Philippine Facilitation Project

U.S. Interests in the Philippines Peace Process

Eugene Martin
Executive Director, Philippine Facilitation Project

The following is adapted from a presentation given by Eugene Martin as part of the February 8, 2005 Institute Current Issues Briefing: "Crunchtime for the Mindanao Peace Process?"

Background

The United States has been involved with Filipino-Muslims since 1898 when we purchased the Philippine Islands from the Spanish for $20 million. Although it never conquered the Islamic sultanates in the south, Spain was willing to transfer all the islands to the United States as if it had. We succeeded in overcoming Moro resistance where Spain failed, thanks to modern weaponry and tactics. Realizing the ethnic and religious differences between the Moros and the rest of the Philippines, the U.S. colonial government administered Muslim areas separately, giving them considerable autonomy in local and cultural affairs. Perhaps as a result of U.S. colonial policies, representatives from Muslim areas formally urged Washington not to include those areas in the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, preferring even to remain a U.S. colony for a longer period. The United States did not heed Muslim entreaties, which has resulted in Moros occasionally telling Washington that the subsequent problems are the fault of the United States so “we” should fix them.

During the American colonial period, migration to Mindanao from Luzon and the Visayas was encouraged, resulting in the dramatic demographic shift between original inhabitants--the indigenous (or Lumad) peoples and Muslims--and settlers, most of whom were Christian. The migration caused changes in land ownership and control over natural resources, leading to realignments in political and economic power. As an increasingly marginalized minority, the Muslim ethno-linguistic groups, trying to present a cohesive front by calling themselves “Moros,” struggled to preserve their ancestral lands, political, and economic way of life and culture, which was in large measure defined by their religion. Their inability to influence or contest the policies and actions of Manila peacefully led to the creation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and subsequently the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) adopting violent means to protect their rights and culture.

Prior to 9/11, the United States was not directly engaged in the conflict in Mindanao. While U.S. security assistance (training, equipment, exercises, etc.) focused on improving the capabilities of the armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) in general, U.S. focus was more on the nationwide threat posed by the communist New Peoples’ Army (NPA), leaving the GRP and the AFP to manage or contain the MNLF and MILF rebellion. While the activities of Al Qaeda representatives in the Philippines attracted greater attention in the mid-1990s after evidence of terrorist plots against airliners, the Pope, and President Clinton, it was the September 11 attack that changed U.S. perceptions of the conflict in Mindanao.

Post 9/11 Developments

Information obtained after the overthrow of the Taliban linked with previous knowledge on the return of Filipino-Muslim fighters from Afghanistan raised U.S. concerns that Mindanao might become a new sanctuary for extremists and Al-Qaeda operatives. The MILF welcomed the weapons, explosives, and tactical training Afghan veterans provided MILF combatants, thereby enhancing MILF capacity to withstand AFP attacks and launch offensive operations. Similarly alarmed by recent developments, Philippine President Macapagal-Arroyo was one of the first international leaders to support the U.S.-led Global War on Terror, perhaps seeing a renewed alliance with the United States as the means to increased U.S. support. She found a willing partner. The passage of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999 permitted joint AFP-U.S. exercises, allowing the U.S. armed forces to conduct more extensive training missions with the AFP in the Philippines. Subsequent counterterrorism training, such as the 2002 Balikatan exercise on Basilan, gave the AFP greater capability to reduce threats from the Abu Sayyaf Group and other criminal/terrorist groups.

In addition to a clear objective against terror, however, the United States has a broader objective in Mindanao. The United States recognizes that the Moro people of the southern Philippines have “serious, legitimate grievances that must be addressed.” While the United States is committed to the territorial integrity of the Philippines and remains concerned about links between the MILF and international terrorist organizations, it has expressed its willingness to support, politically and financially, peaceful negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF. Its assistance is predicated on the MILF renouncing and severing its ties with terrorists.

Former MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim responded in a letter to President George W. Bush and in a subsequent policy statement to reiterate his “. . . condemnation and abhorrence of terrorist tendencies. . . “ and to “. . .Reject and deny any link with terrorist organizations or activities. . . .” On that basis, the United States Institute of Peace was asked by the U.S. government to work in coordination with the Malaysian government for a successful peace settlement.

Current Status of the Peace Talks and Roles of the Facilitators

Formal negotiations were resumed in the spring of 2001 after President Macapagal Arroyo was elevated to the presidency upon the overthrow of former President Estrada. Estrada had launched an “all out war” on the MILF base, Camp Abubakar in 2000, ending three years of intermittent talks. President Arroyo asked the Malaysian government to serve as the mediator and host of the negotiations. Malaysia had supported the MNLF after Marcos tried to destabilize Sabah in the early 1970s and so it had extensive contacts among the Moros in Mindanao. After Estrada’s attack on Camp Abubakar, the MILF insisted that future talks be held in a third, preferably Muslim, country. The Malaysians, however, do not consider themselves mediators, preferring instead to be seen as facilitators and hosts. They describe their role as providing the facilities and record-keeping secretariat for the talks. They also reportedly wait until both sides report their readiness to meet before scheduling a session.

The formal negotiations broke off again after the AFP attacked the MILF’s new headquarters in Buliok in February 2003. Talks succeeded in establishing a ceasefire between the AFP and MILF in July 2003, the month MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim died suddenly. It took over a year for the GRP to meet the MILF’s preconditions for resuming formal negotiations but they have yet to reconvene. The two sides to date have held six exploratory sessions attempting to overcome obstacles and differences of opinion. The latest was the third week of December and was supposed to be followed by another round last weekend. The latest word is that the talks have slipped again to late February or early March. However, it now appears that the MILF has asked the GRP to lobby the Malaysians to schedule the talks.

The U.S. Institute of Peace and the GRP-MILF Peace Process

In June 2003, after President Arroyo asked President Bush for U.S. assistance, the Institute was asked by the State Department to work with the Malaysian government to facilitate the negotiations. President Arroyo’s request was echoed in a May 2003 letter to President Bush from Chairman Hashim welcoming U.S. involvement. The Institute does not seek to supplant Kuala Lumpur, but instead to work with all parties to move the process forward as part of the overall U.S. commitment to help implement an equitable and durable peace agreement after one is reached.

Contrary to original expectations, the Malaysians have not welcomed Institute participation in the talks. Irrespective, however, the Institute continues its work to further the peace process in spite of such developments. Our activities over the past 19 months have focused on meeting with GRP and MILF representatives engaged in the peace process as well as establishing ties with civil society activists in Mindanao promoting peace. We have also sponsored research on underlying issues such as ancestral domain, initiated an effort to sensitize Philippine media to the impact it has on the conflict, positive or negative, and begun to plan seminars to explore alternative ways of addressing unresolved issues.

In closing, the Institute will continue to work with interested parties in the region and seeks to promote discussion here in Washington on developments in the peace process through event like today’s Current Issues Briefing. We remain hopeful the talks will resume soon.

The views expressed above do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.