

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
1200 17th Street, Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20036

In Association With

WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
and
MUSLIM WORLD INITIATIVE

+ + + + +

WHAT MAKES ZARQAWI TICK?

+ + + + +

THURSDAY
MARCH 16, 2006

+ + + + +

SPEAKERS:

HALEH ESFANDIARI, Chair
Director, Middle East Program
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Washington, D.C.

GILLES KEPPEL,
Director, Middle East-Mediterranean Program
Sciences-Po, Paris

DAN BRUMBERG,
Special Advisor, Muslim World Initiative, USIP
Department of Government, Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.

DAN BYMAN,
School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.

1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2 (Time not provided)

3 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Good morning.

4 I'm Haleh Esfandiari, the Director of the Middle
5 East Program at the Woodrow Wilson International
6 Center for Scholars.

7 We have a tradition of co-sponsoring
8 meetings with different programs at the United
9 States Institute for Peace. And we are delighted
10 to co-sponsor this meeting with the Muslim World
11 Initiative at USIP.

12 It's a pleasure as always to work with
13 my old friend and colleague, Dan Brumberg.

14 The topic today is very interesting and
15 timely, "What Makes Zarqawi Tick?" And we couldn't
16 find a better speaker than Dr. Gilles Kepel, whose
17 book on, I just look at it, *Al-Qaeda Dans le Texte*,
18 was published a few months ago in Paris.

19 Dr. Kepel will speak maybe for 15-20
20 minutes and then we will have Dan Brumberg and Dan
21 Byman commenting.

22 A brief introduction of our speakers so
23 in order not to interrupt the flow of discussion.

24 Dr. Kepel is the Director of the Middle
25 East Mediterranean Program at the Sciences-Po in
26 Paris. And he's a leading expert and author on the
27 Islamic World. He holds degrees in Arabic,
28 English, and philosophy and a doctorate in
29 sociology and political science.

30 In the 1990's, he was a Visiting

1 Professor both at New York University and at
2 Columbia University. And he has a number of books,
3 including *Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam* and
4 *The War for Muslim Minds Islam and the West*. You
5 can't be a student of Islam and not having read all
6 of his books.

7 The two commentators, I'll start first
8 with Dan Brumberg, who is an Associate Professor in
9 the Department of Government at Georgetown
10 University, and a Special Advisor to the Muslim
11 World Initiative at USIP.

12 His areas of expertise include
13 comparative politics in the Islamic World, Third
14 World Political Development, and the sociology of
15 Ideology. He too is the author of a great number
16 of publications, articles, and also a book. His
17 last book was *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle
18 for Reform in Iran*.

19 As someone who is quite familiar with
20 books written on Iran, this I can say is one of the
21 best books that was published in the last few
22 years.

23 MR. BRUMBERG: Haleh, you must
24 compliment more frequently.

25 (Laughter.)

26 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: I usually am not
27 so complimentary. You can ask my colleagues here.

1 (Laughter.)

2 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Dr. Dan Byman,
3 who is also going to comment on what Gilles Kepel
4 will say, is Associate Professor and Director of
5 Security Studies Program at the Center for Peace,
6 and Security Studies at Georgetown University,
7 Edmund Walsh School for Foreign Service.

8 He's also a nonresident Senior Fellow
9 with the Saban Center for the Middle East Policy at
10 the Brookings Institution. He has served as a
11 Professional Staff Member with both the National
12 Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United
13 States, better known as the 9/11 Commission. And
14 the Joint 9/11 Inquiry Staff of the House and
15 Senate Intelligence Committee.

16 Dan Byman has also worked as the
17 Research Director of the Center for Middle East
18 Public Policy at RAND Corporation. And among his
19 publications are his latest book *Deadly Dynamics:
20 States that Sponsor Terrorism*, which was released
21 in 2/05.

22 Gilles Kepel, the floor is yours.

23 MR. KEPEL: Thank you very much Haleh,
24 and thank you for inviting me. I'm feeling a
25 little embarrassed and threatened to be speaking
26 between the two Dans. So I don't know what this --
27 I'll try to do my best.

1 I was sort of a bewonderment when I
2 discovered the title Dan had chosen for me, "What
3 Makes Zarqawi Tick?" because I didn't really have a
4 clear idea of what "tick" meant in colloquial
5 American. So, he had to sort of send me a long
6 tafsir. And we'll see if it works or not.

7 So, I guess that one of the very
8 interesting things that one can understand about
9 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi is that with him, in a way, we
10 have reached sort of a long awaited for desire from
11 the al-Qaeda leadership to find someone who would
12 mobilize the masses.

13 And if you read back into what I
14 consider is the sort of festoon or what is to be
15 done of the al-Qaeda movement. Ayman al-Zawahiri's
16 booklet "Knights Under the Prophet's Banner," or in
17 Arabic, "Fursan Taht Rayat Al-Nabi," published in
18 excerpts by Asharq Al-Awsat, the English -- the
19 Arabic language, British-based, London-based
20 newspaper in the end of 2001.

21 Then you have the -- the statement of
22 anxiety of political anxiety in al-Zawahiri's
23 declarations. I mean, we the Vanguard's have been
24 unable to mobilize the masses of the 'umma tajij
25 jamahir al-umma (phonetic).

26 We are the rightful Vanguard. The
27 masses are afraid. They do not understand us. And

1 this is why we failed. This is why we failed in
2 the 1990's in Egypt, in Algeria, in Bosnia, in
3 Kashmir, Chechnya, what have you.

4 So we have to find a device in order to
5 mobilize the masses. And this device, was but
6 9/11, i.e., using the media to produce some sort of
7 a spectacular, by all means spectacular, shockwave
8 that would then convince the masses that the enemy
9 was weak.

10 And not only the nearby enemy, al-'Adu
11 al-Qarib, i.e., the -- the powers that be in the
12 Muslim world, but more so the faraway enemy, al-
13 'Adu al-Ba'id, i.e., the U.S., who is the backer of
14 the local regimes.

15 And by sort of exposing the Achilles'
16 heel of the faraway enemy, then al-Zawahiri
17 believed, then the masses would suddenly discover
18 that there was no need to be afraid. And that they
19 could join the ranks of the Vanguard's and join the
20 ranks of jihad and topple the powers that be.

21 As you all know, this is not exactly
22 what happened after 9/11. And al-Qaeda, whatever
23 we call al-Qaeda, but we have no time and nine
24 minutes I have left to define al-Qaeda at length.
25 Al-Qaeda was unable to sort of develop from
26 Vanguard's terrorists martyrdom operation group
27 into mass movement or into a movement that would

1 mobilize the masses.

2 And they were compelled in order to
3 show that they were still in existence, to perform
4 all those copycat bombings in 2002, 2003, 2004, up
5 to 2005, and lastly the London bombings of this
6 last summer.

7 This did not -- did not lead anywhere
8 in terms of the -- of a goal that was sought after,
9 i.e., the mobilization of the masses and the
10 toppling of the powers that be.

11 Only in Iraq did it finally happen.
12 Only in Iraq after U.S. and allied invasion and the
13 toppling of the Saddam regime in the spring of
14 2003. Where Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi and his group
15 managed to join forces with Sunni insurgents.

16 And in a way this joining of forces was
17 after a while defined or claimed as the work of al-
18 Qaeda. Al-Qaeda, which for that occasion took the
19 sort of new name of the local branch, if you wish,
20 the local franchise, took the name of Qaeda al-
21 jihad fi bilad al-rafidain, i.e., literally
22 translated, the base for jihad in the country of
23 the two rivers of Mesopotamia.

24 And Zarqawi had a life before Iraq as
25 you know. He was born in Jordan. His name is not
26 Zarqawi, it's his pseudo. And related to the city
27 of Zarqa from which he is originally. And he had

1 fought in Afghanistan already during the first
2 Afghan Jihad wars.

3 Then came back to Jordan. Was put in
4 jail. Got very close to a very important advocate
5 for jihad who's under semi-liberty in Jordan
6 called, Abu Muhammad Maqdissi, who is a very useful
7 person because he is the sort of internet
8 encyclopedia of jihad.

9 I mean his website is the place where
10 you go to see whether a jihad text is, if I may say
11 so, kosher or not, because if it's on
12 www.towelhead.ws, it's culture (inaudible). If
13 not, you should have doubts.

14 And Abu Muhammad Maqdissi is probably
15 the person who was the most influential on Zarqawi,
16 because Zarqawi himself is not ideologued by any
17 means. His -- he probably reads and writes a
18 little, but he definitely hasn't written the texts
19 that he has signed.

20 The text he signed and one of the most
21 famous of them is the one that was found on -- by
22 Kurdish soldiers, or Peshmergas, on one of his
23 envoys in early 2004, exposing his strategy of
24 attacking Shias, was most probably written by
25 another intellectual who was close to him, who was
26 killed on September 2004 on an attack on the
27 infamous Abu-Ghraib prison, Abu-Anestshemi

1 (phonetic).

2 So, it so happened that after he was
3 freed from jail in Jordan while on the occasion of
4 King Abdullah's coming to power, who had a general
5 amnesty for prisoners. Zargawi then went back to
6 Afghanistan, and to -- lately to Iraq, through the
7 Kurdish (inaudible) Islam groups, where he finally
8 joined forces after the -- after the invasion of
9 spring 2003 with -- with the Sunni insurgents.

10 As I said, there you have the first
11 opportunity for al-Qaeda to be grounded on a turf,
12 i.e., not to plan bombings, or executions, or
13 whatever, through a little group of people who are
14 either planted in a country or who come and leave.
15 But, really to sort of achieve this goal that
16 Zawahiri has indicated, i.e., mobilize the masses
17 by virtue of example.

18 Mobilize the masses so that they will
19 topple. The unjust state or the unjust ruler or
20 the empire's powers that be, or what have you.

