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Special ReportAugust 1995 | Special Report No. 14 The Military Balance in Bosnia and Its Effect on the Prospects for PeaceKey PointsThe speakers held that the military balance in Bosnia is key to diplomatic efforts at peacemaking. They limited their remarks on June 7 to weighing the current balance of forces and to examining the realities should the international community take one of the following options: ( I ) continuing the arms embargo on Bosnia, (2) lifting the embargo (on Bosnia or Bosnia and Serbia), or (3) diminishing the military advantage of the Bosnian Serbs. Neither speaker advocated any particular option or proposed objectives for the international community. Both stressed at several points that altering the military balance in Bosnia could not be undertaken without an international consensus on the larger objective of doing so, and both clearly favored a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The Balance of Forces
The vulnerability of the Bosnian government forces lies primarily in low levels of heavy equipment and weapons designed to counter heavy equipment and limit Bosnian casualties. This vulnerability cannot be overcome by increases in light arms alone. Changing the Balance of Forces and Negotiation
IntroductionOn June 7, the United States Institute of Peace conducted a briefing on the military balance in Bosnia at the invitation of the Congressional Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The event was conceived as the first in a series of meetings on the question of opening new prospects for diplomacy in managing the conflict. The question before the meeting was whether the state of and tendencies regarding weapons, manpower, morale, operational characteristics, and so on, among the parties to the Bosnian conflictissues not prominent in the public or legislative debateunderlies all of the questions before the international community about the conflict. Without understanding the current situation, one cannot tackle such issues as reconfiguring and securing United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR), evacuating UN troops (if necessary), and lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia or easing sanctions on Serbia. The military balance is also fundamental to the question of how the international community can make progress at the bargaining table now and in the longer term. The briefing, which was moderated by the vice chairman of the Institute's Board of Directors Max M. Kampelman, involved remarks from military experts Norman Cigar of the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting and Zalmay Khalilzad of the RAND Corporation. The speakers held that the military balance in Bosnia is key to diplomatic efforts at peacemaking. They limited their remarks to weighing of the current balance of forces and to examining the realities should the international community take one of the following options of ( I ) continuing the arms embargo on Bosnia, (2) lifting the embargo (on Bosnia or Bosnia and Serbia), or (3) diminishing the military advantage of the Bosnian Serbs. Neither speaker advocated any particular option or proposed objectives for the international community. Both stressed at several points that altering the military balance in Bosnia could not be undertaken without an international consensus on the larger objective of doing so, and both favored a diplomatic solution to the conflict. The United States Institute of Peace believes that the following summary of remarks will serve to inform policymakers and others who must deal with a changing and volatile situation on the ground in Bosnia. Since the briefing on June 7, significant new fighting has broken out that altogether threatens UN operations in Bosnia. That fighting may itself alter the military balance, which the international community would have to consider in proceeding to the next stage of its presence in the region. The material that follows, which presents the basics of the military situation in Bosnia, should shed light on events as they unfold. Norman CigarNorman Cigar addressed the nature of the military balance in former Yugoslavia and whetherand howit was amenable to change. The question of whether it should be changedor the relation between the balance and the negotiating tableCigar preferred to leave to others. In Cigar's opinion, the facts about the balance are well known: the Bosnian government and its Croatian allies have a manpower advantage, and the Bosnian Serbs have an advantage in heavy equipment. When it comes to tanks and armored personnel carriers, artillery and ammunition, the ratios are 8-to -1 to 1 0-to- 1 in favor of the Serbs. Despite the presently insurmountable advantage in heavy equipment, a rough balance of force seems to obtain, a balance that is a recipe for an indecisive, bloody, and volatile stalemate. More important than knowing these facts is understanding the nature of the balance knowing the answers to such questions as: What is the operational center of gravity for one party to the conflict or another? What allows one party or the other to be successful on the battlefield? Assessing the Bosnian Serbs The Bosnian Serbs also have certain vulnerabilitiesmorale and manpower. It has long been assumed that Bosnian Serb morale is high and that they fight with reckless abandon. This is not true now, Cigar said. There are numerous