelines, if followed, should have ensured the safe integration of different forces and aircraft in the safe area of operations. We found that the members of the task force were not adequately familiar with the guidelines they were given, and failed to follow some critical directives.

While proper actions have already been taken to correct it in Europe, more broadly, we have directed a complete review of all task forces operating worldwide to ensure they are complying with published guidance. Additionally, the higher headquarters of all joint task forces have been directed to ensure that they rigorously and routinely inspect and check their joint task force. In addition, I've directed the Joint Staff to examine, and if necessary, to make appropriate changes in the training we use to prepare our officers to serve in joint task forces.

The second problem was the performance of the AWACS crew. General Andrus described this problem in some detail. As a result, we are taking action to ensure that no other AWACS crews worldwide, or for that matter, any of the other types of tactical air command and control crews we have in our forces, have similar problems. Therefore, we have directed all the services to reexamine how they train and certify their people to perform this very vital function.

The Air Force specifically has been directed to use the lessons learned from this tragedy to develop a retraining program for all AWACS personnel, and then to certify the accomplishment of that retraining.

The third major problem was the fact that the F-15 pilots did not correctly identify the helicopters as friendly Black Hawks. As a result, the Air Force is well into reviewing and revising the visual identification techniques and procedures, with particular emphasis on helicopters. We have directed the other services to do the same and have it completed by 30 September. Additionally, we directed them to ensure that our aircrews are trained to recognize all kinds and different configurations of aircraft they are likely to encounter in the area in which they might be operating.

The fourth problem which General Andrus described were the procedural problems of fast-flying fixed wing aircraft and helicopters operating in the same area. Different procedures were used for command and control of these two different kinds of aircraft. This led to confusion at the very moment when the decision had to be made about whether the helicopters were friendly or not.

While the European Command took immediate corrective action to end this problem, I have directed the Joint Staff to publish new guidelines for worldwide operations that build on the lessons learned from this tragedy, and to create a standard, uniform, operating procedure.

Complementing this effort, Secretary Perry has directed that in the broadest sense I examine the adequacy of our procedures for joint air operations and report back to him my findings as soon as possible.

The fifth major problem was the failure of the electronic identification system. Despite hundreds of hours of testing, we still don't know why the system failed to alert the F-15s that the helicopters were friendly. That is particularly in Mode Four. We will continue to try to find out why the systems didn't function as they were supposed to. But beyond that, we need to develop new and better technologies to minimize the chances of this happening again. As many of you know, we have been reviewing technological improvements for these kinds of systems, not just for our air forces, but also our land forces. Secretary Perry and I directed the services and the Joint Staff to expedite these reviews and to forward recommendations to us by the 30th of September.

Secretary Perry has also directed the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology to assure an aggressive acquisition effort to follow up on these recommendations.

As well, we directed the services to examine their training on these electronic systems and to expand their emphasis on the limitations of electronic identification systems.

The corrective actions that I have outlined have been communicated to the service chiefs and our senior commanders worldwide. I have also convened a conference of the Joint Chiefs and all of our senior commanders later this month. At that meeting we will review the progress made to date, and we will discuss what we need to do to implement all of these directives by the end of December.

Investigating a tragedy of this nature is an enormously difficult and emotionally straining task. I believe, and I hope you share the view, that the investigation was methodical, thorough, and candid. A wide range of errors and problems were disclosed, including leadership problems, which must and will be corrected.

Now, before I turn the floor back to Secretary Perry, let me convey one more time my deepest condolences and sympathy to the families and loved ones of those who died on April 14th. As I said on one previous occasion, the loss of these 26 men and women I think touches the very fabric of our institution.

The military is an institution whose code and passion is to take care of each other and to make sure that we protect one another from any danger. So when a tragic incident like this happens, it is for us an especially deep loss. But it also moves us on to an unwavering commitment to correct that which went on. That is what we now must pursue. We owe no less to those who died that day.

USCINCPAC Change of Command
Honolulu, Hawaii
1 August 1994

Admiral and Mrs. Macke, Melissa, Admiral and Mrs. Kelly, General and Mrs. Rutherford, Admiral and Mrs. Zlatoper, Admiral and Mrs. Clarey, Admiral Hays, Admiral and Mrs. Hayward, General and Mrs. Fields, General and Mrs. Ord, General and Mrs. Krulak, Representative Saiki, members of the diplomatic corps, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.

Thank you all so very much for coming to help us in this festive way to say a special welcome to the next Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command, Admiral Richard Macke; his wife, Barbara; and their daughter, Melissa.

My very special compliments go to the members of the band and to the men and women standing this formation. You are a grand sight and you make us all very, very proud.

Some two weeks ago you held a similar formation to say farewell to Admiral Larson and Sally Larson. Regrettably, events elsewhere kept me from participating. So here today, let me first and foremost, express my thanks and my deep admiration to Chuck and Sally Larson. Their contributions to the security of our Nation to the protection of America's interests in this vast and most important Pacific region, and to the well being of our service men and women and their families has been enormous.

Over 3 years ago, Admiral Larson inherited a command trying valiantly to adjust to the totally new strains and stresses of the post-Cold War world. And because of his vision and his wisdom, and his ability to get things done, he left a command confident of its key role in this "new" Pacific trained and ready to protect America's interests and those of our friends and allies — and manned by men and women as competent, as confident, as well-trained, and as well-led as any who ever wore America's uniform. Chuck and Sally have left their imprint throughout the far reaches of this vast command and for that the President, Secretary Perry, and I, and our Nation are deeply grateful.

We are equally grateful that at this time of continuing change, of great challenges, but also of vast opportunities, we have Admiral Richard Macke, a gifted leader with the experience and proven record to follow Admiral Larson, and Barbara Macke who will make her caring influence felt in every corner of this vast command.

Now I have been most fortunate to have served with Dick on three separate occasions: first when I served as the assistant to General Colin Powell; next when I commanded our European Command and served as SACEUR; and now finally as the Chairman. Having watched Dick from these different vantage points, I join the chorus of his many admirers who so loudly and clearly sing his praises.

When I was in Europe I never worried for I knew that Dick was there worrying over every little detail and if I ever needed anything I only had to call. More importantly, I knew I could always call him for an azimuth check and that his advice and counsel would always be rock solid.

My admiration and respect for his many skills and flawless judgment have only been strengthened these last nine months that we have worked together so very closely. In these extraordinarily difficult times full of change and uncertainty he has been rock steady and his service to our Nation has been nothing short of remarkable.

And so I am delighted, and not at all surprised, that Admiral Macke was selected to serve as Commander-in-Chief

of our largest geographic command. A proven carrier deck pilot, a trained experienced test pilot, who put his enormous flying talents into practice in over 150 combat missions. Whether commanding an A-7 squadron, the USS CAMDEN, the EISENHOWER, two different carrier battle groups, or the Navy's Space Command — in each he proved a solid commander — steady under fire, seasoned and wise, and an inspiration and mentor to all.

As I look at the Pacific today, the grave challenges facing us on the Korean peninsula, and the vast opportunities in China and beyond, I feel very confident that our interests will be looked after very well -- as will the interests of our service men and women — and their families who are performing so magnificently across the vast stretches of the Pacific Command.

As I close, let me thank every man and woman of the Pacific Command for your outstanding service to our Nation these past three years — and tell you how proud I am to formally introduce you to your new Commander-in-Chief and his lady — Admiral and Mrs. Macke.

Our President has selected well and so let's publish the orders and raise Admiral Macke's flag, and thus start another chapter in the proud history of the Pacific Command.

Thank you very much.

National Security Industrial Association
and the National Defense Preparedness Association
Arlington, Virginia
4 August 1994

I am certainly pleased to be here today and to have this wonderful chance to share some thoughts with two such great organizations. It truly is a great honor for me to be among so many great supporters of a strong national defense.

Jim Hogg told me that I can speak on any subject that I choose. So I would like to spend just a few minutes telling you a little about what our forces are doing around the world today because I am extraordinarily proud of them and then move on to address what I am convinced is the largest challenge that you and I share.

I remember three years ago when I was serving in Europe as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of United States Army Europe. One day while I was sitting in my office attending to the normal flow of Army affairs in Europe, which at that point was providing support to the United States Central Command just as the Gulf War was ending, and General Jack Galvin who was the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe at that time called me on the phone.

He told me that I had been selected to form and command a Joint Task Force with the mission of providing humanitarian support to the Iraqi Kurds who were being persecuted by Saddam. As a result, Saddam had triggered a mass migration as the Kurds fled into the mountains of northern Iraq where they were dying in thousands because they lacked food, water, and shelter.

I must tell you that this came as quite a shock to me because in the first case, I had never heard of the Kurds before and in the second, I felt that my expertise was with warfighting with a particular focus at defending Western Europe from a Soviet invasion. As it was, I was still trying to adjust to a new era in Europe and I suppose like many others, trying to come to grips with what future roles our military forces in Europe should be accomplishing.

So as you might imagine, Jack Galvin's call most certainly gave me pause. The next six months were among the most challenging in my career because not only was I no expert in humanitarian support, but the members of the Task Force working with me were also not experts in this kind of endeavor. Thank God I was surrounded by truly remarkable men and women who performed brilliantly. As tough as these warriors could be on a battlefield, when they arrived in Northern Iraq and found the tragic sights of thousands of starving children mothers and old people, they threw every bit of their considerable talents and their waking hours into devising ingenious ways to stop the misery.

Just a few weeks ago, I felt no small sense of deja vu when I called General George Joulwan, the current Supreme Allied Commander, and told him that we needed to send General Shroeder, the current Deputy Commander-in-Chief of United States Army Europe, to lead another task force.

This time it is to go to the aid of the Rwandans, because there are an estimated two million refugees on the ground and thousands are dying daily.

I don't expect that General Shroeder had even heard of the Hutus and the Tutsis before Rwanda erupted into this incredible catastrophe just two months ago, but I am completely confident that in short order he and the members of his task force will be complete experts on Rwanda's problems and on providing humanitarian relief.

More and more often in this new era, our military forces are being called upon to perform kinds of missions that just

were not part of our lexicon during the Cold War years. When you look around the world today it truly is startling what our men and women are accomplishing.

In Iraq, we are still maintaining a no-fly regime against Saddam and his forces even while we are also working with our allies to enforce the United Nations sanctions that resulted from the Gulf War.

And of course in Bosnia, we are participating in the most unusual group of operations that I have seen in my career. In addition to enforcing another no-fly regime and more U.N. sanctions through NATO, we are also supporting the United Nations' peacekeepers on the ground, supporting their humanitarian operations, providing protection to the U.N. peacekeepers when called upon, and by stationing American forces in Macedonia we are helping to contain the fighting and keep it from engulfing more peoples and countries.

And around Haiti, we are also enforcing U.N. sanctions and our forces are picking up the Haitians, who have been fleeing occasionally by the thousands, and we are providing for these thousands of refugees and caring for them until their future directions are determined.

Many of you in this room are veterans of military service and I expect that you understand that each of these are extremely difficult operations. What our forces have been asked to do in Uganda and Rwanda is nothing short of creating a miracle. What is occurring is the largest humanitarian operation ever attempted and it is an operation confronted by enormous logistical difficulties and obstacles.

But I think that what is most amazing to realize is that our Armed Forces are doing all of this while still remaining the finest fighting force on the face of the earth, while deterring aggression against important American interests in several places in the world, and while serving as a vital lever of global stability and peace.

And I think the very first thing that this points toward is not the great technologies that this country provides its fighting forces, rather it is the truly astounding men and women we have in uniform today. It is their capacity to very rapidly conquer the most difficult challenges and to bring life and order and hope to millions of people who have no hope.

I must tell you that having commanded one of these task forces myself and having had the great privilege over the past nine months to visit our forces who are performing similar missions around the world, from Somalia to the Balkans, that in every case the success or failure of these operations rests on the professionalism, the grit, and the brains of our people. They are human enterprises. And very clearly our uniformed men and women have these qualities in great abundance.

So it only confirms what we realized during the Cold War, that we must preserve the outstanding quality of men and women in our forces. Because more and more we are not only asking them to perform the traditional and very demanding tasks of security upon which our country relies, but we are also sending them out around the world to create humanitarian miracles, or to try to bring peace between nations or within nations that have turned against one another.

From my perspective as their senior military officer, I could not be prouder. Five years ago we decided that our military forces would have to make a lot of adjustments to remain effective in this new era, and at every level our men and women have been accomplishing just this very splendidly. But it makes me question whether we have been backing up our field forces by making the same magnitude of adjustments back here.

Seven months ago when I testified before Congress in my posture statement, I told the Congress and the Armed Forces that we do in fact have to make great changes.

The fact is that our defense dollars are growing much smaller and we have to turn over every rock and look for every conceivable way to make sure that we are getting a full one hundred cents out of every dollar. And even after we have convinced ourselves of this, we have to squeeze that dollar even harder and try to get two hundred cents out of it.

At that time, Secretary Perry and Under Secretary Deutch disclosed to the Congress that they had critically examined the Department of Defense's financial management systems and it was their view that hundreds of millions of dollars a year, perhaps even billions of dollars, were being lost due to poor and antiquated managerial practices. And as a result they are instituting a fundamental overhaul in our practices to find ways to end this waste.

At the same time, I told the Joint Staff and the Services that we also are going to have to critically examine every gold watch, to look behind every tradition, and to question every one of our ways of doing business because we also are going to have to find more innovative solutions to provide for our forces.

I am convinced that the recommendations of the Bottom Up Review are just about right. When we are done we will have a lean force, very lean, but it will be adequate to accomplish the objectives of our strategy. But it will only be adequate if we possess all of the forces and capabilities and enhancements recommended by the review. My concern is whether we will get there.

I think that we have progressed a very long way at reforming our joint warfighting capabilities. In the aftermath of

the Goldwater-Nichols Act, we have streamlined how we command and control our forces, we have eliminated some major commands and consolidated others, we have built a joint doctrine, and we have inculcated a joint spirit in our forces. But I think we have to go beyond this and carry the spirit of jointness into how we man train, organize, and equip our forces.

On the one hand this means that we must continue to scrutinize how we organize the roles, missions, and functions of our forces and our military departments. But I must also tell you that this area of review can be deceptive. We must go deeper than roles, functions, and missions because these are really the endpoints of what our Armed Services provide.

And this is why I asked the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Bill Owens, and the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the services to expand the functions, the parameters, and the visibility of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and to use this institution as a base to search for more innovative ways to do our business.

This means that we must look from a joint perspective at how we provide our forces and our equipment, all the way from the stage where we define our joint strategic requirements for various forces and capabilities, through how we design and build our equipment, through how we school and train our forces, and how we station them, and sustain and maintain them, and the services that we provide our units and people.

I am encouraged that this effort will prove very fruitful. The fact is that all of the services realize that our budgets are going to stay lean. Unless we find ways to get more efficiency and output out of what we are being provided, we are going to have to cut away the few dwindling modernization programs we have left and then some more structure.

So we must carry jointness beyond warfighting. We must carry it into maintenance, into stationing, into training and sustainment, and every other function of our Armed Forces where it makes sense. The guiding spirit of this effort must be that we will do things separately only if it is essential to our readiness or more fiscally responsible to continue doing it this way. This does not in any way diminish the responsibilities and authorities of the services. In fact it furthers their own objective of providing the most cost-effective forces and capabilities for joint warfare.

Let me add that all of you sitting here have a role to play and will be heavily effected by this effort also. I know that over the past decade you have been inundated with dictums about procurement reform, about increased productivity, and about finding more innovative ways to build more with less. And I also know that our defense industries have been harder hit than any other segment of our economy over the past five years.

But I must encourage you to continue to look for more and more ways to squeeze more pennies out of every dollar, because as both of the organizations represented in this room recognize, this must be a team effort between the Armed Forces between industry and with the Congress.

In fact, already I am deeply concerned that we are losing our ability to maintain the proper balance in our defense programs.

Perhaps many of you have read that a fair number of our troops and their families are currently on food stamps. This may sound hard to believe, but I'm embarrassed to admit that it is true.

You may remember the same kind of reports back during the late seventies when in fact many of our young enlisted families also had to rely on food stamps. Of all the studies that we did during that period about what most contributed to our manning problems, the fact is that the greatest factor was pay and benefits. No other single factor contributed more to the erosion of our forces.

I think it's a very difficult thing when we ask a young private or seaman to deploy to Korea or Bosnia or Rwanda, to go out to perform a dangerous and difficult task for our nation and to leave his family behind on food stamps.

I think also that many of you here are all too aware that our modernization accounts have been cut to the bare bones in order to preserve essential funds for readiness and for manning our force. Each year since the late eighties, we have dipped deeper and deeper into our modernization accounts to find savings. What concerns me is that at some point we will cross a threshold where we have damaged our defense in the future in order to pay our bills today. Then before we know it the future is upon us.

So I am concerned about this element of balance also. We can exist for a while on all that we built during the last years of the Cold War. We remain more technologically advanced than any other military force. But we cannot be sanguine for too long. Warfare is an evolutionary art, but at certain times it is a revolutionary art.

Looking at the Gulf War, I am tempted to conclude that we are either in a very quickly paced evolutionary period or perhaps even in a revolutionary period in warfare. The same electronic-information revolution that is sweeping through the marketplace is seeping over onto the battlefield and it is transforming the ways we fight.

We must stay at the cutting edge of this revolution and that means that we must maintain a strong Research and

Development base and that we must maintain the ability to identify, and if warranted, to produce the kinds of revolutionary technologies that keep our forces better than any opponent they may have to meet in battle.

