May 2007 Electrical Safety Occurrences

There were 11 electrical safety occurrences for May 2007:

- 1 resulted in shocks to a worker
- 1 involved lockout/tagout
- 7 involved electrical workers and 4 involved non-electrical workers.
- 3 involved subcontractors.

In compiling the monthly totals, the search initially looked for occurrence discovery dates in this month, and for the following ORPS "HQ keywords":

01K - Lockout/Tagout Electrical, 01M - Inadequate Job Planning (Electrical),


08A – Electrical Shock, 08J – Near Miss (Electrical), 12C – Electrical Safety

The initial search yielded 10 occurrences and a review of these determined none needed to be culled out.

period	Elec. Safety Occurrences	Shocks	Burns	Fatalities
1/07	15	1	0	0
2/07	11	3	0	0
3/07	9	1	0	0
4/07	18	3	1	0
5/07	11	1	0	0
2007 total	64	9	1	0
2006 total	166	26	3	0
2005 total	165	39	5	0
2004 total	149	25	3	1

The rolling summary of 2007 electrical safety occurrences is now:

The average rate of occurrences in 2007 is now 13 per month, which is less and the average rate of 14 per month experienced in 2006.



Electrical Safety Occurrences - May 2007 - as of 5/31 download

No	Report Number	Subject / Title	ew	n-ew	sub	shock	burn	arcf	loto	excav	cut/d	veh
1	EM-RPBNRP- RPPWTP-2007-0010	Articulating Boom Strikes Electrical Distribution Box		х								
2	NALASO-LANL- NUCSAFGRDS-2007- 0001	Potential Faulty Wiring Installation Results In LOTO Failure	Х						х			
3	NALSO-LLNL-LLNL- 2007-0026	Contact with 120VAC Electrical Source During Pump Start- up Activity	х			Х						
4	NAPS-BWXP- PANTEX-2007-0065	Wire Disconnected From Solder Joint	х									
5	NAPS-BWXP- PANTEX-2007-0066	Discovery of Electrical Wires in Building 16-12 Equipment Room Extending Past the Open End of Flexible Conduit		Х	Х							
6	NA—PS-BWXP- PANTEX-2007-0069	Control Panel Door Found Unsecured	X									
7	NE-IDBEA-TSD-2007- 0001	Unguarded Open Control Panel Exposing Electrical Hazard	X									
8	SCASO-ANLE-ANLE- 2007-0007	Electrical Near Miss		Х								
9	SCASO-ANLE- ANLEFMS-2007-0008	Subcontractor Initiates Work Beyond Authorization	х		Х							
10	SCASO-GOCH- DOEARGONNE-2007- 0001	DOE-CH Electrical Near Miss		Х								
11	SCBHSO-BNL-BNL- 2007-0008	Ungrounded Neutral Discovered in wye connected output of 13.8kV/208V Dry Type Transformer	X		X							
	Total		7	4	3	1			1			

<u>Key</u>

ew= electrical worker, n-ew = non-electrical worker, sub = subcontractor, arcf = significant arc flash, excav = excavation, cut/d = cutting or drilling, veh = vehicle event

ORPS Operating Experience Report

Production GUI - New ORPS

ORPS contains 53238 OR(s) with 56556 occurrences(s) as of 6/6/2007 3:36:53 PM Query selected 11 OR(s) with 11 occurrences(s) as of 6/6/2007 4:00:00 PM

	Γ	Download this report in N	Iicrosoft Word format. 🖻			
1)Report Number:	EM-RPBNRP-RPPWTP-2007-0010 After 2003 Redesign					
Secretarial Office:	Environmental Management					
Lab/Site/Org:	Hanford Site					
Facility Name:	RPP Waste Treatment Plant	RPP Waste Treatment Plant				
Subject/Title:	Articulating Boom Strikes Ele	ectrical Distribution Box				
Date/Time Discovered:	05/16/2007 14:45 (PTZ)					
Date/Time Categorized:	05/16/2007 15:50 (PTZ)					
Report Type:	Notification					
Report Dates:	Notification	05/23/2007	16:54 (ETZ)			
	Initial Update					
	Latest Update					
	Final					
Significance Category:	3					
Reporting Criteria:	10(2) - An event, condition, or series of events that does not meet any of the other reporting criteria, but is determined by the Facility Manager or line management to be of safety significance or of concern to other facilities or activities in the DOE complex. One of the four significance categories should be assigned to the occurrence, based on an evaluation of the potential risks and the corrective actions taken. (1 of 4 criteria - This is a SC 3 occurrence)					
Cause Codes:						
ISM:	2) Analyze the Hazards3) Develop and Implement Hazard Controls4) Perform Work Within Controls					
Subcontractor Involved:	No					
Occurrence Description:	At 1435 hours on 16-May, 2007, and ironworker operating an articulating bo lift within the LAB Facility at the Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) struck an electrical distribution box while descending. The area was placed in a safe configuration and secured for investigation. The preliminary investigation determined that there were three individuals acting as spotters present, but as another lift was descending at the same time, the spotting for the lift that stru- the box was not adequate.					
	The electrical distribution box suffered damage (a dent ~ 8 " across) to the exterior surfaces, but there was no electrical sparking and the circuit breaker did not trip.					

Cause Description:	
Operating Conditions:	Construction
Activity Category:	Construction
Immediate Action(s):	- The area was placed in a safe configuration and secured for investigation.
	The area was placed in a sure configuration and secured for investigation.
	- An investigation was initiated.
FM Evaluation:	
DOE Facility Representative	
Input:	
DOE Program Manager	
Input:	
Further Evaluation is	Yes.
Required:	Before Further Operation? No
	By Whom: M. Hood By When:
Division or Project:	Waste Treatment Plant
Plant Area:	600
System/Building/Equipment:	
Facility Function:	Nuclear Waste Operations/Disposal
Corrective Action:	
Lessons(s) Learned:	
HQ Keywords:	07DElectrical Systems - Electrical Wiring
	08FOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Industrial Operations
	08HOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Safety Compliance
	08JOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Near Miss (Electrical)
	08KOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Near Miss (Other) 12KEH Categories - Near Miss (Could have been a serious injury or fatality)
	13AManagement Concerns - HQ Significant (High-lighted for Management
	attention)
	14EQuality Assurance - Work Process
HQ Summary:	An ironworker operating an articulating boom lift within the Hanford LAB
	Facility at the Waste Treatment Plant struck an electrical distribution box with
	the boom as it was descending. The electrical distribution box suffered an 8-inch dent but there was no electrical sparking and the circuit breaker did not trip.
	Three spotters were present during this lift, however they were distracted by
	another lift at the same time. The area was placed in a safe configuration and
	secured for investigation
Similar OR Report Number:	
Facility Manager:	Name EDENS, VICTOR G
	Phone (509) 371-2077
	Title Safety Operations Manager
	Title Safety Operations Manager
Originator:	TitleSafety Operations ManagerNameEDENS, VICTOR G