21 And this is very different, if I may
22 so, from the situation in Palestine, where in
23 Palestine you also had a number of suicide bombings
24 that were carried by religious groups, Hamas,
25 Islamic Jihad, and also by other groups, bi-secular
26 groups. But, never ever was al-Qaeda able to set a
27 tone into the Islamic -- Palestinian Israeli Jihad

1 process.

2 I mean this was kept, this was a
3 process that was kept under control by the local
4 Islamic and non-Islamic movements. And they
5 definitely did not want to be hostage to the vested
6 interests of the al-Qaeda leadership.

7 And this something we can -- we can
8 discuss later of course, which has lead in a way to
9 the transformation of violent operations into the
10 voting of Hamas into parliament lasting.

11 In Iraq it's quite different. Then
12 Sunni insurgents needed the al-Qaeda activists and
13 vice versa. And this created the sort of the first
14 place where you had a blend between the two. But
15 this blend is -- is in itself a problem.

16 It is a problem because in a way when
17 you look at it from -- from a distance, or when you
18 -- you look at it say in 2004 when it sort of
19 started, looks like the al-Qaeda guys were able to
20 sort of sell their propaganda and their well view
21 to the -- to the local Sunnis.

22 And that's the reason they -- they were
23 so popular and so well entrenched particularly in
24 Fallujah was that they were the uncompromising
25 adversaries of the U.S. military in U.S.
26 occupation. And not only did they rely on local
27 forces, but they also created the new magnet for

1 jihad in the area.

2 Iraq now being what Afghanistan was in
3 the 1980's, if you wish, where you have young
4 people from the Arab world going usually through
5 Syria or through Saudi Arabia, at times through
6 Jordan, and Kuwait, so, rarely through Iran, to
7 Iraq in order to die there.

8 And in France among other places, the
9 police have arrested a number of kids from Paris,
10 from North African origin, who were volunteers for
11 Iraq. At least two were reported dead in suicide
12 operations.

13 Plus, there was this famous story in
14 Europe of this Belgian young lady. A former drug
15 addict, and someone who sold cakes in a bakery, who
16 was Belgian-born, converted to Islam. And finally
17 with her husband, her husband drove a Mercedes all
18 from Shalawa (phonetic) to Baghdad to blow the
19 Mercedes up in front of the U.S. combine.

20 So, this has created this new -- new
21 field for jihad, a magnet for Jihad in the area.
22 In a way, it is something that plays the same role
23 as Afghanistan in 1980.

24 For instance, when we think of Saudi
25 Arabia, one of the reasons for which the
26 casualties, the number of casualties in Saudi
27 Arabia went down significantly over the last two

1 years, was not only that the Saudi police was
2 finally able to track down a number of insurgents,
3 but also that they were all sent to Iraq.

4 Just like, you know, Afghanistan in the
5 old days was the place where activists from
6 Algeria, from Egypt, and from other places were
7 sent with the blessing of the police. You know, go
8 there and get lost, blow yourself up, and die for a
9 lie, if you wish. But, you know, get out of the
10 way.

11 And -- but, the difference of course,
12 is that in -- in the old days of Afghanistan, jihad
13 was blessed by the U.S., where as this is an untied
14 U.S. jihad. Or is it?

15 Because there was a price to pay for
16 Zargawi's alliance with the Sunni insurgents. And
17 this price was that the targets were not only the
18 Americans or the infidels, or the -- or the
19 Empire's rulers, but also and mainly, if we can
20 judge in terms of the number of people killed,
21 fellow Iraqi's, the so-called heretics, Rafidah, or
22 Shias. Rafidah in Zargawi's vocabulary.

23 And one very significant contribution,
24 original contribution of Zargawi's to the al-Qaeda
25 pros as we sort of showed in this -- in this reader
26 of al-Qaeda, which we published in French,
27 something that the neocons will decide is another

1 proof that the fact French are on the wrong side.

2 The -- something which is very clear is
3 that nowhere neither in 'Abd al-'Azzam's texts,
4 nor in Zawahiri's, nor in (inaudible) text, is
5 there any reference made to the Shias, and they are
6 not interested in it. It's not part of their
7 goals.

8 Whereas, Zarqawi's text, are obsessed
9 with Shias or the fact that Shias are traders.
10 They are stooges of the Americans, friends of the
11 Jews, and that they should be killed first and
12 foremost. And that they are the most dangerous
13 people in the world. And that Islam cannot succeed
14 unless Shias are exterminated.

15 Now, this is okay when you are, you
16 know, part in parcel of the groups of Sunni
17 insurgents who are interested in having the biggest
18 share of power at the end of the day in the U.S. --
19 or in the post-U.S. Iraqi government.

20 And the more you put pressure on the
21 Shias, the more you kill them, then they will
22 finally yield and give the Sunnis, I don't know,
23 one-third, or one-tenth, or one-fourth, or one-
24 half, of -- of oil and of power whenever oil flows
25 back into Iraq.

26 But, in the meantime, this is something
27 that is detrimental to al-Qaeda's message, because

1 in a way in doing so, Zarqawi has become a tool in
2 the hands of Sunni, Iraqi Sunnis, and it's just
3 doing their politics. He just a killer for hire,
4 but he has forgotten the sort of universal
5 objectives or goals of al-Qaeda, which is global
6 jihad. If I may say so, Zawahiri is the Trotsky of
7 al-Qaeda, but you know, it's jihad in -- in the
8 world.

9 Whereas, Zarqawi is sort of low times
10 Stalin of jihad in one country. And this jihad in
11 one country is also something which -- which
12 becomes hostage, there again of the -- of the
13 vested interest in the Sunnis.

14 So, he has his mass mobilization,
15 jamahir al-umma. You know, but nevertheless, the
16 problem is that it's not for the right cause. And
17 that explains why you had this letter that
18 (inaudible) published and from Zawahiri to Zarqawi
19 there were controversies on whether this letter was
20 authentic or not.

21 I mean, knowing to some extent al-
22 Zawahiri, I would tend to say that it sounds like
23 it. As the Italian -- senori averi el bento
24 trovato (phonetic), it's well -- it's well crafted.
25 Congratulations to (inaudible) if they did it.

26 But, it looks true. And then Zarqawi
27 attacks him on that. And says, you know, stop this

1 fuss with the Shias. Because instead of pursuing
2 universal jihad, you're into fitna. You're into
3 sedition. You're into in terms in fighting between
4 Muslims. And this is not going to lead to our
5 success. This is going to lead to another failure.

6 And what's this business with
7 beheadings on webcam. You think this going to --
8 to give us publicity, but this is too much. You
9 know, on the contrary, this is frightening people
10 and we look like monsters. We don't look like the
11 rightful Vanguard. And it's extremely bad. And
12 actually the televised execution stopped after --
13 in 2005.

14 So, in a way Zarqawi is at a crossroads
15 and the Zarqawi, whatever Zarqawi means, I mean the
16 Zarqawi meaning in this case the -- the al-Qaeda
17 operatives in Iraq.

18 As you -- as you all know and
19 definitely much better than I do, there was an
20 attempt for an approachment between Sunnis and
21 American authorities, and Ambassador Khalilzad and
22 others have been very clear on that. And Muslim
23 Brothers, Sunni Muslim Brothers, in Iraq who are
24 welcomed to take parts in the -- electoral process
25 that led to the -- to the parliamentary elections.

26 And that was an attempt by -- by the
27 U.S. to sort of bring back the Sunnis into the

1 folds. And to try to cut the Sunni, the good
2 fighting Sunni elements from the bad Zargawi
3 activists. This was of course something that would
4 become extremely dangerous for -- for the Zargawi
5 guys. Because it would cut their -- their mass
6 space in a way.

7 And it would also play into what is al-
8 Qaeda's nightmare. That is to say that once again,
9 the Muslim Brothers, those pretors in the blood of
10 martyrs, I mean, it's not me of course, it's
11 Zawahiri speaking, are going to get an upper hand.

12 And it was not lost on Zawahiri how
13 favorably the U.S. press covered the good
14 democratic Muslim Brothers who were candidates in
15 Egypt against the corrupt elements of the regime.

16 And, you know, you had an infuriated
17 reaction from Zawahiri to the Muslim Brothers'
18 victory in Egypt, or victory wherever they were
19 candidates. Also, a very violent attack on Hamas
20 recently. And the same was true with -- with Iraq.

21 So, to -- to Zawahiri these politics
22 are going to lead the Muslim Brothers, his
23 archenemies, to sort of reap the benefits of the
24 jihad that the radicals have -- have implemented,
25 which is one of the -- one of the dangers that he
26 sees and that he wants to avoid at all costs.

27 So, due to -- to this -- this problem

1 in the after the elections, after the participation
2 of Sunnis in the elections, then you had the -- the
3 last episode with which I will conclude, because I
4 see Haleh and Dan looking at -- looking at me with
5 anxiety.

6 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: I would have
7 sent you a note. Go ahead you have time.

8 MR. KEPPEL: Okay. I'll conclude.

9 That lead to the destruction of the
10 Samarra Dome on the 22nd of last month.

11 The -- which is something -- which is a
12 major -- a major attack on the sanctity of Shias.
13 And the -- the destruction of the dome was
14 something that unleashed Shia forces. And that led
15 to those massacres, which are, if it's not a civil
16 war, it looks like it. Where every night you find
17 tens of Shias who were killed at random in a place
18 and the other night you have tens of Sunnis, and so
19 on, and so forth.

20 Something which is making the
21 possibility of a coalition government even more
22 remote because Sunnis, there again, are not willing
23 to get into that.

24 And, now to what extent is this finally
25 a victory or not for -- or a temporary victory for
26 the al-Qaeda and Zargawi strategy. It seems clear
27 that it will be difficult after the Samarra bombing

1 to coopt Sunni leaders significantly into the
2 governing Iraqi body.