Now before I close I want to repeat again that all of us should be extraordinarily proud of what our men and women in uniform are accomplishing these days for our nation. When I was a young child in war-torn Europe, and later in the ravaged and contested Europe that emerged after the Second World War, I gained a very special appreciation and awe for America's Armed Forces. Perhaps with a better vantage than most, I saw America's Armed Forces as embodying the two great strengths of this nation. They are ferocious and insurmountable in war and extraordinarily noble in peace. I am proud to say that fifty years later our men and women are keeping both of these lights burning very, very brightly.

Again thank you and Godspeed.

USCENTCOM Change of Command
MacDill AFB, Florida
5 August 1994

Among the many great traditions of the Armed Forces none are more significant than Changes of Command. This one in particular is deeply moving and inspiring, as it should be, for these two great commanders. And I want to thank the United States Marine Drum and Bugle Corps and the saluting battery of the Second Marine Division for making this such a stirring event. And I salute the service men and women standing here so proudly. You look terrific and I am proud to be here with you.

We have such a wonderful group of guests here today that there is simply no way to do justice to them all. But I certainly would like to recognize the representatives and Ambassadors of some of our very good friends and allies in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Kuwait, Egypt, and Qatar.

We are also honored by the presence of Ambassador Martin Cheshes and Mrs. Cheshes, members of the State Department, Service Chiefs, and Unified Commanders.

And to everyone, our distinguished guests, to family and friends, and to the members of the great Central Command, I know how very much it means to General and Mrs. Hoar and General and Mrs. Peay to see you here today to help celebrate this very special occasion. Your presence is an honor to this command and for that I thank you.

This is a very memorable day for United States Central Command, another milestone in its history marking the end of one captivating chapter and the beginning of another. And how great it is to have General and Mrs. P.X. Kelly, and General and Mrs. Crist, and Mrs. Schwarzkopf who are so much a part of the history of this proud command here with us today.

We have just witnessed a very important event and that is the retirement of one of America's great military leaders General Joe Hoar.

And on behalf of our President, on behalf of Secretary Perry, on behalf of the Joint Chiefs and our Nation, I thank him for his extraordinary leadership and exemplary devotion and for over 37 years of truly remarkable service to our Nation.

When President Bush was looking for someone to take over Central Command three years ago, the men and women of this command had just orchestrated the stunning victory over Iraq and placed the Armed Forces of our Nation and the nations of the coalition forces in the highest regard throughout the world. How do you follow an act like this?

It would require a commander of great intellect, of great vision, a leader who could foresee the future needs of this very, very important region and design a security arrangement to fit the new balance of power within the region.

Nobody could have been a better choice than Joe Hoar, a man who had been tested in the jungles of Vietnam as well as the halls of Washington and whose tremendous leadership, integrity, and dedication were so legendary. Joe Hoar was the natural choice and of course the perfect choice to face the challenges that lay ahead.

But who could have imagined then that the region would become embroiled in one crisis after another. Who could have imagined the need to remind Saddam Hussein time and time again of our military resolve? And who among us could have possibly imagined a tragedy of such enormous proportions in Somalia, the starving millions, old men and women, children dying by the thousands daily?

Time and again, the United States Central Command was put to the test and time and again you performed magnificently. In response to these and other crises, Central Command, under General Hoar's wise leadership, organized, activated, and directed six Joint Task Forces, four of them simultaneously, an unprecedented accomplishment for any unified command.

But just as crucial to this region was a concept being formulated in the staff of Central Command, a strategy for regional stability. This three-tiered strategy has already made great strides enhancing the capabilities of our allies and encouraging cooperative efforts toward regional stability.

In fact, it has been the catalyst for the first multi-national exercises ever conducted in this region. And Joe, no one could have done it more brilliantly.

And isn't it ironic that this man, who by his own admission had not aspired to a career in the military, has become one of the most well-respected and most admired military men of our Armed Forces? And who capped his career so appropriately and so magnificently as the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Central Command.

So today we honor this low-key, soft-spoken leader as one of our great American heroes. And I am truly proud and honored to be a part of this great occasion.

And if you want to know where Joe gets his inspiration you only have to look to his college sweetheart, his wife, Charlie, and their beautiful family.

Charlie, you've been by his side through it all, the good times and the difficult times, in peace and in war, raising five wonderful children, often on your own.

And I honestly can't imagine how you ever found the time to complete a master's and a doctorate degree while raising a family. But that was just one more demonstration of the energy and caring you put into everything you do.

And that energy and caring extended well beyond your front door. It extended to the men and women in Joe's charge, to their families, and to countless charities. In every community you have been your limitless enthusiasm has left a lasting impression. You have been a wonderful first lady and we will miss you sorely.

But as we say farewell to Joe and Charlie Hoar, we have the wonderful task of welcoming on board General Binnie Peay and Pamela Peay, to whom we have just entrusted the men and women of Central Command and the safety and security of this important region. General Peay, as you all know, has just left a Pentagon tour and he is absolutely thrilled to be back among troops.

In his last tour, he served as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army and before that, as the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; so he has a great reputation and a great following in the staff corridors of the Pentagon.

He is also a proven commander at every level. Long before DESERT STORM, Binnie showed his skills as a combat leader in Vietnam. And in addition to a long list of other extraordinary accomplishments in his career, General Peay commanded the 101st Air Assault Division magnificently during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. General Binnie Peay is a courageous warrior, a great innovator, a proven performer, and a compassionate leader and I am very proud and honored to introduce him as the new commander of the United States Central Command.

And walking beside him every step of the way has been Pamela Peay, well known throughout the Army and certainly among her many friends as a woman of tremendous warmth and charm.

What an incredible inspiration she was to the families of the 101st Air Assault Division during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. And what a wonderful first lady she will be to the United States Central Command. Welcome Pamela.

So Joe and Charlie, as you begin the next chapter of your lives together, as you cycle into the setting sun, you take with you our deepest appreciation for your unwavering dedication and your compassionate devotion to the men and women of our Armed Forces and our Nation.

On behalf of our President and all of us in uniform good luck and God Bless.

Jewish War Veterans National Convention
Dallas, Texas
24 August 1994

I must tell you all that I walk out here to this podium with a great, great feeling, for I know that I am among friends. And I know that with this group of men and women, I share not only many experiences, but also many outlooks and certainly many convictions.

But let me first, at the outset, thank you, thank you all very, very much.

"Thank you" for your outstanding service to this great country.

And "thank you," at the risk of being melodramatic, thank you for fighting America's wars, and for keeping this nation and its principles safe.

And "thank you" as well, for creating a tradition of courage, and of service, and of sacrifice for our country, a living

tradition, a tradition that inspires every young man and woman serving in uniform today more so than you will ever realize.

And when I look around this room, I see some slightly weather-beaten faces of those who fought in World War One, in World War Two, in the Korean War, in the jungles and rice paddies of Vietnam probably, and I wouldn't be surprised if there weren't at least one or two in this room here, some new faces, those of you who tasted that great victory now called DESERT STORM.

Put another way, if you wish to reflect upon it, in your faces is reflected the triumph, and sometimes the tragedy, of America's military history in the twentieth century. But also, standing here, where I'm standing, you see in your eyes, a justifiable pride. Pride for having served our Nation in time of need, and pride for your untiring efforts, day in and day out, on behalf of our service men and women.

But I also see great wisdom, wisdom of those who understand the need for a strong defense, and wisdom of those who know the terrible price this country pays for complacency.

And that wisdom must never be lost on the people of this nation, for it is complacency, I submit to you, that is today's greatest risk to our country.

It is the same kind of complacency that some of you experienced when you returned home victorious from the trenches of the First World War — and I know that among you, even if not present here today, are those who did just that — when you returned from the conflict that was called "the war to end all wars." And what a terrible tragic mistake that turned out to be. Remember?

And then, after many of you returned home from the victorious battles of Europe and the Pacific during World War Two, after you destroyed the dictators who grew so powerful while our nation was complacent. And then it happened once again. Once again, we had to pay the terrible price for letting up, and we paid that price in the opening days of the Korean War.

So once again our soldiers, our airmen, our sailors and our marines went out to fight another dictator, then Kim Il Sung, and to save another nation, South Korea, and another region.

And then many of us went off to Vietnam, where we once again fought, and this time fought America's longest battle. But when we returned home from this fight, it happened yet again.

By the late seventies, our Armed Forces were hollow. We had ships that couldn't deploy, planes that couldn't fly safely, and divisions that lacked the parts and the training to perform their missions. And thinking that Détente meant peace, we shrank our arsenals, and we allowed our forces to atrophy once again.

And it was only after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, if you recall, and our embassy was seized and our people were imprisoned in Iran, that we finally shook off that complacency, and began to rebuild our forces.

And it was a good thing we did. In Grenada, then in Panama, we saw our forces grow stronger and stronger. And then three and a half years ago in the Gulf War, we saw our men and women execute an extraordinary military feat. DESERT STORM became the high point of our military high tech excellence.

You see, there has been this cycle throughout this century, a cycle of enormous and costly exertions, followed by a false sense of relief, a delusion that we had done our part, and that it was time to rest to collect the dividends for our efforts.

Well, this time around as we close this century, we have to, no, we must fight this dangerous embrace of complacence.

Let me remind you of a fact of American history. Since our nation was founded, we have never, we have never experienced a twenty-year period of uninterrupted peace. Put another way, no soldier in this country's history has ever completed a military career when our nation did not engage in armed conflict at least once.

This then is the reality that underscores our need to remain ready. We owe it to our sons and daughters to remain ready for the unexpected.

But there is another reason to reject complacence, and to embrace military readiness. Today we are the world's most powerful nation, we are its richest nation, and we are its leading nation.

Recently some have suggested that we can't shoulder this leadership any longer, that the price of leadership is too high, that if we continue to pay this price, we will soon exhaust and impoverish ourselves. Well, actually just the opposite is true. It is our leadership that has kept us the world's most democratic and the most prosperous people.

Give it up, give up our leadership and it will be the beginning of the end of our greatness. It's just as simple as that. You either go forward with confidence or you slip backwards in self-doubt. You can't stand still.

Those of you who took part in the occupations of Japan and Germany, who rebuilt Japan and Western Europe from the ravages of war, and who defended South Korea and kept it safe for forty years, and who stemmed the tide of the

communist onslaught into Southeast Asia, you laid the foundation for the freedom and prosperity that we, and they, are enjoying today. You helped build the markets that have made us — the United States, Western Europe, and Northeast Asia collectively — the three richest democratic regions in the world.

You also created the allies who helped us to defeat the many threats that emerged after the war. They were beside us, taking the same risks and the same stands throughout the Cold War. And they were there with us in nearly every conflict we have fought, from Korea to Vietnam to the Gulf.

But now, today, there are new challenges, new risks, but also new opportunities, in Eastern Europe, in the states of the former Soviet Union, and in China and Southeast Asia.

And as we have throughout history, so today we expect our Armed Forces to be ready to protect us from those who would wish us ill, wherever they might be, and to be there to help grasp the opportunities that might lay before us.

Now since I became Chairman some ten months ago, I have had the deep honor to visit our forces here and overseas — in Korea and Somalia and Hawaii and Panama, in Europe, and just less than two weeks ago, in the death filled refugee camps of Rwanda — and I want to report to you that without the slightest doubt, our forces continue doing a simply magnificent job.

Despite major reductions and continually shrinking budgets, they are guarding our nation and our allies, and are accomplishing the many missions we have assigned them with every bit of the courage, and skill, and the enthusiasm that you showed, and that Americans have come to expect from our Armed Forces.

But I must also tell you that when you sit down, and you talk to the old, experienced non-commissioned officers, they will tell you the danger signals are appearing, and that it's high time to stop reductions in people and in budgets. You and I know that.

But the operations tempo for our forces is higher than ever, and yet those forces are smaller in numbers than ever. And yet, we send them to more places than ever before. Just reflect on it for a moment.

Our young men and women stand watch in South Korea, along the DMZ, should North Korea and Kim Chong Il miscalculate, and once again bring war to that peninsula.

And when you talk to them, as I have, you walk away convinced that should conflict break out, our men and women, together with our South Korean allies, will prevail. There is this quiet confidence within them.

And although the Gulf War is now long over, our forces continue to patrol the skies over southern and northern Iraq, enforcing protective no-fly zones over the Shias and the Kurds, and our ships continue to enforce sanctions against Iraq. And throughout the region, our men and women are providing a powerful counterweight to Iraq and Iran's ambitions.

Not long ago, I went to Panama to visit our command there. The command that, over the past ten years, helped block the spread of communism in this region, and helped usher in a new unprecedented era of democracy, one that has spread throughout South and Central America. These are the same men and women, who only a few years ago, took down Noriega in Operation Just Cause.

Today, they are waging a shadowy, but tough fight, to stop the flow of drugs into our streets, and working with our regional allies to maintain peace and stability throughout that vital region.

But nowhere, nowhere have the changes been greater than in Europe. In nearly every capitol of Eastern Europe, you find American service men and women, reaching out a hand of friendship in a partnership for peace which is probably the most comprehensive military-to-military outreach program ever undertaken.

And in just two weeks, actually less than two weeks, in a place east of Moscow, American and Russian soldiers will begin the first-ever joint peacekeeping exercise between our two nations.

Our service men and women are doing this while others in Europe patrol the skies over Bosnia, while still others enforce sanctions in the Adriatic, and still others deliver humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo in what is now the world's longest lasting air bridge, far exceeding the Berlin Airlift of yesterday.

Others guard the border of Macedonia against the spread of that conflict into new regions, and still others, probably you are not even aware of, are still in Mogadishu, in Somalia, guarding that effort.

Closer to home, our ships enforce sanctions around Haiti while soldiers and marines on Guantanamo provide a safe haven for some 15,000 Haitians and now, as you so well know from the press, to thousands of Cubans, fleeing the harsh realities of their homelands.

And for the last thirty days, American men and women have been performing miracles, miracles in the midst of the most enormous human tragedy in Rwanda. No other nation has the capability to bring relief to that devastated country, and the suffering millions there, as quickly and as effectively as your sons and daughters, and they are doing that today.

And still others, probably unbeknownst to most of the public, comb the jungles of Vietnam today, and of Laos

today, and of Cambodia today, searching for the remains of their comrades as part of a task force called "Full Accounting." While nearly four thousand others are fighting forest fires here at home.

And I certainly cannot emphasize strongly enough for you, what great men and women we have in our ranks today. When you look at what they are doing around the world in the places I just mentioned, it is absolutely astounding.

They are talented and dedicated, and if you want to retain them, and continue to recruit more like them, then you have to take care of their welfare and the welfare of their families. And the very last place to look for more savings is in their paychecks and in what we provide for the quality of life programs. Whenever I have a chance, I like to call them our Super Bowl team, but without Super Bowl wages.

I must tell you, I find it wise to remember the great defense debate of our first, very first Congress in 1787, right after we had won our freedom. That debate started when a representative, named Elbridge Gerry, who subsequently became Governor of Massachusetts and then Vice President under James Madison, when Mr. Gerry introduced a resolution to permanently limit the size of our country's Armed Forces to just 10,000 men.

Now, since in the minds of the members of our new Congress there was a healthy distrust for large militaries and our foundling nation was very, very poor, Gerry's resolution, as you might expect, drew considerable support.

In fact, the resolution was poised to be passed by a substantial majority until another representative, a man named George Washington, who had earned quite a reputation for himself during the Revolutionary War, remarked to the larger body that this indeed was a very good idea. "In fact," he said, "let us limit as well, while we are at it, the size of any invading force to no more than just five thousand men." A true story.

And I will tell you that Washington's reminder is as wise today as it was in 1787. We cannot, we cannot legislate away our threats or our responsibilities. We have involved our military forces in more operations in the last few years than throughout the entire Cold War, and I expect we have not yet seen the end of it.

So, this much smaller, considerably leaner force must be more capable and more ready than ever. But to be so, we will continue to need the strong will, the strong support, of our President, our Congress, and of course, of each and every one of you here in this room.

I know that shortly, your business meetings will begin, and you will hear reports of all the many wonderful things that your organization has been doing that benefit, I think more than anyone else, the men and women in uniform today.

And the tremendous work that you are doing every day, as part of the Military Coalition, in Veterans' Hospitals, in shelters, in blood banks, and on our streets in rallies and celebrations, reaches across the spectrum of our society; to our youth, and our retirees, the healthy and the homeless. But the military, and our veterans, have been the greatest benefactors of your work.

You have had a tremendous impact on the quality of the men and women who serve our Nation, and I want to thank you for your enormous efforts to keep our military strong, and to ensure that the men and women who sacrifice so much for this great Nation, receive the benefits and the care that they so very richly deserve.

And one more time, on behalf of all of them, from the bottom of my heart, thank you.

And with that, God Bless you all, and God Bless the United States of America.

The Navy League, Association of the U.S. Army, and Air Force Association
Fort Worth, Texas
24 August 1994

Let me begin by thanking you all for this great excuse to come down here to visit the great state of Texas and to spend a day in this state. This is really a delightful break from Washington. And what a treat it is to speak to so many super organizations all gathered under one roof. I sure hope the roof doesn't fall down on this building because our Armed Forces would lose a lot of strong supporters.

Let me admit to you also, that I had a very difficult time deciding what to talk about because really there are far more defense experts sitting here in the audience than there are standing at this podium tonight.