	Title				
HQ OC Notification:	Date	Time	Person Notifi	ed Organization	
	NA	NA	NA	NA	
Other Notifications:	D	ate	Time	Person Notified	Organization
	05/16	6/2007	14:45 (PTZ)	M. Hood	BNI/Con
	05/16	5/2007	14:45 (PTZ)	G. Ceffalo	BNI/Saf
	05/16	5/2007	14:59 (PTZ)	J. Christ	DOE/FR
	05/16	5/2007	16:30 (PTZ)	V. Edens	BNI/Saf
	05/16	6/2007	17:28 (PTZ)	N. Crarry	ONC

Authorized Classifier(AC):

2)Report Number:	NALASO-LANL-NUCSAFGRDS-2007-0001 After 2003 Redesign					
Secretarial Office:	National Nuclear Security Administration					
Lab/Site/Org:	Los Alamos National Laborat	Los Alamos National Laboratory				
Facility Name:	Nuclear Safeguards					
Subject/Title:	Potential Faulty Wiring Instal	lation Results In LOTO	Failure			
Date/Time Discovered:	05/03/2007 11:55 (MTZ)					
Date/Time Categorized:	05/03/2007 12:05 (MTZ)					
Report Type:	Notification					
Report Dates:	Notification	05/07/2007	19:21 (ETZ)			
	Initial Update					
	Latest Update					
	Final					
Significance Category:	3					
Reporting Criteria:	10(2) - An event, condition, or series of events that does not meet any of the other reporting criteria, but is determined by the Facility Manager or line management to be of safety significance or of concern to other facilities or activities in the DOE complex. One of the four significance categories should be assigned to the occurrence, based on an evaluation of the potential risks and the corrective actions taken. (1 of 4 criteria - This is a SC 3 occurrence)					
Cause Codes:						
ISM:						
Subcontractor Involved:	No					
Occurrence Description:	Management Synopsis: On May 3, 2007, management identified a concern related to potentially faulty wiring at the Nonproliferation and International Security Center (NISC) which resulted in a failed Lock Out/Tag Out (LOTO). On May 1, 2007, a Prototype Fabrication (PF) electrician was performing a zero energy check on equipment he had locked and tagged out when he discovered the piece of equipment was still energized. The electrician found 120V on the neutral wire. The electrician obtained a second voltmeter and verified the equipment was still energized. He along with a co-worker identified a second					
equipment was still energized. He, along with a co-worker, identifi						

	piece of equipment that was on the same 208 volt bus. They performed LOTO on the bus for the second piece of equipment which successfully de-energized the breaker. At 1545 on May 1, the NISC Operations Manager submitted an engineering service request (ESR) for an electrical system evaluation in room 1828A. On May 3, 2007, the facility electrical safety officer (ESO)/deployed electrical engineer determined the LOTO failed because the neutral was not grounded or bonded properly. This resulted in a floating (ungrounded) system instead of a grounded system as intended by facility design specifications. He also determined that the neutral wire was not the correct color (white) in accordance with National Electric Code (NEC) standards. Instead, the white wire was phased and the neutral wire had been taped blue. Additionally, the labeling on the machine, breaker, and transformers were not correct. The FOD ESO determined that equipment case grounds had been properly installed. Background: The PF electrician followed LOTO procedures to include using proper personal protective equipment (PPE) (dielectric gloves rated from 0-1000 volts, flash hood and flash vest). He entered the work activity on the LOTO log and performed LOTO on the equipment. He checked all four wires including the three phased wires and the neutral wire. He discovered the unexpected voltage when he checked the neutral wire which led to the discovery of the faulty wiring. Notifications during this event were made promptly and appropriately.
Cause Description:	
Operating Conditions:	Normal
Activity Category:	Maintenance
Immediate Action(s):	
mmediate Action(s):	 The breakers for both pieces of equipment were immediately locked out. Management stopped work activities involving equipment on the 208 volt system in room 1828 until repairs could be made. Management directed an independent electrical inspection for NISC facility. Management directed a review of electrical system labels.
FM Evaluation:	
DOE Facility Representative Input:	
DOE Program Manager Input:	
Further Evaluation is Required:	Yes. Before Further Operation? No By Whom: TRP and QA-OA By When: 06/15/2007
Division or Project:	Nuclear Nonproliferation (N) Division
Plant Area:	machine shop
System/Building/Equipment:	Bldg Electrical system/TA3-2322/machine shop
Facility Function:	Laboratory - Research & Development
Corrective Action:	
Lessons(s) Learned:	
HQ Keywords:	01BConduct of Operations - Configuration Management/Control 07DElectrical Systems - Electrical Wiring

	12CEH Categories - Electrical Safety 14DQuality Assurance - Documents and Records				
HQ Summary:	An electrician at the LANL Nonproliferation and International Security Center performed a zero energy check that measured 120 volts on the neutral wire for a piece of equipment he had locked and tagged out (LOTO). He and a co-worker identified a second piece of equipment that was on the same 208 volt bus. They locked out the circuit breaker for the second piece of equipment and this de- energized the neutral wire. An investigation by an electrical engineer determined the LOTO failed because the neutral wire was not grounded or bonded properly. Also, the color of the neutral wire and the labeling on the machine, breaker, and transformers were not correct.				
Similar OR Report Number:					
Facility Manager:	NameGail JohnsonPhone(505) 667-4362TitleFOD				
Originator:	NameHAKONSON-HAYES, AUDREY CPhone(505) 667-9364TitleOCCURRENCE INVESTIGATOR				
HQ OC Notification:	DateTimePerson NotifiedOrganizationNANANANA				
Other Notifications:	Date Time Person Notified Organization				
	05/03/2007 12:05 (MTZ) Myra NNSA				
	05/04/2007 09:32 (MTZ) Cordell Myer PAAA				
	05/04/2007 09:34 (MTZ) Carl Geisik IHS				
Authorized Classifier(AC):	Antonia Tallarico Date: 05/05/2007				
3)Report Number:	NALSO-LLNL-LLNL-2007-0026 After 2003 Redesign				
Secretarial Office:	National Nuclear Security Administration				
Lab/Site/Org:	Lawrence Livermore National Lab.				
Facility Name:	Lawrence Livermore Nat. Lab. (BOP)				
Subject/Title:	Contact with 120VAC Electrical Source During Pump Start-up Activity				
Date/Time Discovered:	05/04/2007 14:40 (PTZ)				
Date/Time Categorized:	05/07/2007 10:30 (PTZ)				
Report Type:	Notification				
Report Dates:	Notification 05/08/2007 11:06 (ETZ)				
	Initial Update				
	Latest Update				
	Final				
Significance Category:	2				
Reporting Criteria:	2C(1) - Failure to follow a prescribed hazardous energy control process (e.g.,				
	lockout/tagout) or disturbance of a previously unknown or mislocated hazardous				