3 And also it opens another -- another
4 avenue for anxiety in -- in Iraq. I guess that the
5 U.S. even though it was difficult could do with one
6 enemy only, i.e., Sunni insurgents, as long as they
7 could count on the Kurds.

8 But, the Kurds are more and more
9 secluded from even though there are Kurds in
10 Bagdad, of course. But, you know, Kurdish
11 territory is more and more becoming a sort of
12 autonomist, a republic. And mainly counting on the
13 support of Shias.

14 But nowadays with factions within the
15 Shias taking arms and killing Sunnis and having
16 their own policy, being held to this regard -- in
17 this regard by Iranian forces under Ahmadinejad
18 (phonetic).

19 It -- it may look like the U.S. will
20 have to face two enemies, because the -- the basis
21 for supports within Iraqi Shias is definitely
22 dwindling now. Dwindling because the Iranian the
23 influence of Iran is making itself felt more and
24 more.

25 And while you have Shias who lash out
26 for revenge against Sunnis then you'll have to have
27 the U.S. forces act in protection of Sunnis. And

1 this was already clear in the last declarations of
2 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad saying that he did not
3 want the police forces be under sectarian control
4 and so on and so forth, meaning the Ministry of
5 Interior.

6 So, this in a way tells us that as of
7 now, the al-Qaeda system in Iraq was sort of, in my
8 view, able to -- to overcome the -- the dangers and
9 the challenges it faced. At first, they sort of
10 joined forces with the Sunnis, and they had their
11 mass following, finally, somewhere.

12 Then there was this problem that you
13 know they were being taken hostage by the vested
14 interest of the Sunnis. And the global jihad thing
15 was -- was disappearing. And then because of the
16 attempt of the U.S. administration in Iraq to
17 separate the insurgents from -- from Zarqawi. The
18 brutal propagation against the Shias nowadays have
19 managed finally to make the Shias come down into
20 the battle and fight against the Sunnis.

21 And in that, even though Zarqawi is not
22 a mere player, a first -- a first rank player,
23 nevertheless, this is going to lead to a situation
24 where -- where U.S. forces are caught between a
25 rock and a hard place, or between Iran and a hard
26 place.

27 And it is not for certain that Zarqawi

1 and al-Qaeda are so enthusiastic at the growing
2 role of Iran in Iraq. But there again, their --
3 their first objective is to -- is to see U.S.
4 troops leave or at least suffer a number of
5 casualties.

6 In Zawahiri's letter to Zarqawi, I
7 mean, he is foreseeing the -- the pullouts of
8 America from -- from Iraq more or less on the lines
9 of a pullout from Vietnam. Where you know, where
10 they leave their alias around, and so on, and so
11 forth.

12 But the -- so this is -- this is where
13 I think we could go -- we could go as of today. I
14 mean, I guess that the Zarqawi guy, I don't know
15 what makes him tick or not, but the answer is for
16 you.

17 But the -- definitely they -- they
18 managed to -- to set fire to -- to a situation
19 where the U.S. is in -- is in a very difficult
20 position, but where there is another major player
21 who is making inroads into Iraq, which is Iran,
22 which is part of the heretics of Rafidah, from whom
23 Zarqawi and company may have to fear more even
24 maybe than the U.S.

25 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Thank you very
26 much. Dan, ten minutes.

27 MR. BRUMBERG: Okay. Well, I'll be very

1 brief. Thanks very much Haleh for joining us again
2 in another event cosponsored with the Woodrow
3 Wilson Center and USIP, the Muslim World
4 Initiative.

5 I have to say that I've been to Paris a
6 number of times and lectured with Gilles and taught
7 a little bit. And I always wished my French was
8 quite as good as Gilles' English.

9 It was a very interesting presentation.
10 In the book itself, I understand that it's going to
11 be translated and published by Harvard. Is that
12 correct?

13 It's extremely interesting because when
14 -- when you read it, you get a sense of this theme
15 of fitna (phonetic) of the ideological divergences
16 within the -- within al-Qaeda. And it does provide
17 a set of insights into a movement which is --
18 Gilles points out in the introduction of the book,
19 is -- is often presented in very obviously
20 simplistic terms in the -- in the media. So it is
21 -- it is very useful to read and I'm glad that it's
22 going to be translated into English.

23 I just want to say a couple of things
24 that struck me about -- particularly about the
25 section on Zarqawi and the piece on the Shia
26 attributed to him or perhaps written by others, but
27 attributed to him.

1 By the way, you know, "The Zargawi
2 Ticks," and my wife -- my wife looked at me and
3 said, that's an interesting dubla anton (phonetic).
4 So, I hadn't thought about it until, believe it or
5 not, until -- until we put it out there.

6 But in any case, reading Zargawi's
7 piece is kind of Mein Kampf on Shia. It's quite
8 striking the virile into hatred he displays toward
9 the Shia in that particular track.

10 And I wondered reading it you get a
11 sense that, well in part, this hatred is a matter
12 of principle. It's ideological if you like, or
13 perhaps even in some strange way philosophical.

14 But it's also -- also clearly tactical.
15 And he has a tactical purpose and he explains it
16 quite clearly. He says, that, you know, if
17 democracy triumphs and the Shia triumphs, we would
18 -- we will not be able to do anything because they
19 will have triumphant democratically by the vote.
20 And our job is to prevent that by creating the
21 civil war.

22 And so you get a sense of the very
23 interesting relationship between principle and
24 tactics here. You got to wonder reading that
25 whether this -- this ideology of hatred vis-a-vie
26 the Shia, who he says are not only by the way, in -
27 - in collaboration with the Jews, but who in some

1 sense have been invented by the Jews, which is a
2 new twist on that theory.

3 You got to wonder whether in fact the
4 Iraqi Sunni insurgents, and I'm not an expert on
5 this issue, but are necessarily ideologically or
6 philosophically opposed to the Shia. This is a
7 matter of power -- as a matter of a power dispute,
8 but whether in fact Zargawi's message of principle
9 hatred, let's put it that way, becomes something
10 that is then -- then becomes widespread in the
11 Sunni community not only in Iraq but further afield
12 and that really means undermining in some sense the
13 -- the world Islamic revolution principle of al-
14 Qaeda.

15 It's quite striking. You wonder
16 whether if you go from practice-to-practice, if you
17 like, from tactic-to-philosophy, and this becomes
18 ingrained what the consequences will be. It's
19 quite striking.

20 The other thing that struck me about
21 reading, particularly in the section on Zargawi's
22 background and his ideology. The thing that struck
23 me was his disdain for Iraqis. His disdain for the
24 Ulema, which of course, Gilles mentioned are the
25 clerics but also just your -- your average Iraqi
26 there's very little out there with whom he feels
27 any kind of basic trust in the milieu that he's

1 operating.

2 This is not in any sense unusual for a
3 kind of Vanguard ideology. We seen this on the
4 left as well where you speak in the name of the
5 masses and yet at the same time you sort of disdain
6 the masses.

7 Zargawi's attitude toward the average
8 Iraqi seems to be quite negative. And I wonder in
9 that sense, how we -- how this evolution of this
10 very interesting alliance is going -- where this
11 interesting evolution is going to move forward.

12 So those were sort of the two -- two
13 things that struck me in reading the text. I think
14 I'll leave it at that and turn -- turn the mic over
15 to my colleague Dan Byman. Thank you.

16 MR. BYMAN: Thank you. It's a great
17 honor to be up here. Dr. Kepel is one of the
18 people who I think clearly writes more than I read.
19 And granted I read quite slowly, but even so, his
20 ability to turn out extremely high-quality works
21 never ceases to amaze me.

22 Reading of his works reveals at times
23 an occasional amusement with American scholars of
24 terrorism and counter-terrorism. Admittedly, this
25 is a bit like shooting fish in a barrel. However,
26 I think I'm supposed to give the perspective of the
27 fish at the moment. So, I will do so because I'm

1 certainly not a scholar of -- of political Islam.

2 I want to talk about four points that
3 occurred to me as Dr. Kepel was speaking.

4 The first is the idea of the Vanguard.
5 And for anyone who follows terrorism, you know that
6 that is almost universal among terrorist groups, is
7 the idea of seeing themselves as a Vanguard.

8 And there are two Vanguard approaches
9 though. And it's very important to think of them
10 quite separately. One is the idea that by this
11 deed by what old Russian revolutionaries call
12 "propaganda of the deed." You know, we shall
13 strike, we shall show the weakness of the straight.
14 And, you know, Haza (phonetic), the masses will
15 rise.

16 A quite different approach is we shall
17 strike, the state will strike back. And that will
18 get people to hate the state. And Haza, the masses
19 will rise. But, one implies that success is in the
20 hands of the terrorist directly.

21 The other requires exploiting the
22 enemy. In this case, governments around the world
23 to act. And they have very different policy
24 implications. And you need to think about what the
25 terrorists are trying to accomplish with this,
26 because in general one frustration that terrorists
27 share almost universally is the masses don't seem

1 to want to rise.

2 They don't quite recognize the
3 brilliance of the revolution whatever its idiom,
4 and this a problem that Marxist revolutionaries
5 had. It's a problem that ethnonational
6 revolutionaries have, and so on.

7 We tend to see terrorist groups as
8 successful. But, you must remember that 90 percent
9 of them are wiped out within a year or two. So the
10 vast majority of terrorist groups, you know, there
11 are five guys sitting in a café. They blow
12 something up. They go to jail or die. And it's
13 over.

14 They fail again and again. The ones we
15 focus us, however, are that small group that has
16 had some measure of success.