Very clearly, I don't need to tell any of you why we must maintain a strong defense. So I thought instead that I would offer you a sort of state of the union address on the what the Joint Chiefs of Staff are working on today and perhaps elaborate on what I see as truly the most important challenges that we face today.

Let me begin by telling you that the Goldwater-Nichols bill that was passed back in 1987, that enhanced the role of the Chairman as well as the influence and authority of our CINCs, is a great success.

I must admit to you that if I harbored any doubts at the time that this reform act was passed they have completely vanished.

We have all seen what this law accomplished for us in Panama and in the Gulf, and certainly we are seeing its effects in our operations in many places around the world today; from Northern Iraq, to Bosnia, to where our forces are performing so magnificently in Rwanda. So Goldwater-Nichols and the joint reforms it ushered in have led us to a tremendous improvement in how our joint forces fight together, deploy, and perform together in other kinds of operations as well.

I am absolutely delighted that we have gotten away from the tyranny, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to gain consensus in order to take action. Under the old rules, as you can well imagine, the result was that on the truly tough issues, which very often were the truly important issues, very often the only way the Chiefs could agree among themselves was to vote for the lowest common denominator. Only on the rarest of occasions was that the best possible answer.

But now the Chiefs and I are facing a new challenge, a challenge that the authors of Goldwater-Nichols most certainly had in mind, but one that gains even more acute urgency because of the downward pressures of the defense budget. That challenge is how to carry jointness even further.

The genesis of this challenge is that over a year ago we all agreed and decided that the forces and capabilities recommended by the Bottom Up Review were to be our target for the future. I supported that target then and I support that target now. Although there are some agnostics running around saying this future force will be too much or too little, I still maintain that the Bottom Up Review recommendations are about what we will need to carry us into the next century.

Our challenge is actually getting there. As has been reported under current conditions, there is not enough money allocated to fund the force and the enhancements that were part of the package.

And when I say that I support the smaller force, that is only because with the enhancements, the additional strategic lift, the prepositioned equipment and stocks stationed overseas on ships and ashore, the command and control systems, the expansion of our intelligence capabilities to extend over two theaters, the smart munitions, the additional stealth systems, and all of the other sundries listed in the Bottom Up Review, that all of these will make our smaller force pound for pound so much more effective. But if these enhancements do not materialize and are not integrated properly in our forces, then the force structure will be inadequate. So I support the Bottom Up Review as adequate for our future needs but it must be the whole package not just a slice of it.

I am not sure how big the shortfall is, whether it is the $150 billion that the truly pessimistic claim or the $40 billion that we in the department have perhaps optimistically recognized. But the Chiefs and I are convinced that we must carry jointness further in order to find more efficient and more economical ways of doing business. We have convinced ourselves that we are on the right track on joint warfighting, but getting to this point was the easy part. We must now progress into the truly difficult and agonizing part. We must now push jointness into how we actually build, train, equip, and maintain our forces. But again there is no doubt in my mind that this is what the forefathers of Goldwater-Nichols intended from the start.

Those of you with long experience in the defense business know better than most how hard this task is going to be. We have just finally managed to overthrow the old tyrant of consensus between the five chiefs on operational matters and that took nearly forty very painful years and now we are importing jointness into pocketbook issues. But we have no choice. We have to change the ways we are doing business.

Over the past few years, we have been publishing joint doctrine and as all of you know, doctrine is the basis for all else in the Armed Forces. Well the doctrine has been going out into the field, but we have found that it has not been properly vetted and that the people in the field don't yet understand the doctrine enough or practice it enough.

So in part, the Chiefs and I know that we must work much harder to truly imbed this doctrine in our forces.

Part of this means paying greater attention to how we develop and disseminate joint doctrine but as all of you know, it is also a matter of training. We have in fact come a long way in joint training over the past few years. But the fact is that joint training still lags far behind the qualitative aspects of training that the Services have perfected so well. For example, the Services have made great strides over the past decade in employing simulations in our training so that we can reduce the need to send troops to the field and sailors to sea, where they end up as training aids in exercises that are really designed for the benefit of their higher headquarters.

Yet oddly enough, as far as simulations have progressed within the services and service-unique training we still don't have good joint software for our forces. As a result, if you go to visit joint training anywhere in the world, you are

left wondering why we are wasting the time of so many of our men and women and wasting our money when if we had joint warfighting simulations, we could get the same benefits but at a much lower cost.

This then carries you into readiness. Over the past year as some of you may know, General Shy Meyers and a task force of wise men concluded a super study on the readiness of our forces and how we measure and maintain readiness.

They discovered what I believe is true, that for the most part our Services are doing a terrific job at maintaining readiness and have pretty reliable techniques for assessing readiness. But we have two problems. First, for the most part, our systems are not designed to predict readiness problems and then allow us to act preventively to keep problems from occurring. Instead our systems are designed mostly to tell us when we have developed a problem.

Second, we simply don't have a way of measuring joint readiness. We measure by service but not the whole package. So we have this lag. We have made joint warfare the apotheosis of how we fight and operate but we don't have a way to measure joint readiness.

We have to develop a joint system for measuring readiness and it must be predictive so that we see what is looming over the horizon. I certainly don't know what this system will look like right now, but I have asked the Vice Chairman, Admiral Owens, and the Vice Chiefs of the Services to take on that issue with as much gusto and speed as they can muster.

In fact the Chiefs and I have asked the Vice Chairman and the Service Vice Chiefs to go much further and to take a truly hard look at all of our functions including how we define our requirements, not just to insure that there is interoperability between our systems and forces, but also to see if we can use jointness to shape our requirements.

I know this will be a difficult hurdle for the Services, but the Chiefs and I know that from now on we must think of requirements from a joint perspective.

For example, regardless of what Service they belong to the fact is that from a joint perspective our Armed Forces must only possess so many attack aircraft or so many tanks. And the perspective to analyze and decide how many of each, should be the joint CINCs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Already a fair amount of our requirements such as strategic lift or strategic intelligence emerges from a joint requirements process and this is how we ensure against wasteful duplication or excesses. And we now need to expand this more broadly.

In fact, we must put all of our major functions under a really critical joint microscope because the Chiefs and I are convinced that we can do much better. All of these things that we do now as a matter of habit, how we station and care for our people, how we maintain our equipment, and how we use our training areas have always been done as individual services and independent departments, a separate bottom up approach. Maybe we can do some of them much better and much less expensively if we do them from a joint perspective. You can go to towns here in America that have two or three different service forces stationed in them and each of these is a separate island that shares nothing with the other Service bases; not housing, not services like commissaries or PXs, finance, and lawyers. Maybe this doesn't make sense any more.

The Chiefs and I are convinced that it is time to break some rice bowls because we owe this to our forces.

Yet another area we are looking at is roles and missions. I think you all know that there is a long and bloody history in the evolution of Service roles and missions, but this time we have to make some bold changes, broader changes than we ever could have entertained in the past. Dr. John White has been appointed by Congress and Secretary Perry to head a panel to study and make recommendations on this area and I applaud this effort from the bottom of my heart. The Chiefs and I fully intend to support this effort to offer our analysis and our ideas and our full backing and to remain as open-minded as we can be.

The fact is that it is time for some boldness. Whether that's changes in the way we fight, the way we organize our forces, or how we allocate roles and missions. Unless we make changes we are not going to get there from here. Already in the field, the CINCs are changing the ways they are going about this. For example, Admiral Miller, the Commander-in-Chief of USACOM, has changed the old mold of configuring naval task forces and Carrier Battle Groups by building joint forces that are configured with greater balance but also that allow us to spread the burdens of forward presence missions more evenly across all the services.

We have to try this because our strategic requirements cannot be wished away and unless we dare to put Army helicopters on Navy ships, or when it fits, to provide air protection for some of our naval forces from land-based air forces, then a lot of our sailors and marines will be at sea far too much and we will pay heavily for this when it comes to time for them to reenlist. But let me assure you we are not looking to change things just for the sake of change or to save money. We will make changes only if we are convinced that it contributes to our defense and to the effectiveness of our forces. If it doesn't pass that litmus test it will be rejected.

Now as all of you might imagine from what I just explained the next few years are going to be very traumatic inside the Beltway.

Don't expect this process to occur quietly because if past history is any guide there will be a lot of sound and fury and criticism and much of this will find its way into the press. I harbor no fantasy that this will occur harmoniously. Very many long vested interests and institutional habits are going to be challenged and some of them are going to be thrown aside. And as I look around this room at the Navy League, the Airpower Council, and the Association of the United States Army, I am wondering if when all this comes to pass if any of you will want to invite me or any of the Chiefs back here to speak when all this is done.

But we cannot afford another mild roles and missions report. We really are at the stage where the dollars won't support it and our troops and sailors and airmen don't deserve it.

All you have to do is to look at the front pages today and you will see the extraordinary adjustments that our men and women have already been making in this new era.

Whether it is Bosnia, assisting the humanitarian efforts or enforcing the United Nations sanctions regime, air-landing in Sarajevo in the longest airlift in history, or if you turn to Rwanda where our forces are splendidly undertaking the most challenging humanitarian operation in modern history, you will see what they are doing. And we owe it to them to push the upper crust resistance aside because otherwise, many will be tempted to find future savings in readiness funds and modernization accounts, in the Bottom Up Review enhancements, or in the paychecks of our men and women.

And I firmly believe that we owe it to them and to the American people to do all that we can to keep this from happening.

But I spoke of other challenges also. One of those can also be found on the front pages of the newspapers and that is our challenge of trying to come to grips with how and when to use our forces. Nearly all of you saw your service during the Cold War. We knew that when the Soviet forces began rushing into the Fulda Gap that we were going to fight and spend no time debating or questioning it. There were no doubts in our minds, no cobwebs of complexity for this scenario or most others. We either fought with overwhelming forces to achieve decisive victory or we fought with limited forces to achieve a lesser outcome.

But we knew what outcomes we had in mind. Today it is not so clear. Yes, there are still the Koreas where I submit to you, we continue to entertain no doubts. If God forbid, the North Koreans miscalculated and we had to fight to protect our ally and our forces sitting along the 38th Parallel, we wouldn't wonder for a minute or even a second what to do; whether to use overwhelming or underwhelming force or whatever. We would know what we have to do and we would know very clearly what victory meant. But what about Rwanda, or Bosnia, or any number of others like this that are looming just over the horizon? What is victory in these cases? And what is overwhelming force in an environment like that?

To some, because of these ambiguities, these are situations to avoid. Some feel we should just a hang outside of the Pentagon that says we only do the "Big Ones." And very often you hear this warning that we cannot be the world's 911 force dashing from one crisis to the next always the first to be called.

But I cannot agree with this. What do we do; wait until the next decade until the world settles down a bit and the threats are then the big ones, but unambiguous? I would submit that these new kinds of challenges are the very unwelcome consequences of the very welcome turn of events we all fought so hard to create for so many decades and we cannot shy away from them.

I am not convinced that we can maintain the position we must have in this world or the influence we must possess if in our effort to keep from becoming the 911 force, we try instead to become the operator always trying to redirect the tough calls for help to someone else.

But on the other hand, I am also convinced that the most important missions of our forces are deterrence and warfighting. And deterrence today rests on our ability to fight and win wars. And if there is one thing we must preserve and protect above all others, it is the unequaled fighting qualities of our forces. So how do we square this circle?

How do we maintain our ability to stay the finest fighting force in the world, protecting our very important interests through deterrence and also perform the humanitarian and peace operations that are so rampant but that tear at our fabric of warfighting readiness?

And this I submit is our second greatest challenge because if we try to shift to either extreme in how we answer this question we will squander our ability to shape the world outside our borders and we will squander the vast opportunities we won in the Cold War. We must, I am convinced, end up somewhere in the middle. We must do the Rwandas when we are called upon because we cannot look ourselves in the mirror if we do not and we will lose our global leadership.

But we must also protect our readiness and our ability to fight because our survival and our interests depend upon it.

Now some of you have perhaps been to visit our forces in Korea, Bosnia, Northern Iraq, Kuwait, or off the coast of Haiti and you will know what a truly incredible job they are doing. From my own visits to all of these places and many others, I must tell you that there are no doubts in their minds what this new era is about or what challenges we must meet. When you look in their eyes, whether it is in Rwanda or in a field hospital performing humanitarian work in Croatia, or along the 38th Parallel, or at an airfield in Germany where our crews our shuttling aid to three or four different places in the world, you see no doubts at all.

What you see instead is a steely resolve; a brisk pride in what they are accomplishing and a complete sense of confidence that our Armed Forces are ready and the best and that we can shape a great future for our nation and for the world.

But this brings to mind one other challenge where we badly need your help and that is protecting the pay and benefits that we owe our men and women in uniform. There are a lot of new ideas floating around Washington today, just as there always are when money gets tight, to reduce military medical benefits or charge a price for those benefits or to keep our military pay raises below the rate of inflation or to start reducing vital quality of life items like the funds we need to maintain our housing and facilities or to eliminate PXs and commissaries.

I don't need to tell any of you here that this is the worst and the most self-defeating way to find savings. When I was in Rwanda just two weeks ago, I went to the water purification point where a young major and a handful of soldiers had been rushed in and worked twenty hour days to set up their equipment and worked past one obstacle after another using enormous imagination to find ways to get the water to the hundreds of thousands of Rwandans whose lives depended them. This handful of men performed heroically and completely selflessly under the most terrible conditions and saved tens of thousands of lives. We cannot afford to lose them or the million and a half others just like them who we are asking more and more from to meet the very many challenges of this new era.

Looking around the world today, our Armed Forces are involved in more operations than at any time during the Cold War. We are asking a great deal from our men and women in uniform. I like to say that they are a Super Bowl team, but we are not paying them Super Bowl wages. I need all of the help that you can muster to protect their pay and benefits.

So I ask for you continued support as those of us in uniform continue to address the challenges of this era. And I ask that you maintain the powerful pressure to the Congress and the American people, keeping them aware that there are no respites in defending our nation. Let me assure you that our men and women in uniform are performing magnificently in all of the very great challenges we are facing and they deserve our very best support.

And with that I have probably spoken far too long. So I will end by thanking you for everything that you are doing for our nation and for our Armed Forces. God Bless you all and thank you.

USSPACECOM Change of Command
Colorado Springs, Colorado
13 September 1994

As all of you know, we are here today to carry on a very special military tradition, a change of command ceremony; a very special moment in the history of every command and certainly every new commander. And how great it is to have General and Mrs. Jim Hartinger, General and Mrs. Jim Hill, and General and Mrs. Don Kutyna, who are so much a part of the history of this proud command here with us today.

And I would like to thank each of you, our distinguished guests, for being here as well and helping us mark the end of one captivating chapter in the life of this proud command and the beginning of another. And to welcome the new Commander-in-Chief of Space Command, General Joe Ashy and his wife Sue. Your presence honors this command and I know means a great deal to Joe and Sue Ashy and Chuck and Mary Jo Horner.

And this is certainly a grand ceremony and I would be remiss if I did not offer my very special thanks to the men and women of NORAD, U.S. Space Command, and Air Force Space Command standing in ranks in front of us and to Canada's Air Command Band and the Air Force Band of the Rockies, our joint and combined color guard, and of course Charlie Battery for the special role you play in making this ceremony even more memorable. You make a wonderful sight.

Just about two months ago, with the hope that we would soon be able to steal Joe Ashy away from Southern Europe, we held a similar formation to say farewell to Chuck and Mary Jo Horner.

Well, things took a little longer than we expected and I would like to pass on my deep appreciation to Chuck and Mary Jo for their continued commitment to the men and women of NORAD, U.S. Space Command, and Air Force Space Command and for putting their retirement plans and some well-earned down time on hold.

And if you will allow me, I would like to spend a brief moment to thank the men and women of NORAD and the Space Commands for your magnificent performance over the past two years under General Horner.

I know that General Horner is enormously proud of what you accomplished together and I must tell you that the rest of the Armed Forces and I are also proud of your many achievements. You have established an impressive reputation and a tradition that I know you will carry into the many challenges of the future.

And now I would like to introduce your new commander, General Joe Ashy and his wife Sue.

I had the great privilege of working with General Ashy when I was the NATO Commander and he came to Europe in a time of crisis and unprecedented change to take on the job as the Commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe.

And what a tremendous impact his experience and expert leadership lent to the success of some of the most difficult and most unusual air operations in military history in operations SKY MONITOR, DENY FLIGHT, and PROVIDE PROMISE. I know it will not come as a surprise to any of you when I say that Joe Ashy is one of the most gifted and talented leaders in the Armed Forces today.

He is a battle-tested warrior with over 250 combat missions in Vietnam and a proven leader as the commander of two air wings, the Air Force Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, a Major Air Command, and most recently as the Commander of AIRSOUTH and 16th Air Force. And he brings with him an intimate and personal understanding of the needs of our men and women on the front line and the needs of our combatant commanders.

In short, he is the right man to lead U.S. Space Command to keep it focused on the challenges of tomorrow, its commitment to excellence, and its exceptional service to our front-line warriors.

And beside him every step of the way has been Sue Ashy. What an incredible inspiration she has been to the families of the men and women of AIRSOUTH during the last two years of continuous tension.

Sue has become well known throughout the Armed Forces and certainly among her many friends as a woman of tremendous compassion and charm. And what a wonderful first lady she will be to the United States Space Command.

So as we give one last salute to Chuck and Mary Jo Horner we extend a warm welcome to Joe and Sue Ashy.