	energy source (e.g., live electrical power circuit, steam line, pressurized gas) resulting in a person contacting (burn, shock, etc.) hazardous energy.
Cause Codes:	
ISM:	
	N
Subcontractor Involved:	
Occurrence Description:	On May 4, 2007 in Building 391 Room B350A, a worker contacted a 120VAC source while starting a new cooling system and received a minor shock on his left index finger. As part of setting up a new cooling system, a worker removed the cover of a small motor and pump assembly. The worker then inadvertantly placed his left hand over both spade connectors of the electrical switch connecting to the motor as he energized the motor and pump with the rocker switch using his right hand. The worker immediately felt an electrical shock to his left index finger and therefore quickly removed his hand. The worker announced to fellow workers that he had received a shock. The co-workers immediately called 911. A Laboratory response team arrived within five minutes and transported the worker to the on-site medical facility. At the on-site medical facility, the worker was examined, was determined to have no injury, and was returned to work at approximately 1600 hours with no restrictions.
	that the event meets the "hazardous" threshold for reportability.
Cause Description:	
Operating Conditions:	na
Activity Category:	Normal Operations (other than Activities specifically listed in this Category)
Immediate Action(s):	Co-workers in the area called 911. The worker was trasported to the on-site medical facility for evaluation. NIF management stopped work, barricaded the area, and initiated an investigation.
FM Evaluation:	Final Report due June 20, 2007
DOE Facility Representative Input:	
DOE Program Manager Input:	
Further Evaluation is Required:	Yes. Before Further Operation? No By Whom: Rob Broderick By When: 06/20/2007
Division or Project:	NIF
Plant Area:	Site 200
System/Building/Equipment:	391
Facility Function:	Laboratory - Research & Development
Corrective Action:	
Lessons(s) Learned:	

HQ Keywords:	 01AConduct of Operations - Conduct of Operations (miscellaneous) 01QConduct of Operations - Personnel error 08AOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Electrical Shock 12CEH Categories - Electrical Safety 13AManagement Concerns - HQ Significant (High-lighted for Management attention) 14EQuality Assurance - Work Process 				
HQ Summary:	While setting up a new cooling system in LLNL Building 391, a worker inadvertently placed his hand over both spade connectors of an electrical switch for a motor and received a 120 VAC electrical shock to his index finger. A response team transported the worker to the on-site medical facility, which found no injury and returned him to work with no restrictions. Management stopped work, barricaded the area, and initiated an investigation.				
Similar OR Report Number:	1. na				
Facility Manager:	NameRob BroderickPhone(925) 423-7775TitleNIF Directorate Deputy Associate Director for Oper				
Originator:	NameECCHER, BARBARA APhone(925) 422-9332TitleOCCURRENCE REPORTING OFFICER				
HQ OC Notification:	DateTimePerson NotifiedOrganizationNANANANA				
Other Notifications:	DateTimePerson NotifiedOrganization05/07/200713:00 (PTZ)David CorporandyNNSA/LSO				
Authorized Classifier(AC):					

Authorized Classifier(AC):

4)Report Number:	NAPS-BWXP-PANTEX-20	NAPS-BWXP-PANTEX-2007-0065 After 2003 Redesign				
Secretarial Office:	National Nuclear Security Ad	National Nuclear Security Administration				
Lab/Site/Org:	Pantex Plant	Pantex Plant				
Facility Name:	Pantex Plant					
Subject/Title:	Wire Disconnected From Solo	der Joint				
Date/Time Discovered:	05/16/2007 14:30 (CTZ)					
Date/Time Categorized:	05/17/2007 09:30 (CTZ)	05/17/2007 09:30 (CTZ)				
Report Type:	Notification					
Report Dates:	Notification	05/21/2007	12:02 (ETZ)			
	Initial Update					
	Latest Update					
	Final					
Significance Category:	3					
Reporting Criteria:	2C(2) - Failure to follow a prescribed hazardous energy control process (e.g., lockout/tagout) or a site condition that results in the unexpected discovery of an uncontrolled hazardous energy source (e.g., live electrical power circuit, steam					

	line, pressurized gas). This criterion does not include discoveries made by zero- energy checks and other precautionary investigations made before work is authorized to begin.
Cause Codes:	
ISM:	2) Analyze the Hazards
Subcontractor Involved:	No
Occurrence Description:	On May 16, 2007, at approximately 1430 hours, A BWXT Instrument Technician was performing an annual preventive maintenance (PM) activity on a steam oven in Building 12-19E. As part of the PM, the Instrument Technician is required to visually verify a setting on a timer located inside a control panel. As the technician opened the hinged control panel door to perform the visual observation, a small spark was noticed from inside the control panel. The spark was created when a 110-volt wire dislodged from a reset switch solder joint and made contact with the panel door. The panel door had moved less than two inches when the spark was observed. The technician immediately placed the system in a safe configuration by closing the door, de-energizing, and locking out the circuit. The technician then notified his supervisor and remained at the incident site to control the scene. BWXT Safety personnel and maintenance management were notified and responded to the scene to begin the investigation process.
Cause Description:	
Operating Conditions:	Operational
Activity Category:	Maintenance
Immediate Action(s):	Instrument Technician de-energized and locked out circuits feeding the steam oven control panel at Building 12-19E. A critique was conducted on May 17, 2007, and the event was categorized as 2C(2) S/C 3, Personnel Safety and Health, Hazardous Energy Control, a site condition that results in the unexpected discovery of an uncontrolled hazardous energy source.
FM Evaluation:	Corrective actions will be tracked through the Issues Management System on PER-2007-0554.
DOE Facility Representative Input:	
DOE Program Manager Input:	
Further Evaluation is Required:	Yes. Before Further Operation? No By Whom: Plant Maintenance Dept. By When:
Division or Project:	Maintenance Division
Plant Area:	Zone 12 North