17 The second point I'd like to raise is
18 the idea of how much ideology matters. And I think
19 more importantly, when it matters. It's to me,
20 inherently, interesting. But that doesn't
21 necessarily tell you much. I actually find
22 biblical criticism quite interesting, but I'm not
23 going to tell you that's going to be something that
24 everyone should be concerned about on a day-to-day
25 basis.

26 Clearly, ideology is a tool. It's a
27 tool for recruitment. It's a tool for inspiring

1 your followers. But, it's an open question to me
2 how much of a guide it is toward a group's action.

3 If you go back and you look at some of
4 the -- one of the first suicide bombings by a Sunni
5 jihadis group, which is an attempted assassination
6 of an Egyptian government official in Egypt by
7 Islamic jihad. And the double back flips the group
8 had to go through to rationalize the suicide
9 bombing.

10 And they ended up dragging in Christian
11 martyrs and talking about the importance of
12 martyrdom. And if you're -- if you're a radical
13 Islamic group reduced to talking about Christian
14 martyrdom, you know you really have a ways to go.

15 And this shows to me that for many of
16 the groups it's pragmatism that is driving them,
17 not ideology, when it comes to the choices of their
18 attacks.

19 But unfortunately it's not that easy to
20 dismiss ideology. In addition to the recruitment
21 and mobilization function, it often leads groups to
22 make huge mistakes from a strategic point of view.
23 And one of the best examples of that is Algeria
24 where, I think, for ideological reasons, mid-
25 1990's, parts of the movement turned the country
26 into a slaughterhouse.

27 And as a result the worldwide jihadists

1 movement kind of recoiled and in a way created new
2 groups to go for this. But it was tremendous
3 weakness. And I think many of us who were watching
4 Algeria in the mid-1990's were very concerned that
5 this government was going to fall.

6 And I think the insurgents through
7 their own ideological incompetence, really gave the
8 government a shot in the arm, that it took a lot to
9 make the Algerian government look better than the
10 alternative, but they succeeded.

11 The third point I'd like to raise is
12 the question of Zargawi himself. The United
13 States, as is well known, has quite a reward for
14 his head. But, it is always an interesting
15 question to me, which is if you remove a leader,
16 let us say he is magically killed tomorrow, does
17 something better come in his place?

18 And I would say for Bin Laden, he's a
19 very unusual leader, quite gifted in a number of
20 ways. Zargawi actually, I don't think is a
21 particularly good insurgent leader. And I would be
22 quite concerned that his replacement might be more
23 effective.

24 There is a certain matter of justice to
25 me that wants me to have his head on a pole,
26 perhaps quite literally. But, that's quite
27 different from whether this is actually a good

1 thing for fighting the insurgency. And this is
2 someone who has divided the insurgency.

3 This is insurgent movement that was
4 really about a bottom-up phenomenon. For those of
5 you who, like me, were in the world of studying
6 ethnic conflict in civil unrest in the 1990's, you
7 know that we focus very much on leaders. How do
8 leaders manipulate masses? How do they create this
9 phenomena where hatred did not exist?

10 This one really seemed to be bottom up.
11 You know, the old line about the man chasing the
12 crowd and saying, "wait for me, I'm your leader."
13 And that seemed to be happening in Iraq where
14 leaders did emerge, but they were not driving the
15 driving force.

16 But Zarqawi has divided the anti-
17 American movement. He's divided the Sunni movement
18 for that matter. And he's made the cause exception
19 unpopular through -- no, excuse me, he's made the
20 cause less popular than it should be through a
21 series of tactics as were mentioned, such as the
22 public beheadings, and so on, that have really
23 caused a lot of problems for him in a way that
24 suggest that his confidence as a leader to me is an
25 open question.

26 The last point I'd like to talk about
27 is this question of when local insurgencies go

1 global that Dr. Kepel raised at the end of his
2 talk. This was something that the movement tried
3 in Bosnia, where you had a strong local movement,
4 where they tried to flood foreign fighters and --
5 and shift the ethos of the movement and failed
6 quite -- quite disastrously.

7 Kashmir, however, has succeeded to a
8 degree. Where you have a number of groups that are
9 either heavily influenced by fighters who are not
10 Kashmiri, whether Pakistani Kashmiri, or any
11 Kashmiri, or who are drawn from really outside the
12 immediate conflict.

13 And while this creates a number of
14 quite effective fighters, and bodies to throw into
15 something, it's actually quite dangerous for the
16 cause in general. If you are a local insurgent
17 leader, there are real risks to this.

18 One is that these people tend to be
19 much less discriminate in who they kill because, as
20 Professor Brumberg mentioned, they often have
21 contempt for the locals. You know, after all,
22 they're lazy, they're not fighting, I can kill
23 them. You know, they're (inaudible), on-and-on.

24 The other is that you hurt nationalism.
25 Most of effective insurgencies harness nationalism
26 in some way. We see this in Iraq where they may
27 have an ideology that involves, you know, power to

1 the people. It may involve Islam. But it tends to
2 work when you get people motivated against an
3 outsider. Or, you get people thinking that the
4 government is not legitimate.

5 But when you drag in foreign fighters
6 of your own, on your own side, nationalism can work
7 in favor of the government. It really does hurt
8 the insurgent movement. And that to me is why very
9 smart groups can shy away from this.

10 If you look at what Hamas has done,
11 Hamas has, from what I understand, cleaned out a
12 number of Palestinian camps of various al-Qaeda
13 figures and some of the ones it controls.

14 And it's quite concerned that its own
15 movement will be hijacked, because it wants to use
16 violence, but use is pragmatically. It thinks
17 strategically and doesn't want violence simply to
18 go off the rails because it recognizes that it's
19 quite dangerous for Hamas' pursuit of power.

20 It's not necessarily because it's a
21 gentle movement, but simply because it's a smart
22 one.

23 I want to close simply by saying one of
24 the things I've admired most about Dr. Kepel's work
25 is that it gives me a tremendous sense of hope
26 because there's a tendency in, especially
27 Washington policy circles, to see the enemy as it

1 were, as an evil monolith, and you're kind of
2 waiting for thousands of fighters to pour into the
3 streets of Washington and set off bombs and so on.

4 But when you read his writings, you
5 understand the divisions and the differences within
6 this movement, their problems, their weaknesses.
7 And that actually suggests a long-term strategy,
8 which is time.

9 You know, there's a question, and this
10 was the heart of, you know, the containment of
11 communism, which is, do certain movements have
12 shelf lives? And do they collapse inherently on
13 their own contradictions?

14 And I think no smart person ever bets
15 on that. But, you have to recognize when you're
16 thinking about this movement that too much of a
17 direct attempt to influence this, may actually
18 prolong it rather than the goal, which should be
19 exacerbating the current and inherent weaknesses,
20 which is this movement in a very broad sense, is
21 quite susceptible for.

22 For I'm seeing the French cover of the
23 book. And there are four names on the cover. Bin
24 Laden, 'Azzam, Zawahiri, and Zarqawi. And with the
25 Zawahiri, Bin Laden exception, Bin Laden formed al-
26 Qaeda in part because he rejected where 'Azzam was
27 taking the organization. It was a splinter

1 movement.

2 Zargawi has been quite resistant as was
3 said to parts of the al-Qaeda agenda. There are
4 huge differences within this movement, and that's
5 something that needs to be recognized and ideally
6 exploited. I'll stop there. Thank you.

7 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Thank you very
8 much. I'd like to open the floor. Could I ask you
9 to go to the microphone and identify yourself and
10 your affiliation, please?

11 MS. RUBIN: Trudy Rubin from The
12 Philadelphia Inquirer. I'd like to ask about this
13 difference between nationalism and al-Qaeda's
14 broader philosophy. I'd like to ask Gilles Kepel
15 inside the Sunni movement in Iraq, as you know,
16 there was the beginnings of an effort actually to
17 combat Zargawi, which seemed to be gaining a little
18 bit of traction even though some of the Shiites
19 involved in it were being murdered.

20 Do you see that movement to repel the
21 foreigners as something that could gain momentum or
22 do you think that the civil strife that was
23 fomented by the Golden Mosque bombing is likely to
24 interfere with the growth of that?

25 And I'd like to ask Dan Byman, do you
26 think that if the peace process really is dead in
27 Israel and the Palestinian issue that the effort to

1 keep al-Qaeda out of the Palestinian movement could
2 end and when you got nothing, you got nothing to
3 lose, Hamas could change their mind?

4 MR. KEPPEL: I guess that the Golden Dome
5 operation is clearly very detrimental to the
6 cooption of Sunni elites and particularly Sunni
7 Muslim Brother elites into the -- into the
8 government. And that's in a way the sort of
9 sectarian violence is now becoming more important
10 than the feeling that there is a common nationhood.
11 You have to fight for against your foreign helpers.
12 Be they from Syria, from Algeria, or from the
13 suburbs of Pittsburgh or Paris.

14 And for the time being, I -- I would
15 say that the -- the sort of -- the attempt that was
16 made to have the Sunnis, you know, join the
17 bandwagon and so that, you know, at the end of the
18 day they would -- they would get a chunk out of the
19 -- out of the oil resources when they stop flowing
20 back.

21 This has been really jeopardized --
22 jeopardized by the -- by the Golden Dome bombings.
23 And the more Shias Sunnis strike, there is, the
24 more Iranian involvement you're going to have. And
25 I guess that now that the Iraqi issue is going to
26 be more and more a mixed Iraqi-Iranian issue, which
27 makes things even more difficult for -- for the

1 present American President.

2 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Dan.

3 MR. BYMAN: Very briefly. I think
4 there's a long way to go before Hamas would embrace
5 al-Qaeda for a number of reasons. One is as we've
6 learned in the Israeli Palestinian dispute, things
7 can always be worse. In fact when you say those
8 words, it's like saying, you know, at least it's
9 not raining. You look out when you say, things
10 could not be worse because they have gotten much
11 worse and certainly could.