Joe, Sue — all of us here wish you the best of luck and our heartfelt congratulations on this very special day.

And now Chuck, Joe, if you will please join me we'll conduct the change of command for United States Space Command.

The Retired Officers' Association
Cincinnati, Ohio
26 September 1994

Let me begin by telling you what a great pleasure it is to be here in Cincinnati, to have the honor to spend this evening, and to share some thoughts with so many friends and comrades.

On my way here I was reminded that I have had the pleasure to speak as an alumnus to a number of schools or organizations that I used to be part of, but it is a particular pleasure to speak to members of an organization that I have belonged to now for some 16 years, and on whose roster I plan to remain for the rest of my life. I guess it's like being with your own family.

And it is doubly nice to be here, for it gets me out of Washington and particularly away from the corridors of the Pentagon, and you all still remember how nice it felt to leave all that behind even if only for a short time.

Let me report to you that the Pentagon has still not yet sunk into the depths of the Potomac River as so many officers have wished over the years, and probably the same rats that were there in the basement when many of you served there can still be heard scampering around at night.

But I also must tell you that the men and women of the Pentagon are busier these days than any time that I can remember.

And this is not just a function of this administration, but rather it is a function of this new era we live in, an era that began when the Berlin Wall came down on that chilly fall day back in November 1989, that instigated so very many changes in the world and produced so many new challenges for our Armed Forces.

And of course last week, I believe I made history by becoming the very first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to launch an invasion force against another nation and then moments before a single shot was fired, to have the pleasure to recall the invasion force and order it to return home because it had already accomplished its mission.

What we saw unfold in Port-au-Prince Sunday, a week ago, was the perfect example of military force in support of diplomacy. But it wasn't until the planes took off from Fort Bragg that General Cedras and his gang, finally got the point that an overwhelming force was about to descend upon Haiti and agreed with President Carter to leave power on the 15th of next month.

I think it was General Eisenhower who once wrote that, "If I was ordered to capture a town defended by a battalion, I would ask for a division and I would take the town without firing a shot." Well, we heeded his advice and thank God it succeeded.

So instead of making a forced landing, our men and women entered Haiti last week without firing a single shot.

And regardless what your thoughts might be about the wisdom of finding ourselves in Haiti, let me assure you that our men and women are performing magnificently and if you would visit them as I did Saturday, your heart would swell with pride.

They are doing great under very difficult circumstances, knowing that the days ahead won't be easy; that fire fights like we had last Saturday night at Cap-Haitien when a Marine patrol clashed with Haitian police, won't be the last one, knowing that they will have to stay there months rather than weeks.

They're confident because they trained hard, because they are led by superb leaders, from Admiral P.D. Miller, to Lieutenant General Shelton, to experienced Division, Brigade and Battalion commanders, because they have the right equipment, because they are ready.

And that in itself ought to make you feel good, being ready, considering all the other things our Armed Forces are asked to do.

Whether it is continuing to deter a still very uncertain threat in Korea or all of the things we are doing in Europe, including what we are doing as part of NATO in and around the intractable tragedy that we used to call Yugoslavia, or standing up the Partnership for Peace, to our humanitarian actions in Africa.

Even with all of this and a lot more going on, the forces involved in this Haitian operation were as well prepared and ready as any force we have ever sent into harm's way.

So I think this is an extraordinary testament to the Armed Forces, that you helped shape and build while you were on duty, that we have these magnificent leaders and these remarkable men and women throughout the ranks and that we have the equipment and capabilities to accomplish all of these tasks and missions.

Our Nation and those of us still on duty owe you our appreciation and admiration for this.

But just as you overcame the challenges that created this unequaled military force today, we face new challenges.

And I thought that I would spend a few minutes explaining what I believe are the three greatest challenges that lie in front of us.

Let me start with what is in my mind the greatest challenge confronting us today. I firmly believe that it is having the foresight to take a long view of the future. Over the past few years the most dominant issues have been Somalia, Rwanda, North Korea, Iraq, and Bosnia and now Haiti. On the one hand each of these situations is serious and merits our attention and our best efforts.

But on the other hand, what happens in any of these countries will probably not be the pivotal forces that will shape the next century.

North Korea and Iraq are clearly the most serious of these situations. But they are near term threats. True, they are threats that could throw their regions into turmoil, but they will not be the determinants of what the world will look like in the next century. In fact neither of these nations may survive in their current forms into the 21st Century.

The future of Asia will be decided in the bustling markets of Shenzin province and on the stock exchange of Tokyo, not in Pyong-yang.

China is the world's most populous country and it is by most estimates already the third or fourth largest economy in the world, with the largest conventional military and the third largest nuclear force in the world. Japan is the economic engine of Asia, with the second largest economy in the world behind our own. The already great power of these two nations is growing, as is their influence regionally and globally.

And in Southwest Asia, until the Gulf War, Iraq was the military power in the Gulf. Had it fielded a nuclear arsenal it might still today be our most serious concern in the region. Instead it is now a defeated country internally divided, its armed forces a shadow of their former strength with its nuclear programs more carefully monitored than any other nation's.

Rather it is Iran, with its religious zealotry and increasingly more powerful and more modern Armed Forces, that is today the more fearsome and long-term regional threat.

But the true gravity of its threat, is less its Armed Forces as its ability to inflame and fan religious conflicts in a region that is already a tinderbox of economic and political issues.

What could prove most ominous is Iran's very clear drive to expand its influence through the pulpit into the Caucasus, a drive that is very threatening to Russia to the Balkan states and our NATO ally, Turkey.

In the same vein in Europe, we must remind ourselves that as much as Bosnia is a very serious concern, the situation there pales when considered against what is happening in the streets of Moscow or Kiev. The true threat of Bosnia is that the conflict that has raged there for two years might spread, dragging more Balkan nations into the cauldron of violence and hatred.

But the future of Europe will not swing on whether the Serbs control 51 percent or 70 percent of Bosnia's soil. It will swing on the future of Russian nationalism and whether we can find a way for Russians and Ukrainians to live peacefully side by side.

There are still over twenty thousand nuclear warheads in the former Soviet states and the mere existence of this arsenal will remain a most profound danger to our future security.

And of course what happens in Russia and the other former states of the Soviet Union will shape the future of the rest of Europe, ultimately determining whether Europe will grow together or fragment apart, the cause of so much warfare over the past centuries.

The point is that while we must deal effectively with the Bosnias, the Koreas, the Rwandas, and the Haitis of today and of tomorrow, we must not allow them to distract us from the truly vital issues that loom before us.

What we all of us must understand is that developments in Russia, the CIS, Germany, and the rest of Europe, China, Japan, and Iran are where we must place our greatest investments and where we must keep our attention most strongly focused. These are the main events.

Our second greatest challenge is settling on a future military force, one that is powerful enough to protect our interests and our international leadership well into the 21st Century.

As all of you know, this was the purpose of the Bottom Up Review. And out of that, we decided that to protect our global interests we had to maintain as a minimum, the capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.

I think this force-sizing goal is generally accepted, but clearly the challenge now is to find the resources to realize it. That said, I expect there are some among you who think that we are cutting too deep and that the Bottom Up Review Force won't be sufficient to fight and win two major conflicts.

I personally think the Bottom Up Review Structure will be sufficient, but I remember that we never thought we had enough. As recently as 1987 our scenarios said that it would require 36 Army divisions, 21 Carrier Battle Groups, and 67 Tactical Fighter Wings to fight and win against the Soviets.

Of course we never came close to building a force this large. And so in those simpler days of the Cold War, we were living with levels of risk that military planners could only characterize as very high.

The end-state force of the Bottom Up Review is more capable of accomplishing its warfighting objectives than our forces of the Cold War. As a matter of fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff view the risk as moderate.

The fact is that in a warfighting scenario against North Korea and the Iraq of today we will win.

My real concern about our future force structure is broader than our ability to fight and win two major regional conflicts like North Korea and Iraq, either of which might not even be a threat by the end of the century.

My concern is maintaining a force that is powerful enough for the unexpected, because our historical experience shows that it is impossible to predict what kind of a strategic environment might emerge ten or twenty years from now.

I believe that the two-MRC force structure is enough for the unexpected, but it must have the same kind of remarkable people in its ranks, the same technological advantages we have today, and the same intense understanding of how to prevail in battle.

Right now the most urgent task is to fight for strong support for these objectives, keep our forces ready, protect the quality of life, and to continue to attract and retain the same kind of outstanding men and women we have today.

Other aspects of our future force are especially fragile, particularly modernization. While for the next few years we can continue to live off the spoils of the Cold War, we know that before the turn of the century we are going to have to start replacing our current stocks simply because our existing equipment will start to wear out. If we eat our seed corn today we will have nothing to take off the shelf later. I am concerned by our own ability to adjust to protect our future force. We in the Armed Forces are going to have to find new innovative ways to train organize and equip our forces.

The last of our three great challenges may prove to be the most difficult and that is adapting to this new world in which we find ourselves.

Even if we manage to build the right force to protect our interests well into the next century, it won't be enough unless we begin to reach consensus as a nation how and where to use this force, to advance our interests in this world of instability of humanitarian crises, of sudden outbreaks of fighting, and of mass migrations.

We had consensus on how and when to use force during the long years of the Cold War. We understood concepts like "overwhelming force" and "total victory."

But now in this era of operations other than war, of operations like Somalia and Rwanda and Haiti, we feel uncertain, unsure. The templates of yesterday have less meaning and don't fit quite as neatly anymore.

Yet the need for these operations won't go away for years to come. The world won't settle down for quite some time to come. It took us a decade to find our bearings at the end of World War Two. It will take us every bit as long to do following the end of the Cold War.

So we must come to grips with this challenge of the role of the Armed Forces and the rest of the force in operations other than war. If we don't, every future operation will tear at us and in the end, will only weaken public support for our government and our military.

These then are the three great challenges that lie ahead. First is having the vision and foresight to take the long view of the future. In our preoccupation with the Somalias, the Rwandas, the Bosnias, and the Haitis not to be distracted from the big issues that will shape the future; developments in China and in Russia, the stability of Northeast Asia, and of Europe.

The end of the Cold War unleashed many new challenges, but it also opened enormous opportunities, opportunities that many of you fought to create. We must try to seize these opportunities if we want the next century to be more peaceful and more secure than this century has been.

Second, we must maintain a military force strong enough and talented enough to protect our interests and our international leadership against the challenges of the next century.

And third, we must find ways to master operations other than war, particularly peace operations, for they will stay with us well into the next century.

These problems are the unwelcome product of a very welcome change in the global security environment.

Now, before I wear out my welcome with all of you, let me close by thanking each of you individually and you all collectively as members of the Retired Officers Association for your extraordinary service to our great Nation, and for what you continue to do for our men and women in uniform.

You did your part superbly to keep America strong. I hate to ask you to pitch in once again. But if we are to retain our military strength as we enter the next century, we will continue to need you by our side. I know that we can count on you to carry the fight for a strong defense and so I thank you and salute you.

God Bless you all and God Bless the United States.

DoD News Briefng — Haiti Update
The Pentagon
Washington, DC
4 October 1994

I'd like to take this opportunity to provide you a very short update on our operations in Haiti so far. As you well know, today now marks slightly over two weeks since our forces were introduced peacefully into Haiti. From the beginning, our mission in Haiti has been to assist in establishing a secure and stable environment that will allow for the restoration of civil order and permit the return of democratic government.

Before I take your questions, I'd like to take a few minutes to fill you in on some of the progress to date.

The deployment of U.S. Forces is essentially complete. Our Forces peaked at the neighborhood of some 21,000. Sunday, U.S. Marines started pulling out our 1,300 Marines from Cap-Haitien, and completed that pull out yesterday. These Marines, by the way, will now be on standby as an afloat reserve. We expect U.S. troop strength to draw down in the near term to around 16,500; then down to some 15,000 by the end of the month; and down to 6,000 by the time we turn this operation over to the United Nations.

At the same time, some U.S. troops are withdrawing and multinational forces are now beginning to arrive in Haiti.

Over 200 Caribbean community troops recently arrived in Haiti, and international police monitors are arriving daily, and I'll have a little bit more to say about that in a minute.

Our Forces are establishing themselves ashore in many ways including: development of an on-shore logistics capability; an expeditionary medical facility in Port-au-Prince; and the reopening of Port-au-Prince International Airport to commercial traffic by tomorrow morning.

In the outlying areas of Haiti, our special forces teams are deployed to assist the Haitian people during this transition period by providing a more secure environment in which people can conduct their daily affairs.

Much has been reported about the security environment in Port-au-Prince. Multinational forces, I think, have made significant progress and will continue to act to establish the safe and secure environment necessary for the restoration of democratic government. We have successfully initiated a weapons control and reduction program, collecting, as of today, over 4,000 weapons, including over 1,000 hand grenades. We will aggressively continue all of our programs to this end.

I'd also like to briefly address the notion of mission creep. I simply don't see it that way. Our mission has not changed from the beginning. What has happened is that we have changed our capabilities and adjusted our procedures slightly, consistent with the changed circumstances on the ground, and I don't think you would want us to do any different.

I recently visited our Forces in Haiti, and was extremely pleased with the performance of our Forces. By the way, Admiral Miller, the overall commander of this operation, is in Haiti today conducting a personal assessment and will be reporting back to me later on today with his personal observations.

Let me run through just a couple of slides for you to make some of the points that I had in the prepared statement. First of all, much of the reporting is always focused on Port-au-Prince, and perhaps Cap-Haitien, so we tend to lose sight that there are Americans in all the other locations. They are the ones that are providing the very needed sense of security to the people out in the countryside, providing medical assistance, and in general, ensuring that the countryside is in fact very quiet — as it has been day in and day out, but with very, very few exceptions. The countryside has been very quiet. So I just wanted to point out to you that American presence is not confined to Cap-Haitien and Port-au-Prince.

One of the things that I address is the weapons buy-back program. These are catalogued weapons that we have collected so far. This chart is as of three o'clock yesterday. Since then [and] in my discussions with Admiral Miller about half an hour ago — he tells me that the count is now well over 4,000 that they have collected.

I am particularly impressed by the 1,100 or so grenades that we've been able to collect, and some 226 that we've been able to buy back. I would make the point to you, as I have on previous occasions, this is not an all-or-nothing program. I'm sure that 1,000 grenades are nowhere near all the grenades that are out there. But that's 1,000 grenades that are off the street today that weren't off the street just a few days ago and that could have done the damage that we saw earlier in this operation.

The second point I will tell you is that it's often thought that somehow we have expanded our operation, and that we are now going from house to house searching for weapons. We are not. We are not doing that. We are going to houses only in response to specific information that those houses contain caches of weapons or automatic weapons designed to hurt us all, as opposed to weapons that are maintained by people who are properly licensed to have weapons such as guards or private industry and others. So I want to dispel the notion that we sometime have had mission creep and now are searching house-to-house for weapons, which we are not doing.

The other point that has to do with security and the secure climate are the international police monitors. This slide shows you the first group of these international police monitors who started deploying on the 29th of September and who will be fully deployed by the 7th of October. These are the countries and the numbers shown in parentheses where this first batch of police monitors is coming.

The next chart will show you the remainder of the police monitors and when they will be arriving. As of today, we have nearly 200 police monitors in country. And you can see the rest of the dates, until the 11th of this month, when all of them will be in place from this initial group; some 840, 850 police monitors, who are very, very important in the effort now to go along with the existing police, ensuring that human rights are not being violated by the existing police, being able to coach them on proper police techniques. Later on as we begin to introduce the new interim police, they, of course, will be key in doing the same function — particularly then the function of coaching the new police in proper police procedures.

To put it in perspective, there will be some 840 police monitors. In Port-au-Prince right now, to the best of our knowledge, there are some 1,700 policemen.

That means we will have nearly one police monitor for every two policemen on the beat. So certainly it signals the

importance that we attach to this program and how key I think these individuals will be to the restoration of law and order and the conduct of law and order by the Haitian police.

Press Conference Opening Statement
Withdrawal of Iraqi Forces from Kuwait Border
The Pentagon
Washington, DC
11 October 1994

Late yesterday, we began to note changes in the readiness and alert status of Iraqi forces, which indicated a change in their intentions. Early this morning, we detected the beginnings of movement by Iraqi troops from field locations toward rail-loading sites and assembly areas.

However, other indicators continue to show that Iraq still has significant combat forces in the South. It is still too early to tell that the crisis is ended, and we will continue to monitor the situation. Saddam's intent and his willingness to create this crisis are of great concern, so we are continuing our deployment of forces, and will do so until there is no longer a threat from Iraq.

I'd also like to take a few minutes to give you a brief update on the deployment of U.S. forces to the Gulf in response to Saddam Hussein's latest threat to stability in that very important region.

We currently have just under 20,000 troops in theater, with another 45,000 planned for deployment. We have also placed an additional 156,000 troops on alert and ordered them to make the necessary preparations for an imminent deployment. In addition to manpower, we have almost 200 aircraft in the theater, and another 467 planned. Our forces are complemented by another 52 allied warplanes. Also in-theater are 12 U.S. ships which include the aircraft carrier, the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, and two missile-equipped cruisers. I also want to mention the 5 allied ships already in theater, and an additional 21 U.S. ships en route to the area of operations.

Since the Gulf War ended, over three and a half years ago, Iraq has continued to test the resolve of the international community. This latest violation of U.N. resolutions not only tests our resolve, but threatens, once again, the Arabian Peninsula.