System/Building/Equipment	12 10E		
System/Building/Equipment:			
Facility Function:	Balance of Plant - Infrastructure (Other Functions not specifically listed in this Category)		
Corrective Action:			
Lessons(s) Learned:			
HQ Keywords:	07DElectrical Systems - Electrical Wiring		
	12CEH Categories - Electrical Safety		
	14LQuality Assurance - None		
HQ Summary:	While performing annual preventive maintenance on a steam oven in Pantex Building 12-19E, an instrument technician opened a control panel door and noticed a spark inside the panel. The technician closed the door and de- energized and locked-out circuits to the panel. An investigation found that spark was created when a 110-volt wire dislodged from a reset switch solder joint and made contact with the panel door		
Similar OR Report Number:	1. None		
Facility Manager:	Name Dale Stapp		
	Phone (806) 477-3247		
	Title Plant Maintenance Department Manager		
Originator:	Name HALL, BEVERLY J		
0	Phone (806) 477-3222		
	Title		
HQ OC Notification:	DateTimePerson NotifiedOrganizationNANANANA		
Other Notifications:	Date Time Person Notified Organization		
	05/16/2007 14:50 (CTZ) Scott Kennedy BWXT		
	05/16/2007 14:50 (CTZ) Noel Williams PXSO		
Authorized Classifier(AC):	Don Gerber Date: 05/21/2007		
5)Report Number:	NAPS-BWXP-PANTEX-2007-0066 After 2003 Redesign		
Secretarial Office:	National Nuclear Security Administration		
Lab/Site/Org:	Pantex Plant		
Facility Name:	Pantex Plant		
Subject/Title:	Discovery of Electrical Wires in Building 16-12 Equipment Room Extending		
	Past the Open End of Flexible Conduit		
Date/Time Discovered:	05/16/2007 20:30 (CTZ)		
Date/Time Categorized:	05/17/2007 16:30 (CTZ)		
Report Type: Poport Dates:	Notification		
Report Dates:	Notification 05/21/2007 12:04 (ETZ)		
	Initial Update		
	Latest Update		

Significance Category:	3			
	2C(2) - Failure to follow a prescribed hazardous energy control process (e.g., lockout/tagout) or a site condition that results in the unexpected discovery of an uncontrolled hazardous energy source (e.g., live electrical power circuit, steam line, pressurized gas). This criterion does not include discoveries made by zero-energy checks and other precautionary investigations made before work is authorized to begin.			
Cause Codes:				
ISM:	3) Develop and Implement Hazard Controls			
Subcontractor Involved:	Yes Noresco			
Occurrence Description:	On May 16, 2007, at approximately 2030 hours, a Subcontractor employee was performing a work site survey when he noticed a flexible metal conduit with 3 wires extending past the open end of the conduit. Two of the three wires were covered on the ends with plastic wire nuts. The wire without the wire nut covering was a ground wire. All circuits in the area had been de-energized and locked out at the time of discovery. A BWXT Safety Representative and Plant Maintenance Department personnel responded to the area, developed an approved work order, and corrected the condition.			
	safety system as a result of this event.			
Cause Description:				
Operating Conditions:	Does Not Apply			
Activity Category:	Maintenance			
Immediate Action(s):	 Plant Maintenance Department personnel developed an approved work package to remove the wiring and flexible conduit to correct the condition. A critique was conducted on May 17, 2007, and the event was categorized as 2C(2) S/C 3, Personnel Safety and Health, Hazardous Energy Control, a site condition that results in the unexpected discovery of an uncontrolled hazardous energy source. 			
FM Evaluation:	Corrective actions will be tracked through the Issues Management System on PER-2007-0557.			
DOE Facility Representative Input:				
DOE Program Manager Input:				
	Yes. Before Further Operation? No By Whom: Plant Maintenance Dept. By When:			
Division or Project:	Maintenance Division			
Plant Area:	Zone 16			
System/Building/Equipment:	: 16-12 Upstairs Equipment Room			
Facility Function:	Balance of Plant - Infrastructure (Other Functions not specifically listed in this Category)			

Corrective Action:				
Lessons(s) Learned:				
HQ Keywords:	07DElectrical Systems - Electrical Wiring 12CEH Categories - Electrical Safety 14LQuality Assurance - None			
HQ Summary:	While performing a work site survey in Pantex Building 16-12, a worker discovered a flexible metal conduit with three wires extending past the open end of the conduit. All circuits in the area had been de-energized and locked-out at the time of discovery. Personnel from the plant maintenance department developed a work package to remove the wiring and flexible conduit.			
Similar OR Report Number:	1. None			
Facility Manager:	NameDale StappPhone(806) 477-3247TitlePlant Maintenance Department Manager			
Originator:	NameHALL, BEVERLY JPhone(806) 477-3222Title			
HQ OC Notification:	DateTimePerson NotifiedOrganizationNANANANA			
Other Notifications:	DateTimePerson NotifiedOrganization05/16/200723:05 (CTZ)Noel WilliamsPXSO05/16/200723:05 (CTZ)Scott KennedyBWXT05/16/200723:05 (CTZ)Bill MairsonBWXT			
Authorized Classifier(AC):	Don Gerber Date: 05/21/2007			
6)Report Number:	NAPS-BWXP-PANTEX-2007-0069 After 2003 Redesign			
Secretarial Office:	National Nuclear Security Administration			
Lab/Site/Org:	Pantex Plant			
Facility Name:	Pantex Plant			
Subject/Title:	Control Panel Door Found Unsecured			
Date/Time Discovered:	05/29/2007 16:45 (CTZ)			
Date/Time Categorized:	05/30/2007 14:06 (CTZ)			
Report Type:	Notification			
Report Dates:	Notification 05/31/2007 15:36 (ETZ)			
	Initial Update			
	Latest Update			
	Final			
Significance Catazarra				
Significance Category:	3 2C(2) Evilure to follow a prescribed bezerdous energy control process (a g			
Reporting Criteria:	2C(2) - Failure to follow a prescribed hazardous energy control process (e.g., lockout/tagout) or a site condition that results in the unexpected discovery of an uncontrolled hazardous energy source (e.g., live electrical power circuit, steam			