12 And Hamas is probably the first group
13 to recognize that possibility. I would also add
14 that there's tremendous, within this community,
15 there's tremendous hostility as was mentioned
16 between the Muslim Brotherhood and other parts of
17 the broader Salafi jihadis movement.

18 And the Muslim Brotherhood is a suspect
19 for a variety of reasons. It's willingness to
20 participate in politics. It's -- part of it's
21 organizational structure. There are a number of
22 reasons, but remember of course that Hamas is the
23 Muslim Brotherhood spinoff. And that there is
24 similarities to this.

25 What I would be more concerned about is
26 actually almost the converse of this, which is
27 we've seen a number of groups when they've been

1 defeated locally going global. It's a very odd
2 reaction when you think about it, which is I have
3 failed to achieve jihad in Egypt. I failed to
4 achieve jihad in Algeria. Therefore, I'm going to
5 attack the United States.

6 But, there is actually tactical logic
7 to it. Because these groups are organizations and
8 must continue to function, it's often too hard for
9 them to function in the countries where they are
10 being hit hard. And going global is in a way
11 tactically easier for them.

12 And what is fascinating, we have
13 letters from Bin Laden to Egyptian leaders in the
14 mid-1990's, saying basically every time you attack
15 a target in Egypt, you lose a hundred people in the
16 aftermath of the attack. Either they're arrested,
17 they're wrapped up, and so on. And what do you
18 gain?

19 On the other hand, the United States is
20 wide open. And if Hamas both does get the sense
21 that, you know, there is no hope through other
22 means, and gets the sense that it's the fault of
23 the United States. I would worry that some
24 elements of Hamas, and particular with foreign
25 branches operating in Europe, would start to strike
26 at U.S. targets.

27 One thing European services are quite

1 concerned about it is that those of you are fans of
2 the Steven Spielberg's movie, Munich, you know that
3 for parts of 1970's and 1980's, Europe was a battle
4 ground between Israeli services and Palestinian
5 groups. That could renew. That you could see
6 Europe again being a feeder in part because Israeli
7 has effectively shut down a lot of what's happening
8 in the Palestinian areas through quite effective
9 intelligence.

10 And because there is a Palestinian
11 presence that's used right now mainly for fund-
12 raising, but could easily be turned into a small
13 operational network.

14 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Yes, please.

15 MR. MCGRAE: Thank you. Alex McGrae,
16 Media Development Associates. My question is for
17 Dr. Kepel and it's a very brief three part
18 question.

19 First, operationally speaking in
20 military terms, how does Zargawi's al-Qaeda
21 organization interface with the indigenous Sunni
22 Arab insurgents?

23 The second part is how many of
24 Zargawi's al-Qaeda's organization, the core
25 organization, are non-Iraqi's. For example,
26 Saudis, Egyptians, Chechnyans, Pakistanis, and so
27 forth?

1 And the third part of the question is,
2 did Zarqawi's organization promote, and in a sense,
3 teach the methodology of suicide bombing to the
4 local Iraqi Sunni insurgents?

5 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Thank you. You
6 can take a seat.

7 MR. MCGRAE: Pardon me?

8 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Wait for the
9 answer. Just sit down, please.

10 MR. KEPPEL: Thank you. If I -- if I
11 were in a position to answer accurately your
12 questions, I would not be sitting here, but
13 probably in someplace in the green zone of Bagdad
14 leading the operations. I mean, know one really
15 knows, you know, how it functions precisely.

16 What you have is that you have to rely
17 on Intelligence sources, which are not always
18 reliable. And on the -- on the documents which
19 you, which you can access to, mainly via the
20 internet, in terms of wills of martyrs, or
21 prerecorded wills of martyrs. And there are quite
22 a lot actually.

23 And if you have Arabic, then you have
24 an Arabic search, whatever it's called, an engine,
25 on the internet. Then you regularly have access to
26 biographies or hagiographies of so-called martyrs,
27 who died blowing themselves up in Iraq.

1 Following that sample, it looks quite
2 clear that a very significant amount of people who
3 blow themselves up in Iraq are not Iraqis. As I
4 mentioned before, there is a very significant Saudi
5 contingent.

6 And Saudis are particularly sought
7 after because they -- when they come to the Iraqi
8 border, I mean, they have, you know, a large amount
9 of pocket money for their daily expenses, which
10 their affixes (phonetic) confiscates for -- for
11 jihad use. And so they are particularly popular.

12 And they're also popular in Saudi
13 Arabia amongst some of the people in charge of
14 security because, you know, the more you send those
15 guys to Iraq to blow themselves up, the less they
16 will remain in Saudi Arabia. This is something
17 that was already experimented in the -- in the
18 1980's with the jihad in Afghanistan.

19 So, -- and we have testimonies and
20 wills from people from Europe, from Syria, Algeria,
21 and the like, who blew themselves up. So, it looks
22 like there is -- there is a significant amount of -
23 - of foreign martyrs who are there and as soon as
24 they, would be martyrs, as soon as they have
25 crossed the border, they have -- they have nothing
26 left, I mean, except their relation with the --
27 with the organization, which is going to send them

1 to -- to their death, right?

2 And even though some have escaped, you
3 know, we have at times you have interviews with so
4 and so, who didn't do the job and escaped. But the
5 majority of the people who go there are there for
6 the job. And they -- and they put themselves in a
7 situation where they will not do anything else.

8 So, to what extent do Iraqis themselves
9 blow themselves up. There are some, but, I mean,
10 in terms of numbers, it's not well -- very well
11 documented. I mean amongst -- amongst other
12 things, because the -- the websites who are keen to
13 -- to post the -- the wills usually are websites
14 which are, one way or another, linked with a group
15 operating in one country.

16 For instance, the Saudi jihadi websites
17 are keen to -- to have the lists of Saudi
18 martyrs, the Syrian martyrs, and so on and so
19 forth.

20 So, your first question was to what
21 extent?

22 MR. MCGRAE: What extent operationally
23 does Zargawi's al-Qaeda's organization interface
24 with the indigenous Iraqi insurgents? Do they --
25 do they work together operationally or separate?

26 MR. KEPPEL: Well, there again if I were
27 able to answer I would not be standing here. But,

1 I mean, what -- what was probably the -- the best
2 case in point in terms of the -- where we have
3 knowledge, Fallujah, where in Fallujah you had
4 indigenous Iraqi fighters, local tribes, and the
5 like, together with a number of Zarqawi people.

6 And a number of them were killed or
7 were found in Fallujah. What -- what comes out of
8 this picture, of this blurred picture, is that in a
9 way you -- you have two -- two layers, i.e., that
10 the -- the Zarqawi people are performing a number
11 of operations, which are not only for their own
12 sake, but for the sake of the Sunni insurgents in
13 general, i.e., trying to hamper Shia interests in
14 the government per se.

15 And this is precisely where the --
16 where the U.S. is trying to -- to be active. I
17 mean, to try to differentiate the two and to show
18 to the local Sunni, even if they are insurgents,
19 that what the Zarqawi people are doing is against
20 their interest as Sunnis.

21 MR. MCGRAE: If I may just add a quick
22 word in?

23 MR. KEPEL: Sure.

24 MR. BRUMBERG: You know this issue,
25 which is very difficult to answer, raises the
26 broader question of what ultimately at the end of
27 the day, do the Sunnis have an interest in a civil

1 war in Iraq.

2 And I think the answer is, if their
3 goal is to use violence for political purposes, the
4 answer is no, because they can't prevail in the
5 civil war. Particularly as Gilles pointed out, if
6 the Iranians intervene, look at the forces that
7 lied against them.

8 So, ultimately what is Zargawi up to?
9 What does he really want? Maybe he doesn't care.
10 Maybe his basic goal is to have man. But, the goal
11 of the Sunnis is to find some way of affecting the
12 political climate.

13 So, this is a very profound fissure.
14 Now, we may have crossed the line already on that
15 issue. In which case, the Sunnis may find
16 themselves on the losing end.

17 So, I think this is in some sense a
18 more fundamental question in terms of what
19 ultimately determines the kinds of fissures that
20 Gilles talked about and the extent to which they
21 can be exploited. And I think we were probably
22 beyond that already.

23 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Gilles did you
24 want to add something?

25 MR. KEPPEL: Yeah, maybe not on Zargawi
26 per se, because there again, I mean, as Dan just
27 mentioned, it's difficult to know whether there is

1 any significant Zarqawi ideology. I mean Zarqawi
2 is somewhere between the al-Qaeda ideology and the
3 day-to-day management of jihad underground.

4 But if you -- if we go back to
5 Zawahiri's letter to Zarqawi released last fall,
6 Zawahiri says that jihad in Iraq has different
7 steps. First step to oust the Americans. Second
8 step creates an Islamic emirate in Iraq, and then
9 reinforce it so that it would become a counterfeit
10 on the biggest amount of territory possible.
11 First, in Iraq and then in surrounding countries.

12 Third step sort of widen the jihadis
13 way, as he says, to the secular countries were
14 neighbors to Iraq. And fourth step, which is the
15 final step, fights Israel and destroys Israel.

16 So, you know, but this -- this is a
17 very, if I may say, a very naive Sunni view of the
18 situation in the area, because, you know, you have
19 -- you have a big man nearby, who is Mr. Iran. And
20 this one has different interests.

21 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: next, please.

22 MR. MARSHALL: My name is Rick Marshall.
23 I work for USAID. This is precisely the question I
24 wanted to ask you and I want to see if I can draw
25 you out a little bit more.

26 It's certainly conceivable that Iraq
27 could go into a much more violent situation and

1 perhaps be a genuine civil war. The United States
2 might even pull out under certain circumstances.
3 But, how does -- is there any sense that -- that
4 this a winnable fight? That -- do they have a
5 plan? Or a sense tactical plan where they actually
6 could prevail given the numbers, at least within
7 Iraq? Or is it really a general Muslim worldwide
8 conflagration that would have to take place?