At the direction of the President, we have tailored a force designed to meet this threat, and that force will, if attacked, conduct combat operations against Iraq to defend the peninsula, and if ordered by the President to do so, to conduct offensive operations into Iraqi territory to destroy Iraqi offensive military capabilities which threaten our allies.

"Salute to the Military"
Gulfport, Mississippi
14 October 1994

You know it was a year ago, in fact only shortly after I passed the point of my 35th year of military service, when President Clinton called me into his office and told me that he was going to nominate me for the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I remember that day very well.

At first I thought of my good friend General Tony McPeak, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Some of you may remember that Tony spoke at this occasion last year. Whenever somebody asks Tony what made him decide to make the military a career he usually pauses grins and observes that well, actually he hadn't made up his mind yet to stay.

Well when the President called, I thought gosh, if I take this job then the next thing you know I'll have to make the military my career.

Well as you can see, I took the job and so I stand before you as a "lifer," one who has finally made the military a career.

But I want to assure you that contrary to my stern look on CNN, I'm usually enjoying whatever it is that I am doing.

Now, your invitation forced me to sit down and think about what it is I have gotten myself into. It made me think long and hard about why so many wonderful people would gather together to take a night out of their very busy lives, in many cases to drive many miles, to come here for this event.

I know why all of these wonderful men and women in uniform are here. They, after all, are members of the military. It is engrained in them. They like salutes. And of course the food is wonderful.

This meal is what we in the military, with our odd way of renaming virtually anything so that we cannot be mistaken for civilians, this meal is what we call a hot A-ration.

To those of you without experience in military matters we further define an A-Ration as a fully home-cooked meal, one each. As a matter of instinct, military men and women never miss a chance for a good A-ration because they never know when the call will come to deploy and live off MREs, meals ready to eat.

So I know why they are here. But what about the rest of you? What have those terrific men and women in uniform done to deserve this very great honor you are bestowing on them tonight?

This question made me think back over the past, now 36 years, to reflect on that very question. And I would like to share some of my thoughts with you.

As many of you know, I was born in Poland and spent my childhood in Europe. When I was three, Hitler attacked Poland and the German Army rolled over my hometown on its way to places like Leningrad and Stalingrad. When the Second World War ended, I was nine years old and that began the conquest of Central Europe by the Soviet Union.

So from the time I was born through my teen years, I saw firsthand the place of my birth destroyed by war and I saw it pass from conquest by one dictator into the hands of another.

When I was 16, my family left Europe and we came to the United States, and I learned firsthand of freedom, hope, and of boundless opportunity.

I was fortunate to go on to college and graduate four years later with a degree in engineering. And with this degree and a job offer in my hands, I went out, took out a loan, and I bought my first spiffy used car.

It was at this point that I received a telegram from Uncle Sam that said, "Not so fast," and like so many others from my generation, I found myself in Basic Training and in the hands of one of those drill sergeants that make Basic Training such a fond memory to have behind you.

And some lucky civilian was driving around in my spiffy car, his hair blowing in the wind while I was left wondering what had happened to my hair.

But you know, looking back on the day I put on that uniform, that really was the proudest day of my life and that pride has never, never tarnished in all of the years and decades that have passed ever since.

In fact, after spending now most of my lifetime with the men and women of our Armed Forces, my pride has only increased with each passing year and so has my love for the military.

But I remember back in the early seventies, when President Nixon made the decision to end the draft. I suppose that like many of you here in this audience, I entertained great doubts about the wisdom of that decision.

I remember wondering then whether we would be able to make a go of the volunteer force. Wondering whether there would be enough who would want to be professional soldiers.

After all, military life places extraordinary demands on its members and on their families.

There is the discipline, which to many can be oppressive. There are the endless days and months and years of time away from home, missing children's birthdays, missing those special moments and holidays with family and friends.

There are six-month cruises at sea with the endless monotony of 18-hour shifts in the engine room, seven days a week, week after week and month after month.

There are the constant moves uprooting our families every few years just when they are becoming members of the community and having to start all over in a new place. Whether you are in the Army or the Navy or the Air Force or the Marine Corps, all of the services put these great demands on their people.

But most difficult of all, there is that perpetual uncertainty of a late night phone call and being told to deploy on moment's notice, leaving your family to go into harm's way, and leaving them behind praying that you will return safely.

And so I wondered back when this decision was made what kind of Armed Forces we would have.

Nearly a quarter of a century has passed since then. Whatever doubts I had then have completely vanished. The fact is we have managed to keep absolutely extraordinary people in our Armed Forces. In fact our men and women in uniform today are regarded worldwide as the finest military force on the face of the earth. And what has made it this way?

A great part of that is because the American people have continued to arm our forces with the finest equipment, like the superb Aegis Cruisers that are built here, and also to fund the kinds of constant and demanding training that military forces require. These two things, modern and capable equipment and readiness have been an absolutely crucial part of why our Armed Forces are the best in the world.

But do you know what is even more important in fact the most decisive factor? To those sitting here in this room, those of you in uniform, and those of you who have come here for this evening's event, I suppose the very fact that you are here shows that you already know the answer. It is of course the men and women in our ranks.

Saddam Hussein had a lot more military equipment than our forces in the Gulf War. And if you ask those who were there, they will tell you that much of it was very modern and certainly very lethal.

What he didn't have was several hundred thousand men and women who knew how to fight, how to think on a very-fast moving battlefield, and who cared far more for their country and the importance of what they were there to do, than for their own safety. In other words he didn't have American troops.

And if you go to visit our troops in Haiti as I did just last week, you will see again the same caliber of men and women in our ranks. And you will see under very different conditions than the Gulf War, the same kind of courage and determination and skill and initiative.

Now as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nothing that I do is more important than protecting this quality force and ensuring that we have the same extraordinary caliber of people in our future force. And like Colin Powell before me, I have wondered how we are going to do this with all of the cuts and reductions that have come in the aftermath of the Cold War.

By 1996, we will have reduced our Armed Forces by 32 percent just since the Gulf War ended. By 1999, our defense budget will be worth less than half what it was in 1987. These are drastic numbers. Over 600,000 people smaller. A budget that is less than half what it was.

That means we have had to tell many outstanding men and women that they must leave the military. And this has been very difficult, in fact agonizing, for very often we are telling men and women who have done great things for this country and that were fully committed to do more great things that they must leave.

But of equal concern, I want to emphasize again that we are cutting around one third of the force but the budget is being cut by a far deeper proportion. When I learned these numbers, it really didn't take long to realize that there are some flaws with this equation.

This is now the heart of the defense quandary and debate in Washington: how to balance this problem. And of course it puts tremendous downward pressure on every part of our Armed Forces.

But there are two things that we must protect above all others. One of these very obviously is readiness. All you need do is take a quick glimpse in the rearview mirror at the past five years, at all of the operations we have sent our forces to do, and even a cursory look at the world around us today and it places a giant scarlet pulsating stop sign in front of our readiness accounts. Clearly this is not an area to go and try and find savings.

But that stop sign creates the temptation to go elsewhere. And that area very clearly is to go after the money that we need to pay our people to take care of their medical benefits, to provide them and their families an adequate quality of life, and once they have completed a long career of honorable and dedicated service, the money to pay for their retirements.

But this is not the place to balance the budget because it will surely drive people that we need out of the service. The equation is really very simple. Readiness built on the foundation of truly superb people is a very different thing than readiness built on a weaker foundation.

But you know there is one other factor beyond superb equipment, readiness, and quality people that have made this professional force of ours such a remarkable success.

Again thinking back to the doubts I entertained when the decision was made to eliminate the draft, I wondered if this would drive an intangible wedge between the American people and their military. I wondered if the same warmth, caring, and mutual pride that was so evident in American history, I wondered whether that would still be there.

And I was bothered by this perhaps more than any other single thought, because I have learned that nothing is more important or more uniquely American than the bond and the affection that exists between Americans and their men and women in uniform.

If you go visit our forces in Haiti today or if you remember the thousands of interviews with our soldiers in the Gulf War, what you see are many young faces, very often smudged with dirt and sweat bags of exhaustion under their eyes and tension very clearly written on their faces, but you see how very much these men and women want to make their country proud of them and how much their thoughts are not on their own dangers and risks, but rather wondering how their families and loved ones are doing.

This is what I see and hear every time I go to visit them. Nothing, and I mean nothing, is more important to our people than their confidence that their country supports them, loves them, is concerned about the risks they are enduring, and that their families are well cared for. And that, God forbid, should they become casualties that someone will be there to care for their families.

That is why I so eagerly accepted this invitation to come here to the Gulf Coast Salute to the Military and why this

event made me think back over the years to what I have been doing and why it is that there should be a salute to the military.

To all of the members of the Armed Forces who are here tonight, you very much deserve this salute. What you do for this country every day, the magnificent way in which you do it, are clearly worthy of a salute from your fellow citizens.

And those of you who spent so much of your time organizing this event and to all of those of you who are here who have given your time to be here, you also are to be saluted because you remind each of us in uniform for what we serve.

50th Anniversary of the Battle of Leyte Gulf
Hill 120 Flag-Raising Ceremony
Philippine Islands
20 October 1994

I imagine that to many of you, who were here fifty years ago, this beach must look very, very different. Then, its sands were littered with equipment and vehicles, the air reeked with the odor of cordite, and the ground rocked with the pounding of artillery. The trees lay flattened. Few, if any, homes or buildings were standing, and the ground was literally measled with shell holes. It was a violent and dangerous place, with none of the beauty, nor the serenity that surrounds us today.

Even this monument where we have gathered, Hill 120, was stripped and barren, hardly the lushly treed mound we see before us today. But here, today, there is still one group of recognizable landmarks, truly the greatest monument we have come to honor — you — the veterans of this campaign, those who fought from the great naval battles here at Leyte, to those who came ashore, who fought from this beach across thousands of miles, through dozens more operations that it took before this nation was free.

Today I have the great privilege of introducing one of these men, then a 24-year old captain with the 96th Infantry when it landed on these beaches. Milton Marks, like many others, was still in school when Pearl Harbor was attacked on 7 December 1941. Within a month, however, he had joined the Army and traded his law books for a carbine.

Like the rest of the 96th Division, Captain Marks saw his first combat here on the beaches of Leyte. He stayed with the 96th, then the 1st Cavalry Division, through the remainder of the fighting until the war ended, battling across the breadth of Leyte, and through the operations in Luzon. In the process, he was one of those who participated in the liberation of the Santo Tomas prison.

After leaving the service as a major in 1946, Milton Marks finished that law degree he began in 1941. Among his many distinctions since then, Milton Marks has been a state assemblyman, a judge, and is currently a state senator in California.

I am very proud to introduce to you this honored veteran, one of many who came with MacArthur to fight, and if need be to die, as so many did, to make this nation free once again. Ladies and gentlemen, let me present state Senator Milton Marks.

Philippine WW II Memorial Ceremony
Philippine Islands
22 October 1994

We gather here on this cloud filled afternoon to commemorate the extraordinary bravery and sacrifice of those who fought and suffered and persevered and in the end prevailed so the people of the Philippines could be free once again.

Fifty years ago, a great invasion fleet, the largest and the most powerful force ever assembled in the Pacific, lay off the shores of Leyte Island and the rolling thunder of the long awaited march of liberty was about to start.

No sooner were the first assault forces ashore with the clash of battle still ringing about, than the voice of Douglas MacArthur was heard throughout the Philippines in that unforgettable radio broadcast.

He began with the same haunting phrase that was used to close the final radio program from besieged Corregidor, two blood stained years before

"This is the voice of freedom," MacArthur spoke.

And so today we have come here, all of us, to remember, to salute the bravery, to remember the sacrifice, to vow never to forget that these silent white markers all around us were the ultimate price of freedom.

And what better place to remember than here, surrounded by such moving symbols amidst these white-marbled graves of 17,201 brave souls and the long walls carved with 36,281 more names, those whose bodies were never recovered. What better place, than here on this hillside where so many heroes rest, to come to remember.

We come to honor the men and women living and passed whose extraordinary valor and spirit changed our lives, changed the fate of every nation in this region, and forged such a special bond between the people of our two nations.

It is said that any nation that forgets its heroes will itself soon be forgotten. Neither we, the children of those who fought and bled here for the cause of liberty, nor our children shall ever forget. We have a very special monument to remind us. And that monument is our freedom.

Here on this gray day, seeing so many old American and Filipino comrades-in-arms reunited once again, hearing you share your now distant memories of a much more difficult time, you remind us of something else we must not forget; that no two nations in the world ever endured more nor suffered more greatly ... for loyalty to one another.

I once asked a veteran of this war what he felt he accomplished fighting through one campaign after another, seeing so many of his comrades fall in combat. "That was the challenge of my generation," he told me, "It is up to you now and your generation to make it worthwhile."

And Americans and Filipinos have endeavored to do just that, and time has not erased that special bond you forged between our two nations. For all who are listening today, we must always remember that veteran's challenge. Let us never squander what they paid so dearly to obtain.

In the shadow of the chapel and bell tower at this site, lies a small plaque. Engraved in bold letters there, it reads, "As these bells ring, honored dead rest, freedom lives." And surely so it does.

Now it is up to us to ensure these bells never stop ringing. And we will so ensure. God Bless those who rest here. God Bless the Philippines. God Bless America. And God Bless you all.

The Fuehrungsakademie
(German War College)
Hamburg, Germany
9 November 1994

Let me begin by telling you what a great pleasure it is to be here today and to have this chance to share some views with you. I know that Secretary Bill Perry was here several months ago and he told me what a great time he had here with you.

At our own war colleges, we have an annual tradition of bringing in each of our service chiefs and each of the joint warfighting commanders each year to discuss their most current concerns and issues.

In this way the students at the war colleges gain a first hand explanation of the most current issues from around the world and an appreciation of the kinds of issues and challenges they are likely to face after they graduate.

So I thought that today I might extend this same tradition and spirit to you here at the Fuehrungsakademie and to offer you a report on the issues that have been crossing my desk in the Pentagon.

It was fifteen months ago when President Clinton called and told me that I was to be his choice for the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I had been the SACEUR for only 14 months. But in that time, I had been completely and exclusively absorbed in the challenges facing our great alliance. As you know, my time as SACEUR, just like General Jack Galvin's before me, was consumed by the alliance's reinvention and trying to assist the very fundamental adjustments we had to make to this new era as well as dealing with the crisis in Bosnia.

So I returned to Washington a little bit out of touch, but also very curious about what challenges face a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in this new era.

Earlier in my career I had several assignments in the Pentagon working on joint issues. In fact, just before becoming SACEUR, I had been the Assistant to the Chairman. So you would think that I should have been firmly grounded in the kinds of issues confronting a chairman today.

But I must tell you that this was not the case. The world has changed so quickly and so fundamentally over the past five years that the issues and challenges are very different.

Let me offer an example. During the decades of the Cold War the fixation of the Armed Forces was on enforcing the doctrine of containment.

But over a period of four decades, the rules and by-laws of containment had long since been ironed out and really, our forces were just manning long-established trenches. To the degree that there were still debates and uncertainties they were nearly always somewhat narrow tactical questions.

Here in Europe for example, if you look back to the period from the late seventies to the late eighties, there were only two significant issues. The first was whether or not to modernize American nuclear systems with the cruise missile and Pershing II.

And although this was a very serious issue at the time, looking back from the vantage of the past few years at the magnitude of issues and changes we have accomplished very expeditiously, it is hard to appreciate why this was such an agonizing and consequential struggle for the alliance.

And the second was the out-of-area debate that began in the late seventies and lingered until 1985 or so. By that time, even the most fervid advocates for NATO to expand its out-of-area responsibilities recognized that it was a mute issue. There was simply no way that the alliance was going to go beyond its immediate defensive obligations.

Again, if you look at the all the changes that this alliance accepted in the past few short years including out-of-area responsibilities, that only underlines the impact of this new era.

In the American defense establishment the greatest debate was over the merits of a maritime or a continental strategy. Actually, this debate was more window dressing than substance. For all the noise and debate there was never any question of veering off toward either extreme. Given America's geostrategic position, we need a powerful global naval force to extend our influence. But we could not and still cannot afford for that influence to end at the shoreline of other continents.

The true stake of this debate all along was a marginal adjustment in how we would balance the increased defense dollars of our defense build-up during that period.

Then came the events of 1989 and 1990 and quickly in succession, the Gulf War and then the explosion in Yugoslavia. And suddenly the kinds of issues that all of our nations were having to confront were very strategic and very grandiose in nature. All of us knew that the world had changed in very great ways, but I think that in Moscow, Bonn, Washington, and every other nation, nobody was very certain where events were carrying us.

In any strategic analysis, the same refrain was echoed again and again, the same three words: uncertain; ambiguous; and unpredictable.

Then, shortly before I left Europe, there was the very tragic firefight in Mogadishu, which left 18 soldiers dead. This event created a searing image in American minds, an image that flashed across television tubes in every living room in our nation, the terrible sight of the bodies of courageous American soldiers being dragged through dusty streets while jeering crowds jogged alongside, crowds intoxicated with anti-Americanism.

And Americans were left wondering how our soldiers who went to Somalia to accomplish such a noble cause, to bring food to millions who were on the verge of starvation, could suddenly be caught in a whirlpool of such violence and hatred.

So when I returned to Washington last October, we were at a point of great urgency in determining our future course. And over the past year what I think we have learned is that there really are three great challenges that lie before us; truly the three great challenges that we must overcome if we are to succeed in the next century.