	line, pressurized gas). This criterion does not include discoveries made by zero- energy checks and other precautionary investigations made before work is authorized to begin.		
Cause Codes:			
ISM:	6) N/A (Not applicable to ISM Core Functions as determined by management review.)		
Subcontractor Involved:	No		
Occurrence Description:	On May 29, 2007, at approximately 1645 hours, Swing Shift Material Access Area (MAA) Electronic Technicians entered the facility and noticed a 480-volt control cabinet to a sand blast booth had been left unsecured. The disconnect was in the "OFF" position. The control panel was energized on the line side of a fuse block, which was shielded. There were no exposed bare conductors. The primary concern was the door being left unsecured. The design of the cabinet requires the door to be latched shut to provide protection for personnel if there is a catastrophic failure of electrical components mounted inside the cabinet.		
	a result of this event.		
Cause Description:			
Operating Conditions:	Operational with no special nuclear material or high explosives in the area.		
Activity Category: Immediate Action(s):	Normal Operations (other than Activities specifically listed in this Category) Swing Shift MAA Crafts personnel tested the control panel for voltage.		
	Swing Shift MAA Craft Supervisor secured the control cabinet. A critique was conducted on May 30, 2007, and the event was categorized as 2C(2) S/C 3, Personnel Safety and Health, Hazardous Energy Control, Failure to follow a prescribed hazardous energy control process.		
FM Evaluation:	Corrective actions will be tracked through the Issues Management System on PER-2007-0582.		
DOE Facility Representative Input:			
DOE Program Manager Input:			
Further Evaluation is Required:	Yes. Before Further Operation? Yes By Whom: Plant Maintenance By When: 07/13/2007		
Division or Project:	Maintenance Division		
Plant Area:	Zone 12 South MAA		
System/Building/Equipment:			
Facility Function:	Balance of Plant - Infrastructure (Other Functions not specifically listed in this Category)		
Corrective Action:			
Lessons(s) Learned:			
HQ Keywords:	08HOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Safety Compliance		

	12CEH Categories - Electrical Safety 14EQuality Assurance - Work Process			
HQ Summary:	Electronic technicians entering the Material Access Area noticed a 480-volt			
	control cabinet for a sand blast booth had been left unsecured. The cabinet was			
	secured and a critique was held.			
Similar OR Report Number:				
Facility Manager:	Name Dale Stapp			
	Phone (806) 477-3247			
	Title Plant Maintenance Department Manager			
Originator:	Name HALL, BEVERLY J			
	Phone (806) 477-3222			
	Title			
HQ OC Notification:				
nų oc Nouncauon:	Date Time Person Notified Organization			
	NA NA NA NA			
Other Notifications:	Date Time Person Notified Organizati	on		
	05/29/2007 17:11 (CTZ) John Thurston PXSO			
	05/29/2007 17:11 (CTZ) Jeff Yarbrough BWXT			
Authorized Classifier(AC):	Don Gerber Date: 05/31/2007			
× ,				
7)Report Number:	NE-IDBEA-TSD-2007-0001 After 2003 Redesign			
Secretarial Office:	Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology			
Lab/Site/Org:	Idaho National Laboratory			
Facility Name:	Treatment Storage and Disposal			
Subject/Title:	Unguarded Open Control Panel Exposing Electrical H	Iazard		
Date/Time Discovered:	05/23/2007 14:15 (MTZ)			
Date/Time Categorized:	05/23/2007 17:45 (MTZ)			
Report Type:	Update			
Report Dates:	Notification 05/29/2007	13:02 (ETZ)		
	Initial Update 05/29/2007	14:18 (ETZ)		
	Latest Update 05/29/2007	14:18 (ETZ)		
	Final			
Significance Category:	3			
Reporting Criteria:	2C(2) - Failure to follow a prescribed hazardous energy control process (e.g.,			
	lockout/tagout) or a site condition that results in the u	· ·		
	uncontrolled hazardous energy source (e.g., live electrical power circuit, line, pressurized gas). This criterion does not include discoveries made b			
	energy checks and other precautionary investigations made before work is			
	authorized to begin.			
Course Contact				
Cause Codes: ISM:	3) Develop and Implement Hazard Controls			

	4) Perform Work Within Controls		
Subcontractor Involved:	No		
Occurrence Description:	On May 23, 2007, the DOE-ID facility representatives for MFC identified an unguarded open control panel containing <120V energized electrical circuits. Maintenance was performing calibrations on Sodium Components Maintenance Shop (SCMS) alcohol level systems. The facility representatives approached the open control panel and found no one was in attendance and no barrier was in place. Shortly thereafter, maintenance personnel returned to the open control panel and closed the panel doors, eliminating the exposed energized electrical hazards. DOE-ID personnel questioned maintenance personnel about voltages present in the control panel. Maintenance workers indicated that 110-120 volts was present in the panel. Workers had been trained on the electrical hazards and were wearing the appropriate PPE for 120 volt circuits while working in the cabinet. The maintenance worker had left the work site to obtain assistance from a Health Physics Technician and failed to close the control panel doors.		
Cause Description:			
Operating Conditions:	Shutdown		
Activity Category:	Maintenance		
Immediate Action(s):	 Control panel doors were shut, calibration work was stopped and appropriate levels of BEA management were notified. Area was secured and barriers installed across the control panel doors to prevent access to the area and control panel A critique was held on May 23, 2007. 		
FM Evaluation:	5/29/07 Updated correct notification time for BEA management, wrong notification time submitted in error.		
DOE Facility Representative Input:			
DOE Program Manager Input:			
Further Evaluation is Required:	No		
Division or Project:	Nuclear Experimenter Facilites		
Plant Area:	SCMS		
System/Building/Equipment:			
Facility Function:	Irradiated Fissile Material Storage		
Corrective Action:			
Lessons(s) Learned:			
HQ Keywords:	01OConduct of Operations - Maintenance 08HOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Safety Compliance 12CEH Categories - Electrical Safety 14EQuality Assurance - Work Process		
HQ Summary:	While maintenance personnel were calibrating alcohol level systems at the INL Sodium Components Maintenance Shop, facility representatives found an open control panel with 110-120 volt energized circuits and no one in attendance, and no barrier in place. When the maintenance workers returned, the control panel doors were shut and calibration work was stopped. The area was secured and barriers were installed across the control panel doors to prevent access.		