9 MR. KEPEL: Who's the "they?"

10 MR. MARSHALL: Zargawi. Yeah, if they
11 are going to go against the Shia, they're obviously
12 not going to be alive with the Kurds. I mean
13 you're going to have numbers, huge numbers against
14 you to begin with.

15 MR. KEPEL: Okay. Going back to what
16 Dan Brumberg said earlier on, why is that Sunni
17 insurgents had an interest in insurgency? I guess
18 that, you know, they consider that what they would
19 get out of the -- of the new sort of pro-American
20 power system in Iraq would be close to zero in
21 terms of the chunk of oil they would get. In terms
22 of the access to power.

23 So, if they had an insurgency going on,
24 there would be no oil at all. So, you know, even
25 if they have nothing, it would zero divided by
26 nothing. And the others would have nothing also.

27 So, the bargain was that we'll stop the

1 insurgency provided we can have a deal, which is
2 satisfactory to us. And then, you know, we'll
3 start bargaining. And this was, in my view, this
4 finally was understood by -- by the U.S. side. And
5 this is why Khalilzad opened to the Sunnis. And
6 their cooption into the system meant that they
7 would get something significant out of the deal.

8 And that is all that was, maybe it's
9 too late now. But that is the only way for the
10 U.S. to have a stable -- stabilized situation in
11 Iraq. Even though the Sunnis are a minority, they
12 nevertheless have a power for nuisance, if I may
13 say so, which can preclude any return to peace, to
14 stability, and to wealth, and well-being in Iraq.

15 So, you better have them in. Then you
16 have to decide on, you know, what's the level of
17 their participation. But with -- with the Somali
18 bombings, it looks like, you know, it's going to be
19 extremely difficult. And that they are not going
20 to -- the stakes are going to be much higher from
21 the Sunnis side in terms of their participation to
22 power.

23 PARTICIPANT: I think he meant, how --
24 do they have a plan to prevail?

25 MR. BYMAN: Let me come in on that.

26 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Dan Byman.

27 MR. BYMAN: There are a couple of issues

1 when you look at that question. The first is the
2 issue of numbers. The very American perspective is
3 to say, you know, 60 percent of the country is a
4 Shia, 20 percent is Sunni Arab. Therefore, you
5 know, three to one. Okay, we're moving on.

6 Numbers actually don't work that way in
7 terms of warfare. You have many, many cases where
8 the usual key is superior organization. And the
9 Sunnis in Iraq have at the moment far better
10 organization, far better training, are far better
11 prepared for war.

12 That diminishes over time, because the
13 Sunnis are mobilizing, or excuse me, the Shia are
14 mobilizing. So in political science terms, there's
15 a window where you have early attacks are better
16 for the Sunnis because if a civil war is
17 inevitable, have it today, not ten years from now.

18 The other is mis-perception, if you
19 talk to many Sunnis, they will tell you that the
20 elections were fixed because Sunnis are a majority,
21 Sunni Arabs are a majority in Iraq. And what is
22 this nonsense about a Shia majority. Although we
23 laugh about it because we have the CIA fact book
24 that can tell us the actual number.

25 This is something that is actually
26 widely believed and influences perceptions, which
27 is that the disparity is not there the way we see

1 it. And needless to say, this mis-perception is
2 very strong among those who it matters most.

3 A related point is contempt, which is
4 we -- a lot of these fighters look upon the Shia
5 with contempt. That hit them hard, they will
6 collapse. They cannot fight. They're not
7 warriors. And we are.

8 And again, this influences that
9 decision. Now you have these different strands
10 within the Sunni community part of which is using
11 violence I think quite tactically. To -- violence
12 here, we strike a deal, the violence reduces, and
13 so.

14 But the problem with inviting the
15 foreigners in and working with them, is you lose
16 control. You might be able to use violence
17 tactically for your little cell. But the cell next
18 to you isn't fighting a civil war and you can't
19 control it.

20 And that to me is the problem for the
21 Sunnis Arab tribesmen in Iraq who is largely
22 motivated by getting a better deal. Are -- in
23 order to push violence effectively, they've invited
24 people in who have no interest in their agenda.

25 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Okay. Yes.

26 MS. MAHLE: Melissa Mahle, C&O
27 Resources. Unfortunately, one of those counter-

1 terrorism analysts. First of all, I'd like to
2 thank you for the presentation. It was very
3 interesting, very informative.

4 In looking at it from an American
5 perspective, one of the things that we have looked
6 at quite a lot was, first of all, we had not
7 anticipated the degree to which Iraq would become a
8 sanctuary for terrorism.

9 And that it's now really fulfilling the
10 role that Afghanistan played in the 1980's of being
11 a source of inspiration, being a training ground,
12 and being the ultimate network. And looking
13 forward, taking into consideration the Sunni Shia
14 element that has truly risen quite to the forefront
15 with the conflict in the current stage.

16 Looking forward to how this is going to
17 evolve in the global jihad, do you see -- would you
18 anticipate moving to a new front, the global jihad,
19 wherever that might be? And maybe you have some
20 thoughts on that. Or really is it going to get
21 bogged down in this Sunni Shia splinter?

22 Will the Bin Laden's of the world, the
23 ideological world, have the say, "no, we need to
24 unite and fight the far enemy?" Or will they bog
25 down in their own more ideological disagreement?

26 MR. KEPEL: Thank you. Well, this was
27 more or less what I tried to discuss in this other

1 book called, in English, *The War for Muslim Minds*,
2 but which in French was called, *Fitna*. But, maybe
3 American publishers thought that such a word would
4 be a catastrophe for sales. And they did not take
5 *Fitna*, but, *The War for Muslim Minds*.

6 MR. BRUMBERG: They might think it has
7 something to do with being fit.

8 MR. KEPPEL: Yeah, well *Fitna*, fitness, I
9 mean, it would sell like hotcakes on Key West, but
10 unfortunately.

11 And so this *Fitna* issue is -- is a
12 major issue, i.e., the problem with jihad is that
13 when it is launched inappropriately, I mean, not at
14 the right time, not by the right people, then it
15 back lashes against those who have launched it.

16 And it's an issue of momentum. It's an
17 issue of knowing your enemy and of tactics of
18 strategy. And there again, the -- the Iraqi front
19 is likely to become something that has to do with
20 the Iranians, which is going to be a problem for
21 the -- for the Sunnis, for the jihadis, for their
22 backers, for the Saudis, for, you know. I mean,
23 there is something -- there is something very
24 worrying, which is opening now in Iraq.

25 I mean, the Pandora's box has been
26 opened and it's not going to close soon, I think.
27 Now, in terms of what are the benefits of this --

1 of this jihad or this entire American jihad in
2 Iraq. As Zawahiri puts it, and Zawahiri is often a
3 rather good analyst of, you know, of geopolitics.
4 I mean, I don't say that I agree with him of
5 course, but it's always interesting to try to see
6 his accounts of things, and the balance of forces.

7 And so he made, if I'm not mistaken,
8 three infuriated declarations of late. Saying that
9 once again, as I mentioned before, the Muslim
10 Brothers are the ones who are taking all the credit
11 for it. And, you know, we started jihad. We were
12 the ones who were managed that there is just an
13 antagonism, such a hatred for the west, and for
14 Americans, in particular, in the -- in the Muslim
15 world, and this is all due to us. This should be
16 put to our credit.

17 But, you know, what have they done?
18 They just opened the door for democratic elections
19 and to some extent in Egypt. To a large extent in
20 Palestine, to quite an extent in Iraq. And who
21 benefits from it, the Muslim Brothers.

22 So, you know, jihad, true jihad, is
23 being betrayed. And even though this leads to a
24 sort of a rising antagonism with the west.
25 Nevertheless, traitors have -- have seized the
26 opportunity to arise their own standards to the
27 detriment of the true jihadis.

1 And they are in a crisis. And hence
2 this attempts to -- maybe to find another --
3 another place than Iraq. Now if you read Dan
4 Pipe's (phonetic) literature, they found it in
5 Europe. You know, "While Europe Slept," and
6 whatever the Pipe's dream cottage industry, which
7 is here and there.

8 And where to read what he writes and
9 his associates write, you have the streets of
10 Paris, and the caves of Paris, and the suburbs of
11 whatever, of London, Amsterdam, are filled with
12 jihadist who are going to destroy putrids and
13 decadent Europe, baby-less (phonetic) Europe, and
14 the like, and turn it into the next land for jihad.

15 I think this has more do to with
16 fantasy than with reality. But that does not
17 exclude the fact that they are probably nowadays
18 trying to -- not to bet all they have on Iraq.
19 Because Iraq is in a way is turning sour. And the
20 stakes are becoming too big for them I would say.

21 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Yes, please.

22 MS. EFRON (phonetic): Sonne Efron with
23 the Los Angeles Times. I'd like to bring you back
24 if I may to the question of financing al-Qaeda.
25 Has Zarqawi to your knowledge tapped into the money
26 that Saddam Hussein had that the Saddam Hussein
27 loyalists presumably still control? And what do

1 you make of the strange line in the Zawahiri-
2 Zarqawi letter exchange about "send money?"

3 MR. KEPPEL: Send me some cash. Send me
4 \$100,000.00. Yeah, um-hmm.

5 MS. EFRON: And could you evaluate the
6 U.S. strategy, the Treasury Department strategy,
7 for trying to shut down the terrorist's assets?
8 First of all, do you think it's succeeding?

9 And second, do you think that money
10 plays a major role in this in continuing the
11 struggle? Or is the ideology basically self-
12 financing that even for example, if the U.S. or the
13 west were to succeed in cutting off the access to
14 funding that it wouldn't affect the insurgency?
15 Thank you.