The first of these challenges is our need to take a long view of the future. As you know, over the past year the headlines that have dominated America's attention have been Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, North Korea, Bosnia, and most recently Iraq. On the one hand, the issues in each of these nations are serious and deserve our attention. But on the other hand, what happens in any of these countries will probably not be the major forces that will shape the next century.

The prospect of North Korea gaining a nuclear weapon is troublesome in many ways. And a North Korean attack against South Korea would throw Northeast Asia into turmoil.

But if you look at North Korea's stature and potential compared to the other nations of Asia, I think you would quickly conclude that it will not be a pivotal force in shaping the future of Asia.

That future is being shaped right now in the booming ports and factories of China and in the government ministries in Beijing. And it is being decided in Tokyo's financial district, where every other Asian nation goes for the seed money needed to start new companies and finance new technologies.

And with regard to Iraq, certainly Saddam Hussein's desperate slyness cannot be ignored. But today, Iraq's Armed Forces are a fraction of what they were in 1990 and I would not recommend for anyone to bet on Saddam's future. A far greater threat is what is happening in Tehran, where the mullahs are very actively trying to spread a creed of hate

throughout the Arab region, into North Africa, and even into the Trans-Caucasus and Turkey. They are trying to undo the progress of a century and to undermine those secular regimes that have a hold in the region. And by tickling Russia's underbelly they are taking great risks.

And so what we have to ask ourselves is how to create a stable multipolar world. Because if you look at the shape of the next century it is very clear that the true shape of things to come is being formed in Washington, here in Bonn, and in Kiev and Moscow, and in Tokyo and Beijing.

Two and three years ago, what many feared was that what would evolve would be three great blocs, each separate and distinct from the others where the practice of exclusion would stunt global interaction and economic prosperity.

I don't think this was ever a very realistic prophecy because global interdependency has simply proceeded too far. So this is not what we must prepare for. To the contrary we must prepare for the opposite.

We face a very unique era, an era very different from anything in the past. It will be a multipolar world with a number of major powers. And despite our best efforts to reduce the numbers of nuclear warheads, there will still be nuclear weapons that make the risk of future conflicts far more dreadful than anything that could have happened before the Cold War.

And it will be a very interdependent world, because no nation today can succeed economically without vibrant trade and because of the continuing explosion of global information systems. So it is important for all of us to take this long view and to invest our resources and efforts accordingly. We must appreciate which are the main events and we can never allow ourselves to lose sight of this.

For Americans the second great challenge is preparing our Armed Forces for the challenges of the next century. This same challenge is affecting every other nation in the world today but I thought it might be helpful if I explained the direction of America's Armed Forces.

We now have had two administrations in a row agree that our forces must be shaped to be able to fight and win two regional conflicts that erupt nearly simultaneously. Our senior military leaders all agree that this is the right template to shape and size our forces. Today we are using Iraq and North Korea to measure this response. But that is not a prediction of where we will have to fight nor is it a fixed array of threats for the future. It is impossible to predict who we may have to fight in the future. So this two contingency force also gives us the equilibrium to stay ready in the event another more powerful adversary, one that is not yet in our vision, could emerge in the future.

But what makes this goal very challenging is that by 1997, we will have cut our forces by one third. In fact we are already well over 80 percent done with these reductions. But by 1999, our overall defense budget will shrink to less than half what it was in 1988 which was the highpoint of our Cold War defense budgets. This is not a balanced equation. Our budget will be less than a half of what it was but our forces will be a third smaller. So the true challenge is how to protect the essential qualities that have made the American Armed Forces such a superb force. In other words we must find ways to get more value from our defense dollar.

There are three elements of our force that must be protected if we are to accomplish this goal. The first of these is maintaining the quality of people. As all of you know nothing is more important to a military force than outstanding people. So to do this we must protect the benefits and incentives and quality of life that attract the right kind of recruits and also that keep professionals and their families satisfied with military duty.

The second element we must protect is readiness. This point was underlined very dramatically just a few weeks ago when we had forces in Haiti ensuring stability helping President Aristide's government reinstitute democracy in that troubled nation and suddenly we had to send forces to protect Kuwait from Saddam's latest challenge.

What underwrites this challenge is that right now we have forces along the demilitarized border of a still threatened South Korea, we have forces operating as part of the multinational force in Northern Iraq, and we also have our forces committed to the operations in former Yugoslavia.

Any of these could escalate overnight and we could find ourselves in the position of having to undertake a major operation. So we really have no choice but to keep our readiness very high because our experience over the past few years, and everything that we can see in the future, suggests that our readiness will be tested.

The third element we must protect is the programs that we need to continue to shape our forces to accomplish this two contingency mission. And I am encouraged that we are making the right strides on this path. Since the Gulf War, we have greatly expanded the numbers of weapons platforms that can deliver long range precision munitions.

We have improved our strategic and operational level C4I capabilities to correct problems we had during that conflict, we have expanded our strategic lift, and put prepositioned equipment sets in Southwest Asia and Northeast Asia to increase our flexibility to address crises anywhere in the world.

But we must continue with this progress. Let me add that one of the ways we are finding to balance these goals is to look for ways to expand upon the jointness of our forces.

Really, until the late 1980's, although we had a joint command and control structure in place — one that extended from the Joint Chiefs of Staff down through our joint warfighting commands, we really had not used this structure nor the spirit of jointness to achieve the great benefits that we should have.

The reforms ushered in by our Congress in the 1987 Goldwater-Nichols Act, reforms that improved the operational jointness of our forces and the quality of our joint staffs, were proven to be enormously effective during the Gulf War. But now we are going to proceed beyond this point to carry jointness into the way that we train, organize, equip, and man our forces.

Up until now these functions have fallen under our military departments and our service staffs. So if you were to characterize how we have done this business it has been as four separate entities.

But all of our senior military leaders recognize that we can no longer afford or accept the inefficiencies of this approach. You may have noticed for example that in the Haitian operation, we sent two aircraft carriers to participate. But the aircraft carriers had left their Navy jets back in the United States and they were carrying instead Army troops and their flight decks were filled with Army helicopters.

This innovation fitted the unique operational requirements of the Haitian operation where attack aircraft could not be used, but it was a step that shattered some old dogmas within our services. Even as recently as the Gulf War, it would have been anathema to attempt such a thing. So this is one evidence of the great changes we are doing.

But let me offer you another example. In the past, the Air Force used to come forward and say that it needed so many air-to-ground fighters and the Navy would come forward and say it needed so many and the Marine Corps would do the same.

Now our joint warfighters say they need this many fighters and then the joint system says this is how many will be Air Force and this many Navy and this many Marine Corps. Then we go a step beyond this and tell the Research and Development people that the planes may be different because the needs may vary but the parts must be interchangeable. The guidance systems and the targeting systems and the weapons platforms and munitions should be the same.

So this is a major effort right now and it is forcing the military leadership in Washington to break a lot of old traditions and to violate a lot of things that until now were considered sacred.

Now there was a third challenge that I mentioned, and again, it is a challenge that is being faced by many the Armed Forces of many other nations as well, including you here, and that is the challenge of how to deal with the growth of these operations like peacekeeping and humanitarian missions that fall in the crack between peace and war.

In some ways, this is a very difficult issue both for America as a nation and for our Armed Forces. It is difficult because we still have enormous warfighting responsibilities and very many commitments that rely on our ability to fight and win.

And this must remain our focus. Protecting our most important interests is a function of warfighting and we will allow nothing to degrade this capability.

But what we have learned over the past few years is that we are going to have to participate in these other kinds of operations. If we just look at America's experience over the past year, even after Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia, it is clear that we will become engaged in these kinds of tasks. And as I see the future unfolding these kinds of tragedies have by no means run their course.

In part, there is the military challenge of how to undertake these operations successfully. And this presents a very great challenge because we train our foot soldiers and marines, those whom we send to do these kinds of missions, we train them to be warriors. Their instincts are honed to respond to an ambush by immediately returning overwhelming fire and then charging the ambushers, because their only hope of survival depends on reacting with such ferocity that they can violently overwhelm their enemy.

And how do you retrain that same soldier or marine to holster that instinct and in the place of action to react with caution and inaction?

How do you train that lieutenant who has just learned to maneuver a force onto an objective, to instead become a superb negotiator who can step between two angry opponents without making himself a target?

And if you are able to train these things, is there a risk that we will have undone that warfighting edge that is so very vital to survival in a different kind of environment? I don't know the answers to these questions. But I know that we have to get better at this because the world situation demands that our forces be able to operate successfully in both kinds of environments.

But there is one other issue associated with this challenge and that is how our nations adjust to these kinds of

missions. Throughout the years of the Cold War, our societies accepted that if we had to go war, then we would fight with all we had to achieve victory. This is what our geostrategic circumstances dictated and this was an engrained understanding. But what is victory in these other kinds of operations? And how do we apply our force?

I think nothing better illustrates this part of the challenge than what has been happening in Bosnia where our intervention has been very beneficial, but has failed to completely resolve the problem.

And for every nation involved in this operation, that has proved very unsatisfying. So for all of us, Americans and Germans alike, this will remain a great challenge.

Now I have probably spoken too long already. But I wanted to share with you the issues we are facing in Washington today, rather than discuss American-German relations; because I suspect you have already heard so much on that topic, but also because the great importance of this alliance depends on both American and German officers sharing a common understanding of each other.

I remember two years ago when I came to the Fuerungsakademie, I had the great honor to speak as the SACEUR and I spoke of the challenges confronting NATO and the Trans-Atlantic partnership that has been such a vital link for these past 45 years. At that time I think there were still many doubts about whether this linkage would be maintained.

Now two years later, I would hope that those doubts have dissipated. But I suspect this is a forlorn hope because I recognize that even in the darkest moments of the Cold War and regardless of how many great challenges our alliance had weathered, these doubts were still present.

But certainly in Washington today, there are no debates about whether America is in Europe to stay or not. American forces are here to stay and we have no intention of relinquishing the great bond that we spent so many decades building.

I remember speaking to an American officer who had a key role in Germany in the years right after the Second World War. I asked him what he and the other American officers were thinking about during the period of military occupation. What was on their mind as they worked with Konrad Adenhauer's newly forming government and helped to create this new Germany?

To my surprise he never once mentioned the Soviet Union or the needs of containment. What he said was that he and his generation of officers felt it was crucial to build strong democratic allies for America because America's extraordinary power at that time could not last. It was an unnatural circumstance of the war that was bound to recede as other nations recovered. He told me that he and his peers felt it was imperative to build the seeds for America's future by creating this strong alliance to help our nation through future challenges.

Well that time is now upon us. And for you, the officers here today and for your peers in America's war colleges, this alliance is now available for our future challenges.

It will be up to you and your American counterparts to shape the direction for the future to make this alliance work for the benefit of both our nations, the rest of Europe, and the world as well. For all the fears that you hear that this alliance may drift apart because there are now fewer Americans stationed in Germany than during the Cold War, or because there is no Soviet threat to force us to stay together, I would answer that today we must remain together because there are these very great challenges remaining, but also these great opportunities that we fought so hard to create. And it will be up to you here today to ensure this. You must continue with the task of building an alliance no longer built on dread but instead built on hope. I have no doubt that you will.

Thank you.

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Certainly the theme of "diplomacy and force" couldn't be any more timely or appropriate, and speaking of force, what a perfect case study we've just had, with major emphasis on force, in the just completed Republican march from coast to coast.

And of course just last month some of you may have noticed that very title of "diplomacy and force" was splashed across the cover of Time magazine. And Henry Kissinger's latest book wrestles with this same subject as well, not to mention Tony Lake's recent lecture at Harvard, again, on that same subject.

So it seems that we are seeing a sort of revival of interest in these two very fundamental elements of American

power. But that should not surprise us, for what we have come to realize over the past several years is that the world has in fact so very fundamentally changed that it is time for us to think anew of the relationship between American diplomacy and force. And I believe there are two challenges that lie before us, two issues that we must come to terms with:

First, to redefine this relationship between diplomacy and force in the post Cold War era, to guide, to harness, and balance these two elements of our national power towards a common purpose, particularly as we enter the 21st Century.

And second, to learn how to deal with the growing number of what I call "Operations Other Than War," the Somalias, the Rwandas, the Haitis, and the Bosnias of today and tomorrow. For I believe that these sorts of "Operations Other Than War" will stay with us well into the next century.

Let me first turn to the relationship between diplomacy and force. I remember reading in George Kennan's autobiography his prognosis that in peacetime, soldiers are the servants of diplomats. But when war erupts, the relationship shifts and suddenly diplomats are no more than the lawyers of the Department of Defense. Now at the time Kennan wrote this, he was expressing a view he learned during the years between the First and Second World Wars. However, the peculiar conditions of the Cold War certainly changed this equation. Throughout the long decades of the Cold War, in almost everything we did, it was simply accepted that security was our paramount concern because, after all, our survival was at stake almost every day. And so we had a strategy, that of containment, that placed the security dimension of our power at the forefront.

From the very beginning of the Cold War an interagency process was developed and then matured to ensure unity between our diplomats and our military. But if truth be known, whatever differences there were, were generally very slight. Sure, there were debates over arms control, or the diplomatic difficulty of supporting certain military measures, such as bringing new missiles into Europe, or constructing bases and training agreements, or how to work through burden-sharing arrangements, particularly in Europe.

But I think that if you look back from today's vantage, from the kinds of issues and decisions we have had to face over the past several years; the issues of the sixties, the seventies, and even the eighties, appear, in retrospect, to have been very undramatic. As containment matured as a strategy there was simply less and less room for disagreement between the diplomats and the soldiers.

But then came the great events of the late eighties and early nineties, when suddenly, our colossal threat collapsed and the bipolar structure that we were so long accustomed to disintegrated right before our eyes.

Immediately, there was a drumbeat to go back to something resembling George Kennan's old relationship. Economics would displace security as the foremost priority of our national strategy and the military would shrink considerably as a tool of our influence. And so, our diplomats were told, sheath your swords and relearn the art of trade agreements.

Now, I guess three or four years later, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, Somalia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, our latest troubles in North Korea and Haiti, I think that some of us, at least, are beginning to recognize that there really was a degree of wishful thinking in that particular view.

We have found that our global leadership is something that we value very highly. And we have also learned to appreciate that it is probably not possible to sustain our leadership if we are unwilling to use one of our two principal strengths, that of military force. As well, we now understand that Kennan's formula worked when our nation had no significant commitments outside of our own territories, commitments like Korea and Kuwait, and many others that you can think of — commitments that rely very heavily on the use of American force, or the preparedness to use American force.

But if we are not back to Kennan's model, we are also not back to the Cold War relationship between diplomacy and force. But then, where are we, and how should we proceed?

I'm not sure that I have the answer to that question. But I would like to offer you some things to think about. Because, if we are going to get it right for the next century, I think we are going to have to find the proper balance in this partnership between diplomacy and force.

In the first instance, both diplomacy and force are operating in a new kind of global climate and structure. And that's no news to anyone. We are now firmly into a multipolar world. And, compared with yesterday, it is a far more complex environment, and a far more fluid environment, one that moves and changes at a much faster tempo than we have been accustomed to these last few decades.

America still has unequaled global power and persuasiveness. We are the richest nation, even though, as a total percentage of world production, our position has diminished considerably since WW II ended. We still have the world's finest and most powerful military. But to project this force abroad, we rely upon other nations for bases, for overflight rights, for cost sharing, and very often, for coalition partners.

But it is the combination of these two, our economic might and our military might, that give us such extraordinary diplomatic leverage all around the world. They are what make America's diplomats the first among equals.

But, perhaps most importantly, as you look into the next century it is clear that there is going to be more multipolarity, not less. As China gets richer and more powerful; as the Russians recover from the loss of an empire; as Germany recovers from the costs of reunification; and as Tokyo finds a new role in Asia and the world; the combination of all of this will reduce our latitude to influence unilaterally or to act independently. It is not that our strength will decline, because I am very optimistic about our prospects in the next century. But I happen to be optimistic about the prospects of others as well.

And so, I think there is a very real need for us to build the framework of this multipolar world.

In the past, this may have meant striking a balance of power between competing powers, the traditional European solution to finding security. But, the world is not so simple today. There are nuclear weapons that cant the equation of power in odd ways. How else could the Soviet Union, with an economy that was so backward and impoverished, have been considered such a powerful opponent?

As well, it is axiomatic that in a balance of power there is a nemesis you are balancing against. Today, who do you want to balance power against? And, is this an optimal solution if the opportunity exists to instead bring all of the major powers into cooperative global roles?

So, this is the first great challenge we face. How do we define this new relationship between diplomacy and force in this very different era? And then, how do we guide, and harness, and balance these two elements of our national power toward a common purpose?

But, there is a second challenge that has been with us since 1990 as well, and you can't separate the two. And that challenge is the growing number of what we in the military call "Operations Other Than War." These are the Somalias, the Bosnias, the Rwandas, and the Haitis, that range from peacekeeping, to peace enforcement, to humanitarian operations, to the counter-drug efforts we are pursuing in Latin America and other regions as well.

They sit in that netherworld between war and peace where the lines between diplomacy and force are intermingled and certainly muddled.

We did such operations during the Cold War but they were very few and far between. And frankly, we didn't always do them very well. So we really don't have a time tested template that we can lay down every time we commit to one of these operations.

And, I think that these operations become even more complex when the effort involves United Nations, or coalition forces, because the job of the warrior, and the job of the diplomat, both, in such cases, become more difficult.