Similar OR Report Number:	1 NE-IDB	EA-ECE-2006	5-0002		
	2. NE-ID-BEA-MFC-2006-0006				
Facility Manager:					
rucinty Munuger.	Name FLATTEN, LOREN R				
	Phone (208) 533-7680				
	Title OPE	RATIONS ST	AFF SPECIALI	ST - TSD FA	
Originator:	Name FLA	TTEN, LORE	N R		
	Phone (208) 533-7680				
		,	AFF SPECIALI	ST - TSD FA	
HQ OC Notification:	Date Time	Person Notifie	d Organization		
-	NA NA	NA	NA		
		INA .			1
Other Notifications:	Date	Time	Person Notified	Organization	
	05/23/2007	17:45 (MTZ)	R. Chase	MFC	
	05/23/2007	18:15 (MTZ)	J. Martin	DOE-ID	
Authorized Classifier(AC):					1
0)D			007 0007 1 84		
8)Report Number:		<u>NLE-ANLE-2</u>	<u>.007-0007</u> After	2003 Redesig	n
Secretarial Office:	Science				
Lab/Site/Org:	e	tional Laborat	•		
Facility Name:	-	tional Lab E	ast (BOP)		
Subject/Title:	Electrical No				
Date/Time Discovered:	05/02/2007	. ,			
Date/Time Categorized:	05/02/2007	13:31 (CTZ)			
Report Type:	Notification				
Report Dates:	Notification		05/04/2	2007	17:46 (ETZ)
	Initial Upda	te			
	Latest Upda	ite			
	Final				
Significance Category:	3				
Reporting Criteria:	10(3) - A near miss, where no barrier or only one barrier prevented an event from having a reportable consequence. One of the four significance categories should be assigned to the near miss, based on an evaluation of the potential risks and the corrective actions taken. (1 of 4 criteria - This is a SC 3 occurrence)				
Cause Codes:					
ISM:	3) Develop a	and Implement	Hazard Controls	S	
Subcontractor Involved:	No				
Occurrence Description:	On May 2, 2007, a child at the ANL Daycare Center holding a metal cymbal by a wooden handle contacted the interface between a plug and a GFCI outlet for an adjacent fish tank. The teacher heard a pop and observed resulting sparks from where the metal cymbal contacted a blade and the ground on the plug. The outlet short-circuited causing the circuit breaker to trip. A 9-1-1 call was				

	initiated and the child was evaluated by the Argonne Fire Department paramedics and was determined to be unaffected; the child did not receive an electrical shock as a result of this incident.
	An outlet box cover has been installed on this outlet and the facility is being inspected to identify additional installation opportunities for outlet box covers on any outlets that are within reach of children and that are regularly used (i.e., something plugged into them instead of only an outlet cover).
	The Site Office staff visited the Daycare Center to verify the installation of the tamper-resistant covers on all accessible receptacles. The ANL Daycare Center is accredited by the National Association for the Education of Young Children (NAEYC). A letter was sent out to all the parents, and the Laboratory will provide a presentation to the children of the daycare on electrical safety similar to what is provided to the children on fire protection.
Cause Description:	
Operating Conditions:	Normal Operations
Activity Category:	Normal Operations (other than Activities specifically listed in this Category)
Immediate Action(s):	A 9-1-1 call was initiated and the child was evaluated by the Argonne Fire Department paramedics and was determined to be unaffected; the child did not receive an electrical shock as a result of this incident. An outlet box cover has been installed on this outlet and the facility is being inspected to identify additional installation opportunities for outlet box covers on any outlets that are within reach of children and that are regularly used (i.e., something plugged into them instead of only an outlet cover).
FM Evaluation:	
DOE Facility Representative Input:	
DOE Program Manager Input:	
Further Evaluation is Required:	Yes. Before Further Operation? No By Whom: D. Whitaker-Sheppard By When:
Division or Project:	NA
Plant Area:	900 Area
System/Building/Equipment:	952 Daycare Center
Facility Function:	Balance of Plant - Infrastructure (Other Functions not specifically listed in this Category)
Corrective Action:	
Lessons(s) Learned:	
HQ Keywords:	07DElectrical Systems - Electrical Wiring 08HOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Safety Compliance 08JOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Near Miss (Electrical) 12KEH Categories - Near Miss (Could have been a serious injury or fatality) 13AManagement Concerns - HQ Significant (High-lighted for Management attention) 14EQuality Assurance - Work Process

HQ Summary:	A child at the ANL Daycare Center held a metal cymbal by a wooden handle and contacted the interface between a plug and a GFCI outlet for a fish tank. This caused a pop and sparks where the metal cymbal contacted a blade and the ground on the plug, and the circuit breaker tripped. Argonne Fire Department paramedics were summoned and determined that the child did not receive an electrical shock. An outlet box cover has been installed on this outlet and the facility is being inspected to identify additional outlets that are within the reach of children.		
Similar OR Report Number:			
Facility Manager:	NameWHITAKER-SHEPPARD, DANNYPhone(630) 252-1581TitleENVIR, SFTY, HEALTH & QUALITY ASSUR		
Originator:	NameCOLGLAZIER, ROBIN ALANPhone(630) 252-8747TitleSR REGULATORY COMPLIANCE SPECIALIST		
HQ OC Notification:	DateTimePerson NotifiedOrganizationNANANANA		
Other Notifications:	DateTimePerson NotifiedOrganization05/02/200712:54 (CTZ)S. MeredithEQO05/02/200712:58 (CTZ)R. ColglazierEQO05/02/200714:10 (CTZ)C. ZookDOE-ASO		
Authorized Classifier(AC):			
9)Report Number: Secretarial Office:	SCASO-ANLE-ANLEFMS-2007-0008 After 2003 Redesign Science		
Lab/Site/Org: Facility Name:	Argonne National Laboratory East Facility Management Services		
Subject/Title:	Subcontractor Initiates Work Beyond Authorization		

Initial UpdateLatest UpdateFinalSignificance Category:3Reporting Criteria:2C(2) - Failure to follow a prescribed hazardous energy control process (e.g.,
lockout/tagout) or a site condition that results in the unexpected discovery of an
uncontrolled hazardous energy source (e.g., live electrical power circuit, steam
line, pressurized gas). This criterion does not include discoveries made by zero-
energy checks and other precautionary investigations made before work is

05/14/2007

17:51 (ETZ)

05/10/2007 12:30 (CTZ)

05/10/2007 14:25 (CTZ)

Notification

Notification

Date/Time Discovered: Date/Time Categorized:

Report Type:

Report Dates:

	authorized to begin.	
	10(2) - An event, condition, or series of events that does not meet any of the other reporting criteria, but is determined by the Facility Manager or line management to be of safety significance or of concern to other facilities or activities in the DOE complex. One of the four significance categories should be assigned to the occurrence, based on an evaluation of the potential risks and the corrective actions taken. (1 of 4 criteria - This is a SC 3 occurrence)	
Cause Codes:		
ISM:	 Define the Scope of Work Analyze the Hazards Develop and Implement Hazard Controls Perform Work Within Controls 	
Subcontractor Involved:	Yes BBM Engineering	
Occurrence Description:	At approximately noon on May 9, 2007, a subcontractor was observed by a Facilities Management & Services (FMS) construction field representative (CFR) standing in front of a control panel for a large air handling unit (AHU) that was undergoing commissioning to supply conditioned air for a large high bay building, Building 366. An FMS engineer had arranged access to the site for the individual for the purpose of attending a coordination meeting to address the operating issues that arose with the AHU during the commissioning phase. When the engineer inquired about the status of the subcontractor, he was informed the individual had been granted access about 40 minutes earlier. The engineer met up with the individual at Building 366 where the issues were discussed. At this time, it was determined that the individual had reprogrammed the AHU at the control panel to operate on the economizer cycle only (cooling with outside air). The individual stated that he would bring in a factory-authorized representative early next week to complete the commissioning effort. The engineer left, assuming the individual would also. Shortly thereafter, the CFR observed the individual at the control panel mounted on the AHU located at ground level exterior to Building 366. The CFR inquired as to the on-going work as he had no knowledge that the individual would be performing work tasks. It was determined that a 24 volt touch key control pad mounted on the inner door of the enclosure had been replaced after the meeting concluded. The work was performed with a potential exposure to an energized 110 volt terminal strip about 24 to 30 inches away mounted in the rear of the enclosure behind numerous ribbon wire connectors. Further inquiry determined that the individual was working without having a current certication for attendance at the Contractor Safety Orientation training, without having a Work Entry Clearance form processed, without having properly controlled and designated the work area, without having properly controlled and design	
Cause Description:		
Operating Conditions:	Outdoors, dry, gravel covered ground, air handling unit functioning improperly	
Activity Category:	Startup	

Immediate Action(s):	 The CFR had the individual halt his work. The control panel door was closed. The CFR contacted his line management and the individual was placed under the contract discipline procedure resulting in a suspension from performing work tasks at the site for a period of 6 months. Notifications were made to the FMS division office and to Procurement with regards to the contract. The individual suspended is self-employed as BBM Engineering. The ORPS designee was notified verbally late in the afternoon of May 9 and made arrangements to view the AHU and control panel during the late morning of May 10. Pictures and a description of the incident were provided to EQO following notification to FMS division management of the potential Occurrence Report. 			
FM Evaluation:	The subcontractor proceeded to conduct work tasks beyond his authorization. A questioning attitude by an observant FMS CFR disclosed the event. Even though the impact of of not getting the unit functional for the FMS customers in Building 366 looms in the future as the weather continues to warm up, the correct action was taken in this instance.			
DOE Facility Representative Input:				
DOE Program Manager				
Input:				
Further Evaluation is Required:	Yes. Before Further Operation? No By Whom: FMS-Engineering By When:			
Division or Project:	Facilities Management & Services Division			
Plant Area:	360 Area			
System/Building/Equipment:	Air Conditioning/366/Air Handling Unit			
Facility Function:	Balance of Plant - Infrastructure (Other Functions not specifically listed in this Category)			
Corrective Action:				
Lessons(s) Learned:				
HQ Keywords:	 01AConduct of Operations - Conduct of Operations (miscellaneous) 01EConduct of Operations - Operations Procedures 01MConduct of Operations - Inadequate Job Planning (Electrical) 01QConduct of Operations - Personnel error 01RConduct of Operations - Management issues 08HOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Safety Compliance 11GOther - Subcontractor 12CEH Categories - Electrical Safety 13AManagement Concerns - HQ Significant (High-lighted for Management attention) 14EQuality Assurance - Work Process 			
HQ Summary:	A subcontractor had been granted site access to attend a meeting to address the operating issues that arose with the air handling units (AHU) during the commissioning phase. While on site, the subcontractor performed unauthorized work on two AHUs, and did not follow the required work controls. Upon			

	discovery, the construction field representative halted the work and his line management took disciplinary action.				
Similar OR Report Number:					
Facility Manager:	Name Stine, Gail Y.				
	Phone (630) 252-8930				
	Title Director, Facilities Management & Services Div.				
Originator:	Name Ridenour, Mary J				
	Phone (630) 252-6786				
	Title ORPS COORDINATOR				
HQ OC Notification:	Date Time Person Notified Organization				
	NA NA NA NA				
Other Notifications:	Date Time Person Notified Organi	zation			
	05/10/2007 12:44 (CTZ) G. Y. Stine ANL-	FMS			
	05/10/2007 14:20 (CTZ) M. J. Ridenour ANL-	EQO			
	05/10/2007 14:45 (CTZ) Eric Turnquest ASO-	DOE			

Authorized Classifier(AC):

10)Report Number:	SCASO-GOCH-DOEARGO	<u> DNNE-2007-0001</u> After	2003 Redesign
Secretarial Office:	Science		
Lab/Site/Org:	Argonne National Laboratory East		
Facility Name:	DOE Argonne		
Subject/Title:	DOE-CH Electrical Near Miss		
Date/Time Discovered:	05/17/2007 10:00 (CTZ)		
Date/Time Categorized:	05/17/2007 11:45 (CTZ)		
Report Type:	Notification		
Report Dates:	Notification	05/21/2007	23:24 (ETZ)
	Initial Update		
	Latest Update		
	Final		
Significance Category:	3		
Reporting Criteria:	10(3) - A near miss, where no barrier or only one barrier prevented an event from having a reportable consequence. One of the four significance categories should be assigned to the near miss, based on an evaluation of the potential risks and the corrective actions taken. (1 of 4 criteria - This is a SC 3 occurrence)		
Cause Codes:			
ISM:			
Subcontractor Involved:	No		
Occurrence Description:	On May 16, 2007, at approxime measurements, in Cubicle 370 wide 25 foot long tape measure) in ANL Building 201, u	using a metal cased 1 inch

	lock which caused the measuring tape to recoil, at which time the lip on the end of the measuring tape snagged on the edge of the surface mounted receptacle box closest to the southeast corner of the cubicle. Soon thereafter sparking was noticed at the receptacle. This 110 volt 20 amp duplex outlet was being used to
	power a laser printer and a facsimile machine.
	The CH employee notified CH Safety and Technical Services the next day and was sent to ANL Medical Department for a precautionary examination and released.
Cause Description:	
Operating Conditions:	normal
Activity Category:	Normal Operations (other than Activities specifically listed in this Category)
Immediate Action(s):	The employee was sent to the ANL Medical Department for examination ANL Maintenance was called to reset the breaker and arrange for replacement of the damaged duplex receptacle; ANL Maintenance posted an out-of-service tag over the duplex receptacle; and the CH Cyber Helpdesk replaced the damaged power cord for the laser printer.
FM Evaluation:	
DOE Facility Representative Input:	
DOE Program Manager Input:	
Further Evaluation is Required:	Yes. Before Further Operation? No By Whom: Karl Moro By When:
Division or Project:	SC-CH Office of Management Analytical and Administ
Plant Area:	200
System/Building/Equipment:	Bldg. 201/Cubicle 370
Facility Function:	Balance of Plant - Infrastructure (Other Functions not specifically listed in this Category)
Corrective Action:	
Lessons(s) Learned:	
HQ Keywords:	 01AConduct of Operations - Conduct of Operations (miscellaneous) 01QConduct of Operations - Personnel error 07DElectrical Systems - Electrical Wiring 08JOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Near Miss (Electrical) 12KEH Categories - Near Miss (Could have been a serious injury or fatality) 13AManagement Concerns - HQ Significant (High-lighted for Management attention) 14EQuality Assurance - Work Process
HQ Summary:	While an employee was taking measurements in ANL Building 201, the tip of a metal-cased tape measure snagged a surface-mounted 110 volt receptacle box and this caused sparking. The employee notified Safety and Technical Services the next day and was sent to ANL Medical Department for a precautionary examination and released. ANL maintenance personnel posted an out-of-service tag over the damaged receptacle, arranged for its replacement, and reset the