16 MR. KEPPEL: Well, there again, if I were
17 in a position to answer your question, I would
18 probably be a U.S. Treasury General, or something.
19 Unfortunately, I'm not.

20 Yeah, I was struck, as you were, by
21 this strange line by the end of Zawahiri's letter
22 where he's after he sort of chastised Zarqawi and
23 said, you know, "kill as many Shias as you want,
24 but don't say it, and don't be so blatant, and stop
25 this webcam, those webcam executions, it's no fun
26 and it's not funny."

27 And then finally he says, "by the way,

1 could you hand some cash and \$100,000.00 would do?"
2 And I did not really know what to -- what to make
3 of it. I mean, it would probably as you're
4 rightfully suggested, lead to the fact that the --
5 they are not denied of resources.

6 And the fact that they have -- they
7 have joined ranks with the Sunni insurgents, means
8 that they have -- they have money, because the
9 Saddam Hussein groups or the Sunni brojrauzi
10 (phonetic) is not out of funds and has looted the
11 country for decades. So all this money has not
12 evaporated.

13 But, more than that, it's difficult to
14 say. I mean, you know, it's a low-cost jihad all
15 together. It doesn't cost much. The budget for
16 the London bombing was a few thousand quids
17 (phonetic).

18 And the Madrid operation was in the
19 tens of thousands. So this is not of dollars or
20 euros, or whatever. So this is not something where
21 you need to have, you know, a major money
22 laundering. I mean, a semi-wealthy individual can
23 be the finance here.

24 And this may -- but there again, this
25 is only a speculation, but this may be one of the
26 reasons why, you know, since 9/11, we haven't seen
27 any operation on the same scale. 9/11 needed, you

1 know, the preparation for 9/11, needed massive
2 money transfers, needed an organization, needed
3 anticipation, and the like. Things which, you
4 know, on a rather long time, things which may now
5 not escape the scrutiny of the many agencies
6 worldwide who are into looking at those things.

7 And the copycat bombings were on a much
8 smaller scale. There are two ways to look at -- to
9 compare the 9/11, 3/11 in Spain 2004, and what
10 happened in London.

11 One, is the sort of optimistic, if I
12 may say so, way considering the number of -- of
13 victims and casualties. By the thousands in
14 America, by the hundreds in Spain, and by the tens
15 in -- in Britain.

16 So you might, you know, conclude that,
17 you know, they are less and less able. But, you
18 can look at it the other way around, and this is
19 far more problematic because in the U.S. the 19,
20 "The Magnificent 19," as that they have it in
21 jihadis circles, were all foreigners. I mean, none
22 of them was American-born, educated, or whatever.
23 They just were thrown into the U.S. just like, you
24 know, agents had been in the past.

25 In Spain, it was a blend of al-Qaeda
26 people from outside and local Moroccan immigrants
27 living in Spain who had been, you know, picked up

1 more or less at the last minute, which lead to the
2 fact that they were not really suicide operations.

3 I mean they were the kids left their
4 booby-trapped bags on the trains and then left,
5 because they had not been trained. Finally, they
6 blew themselves up where they were surrounded by
7 the Spanish policeman.

8 But nevertheless they were locals even
9 though they were not nationals, they were locals,
10 which is much more (inaudible). And ultimately,
11 Muhammad Sidique Khan (phonetic), the lead suicide
12 bomber, was the quintessential son of British
13 multiculturalism.

14 And the, and you'll probably see this
15 tape, the sort of jewel tape, that was sent
16 afterwards where you have Zawahiri's tape as an
17 envelope who gives the sort of geopolitical -- of
18 the attack against Britain.

19 And then you have within the envelope
20 you have a little tape by Muhammad Sidique Khan
21 with a thing over his head speaking in a strongly
22 accented Yorkshire English, which is his new other
23 language, right? And saying, I can't really
24 imitate it. And who would I be to dare imitate an
25 English accent.

26 But, "this is war and I am a fighter,"
27 something like that. And which, you know, it

1 doesn't need much cash, but to do that. But this
2 is probably it's much more problematic. I mean,
3 because this is ideological and this is -- this is
4 something much more powerful than money.

5 If you -- if you have access to -- to
6 locals who can -- who can sort of go anywhere. Who
7 have identity, in terms of identity cards, and the
8 like. Just like, you know, this is one of the
9 issues with the converts who are being more and
10 more used as the tools.

11 And the famous Belgian, Boulonjay (phonetic),
12 and the others. And that raises questions also of
13 social control. And is one of the debates which is
14 raging in Europe today is the -- the Brits have
15 their Londonistan model, i.e., at community "was
16 under the control of moderates Islamic leaders who
17 would report to the police and check that peace and
18 order be delivered."

19 Leads clearly showed the limits, the
20 limitations of this model. The French system has
21 no such community thing. And the police and
22 security forces have, who have had unfortunately
23 more than 20 years experience in this issue, have
24 gone much deeper into -- into the movement. And
25 this, to a large extent, explains why France was
26 spared from 2001. As neocons would tell you that
27 it's because we're cowards and we are not in Iraq

1 and this is why.

2 I don't think so, because we have the
3 veil affair, which is even worse than Iraq. And to
4 their eyes. But, I guess that this largely because
5 -- because the police and the Intelligence Agencies
6 have -- have done a far more in-depth work in those
7 -- in those groups. And there is far less supports
8 in the sort of the wider Muslim community.

9 But there again, I mean, I guess that
10 the real battle is taking place there. I mean, I
11 don't mean in Europe or if it's in Europe, it's not
12 lost as Pipe said. It's in the making and I think
13 we'll win it.

14 But the -- but it's an issue of how we
15 win the battle for hearts and minds. And this is
16 not only an issue of money. I mean, money is an
17 issue as the sort of panic about on the control of
18 U.S. ports, as port authority showed, reveal of
19 late. But it's not only that.

20 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: We just have
21 five more minutes, so I would like three quick
22 questions please, and then brief answers from the
23 panelists. But, really no comment, just brief
24 questions.

25 MR. HELF (phonetic): My name is Brian
26 Helf from the Institute of World Politics. I have
27 a question. You actually mentioned at the end of

1 your last statement, "hearts and minds," which has
2 come across your statements abound, "draining the
3 swamp," is another.

4 To what extent should the United States
5 be treating this as more of political conflict?
6 The synergy between ideology and politics is self-
7 evident. The United States and its alias in
8 fighting not only against Zarqawi and the Iranians
9 in Iraq, but against terrorism abroad be treating
10 this less as a military conflict, less as an
11 attempt to make friends in the Muslim world, but
12 also -- but instead denigrate the sociopathic
13 ideology of these terrorists. There is a word, I'm
14 sure you're familiar with it, a "herella
15 (phonetic)" the war against society in Arabic.
16 It's one of the greatest --

17 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Thank you. I'm
18 going to take -- let's take all the questions
19 together.

20 MR. FRADKIN: Hillel Fradkin, of the
21 Hudson Institute. Let me thank Gilles for a very
22 generous talk. It was two talks. One was on Iraq
23 and one was on al-Qaeda. And I got a little
24 confused along the way. So, I just want to be very
25 clear, although I think you've been clarifying it
26 along the way.

27 As far as Iraq is concerned, things are

1 very, very bad for the U.S. But, the main
2 beneficiary looks like it will turn out to be Iran.
3 And as a result of which, it's very, very bad for
4 al-Qaeda. That it's really terrible for al-Qaeda.

5 And on that side, the main
6 beneficiaries are, let's put it this way, the
7 Salafi (phonetic) wing of the radical movement.

8 I want just to be in the first place
9 clear, that that's your opinion. And perhaps ask
10 you where that goes, perhaps especially in light of
11 a thesis I recall a long time ago that political
12 Islam was dead, which was had lead or Salafi
13 political Islam was dead, and that's what had lead
14 to the insurgents of jihadi political Islam.

15 Second thing, I just simply want to
16 make a comment. You know, you may very well be --
17 be correct that -- well, I actually I have another
18 question, and then one comment. The question is I
19 wasn't quite clear of why you thought the neocons
20 would object to the publication of your book. Is
21 it that you're publishing the documents? Or is it
22 that it's in French, a language they refuse to
23 read.

24 Lastly, well it may very well be true
25 that Pipes is -- is incorrect. Probably, if he
26 were, he would -- it's because he has not taken
27 sufficiently into account the -- the Intelligence

1 services, which you -- in France at least, which
2 you mentioned. Nor the good sense of the French
3 Intelligentsia.

4 And what I recently noticed was their
5 response to a plan to try to absorb more of the
6 unemployed youth in the suburbs with some new labor
7 law. I see that the French students, French
8 intellectuals, French labor unions have embraced
9 this plan with great enthusiasm.

10 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Last question.

11 MS. AL-AMEER: My name is Rasha al-
12 Ameer. I'm from the University of Maryland.
13 Although very realistic, this division of the word
14 between Sunni, Shias, Kurds, Protestant, is a flow.
15 It's a vice in the -- in the European and American
16 way of thinking the word.

17 But to come back to this realistic flow
18 and vice, don't you think that the big man, Iran
19 that you called, had the right as a Shia identity
20 to help his bomb, because on the other hand, the
21 Pakistanis, the Sunnis have there's?

22 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Panelist.

23 MR. BRUMBERG: I'll say very quickly
24 then leave the final word to Gilles, our guest
25 here. I just think that in terms of what we call
26 in the states, blow back, this is major blow back
27 in terms of Iraq. And it leads to the question of

1 what we will do with Iran given the present
2 situation.

3 And it is interesting to note that our
4 own Ambassador sitting in Bagdad has talked about
5 six, seven, eight weeks ago, about initiating a
6 dialog with the Iranians. Now that comes very late
7 in the day.