Any of you here that have been involved in one of these United Nations or coalition operations will hopefully agree with me that there is much less leeway then when you are operating unilaterally, because any daylight or confusion between our diplomatic and military strategies, very quickly becomes a source of confusion to our partners. And, if we are leading the effort, as is often the case, it is all the more deplorable, and all the more dangerous.

I think our record over the past year, on the other hand, has been getting better. If you look back on Rwanda, and what we have done so far in Haiti, and in a slightly different way in North Korea, you would, I think, conclude that the interaction between diplomacy and force has, in fact, been quite good.

And so I think we have learned a few lessons that we will be able to apply to the future. And I'd like to spend just a moment discussing some of these lessons with you.

I can remember a time when the military viewed diplomats as elitists in striped pants who put greater stock in turning an elegant phrase than taking action.

And this disenchantment was reciprocated. For their part, diplomats viewed the military as men who saw the world simply as black and white, and who admired action for action's sake. We were very uncomfortable in one another's presence, and both institutions studiously sought to avoid each other. When we met, we very often talked past each other.

But the time when these feelings permeated passed long ago, probably because the pressures of the Cold War forced such a constant interaction between us.

To fully appreciate how far we have come, all you have do is to spend a day with Ambassadors Albright and Redman, as I have recently done, flying into the bullet-riddled city of Sarajevo. For that particular trip, both of them had traded in their striped suits for their flak jackets and steel pots. And instead of riding around in shiny limousines, both of them spent the day in French armored cars, surrounded by tough and vigilant young guards.

Instead of going to meetings and exchanging pleasantries, both of them were completely absorbed with going to the

site of the latest atrocity in that city, and studying the logistics of how we were going to keep the people of Sarajevo fed for just another year.

And I have seen the same kind of sharing of understanding and of risks in Rwanda, and Somalia, and Haiti, as well. So, I think this is one point. In these kinds of operations, because of their complexity, and because of the blend of diplomacy and force, it is especially vital that our diplomats and warriors operate in complete tandem.

But, there are still very real differences between our two institutions, and we must all understand these differences, because they tend to become clearest whenever a crisis emerges. And, this surely is not a good time to become enlightened.

The military is, in fact, most comfortable when the objectives are clear and precise. Institutionally, the military is very solution oriented. When force is used, we have a strong preference that its use results in achieving that state we call victory. When we fight, our first recourse is to apply overwhelming force to achieve a very rapid and a very decisive conclusion.

Partly, this is because we think lives are at risk. But, also because once diplomacy turns to force, rationality falls prey to emotion and unpredictability.

On the other hand, as Henry Kissinger observed, diplomacy is very often the art of managing the insoluble. So the diplomat operates inside the milieu of rationality, a world of half measures, of compromises, and of the kinds of complex arrangements that we call "peaceful relations." An experienced diplomat is an expert at finding just that particular line in the sand that leaves both sides least dissatisfied. When force is used, a diplomat might reasonably ask if it isn't possible to use just the right amount of force to accomplish the very specific purpose in mind.

Traditionally, this has been the great clash in outlooks between diplomats and the military. One looks to apply just enough force to gain a negotiated agreement: the other, the military, to apply so much force that he gains acquiescence from the other.

But, in "Operations Other Than War" this traditional clash of outlooks tends to get confused and turned on its head. Nearly always, these kinds of operations are not about vital interests. And, because our interests are limited in such operations, so are the means we are willing to apply and what we want to achieve. And so there is an intangible struggle to find the right balance.

As well, there is a struggle to find the right way to use force, because very often in these "Operations Other Than War," the adversaries are not opposing states but are instead warring factions, tribes, or ethnic groups, and the effects of either diplomacy or force are not easily calculable, rational, or predictable.

In the Cold War, we were wary of limited operations, because there was always this risk of a limited conflict getting out of hand and escalating to a superpower confrontation. But, now that the Cold War is over, our visceral concern in these limited operations is that the operation might escalate in risks and costs beyond the level of our more limited interests.

And we recognize, as well, that once American lives are lost, our interest will swell. And so, we necessarily ask ourselves, how many casualties can we stand in this particular operation?

I remember when it was first announced that I was to be nominated by the President to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That week a national magazine carried my picture on its cover under the dubious title of "Globocop." More recently, on several occasions I have seen several newspapers refer to me as a pacifist. And I have seen others argue that I have a phobia about placing American lives at risk. So apparently I have traveled quite a distance in this past year!

But, really, the issue is not a reluctance to use American force for the right reasons or in the right ways. The issue is for what interest are we using force, and then how do we balance our risks, and use force appropriately and effectively to protect that particular interest? And understanding that once we commit American prestige and lives, can, or should, we resolve ourselves to something less than a decisive outcome?

In Bosnia, for example, there has been this recurring debate about using American airpower to influence the Bosnian Serbs to stop the fighting. I'm not sure there is anywhere in the world where airpower, by itself, is enough to convince a determined nation or people to do anything in particular. But I know with nearly complete certainty that Bosnia is not the place to try such a thing. And once you move down this road, you begin a chain of events where you are not the only one making decisions. And once American prestige and lives are committed, we always have to ask if we are willing to follow through. I am not saying that we cannot use airpower to help enforce the United Nations protected safe zones in Bosnia, or to protect peacekeepers from attacks in that country. For those limited purposes airpower has a legitimate role. But, you have to understand what is lurking around the corner, before expanding beyond this purpose.

In another place, in Rwanda, some proposed that we needed to expand our humanitarian support and intervene

between the warring factions. This would have been a large step beyond providing clean water, medicines, and food. Our risks would have been much greater and this step could have dragged our forces into a very deep and tempestuous well.

Along the same vein, in Haiti, where we are today, some have called for us to use our forces to do more, to perform civil police functions, for example. Again, we have to carefully examine what it is that we must accomplish, and what it is that the Haitians must accomplish for themselves, to build what is, after all, their own nation.

I am not saying that we should stand idly on the sidelines and watch Haitians get beaten and murdered. Long before we entered Haiti, one of our purposes was to keep this from happening. But there is a dangerous line between acting to prevent this and becoming the police force for an entire nation.

Secretary Perry has recently proposed what I believe to be a very sound formula for making these kinds of choices. There are still interests that are vital to the security of our nation. If Saddam Hussein were to attack tomorrow, we would not pause, nor hesitate, nor debate for a moment whether to send an overwhelming force to defend the region and to achieve decisive victory. We would go immediately and, if need be, we would fight until the job was done. In fact, we did go just recently, and because we did, we didn't have to fight!

But we also have interests that are other than vital interests. We have important interests, that are clearly, however, not vital. In these cases, we are willing to use our military power primarily for coercive purposes in support of our diplomacy. But, because our interests are limited, so are the means we intend to apply. Haiti is a good example where we were prepared to use limited force in support of diplomacy, and had diplomacy failed, we would have used force to get the job done. Fortunately, it wasn't necessary.

And finally, there are cases where our interest may not be very strong, but our humanitarian motives may come into play. And, here, Rwanda is a good example where the need was so great, and the actions of one party to the conflict so morally reprehensible, that we, as Americans, could not simply turn away.

But, even having this equation, I think there is one other thing we must understand if we are to keep a proper balance between our risks and our stakes. There will always be this temptation to shift the mission a little this way, or use a little more force for this, or that purpose. And, I believe the only way to guard against these temptations — this urge to allow mission creep — is to have a very firm, and very clear, understanding of what it is that we want to achieve before we commit, and then, we must all adhere to a principle called perseverance. Or, as we say in the military, "Steady as you go. Keep your eye on the objective."

I think this is what has succeeded so far in Rwanda, and is succeeding today in Haiti, and that has led to a smooth partnership between our diplomats and our military, in both those places.

But, I am not so optimistic that I believe we have learned all that we need to learn about how to manage this in all future circumstances. And, I think that we still need to have some of our best minds working on the very real quandaries and kinds of problems that are endemic in these "Operations Other Than War."

Just as I also believe that it is very important that our best minds continue to explore how we arrange the balance and purpose of our diplomacy and force; to construct the right arrangements for the challenges and demands of the next century.

And that is why I am very pleased to come here today and to have this chance to share my views with you, here at Georgetown, really in the birthing room of our diplomatic corps. Because, how well we are going to handle these challenges depends so very much upon your thinking.

And now I have probably spoken far too long and answered far too little. So before we let this get any longer, let's change the format, for I would be most pleased to try to answer your questions.

Thank you very much.

Field Artillery Ball
Arlington, Virginia
19 November 1994

I remember the last time you introduced me, almost exactly 5 years ago, when you were commanding the 1st Armored Division Artillery, and you were kind enough to invite me to speak to your gunners. I can only tell you that I must have been quite a hit, if John had to wait five years to invite me back.

But, regardless, let me assure you what a great thrill it is for Joannie and me to share this evening with so many

distinguished Army and Marine Corps gunners. After living in the joint world, as I do, it's truly very nice to come here to share this evening with fellow Redlegs.

Now, I must confess that knowing so many great artillerymen would be assembled here this evening caused me to give more than casual thought to what I should talk to you about this evening.

But as I reflected on this evening, it occurred to me that today is also the day on which, 35 years ago, I attended my first Artillery Ball, blues and all, and was formally inducted into the Order of Saint Barbara, just like Sergeant Major of the Army Kidd just was. If you think about it, that is over a third of a century of attending such Artillery functions, and over a third of a century of Artillery Ball speeches, and yet, no matter how hard I tried, I couldn't remember a single Artillery Ball speech I had ever heard!

Now, because I know that many of these speeches were presented by some of the most distinguished and articulate Redlegs that this century has produced, and many of them are here tonight, I can only conclude that an Artillery Ball speech, to be truly memorable, must be, at the very least, also very forgettable! And I shan't disappoint you!

Now, despite my reference to forgettable speeches, you and I know that tradition dictates that my remarks include, at the very least, a word or two about the King of Battle, our Artillery. And so, qualifications not withstanding, I am pleased to stand here before you as your representative, to offer a few modest thoughts about the profession that has brought us together here this evening.

We in this room have grown up recalling the greatness of artillerymen, from ancient times, when we were no more than simple stone throwers, to the earliest firing engines that were more dangerous to the users of these devices, than to the recipients of their projectiles. On occasions such as these, we like to really beat our chests, and recall all of the great sayings ever uttered by important captains of war, about how artillery proved decisive in winning battles large and small. Great stuff, all of it true, well, most of it.

But what has been undeniably true — from the birth of America's Artillery, and men like Henry Knox, and women like Molly Pitcher, now somewhat shrouded in the fog of receding history, through all our wars, and the suffering, and the pain, and the glory of building a nation, and a better world, to the more sharply-focused memories of great Redlegs like Ott, and Kerwin, and Vuono, and Keith, and Merritt, and Scott and Crosby and Trefry and all the other great gunners here tonight — that one undeniable truth about them all, and the long columns of others as far as the mind's eye can see, has been that they have been men and women of extraordinary courage, of deep love for their country, of wisdom to do what's right today, and of the vision to know what to do to move us into tomorrow.

There is something special about Artillerymen. You can see it in this room in the eyes of the young, and not so young. They are proud to be part of the team. We talk about it a lot, and yet we're a breed apart.

So before I say another word, let me salute you all here tonight, and ask you, to raise your glass to yourselves, such extraordinary men and women of the Artillery. To you all, to the Artillery!

With that done, let me vary somewhat from tradition, and say a word or two about three revolutions that are currently in motion and what these revolutions mean to us here in this room.

Whenever you say the word "revolution" it invokes this image of a noisy, swirling maelstrom that sweeps aside all in its path. And in fact, some revolutions do fit this mold. But there is another kind of revolution. This second kind of revolution is in some ways more dangerous, because it is quiet, less transparent, and easily missed.

Of the three revolutions in question, one fits into the mold of the noisy, transparent type, and the other two are of the second sort: subtle; steady; and silent.

The first, the transparent revolution, was begun four years ago, on the day that Boris Yeltsin stood on a tank in front of the Soviet White House.

When that day was over, it signaled the end of a global empire, and the end of a world order that had existed for nearly 50 years. But the forces that were set in motion are still cascading around the globe, and I suspect that they will still be reverberating for many years to come.

For us, the greatest challenge of this revolution is the sheer difficulty of interpreting both its effects — on both sides of the Atlantic — and what we should do to steer the course of change, again on both sides of the Atlantic.

We know that we are in a new era — we feel it — one filled with new kinds of challenges, and certainly with great opportunities as well, and our military forces have, without a shadow of a doubt, a great part to play, both in handling the challenges of this new era, and also in seizing the great opportunities that can make the next century so much better than the one we are now leaving. But to seize this historic opportunity, we need today, more than ever before, the same kind of men and women of wisdom and vision, that I mentioned just a moment ago. And yet I am confident that we will find them, and that many of them are here in this room tonight.

Now, the second revolution that I mentioned is the quiet, unobtrusive sort. And that revolution is caused by the very

great reductions in defense spending. To appreciate the magnitude of this revolution, you must realize that by 1999, just around the corner, the defense budget will be less than half of its size in 1988, which of course as you recall, was the apex of our Cold War defense spending. Against this, our force will be one third smaller. If you think about these numbers for a moment, you will quickly realize that this is not a well-balanced equation: a force one third smaller; trying to survive on a budget that is less than half the size.

And this is why I title this a revolution, because in order to make that equation work, we are going to have to change the way we think, the way we are organized, and the way we do our business, in every way. The math tells you that we cannot fit inside that equation unless we make some very dramatic, and very revolutionary, changes.

And the path we are going to have to follow I call jointness. Sure, we can, and we must, find more savings by closing some more bases, and by increasing productivity, things that fall well outside of jointness. But in the end, we must do far more than that. We are going to have to entertain fundamental changes in how we organize, in how we fight.

We are going to have to bring jointness into the very beginning of how we define our military requirements, and even into how we base, and how we train our forces. We are going to have to be revolutionary in every sense of the word in our thinking.

The same kind of thinking applies to the third revolution as well, what some call a "Revolution in Military Affairs." This revolution is also quiet, indeed so quiet that many are still debating whether it exists at all. But it does exist.

Advances in technology in this age of information offer us opportunities not even dreamt of before. Just as an example, the Advanced Field Artillery System that is surely to come is not just a better howitzer, brilliant munitions that are now coming on are not just better dumb bombs or projectiles, systems that tell us instantaneously and continuously where our forces are on the battlefield are advances we do not yet understand.

We are not just getting better at what we do, we are potentially on the threshold of a breakthrough, the beginning of a revolution, and that's exactly how we must answer the challenge presented by these last two revolutions I mentioned. We must, all of us, learn how to become — ounce for ounce, and pound for pound — more powerful, even as we become smaller. And I am proud to see the Artillery leading the way in this revolutionary thinking.

So, these three revolutions are occurring all at once, each affecting our Armed Forces in different ways, and each having a very direct impact on all of us here tonight.

It will not be an easy task to overcome these great challenges, and to realize the great opportunities. But I know this: Today our Armed Forces are the envy of the world. We have the best people and our challenge is to retain them, and to recruit more like them. We have the finest equipment of any military force in the world, and we must not allow that to change either. But as I look around this room tonight, at the extraordinary men and women sitting at these tables, I have no doubt that we will accomplish all of this.

I have no doubt, because the men and women in this room are accustomed to accomplishing miracles and, perhaps from the prejudices of my own experience, there is no question in my mind that the gunners of the King of Battle will be indispensable in leading these three revolutions.

Now, let me close by returning to the early days of our Artillery, and with a story that was told around the campfires at Valley Forge.

It seems that Henry Knox's artillery regiment lived, and fought, under the watchful eye and protection of a portly regimental chaplain who, not unlike most chaplains in today's battalions that you're so well familiar with, found himself without a way to make his rounds.

So, to spare his feet, our chaplain bought himself a mule.

He soon learned, however, that this mule had an even greater than normal stubbornness.

Our chaplain complained to its former owner, an Anglican minister from a neighboring Dragoon regiment, who apologetically explained that through sheer oversight he had forgotten to mention the unique language to which the mule responded.

He promptly revealed the key: to move forward, the mule responded only to the words, "Thank God."

To stop, "Amen." (To move forward, "Thank God;" to stop, "Amen.")

Our chaplain, reassured by this new knowledge, leapt upon the mule and bravely shouted, "Thank God."

The mule jumped forward with a lurch, and down the road and beyond the battery perimeter flew chaplain and mule.

Shortly, however, our chaplain noticed that they were approaching a sheer cliff, and to his horror, he could not recall the phrase required to stop the mule.

But at the very last moment, however, with clammy hands and a scream trying to escape his throat, our chaplain finally remembered, and at the very last possible second screamed, "Amen."

The mule screeched to a halt, its forward hooves quivering at the very edge of the cliff. Peering off the thousand-foot drop, our chaplain uttered an enormous sigh of relief, and without further thought, spoke a very heartfelt, "Thank God."

Clearly, our chaplain knew not when he had said enough.

I hope I haven't fallen victim to a similar failing, so let me close with a heartfelt "Amen", and my sincere appreciation for the opportunity to share this evening with you, and I hope God Blesses you all. Good night.

National Military Family Association
Arlington, Virginia
30 November 1994

Let me start out by adding my congratulations to Secretary Perry, and to you, Catherine (Ahl). I think that all we have heard in the introductions and in the presentation of these two awards speaks volumes to the wisdom the selection committee had in selecting those two. I cannot think of anything more important to the quality of the force, to the readiness of the force, than the successes that these two have had and I am absolutely delighted that you would recognize them.