	breaker.					
-	1. SCASO-ANLE-ANLE-2007-0007					
Facility Manager:	Name MORO, KARL G					
	Phone (63	0) 252-2065				
	Title PE	RSONNEL PR	OTECTI	ON TEA	AM LDR	
Originator:	Name ME	EREDITH, STU	JART G			
	Phone (63	0) 252-6312				
	Title PA	AA COORDIN	ATOR			
HQ OC Notification:	Date Time	Person Notifi	ed Organ	ization		
	NA NA			JA		
Other Notifications:	Date	Time	Person N	Notified	Organizatio	on
		7 12:40 (CTZ)	Creig		ASO-DOI	
Authorized Classifier(AC):	1				1	
11)Report Number:	SCBHSC	-BNL-BNL-20	07-0008	After 2	003 Redesi	gn
Secretarial Office:	Science	Science				
Lab/Site/Org:	Brookhaven National Laboratory					
Facility Name:	Brookhave	n National Lab	oratory (I	BOP)		
Subject/Title:	Ungrounded Neutral Discovered in wye connected output of 13.8kV/208V Dry Type Transformer					
Date/Time Discovered:	05/15/2007 13:00 (ETZ)					
Date/Time Categorized:	05/15/2007	05/15/2007 13:30 (ETZ)				
Report Type:	Notification/Final					
Report Dates:	Notificatio	n		05/17/2	2007	17:13 (ETZ)
	Initial Upo			05/17/2	2007	17:13 (ETZ)
	Latest Up			05/17/2	2007	17:13 (ETZ)
	Final			05/17/2		17:13 (ETZ)
Significance Category:	4					- (-/
Reporting Criteria:		event conditio	n or seri	es of eve	ents that do	es not meet any of the
	10(2) - An event, condition, or series of events that does not meet any of the other reporting criteria, but is determined by the Facility Manager or line management to be of safety significance or of concern to other facilities or extinities in the DOF second concernation of the formation of t			ty Manager or line to other facilities or		
	activities in the DOE complex. One of the four significance categories sho assigned to the occurrence, based on an evaluation of the potential risks an corrective actions taken. (1 of 4 criteria - This is a SC 4 occurrence)				he potential risks and the	
	A1B4C02 - Design/Engineering Problem; Design Verification / Installation Verification LTA; Testing of design/installation LTA					
	3) Develop and Implement Hazard Controls5) Provide Feedback and Continuous Improvement					
	Yes Roppelt Ele	ectric				

Occurrence Description:	On April 17, 2007, at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL), electricians discovered an abnormal electrical condition while installing receptacles and associated wiring in Building 703 West Wing, Lab W6. Further investigation by an electrical engineer concluded that a laboratory furnace ac power supply circuit was grounded on "A" phase. In addition, the supply circuit had an ungrounded neutral. There was no electrical shock or injury to personnel. Plant Engineering safety personnel were notified, and the BNL Electrical Safety Officer performed an Electrical Severity review of the site condition. The review conclusion was calculated utilizing the Energy Facilities Contractors Group (EFCOG) Electrical Severity Measurement tool that determined the potential severity of the issue. The result was presented to Plant Engineering on May 15, 2007. The conditions have been corrected.		
Cause Description:	A field verification of the bonding of the transformer did not occur after installation. The furnace ac power wiring was probably damaged during the transportation process from the researchers' Michigan Laboratory to Brookhaven National Laboratory.		
Operating Conditions:	Normal		
Activity Category:	Maintenance		
Immediate Action(s):	The fault conditions were corrected immediately. The phase to ground fault in the furnace supply was cleared and the wye connected transformer output neutral was bonded at the secondary side of the transformer.		
FM Evaluation:			
DOE Facility Representative Input:			
DOE Program Manager Input:			
Further Evaluation is Required:	No		
Division or Project:	Plant Engineering and Engineering and Construction		
Plant Area:	B-703 West Wing Labs		
	13.8kV/208V Dry type transformer for Building 703 West Wing		
Facility Function:	Balance-of-Plant - Site/outside utilities		
Corrective Action 01:	Target Completion Date: 08/03/2007 Actual Completion Date:		
	Revise E&CS-303 "Construction Inspector" procedure to require inspection and testing of transformers and to record the test results in the construction job file.		
Lessons(s) Learned:	In WYE secondary electrical distribution schemes a grounded neutral is required to provide an appropriate ground path for personnel and over-current protection. Workers involved in transformer and distribution panel installations must ensure that the system is configured as designed.		
HQ Keywords:	07DElectrical Systems - Electrical Wiring 08HOSHA Reportable/Industrial Hygiene - Safety Compliance		

	 11GOther - Subcontractor 12CEH Categories - Electrical Safety 14EQuality Assurance - Work Process 14HQuality Assurance - Inspection and Acceptance Testing 		
HQ Summary:	Electricians discovered an abnormal electrical condition while installing receptacles and associated wiring in Building 703 West Wing, Lab W6. Further investigation by an electrical engineer concluded that a laboratory furnace ac power supply circuit was grounded on "A" phase. In addition, the supply circuit had an ungrounded neutral. There was no electrical shock or injury to personnel. The conditions have been corrected.		
Similar OR Report Number:			
Facility Manager:	Name MURPHY, EDWARD T		
	Phone (631) 344-3466		
	Title DIVISION MANAGER		
Originator:	Name SIERRA, EDWARD A		
	Phone (631) 344-4080		
	Title LLL/ORPS COORDINATOR		
HQ OC Notification:	Date Time Person Notified Organization		
	NA NA NA		
Other Notifications:	Date Time Person Notified Organization		
	05/15/2007 13:30 (ETZ) J. Durnan BNL LESC		
Authorized Classifier(AC):			

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