8 But if the analysts that Gilles
9 presents suggest anything, it would suggest that
10 there has to be some sort of reviewing of our
11 approach to the Iranians given the kind of leverage
12 they're going have and already have in Iraq. So, I
13 just wanted to throw that out as a policy relevant
14 observation. And I'll turn the chair over to
15 Gilles to help us finish up.

16 MR. KEPPEL: Thank you very much. I
17 don't know how I'll manage with all those
18 questions. The last one, i.e., whenever you go to
19 Iran, I mean, one thing is clear that even art
20 secularists (phonetic) in Iran are the type who
21 eats mola (phonetic) every morning for breakfast, a
22 sankin (phonetic) cooked in wine.

23 Those people will tell you that they
24 will die for the Iranian nuclear bomb. Because
25 Iran, which is a thousand-year civilization is
26 surrounded by lizard-eating Arabs, Pakistani
27 bandits, Turkmen peasants, and so on, and so forth.

1 So, there is this feeling that if only
2 for defensive reasons, Iran has a right to -- to
3 have a bomb because of -- among other things. Not
4 necessarily because the Israeli's have it, but the
5 Pakistani's have it.

6 And so I don't know. I mean, we
7 recently saw that President Bush offered a nuclear
8 deal to India. But, that means that, you know, the
9 Indian government is deemed more reliable than the
10 Iranian government for the time being.

11 But this issue is not going to be
12 settled with a "no." There is no doubt about that.
13 I mean, the Iranian nuclear issue is something that
14 has to be negotiated. And to what extent is it
15 possible to have an Iranian civilian nuclear
16 system, probably not with -- with the Malauz
17 (phonetic). But, in the future, I don't see how he
18 could escape it.

19 The first -- then there was those very
20 complicated questions by Hillel. I have to deal
21 with it. What was the first question?

22 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: The first
23 question.

24 MR. KEPEL: Yeah.

25 MR. FRADKIN: Attacking the idea --

26 MR. KEPEL: Oh, with the war, yeah, war.
27 Well, I think this is a very interesting, sorry, a

1 very interesting issue. Actually, the -- maybe the
2 mistake in the west, and particularly in this
3 country, after 9/11, was to consider that this was
4 a matter of war. And that war was illegitimate.
5 And the most efficient answer to the out-surge of
6 terrorism.

7 The war on terror was something that
8 was started in a way to make a link between 9/11,
9 Afghanistan, and then Iraq. Because, you know, the
10 natural outcome of the war on terror was Iraq. And
11 as soon as the Saddam Hussein regime was toppled,
12 now we don't hear of the war on terror anymore.
13 It's not on the official agenda.

14 There was something new that was
15 coined, but it didn't work out. Project for the
16 whatever. It was something against violent
17 extremism. Something like, nack (phonetic) or nade
18 (phonetic) or -- . Something that was sponsored by
19 -- by the administration.

20 But, it's, you know, the fact that with
21 such an imminent people as you, we're at pains
22 finding the acronym, means that it's not really
23 that popular, right?

24 So, I'm struggle maybe better for --
25 struggle, right? Struggle may be more significant
26 than war in terms of the means which are -- which
27 are used. Because it's not -- it's not really an

1 issue that the military can deal with. It's far
2 more complicated.

3 And it has to deal also with -- with
4 issues within societies for which the military are
5 not equipped, including our societies. Definitely
6 "The Sleeping Europe," but also the great awakening
7 America.

8 Now, to -- to go back to -- to Hillel's
9 questions. You know, I tried to -- to make an
10 assessment of what I thought was happening in -- in
11 Iraq. And it may be a non-Euclidian assessment.
12 That is to say, where parallels interfere with each
13 other.

14 The -- I fear that what the Samarra
15 bombing -- anyway, the Samarra bombings were
16 intended, the way I understand them, to preclude
17 the cooption of the Sunnis into the Iraqi's
18 political system. That would put an end to the
19 American dream to have the good, even the good
20 insurgent Sunnis into the system, so that they
21 would -- they would cut all ties with Zarqawi and
22 Zarqawi would be isolated.

23 So, now that the Sunnis are alienated,
24 because of the major Shia retaliation, there will
25 be no Sunni cooption. And then there is no Zarqawi
26 isolation from the mainstream Sunni insurgents.
27 That's Phase One, I mean, goal number one.

1 But then there is an intended or
2 unintended consequence. Is that the more, as the
3 gentleman said, one of the people who mentioned the
4 fact that Sunnis, though a minority, were far
5 better trained, equipped, were rich, and had this
6 feeling of superiority on Shias.

7 I think this is all very -- all very
8 true. But, then now that you have Shias mobilizing
9 finally, then significant mobilization of Shias in
10 Iraq, of Shias thinking that the U.S. cannot defend
11 them anymore. And that the U.S. are now interested
12 in having Sunnis in and that they are not reliable,
13 and so on and so forth.

14 That opens an avenue for Iranian
15 interference, which is already extremely
16 significant in the ranks of the -- of the alsedra
17 (phonetic) militia. And also in the Hakeem
18 (phonetic) group. And this may be if you wish a
19 semi-unintended consequence. I mean, for -- for
20 the Zarqawi people, what is interesting is that the
21 insurgent Sunnis are not going throw them out now.
22 I mean, they have, you know, they have secured,
23 they have covered their back on this issue.

24 But in doing so, they may have opened
25 the door for -- for a major window of opportunity
26 for the Iranians. Something which at the end of
27 the day will not -- should not be great for the

1 Zargawi people, because then the conflict is going
2 to take another nation, provided the U.S. still
3 stays in the game, which may not be the case.

4 I mean, in terms of physically, staying
5 in the game in Iran. But this is, you know, this
6 is too farfetched to decide as of today.

7 As of your other questions, I was just
8 joking of course about the fact that the
9 publication of this book in French would be
10 perceived as another sign that -- by the neocons
11 that the -- the French were really on the bad side.
12 But we know that already.

13 And the -- what you said about the
14 parties are not there the way we see it. And
15 needless to say, this mis-perception is very strong
16 among those who is matters most.

17 A related point is contempt in
18 neighborhoods of outskirts of the big cities where
19 we have projects, which are mainly people by
20 families or semi-families, I mean semi-families
21 because very usually the fathers are absent.

22 More or less like what happens in
23 African-American neighborhoods here, where kids
24 mostly predominately from African origin whether
25 black Africa or north Africa origin, set fires to
26 cars in a sort of sacrificial manner, after dusk to
27 attract attention on their plight.

1 And so this was diversely interpreted.
2 Some said that it was the failure of the French
3 model of integration. Others, Fox News had it that
4 it was Fallujah on the Seine. I think the New York
5 Times was the third intifada. And each according
6 to his own series of fantasies.

7 Dealing with -- my students and I went
8 through the blogs that, you know, that insurgents
9 or semi-insurgents, Fallujah French insurgents, had
10 on the internet. And there was very, very little
11 Islam in that. It was -- it was mainly things that
12 had to do with respect, with burning -- torching
13 more cars than the other city, and the like.

14 And at times you had a guy who started
15 with Hondu ela (phonetic) my brothers, don't burn
16 cars. We have to burn the great evil of empires
17 French, and whatever. But, then he would be sort
18 of brushed off by the others who said, "no, sucks
19 and we don't buy your shit."

20 Or you would have another guy, a
21 leftist French, who you would identify because he
22 would write in grammatical French instead of text
23 French. Mixed-up with back-slang and Arabic back-
24 slang and say, "comrades, do not burn the cars of
25 your -- of your brothers in suffering, but go to
26 Nior with the posh neighborhoods and burn the cars
27 of the capitalists." And there again he would be

1 "hey, you're a bufunce (phonetic), or dummy, or get
2 out," and we don't -- we don't understand the
3 language he was talking.

4 So, it was -- it was more of a movement
5 that was showing not only social deprivation, but
6 also -- also the feeling of racial and ethnic
7 alienation. Visa vi (phonetic) the mainstream that
8 was -- that I personally interpreted as an attempt
9 to join the mainstream and to join the folds.

10 That is why there were a number of
11 measures that were taken in order to try to
12 facilitate their access through the job market.
13 Now the measures -- the government measures that
14 you so facetiously refer to called the CPE or the
15 contrat premiere embauche (phonetic), "the first
16 job," whatever it is called thing, which is now
17 leading to demonstrations, massive demonstrations
18 in France, which is why I fled my country and try
19 to ask for shelter in the U.S.

20 It was -- it is not directly related to
21 that. It is something that has to do definitely to
22 this problem of having access to the job market for
23 -- for young people, but the vepaun (phonetic) sort
24 of mis-targeted the issue because the students are
25 not pleased because they're convinced that they can
26 have access to a job for life. And that they will
27 not be fired, you know, during when they have their

1 first jobs.

2 And this job thing, this new job thing,
3 allows the corporation or whatever to fire someone
4 within two years without providing any
5 explanations, any justification in order to
6 fluiditify (phonetic) the job markets.

7 The idea would be that, you know, as
8 it's easier to -- to recruit than, you know, young
9 people will have -- will break the first lock and
10 then will be kept in the system.

11 But then for the unemployed youth of
12 the projects, who have no qualifications at all
13 usually, this thing does not help because no one
14 wants them on the job market. Whether it be on a
15 temporary basis or a non-temporary basis. So, it
16 has no real relation with -- with the suburb's
17 thing, much to our regrets.

18 CHAIRWOMAN ESFANDIARI: Thank you very
19 much. We couldn't help, but end with a note
20 regarding France, which was very nice. Thank you
21 very much.

22 MR. KEPPEL: It's the center of the
23 world.

24 (Whereupon the entitled-
25 matter was concluded at
26 (time not provided).)

27

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10