Now before I say another word, let me add my congratulations to, and applaud the National Military Family Association. You know — and you have heard today from Sylvia, Michele, and Catherine — the many, many programs that you are involved in, the things the Association is doing, but I am not sure how many of you think of that as helping the readiness of the force, as opposed to helping the quality of life of families. You are probably so unique and do so much, and are so absorbed in the day-to-day operations that you don't have the time to reflect upon how much you are doing. Or you stand at home in front of a mirror and look at yourself and you don't know what you have accomplished that particular day, so often against such great odds, because this world and this town is full of people who like to say "NO," instead of people like Mr. Perry, who like to say "YES." I am well aware that those successes of yours are very, very hard fought for, and are therefore that much more meaningful.

You know, Secretary Perry, when he stood here a few minutes ago, alluded to this extraordinary force that we have, the young men and women in uniform today, and how accustomed we are, and rightfully so, to saying that they are the very best who ever wore an American military uniform.

And as you go around and visit, as I have the opportunity to do, whether it's in Somalia, or in the refugee camps in Rwanda, or on an operation in Haiti, or in Bosnia, or in the Adriatic, flying no-fly missions over Bosnia — wherever you go, in Korea, or in Germany, you cannot but be amazed at what they do so willingly, and what they do so superbly. We understand that and we are fond of saying that if we wish to retain them, and if we wish to recruit more like them, we have to do everything we can for them. That includes ensuring that we compensate them for their service, and that we train them correctly to do the tasks we ask them to do, that are often so very difficult.

We're used to understanding that we have to equip them, so that they have the tools with which to do the job, and that we have to take care of their quality of life. But you see, the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard aren't what they use to be when I first came in (in 1958) and was drawing 75 bucks a month! My car payment was $110 dollars! It's a very different Force today, and you all know that. Well over 60 percent are married. So we have to understand, and you do that so well, and you remind the rest of us, that what is true of the Force itself — to which you speak so often, and many people so very eloquently — the same thing applies every bit as much to those great military families. What they contribute under the circumstances in which we place them is equally extraordinary, and deserves every bit as much our attention and our best effort.

You in this room know so well what it means to move every two or three years. You know very well what it means when you end up at the end of a 20-year career with 50 sets of curtains! You can't move them from house to house because, for some reason in our great wisdom, we put different size windows in every set of family quarters! You know what it means to take your children out of school in the middle of the year and move them to someplace where the two schools are not in synch for the new children. You all, at one time or another, either have, or know someone intimately who has, moved a son or a daughter between the junior and senior year, and you know what price that family pays. You know what it means to all of a sudden get assigned to a place in Belgium, where there isn't an American hospital within miles and miles. You know very well what it means to get assigned to some place in Turkey and your 19- or 20-year old wife is about to give birth to a child, and you have to do that in a Turkish hospital because there are no American hospitals. You know what it means, and you know how very important it is — not that we fix all the ills for them, as

much as we would like to — how terribly important it is that they feel that there is an organization like yours, that's devoted to their welfare, that's ready to stand up, day-in and day-out, against those who like to say "NO," and fight for them, and how good they feel when they know that there is a Secretary of Defense like Bill Perry, who listens and goes out there himself and finds out what the problem is, and does something about it.

One of you alluded to the fact that this is a man who doesn't just talk about it, but he does something about it. That's what those families appreciate. That, I tell you, translates directly into the readiness of the force, every bit as much as buying a new tank, or buying a new F-16, or a new frigate. That is what readiness is, when the soldier knows that, when he or she gets deployed to Bosnia, or to the Adriatic, or goes on a separation tour to Korea, his or her family back there is going to be cared for, that someone cares, and someone is prepared to do something (to help). Now, it would be wonderful, if we could repeat over and over again what Secretary Perry did when he moved those $2.7 billion into the Quality of Life programs, if we could do this over and over again until we fixed all the problems. But you know that is not possible. You know that there are challenges out there that we need to come to grips with together, that we need to find the answers to, in the smartest way that we can.

Let me just mention a couple. The first one is the one that we've been wrestling with, I guess, ever since the end of DESERT STORM, and that is the very significant reduction of our Force. You know that we are going down from that force at the end of DESERT STORM by approximately one third. When you think about it, that's a significant number of people, a significant number of lives that are affected. Those are countless worries of people who wanted to stay but couldn't, countless worries of those who are still with us today, but aren't sure they will be able to stay. It translates into shorter tours, it translates into moves sooner than we expected, because all of a sudden their unit is being inactivated. It translates into Quality of Life programs being terminated ahead of time, before all the people have left a particular installation. All these stories, you have heard.

And yet, I think the people that have gone through this have been extraordinarily strong, extraordinarily patient and understanding. But what worries me, and what I think the challenge is that you and I face, is that it isn't over yet. We are about 80 percent complete, but it won't be until about '97 when the reductions are fully done. And that means that there are still people out there who worry about whether they will be able to stay, people who have signed up to make this their life's work. There will be children still that will have to relocate in the middle of the school year to go somewhere. There will be wives who are working in an MWR facility that's going to close before the family leaves, and the wife will lose her employment, and all the things that were true in the very beginning will be true at the very end. The challenge for you and I is, first of all, not to forget that this isn't over yet. Secondly, that in reductions in force of the magnitude we're going through — or for that matter, any reduction — it's not a matter of numbers, it's a matter of people. We tend, particularly in this town, to talk about "80 percent completed, so many more to go," and they are numbers, but each one of those numbers is a person, each one of those percentages represents people. And the third challenge to us — and remember that we are talking about people — is to remember that we owe the same sort of concern, the same sort of a helping hand to the very last one in this drawdown as we provided to the first one and the hundreds of thousands in between. So I ask all of you, as an organization, don't let us forget that those are people. Don't let us forget that it isn't over yet. Don't let us forget that we owe this concern, that we owe this help to them, and that we owe this understanding to them, to the very last person that we relocated either into civilian life or to some other military post. I'm very thankful to the Congress. I think they have done yeoman work to cushion the process for people who had to leave the service. We just need to make sure that those programs stay in effect and that we all concentrate on that huge task that is still ahead of us.

The second challenge, I will tell you, I think is very much tied to that, and that is the ever-reducing budget numbers. I just told you that we are reducing the force by one third, that by 1997 the force will be reduced by one third. Yet when you look at our budget by 1999 in real terms, it will be reduced by one half. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to recognize that we simply cannot do business the same way we've been doing it when we are reducing the force by one third and reducing, in real buying power, the budget by approximately one half. The challenge is enormous. It will take on your part and my part and on everyone's part a determination to question everything we do, to find a better way of doing it.

When I talk to young officers and NCOs, particularly when they are in schools and they are on their way back out to units, I ask each one of them not to go back to that unit and just find out how things are being done and then fall in a groove and "do it the way things have always been done." But rather, I want them, from the first day they arrive, to question what is being done and why, and search, not in a destructive way, but in a very constructive way, for better ways of doing it, because if we don't, we will be on a collision course. If we don't, then Secretary Perry will be hard-pressed in the years to come to do what he did, to make those extraordinarily difficult choices to move money to what is clearly his, and certainly in this room, everyone's priority, which is our extraordinary people. The money simply will not be

there. So it isn't just an issue of "tightening our belts," it's more than that. It's finding better ways — innovative, revolutionary ways — of doing our business. That's true whether we're talking about procuring things, or how we take care of people and how we house people. We simply can't afford to be doing things the same way that we used to.

Now, what does that mean for you and me? What does it mean for the subject that we here gathered to address, which is the Quality of Life for our families? I think we need to be realistic about some things. We've gone through an extraordinarily rich period of time, when we were able to do some badly needed, great things for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen and their families. We today enjoy child development centers never dreamed of when I was only a colonel, not so long ago. We today enjoy athletic facilities that would be the envy of the richest community here in Washington, and the list goes on. I think we need to be realistic, that perhaps in the near term at least we have to constrain our appetite for new things or ever-better things. We need to concentrate more and more on retaining those things that we now have, and the gains that we've been able to make because of what you have done and because of what men like Secretary Perry have done. In some cases this works. For instance, on commissaries, Secretary Perry put his foot down and said we are going to retain commissaries the way they are, and "let us not talk every year about new surcharge charges, or other nonsense. Commissaries are terribly important and we ought to retain them the way they are."

We must not go back on most of the things that we have been able to give our service men and women and their families. But we have to be very careful and very honest with each other. Otherwise, you will not be able to prioritize the few dollars we will have left for quality of life to apply against those new projects we need. But they must be applied only against those new projects where the need is really great, or where we get the greatest benefits.

Let me give you an example of that. That is the one (that is) so near and dear to your endeavors this last year, and that's health care. It's no secret to anybody that health care, with each year, is getting more and more expensive, and you know the reasons for it. It is no secret to you that with every year it is getting more and more difficult to get entry into the military health care system, because the population that draws on that is increasing more and more each year. Here, I don't think it's an issue of being able to just protect what we have, because what we have right now is heading towards a cliff. Here, there's an issue where we will very wisely have to apply not only our limited resources, but hopefully our unlimited imagination and energy to fix something, whether that's all of us agreeing on some HMO option, or whether that's me taking good advice that I receive from many of you! I think Sylvia beat up on me long enough for me to finally understand that you cannot have — whether that's in an HMO or whether that's in our health care system that we now have — a fee system that somehow charges a youngster, even if it's only a nominal fee, towards the end of the month, because there aren't too many privates or young specialists who are cash-rich on the last day of the month. So, even if we have some other modest fee system, whatever the wisdom of that might be, we have to ensure we have a system where that young man or woman isn't kept from going to the doctor simply because he or she does not have the cash on hand at that time. That is very simple to do, and I thank you all for pointing that out.

Now, there is also the issue that I know many of you have been pushing, of going with the Federal Employees' medical benefits program. I don't know yet what the answer is for that, but I know that because you spoke, it is one of the programs that is being considered for inclusion, not as a substitute, but as an alternative to either an HMO or going to the health care facilities we have right now. While we still have some work to do, it is that kind of thinking on your part that at least allows us to explore more alternatives.

The point I am trying to make to you is — please understand that we are in a period in our budgets where we have to set priorities — we just absolutely have to. Then, we must protect what we have. I don't think the families out there, or the soldiers out there, would understand if we started sliding backwards. And then, with whatever resources are available, we need to be clear where we want to apply those, so we get the maximum benefit and apply it against the largest hurdle. And if we do that, we must remember that this is all about people; this is not about things. This isn't even about building a new hospital, or a new commissary, certainly not about building a new tank. This is about making sure that the corpsman who works in the hospital, or the family that visits the hospital senses, that although the wall might not have a fresh coat of paint, the people there are seized with helping, seized with trying to do some good. It is the commissary, not because we live on the post that has the newest commissary, but because when you walk in, people smile. They have all gone to "friendly school." They care, they want to help, so the families that go in there, the single soldiers that go in there, the single airmen that go in there feel that it's a pleasant place to be. We are all part of a larger family than just our immediate one. We all care for each other. That is what gives us real strength — and that is what we have to retain. We must remember those priorities and put our emphasis to where it counts.

I must tell you that I am extraordinarily optimistic that we will transition through the next few years and that we will enter the next century with a military that we will not only be extraordinarily proud to be part of, but a military that will

be seized with its mission and with its morale way up there — a military force that without any question will be able to protect our interests worldwide.

If you go out and look those youngsters in the eye, as I do, you see their enthusiasm. You see it as they try to help in some village in Haiti or in some refugee camp in Rwanda, in how they cared for those who were dying in the streets of Mogadishu because they were too weak to drag themselves off to the side of the road to die there. You cannot have the slightest doubt that as long as we have people like that, backed up by families that are in turn backed up with organizations like yours, who fight for them back here, we'll have absolutely no problems. We are not on some glide path down. We are not even "just holding our own." We are on an upswing, as far as the quality of this force is concerned. We have to measure it not by just how many spare parts we have for the tank, but how that tanker feels about himself, and how he feels about how we take care of his family.

Let me conclude by telling you what I started out saying, you're an extraordinary group, you're every bit as extraordinary as those young men and women in uniform out there and their families. Without you, there would be a great hole in this family called "the military." So whatever you do, keep smiling, keep fighting for whatever you have been fighting for up to now, and keep prodding us along. We need your good ideas. Take care of yourself and God Bless you all!

50th Anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge
St. Louis, Missouri
15 December 1994

Earlier today, my wife and I left Belgium to spend this evening with you.

It is, for me, indeed a great honor to stand before you. Inside this container I am holding is soil collected just yesterday from a small town in Belgium. It came from an otherwise unexceptional town, indistinct from the many other beautiful villages that spot the Belgian countryside.

But for two facts. One, if you are traveling from east to west, this town sits at a key intersection of roads that leads to Belgium's seacoasts. And second, because of its location, this town, Bastogne, became the best-remembered fight of the battle we memorialize here tonight.

The Second World War was won on many, many battlefields. But there was something different about the Battle of the Bulge, something truly exceptional.

In our memories of this war, this battle — your battle — has a mystical echo. For in a war where American heroism and tenacity were commonplace, at the Battle of the Bulge these qualities became a legend.

It was on this very night, now fifty years in the past, that three massive field armies, the most powerful and best-equipped units in the German Army, lay in wait, sitting behind the Seigfried Line. In just a few more hours they would be unleashed.

Hitler planned and prepared this attack for months. It was his greatest, his most desperate gamble of the war. Ever since the June landings at Normandy, Hitler and his forces had been shoved across Europe in a wave of defeats, a wave that seemed to have no end. Hitler and his forces were stymied. Accustomed to victory, to them it was incomprehensible that America's forces could best their own in battle.

Rather, Hitler and his generals took solace from the only explanation they could accept: that their defeats came not from the mettle of America's fighting men, but instead from America's material superiority; from the sheer mass of America's equipment; from its huge armadas of tanks and artillery; and from its vast fleets of airplanes. It was only American steel that outweighed German courage and skill, but not American spirit and skill ... or so they thought!

And so, it was in the Ardennes where Hitler thought he would reverse these advantages, where in one decisive counter-thrust, he would try to break the spine of the offensive closing on his country. This time, for once, Hitler's forces would have the advantages: the advantage of surprise, which was achieved; and advantages in firepower, and tanks, and mass. Even the weather worked to his favor. For the first week of his attack, American aircrews would sit grounded, despairingly helpless to come to the aid of their besieged comrades on the ground.

In the fog and bitter cold of the early morning hours the historic struggle opened with bewildering fury. Thousands upon thousands of German tanks and half-tracks and artillery rushed against the thinly held American sector in the Ardennes. Instantly, the battle became a melee of hundreds of fights, with isolated and beleaguered units fighting to hold against seemingly insurmountable odds.

Even in hindsight, the cold calculus of battle should have dictated victory for Hitler and his forces. Within days they should have been across the Meuse River, dashing toward the port of Antwerp.

But there had been one miscalculation, one flaw that unraveled — and then completely unhinged — Hitler's last gamble. It was the one factor that cannot be estimated in the cold logic of battle. It was the one feature that Hitler had discounted, had in fact assumed would not be there. And that, very simply, was the courage, the grit, the implacable resourcefulness, initiative, and spirit of the American fighting man. Outnumbered, outgunned, often out-flanked or surrounded, dozens of pockets of desperate, but determined soldiers blocked, impeded, and hindered the advance. Where Hitler thought he would be pounding a sledgehammer through water, he found himself, instead, striking against an unbreakable anvil, an anvil of iron forged from courage and determination.

Americans were transfixed by the stand of the 101st at Bastogne. But, the same spirit occupied dozens of other places on this battlefield, and it was there among our allies, as well, among the Belgian people, and the people of Luxembourg, who fought and suffered and stood beside our own forces. And, outside of the Bulge hundreds of thousands of others fought just as tenaciously to stop the advance, and to break through, to relieve those forces trapped within German lines. Within weeks, Hitler was stopped and the jaws of the Patton's Third Army were closing from the south, eliminating what remained of the bulge.

You, the veterans gathered in this room were the heroes that Hitler had not counted upon; you and thousands of others who are not here tonight, some American, some Belgian, and those from Luxembourg as well.

Yours was an act that remains an inspiration to every man and woman in uniform today, men and women who so proudly carry the same valorous tradition to other battlefields and other missions.

This weekend we will remember. We will remember, first, our missing comrades, those who lay under the neat rows of white crosses and David's stars in a quiet field outside of Bastogne: a silent and eternal testimony to American courage and strength, and to the price paid for Europe's freedom. But we also remember and honor the living: the veterans of the Battle of the Bulge gathered here in this room, and others who could not attend.

I am here tonight representing a thankful nation, and a proud and admiring military. And I have come to salute you all. I have come to tell you that we shall never forget what you did, for today's soldiers are the children who bask in the freedoms you fought for so nobly.

We shall never forget your courage and your heroism. Indeed, you are an inspiration to us today, of what is demanded of us as we look toward the future that we must create for our children.

This is why I brought this container of soil. To some, it may seem only a small handful of dirt. But it is far more than that. It is soil mixed with the blood and sacrifice of heroes. Fifty years ago, it was the soil you fought and struggled over. Today, it is the soil of a proud and free nation. This is your monument.

You are our nation's heroes. We are forever grateful. God Bless you all and God Bless the United States of America. Thank you.