stories in circulation regarding the desertion of troops, including some about roundups of deserters in Serbia and Montenegro, of mines placed between forces and their armored vehicles to prevent retreat, execution squads to prevent units from leaving, and so on. One Bosnian Serb general said last year that 46 percent of the officers had already left the Bosnian Serb army. Taking up the manpower vulnerability of the Bosnian Serbs, Cigar noted that their forces are fairly small. Bosnian Serbs numbered about 31 percent of the population in the first place, and about 200,000 live in lands now held by the Bosnian government and the Croats. Perhaps as many as 500,000 have left Bosnia altogether, leaving 600,000 in Bosnian-Serb-held areas. The Serbian population is older than the Muslims and Croats. The front is some 1,600 km. long, and the Serbs are stretched to man it. As morale dips, the manpower pool shrinks, and casualties affect both morale and manpower. Even though the Serbs have superiority in heavy equipment, it is not easy for them to keep that equipment manned. The Bosnian Serbs have gone so far as to draft Muslims and other non-Serbs in their territory for such tasks as digging trenches. The Bosnian Government and Croat Forces Regarding the current status of the balance, Cigar opined that the Bosnian Serbs had gone as far as they can go at the cost they are willing to bear. They do not have everything they want, but they have to minimize their casualties. It is much easier for them to starve Sarajevo out than to fight for it. In Cigar's estimation, the Serbs now want to consolidate their gains, they are tired and, most important, have no good war-ending strategy. They seek to hold on and bleed the Bosnian government, while hoping for a breakdown of the Bosnian- Croat Federation and for the international community to tire of the struggle and to cease supporting the Bosnian government. Changing the Balance Considering the strength of Serbia's ability to commit to help the Bosnian Serbs, Cigar noted that Slobodan Milosevic would have his own manpower problems over the long term, since 300,000 to 500,000 draft-age men have left Serbia. Cigar did not believe that shifting the balance in favor of the Bosnian government would lead to a no-holds-barred guerrilla war. The latter would not suit the Bosnian Serbs, whose strength is in heavy equipment. It would also play into the hands of the Bosnian government, which has the light forces to deal with a "people's" war. Cigar concluded that although a rough balance obtained at present, it could be changed easily and fairly quickly. The question was not whether or how to change it, but why? To what end should the balance be changed? What arc the objectives of the international community? Does a changed balance suit those objectives? Zalmay KhalilzadZalmay Khalilzad opened with the observation that the military balance in Bosnia has been the key variable in the failure of the international community to bring peace there. The Serbs have felt that they had more to gain on the battlefield than at the negotiating table because the balance favors them: they also demand a settlement that reflects the current balance. It is true that the international community has tried to affect the balance by imposing UN forces and establishing no-fly and exclusion zones. However, ambivalence among the powers and divisions between the UN and NATO have prevented the desired effect. Initially, said Khalilzad, the Serbs were uncertain about the effectiveness of the international community. By now, they are convinced that no outside military force will be a credible factor in the proceedings because of poor command arrangements, the vulnerability of UN forces, the weak authority of the commander, limited staff capability, and timid rules of engagement. For these reasons, the local balance of forces has not been affected. The Current Balance of Forces Khalilzad provided a set of statistics (from UNPROFOR and U.S. government sources) comparing the state of the balance in 1993 with that of 1995; it showed a trend moving slowly toward improvement in the Bosnian position. He noted that the intelligence on tanks and artillery showed wide variations for 1995, more evidence of the difficulty of being definitive. (See table below.) Balance of Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina
* Includes both Bosnia government and Bosnian Croat assets. Changing the Balance? Once the embargo was lifted, the United States could lead an international effort to provide weapons, intelligence, support, and training as the West did in Afghanistan. In Khalilzad's view, when the West began aiding the Mujahedin in Afghanistan, the balance of forces was much less favorable to them than it now is for the Bosnian government. Even with the embargo in place, the United States could do more to strengthen the Bosnians. The embargo does not preclude providing training, nonlethal assistance, or even helicopters. Khalilzad asserted that if the United States had provided the same sort of assistance to Bosnia that it is currently providing to Slovenia--under the same embargo--the balance could have been positively affected. The other way to change the balance to force negotiations would be to weaken the Serbs. Khalilzad asked why, when heavy weapons have been placed under UN supervision, they have not been disabled. That would surely have made a difference in the balance and still could. He conceded that to weaken the Serbs over the long haul, the UN force would have to be either withdrawn or reduced in size and reorganized under NATO command. Even without troops on the ground, airpower could make a major difference. It might not bring peace, bit it could shift the balance. Airpower could interdict forces on the move, disable heavy weapons, and disrupt supply lines. According to Khalilzad, a deliberate Western strategy of weakening the Bosnian Serbs, consisting of a number of elements, could have been employed:
This strategy, if it had been seriously pursued, could have had one of two results: the Bosnian Serbs might have come to accept the Contact Group plan, or the balance of power might have changed in favor of the Bosnian government, further increasing the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. Such a strategy would have turned Bosnia into a quagmire for the Bosnian Serbs, not for the West. The Prudent Way to Proceed? According to Khalilzad, there is no prudent way to proceed now without U.S. leadership: no strategy for success is likely without the United States at the center of it. Under the U.S. leadership, the international community should stick to the 51-49 percent arrangement and work to change the military balance by lifting the arms embargo, using NATO airpower effectively, or using a combination of the two. Unless the balance changes, neither a settlement nor long-term arrangements is likely. Unless the balance is changed, Bosnia would have to become an international protectorate in order to survive and that is not in the interests of the United States and other nations. In closing, Khalilzad mentioned that the United States and its allies should also consider "holding Milosevic's feet to the fire." There are differences between Belgrade and Pale, the Serb and Bosnian Serb capitals, but Milosevic plays a key role, especially if the goal is to limit the capabilities of the Bosnian Serbs. In proceeding prudently, he warned, we must also be on guard against the possible spread of war beyond Bosnia to Kosovo and Macedonia. Khalilzad agreed with the proposition that Bosnia is important to the United States. Indeed, twenty years from now, the conflict may be seen as the defining event in U.S. dealings with Europe and the Islamic world and with the peace and stability of the Balkans. Asking whether it was such a vital interest that we should risk a large number of casualties on the ground, he said that there was "a huge range of alternatives between doing nothing or something ineffective and going in a big way on the ground." American airpower, weapons, training and intelligence could be used to shift the balance in a way that is consistent with our values and interests. Using ground forces is one solution, but the cost may be too high for us. If we choose not do that, we are not out of options. There are effective options "in between," as the case of Afghanistan shows. Additional Comments from the Question-and-Answer PeriodThe Brcko Corridor In response to a question regarding whether the Bosnian and Croatian armies could seize the Brcko Corridor, which links the major Serb-held areas of Bosnia, Norman Cigar was cautious. He noted that although the Bosnia- Croatian numbers looked good on paper, there was not, after all, unity of command and effort: getting cooperation between these forces has been difficult. In addition, the corridor is very well defended by the Bosnian Serbs and has the highest concentration of quality Serb forces. It would clearly be the hardest area to take, and the Serbs are still trying to widen it. The question, Cigar said, is whether to attack Serb strength first or to attack Serb weakness. In his option, the Bosnians and Croats could not take and hold the corridor right now without more artillery. Contradicting Cigar somewhat on Bosnian-Croatian cooperation, Zalmay Khalilzad noted that the Bosnian-Croat Federation has been helpful. The fact that Bihac has not fallen, he said, has been due to Croatian assistance, including helicopter-lifted supplies. The Bosnian-Croat agreement has been a "significant achievement affecting the [military balance]," moving it away from the Serbs. Strategic Bombing TV, Radio and Communications Bosnia and NATO, the Russian Factor, and Serbian Status in the Balkans Khalilzad stated that it is a false proposition that we have to choose between Bosnia and NATO. We can lead NATO, after all, and if the situation in Bosnia continues, it may undermine NATO's credibility. Europe remains vital to the United States, and challenges to Europe can come from both east and south. We can still have to solve the problem of how NATO reacts to the absence of a single overwhelming threat. Our lack of conviction or strategy in the case of former Yugoslavia has left that problem unsolved. Khalilzad admitted that Russia was a problem under the current circumstances: "We have to remember that as long as this is a UN action, Russia will be there and may veto a more robust intervention." The Russians have, however, accepted the 51-49 percent formula and may even go along with lifting the embargo on Bosnia under certain circumstances. Khalilzad has heard from some Russians that they would support a "lift-lift" approach, that is taking the embargoes off both Bosnia and Serbia. Given the relative ineffectiveness of sanctions against Serbia, he "would not regard this as an entirely negative proposition" for the United States if it is to pay the price of getting the Bosnian embargo lifted. Regarding the larger picture in the Balkans, Khalilzad said that the Serbs will be the dominant force in the Balkans if they win in Bosnia. While the Bosnians and Croats represent greater numbers in Bosnia, whether or not that will mean anything in the long run depends on how the present conflict is resolved. Russia, Serbia, and the Adriatic Coast Lifting the Embargo: Perils of the Interim Khalilzad noted that there were a number of ways to arm the Bosnians and recalled the long, complicated debate over how best to help the Afghans. The most important thing if we wish to help, he said, is to be willing to adapt to the situation. What the Bosnians need are antitank weapons, artillery, and counter artillery, which a number of states can provide. The United States could orchestrate this effort, but there is no reason why we should pay for everything. "There are lots of people who would like to be of assistance, " Khalilzad asserted. He went on to say that nothing forbids training Bosnian government troops right now and that such training could be done in Croatia or even Germany. "If we decide to use American power indirectly, we have to persist until the Bosnian Serbs come to the table. If we're patient, we wouldn't have to go in all at once on the ground to effect peace." To a related question about the amendment lifting the embargo put forward by Reps. Smith and Hoyer, Khalilzad responded that he had favored lifting the embargo during his time in the Bush administration. He argued that the Bosnians have the right to defend themselves: "The embargo policy has worked to the advantage of the aggressor, but that advantage is eroding. An active strategy of arming Bosnia--not by the U.S. alone--would be a good alternative to going in [on the ground]." Airpower Redux Khalilzad said that the key to the question was objectives. If the objective is to reduce Serb capability rather than to end the war--that is, to shape the outcome and to protect the enclaves during the transition after lifting the embargo-- airpower can do the job. He noted that we even have the capability to deal with one of the most significant problems in Bosnia--cloud cover. The Predator UAV system, although not yet fully operational, might deal with that problem. It should be deployed to the region. Khalilzad noted that the use of U.S. airpower should be transitional. Whatever the objectives, the question that remains is whether we have the will to meet them. The key issue now is our determination and our ability to demonstrate leadership. He felt that bringing the major states along would be a very demanding task for the United States. The Problem of the 51-49 percent Formula and Getting Back to the Table Kampelman closed by saying that the diplomatic objective of the United States and Europe should be to get the parties back to the negotiating table, where grievances, many legitimate, with respect to boundaries and other divisive issues can be peacefully resolved. Referring to some of the discussion, he said that it appeared to him "if we want to win a war, we have to look to something beyond airpower. But for a more limited purpose--such as providing incentives by regrettably inflicting punishment to get the parties to the negotiating table. . .-- for that airpower may play a vital role." ParticipantsMax M. Kampelman, Moderator Norman Cigar Zalmay Khalilzad About This ReportOn June 7, at the invitation of the Congressional Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United States Institute of Peace conducted a briefing on the military balance in Bosnia The event was conceived as the first in a series of meetings on the possibility of opening new prospects for diplomacy in managing the conflict. The question before the June 7 meeting was whether the state of and tendencies regarding weapons, manpower, morale, operational characteristics, and so on, among the parties to the Bosnian conflictissues not prominent in the public or legislative debateunderlies all of the questions currently before the international community about the conflict. The briefing, which was moderated by the vice chairman of the Institute's Board of Directors Max M. Kampelman, involved remarks from military experts Norman Cigar of the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting and Zalmay Khalilzad of the RAND Corporation. The U.S. Institute of Peace believes that the summary of remarks will serve to inform policy makers and others who must deal with a changing and volatile situation on the ground in Bosnia. Since the briefing on June 7, significant new fighting has broken out that altogether threatens UN operations in Bosnia. That fighting may itself alter the military balance, which the international community would have to consider in proceeding to the next stage of its presence in the region. The material that follows, which presents the basics of the military situation in Bosnia, should shed light on events as they unfold. This Special Report presents the views of the briefing participants and does not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace or of the Congressional Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe. August 1995 See the complete list of Institute reports. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policies. |
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